Joint Warfighting Center

Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations

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MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER

This Handbook has undergone a major revision to reflect experiences gained in recent peace operations and data provided in current joint doctrine. It still is designed for senior commanders designated or about to be named as joint task force commanders for peace operations. It is meant to be a resource tool for the commander and senior staff, and is most useful when supplemented by the Peace Operations Database maintained as part of the Joint Electronic Library. Though consistent with joint and Service doctrine, it is not a doctrinal publication. Joint Publication 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping,” contains joint doctrine for peace operations.

As we have witnessed over the past decade, there has been an ever increasing demand for the Armed Forces of the United States to participate in various peace operations. From Somalia to Bosnia, US forces have been in the forefront in providing military assistance where needed. Considering the instability and uncertainty in many countries throughout the world, it is paramount that US forces remain ready for future peace operations. The “Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations” is one of many tools that potential joint task force commanders can use to become more familiar with the many facets of peace operations. We are indebted to the experienced joint task force commanders, subject matter experts, and the many others who contributed so greatly to this Handbook. They identified the enduring peace operations themes deemed to be invaluable to prospective joint task force commanders.

Corrections or suggestions for improvement of this Handbook are welcome. They should be sent to The Joint Warfighting Center, Building 96 Fenwick Road, Ft. Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000. The DSN telephone is 680-6550, commercial (757) 726-6550, and FAX extension -6552.

HAL M. HORNBURG
Major General, USAF
Commander
SITUATION:

“The refugee crisis in eastern Zaire threatened to reach disastrous proportions today, as one camp ballooned to 400,000 people and aid workers scrambled to deal with dwindling food and supplies for the 1.1 million refugees in the region. ... The refugees are mainly members of the Hutu ethnic group who fled Rwanda in the summer of 1994, fearing revenge killings by ethnic Tutsis, the principal target of a Hutu-led Rwandan government campaign of tribal slaughter. The Hutus fled into Zaire after a Tutsi rebel force crushed the Hutu military and militias who led the campaign of genocide. In recent days, the refugee population in eastern Zaire has been rattled by fighting between Zairian Tutsis and that country’s military. ... The fighting that has shaken the region continued to spread today, as Zairian soldiers and Rwandan troops exchanged gunfire ... Earlier this week, the [Zairian] government declared a state of emergency in that region.”

Stephen Buckley
Washington Post

1. General

a. The United States conducts modern peace operations to prevent, contain, or resolve regional conflicts that may pose threats to national interests. The facts upon which strategic decisions and agreements with involved parties are based may greatly differ from the realities the operational and tactical level commanders may find once they are deployed. Additionally, the operations these commanders are tasked to perform may result from long-term, maturing crises, such as one in which a peacekeeping operation is needed. Conversely, the operation may seek to relieve a humanitarian crisis, which can be a short notice rapid reaction effort. Finally, the commanders may find themselves faced with a combination of the two, creating a “complex contingency.” As a joint task force commander, you must grasp the nature of the operating environment in order to successfully complete the mission.

b. Military Operations in the 1990’s

“My experience in Haiti reaffirmed my belief that combat trained soldiers, given a focused objective, time and resources to prepare, and led by adaptive and mentally agile leaders at all levels, will perform superbly as peacekeepers. The mission in Haiti clearly demonstrated that if the right conditions are created and sustained by the military component, and the military component is able to synchronize its actions with the international, diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian components—success is achievable. Our experience in Haiti has reinforced my belief that preparing for war must be the priority for any Army. The key is to understand the complexities of the peace operation environment you are facing and then adapt your warfighting skill to meet them.”

Lieutenant General J. W. Kinzer, USA
Force Commander, United Nations Mission in Haiti
• As the 21st century approaches, the nature of conflict continues to change from that of interstate war to that of intrastate conflicts. US military traditional training has taught leaders about the impact that the mission, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available have on operations. Today, successful military operations also include consideration of other factors, as depicted below, and their impact on those operations.

- Failed state environments (e.g., Somalia and Rwanda).
- Political considerations.
- Nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and international organizations (IO).
- Media representatives.
- Increasing amounts of urbanized areas.
- Civilians (resident within the joint operations area (JOA), refugees, displaced persons).

2. Complex Contingencies

a. A complex contingency occurs whenever one kind of a peace operation takes place in conjunction with a humanitarian assistance operation. The most likely example of a complex contingency is one in which the US force would provide security for humanitarian assistance in addition to conducting a peace operation.

b. It is probable that the majority of future peace operations will be part of complex contingencies. Although the reminder of this Handbook will key on the term “peace operations,” it is important that you remember that your involvement in future peace operations may be better defined as complex contingencies. Figure 1 highlights some of the characteristics of complex contingencies.

c. Situation Assessment for Complex Contingencies. Assessing the situation is one of the most critical steps you must accomplish. In assessing the situation, you should consider the role each of the following factors plays:

- General Situation. Examine the following:
  - General nature of the conflict, duration, and major participants.
  - Causes, issues at stake, and scope of the conflict.
  - Forces used and relative power.
  - Activities of outside actors both friendly and hostile and their interests in the crisis.

- Political Situation. Understand the following:
  - Nation’s internal political situation, nature of the host government, and key centers of power.
  - Ruling party, opposition parties, and points of internal political conflict (wealth, territory, resources, power, ethnic identity, religion, or ideology).
  - Intensity of grievances, level of political mobilization and polarization, status of democratization, and degree of ethnic integration and accommodation.
  - Level of corruption and government responsiveness to recent reform initiatives. You also must understand which NGO, PVO, and IO
representatives will be working with you.

• **Military Situation.** Know the following:
  
  • Military, paramilitary, and militia factions operating in the region.
  
  • Size of the force, equipment and capabilities, degree of military discipline and cohesion within each warring faction.
  
  • Source and quantity of weapons supplies, military balance, operational military objectives of the factions, if any.
  
  • Types of force employed, scope of the violence, killing and destruction, and degree of political control over the military.

• **Public Security and Law and Order Situation.** Understand the following:
  
  • Types of police forces, scale of law and order, degree of political control of police forces.
  
  • Cultural aspects of the legal system.
  
  • Amount of corruption, nature and scope of police violence, nature of criminal activity, and quality of the legal system.
  
  • Nature of human rights practices and treatment of citizens.

• **Humanitarian Situation.** Determine the following:
  
  • Recent population movements, location and numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons.
  
  • Requirements for water, food, sanitation, housing, medical services, heating supplies, or other humanitarian needs.
• Threats of ethnic violence and genocide.

• Current and projected activities of the international relief community in the region.

**Economic Situation.** Be aware of the following:

• State of the economy, unemployment, distribution of wealth, types of natural resources, principle agricultural commodities.

• Level and nature of production and trade, effect of sanctions (if appropriate).

• Level of international investment, degree of graft and corruption in licensing, and quality and effectiveness of government economic policy.

**Infrastructure.** Examine the following:

• Potential effects of climate and terrain on the operation.

• Condition of the country’s available infrastructure such as airports, roads, communications, utilities, and the need for additional assets or facilities.

**International Organizations.** Know the following:

• What United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces, relief operations, or other organizations are operating in the region.

• Activities of private business interests in the area.

**Host-Government Cooperation.** Determine the level of cooperation by the host-government with anticipated operations. Assess what it would take to gain host nation (HN) cooperation.

**Regional Cooperation.** Identify the following:

• Key regional actors, major powers, regional organizations, international actors, and other participants and their interests.

• Regional alignments—assess the unity of purpose regarding the operation and be aware of the level of consensus within the UN Security Council.

### 3. Major Considerations of the Operating Environment

Because political factors often dominate an operation, you should fully understand the following considerations:

a. **Authorizing Body.** What organization developed the instruments? What is the relationship between it and the United States?

b. **Mandate, Accords, and/or Settlement Instrument.** Does this contain any military requirement that is unsuitable or unrealistic for your joint task force’s (JTF) capabilities? Is it being used to assist in developing your mission statement? What other implied missions (e.g., support for elections, support to local police activities) are included?

c. **Belligerent Representation.** Were the belligerent parties represented in the development of these instruments? What is their level of consent to the process?

d. **Expectations for Compliance.** Does consent exist? Are the former belligerent parties willing to comply with the process? At all levels of the operation—strategic, operational, and tactical?

e. **Rules of Engagement.** What modifications to CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, with Change 1,” must be made to suit the needs of
the instrument’s implementation? Are there any unique training requirements needed to support these modifications?

f. **Terms of Reference (TOR).** If the JTF includes other nations’ military forces, what are the TOR for each force and the limits for using it?

g. **Use of Force.** What have been the consequences of the authorized use of force? Were nonlethal means been considered? What consequences are foreseen with the use of nonlethal force? Are there any special training requirements?

h. **Exit Strategy.** Does an exit strategy exist? Is it being updated as necessary? Is it realistic? What transition actions need to occur?

4. **Summary**

“Post-Cold War realities present a wide array of challenges to senior military leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States. These challenges range from executing small-scale contingencies on one end of the spectrum to preparing for and fighting major regional campaigns at the other end. The US military has proven itself time and again ready to fight and win the Nation’s wars. It must now continue this record of excellence in preparing for the numerous challenges grouped under the category of peace operations.”

Mr. Len Hawley Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense For Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance

a. This preface has attempted to describe the many types of variables that will define and effect your operating environment. Your thorough understanding of the operating environment is key to the development of the mission statement, concept of operations, and subsequent tasks to the JTF’s components. This understanding also will play a major role in the development of the exit strategy, a critical part of your operation plan (OPLAN), operation order (OPORD), or campaign plan.

b. From what has been described, a JTF could be established to perform a multitude of tasks. Are you prepared to become the commander of that JTF in what might be a multifaceted operation in an ever-changing environment?
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in all conflicts, we now have a choice. It is also true that if we move early in dealing with these conflicts, and if we have an effective method for carrying out international peace enforcement, especially in a preventative way, we have a new tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult, potentially intractable situations that could well offset our national interests and our future.”

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering
Remarks to a National Defense University Conference

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an overview of the many responsibilities and challenges facing a commander, joint task force embarking on a peace operation
• Discusses mission considerations as they relate to peace operations
• Explains the importance of civil-military relations
• Discusses joint task force organization, staffing, and command responsibilities
• Provides a synopsis of issues and questions concerning how the joint task force transitions to the United Nations, regional organizations, another military force, or a civilian organization
• Discusses logistics, intelligence, and legal support
• Highlights the importance of force protection
• Covers training considerations
• Discusses refugee, displaced person, or migrant camp operations

Chapter I—Mission

Each peace operation is unique—many will use the Charter of the United Nations as buttressing rationale.

The United States participation in peace operations may be as part of a United Nations (UN)-sponsored activity, a regional organization, in cooperation with other countries, or a unilateral effort. In any case, these operations have unique reasons for our participation and equally unique characteristics that define them. UN-sponsored peace activities use the Charter of the United Nations as background for conducting peace operations. Although the Charter does not specifically cover peace
KEY TERMS

**Peace Operations:** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

**Peacekeeping:** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

**Peace Enforcement:** Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

**Peace Building:** Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**End State:** What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power.

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**United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.**

To better direct and control UN peacekeeping operations, the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) was established. As the commander of a JTF, you will be coordinating with this department in the event you are involved in a UN peacekeeping operation. Within the DPKO, a Situation Centre was formed to provide situation monitoring and exchange of information services between the UN HQ in New York and UN field missions worldwide. The Situation Centre is staffed 24 hours per day.

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**Accurate and timely mission analysis is essential—consider leading the assessment team.**

The assessment team can be the bridge between difficult-to-decipher mission orders and the actual implementation of a peace operation—but it will need senior leadership and perspective to be effective. The assessment team’s composition and later retention on your staff will aid in the transition from planning to deployment and the actual commencement of your operation.
Executive Summary

The critical variables of peace operations are the level of consent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality. These variables are not constant and may individually or collectively shift over the course of an operation. Success in peace operations often hinges on the ability to exercise situational dominance with respect to the variables; failure is often the result of losing control of one or more of them.

The end state may be a moving target, one that needs continuous refinement throughout your operation. You must work toward a clearly understood, agreed upon, and measurable mission end state. You may have the opportunity to contribute to the development and wording of the end state during the mission analysis phase.

The rules of engagement (ROE) are the means which the NCA, through the JCS and the combatant commander, provide guidance. Review the JCS Standing ROE (SROE) as a point of departure. They are also the principal means for you to express “commander’s intent.” They must always emphasize the right of self-defense.

Figure EX-1. Types of UN Operations

**TYPES OF UN OPERATIONS**

"AUTHORIZED" -- Operations for which the UN sanctions military intervention with the lead role assigned to a nation (e.g., DESERT STORM, Somalia).

"DIRECTED" -- Operations conducted under UN auspices with a military force under UN control (e.g., blue-helmeted force; Cyprus, Cambodia).

**Peace operations are conducted in a dynamic environment.**

**It is critical that you have a definable end state.**

**Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide the guidance and basis for action—keep them clear and current.**
Executive Summary

**Become personally involved in ROE development—ensure they are adjusted in a timely manner to fit your situation.**

ROE may remain constant throughout your operation or more likely they may need to be changed or refined. The JCS-issued SROE contain the basics. They apply to all commanders through the chain of command and remain in effect until specifically modified or superseded. They may be modified by the combatant commands and you may request supplemental measures as necessary. These SROE define the inherent right of self-defense in terms of unit and national self-defense. You must advise the combatant commander when the ROE need adjustment.

**Integrate multinational forces—balance strengths and national agendas.**

You may command a force of widely varying capabilities. You must work to employ multinational forces where they can contribute the most toward mission success. You also will need to understand that they may have subtly different agendas, although completely rational for their purposes.

**Recognize nontraditional considerations—where possible integrate with other organizations and operations.**

Be aware that political issues and decisions beyond your authority may have a major impact on your peace operation. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and international organizations will be on scene, pursuing their own missions. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), United States Agency for International Development, probably will be represented in-country by a special Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). In any case, OFDA (and its representative DART) is a professionally run organization that can help you. It is in the best interest of your mission to integrate these organizations or at a minimum be aware of their activities.

**Chapter II—Civil-Military Relations**

**Civil-military relations. In peace operations, interagency coordination may be your top priority.**

This, in part, is due to the increased involvement of JTFs in civil activity both in the United States and abroad. This civil activity requires the skills and resources of many organizations (e.g., United States Government agencies, NGO, PVO, and international and regional organizations).

By understanding the interagency process, you will be better able to appreciate how the skills and resources of the above can assist in mission accomplishment. Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they encourage the development of the affected nation’s materiel and human resources.
Executive Summary

Nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations are a fact of life—the civil-military operations center (CMOC) has worked well integrating and capitalizing on differing expertise and capabilities.

CMOC. You must be able to work with all organizations and groups to accomplish your mission. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of these elements.

Most NGO and PVO have legitimate agendas but operate differently than the military. Learn what they are about; they have expertise and capabilities you may need. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) has proven extremely useful in getting all participants to know each other, their roles and capabilities.

The CMOC has been effectively employed as a means to coordinate civil and military operations. Its structure is dependent on the mission and the requirements for civil-military operations in the affected country. As the commander, you are the driving influence behind this endeavor.

Chapter III—Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing

As a commander, joint task force, you have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.

You may organize the joint task force (JTF) headquarters as necessary to carry out all duties and responsibilities.

The intent is to meet your needs while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations. The manner in which you organize the forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. You organize forces to accomplish the mission based on your vision and concept of operations.

The options that may be used to form a joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ) are use of a standing JTF HQ, augment a core Service component HQ, or form an ad hoc HQ from various contributors. The nucleus JTF staff normally is formed from an existing Service component HQ, usually not below the level of Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, Numbered Navy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force. When fully formed, the JTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key
of responsibility from each Service or functional component or subordinate task force having significant forces assigned to the command.

You will make the final decision on the composition of the JTF HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and bureaus.

The organizational structure of the force will depend on the mission to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength of the component elements of the forces assigned and attached, and the phasing of the contemplated operations.

You must identify the requirements for additional forces or personnel to higher HQ.

As the commander, you make recommendations on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for the accomplishment of assigned missions.

Personal and special Staff of the Commander.

Your personal and special staff performs duties as prescribed and handles special matters over which you wish to exercise close control. This staff may include the political advisor, public affairs officer, legal officer, surgeon, inspector general, provost marshal, comptroller, chaplain, and others as directed.

Liaison personnel should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, between the JTF HQ and component and subordinate task force commands, between adjacent units, and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and the JTF HQ.

You must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ.

You must identify the requirement for liaison personnel and request them at the earliest opportunity.

Special operations forces are very valuable assets to the JTF.

Civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel and units are force multipliers and should become an integral part of mission planning and execution. CA and PSYOP may become the centerpiece of your operation and become a much more critical part of your daily responsibilities.
Chapter IV—Joint Task Force Command Responsibilities

“One of the JTF Commander’s biggest challenges will be to determine just who are the policy makers and power brokers.”

Brigadier General E. Bedard, USMC
President, Marine Corps University

**Chain of command.**

As a Commander, JTF (CJTF) you will be the key to success in maintaining impartiality and building consensus among widely diverse players. Encouraging and obtaining unity of effort at the military, political, and cultural level will be a major challenge for you. Depending on the type of peace operation (UN multinational, US-led multinational, or unilateral) you will have to deal with differing command arrangements. In any case, it is imperative you understand how National Command Authorities decisions flow and appreciate that the current political process will be a major factor in your operations.

**Communications will not be easy—plan on the worst.**

Your ability to effectively communicate with your own staff, involved multinational partners, other national and international players, and host nation (HN) representatives will be one of the keys to success.

It is critical that military/security, humanitarian/economic, and political/diplomatic activities are constantly coordinated. Each of these three “legs” shown in Figure EX-2 must remain steady.

![Figure EX-2. The JTF Commander’s Stool](image-url)
### Executive Summary

**Negotiation and mediation may be necessary to settle disputes.**

Though not a primary duty, there will be times when, as the senior military officer, you may be required to arrange, participate or lead negotiations and/or mediation. Your background in problem identification and resolution will be useful in settling widely varying disputes. A whole range of topics, from bartering for services to establishing relationships, may require your involvement. Try to keep sight of the “big picture” from the US viewpoint as well as that of the parties in conflict. Considering other alternatives, although not initially appealing to all parties, may be helpful.

**Joint Commissions.**

Joint commissions have been a useful structure and process in the implementation of the peace settlement. They are one aspect of a number of actions which fundamentally are about political decisions that are carried out along political, military, and humanitarian lines.

**Responsibilities to the local population.**

Your legal obligations in peace operations are much more limited than during armed conflict. You should determine in advance what those limits are and promulgate the rules in a concise format. Clear guidance on humanitarian and civil action projects, as well as medical treatment for local nationals, should be issued early in the operation.

### CHAPTER V—Transition

**Transition planning is required to successfully achieve the desired end state.**

Mission analysis and operational planning should include the significant issues, major events, and work required for the transition. Anticipating the desired end state and having an understanding of when you have reached it will assist transition planning.

### CHAPTER VI—Logistics Support

**Organization and authority.**

The combatant commander may delegate directive authority for logistics to you within the joint operations area (JOA). This authority does not relieve the Service components of their responsibility for support or coordination. The combatant commander’s Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) may prove especially helpful in providing key logistics support and functions.
Executive Summary

**Operations and logistics are inseparable—neither can be more important than the other.**

The J-4 will support you functionally but you set the tone for unity of effort through the entire operation. The J-4 will coordinate requirements, funding, contracting, movement control, apportionment and allocation, logistics discipline, and logistics support for NGO and PVO.

**Transportation is the “linchpin” of your operation.**

Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to deployment and redeployment of the JTF. Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment stage and continually updated as operations progress. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) will provide the critical coordination of transportation assets.

**The Director of Mobility Forces.**

Nominated by USTRANSCOM, the director mobility force (DIRMOBFOR) will deploy with functional experts to support, plan, monitor, and execute the air mobility mission. Once established, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the area of responsibility or JOA.

**Logistics Planning.**

Logistics for peace operations is complex and requires early involvement of your logistics staff in the overall planning to ensure success. You should identify those logistics principles that have primacy in your operations. Environmental planning and disposal operations become important elements of your logistics plans. Logistics plans should be integrated with component commands, as well as NGO, PVO, and outside agencies involved in the operations in order to obtain a complete logistics picture.

**Expect to be in the lead for providing support to a multinational effort.**

Some participating countries may be unable to do much more than contribute manpower. In those cases, the United States often becomes the chief supporter of those nations’ efforts. You must clarify guidance, funding, and support early to determine if the desire and capability to support others is present. The UN’s intentions are good, but often they are woefully late.

**Contracting may be required to provide support during peace operations.**

Contracting can be an effective force multiplier. The civilian augmentation program can provide a myriad of services to support you mission. The development of a comprehensive contracting support plan which outlines both procedures and policies should become part of your supporting logistics plans.

**Maximize use of host-nation support and services.**

Using HN services and support to the maximum extent possible can lessen the number of military personnel required (a troop ceiling may be a factor) and support subsequent efforts to reestablish national infrastructure.
Logistics Boards, Offices, and Centers are your keys to timely logistics support. The establishment of logistics Boards, Offices, and Centers are critical to effective coordination of the JTF logistics effort. Establishment of each should be evaluated based on the projected operations.

CHAPTER VII—Intelligence Responsibilities

There are no standard templates for structuring support to peace operations. In peace operations, intelligence systems must be tailored to satisfy specific mission requirements. The JTF intelligence resources should be flexibly structured to support potentially changing requirements.

Human intelligence will be critical to your operation. Encourage your J-2 to cultivate widely diverse sources. Understanding the affected country and its people through cultural and anthropological studies can provide you critical information. Establishing ties with the local populace will pay off in terms of information about what the public knows and thinks.

CHAPTER VIII—Public Affairs and Media

The media can help—you will not be able to operate outside their scrutiny. Get out front, fill the vacuum with useful information, and the media will more than likely end up as an ally instead of an adversary. Your public affairs officer and the Joint Information Bureau will be force multipliers and should work closely with you and the operations planning staff.

“CNN [coverage] had great implications. It allowed us to focus on what had to be done by portraying the situations and conditions as they were.”

Lieutenant General R. Johnston, United States Marine Corps
Commander, Joint Task Force
Unified Task Force Somalia

Chapter IX—Legal Responsibilities

Legal support is critical in peace operations. Your operational lawyer should be immediately available to advise. A good legal advisor is a force multiplier and will assist in accomplishing your mission in a lawful manner. Your advisor is the best person to draft a general order to establish basic
Executive Summary

Existing international agreements will impact your mission.

Your legal personnel must work with psychological operations and civil affairs personnel to enhance mission success and resolve other nontraditional situations.

Standing UN resolutions or other international directives can form the basis for legitimate US action—and they can be very significant to your mission analysis.

Legal advisors can help in many areas including refugees; displaced and detained civilians; advise to the PSYOP and CA cells; local culture, customs, and government; military and political liaison; claims; investigations; and contingency contracting. Like the public affairs officer, the legal advisor needs to be an integral member of your staff. Your advisor can provide guidance on the legal restraints on operators and the rights to employ force.

CHAPTER X—Force Protection

Force Protection—the higher the level of security the less likely the JTF will suffer a disaster.

It is important to remember that many factors influence force protection to include political considerations.

Every commander is responsible for force protection, regardless of the type of operation or the perception of the threat. The mission analysis phase will help determine the type of forces required to provide the necessary protection. Past experiences in this area have provided ample “lessons learned.”

You may have little control of some of these factors. Conducting a thorough mission analysis should assist you in determining the overall policy for force protection.

CHAPTER XI—Training Requirements

Maximize training prior to deployment.

Rehearsals are absolutely essential for success.

Our experience has proven over and over again that a conventional armed force, well-trained and highly disciplined, can be successful at peace operations. There will be some peace operations training, such as staff exercises, negotiating skills, live firing, and language proficiency, that is best done at home station. This training should include NGO and PVO. Specific requirements, functional training, or brush-up work may be accomplished once in country.

As a minimum, the JTF staff must rehearse key events—even if time is short. Likewise, rehearsals and careful wargaming should precede operations in which units are working together for the first time. Your intent and the concept of the operation
should receive special emphasis to avoid confusion that might occur because of differences in doctrine, terminology, or language.

CHAPTER XII—Refugee, Displaced Person, or Migrant Camp Operations

In Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SEA SIGNAL, the United States was involved with camp management operations.

United States participation in camp management operations may involve a variety of tasks that range from holding refugees, displaced persons, or migrants in camps to processing and arranging for their ultimate resettlement. This type of operation involves significant joint interagency coordination.

CONCLUSION

This Handbook will assist joint task force commanders in preparing for peace operations. It is based on lessons learned from previous peace operations and current joint doctrine. It is not the intent of this Handbook to provide a detailed account of every aspect of a peace operation but instead provide joint task force commanders with an appreciation of how other joint task force commanders and staffs accomplished their missions.
CHAPTER I
MISSION

"... We learned that when you use land combat power in the peacekeeping or peace building role, you can't achieve an end state of long-term peace—of stability and prosperity in the area. In general, a military element only can bring about an absence of war."

Major General William L. Nash, USA
Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division
and Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-Herzegovina
FA Journal January-February 1997

1. General

a. There is no standard peace operations mission. Each peace operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.

b. US military participation in peace operations may involve peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other military operations in support of diplomatic actions to establish and maintain peace. Humanitarian assistance operations (HAO) also may complement peace operations.

c. Whatever the mission, US participation will be based on the current national policy on peace operations. This policy can be found in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) Peace Operations database under the title “Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25)—The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.” An unclassified summary and highlights of PDD 25 are in Appendix A.

d. The United States may participate in peace operations under the auspices of the United Nations, with regional organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of African Unity), unilaterally, or in cooperation with other countries.

• Regional organizations, with the exception of NATO, probably cannot contribute much militarily.

• Where regional organizations provide more impact is perhaps in the areas of diplomacy and negotiation.

e. There are various legislative acts that govern US participation in peace operations. The two primary authorization documents are:

• The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, Chapters 2 and 6, as amended (22 USC 2318, 2321j, and 2348a). This act authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and IO for peace operations and other programs to further US national security issues.


f. As part of the United Nations, the United States may participate in operations that fall within Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), or Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the Charter of the
Chapter VI: "Pacific Settlement of Disputes"  
(Peacekeeping)  
- Focuses on using negotiations, mediation, arbitration, and judicial means.  
- Traditional peacekeeping operations.  
- UN observer missions.  

Chapter VII: "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"  
(Peace Enforcement)  
- Appropriate military operations to maintain and restore international peace and security.  
- Authorizes use of armed force provided by member states.  
- Allows UN to force compliance on unwilling states.  
- Has been expanded to include peace enforcement operations under wider interpretation of breaches of the peace.  

Chapter VIII: "Regional Arrangements"  
- Relates to the maintenance of international peace and security.  
- Makes every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or regional agencies.  
- Takes enforcement action upon authorization of the Security Council.

United Nations. Figure I-1 highlights Chapters VI, VII, and VIII operations. (The terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement do not appear in The Charter, but have been used as indicated in Figure I-1.)

g. Appendix B provides further explanation of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter. Additionally, the JEL Peace Operations database contains all articles of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter. (The United States participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) was an example of a Chapter VIII operation—NATO served as a regional organization in charge.)

h. In addition to Chapter VI and VII operations, some UN operations are referred to as “Chapter VI 1/2.” Such operations fall in a “gray area” between traditional peacekeeping and repulsing cross-border or intrastate aggression.

- The Charter of the United Nations does not expressly address those peace operations focused on internal political conflict (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina). Missions may include:
  - Weapons reduction activities.
2. Mandates

“Every mandate should be sufficiently clear that the Force Commander understands what he is expected to accomplish. But clarity alone is no guarantee of success. A more fundamental issue is feasibility: Can the peace force reasonably be expected to accomplish the tasks contained in the mandate? Some tasks may yield to a more capable peace force than was originally planned. Others, especially some associated with transition operations, may be inherently so difficult that even a very capable peace force will be frustrated.”

_soldiers_for_peace_critical_operational_issues

Bruce R. Pirmie and
William E. Simons

a. The mission is derived from a mandate or resolution issued by either the United Nations Security Council or through international or regional treaties, accords, resolutions, or agreements. In the case of non-UN operations, the United States will issue mission statements or orders through its chain of command.

b. Mandates are developed by politicians and diplomats during the negotiation phase of a peace operations mission. They are often collections of compromises developed to influence the negotiation process. Because of ambiguities, purposeful or otherwise, in the accords finally signed, the commander who receives a mandate may find it difficult to put into operational terms. (Often, there are military advisors to politicians and diplomats who may be able to influence the writing of mandates.) The major elements of a mandate are shown in Figure I-2.

c. Normally, changes to mandates will require the consensus of all participating countries, subsequent to approval by the implementing body (United Nations Security Council or regional organization).


   a. A SOFA or status of missions agreement (SOMA), (hereafter SOMA is included wherever the term SOFA is used) proceeds from the mandate. However, peace enforcement operations would not normally include a SOFA, except with the host country or countries from which operations are staged. With the advice of the concerned military commander, the diplomatic elements negotiate these agreements between the HN, sponsor, and contributors which establish the detailed legal status of peace operations forces. SOFAs must balance two fundamental factors: the independence of the forces versus the governmental authorities of the host government, and freedom of movement. However, as a minimum, SOFAs should include the following main points:

   • International status of the force and its members.

   • Entry and departure permits, to and from the HN.

   • The right to carry arms and the authorized type(s) of weapons.

   • Freedom of movement in the performance of service.

   • Freedom to exercise religion of choice.

   • Freedom of movement of individual members of the force in the HN.
• The use of airports, harbors, and road networks in the HN.

• The right to operate a communications system to include the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service and secure communications nets.

• Postal regulations.

• The flying of flags (e.g., United Nations and national).

• Uniform regulations.

• Application of “The Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.” These privileges and immunities can be found in the “United Nations Guideline-Standing Operating Procedures for Peace-Keeping Operations.” Refer to the JEL Peace Operations database for this document.

• Matters of jurisdiction.

• Military police and security patrols.

• Tax and duty regulations.

b. All aspects of the SOFA or stationing agreement must have the appearance of total impartiality of the force.

c. Military and civilian personnel of the peace operation’s force remain under the criminal jurisdiction of their own nations. A legal instrument should provide for the handing over of members of the force from the host government to their respective contingents for disciplinary action.

d. In the event the host government is nonfunctional, the United States will retain total jurisdiction over its forces.

e. In a multinational peace operation, separate SOFAs may be required between each participating troop contributing country and the host country. The force headquarters (HQ) is not a legal entity subject to international law.


4. Terms of Reference

a. TOR are developed to govern implementation of the peace operations based on the mandate and the situation and may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute in peacekeeping operations.

b. The UN Secretary General will usually send the TOR to the force commander of the mission in either letter or message format. When the United States is a participant in a peace operation, the TOR are coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State before final approval by the National Command Authorities (NCA).

• The TOR describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the peace operations force.
• The TOR are written by the United Nations or other sponsoring organizations.

c. TOR are often far less precise than is desirable from a military point of view for the following reasons:

• They may be rendered innocuous or ambiguous to obtain acceptance of the mission by the HN and other nations.

• TOR may have been quickly prepared to hasten publishing the terms and activating the mission.

• In a UN peacekeeping operation, there may have to be a compromise to obtain acceptance by all parties.


5. Mission Analysis

a. One of the most important tasks is to conduct a detailed mission analysis. Normal procedures should be used by the staff in analyzing the mission. An example is a staff planning procedure that the Army and Marine Corps commonly use to help them in mission analysis that looks at mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T). In peacekeeping operations, the term “parties to the dispute” should be substituted for “enemy” in METT-T. Additionally, other planning factors which will have an impact on the analysis process include the cultural information and the political situation of the projected JOA.

b. Continuous mission analysis is vital to understand the mission and situation before entering the projected JOA. For instance, are you to disarm civilians, establish lines of communications, monitor the collection and

• Throughout the mission analysis, if a mandate or parts of a mandate are unclear, you should take the necessary steps via higher authority to have it explained or redefined.

• A means available to influence a rewrite of the mandate is to develop your own mission statement and coordinate it with higher authority prior to issuance of the mandate. This also may provide you with the opportunity to clarify force structure requirements, end state(s), and “commander’s intent” with the supported combatant commander.

• It is important to remember that political issues often affect all aspects of your military mission. It is not uncommon for political decisions to take precedence over military requirements. Normally, political issues are beyond your scope of authority, but when possible you should try to influence them if they affect mission accomplishment.

For example, the size of a force may be influenced more by political decisions than military requirements. The personnel strength of a force preparing for deployment to Somalia was artificially capped at 10,200. This was not based on mission analysis, but on political decisions.
storage of heavy weapons, and/or perform other unique tasks?

c. You also should be able to answer the following questions.

- What is the mission going to achieve, how will the JTF achieve it, and what resources are required?

- Can the JTF accomplish its mission in the allotted time?

- What and how much of the affected nation’s infrastructure should be restored?

- Will the JTF projected actions solve the long-term problem of the mission area? (This may be beyond your mission scope but still should be considered in the analysis process.)

- What are the requirements for United States Government (USG) interagency and multinational coordination?

- What is the end state?

- What are the requirements for transition and who is the transition force and controlling HQ?

d. You need to appreciate and be able to forecast the longer term impact on the HN (affected country) in contrast to the United States particular short-term, military solution.

- The mission must be periodically reviewed to avoid both directed and self-imposed mission creep.

- A thorough mission analysis will help in deterring mission creep and any adverse impact on the actual mission.

- In most operations, it is difficult to deter mission creep because of the inherent desire of US personnel to do more than is required. This is especially true when faced with human suffering. However, it is important to remember that well-intended actions can be especially dangerous in peace operations, where they can threaten impartiality as well as undermine long-term programs. In many cases, inaction will be better than action.

e. Indicators of success related directly to the desired end state need to be established and regularly reviewed—progress and success (victory) often are difficult to assess. This will indicate the need for more detailed transition planning. Questions impacting mission success are highlighted in Figure I-3—as the CJTF, you must realize that political decisions may have a significant bearing on the outcome of a number of these questions and thus be out of your sphere of control.

f. You have to recognize when the mission is not achievable—without restructuring and/or commitment of additional assets, further action may result in a waste of resources.

g. As with any mission, commanders at all levels must have a common understanding of the conditions that constitute success prior to initiating operations. In peace operations, settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, though settlement is rarely achievable through military efforts alone. Peace operations are conducted to reach a resolution by conciliation among the competing parties rather than termination by force. Principally, peace operations are designed to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed.
h. In peace operations, military action must complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in the pursuit of an overarching political objective. The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in peace operations.
“Our experience in Haiti [United Nations Mission in Haiti] reaffirmed the notion that the military component of a peace operation must understand the political-military environment in which it will operate. Within this dynamic and complex environment the force must synchronize its operations in a manner that will create and sustain the conditions necessary to enable the political process to proceed without interference.”

Success in Peacekeeping
United Nations Mission in Haiti
The Military Perspective

i. It would be helpful during your analysis to identify the single most important task—the one thing that will stabilize the situation (e.g., establish secure convoy routes). This will help focus the mission and assists in emphasizing end state(s) and force requirements.

j. Figure I-4 illustrates the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) which apply to the conduct of peace operations. These principles may benefit you during the mission analysis and planning process.

k. A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the early deployment of an assessment team to the projected JOA.

• The assessment team may help in clarifying the mission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished, what type of force is required to accomplish it, the proper sequence for deployment of the force, availability of in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are being conducted by organizations other than military forces. Depending on the type of peace operation (e.g., peacekeeping), some of the above information will be mandate directed. This should not deter you from emphasizing your requirements to the supported combatant commander.

• Composition of this assessment team varies. You should consider the following individuals for team membership. Among these team members should be personnel capable of identifying, determining, and assessing infrastructure and transportation limitations (sea, air, and land lines of communications). Additionally, personnel also are required to identify, determine, and assess environmental concerns (e.g., ground, water, and air pollution or environmental contamination for future remediation) in the projected JOA.

• Commander or designee
• Linguists or interpreters

“A thorough assessment of military resources needed to assist in the humanitarian relief mission was made shortly after arrival in theater. This permitted the JTF commander to establish priorities, develop success criteria, and rationalize the many requests for assistance that will be received daily from the UN and IO/NGOs/PVOs [international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations]. ... Without such an assessment made early-on (and then modified as the operation progresses), requests for military assistance cannot be adequately evaluated, ‘real’ progress is difficult to measure and meaningful disengagement criteria probably cannot be established.”

Operation SUPPORT HOPE
After-Action Report
## PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

### OBJECTIVE

Direct military operations towards a clearly defined decisive, and attainable objective.

- Defined by a Resolution/Mandate.
- End state refinement is iterative.
- Political considerations often drive operations.
- Concurrent actions required during operations to achieve permanent peace.

### UNITY OF EFFORT

Seek unity of effort toward every objective.

- Military may not have the lead.
- Seek a coordination structure that incorporates activities of all elements in the area (nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations).
- Atmosphere of cooperation required.
- Establish extensive liaison and communications.

### SECURITY

Never permit the hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

- Force protection.
- Enhances legitimacy and impartiality.
- Attains international credibility.
- May extend to nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations.
- Freedom of action throughout the joint operations area.

### PERSEVERANCE

Prepare for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

- Prepare for long protracted operations.
- Information operations strategy key.
- Gauge social and political progress to measure success.
- Balance attaining objectives quickly with strategic aims and other restraints.

### RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

- Disciplined application of force, tactics, and rules of engagement.
- Justified and carefully controlled.
- Closely related to "Legitimacy."
- Societal "face-saving" options can diffuse a crisis.
- Use of mediation and negotiations.

### LEGITIMACY

Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern, or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

- Avoid inadvertent legitimization of factions.
- Use public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations programs to enhance perceptions.
- Impartial treatment is critical.

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**Figure I-4. Principles for Peace Operations**

- J-2
- J-3
- J-4 and key logistics planners—engineering personnel, transportation personnel, contracting personnel
- J-6
- Medical planners—preventive medicine personnel
- Legal personnel
- Chaplain ministry team
The Commander for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was able to participate in the UN’s military survey mission to that country. “With this experience he was able to help shape the structure and composition of the military force before its deployment. In addition, his time in Cambodia gave him a firsthand look at the terrain, the people, and the leaders of factions with whom he would have to interact.”

Colonel K. Farris, USA
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

- Special operations forces (SOF) planners to include civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel
- Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) representatives*
- Public affairs (PA) personnel
- Political-military representative
- Embassy liaison officer
- UN representation, when appropriate

Note: * OFDA representatives may be in the projected JOA prior to arrive of the assessment team. CA personnel should coordinate with them to prevent a duplication of effort during the assessment process.

- The assessment team can validate the mission analysis process, reduce duplication of effort, and provide for a rational division of labor.

- The members of the assessment team should be part of the JTF that will participate in the actual operation, when possible.

1. Development and refinement of rules of engagement (ROE) are an important function during the mission analysis and assessment
process. ROE are discussed subsequently in this chapter.

m. Additionally, resource and funding requirements need to be addressed during the assessment process.

n. Because of the assessment and the total mission analysis process, an end state(s) should be specified.

6. Fundamentals

a. Peace operations are conducted in a dynamic environment, shaped by a number of factors that strongly influence the manner in which operations can be conducted. Successful commanders must grasp the importance of these factors. Figure I-5 illustrates the critical variables of peace operations—the level of consent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality. The degree to which these three variables are present will play a major role in determining the nature of the operation and force tailoring mix. They are not constant and may individually or collectively shift over the course of an operation.

b. Commanders who are aware of these variables and the direction in which they tend to move may be more successful in influencing them and thereby controlling the operational setting. In order to exercise control, they must be able to influence the variables and the pace and direction of change. Success in peace operations often hinges on the ability to exercise situational dominance with respect to the variables; failure is often
the result of losing control of one or more of them.

c. Assessments of the level of consent are political-military in nature and possibly policy driven. Such assessments are factors in determining force tailoring for operations.

7. End State

a. End state refinement is a continuous process.

b. An important step in the mission analysis process is to be sure that there is a clearly definable end state(s). From the end state, the transition (drawdown, handover), and departure data should be determined.

• Although an end state may be difficult to define in peace operations, you should strive to refine the mission to ensure one exists. As previously stated, being prepared early to develop your own mission statement and coordinating it with higher authority may allow you the opportunity to clearly identify an end state(s).

• The above process also may serve as the impetus for all militaries, the United Nations, and other organizations involved in the operation to agree on what needs to be accomplished or what is acceptable to reach an end state(s). Conditions required to reach an end state must be made known.

• An end state will not always be clearly defined or that what is defined may be arbitrary or unrealistic.

• Political decisions will have a great impact on an end state.

• Without a clearly defined mission statement from you which includes the end state, your component commanders and other multinational members cannot develop or define their implementing and supporting tasks.

• You should develop criteria to define mission success. These criteria may be defined by nontraditional tasks such as peaceful resolution of conflict, vice traditional criteria such as destruction of the enemy. This will require the JTF to look beyond conventional warfighting criteria to take into account, the unique characteristics of the specific peace operation.

8. Rules of Engagement

“In all circumstances, ROE [rules of engagement] must be tactically sound, flexible, understandable, and enforceable.”

Operational Law Handbook

a. “Operators” are responsible for the development of ROE.

b. Your legal advisor can help in developing ROE to ensure that they do not improperly constrain your actions, but are still consistent with national command policy.

“US Foreign Policy may succeed or fail on the basis of how well Rules of Engagement are conceived, articulated, understood and implemented.”

Naval Justice School

c. ROE are the directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement against belligerents encountered. In other words, ROE are the means by which the NCA and operational commanders direct the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and international law. More simply put, ROE are the rules that specify “when, where, against whom and how force can be used.” ROE are derived from the three areas depicted in Figure I-6.

Figure I-6. Basis of Rules of Engagement

d. ROE may be used to control the use of force in three main areas: force protection, mission accomplishment, or armed conflict.

e. ROE generally provide guidance regarding the use of force by commanders and individuals based on three types of considerations:

• **Military.** Properly drafted ROE help accomplish the mission by ensuring the use of force in such a way that it will be used in a manner consistent with the overall military objective. They must support both force protection and mission accomplishment. ROE can assist the commander by preventing the unintended start of hostilities prior to achieving a desired readiness posture; by establishing economy of force considerations during hostilities; and by protecting from destruction infrastructure that may prove logistically important at a later date.

• ROE should be distinguished from tactical control measures, threat conditions, and arming orders—arming orders are sometimes listed on the same cards as ROE, for easy reference.

• ROE also should be distinguished from other policies and directives developed by you, such as weapons confiscation rules.

• **Political.** In part, ROE are a reflection of the political will of the government. Missions cannot be completed successfully without the popular support of the American people and their elected officials. The development and training of ROE to multinational allies is an inherently political process which may require coordination with the country team or other designated representatives of the Department of State.

• **Legal.** ROE are also a reflection of international or domestic law or national policy.

f. ROE must contribute to morale and fighting spirit while supporting the political, military, and legal requirements of the mission.

g. **Nothing in the ROE can limit the inherent authority to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate action in self-defense of an individual member of the JTF, a unit of the JTF, or other JTF personnel.**

• The elements of self-defense are:

  • Necessity—Imminent danger requires resort to force when there is a hostile act or hostile intent.
Mission

“With respect to self-defense, ROE ultimately come down to individual judgment. For example, assume that there has been a series of bomb threats in your area. A child runs toward a convoy with a box. Although authorized to fire (hostile intent?) it may be prudent to hold fire. In Somalia, a beggar child was shot in this situation but the rifleman was not charged because he honestly felt threatened. Only with the proper training can the individual rifleman have the confidence to make these quick, stressful decisions.”

Colonel F. M. Lorenz, USMC
Unified Task Force Somalia

- Proportionality—Force must be limited in intensity, duration, and magnitude to that reasonably required to ensure the continued safety of US forces.

- ROE should be unambiguous and written so everybody will know that they will not be prosecuted if they are acting in self-defense. (1) Conduct a prompt inquiry (not necessarily a formal investigation) in all questionable cases of the use of deadly force—Your legal advisor can help. (2) Promptly and accurately record the facts. (3) Media attention can be expected. (4) Be prepared to begin more formal proceedings, but be aware that this may have a chilling effect on the actions of members of the force who are already in a stressful and dangerous situation. (Assistance from investigative agencies, for example, US Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or Air Force Office of Special Investigations is absolutely essential.)

h. ROE should be used to assist in course of action (COA) development, wargaming, analysis, and selection process, but care must be taken to ensure that the mission drives the ROE and not vice-versa.

i. The development, distribution, training, and modification of ROE must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters.

j. Additional information on ROE can be obtained from the JEL Peace Operations database under the title “Operational Law Handbook.”

k. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

“These rules [Standing Rules of Engagement] do not limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander’s unit and other US forces in the vicinity.”

CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, with Change 1

- ROE are the primary means by which the NCA can, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, provide guidance to US forces in peacetime for handling the use of force during crises and in wartime to help control the level of hostilities. The NCA have provided the SROE for US forces as stand alone guidance for US forces worldwide that are equally applicable to all the combatant commands and can be easily and quickly amended or clarified by mission-specific ROE. See CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, with Change 1,” for amplification of SROE.

- SROE apply in the absence of specific guidance from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures.
• SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular situation.

• SROE do not apply to multinational forces; civil disturbance operations; disaster relief operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their operational control (OPCON)) conducting law enforcement operations; and, US forces in support of operations not under operational or tactical control of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other USG departments or agencies.

• Combatant commanders also may augment the SROE in order to properly respond to the mission and threat in their area of responsibility.

• You and your staff must understand the military, political, and legal mission objectives that necessitate ROE and be able to distill the SROE and any combatant commander specific ROE into baseline ROE for the unit commander, weapon system operator, and infantry soldier to apply in the field.

• In developing ROE, it is critical that the planners consider any Service-specific core training in ROE that the combat forces may have received prior to deployment.

• Core training in the SROE, which at present is not uniform among the Services or even within the Services, has proven an exceptional tool to familiarize the “trigger-puller” with ROE and has proven effective in streamlining swift adjustments in ROE dictated by rapidly changing circumstances.

• As Service doctrine develops on such core ROE training, the JTF will lessen confusion and contribute to readiness and effective use of force by accounting for the language and training that Service components are using in core training and incorporating the same into the ROE planning process as much as possible. Figure I-7 lists several key ROE considerations.

1. Development of Rules of Engagement

• Analyze the mission and the anticipated threat level. Are the applicable ROE adequate for the situation? If not, seek approval of supplemental measures.

• Do the ROE protect the force?

• What is the higher HQ commander’s intent?

• ROE must be clear, concise, and at the soldier (“trigger-puller”) level, unclassified. ROE cards should be distributed. A sample ROE card is depicted in Figure I-8.

• During peace operations most ROE are “conduct-based,” that is, your actions are based on a situation or threat that indicates a hostile act or intent. The threat may be a variety of groups or individuals but are not usually an “enemy” in the “warfighting” sense.

• Training all personnel on situations likely to be encountered during the operation is critical in the understanding of ROE. Personnel should see what the threat or hostile intent looks like using Situational Training Exercises.
Mission

"The ROE vignettes are a lot like football plays. We practice the vignettes but in the real game they let the fans on the field."

Soldier,
10th Mountain Division

• ROE may remain constant throughout your operation. Changing the rules may cause confusion or send the wrong signal to the local population. However, changes in the threat situation or political situation may dictate a formal change to the ROE and require immediate distribution.

• As the commander, you will recognize when new ROE are required, and promptly make a request for a change to the supported combatant commander. For example, if the presence of antiaircraft weapons near your flight routes becomes a serious threat to the force, it may be necessary to seek permission to act to deter, neutralize, or if necessary, destroy.

• ROE must be understood, remembered, applied, reinforced, and practiced.

• The aggressiveness that is important in wartime operations must be tempered with restraint in the ambiguous environment of peace operations.

m. Promulgation of Rules of Engagement

• Normally, ROE are distributed through the chain of command via an OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan. In multinational operations, it is important to develop ROE in a format that can be promptly distributed to other nations.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

• International law.

• Operational concerns (mission requirements).

• Commander’s intent (both commander, joint task force and higher headquarters).

• Threat.

• Tactical capabilities (of proposed force).

• Tactics and weapons systems organic to the joint task force.

• Host-nation law and requirements.


NOTE: May Not interfere with right and responsibility for self defense!!!
Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.

A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.
B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.
C. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.
D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.
E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.

REMEMBER

1. The United States is not at war.
2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
3. Use minimum force to carry out mission.
4. Always be prepared to act in self-defense.

The “coalition forces support team” (CFST) discussed in Chapter III can assist in distributing current ROE and teaching it to multinational forces. It is important that all forces have the same understanding of the ROE.

Rules of Engagement Cell

To assist in the ROE process, the establishment of a ROE Cell may be warranted.

JTF J-3 is responsible for the development of ROE in crisis action planning. ROE Cell provides a formal planning structure through which the J-3 can effectively perform this responsibility.

ROE planning process requires timely and extensive intra-staff coordination and planning.

The starting point for mission-specific ROE is the SROE, which may be modified with approved supplemental ROE. (1) ROE are not static, however. They are tailored to the individual mission and threat environment and must remain responsive to changes in either. (2) ROE planning process does not end when the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan is approved. The ROE Cell should track and review the ROE and respond according to threat or mission changes. It also is the responsibility of the ROE Cell to ensure that core ROE training concepts from the Service and functional
component forces are integrated into the ROE development process and that subsequent training on the approved mission-specific ROE build upon that core training base. (3) ROE development must begin early in the planning process (before or during COA development). The ROE Cell ensures early and knowledgeable ROE development. **Key participants in the ROE Cell are:** joint planning group (JPG) representative, J-2, J-3, J-5, and Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) representatives at a minimum (participation may vary according to the mission). Figure I-9 highlights some of the responsibilities of the ROE Cell.

9. **Mission Considerations for Multinational Forces**

a. As a JTF commander in peace operations, you probably will operate with multinational forces. There are numerous unique considerations that should be evaluated before you assign missions to these forces. Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for
Multinational Operations,” provides more in-depth discussion concerning multinational operations and planning.

b. Missions should be assigned that are commensurate to each multinational force’s political commitment and military capability. The key to assigning missions to multinational forces is a clear understanding of their capabilities, political will, and their national interests in the operation.

c. Command and control (C2) issues, language, force capabilities, cultural and historical backgrounds, religious beliefs, logistics, training, and political goals and objectives all impact the coordination of multinational operations. Based on the above, it is difficult to “put together” a multinational operation.

d. Consequently, many things that influence the performance of multinational forces are out of your control. Nonetheless, you should devise a program or system to evaluate these forces before mission assignment. For example, a US commander in Somalia conducted leaders’ reconnaissance with all of his commanders, including multinational leaders. He was then able to evaluate their leadership, self-discipline, moral commitment, knowledge, capabilities (individual, unit, and equipment), prior to mission assignment.

- Additionally, you can determine what is an acceptable “degree of risk” for commitment of each unit in a multinational force for specific missions in the JOA.
• Multinational forces may or may not arrive in the theater of operations simultaneously with the JTF. This may impact on transition planning.

e. Other countries’ contingents may face political constraints or operational constraints due to limited capabilities.

“One of the nations with a sizable contingent in Cambodia had a particularly low level of tolerance for casualties, which directly affected operational planning.”

Colonel K. Farris, USA
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

f. A means of alleviating some of the concerns in working with multinational forces would be to issue them “mission-oriented orders.”

• These type orders appear to provide the best results and give a more positive sense of national pride.

  • Provide written orders—short, clear, simple.
  
  • Avoid using acronyms, slang, and obscure metaphors.
  
  • Use simple, repetitive wording—stressing understanding, not eloquence.
  
  • Use several means to confirm understanding of communications.

• Another recommendation would be to issue separate mission orders to each multinational force. This may not only work better but also support, to a greater extent, each country’s national objectives. From past experience, some countries withdrew from offensive operations. To have forced these countries to participate in such operations would not have been in their best interest nor would have supported the goals of the United Nations.

• In multinational operations, there should be centralized planning and decentralized execution.

g. More simply stated, some countries are good for peacekeeping operations, but not for peace enforcement operations.

h. Strategic implications of all actions must be considered because of the nature of peace operations and competing multinational interests.

“The general in charge of a multi-battalion UN force once ordered a subordinate commander to seize an area where snipers were hiding as they fired at UN soldiers. The subordinate feared the task would entail casualties between his own troops and get him into hot water with his home-country superiors, so he stalled for time. Then he contacted national-level authorities in his country ...to ask whether or not he should obey his tactical orders from the United Nations.”

Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Baker, USA
Parameters, Spring 1994

i. The intent of this section was to highlight the importance of using “common sense” when dealing with multinational forces. Regardless, if you communicate with them collectively or singularly, the one factor that must remain constant is that these forces are treated as legitimate partners with trust and confidence. Liaison personnel can do much to enhance the relationship between the JTF and a multinational force.
10. Additional Considerations

a. As previously stated, other types of operations (e.g., development or humanitarian relief operations) may be in progress prior to arrival of the JTF in the JOA. NGO, PVO, and IO often are conducting activities well before the arrival of military forces. Consideration should be given to acknowledging and coordinating some of these activities with your overall plan. Chapter II, “Civil-Military Relations,” provides additional information on NGO and PVO.

“By 1993, there were more than 100 such groups (nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations) in Cambodia. Some had been there for ten years; for much of that time they constituted the only foreign presence in the country.”

Colonel K. Farris, USA
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

b. In further analyzing the mission, you also should consider the regional strategy for the projected JOA.

- Regional strategy can be obtained from the supported combatant commander.
- The State Department also can provide this information with an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations.

c. In past peace operations, traditional roles and functions of the military were expanded to support taskings. The goal should be to avoid expansion of traditional military roles and functions through expanded interagency coordination.

d. As the commander, you should be prepared to start the planning process and exert your influence in mission development to ensure what you are being told to accomplish is feasible in the allotted time.
Remember, the military normally cannot provide a long-term solution for peace operations.

e. Figure I-10 highlights the many competing dynamics that may be associated with peace operations. As the CJTF, you must recognize these dynamics but realize that “the solution” may be well beyond your control and capability.
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CHAPTER II
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

“The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operations.”

Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations

1. Interagency Coordination

a. In peace operations, interagency coordination may be your top priority.

• This, in part, is due to the increased involvement of JTFs in civil activity both in the United States and abroad. This civil activity requires the skills and resources of many organizations (e.g., USG agencies, partner nations, NGO, PVO, and international and regional organizations such as the United Nations and NATO).

• By understanding the interagency process, you will be better able to appreciate how the skills and resources of the above can assist in mission accomplishment. Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they encourage the development of the affected nation’s materiel and human resources.

• Part of the educative process you and your staff must understand is that each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table.

• You must ensure an atmosphere of cooperation exists so that both the skills and resources of the JTF and interagency organizations can be more effectively and efficiently utilized. Unity of effort must be achieved.

• You should identify all agencies, departments, and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation and then determine how best to coordinate with them. The supported combatant commander can assist in this endeavor. Coordination may be achieved through (1) direct coordination by yourself or representative (e.g., deputy, commander, joint task force (DCJTF)), (2) coordination by a JTF staff directorate(s) or through an organization such as a civil-military operations center (CMOC). In most instances, such coordination should be done at all levels. CMOC is discussed in more detail subsequently in this chapter.

• When appropriate and within operational considerations, you should involve representatives from the interagency organizations in JTF staff meetings and briefings. This also should include participation in joint planning and training from the outset.

• Other ways to enhance interagency coordination may be to:

  • Establish an appropriate decision-making structure to resolve political, humanitarian, and military issues and to coordinate operations.

  • Situate coordination or liaison cells at each level to facilitate communication between participants.
Chapter II

- Establish a relationship with the US Ambassador, the country team, and, if a UN operation, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

b. For further detail see Chapter IV, “JTF Command Responsibilities,” of this Handbook and Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II.”

2. Nongovernmental Organizations, Private Voluntary Organizations, United Nations Relief Agencies, and International Organizations

"What’s the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGO and PVO that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other."

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

"In many instances, NGO are the end of the line—without them there is no hope."

Barbara Smith
International Rescue Committee

b. These organizations play an important role in providing support to the HN. In fact, NGO and PVO provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between $9 and $10 billion each year—more than any single nation or international body (such as the United Nations). Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGO and PVO must be factored into your assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

- The Role of NGO and PVO. NGO and PVO may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster.

- The professionalism, capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one organization to another. NGO and PVO are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. Standards of conduct and standards of
Civil-Military Relations

Protocol are being developed by civilian organizations to enhance the professionalism among NGO and PVO. *(It is important to remember that some of these organizations do not respond positively to the US military and have their own interests and agendas that may be in total contrast to that of the military.)*

**The connectivity between NGO, PVO and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage.** But while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGO and PVO are major players at the interagency table. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the NGO and PVO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community. In fact, individual organizations are often tapped by the United Nations and USG agencies to carry out specific relief functions.

**United Nations Relief Agencies and International Organizations.** Below are brief descriptions of a number of the agencies and IO that JTFs have coordinated with in past operations and ones that you may coordinate with in future operations.

**United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).** UNDHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. It mobilizes and coordinates international disaster relief, promotes disaster mitigation (through the provision of advisory services and technical assistance), and promotes awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related matters. It is responsible for maintaining contact with disaster management entities and emergency services worldwide and is able to mobilize specialized resources. The appointed UNDHA resident coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at country level, and also coordinates locally represented PVO and NGO as required. The resident coordinator convenes the United Nations Disaster Management Team at the country level, seeking unity of effort among all the various PVO, NGO, and agencies. (1) UNDHA’s mission is to coordinate and facilitate international relief assistance following sudden disasters and similar emergencies. UNDHA is headquartered at the UN office in Geneva (Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland). It also can be contacted at UN Headquarters in New York City. (2) The UNDHA staff in Geneva and New York is involved in policy planning and early warning functions, emergency operational support and relief coordination, and disaster mitigation. The UN Under Secretary General of Humanitarian Affairs also serves concurrently as the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. While the main responsibility of the Under Secretary General of Humanitarian Affairs is to head UNDHA, the main responsibility of the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator is to develop rapid response procedures and teams to international humanitarian emergencies.

**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).** UNHCR has two closely related functions; to protect refugees and to promote durable solutions to their problems. UNHCR assists all refugees who have fled their countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
and who cannot or do not want to return. UNHCR’s mission is to protect refugees against physical harm, to protect their basic human rights, and to make sure that they are not forcibly returned to countries where they could face imprisonment, torture, or death. The latter mission—UNHCR’s most important function, known as “international protection”—means that the organization strives to ensure that no refugee is returned involuntarily to a country where he or she has reason to fear persecution. UNHCR is headquartered in Geneva (UNHCR Secretariat, Case Postale 2500, Ch-1211 Geneva 2 Depot, Switzerland). The UNHCR Branch Office for the United States is located in Washington, D.C. (1775 K Street, N.W., Suite 300, 20006).

**World Food Programme (WFP).** The WFP is the food aid organization of the United Nations. The Programme’s assistance is targeted at the poorest sections of the population in low-income, food-deficit countries, particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children. While WFP has been increasingly called upon to provide disaster relief assistance, it believes that development projects have been and should remain at the core of its work to help poor people become more self-reliant. WFP works on two fronts; as the principal international channel providing fast, efficient relief assistance to victims of natural and manmade disasters, and as a major supplier of food aid to poor people in developing countries aimed at building self-reliant families and communities. In both emergency operations and development projects, WFP is responsible for assessing food aid needs, mobilizing contributions from donors, transporting commodities, and managing overall distribution on a country-wide basis. But final distribution to beneficiaries is undertaken either by government agencies or local and international NGO and PVO. WFP is headquartered in Rome, Italy (Via Cristoforo Colombo, 426, 00145 Rome, Italy).

**United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).** The Fund is charged with giving assistance, particularly to developing countries, in the development of permanent child health and welfare services. UNICEF HQ is located in New York City (UNICEF House, 3 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017).

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).** The ICRC is a private, independent humanitarian institution, not multinational organization, composed exclusively of Swiss nationals. Its mission is to provide care to persons not directly participating in hostilities, such as the sick, wounded, prisoners, or those in distress, without discrimination. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols confer on the ICRC what many nations believe is the right to take action (e.g., to visit prisoners of war) and to make proposals to states (e.g., to offer its services). Additionally, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s Statutes recognize that the ICRC has a right of humanitarian initiative in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions or their protocols. All of these “rights” constitute the permanent mandate conferred on the ICRC by much of the international community. This specific mandate distinguishes it from other humanitarian organizations. The ICRC and advocates of humanitarian law may argue that the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have gained universal application through the formative custom of international law, the United States does not agree. The United States has not ratified the 1977 Protocols
and may not always agree with nor recognize as authoritative ICRC actions based on the Protocols. Other nations that have acceded to these Protocols are bound to them. This leads to a major problem for the legal counsel in the international arena: not all participants are similarly bound to international law on very basic matters. There are numerous conventions of wide but not universal application. Adherence or non-adherence can make a mismatch of potential partners in humanitarian ventures. The ICRC is the guardian of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.

• You may encounter scores of NGO and PVO in the JOA. In Somalia alone, there were some 78 private organizations contributing relief support, and assisting the UN relief in the Rwanda crisis were over 100 relief organizations. Over 350 such agencies are registered with United States Agency for International Development (USAID). NGO and PVO may belong to the organizations listed below.

• InterAction is a membership organization of US based PVO who are involved in overseas disaster relief and response. Its membership includes approximately 150 private agencies operating in 185 countries. Examples of these organizations are: Food for the Hungry, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CAREUSA), and International Aid, Inc.

• The International Council of Voluntary Agencies also has membership numbering in the hundreds.

• A more complete description of each of these organizations is provided in the JEL Peace Operations database or in Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II.”

• Military and Private Organization Relations. NGO and PVO concerns in the military taking control of existing operations are real. CA interaction with these organizations before the onset of operations may allay this fear.

• The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation.

• While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by the JTF or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Combatant command staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the host-country government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the proposed PA guidance.

• PA planning also should include the identification of points of contact with NGO and PVO that will operate in an affected area to arrange referrals of news media queries regarding their operations to an authorized spokesperson. Military
spokespersons should comment on NGO and PVO operations based on guidance provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]), in cooperation with the in-country HQ of the organization.

• Military Support of NGO and PVO

“What the military, in turn, needs to learn is that while some NGO still regard it as the very embodiment of evil, there are today an increasing number of professional, business-like NGO who depart sharply from the ‘flaky do-gooder’ label with which the military has too long tagged them. The risks of degrading the performance of the military, which rightfully prides itself on organization and discipline, to a ‘least common denominator’ level through association with UN agencies and NGO is minimized when all the team members can project their strengths and focus their resources ....”

Walter S. Clarke, US Army Peacekeeping Institute and Arthur E. (Gene) Dewey, Congressional Hunger Center

• NCA may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) NGO, PVO, UN relief organizations, or the ICRC. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants.

• A climate of cooperation between NGO, PVO, and the military forces should be the goal. Taskings to support NGO and PVO are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. (1) In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the NGO and PVO. (2) It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the JTF should be to enable—not perform—NGO and PVO tasks. US military assistance has frequently proven to be the critical difference that enabled mission success.

• You also should understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the JTF and NGO, PVO, and other agencies may be critical to the success of the operation.

c. Additional Considerations for the CJTF

• Conduct planning, preparation, and training with NGO, PVO, and other agencies prior to deployment and at other times, as appropriate and within operational constraints.

• Develop, with the NGO, PVO, and other agencies, a list of common concepts, goals, and procedures at the operational level that can be used throughout the entire operation. In addition, you need to know the location of these organizations and agencies in the JOA. This may include the location of their warehouses and storage areas.

• Work with other military and civilian officials to become aware of the responsibilities, capabilities, goals and

For Example: In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint task force’s main support was to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. In Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, the joint task force worked closely with the World Food Bank, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
objectives, and limitations of civil organizations, NGO, PVO, and military elements involved in peace operations. Remember that NGO and PVO are important resources who can provide excellent information on local customs, infrastructure, local government structure, procurement and pay scales, and relief assessments.

- Reinforce a positive attitude with your staff and other military personnel toward the capabilities of NGO, PVO, and other agencies. However, a number of these organizations and agencies may work in direct conflict to what you are trying to accomplish. They often have very different cultures, ideals, and agendas in comparison to the military.

- Coordinate with Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command any policy which envisions the use of strategic air, or any other Defense Transportation System lift assets. In past operations, transportation of non-DOD personnel (e.g., NGO, PVO) aboard US military aircraft has been an issue.

- Understand as conditions improve in the JOA and the duration of the operation lengthens, agendas change to include those of NGO and PVO—mutual cooperation may be more difficult to achieve.

- Share lessons learned with appropriate organizations.

- Realize programs that are started must be sustainable once the JTF redeployes. Organizations such as NGO and PVO can provide sustainability; this assists in the long-term peace operations solution.

- One means of fostering a relationship between the JTF and NGO and PVO is to develop a formal working arrangement within the JOA. The creation of a CMOC (which is discussed subsequently in this chapter) may facilitate in solidifying this relationship.

“NGO are the most critical source of information ... The role of the NGO community is of paramount importance. They must participate, they must advise, and they must do it in a manner conducive to a comprehensive effort.”

The U.S. Military / NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions
Chris Seiple

3. Civil-Military Operations Center

“The center [civil-military operations center] was an effective innovative mechanism, not only for operational coordination, but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions. By developing good personal relationships, the staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief community.”

Ambassador R. Oakley
President’s Special Envoy for Somalia

a. You must be able to work with all organizations and groups to accomplish your mission. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations, NGO and PVO, and the population.

- Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of these elements. Although not a new concept, the CMOC has been effectively employed as a means to coordinate civil and military operations and plays an execution role. The
organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent—flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in a JOA (such as occurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.

• The transition from conflict to postconflict or during HAO requires the supported commander to shift support priorities toward accomplishment of the civil-military operations (CMO) mission. Dedicating combat support and combat service support assets for CMO employment is one method by which you can accomplish the mission and meet the needs of the local population.

• During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the United Nations deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for transmitting CMOC responsibilities to the United Nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Civil-Military Cooperation concept (more commonly referred to as a CIMIC) was developed to perform basically the same functions as a CMOC.

b. You may form a CMOC as the action team to provide the following:

• Carry out guidance and institute CJTF decisions regarding CMO.

• Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

• Provide a partnership forum for military and other engaged organizations.

• Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from the NGO, PVO, and regional and international organizations. It is important to
remember that these organizations may very well attend CMOC meetings but may not consider themselves members of the CMOC. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for interagency discussions but not as an interagency forum.

c. It can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the collective national or international mission. In establishing the CMOC, you should build it from a nucleus of organic operations; information exchange; and CA, logistics, legal, and communication elements. You should invite representatives of other agencies that include the following:

- Liaisons from Service and functional components, and supporting infrastructure, such as ports and airfields.
- USAID/OFDA representatives.
- Department of State, country team, and other USG representatives.
- Military liaison personnel from participating countries.
- Host country or local government agency representatives.
- Representatives of regional and international organizations (e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and ICRC).
- Representatives from NGO and PVO.
- The composition of a notional CMOC is illustrated in Figure II-1. It is not the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as the center of coordination for all interagency activities but rather to illustrate organizations that the JTF may coordinate with and hold discussions with concerning an ongoing operation.

d. Political representatives may provide you with avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGO and PVO because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the military for their needs, ensuring that the unified efforts of the JTF and the relief community are focused when and where they are most needed. Although US forces may be latecomers compared to many relief and IO, they bring considerable resources with them.

- It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.
- You cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies. However, working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistics support, information sharing, communications, and other items, as well as the shared goal of improving conditions for HN nationals, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

e. CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify components within the interagency forum capable of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action.

- Facilitate and coordinate activities of the JTF, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.
- Receive, validate, coordinate, and monitor requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.

f. CMOC tasks may include the following:
“In Somalia, a daily meeting was held where the NGO were briefed on the current situation from all military participants. A review of ongoing humanitarian actions was briefed by NGO and security requests for throughout the country were processed by the assisting units. In addition, the CMOC served as the venue for UN humanitarian programs to operate from. Organizations such as Food and Agriculture, Education, and Water held coordination meetings at the CMOC and developed nationwide plans for operations in-country.”

US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (Light)

Figure II-1. Sample Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

- Coordinate response to requests for military support with Service components.
- Coordinate requests to NGO and PVO for their support.
- Coordinate with the DART deployed to the scene by OFDA.
- Convene ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support NGO and PVO requirements (examples include convoy escort and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers).
- Convene follow-on assessment groups.
Civil-Military Relations

- Coordinate PA matters.
- Provide situation reports regarding JTF operations, security, and other information for participants in the collective effort.
- Chair port and airfield committee meetings for space and access-related issues.
- Facilitate creation and organization of a logistics distribution system for food, water, and medical relief efforts.
- Support, as required, civic action teams.
- Maintain a resource database to assist in the efficient and effective use of military and non-military assets.

h. Overall management of a CMOC may be assigned to a multinational force commander or shared by a US and a multinational commander. In a US military-managed CMOC, the J-3 normally is responsible for the management of, or participation in, the CMOC. CMOC may be a suborganization of the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) and the CMOC may have suborganizations to accommodate military or geographic requirements. The director of the CMOC must have unlimited access to you.

i. For further detail see Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
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SECTION A. STAFF ORGANIZATION

1. General

a. This section addresses the broad aspects of staff organization to include highlighting a number of your responsibilities as the CJTF. Additionally, this section provides an overview of some of the responsibilities of your DCJTF, chief of staff, and personal staff group. Another section of this chapter discusses SOF as they relate to staff organization.

b. All possible staff organization options are not reflected in this section. It does, however, underscore options and recommendations gleaned from interviews with former CJTFs, JTF staff officers, and others who have been associated with peace operations.

c. As a CJTF, you may organize the JTF HQ as necessary to carry out all duties and responsibilities. Your organization, in part, will be based on what option is used to form the JTF HQ.

• There are several options that may be used to form a JTF HQ (e.g., use a standing JTF HQ, augment a core Service component HQ, form ad hoc from various contributors). You may not have a great deal of input into what option is selected—JTF establishing authority is the “key decisionmaker.”
• Normally, the nucleus JTF staff is formed from an existing Service component HQ, usually not below the level of Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, Numbered Navy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force.

• Whatever option is used, a building process will be necessary. Additionally, this process must support the mission and provide the best opportunity for success. In this regard, it may be necessary to change the names of various JTF functions (based on sensitivities) when working with organizations such as the United Nations.

> “... the transparent nature of UN operations is not conducive to activities involving such things as psychological operations, intelligence, and public affairs. To satisfy the political sensitivities involved, UNMIH [United Nations Mission in Haiti] would, hence, employ Military Information Support Teams (MIST) [vice psychological operations], gather information vice intelligence, use force protection teams, as opposed to counter-intelligence teams, and do public information instead of public affairs.”

**Success in Peacekeeping**

**United Nations Mission in Haiti**

**The Military Perspective**

• When fully formed, the JTF staff should be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component or subordinate task force having significant forces assigned to the command.

• One former CJTF stated that “at least 85% of the JTF staff should be in place and trained before the CJTF assumes command.”

• See Appendix D, “Joint Task Force,” of this Handbook for further information concerning a JTF.

d. The following additional factors should be considered when creating a staff:

• It must be composed of Service members that comprise significant elements of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. In many situations, members from multinational forces will comprise part of your staff.

• Filling key positions of responsibility with members from Service, functional components, and subordinate task forces will be based in part on the mission and type of operations to be conducted (e.g., predominantly ground operations—J-3 should be from the United States Army or United States Marine Corps). As previously mentioned, members from multinational forces also may play a prominent role on your staff.

• Force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support.

• The importance of knowing, trusting, and being able to rely on key players may require you to handpick some members of your staff (e.g., chief of staff or J-3). This is important because personalities often play a significant role on a staff and you must be able to quickly reach a comfort level with key staff members.

> “Trust—defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another—is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams.”

**Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States**

e. When mission requirements exceed your staff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel,
Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing

facilities, or equipment), you must request assistance through the JTF establishing authority.

• JTF establishing authority should make provisions to furnish the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment.

• Often an establishing authority has a “cell” of experts prepared to augment a JTF to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning (e.g., United States Pacific Command’s and United States Atlantic Command’s (USACOM) Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cells, or United States European Command’s Joint Core).

• In most situations, this “cell” is prepared to provide as much assistance as you desire.

• Staff officers who augment the JTF nucleus from combatant commands or the Services should be trained as part of a joint training and exercise program (e.g., USACOM’s training program for JTFs).

• The Services and combatant commands should ensure qualified personnel are nominated to fill JTF augmentation billets. These augmentees should possess the following attributes:

  • Knowledge, confidence, forcefulness.
  
  • Preparedness to represent their Services and units.
  
  • An understanding that they are the de facto Service “experts.”
  
  • Ability to work as part of a joint team (no Service parochialism).

f. A staff and facilities orientation program should be established to ensure all individuals joining the JTF staff become thoroughly familiar with their surroundings (e.g., work and HQ areas, living areas, key personnel).

• This could be accomplished through establishment of a joint personnel reception center (JPRC) under the JTF J-1.

• Another program that could be established in conjunction with the JPRC or by itself is the “buddy system”—an experienced JTF staff member is assigned to a new staff member to assist in the familiarization process.

• During operations in Somalia, Marine Forces Somalia and SOF elements formed a CFST to process incoming multinational forces. (1) JTF recognized the value of the CFST and used it to ensure the proper disposition of all incoming multinational forces. (2) CFST provided such things as prearrival planning, briefings, initial billeting, and deployment within country. (3) SOF used a similar support team concept (Coalition Support Team) in Haiti (United Nations Mission in Haiti) to provide liaison to national force contingents. (4) For future operations, it may be worth establishing similar type organizations.

• Whatever the program, it should improve the efficiency of the staff and lead to building the joint team.

2. Commander, Joint Task Force

Some of your many responsibilities are outlined below. These are provided as a guide and will have to be adapted to your mission and forces assigned.
Chapter III

a. Making recommendations to the establishing authority on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for the accomplishment of such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander.

b. Exercising OPCON over assigned and normally over attached forces. When multinational forces comprise part of the JTF, you must determine how best to establish command relationships with these forces to ensure mission success. You also must determine when forces will be transferred to your OPCON (e.g., upon arrival in the JOA).

c. Developing a detailed OPORD or campaign plan within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) crisis action planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authority. You determine applicability of existing OPLANs, operation plans in concept format, functional plans, and campaign plans, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.

d. Providing your commander’s intent. Additionally, you should provide your initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) to the JTF staff and components. CCIRs are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affect successful mission accomplishment.

e. Requesting supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the assigned mission. This may include requesting release authority for riot control agents—do not delay this request—it requires NCA approval in wartime and approval of the supported combatant commander in peacetime.

f. Establishing combat identification measures.

g. Notifying the establishing authority when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned JOA.

h. Ensuring that cross-Service support is provided and the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting joint team. See Chapter VI, “Logistics Support,” for further detail.

i. Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on the establishment of the necessary boards, offices, centers, and bureaus (e.g., Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB), Joint Movement Center (JMC), CMOC, ROE Cell) to enhance operational efficiency.

- You should require the JTF proponent of a joint board, office, center, cell, or bureau to provide criteria and supporting rationale for establishing it (i.e., purpose and authority) and its proposed membership.

- You make the final decision on the establishment of any board, office, center, cell, or bureau—if it is not required do not establish it.

“US and allied pilots are to be trained to identify US ground vehicles in Bosnia. US DoD officials say that pilots flying fixed-wing aircraft are expected to receive their first familiarization training in combat identification (ID) of the US vehicles. A similar programme is being developed to familiarize ground forces of other IFOR [Implementation Force] coalition members with US ground combat ID systems.

Jane’s Defence Weekly
Barbara Starr
j. Defining the area of operations within the JOA for land and naval component commanders and a joint special operations area (JSOA) for use by a joint force special operations component. Identify JTF primary and alternate airfields as well as JTF-designated no-fly zones to the air component commander.

k. Using assigned and attached forces to best perform the mission. The organizational structure of the force will depend on the mission to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength of the component elements of the forces assigned and attached, and the phasing of the contemplated operation.

• Identifying the requirement for additional forces or personnel to the JTF establishing authority. Ensure accurate accountability of the forces that are required and that are actually deployed to the JOA.

• The establishing authority is essential in the process of obtaining additional forces, equipment, information, and other assets or data for the JTF. See Appendix D, “Joint Task Force,” of this Handbook for additional information concerning an establishing authority.

• Daily contact with the establishing authority or representative is critical to stay abreast of and keep fully informed of the situation.

“Close contact (more than on a daily basis) with the supported combatant command is a must.”

Rear Admiral M. D. Haskins, USN
Commander, Joint Task Force 160

• The requirement for units and personnel that are found mostly in the Reserve Components (such as CA, PSYOP, and historians) also should be considered even though they may not be readily available for deployment or employment.

l. Providing guidance to subordinate forces for planning and conducting operations to include responsibilities with respect to supporting forces as directed by the JTF establishing authority.

m. Monitoring the operational situation and, as required, keeping the JTF establishing authority informed.

n. Coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, USG agencies, NGO, PVO, or IO as appropriate. This coordination should exist throughout all phases of an operation.

o. Establishing, if necessary, a coordinating procedure for specific functions or activities (e.g., procedures for rear area security and/or receipt of forces) among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

p. Establishing the succession of command.

q. Assigning to subordinate commanders, as necessary, those tasks needed to accomplish the plan.

r. Providing guidance to subordinate forces for the planning and execution of redeployment operations.

s. Requesting, through the supported combatant commander, the necessary discipline and courts-martial authority to ensure “good order and discipline” can be maintained throughout the operation.

t. Ensuring that the JTF HQ is organized to support the basic tenets of information operations (IO)—may be a sensitive subject in some environments.
Chapter III

• IO focuses on the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing dependence by the United States and some of our adversaries on information and information systems. At the tactical and operational levels, the target of IO is the information-dependent process, whether human or automated. The establishment of an IO Cell may be necessary to manage these activities.

“Perhaps no single factor has as much potential as the information explosion for changing the way in which military organizations function, both during peace and in war.”

Lieutenant General E. J. Rokke, USAF
President of the National Defense University

• For further detail see CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,” (classified secret) and Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

u. Coordinating with the supported combatant commander in establishing a rotation policy.

• JTF J-1 should recommend a policy concerning tour lengths to you.

• A rotation policy may be based on the JTF’s mission, length of operation, operational environment, and requirement for “skilled” personnel.

• A standard tour length for all personnel may seem more equitable and impact more favorably on morale but may not be supportable from an operational aspect.

• Tour length probably will be governed by the JTF’s mission.

• Other factors that may influence tour length:
  • Supported combatant commander’s guidance.
  • Tour length for Reserve Component units and personnel.
  • Tour length for personnel on temporary additional duty or temporary duty.
  • Service policy.
  • Rotation policies of other participating nations.

v. Ensuring policies have been established covering such subjects as personal and unit awards; postal operations; morale, welfare, and recreation requirements; casualty reporting; and other areas as required.

w. Incorporating the appropriate responsibilities to build a cohesive team that may include multinational forces, NGO, PVO, interagency representatives, and others. This is a must—it cannot be just “lip service.”

“Apart from the staff, what about the contingents? How do you build this team? There are many nationalities involved; in UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force], I believe, thirty nationalities are represented in the military, with probably thirty or forty other nationalities represented among the police and civilians there. Different languages, different religions, different races, different cultures, different levels of experience — how does a commander bring all these people together and get them to work as a team? That is probably the biggest challenge that faces anyone selected to do the job.”

Major-General Clive Milner, Canadian Army (RET)
3. Deputy Commander, JTF

a. Normally, the DCJTF is not from the same Service as yourself. In multinational operations, the DCJTF in all likelihood will be a non-US officer. DCJTF selection may be based on the type of mission assigned and/or the number and type of forces comprising the JTF.

b. Usually is of equal rank or senior in rank to the component commanders.

c. Should possess a broad understanding of the type of operation to be conducted.

d. May be dual-hatted as the chief of staff, although not recommended for large scale or multinational operations.

e. Responsibilities of the DCJTF may include:

- Assuming command if the commander becomes a casualty or is otherwise incapacitated or unavailable to exercise command.
- Serving as principal assistant to the commander.
- Performing special duties as directed by you (e.g., chairs various committees, has cognizance of liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ, interagency coordination).
- Working with the components to keep you updated.
- Refining the relationship with the components to ensure the most efficient and effective command relationships.
- Tracking your CCIRs to ensure compliance.

4. Chief of Staff

Chief of staff responsibilities may include:

a. Functioning as your principal staff officer and advisor. In most cases, the chief of staff will come from the same Service as yourself—probably from the same command.

b. Coordinating and directing the work of the staff divisions—supervises the preparation of staff estimates, OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. Must ensure staff coordination.

c. Ensuring staff training is conducted, when appropriate.

d. Establishing a scheme to develop a daily schedule for the JTF staff that emphasizes coordination, logic, and your CCIRs. It is important for the staff to be on a daily schedule that allows them to accomplish all tasks in the most effective and efficient manner.

- This schedule should depict a step-by-step approach that leads to accomplishing the tasks. Daily events (briefings, meetings, shift changes) should support each other and follow a consistent pattern.

- This daily schedule may be referred to as the “JTF Daily Operations Cycle.” Figure III-1 depicts, strictly for illustrative purposes, a “JTF Daily Operations Cycle.”

e. Representing you when authorized.

f. Ensuring your decisions and concepts are implemented by directing and assigning staff responsibilities when necessary—review staff actions.
g. Formulating and announcing staff policies (e.g., message releasing authority; procedures for developing, tracking, and resolution of requests for information; and appointment of security manager).

h. Maintaining a master policy file and monitoring standing operating procedures (SOP).

i. **Ensuring required liaison is established.** Liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ may fall under the cognizance of the chief of staff.

5. **Commander, Joint Task Force’s Personal Staff Group**

Your “personal staff group” (e.g., political advisor (POLAD), PAO, legal officer, surgeon, inspector general (IG), provost marshal (PM), comptroller, chaplain, and others as directed) becomes the focus of a peace operation more so than perhaps in conventional combat operations. This group needs to be directly accessible to you; it must not work in isolation. Following is a synopsis of various staff sections within this group.

a. **Political Advisor**
• The first step for you is to immediately establish a close and efficient relationship with your political advisor. This individual will be a force multiplier for the JTF if properly used by you. The political advisor will ensure the country team leader is informed of your plans and provide you with valuable information that will impact on operations—the POLAD provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies in the JOA and with the Department of State.

• The POLAD supplies information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State that are relevant to the operation.

• Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force Command Responsibilities,” provides further detail concerning interagency and political coordination.


d. Surgeon

“Preventive medicine, veterinary, and combat stress detachments were the most valuable assets of the entire force. While these assets were considered essential to maintaining the health of the force, it is important to note that UN accepts World Health Organization Standards for food, water, medicine and immunizations when US standards may be more rigorous. Cost differences resulting from adherence to these stricter standards must be absorbed by the nation concerned.”

Success in Peacekeeping
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The Military Perspective

“Many peace operations will be conducted in areas where there is little or no medical infrastructure. US forces will be at risk from accidents and a wide variety of endemic diseases requiring extensive planning for surgical support, aeromedical evacuation, and appropriate immunizations and preventive measures based upon the disease threat. Environmental hazards from ground, water, and air pollution also pose a threat to deployed forces. Evaluation of these potential threats can not be simply evaluated ... evaluation and development of countermeasures is an ongoing process requiring constant monitoring by medical professionals.”

Colonel David W. Foxworth, USA
US European Command Deputy Command Surgeon

Responsibilities of the surgeon include:

- Preparing the HSS plan. This plan should define the scope of medical care to be delivered in detail, determine the requisite number of medical personnel required to staff the JTF surgeon’s office, and the types of units and personnel required to support the operation. The HSS plan also should include a medical surveillance program. This program is necessary to follow disease trends, detect disease outbreaks, develop public health policy, and to allocate resources.

- Establishing, in conjunction with the supported combatant command and others (e.g., the United Nations), a policy concerning medical care eligibility and

• Plan to deploy medical personnel early, as they are critical to the success of the operation.

• The surgeon is responsible for establishing, monitoring, and evaluating joint force health service support (HSS).
Medical Care Eligibility: Following an agreement between the [United States Atlantic Command] and the United Nations, the US [United States Support Group Haiti] medical facility would provide Level II and medical care to all UN forces (to include UN civilians) in Haiti.

- Advising you on HSS aspects of the operation; intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution; preventive medicine; blood policy and distribution system; dental; veterinary medicine requirements; and other medical factors that could affect operations.

- Informing you on the status of HSS units and assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace and US Nationals.

- Reviewing ongoing health programs of NGO and other civilian agencies in the JOA, advising CA forces on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the JOA.

- Coordinating HSS provided to or received from multinational forces or other friendly nations. This includes coordinating with other staff sections (e.g., legal, PA, CA, J-3, and J-4) to determine the policy and standards concerning who are eligible beneficiaries of medical care, both routine and emergency, and under what conditions.

- Establishing and coordinating a comprehensive medical logistics system for Class VIII A (medical materiel) and B (blood and fluids).

- Supervising the activities of the necessary medical cells, boards, and centers established at the JTF level. For example: (1) Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC) is under the control of the JTF surgeon, to coordinate and control patient movement, in terms of identifying bed space requirements, the movement of patients within and out of the JOA. JPMRC also generates JTF plans, and schedules, to execute JTF’s patient evacuation to medical treatment facilities in accordance with the supported combatant command’s Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center. JPMRC is established in conjunction with the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center. (2) JTF Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) is activated on order of the supported combatant command and is within the office of the JTF surgeon. JTF’s JBPO is task-organized to plan, coordinate, and direct the handling, storage, and distribution of blood within the JOA. (3) There is a corresponding patient movement center (Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center) and JBPO located at the supported combatant command level to assist the JTF.

- Developing a plan for patient evacuation in coordination with theater and component surgeons and the United States Transportation Command/SG (USTRANSCOM).

- Developing a mass casualty response plan.

- Coordinating medical intelligence support for HSS organizations.

- Developing an extensive preventive medicine program, to include pre- and post surveillance programs. (1) Evaluating infectious disease risks. (2) Determining the requirements for an entomologist for vector control. (3) SOF
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medical personnel are excellent sources for medical requirements and infectious disease risk evaluation.

“Vector borne diseases, diarrheal diseases, and respiratory diseases continue to be a significant threat to deployed forces and have the potential of compromising their mission. Constant vigilance is required by the line and the medical communities within the Services to ensure routine quality preventive measures are implemented at all stages of an exercise or operation. Immunizations and chemoprophylaxis, personal protective measures, medical surveillance, and prompt public health responses are major tools used by the line and preventive medicine communities to ensure that operational forces maintain the optimal level of health and fitness. Relaxing standards or underestimating the value of Preventive Medicine measures can be disastrous to the timely and successful accomplishment of a mission.”

Operation SEA SIGNAL

• Providing technical assistance and advice to the CMOC.

• Ensuring liaison is established with each component surgeon.

• Resolving the JTF medical equipment and supply requirements, as medical items frequently require long-lead times and special handling.

• Preparing the HSS plan and ANNEX Q (Medical Services) of your OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan. The HSS plan should include a medical surveillance program. This program is necessary to follow disease trends, detect disease outbreaks, develop public health policy, and to allocate resources.

• The surgeon staff should be joint and of sufficient size to accomplish joint coordination of HSS initiatives, standardization and interoperability, and review of component medical plans and operations.

• There are many aspects of HSS support that the surgeon will have to coordinate through the JTF J-4.

• See Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations,” for more detail concerning HSS.

e. Inspector General. The role of the IG is as important across the range of military operations as it is in a garrison-type environment. You should strive to have this function as part of the JTF. The IG should be experienced in joint operations and be of a grade (particular rank) that is commensurate with the overall JTF organization.

• Basic IG functions are inspecting, assisting, investigating, and training the force.

• IG responsibilities may include:

  • Checking and instilling discipline, ethics, and standards in the JTF.

  • Serving as your unbiased consultant for evaluating management and leadership procedures and practices.

  • Improving the force (while protecting the rights of individuals) through timely, complete and impartial inquiries, investigations, and inspections.

  • Conducting investigations and inquiries to determine the state of readiness, economy, efficiency, discipline, and morale of all JTF-level and subordinate units.
• Providing reports and assessments on matters relating to C2 and support of assigned forces and joint operational readiness.

• Interfacing with interagency organizations to assist in resolving differences with the JTF.

f. Provost Marshal

• JTF PM is capable of developing and issuing policies, programs, and guidance for the planning and conduct of military police operations.

• Responsibilities of the PM may include:
  • Detainee and counterintelligence (CI) collection, processing, and reporting.
  • Force protection and physical security policy. The PM, based on unique experience and training, advises you on technical and procedural aspects of physical security and force protection.
  • Law enforcement policy and civilian police liaison. The PM provides you with a focal point on all matters of law enforcement planning, policy, and reporting. In addition, the PM provides a liaison for you with local and other civilian law enforcement authorities in the JOA.
  • Military and security police planning. Based on your intent and operational concept, the PM can recommend ways in which military and security police capabilities can best support the JTF’s mission.

g. Comptroller

For success, it is essential that a policy be developed for “funding” the peace operation.

This may be one of your most complex and time-consuming tasks.

• Finance management support to the JTF includes financial services and resource management functions.

• Responsibilities of the JTF comptroller may include:
  • Serve as your principal financial management advisor.
  • Represent you in identifying JTF resource and financial service needs to the supported combatant commander, components, and others as required.
  • Establish JOA financial management responsibilities. Coordinate the designation of lead executive agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
  • Provide estimates of resource requirements to the supported combatant commander, component commands, and others as required.
  • Establish positive controls over funding authority received.
  • Coordinate with the JTF J-4 to develop a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.
  • Coordinate with the JTF SJA office on funding authority issues.
  • Handle reimbursement for services (e.g., medical services) provided to multinational forces and others.
  • Prepare Appendix 3 Finance and Disbursing of ANNEX E (Personnel) of your OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.
h. Chaplain

“Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many young people and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. In some cases, religious self-understanding may play a determinative or regulating role on policy, strategy, or tactics. It is important for the joint force commander (JFC) to have an understanding of the religious groups and movements within the operational area and the potential impact that they may have on the accomplishment of the assigned mission.”

Joint Pub 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations

- Recommend deployment of chaplain ministry teams as early as feasible.

- The JTF chaplain has responsibilities associated with almost all facets of an operation. For example the chaplain:
  - Advises you on religion, morals, ethics, and morale.
  - Performs ministry according to his or her respective faith group and Service practices and standards, expanding the spectrum of professional expectations to meet the requirements.
  - Ensures that task force religious support personnel of all Services receive professional assistance, program funding, and logistics and personnel through appropriate JTF staff channels; establishes and coordinates a Task Force Religious Ministry Support Plan that will provide adequate chaplain coverage to all elements of the task force; and recommends personnel replacement or rotational policies to cognizant JTF staff agencies.
  - Assists humanitarian agencies and CA with humanitarian and disaster-relief programs.
  - Ensures that detained persons receive ministry and care appropriate to their needs.
  - Prepares Appendix 6 (Chaplain Activities) to ANNEX E of your OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.
  - The chaplain also may be better attuned to the religious sensitivities in the JOA which in peace operations may be a major factor in reaching the desired end state.
  - Additionally, the chaplain provides confidentiality and privileged communications in counseling for JTF personnel—imperative for stress management, morale, and early identification of critical personnel problems.

6. Other Staff Requirement Considerations

a. The successful commander integrates other functions (e.g., civilian organizations, political representatives, and military) into the staff and planning process. The following are additional staffing considerations.

  - Linguists and Interpreters. They are critical to mission success.
You must identify the requirement for linguists and interpreters as early as possible because of the scarcity of these assets and the long-lead time required to deploy them. (Historically, the timely and complete sourcing of linguists and interpreters has been a problem that significantly impacted both personnel tempo and JTF operations.)

Communications with the local populace and multinational forces can be greatly hindered without linguists or interpreter support. The ability to communicate in English should not be considered a given.

These assets often are in the Reserve Component and must be requested early to ensure availability and timeliness for deployment and employment.

In past operations (e.g., Operations DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, and JOINT ENDEAVOR), the US military used contracted interpreters to support operations. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions will invariably require military linguists with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, JTF components may require parent Service or other Service augmentation.

- **JTF Liaison Personnel**

“During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit’s capabilities, and make recommendations.”

-Lieutenant General C. W. Stiner, USA
Commander, Joint Task Force South
Operation JUST CAUSE

You must identify the requirement for liaison personnel and request them at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel also should be noted. The requirement may be for liaison cells vice individuals because of the many required functions that must be covered on a 24-hour basis.

The JTF should establish a familiarization program for all liaison personnel—a JPRC could perform this requirement. You must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to the JTF HQ for duty (e.g., DCJTF, chief of staff, or J-3).

The maximum use of liaison personnel will enhance interoperability and contribute significantly to mission success.

Liaison personnel should be established between the JTF HQ and
higher commands, between adjacent units, and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces, and other appropriate host nation (HN) and IO, and the JTF HQ. (1) Liaison personnel to the JTF HQ perform their duties within the JTF staff division that is normally responsible for JTF functions related to the liaison personnel’s assigned duties. (2) They are representatives of their commanders and normally will attend briefings and maintain close contact with the JTF joint operations center. (3) It would be advantageous to the JTF during support to UN operations that liaison personnel be placed at the United Nations HQ in New York and the United Nations office in Geneva, Switzerland.

**LIAISON FUNCTIONS**

Monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist the command to which attached.

- Liaison personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services. Without these qualifications they are of little value to the gaining HQ.

- Component liaison personnel to the JTF HQ should be of sufficient rank (recommend grade of 0-6) to influence the decisionmaking process. (1) Liaison personnel may be authorized to answer certain routine CJTF queries on behalf of their commands. (2) In addition, you should not formally task components through the component liaison personnel to the JTF HQ. Formal tasking of components should be accomplished through normal C2 channels.

- **Command Historian.** All too often, key events, important decisions, and “how to’s” of an operation are not recorded and thus not available for use as learning tools for future JTFs.

> “The historian needs the same immediate, routine access to command meetings and sources as the legal advisor, public affairs officer, political advisor, and operations officer. Without directly observing discussions and actions, the historian only can produce a general organizational overview. That record will neither permit a detailed analysis of lessons nor support the commander if his judgment is later challenged on specific decisions and outcomes. And the commander can expect his judgment to be challenged.”

> Captain J. W. Williams, USNR
Implementation Force Historian

- To remedy this situation, consideration should be given to establishing a small staff section to collect historical information covering the many aspects of an operation from the initial planning process to redeployment. A lessons learned cell may serve the same purpose.

- This section would be headed by a command historian who could be responsible for capturing and recording JTF events for historical purposes, collecting lessons learned, ensuring turnover files are properly developed, and assisting in the development of SOP. (1) This process would include collecting and cataloguing photographs. (2) Additionally, the historian would ensure a daily record is kept on all important events. (3) To be credible—hence, useful to the commander—the historical record must be created at the time of an event and must include the sources available at the time, as well as a synopsis of rationales for the course of action adopted.

- Cognizance of this staff section will
be as directed by you. (1) This staff section probably would require some independence to be effective. (2) It also should not become entangled in the decisionmaking process.

- Other methods may be available to record historical data but having a single staff section dedicated to accomplishing this task would appear to be more productive and practical.

- **Command Stenographer**
  - The command stenographer allows for the transcription of comments and discussions at your daily situation or staff briefings.
  - The stenographer also can transcribe discussions at key decisionmaking sessions.

  All three commanders of the Implementation Force [Bosnia] acquired such a stenographer and found them extremely useful.

  - Transcripts should be reviewed, corrected, and validated by yourself or designee. Transcripts, combined with a copy of briefing slides and briefer notes or information papers, provide a common, verified reference for you and the staff. Ultimately these items should pass to the historian for the permanent record. These items may provide the only reliable record of decisionmaking.

- **Contracting Officer**
  - It is essential to have contracting personnel as part of your organization.
  - Contracting is essential in providing supplies, services, and equipment that cannot be deployed from home station.

  - For the JTF to successfully conduct contracting, highly trained contracting personnel are required.


- **Joint Planning Group**
  - The expeditionary nature of most recent and probably most future JTF operations requires great flexibility in both planning and execution of these operations. J-3 and J-5 personnel in particular must work closely together to ensure your intent is captured in planning and implemented in execution.

  - Formation of a JPG will facilitate these efforts.

  - The decision on the organization and functions of the JPG should be determined by you at the onset of organizing the JTF.

  - Furthermore, it must be made clear how the JPG and staff sections (especially the J-3 and J-5) will interact during planning and once operations commence.

  - Suggested purposes for the JPG are to conduct crisis action planning, be the focal point for OPORD or campaign plan development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed. Another option available for future planning is to establish a “future operations cell” under the JTF J-3.

  - JPG is composed of representatives from appropriate JTF staff sections, components (Service and functional), and others as deemed necessary.

• **Joint Visitors Bureau.** The anticipated influx of visitors to a JOA may warrant the establishment of a JTF JVB.

  • This bureau can assist in handling all visitors but especially distinguished visitors—usually a full-time responsibility.

  "Visitors can also place demands on your time. They all think they are important. Prime ministers, ministers of defence, chiefs of staff, chiefs of police, diplomats, politicians, the media, staff from UN Headquarters—they will visit a mission area in droves. All of them want to see the commander. It takes a lot of patience and a lot of endurance, and your time and schedule is very difficult to manage but, remember, you also have to be out there with the troops from time to time."

  **Major-General Clive Milner, Canadian Army (RET)***

  • A senior officer should be the director of the JVB. Reservists with a protocol background have been used in this position in past operations.

  • The JVB should be established as a separate entity and not as part of the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) or PA office. It can work directly for you, DCJTF, or chief of staff.

  • It should be comprised of representatives from the components.

  • Possessing sufficient communications and transportation capability is vital to the JVB.

  • Personnel assigned to the JVB may require security training (e.g., executive protection, antiterrorism, patrolling, communications) and training in the proper handling of distinguished visitors.

• **Automated Data Processing Operators**

  • Your staff should include experienced operators for the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and JOPES.

  • These individuals will be major contributors in assisting with deployment and redeployment of forces and managing the time-phased force and deployment data.


• **Civil-Military Relations.** Chapter II, “Civil-Military Relations,” of this Handbook discusses civil-military relations.

• **Intelligence.** See Chapter VII, “Intelligence Support,” of this Handbook.

• **Multinational Members.** US-led JTFs should expect to participate as part of a multinational force in most future peace operations. In this instance multinational members should be part of the JTF HQ staff.

  • This may allow you to gain insight into the capabilities of their respective forces early in an operation and also benefit from their expertise. A policy for releasing classified information to multinational staff members will be required.

  • Multinational members should be treated with trust and respect—the US staff members will follow your lead.

b. The military staff that remains narrowly focused may hinder success—any signs of “stovepipe” thinking should be eliminated.
7. General

a. Special Operations Forces. SOF are very valuable assets to a JTF. They possess unique capabilities and often are capable of achieving success where more conventional forces may falter. SOF are area oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures found in the JOA. SOF units can assist you with liaison and Coalition Support Teams to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When the use of SOF is considered, it is very important to understand the capabilities of SOF and to properly apply those capabilities. For further details, see Joint Pubs 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” and 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”

b. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC)

- You may designate a JFSOCC to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA.
  - JFSOCC normally will be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2.
  - Normally, the JFSOCC is the commander of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). (1) Usually, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces. (2) JFSOCC allocates forces against strategic or operational tasks and in support of other JTF component commanders based on guidance from the CJTF.

- You may define a JSOA for use by the JSOTF. The establishment of a JSOA may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

c. Two capabilities of SOF that, at times, are overlooked are CA and PSYOP.

“Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a tremendous success, and JTF-Alpha’s Special Forces Teams were the only ones who could have accomplished the mission in the mountains.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned Number 92-6 Dec 92

“The former supporting functions of civil affairs and psychological operations will become a centerpiece of peace operations and a much more critical part of your daily responsibilities.”

Anonymous
Operation RESTORE HOPE

- The implementation of CA and PSYOP operations is your responsibility.

- CA and PSYOP personnel and units are force multipliers and should become an integral part of mission planning. The United States Special Operations Command includes all active and reserve special operations, US Army psychological operations, and civil affairs forces (except for Marine Corps Reserve Civil Affairs Groups) stationed in the United States. Active component CA personnel are “generalists” who provide a quick response CA capability to the JTF. They may require augmentation by
CA specialists from the Reserve Component who may not be immediately available for deployment or employment. PSYOP capabilities within the active component include both planning and execution assets that are regionally oriented and immediately deployable.

- You must determine where in the JTF organization these assets best fit—as functional components, under the J-3, or some other structure. Both the CA and PSYOP supporting operations developed by the respective staff officers of the JTF are integrated into the operation order by the J-3. Due to the political sensitivity of these areas, approval authority for these operations normally remains with the NCA or Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (OASD (SO/LIC)). However, the implementation of these operations remains with you.

- At the earliest opportunity, you must identify to the JTF establishing authority the requirement for CA and PSYOP units and staff augmentation.

  - These units often require Reserve Component augmentation to be fully capable. This should be taken into consideration when requesting these assets because of the process and lead time necessary to obtain them.

  - The legal limitations of reserve call-up must be explored. Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” provides insight into additional methods of force expansion (e.g., use of volunteers and Presidential Selected Reserve Callup).

  “I think all our conventional leaders and commanders need to understand and work more closely with Special Operations forces—Special Forces Operational Detachments, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP teams. This marriage must occur; we’ve got to force it. We cannot succeed on the modern battlefield without cooperation among these elements.”

  Brigadier General L. Magruder, III, USA Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training Center

- CA, PSYOP, and PA actions can dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations. CA actions should reinforce (and be reinforced by) PSYOP themes and actions. PSYOP themes and actions should be coordinated with PAO initiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy (real or perceived).

- It is particularly important to bring functional activities not normally associated with your staff to their attention since most staffs are concerned with “warfighting” vice “peace operations.”

8. Civil Affairs

a. CA encompasses the activities that you take to establish and maintain relations between your forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and
Chapter III

institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where your forces are employed.

- You plan and conduct CA activities to facilitate military operations and help achieve political-military objectives derived from US national security interests. In multinational operations, political-military objectives will be derived from some sort of compromise between participating nations.

- Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may entail interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies as part of your mission.

- These activities may occur before, during, subsequent to, or in the absence of other military actions.

b. Civil-Military Operations

- The term “civil-military operations” is a broad, generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of your mission. CMO range from support to combat operations to traditional nonmilitary roles assisting countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability.

- CMO are undertaken to encourage the development of a country’s material and human resources to assist in achieving US and host-government political, economic, and psychological objectives. CMO involve liaison and coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and among US forces and other government agencies as well as NGO or PVO.

- A variety of types of units, including engineer, medical, intelligence, security, special forces, PSYOP, CA, communications, and transportation provide capabilities, in varying degrees, to plan and conduct CMO and achieve political, economic, and psychological objectives.

- Dedicated CA forces, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host-nation advisory and assistance activities, as well as in civil-oriented functions paralleling governmental functions, are essential in CMO designed to secure support from the civilian population, fulfill essential civil requirements consistent with military missions, and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and HN counterparts and governments.

- As a fundamental precept, CMO should be closely coordinated with the Country Team and other USG agencies. Most military responses or efforts, especially those in MOOTW, require the military-civil partnership that successful CMO provide. Successful CMO should use military CA functional specialty skills but do not necessarily require their use. In all cases, actions by the Armed Forces of the United States should support the host or friendly country’s control over CMO programs and enhance popular perceptions of its stability and legitimacy.

- Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. JCMOTF is normally a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or JTF, flexible in size and composition depending on mission circumstances. It may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission. You may organize JCMOTFs
to perform some or all of the following CMO-relevant functions:

- Provide C2 or direction of military HN advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Help establish US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater understanding and efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements and promote unity of effort.
- Perform essential coordination or liaison with HN agencies, Country Team, UN agencies, other USG agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and HN military forces and supporting logistics organizations.
- Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Plan and conduct joint and multinational CMO training exercises.
- Allocate resources and sustain and coordinate combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities.
- Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other USG agency, international organization, or HN responsibility.
- Assess or identify HN civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the supported combatant commander.
- Advise you on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or HN sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.

### c. CA Support to Military Operations

- Although the types of operations differ across the range of military operations, the basic CA objectives and CA-relevant functions of commanders, staffs, and supporting CA elements and personnel remain the same.
- CA functional capabilities that span the range of military operations include, but are not limited to, any combination of the following:
  - Preparing CA assessments, estimates, agreements, and annexes in accordance with JOPES—CA personnel are responsible for developing ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) of your OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.
  - Assisting in the planning and coordination of logistics activities. CA activities plan for the following logistics activities: (1) Support for military forces from civilian resources to include such items as subsistence, water, billeting, cargo handling, transportation, limited spare parts, emergency medical support, and both skilled and unskilled labor. (2) Facilitate host-nation support (HNS) and contracting to US and/or friendly forces in multinational operations following guidance and procedures specified in the supported combatant commander’s OPLAN. (3) Support requirements and sourcing
(estimated in OPLAN) for civilian population and agencies. (4) Assist, supervise, or control self-supporting civilian sector operations.

- **Assisting commanders**, in coordination with the CJTF’s SJA, in fulfilling lawful and humanitarian obligations to the civil or indigenous population and ensuring CA activities are consistent with international law, including the law of armed conflict, treaty obligations, and US law.

- **Minimizing local population interference** with US military operations by coordinating with civil agencies or authorities to implement population and resource controls.

- **Supporting and coordinating CMO**, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, in concert with DOD elements, other USG agencies, foreign or HN authorities, and NGO and PVO to reduce serious threat to health, life, and property and to project positive US influence in the JOA.

- **Assisting in** the establishment and maintenance of liaison or dialogue with indigenous personnel, agencies, and/or civilian organizations to support national and regional information programs and other efforts that favorably portray US or multinational military operations.

d. For further detail see Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

9. **Psychological Operations**

a. PSYOP are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities. These all impact on peace operations.

b. The **Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or designee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)** reviews and approves all PSYOP programs. The supported combatant commander’s PSYOP staff officer is the conduit for achieving this permission and the PSYOP forces required to execute PSYOP.

c. Ensure you have and exercise approval authority over PSYOP products, activities, and programs. Coordination between PAO, CA, political advisor, and PSYOP is imperative. While the PAO effort is focused towards the international and US media, PSYOP efforts are directed towards achieving your objectives through communicating with the local and regional audience.

d. PSYOP are employed by you to communicate with the local and target audiences. Some critical objectives of PSYOP may include:

- Enhancing safety and security of the force by: (1) Explaining the JTF mission and forestalling the development of false expectations. (2) Providing a nonthreatening means for communicating with the local populace.

- Facilitating the conduct of operations by providing you with the forum for providing instructions to the local populace.
e. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

- You may determine through the mission analysis process that a JPOTF is required to coordinate PSYOP activities in the JOA.

- JPOTF is task organized in accordance with requirements of the supported commanders and may include all or some of the following elements: loudspeaker teams, Product Development Center, C2 element, and print, radio, and/or television production and broadcast elements.

- JPOTF may provide the following capability.
  - Advise you on PSYOP.
  - Conduct PSYOP planning and execution.
  - Analyze various COA.
  - Produce PSYOP products.
  - Coordinate with other subordinate task forces and components to ensure the most efficient support is provided to you.
  - Conduct PSYOP dissemination operations.
  - Evaluate the results of PSYOP.
  - Conduct liaison with HN agencies and other USG organizations.
  - Establish combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on your guidance.

f. PSYOP personnel are responsible for developing Appendix 4 Psychological Operations of ANNEX C (Operations) of your OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

g. For further detail see Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
CHAPTER IV
JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

“\text{The tools that have been developed to help us fight our wars do not need to be changed; they work and work well. The key is to train leaders at every level to be flexible, mentally agile, and able to adapt their learnings to the environment in which they find themselves. They must take the time to study and understand the military, political, economical, and social environment. Additionally [in the event of a UN operation], they must understand the unique nature of the UN and its system of operation and organization.}”

Major General J. W. Kinzer, USA
Force Commander, United Nations Mission in Haiti

SECTION A. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. General

a. You must establish unity of command throughout the JTF’s organizational structure and procedures. The success of the peace operation begins with you having the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.

- To accomplish your mission, you will have to refocus your thinking from “warfighting” to peace operations, particularly for peacekeeping. This should not be interpreted as de-emphasizing warfighting. It simply means that peace operations have uncertainties that require a different view.

- The commander with vision and a total understanding of the “big picture” is more apt to be successful in peace operations than the commander who is narrowly and solely focused on warfighting. The major objective of a peace operation is a \text{settlement}, not a victory. All concerned parties must recognize there is more to gain from peace than conflict. Achieving this goal exceeds the abilities of any military force; hence, the need to understand the “big picture” and its political and economic facets.

“\text{One cannot succeed with peace operations if one allows subordinate commanders and men in the field to give way to their natural inclinations, and act the way they are trained to act in war. With proper measures, good commanders can make the distinction understood up and down the line, and do so without losing the ability to respond fast and forcefully should there be a situation which calls for it.}”

Ambassador R. Oakley
President’s Special Envoy for Somalia

b. An important first step for you is to immediately establish connectivity with higher authority (e.g., the supported combatant commander, UN representative, regional organization representative).

- The earlier this connectivity is established, the more enhanced capability will be available to you and the JTF staff.
Higher authority (e.g., the supported combatant commander) holds the key to obtaining forces, equipment, information, and other assets and data. Your personal daily contact with this individual or organization is critical.

This is especially important because you must be prepared to accept the responsibility for detailed planning and immediate execution. An initial response to the situation may be required in a very short period—US forces may be the only force initially available for employment. Sound staff organization will help in the planning and execution process.

Your planning should consider that force requirements normally are based on the capability required to gain control of the situation and effect the desired end state.

“Our military’s successes in Haiti and Bosnia came because they established, through intimidation and the threat of overwhelming force, a secure environment through the exercise of military power and military prowess ....”

For the Record
Washington Post

The supported combatant commander also can help in limiting the number of nonessential US military personnel (“strap-hangers”) in the projected JOA. You cannot afford to become a “tourist bureau.”

2. Chain of Command

a. US Policy:

The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. The JTF will remain within the US chain of command.

b. UN Policy:

UN peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council and fall under its authority. The Secretary-General is responsible to the Security Council for the organization, conduct,
and direction of the operation, and he or she alone reports to the Security Council. To better direct and control UN peacekeeping operations, the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) was established.

- The Special Representative of the Secretary-General usually will be the head of mission in a UN conducted peace operation. This representative is the UN’s “power broker” as the US ambassador is in a US run operation.

  - The JTF will be under the operational control of the UN force commander, however it will remain within the US chain of command.

  - As the CJTF, you may not be dual-hatted as the UN force commander. If not, your authority and influence in a UN operation will have to be tempered as a member of the UN team.

  c. Department of Peace-Keeping Operations. The following is a synopsis of the responsibilities of the DPKO. You will be coordinating with this department in the event that you are involved in a UN peacekeeping operation.

    - DPKO is responsible for the planning, conduct and direction of all UN field operations and as such serves as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all UN field operations, in particular, the management and direction of peacekeeping operations. Figure IV-2 highlights some of the responsibilities of the DPKO.
• DPKO Situation Centre. The Situation Centre was formed in the DPKO, to provide situation monitoring and exchange of information services between the UN HQ in New York and UN field missions worldwide. The mandate for this Centre has been described as follows:

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

• Formulates policies and procedures, based on Security Council decisions, for the establishment of new peacekeeping operations and the effective functioning of ongoing operations.

• Secures, through negotiations with Governments, military units and equipment as well as other military, police and civilian personnel required for peacekeeping operations.

• Develops operational plans and methodologies for multidimensional operations to include election-monitoring.

• Undertakes contingency planning for possible new peacekeeping operations and related activities.

• Proposes resource requirements for these operations to the Controller for preparation and submission of budgets to the legislative bodies for approval.

• Monitors and controls regular budget and extrabudgetary funds related to peacekeeping activities.

• Provides logistics and administrative support for field operations.

• Maintains contacts with the parties to the conflicts and the members of the Security Council concerning the effective implementation of the Security Council’s decisions.

• Liaisons with Member States, United Nations agencies and nongovernmental organizations and coordinates with other entities concerning their participation in peacekeeping operations and special missions.

• Prepares the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly on individual peacekeeping operations and on questions of peacekeeping in general.

• Provides substantive and secretariat services to the Special Committee on peacekeeping operations and prepares training guidelines and principles for Member States.

Figure IV-2. Responsibilities of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
“The Situation Room [renamed Situation Centre] is intended to speed up, complement, and amplify the information flows generated in the field to facilitate timely decisions by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations. Its role is to maintain communications links with all missions, to solicit information from the field as well as to process and analyze raw incoming information... Its staff, organized in teams to provide coverage around the clock, will screen incoming information, respond immediately to factual queries, judge when to contact senior decision makers and to summarize incoming information... (In the final stage) the Situation Room [Situation Centre] will also be in a position to provide daily briefings to senior managers, present spontaneous briefings upon request, maintain constant situation displays and continuous event monitoring and display.... with reference to relevant information using maps, statistics and basic political, military and economic information as well as access to in-house and public data bases.”

- Figure IV-3 depicts some of the tasks of the Situation Centre.

**d. Additional Considerations:**

- In multinational peace operations, there probably will be parallel chains of command—national and military.

- National interests undoubtedly will have an impact on military decision-making. As discussed in other sections of this book, multinational operations are affected by each participating country’s political agendas. The national interests of Troop Contributing Nations regarding the operation are usually described in the

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**SITUATION CENTRE’S TASKS**

- Provide a point of contact--24 hours per day.
- Maintain uninterrupted communications with all UN peacekeeping missions and be able to communicate with all other UN-missions around the globe.
- Collate and disseminate timely raw information.
- Develop in coordination with UN HQ services. Enhanced communications, data processing and multiple visual display facilities.
- Prepare consolidated summaries.
- Develop an in-house capability to amplify and synthesize the information flow from the field.
- Monitor developing regional situations around the world, that could affect the general security and safety of UN personnel, using all available news media and UN information channels.
- Provide a Crisis-Centre in the event that a peacekeeping mission has to be implemented on a short notice, or a crisis occurs in one of the established missions or elsewhere.

- Development of a written document (e.g., annex to OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan) outlining command relationships is essential.

- Figures in Appendix C of this Handbook depict typical chain of command structures.

3. Interagency and Political Coordination

a. The Chief of Mission (i.e., the Ambassador) has authority over all elements of the USG in country, except certain elements of the Armed Forces.

   “Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have the full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of the US area military commander.”

   22 USC 3827 (A)

b. The ambassador is the senior representative of the President in foreign nations and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG personnel in-country. The ambassador integrates the programs and resources of USG agencies represented on the country team.

c. Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

d. For the Department of Defense, in the political-military domain, this involves:

   - Bilateral and multilateral military relationships.

   - Humanitarian and peace operations (including all UN operations).

   - Treaties involving DOD interests.

   - Armaments cooperation and control.

   - Technology transfer.

e. You must establish an effective relationship with your political advisor. Acting together, you should assist the NCA in crafting policies that meet national objectives and can be realistically executed. Additionally, you and the US Ambassador acting as the country team leader should maintain a close working relationship. Your political advisor acts as the principal contact with the Ambassador.

f. You must coordinate political issues with the Ambassador and the supported combatant commander. This will ensure that issues receive due attention from the Interagency Working Group that advises the NCA. This group maintains a broad perspective on the crisis without letting parochial views dominate decisions affecting JTF’s operations.

g. Recognize that any modern peace operation will be a complex contingency. A complex contingency occurs whenever a peace operation occurs in conjunction with a humanitarian assistance operation. The majority of modern peace operations will be complex contingencies and you should plan accordingly.

h. Understand the difference between the US Defense Attaché Office, the Security Assistance Organization, the Country Team, and the DART.
KEY TERMS

US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO)—Service attaches comprise the USDAO. The Defense Attaché (DATT) is normally the senior Service attach assigned to the embassy. While keeping the combatant commander informed of their activities, DATTs are rated and funded by the Defense Intelligence Agency. These attaches are valuable liaisons to their host nation (HN) counterparts. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches assist the foreign internal defense (FID) program by exchanging information with the combatant commander’s staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions.

Security Assistance Organization (SAO)—The SAO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the Ambassador. The SAO — which may be comprised of a military assistance advisory group or liaison group, other military activity, or a single security assistance officer — reports to the US Ambassador but is rated by the combatant commander and funded by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance (SA) program. SA offices also help the US country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the US Government. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. The SAO is excepted by law from giving direct training assistance. Instead, training is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, quality assurance teams).

Country Team—The United States country team is “the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission.” (Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Directory of Military and Associated Terms.”) It includes representatives of all US departments and agencies present in the country. The US Ambassador, synonymous with chief of mission, represents the President but takes policy guidance from the Secretary of State through regional bureaus. The Ambassador is responsible for all US activities within the country to which the United States is accredited, and interprets US policies and strategy regarding the nation. The composition of the country team varies widely depending on specific US national interests in the country, the desires of the chief of mission, the situation within the country, and the number and level of presence of US agencies. Agencies represented on the country team can include US Agency for International Development; Department of Defense, through the Defense Attaché and Security Assistance Organization; US Information Agency, through the local US Information Service office; US Customs Service; Peace Corps representatives; US Coast Guard; US Immigration and Naturalization Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Legal Attaché; et al. The country team facilitates interagency action on recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of US programs and policies.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)—United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected country; nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations; United Nations; other assisting countries; and US military assets deployed to the disaster. The structure of a DART is dependent on the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster, and the needs of USAID and/or the Embassy, and the affected country. The DART is organized and supervised by a DART Team Leader selected by OFDA. The team leader receives a delegation of authority from and works directly for the OFDA Assistant Director for Disaster Response or higher designee.
i. Try to include local government, if one exists, in all support operations.

j. Working within the interagency and political arena requires patience and a willingness to be the consummate team player.

4. Multinational Operations

a. To be successful in multinational operations, it is imperative that sound and effective command relationships are developed. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance can assist combatant commanders in assessing other countries capabilities to participate in peace operations. Figure IV-4 highlights multinational C2 variables.

b. As with the United States, most other nations are not willing to relinquish command of their forces to other countries. Your challenge, as the JTF commander, will be to arrange the best possible working relationship with multinational forces. There is no "perfect solution" to this situation.

c. In developing this relationship, it is important to remember that multinational operations do offer political legitimacy, especially in peace operations.

  • Legitimacy builds and sustains the willing acceptance by the international community, the US public, and the indigenous populace of the right of the sponsoring authority to take action.

  • Loss of acceptance by any one of the above groups will limit or jeopardize the effectiveness of operations.

d. An initial challenge for you will be to understand and work in an environment where some foreign nations harbor resentment toward the United States because of a perceived attitude that the United States is pursuing a world dominance role. Additionally, some nations also may feel that the United States approach to operations is “if it ain’t done our way, it ain’t done right.” This attitude, if prevalent, can only disrupt the team building required in multinational operations.

e. An issue that may evolve concerns the transfer of authority of multinational forces to your control—nations may not agree on when the transfer should occur. The earlier you gain control the more flexibility you will have in conducting operations.

f. Consensus building is an extremely important task. You are the key to an effective team. Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni stated from his Somalia experiences: “In multinational operations the goal is to ensure compatibility between coalition partners.”

g. The goal of compatibility is at the political, military, and cultural levels. You should be able to address the following questions.

  • What are the political motivations that are responsible for each nation’s participation in the operation? What potential conflicts may arise?

  • Have you considered interoperability of all the factors that make the mission possible (e.g., command, control, and communications, logistics)?

  • Are there cultural barriers that may prevent a harmonious relationship? Have you considered a force structure that minimizes friction between partners?

h. In multinational operations, unity of effort must be achieved.
"Unity of effort in peace operations must stem from an understanding that policy comes first. The military is an instrument of national policy in the truest Clauswitzian sense during peace operations."

**US Army Infantry School White Paper**

i. The principle of unity of command also applies to MOOTW, but this principle may be more difficult to attain.

- In peace operations, other government agencies often have the lead.

- You may report to a civilian chief and employ resources of a civilian agency.

- Command arrangements often may be loosely defined and many times will not involve command authority as normally understood.

- You should consider how your actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature.

- Because peace operations often will be conducted at the small unit level, it is important all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.
In Somalia UNITAF operations were, in part, successful because “unity of effort was maintained because the United States set the agenda, and ensured coalition partners agreed to the mission’s objectives and were prepared to follow the US Lead.”

j. A simplified command structure at the mission level is helpful in achieving unity of effort.

k. As discussed in Chapter I, “Mission,” multinational political and military objectives will probably have an impact on most operations. Each country will have its own political agenda and will follow it.

l. When working with multinational forces, it may be more productive to conduct separate discussions with national commanders. This allows each commander the opportunity to express that nation’s views. Your professional and personal relationship with each country is very important and at times can influence a reluctant country to provide more assistance.

m. Many countries are not staffed or equipped to offer a full spectrum of support.

• They may not possess:
  • A full array of combat support or combat service support assets.
  • Maps of the projected JOA.
  • The capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by US forces.

• This will require you to be even more descriptive when providing information to such multinational forces.

• These military forces probably will look to the United States for equipment and supplies. It is important to know what agreements exist between the United Nations and these militaries before their arrival in the projected JOA.

n. The United States can offer special capabilities (e.g., airlift; special operations; intelligence collection; command, control, and communications; security; logistics) which can offset other countries’ shortfalls and enhance overall operational capability.

o. There may be operational pauses based on the ability of a multinational force to work together smoothly. The transition from one event to the next may not always occur as planned.

p. You may have difficulty removing a particular force or individual from a multinational force unless they are from your own nation.

5. Communications

a. If you want to communicate, you must bring the capability with you. This should include the capability to communicate using voice (secure and nonsecure), data, and video teleconferencing (commonly referred to as VTC).

b. JTF cannot deploy, sustain itself, or redeploy without access to JOPES via GCCS. JTF must have a deployable GCCS capability and sufficiently trained operators for sustained operations. You also must have multiple means of communicating to avoid the possibility of a single point failure.

c. The ability to communicate with all military forces, NGO, PVO, IO, UN agencies, HN agencies, religious organizations, and other organizations involved in the peace operation is essential.
Joint Task Force Command Responsibilities

- The transition to follow-on units, commercial communications, or to agencies like the United Nations must be considered early in the operation.

- **Noncompatibility of communication equipment among organizations and multinational forces has been a problem in previous peace operations.**

- Be prepared to offer communications access through the CMOC to NGO and PVO. Such an offer will encourage them to work with you and the JTF.

- Depending on the situation, communications with multinational forces, NGO, PVO, IO, OFDA, or DART should be established **early in the operation.**

- Nonmilitary agencies may have communications networks established for their uses.

- These networks may include commercial leased circuits, commercial based satellite services (such as International Maritime Satellite Organization) as well as high frequency and very high frequency radios.

- Civilian organizations and other agencies may want to use military communications assets once they are established. You may need to establish a policy concerning this use.

- You should address the need for secure communications and requirements to control cryptographic materials.

- A policy for the release of classified communications information should be introduced **early in the operation.** Recognize that NGO and PVO will require some form of access to normally classified material in order to accomplish their missions. Remember these organizations can be force multipliers if they have enough information around which to structure their efforts.

- The mission analysis and assessment process provides the opportunity for your J-6 to identify communications requirements and evaluate in-country capability. Consider the following questions when conducting the assessment.

  - What is the requirement for cellular telephones, land mobile radios, or other portable communications devices?

  - Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by your forces?

  - If you establish a JVB, what commercial communications capability is required?

  - Who will be responsible for the funding of additional communications equipment or capability?

  - Will you be expected to provide communications capability to other military forces, civilian organizations, US political agencies, news media?

  - Have you planned for expansion?

  - What is the policy on morale calls? Will you be required to support morale calls?

- **Additional communications considerations:**

  - Spectrum management. Frequency management must be identified and planned. Ensure that you account for frequencies already in use by NGO, PVO, UN agencies, HN agencies, religious organizations, and other organizations involved in the operation.

  - Automated data processing software compatibility is recommended to facilitate transfer of files.
• Interoperability. A system should be developed that satisfies communications requirements from the NCA to the lowest information exchange requirement.

• If non-military groups like NGO, PVO, or IO have separate communications networks, but part of the JTF mission is to provide security for these organizations, it will be important to establish procedures for how they make requests for assistance during emergencies.

• Redundancy. Multiple assets must be available and used during peace operations to ensure information flow.


6. Additional Considerations

a. The uncertainty of peace operations may require you to be more proactive in dealing with all levels of your command.

b. It is essential that “the troops” fully understand the mission, goals, and objectives of the operation.

“\textit{It is all about trust—up, down, and all around.}”

\textbf{Major General C. F. Ernst, USA}\textbf{\textit{CJTF Somalia}}

c. A set of instructions should be developed to cover those features of operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness—standing operating procedure. These instructions should be easy to understand and be “joint and/or multinational.”

d. There will be lots of rules to be worked out—normally, these will not be in your field of view. Nonetheless, you still should provide a forum for deconfliction and resolution. As the commander, you must have a way to communicate with all the participants.

• This will require more than simply providing a platform to express ideas.

• The simple fact is that there will be personnel, to include commanders from multinational forces, who do not have a working understanding of the English language.

**Affirmative responses do not necessarily mean a total understanding of your direction, guidance, or intent to comply.**

• In Somalia, models in the form of “sand tables” were used by some commanders as an effective tool to overcome language deficiencies when describing operational requirements. Regardless of the mechanism used to enhance understanding, it still will take extraordinary patience and detailed explanations by you and your staff to enhance mission success.

• Terminology will be another problem between multinational forces and other organizations (such as NGO and PVO).

“\textit{Differences in defining terminology results in differences in procedures.}”

\textbf{Captain Peter Feist, German Navy}\textbf{\textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization Joint Analysis Team}}

• A lexicon of mutually agreed terminology should be developed to ensure enhanced operability and maximum understanding by all peace

\textit{operators.}
operations militaries, NGO, PVO, religious organizations, and others. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” and the glossary in this Handbook can help provide a common basis for understanding.

“The units participating in Peace Support Operations could have easier going if all were using the ‘Peacekeeping’ words in the same way. Today, different defense forces are using the very same expression with different meanings. If we are going to create a real Joint and Combined force for Peace Support Operations, we need to solve the terminology problem.”

LtCol Alf Gorsjo, Swedish Army Swedish Armed Forces International Centre

“Military success in coalition warfare depends on the ability of American commanders to harmonize the capabilities, doctrines, and logistics of forces from various cultures.”

Captain T. J. Pudas, USN JFQ Forum Winter 93-94

• Widest distribution of mutually agreeable terminology is essential.

• Maximum use of liaison officers also will enhance interoperability and unity of effort. (1) At the earliest opportunity, identify the requirement for liaison personnel, linguists, and foreign area specialists to the supported combatant commander. (2) SOF with cross-cultural and language skills working with multinational forces can prove to be a valuable asset. Do not leave “home” without them—they are that important. (3) In multinational operations, incompatible communications equipment makes it imperative that liaison personnel are used. It is essential that liaison personnel have equipment compatible with the JTF. (4) Saturating multinational forces with intelligent and articulate liaison personnel will greatly enhance unity of effort. (5) JTF liaison officers stationed at the United Nations mission HQ can be a valuable source for information and planning assistance. (6) Multinational liaison officers assigned to the JTF often are senior military officers who can provide better coordination because they speak with authority and understand their individual countries’ interests. Integrating multinational liaison personnel into the JTF staff is totally dependent on your desires. Security considerations may inhibit this process.

e. The location of the JTF HQ is very important. You must be able to protect it—be prepared to fight to defend it.

f. You should be in a position to easily work with both the political and military sides of the operation. Coordination at all levels is a requirement, and being close to the United States Diplomatic Mission may provide the potential to enhance military operational capability.

g. You need to know all policies that have been established by Department of State and Department of Defense prior to deployment.

h. Your efforts to coordinate the many aspects of peace operations will be based upon your ability to work within the framework that is established by the integrated military, political, and humanitarian strategy. This will have to be balanced with the many divergent objectives presented from these same three spheres of influence (see Figure IV-5).
INTEGRATED STRATEGY VERSUS DIVERGENT OBJECTIVES

Figure IV-5. Integrated Strategy versus Divergent Objectives
7. General

a. Although not one of your primary duties, you will probably find yourself in the role of a negotiator, mediator, or even arbitrator at some point during operations. Each role requires different attributes, but there are many common ones and this section focuses on those common attributes and techniques. Experience has shown that leaders at all levels conduct negotiations in a peace operation. For example, you may be negotiating for rights of passage; mediating between hostile factions; or bartering for use of facilities, buildings, roads, and services. As you think about the process of negotiation, guide your analysis with the following concepts:

b. Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. It is important to understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature.

- In peace operations, it is essential to maintain dialogue with all parties, groups, and organizations—including of course the government if one exists, but also the opposition or various factions or militias.

- It also is important not to allow any one incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied)—creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a resolution.

c. Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. It is a way to advance your interests by jointly decided action. You need the cooperation of the other parties; consider them partners in solving the problems you face.

d. Think carefully about the full range of your interests and prepare thoroughly for the full range of interests of the other parties. What are the underlying interests behind a particular position that a party has taken on a particular issue? People negotiate for different reasons such as:

- tasks (e.g., the lease of a compound);

- relationships (e.g., to get to know the other party and find out more information about who that person is);

- status (e.g., legitimacy as a participant in the eyes of others).

e. Think carefully about your alternatives to negotiating an agreement. How will you be most persuasive in educating others to see a negotiated settlement as being in their best interests?

f. Be attuned to cultural differences. Actions can have different connotations. The use of language can be different; yes may mean no. How people reason and what constitutes facts and what principles apply are shaped by culture. Nonverbal behavior such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also is important.

g. Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: negotiations among US
agencies and departments; between the multinational partners; between the JTF and UN agencies; between the JTF and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

“There are no panaceas or cookbook answers to negotiations and mediation and the broader context of conflict management and resolution. The process is complex and what works in one situation may not be applicable in the next operation.”

US Army Peacekeeping Institute

8. Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation

a. Successful negotiations should be based on the following steps:

• Establish communications. The first step is to establish an effective means of communicating with the political and/or faction leader(s). Do not assume that certain leaders or elements are opposed to your efforts without careful investigation. Insist on fact finding before forming any opinions.

• Carefully develop a strategic plan and diagram the results of your analysis. Useful questions to answer in this analysis are:

  • What are the main issues as you see them?
  • Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?
  • What are these parties’ publicly stated positions? Privately stated positions?

  • What are the underlying interests behind these positions?
  • What are the bottom-line needs of each party?
  • What are their concerns? Fears? To what degree does historical baggage affect them?

• There will be a negotiation on the conduct of negotiations. This process must be addressed in your initial planning sessions.

• Set clear goals and objectives. Know what you are trying to accomplish as well as the limits of your authority. Think carefully about how you want to approach the issues. Settle the easy issues first. Settle issue by issue in some order. Look to create linkages or to separate nonrelated issues. For example, security issues might be separated from logistics issues. Consider having details worked out at later sessions with the right people. Understand these sessions will also be negotiations.

• Work with the parties to identify common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue. Expect to spend considerable time determining the exact problem(s). At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented.

  • If a party perceives more benefits from an alternative to negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce, do not expect that party to negotiate to achieve an agreement. You need to educate and persuade them that negotiations will in fact produce the most benefits.

  • Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of interests, forecasts of future events,
aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.

- Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking.

- When necessary, assume the role of convener, facilitator, or mediator. Be patient.

- **Composition of negotiating forum and decisionmaking mechanisms.** In some cases a committee or council can be formed with appropriate representation from the various interested parties. It is critical to identify the right participants in advance. For example, will it include ambassador and JTF commander-level, mid-level, or working-level personnel?

- In deciding what constitutes the appropriate construct for a meeting, consider the culture. For example, what role do women play in the society? How is status defined in the culture?

- Composition of the committee or council also may include legal advisors, political representatives (e.g., Department of State, UN agencies, or others), military representatives (J-3, J-4, J-5), and other civilian representatives from the JTF or NGO and PVO.

- Members should possess the status and ability to deal with the leadership representing all involved parties.

- For those members seen as part of the JTF, it is important that they understand the issues and speak with one voice. This will require a prior negotiation within your own delegation. They must understand policy and direction from your higher authority.

- Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frustrating. Be attentive to whether you have the people negotiating who can effectively recommend that an agreement reached be ratified by their superiors. Are all the decisionmakers who will determine whether or not the agreement reached is implemented represented in the committee or council?

- You need to develop a supportive climate for the decisionmakers to complete an agreement. In that vein, it is useful to talk to those who are not decisionmakers but from whom the decisionmakers will need support. In this way, they may assist you in helping their decisionmakers reach agreement.

- In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, it is frequently difficult to determine the legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement must be made.

- Ensure your negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their authority. Their requirement to get your prior approval will empower them in their role as negotiator and/or mediator.

- **Establish the venue.** What is the manner in which meetings can be called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should US representatives go to the factional leader’s location, or will this improperly affect the negotiations? What about the details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings traditionally used in the culture?

- Selection of a negotiating venue should also be based on security for all involved parties, accessibility, availability of communications facilities, and comfort.
• Ensure that information arising from or relevant to the negotiations is shared with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances.

• Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generated from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publicity may help create support and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive. Flexibility is needed here rather than a hard and fast rule.

• Cultural Considerations:

  • There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and departments of the USG that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are national cultural differences.

  • It is imperative that experienced interpreters be part of your negotiating team. What is critical is their understanding of the cultural context of terms used. You need more than literal translators.

  • Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. It is worthwhile to consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting your approach. Adapting your techniques with indigenous ones may improve the prospects for a settlement. (1) There are differences in styles of reasoning, manner in which an individual negotiates, who carries authority, and behavior in such dimensions as protocol and time. (2) For example, in our culture it is accepted that one may offer concessions early in a negotiation to reach an agreement. That approach may not have the same connotation in other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a positive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cultures. (3) Where we as Americans are direct problem solvers with a give-and-take approach, other cultures are indirect, most concerned with the long-term relationship, historical context, and principles. Issues of symbolism, status, and face may be important considerations. (4) For example, answers may not be direct and you will have to look for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand what the other party is telling you. In turn, this means you need to be careful with your wording and gestures so that unintended meanings are not sent. The other party may not say no directly to a proposal but that is what is meant. (5) In Kismayo, Somalia, a meeting of the various clans and subclans to seek political reconciliation in 1993 was in a traditional setting under a tree with pebbles scattered underneath instead of the American custom of a meeting at a table.

  • If you cannot reach agreement, keep the dialogue going. At a minimum, seek agreement on when the parties will meet again. Look for something to keep the momentum alive. Go back to earlier discussions on common ground. Seek to keep trust alive in the process.

  • Within your own team, consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to look at the process of the negotiations and advise you. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, he or she may be
able to coach the JTF negotiators in more effective techniques.

b. Implementation

- At the conclusion of negotiations, a report should be prepared to ensure all accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use.

- Consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to all participants what has taken place. This can build trust in the process if it is viewed as an honest effort to understand each side’s position.

9. Negotiation and Mediation Training

“There are many times when platoon leaders and platoon sergeants at roadblocks, and company and battalion commanders working in cordon and search operations, must negotiate and communicate with potential belligerents. Leaders need to know that they may be placed in a position that requires them to mediate or negotiate on the battlefield.”

Brigadier General L. Magruder, III, USA CG, Joint Readiness Training Center
a. Negotiation and mediation training is essential for military officers in peace operations. They need a conceptual foundation of conflict management and resolution and conceptual skills to help them in analyzing and selecting approaches to deal with the conflicts. Too many officers have had to develop this skill through on-the-job training. Such training in a predeployment training program is the preferred approach. Moreover, once deployed you may not have the means or time to provide a suitable training program.

b. Ideally, education in how to think about negotiations should be a part of the professional development of leaders in an organization that may participate in peace operations long before any alert for a possible deployment.

- Basic concepts need to be introduced and then applied in a series of exercises in a course of three to five days.

- Selected leaders who would benefit from such training include staff officers down to battalion level and company commanders.

- Sources of such courses include the following:
  - The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA has a 3 and 4 day exportable negotiations course.
  - The Foreign Service Institute at Arlington, VA offers a one week Negotiation Art and Skills course several times a year.
  - Other institutions that are sources of expertise in negotiation and conflict resolution and offer training in a variety of formats are listed below. The United States Army Peacekeeping Institute can provide points of contact for these institutions.

    - The United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC. This institute is federally funded and is one of the foremost institutions for its expertise and practical work with governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
    - The American Arbitration Association, Washington, DC. Extensive practical experience as negotiators and mediators and trainers for governmental agencies and IO.
    - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. One week course offered once a year entitled “Strategic Public-Sector Negotiation.”
    - Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA. Various courses and workshops available to non-lawyers.
    - Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, MA. Nonprofit organization that tailors programs for organizations and has extensive international experience.
10. General

a. Joint commissions, bodies of individuals representing the peace operations force, various factions, and institutions involved in the conflict or its resolution, have been used in peace operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, and Bosnia. Historically, commissions were used in other operations such as the withdrawal of the Nationalist Chinese troops from Burma in 1953-54.

b. In a broad sense, peace operations seek to create the opportunity for the parties to resolve a conflict. More recent peace operations have sought to implement a peace settlement. The terms of that settlement should provide mechanisms to help initiate and sustain the peace process; well-crafted peace settlements will be a guideline toward a deeper resolution of the conflict.

c. Joint commissions have been a useful structure and process in the implementation of the peace settlement. They are one aspect of a number of actions which fundamentally are about political decisions that are carried out along political, military, and humanitarian lines.

d. Dependent on the terms in the peace agreement that establish the joint commissions, and the tasks given to the force in the peace operation, the integration of efforts by the task force may take place in the staff section overseeing the joint commission process. In contrast to the normal situation, the integration effort is not located in the operations section but rather the synchronization of efforts is orchestrated through the joint commission system.

11. Objectives of Joint Commissions

a. Joint commissions serve three main functions:

- Translate political agreements into actions on the ground.
- Act as a dispute resolution mechanism.
- Assist in peace building.

b. Translate political agreements into actions on the ground.

- There will be gaps in the peace settlement document (e.g., treaty) that are not sufficiently covered—often deliberately in order to gain agreement—that the political and military mission will have

"Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the NATO-led Peace Enforcement mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H), exposed US and Coalition commanders to the concept of Joint Military Commissions (JMCs). Peace operations require substantial interaction between military commanders and belligerent military or political leaders to resolve conflicts or to secure cooperation. During [Operation] JOINT ENDEAVOR, the multinational divisions (US, French, and British) found the JMC process to be the key control and liaison mechanism for compelling compliance with treaty talks."

Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 96-8
to resolve with the parties in order to implement the treaty.

- This is a double-edged sword: it may allow for the gaps to be filled in at the next level of decisionmaking when the momentum and other aspects of closing the deal on the treaty so dictate.

- On the other hand, it means that the negotiation that must take place at the commission level needs to have the political and military mission members well conversant with the context of the compromise forged at the peace treaty level.

- In other cases, there will be questions of interpretations that the treaty does not answer which the commission must answer for implementation.

- Lack of resources, unpredictable events, and terrain considerations are all problems that may arise when translating agreements into action. These will need to be solved at the commission level.

In Cambodia, they [commissions] spent four hours defining the term “troops” and “forces” in relationship to the presence of Vietnamese troops; even afterwards it remained a difficult area.

In El Salvador, the treaty called for a separation of forces. Questions that had to be addressed included where would the encampments be, how would the soldiers be fed, their health and sanitation needs provided for, as well as their safety.

- In Mozambique, they [commissions] had to negotiate what was meant by the term “offensive military action.”

- In Bosnia, factions often had interpretations of the treaty that seemed reasonable and plausible, but were incorrect. IFOR [Implementation Force] commanders worked with the factions at the joint military commissions to develop a joint interpretation of how to execute a clause in the treaty.

- Concerns can be raised in the commissions and may well cut across the strictly military aspects of the agreement, often involving a separation of forces:
  - Facilitating delivery of humanitarian assistance;
  - Movement of displaced persons;
  - Violations by civilians in the zone of separation;
  - Human rights allegations (someone tries to detain a person as a human rights offender).

- Joint commissions are a way for the parties to resolve disputes which come up over the course of time.

- Act as a dispute resolution mechanism.

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Joint Task Force Command Responsibilities

1st Armored Division (IFOR [Implementation Force]) indicated that the joint military commission should not be used for purely civil matters, and any decision to use that forum for nonmilitary issues needed to be carefully coordinated with political authorities at the highest level. Lack of alternate institutions might require nonmilitary issues to be raised through the joint military commission channels, but they should be properly referred to G-5 and joint civil commission channels for action.

- Each peace operation is unique and these guidelines will need to be evaluated by the task force as to their applicability to its operation. What is certain is that there will be issues raised that must be resolved in the military commissions that are not purely military issues.

d. Assist in peace building.

- Often overlooked in the initial planning is the contributions joint commissions—including joint military commissions—can make as a vehicle to assist in the reconciliation of the parties so they can build a sustainable peace.

- Peace building includes efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.

- It may include disarming, restoration of order, custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

- Frame your thinking about joint commissions to include how this process of working together can be used to build other mechanisms or institutions that promote a sustainable peace. This is really “political” peace building that needs to precede other actions.

- As an illustration, there are ramifications of a task that you might be given, e.g., disarming individuals. The rifle or weapon may have psychological, economic, and perhaps other values that have to be considered which may not be purely military.

- The other aspect of peace building is to understand that subsequent agreements you reach in implementing the treaty will give rise to other disputes and questions. All the more reason to build in processes in those agreements that provide for how disputes will be handled.

12. Key Concepts

a. Commissions System

- It is important to institutionalize whatever degree of reconciliation the parties achieve in the peace negotiation into the peace treaty because it will be needed later when tensions rise in its execution.

- The commission system needs to be included in the treaty; it is very hard to negotiate such a mechanism afterward.

- Secondly, it gives you the basis for your authority.

- It is important that the political and military leadership of the mission are privy to the processes of the peace treaty negotiations so they understand the context in which agreement was reached on the provisions.
There needs to be a system of commissions in place that cuts horizontally and vertically across the three dimensions of political, military, and humanitarian.

- The system will need to be tailored to your particular situation but needs to extend to the local level.

- Whether there is one overarching commission and then working groups for functional areas or several commissions is not central but there is a need for several forums that address the three broad dimensions.

b. Coordination is critical for the mission across these commissions and down to the local level.

In UNITAF [Unified Task Force (Somalia)], Lieutenant General Zinni’s experience noted that some items could be handled in a “technical way” by referring them to a security or military committee (or commission) that would have been difficult to resolve if referred to the political committee. For example, soldiers fired on must respond if repeatedly taken under fire; we as military men understand that any nation’s commanders must address this.

The integration of the political, military, and humanitarian aspects of these operations are so critical that as the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Zinni felt that he couldn’t have enough smart colonels in his hip pocket to send as liaison to the other committees and to use to form working groups as needed to address issues that develop as roadblocks or stalemates. Lieutenant General Kinzer, Force Commander for UNMIH [United Nations Mission in Haiti], stressed the same point in the context of his mission.

- Consistency of coordination, procedures, and approaches within all levels of commissions is a major task. Equally important is the political, military, and humanitarian coordination that needs to take place horizontally at each level and from top to bottom.

- All who have worked with joint commissions stress the importance of trying to resolve as much as possible at the lowest level.

- Anticipate that you will need to provide everything to get the system working.

  - You must ensure that logistics cannot be used as an excuse by a party not to attend meetings.

  - You need to determine where parties may need assistance in executing agreements reached, e.g., can they communicate in a timely fashion with their subordinate units?

  - Traffic flow, security, and provisions for the media are examples of the details that need to be rehearsed.

  - Office space for each party at the commission meeting area is useful for their own consultations, private meetings with mission leaders, follow-up efforts, and as waiting areas before the start of meetings.

c. Your role in the commission: convener, third party, and negotiator.

- The most effective joint commissions are ones where the agreement establishing the commission places the individual in charge of the overall mission as a participant vice observer and the chair of the commission.
• Each operation is unique and what role you play will vary. In some instances, you are not negotiating with the other parties because what is required to be done is clear and specific. Even in those instances, you may combine aspects of the various roles described below to achieve your objectives.

• As the chair you are fulfilling the role of:
  • Convener in that you will initiate and seek to persuade the parties to move forward in implementing the agreement. In that sense, you have leverage initially and the wherewithal to start the process.
  • Third party—from facilitator to mediator—to help shape the agenda, to help the parties see where each others needs and interests are, and where appropriate offer proposals to move the process forward.
  • Negotiator—you have specific interests you are seeking to advance in terms of the peace agreement or treaty.
  • Adviser and an arbitrator (at times).
  • By combining these roles in a complex way you advance your interests while advancing the other parties interests at the same time in some manner of balancing so all see value in the process.
  • In this balancing, you are seeking to accomplish the following: (1) Fill the vacuum of trust between the parties by the trust they place in you. (2) Shift this trust to the negotiation process that is inherent in the joint commission system. (3) Transfer this trust in the process to trust between the parties.
  • Have an individual who can monitor the process so he or she can assess where you are in terms of where you are trying to go in a strategic sense as well as observing how the day-to-day process is working. It is easy to get caught up in the day-to-day challenges that you lose sight of where you are in the strategic sense of where you are trying to go.
  • You will have initial authority and leverage from your position. Over time you build trust with the parties by your actions. Additionally, your personal value to other parties can be an asset for leverage, if used sparingly.

• Advancing interests through joint decisions.
  • Thorough understanding of each parties interests—what they care about—in the broadest sense is key to maximizing your role.
  • Focus on what is behind the position the parties are taking on an issue and why they are taking that stance.

In IFOR [Implementation Force in Bosnia], the 1st Armored Division judged that IFOR’s inherent capability to compel compliance was key to obtaining the parties voluntary compliance. At the same time, 1st Armored Division pointed out the two-edged sword of using force to compel compliance. On the one hand, its use risks losing the local consent for the mission’s operations. On the other hand, noncompliance risks the credibility and authority of the mission force as a guarantor of the peace agreement. (See section below on graduated response to noncompliance.)
Chapter IV

- Interests are both tangible (territory) and intangible (status, legitimacy, honor).

IFOR [Implementation Force in Bosnia] used area experts and joint commission officers, as liaison officers with the various factions. They built special relationships with them and were a valuable source of information for the commander in understanding the intent and actions of the factions; they were also in a position to better explain IFOR’s desires and intent to the factions.

- Picking the right people with the right personalities is key to success. Individuals must not take things personally. Frustration with mission personnel often is frustration with the intractable problems with which the parties are dealing.

- Preparation for each meeting can not be overemphasized.

“A [Implementation Force Bosnia]. The JMC [joint military commission] was so critical to our mission that we prepared for each meeting as if it were a battle, wargaming all the possibilities.”

Colonel Gregory Fontenot, USA
Commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division
and Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-Herzegovina
FA Journal, January-February 1997

- Rehearsals are mandatory to ensure all details have been considered and addressed.

- The level of formality may vary depending on the level of the joint commission meeting.

- Informal meetings and other meetings away from the table of the formal meeting are as important as the formal meetings.

A US commander of a brigade combat team in IFOR [Implementation Force in Bosnia] stated that for every formal joint military commission meeting he had probably conducted five informal one-on-one meetings.

On occasion, when tensions between IFOR and a party became elevated, an IFOR commander would take a more informal stance with the party’s commander. An informal meeting at lunch was used in an attempt to relax tensions rather than responding initially by applying more pressure formally at the meeting.

e. Understand the cultural context.

- Understanding how the parties solve problems is important so that your suggestions are appropriate. In Somalia during the negotiations for the accord reached in Kismayo in 1993, compensation for the dead was handled by a public acceptance of apology for un-Somalia like behavior.

- Understand how each side validates decisions it makes. It may take time to ratify and sell to their communities that to which they are agreeing. If needed, providing assets to do that as well as the time for that to happen helps ensure those agreements will be implemented.

f. The process is dynamic and expect to learn while doing.

- Patience is a virtue you must have.

- Understanding the other parties fears, needs, and expectations is critical; understanding does not mean agreement.
• Your success in this role is seen in the parties’ perceptions of you as impartial, credible, and trustworthy: That is built little by little in small ways.

• Over time a series of negotiated agreements can provide the framework for the resolution of the conflict.

• But relationships with individuals is what implements those agreements. For that to happen there must be trust as you are asking them to do things that they would not ordinarily do.

g. Develop the capacity to make innovative proposals.

• At different times, you will need to develop the capacity to make innovative proposals. You want the parties to develop this capacity so your role may be more meaningful in helping them to see how they can accomplish this.

• You do this by preparation that will involve discussions in private channels, off the record, away from the table of formal meetings.

• Move carefully here so that you are sure before you put forward a proposal as it will have legitimacy and it affects the other parties’ perceptions of you.

• You want a concrete action to be agreed to by all parties with a deadline. Offering directives or deciding for them is not what you are seeking to accomplish.

• Impasses may develop where issues must be referred up the structure, over to the political side, and the mission may need to contact other influential actors to assist in resolving the stalemate. The people presented to you as the leaders may not in fact be the key community leaders; they may simply be the ones with weapons.

h. Graduated response to noncompliance.

• Graduated responses to noncompliance need to have been thought through beforehand, developed, and agreed upon at the senior political and military levels.

• These responses must be applied in a consistent way across all contingents in the task force and mission and coordinated with all.

• Examples of graduated responses include:

  • Obtain name, rank, position of refusing authority; relay to higher headquarters.
  • Elevate negotiation to next level.
  • Call in mediator.
  • Shows of force with helicopters and/or demonstrations of combat capability, e.g., arriving at informal meetings with tank platoons as escorts.

• The use of force should be at the end of a long list of other actions. Its use needs to be coordinated with the top political and military leaders in the mission.

• Your actions should not be a surprise to the other party.

  • Inform them ahead of action and use the commission system to do that.
  • Do not say things you do not mean or have the authority to execute without approval.
Once you decide that you must use force, resolve is key. Immediately afterwards use the commission system to deal with the situation.

In Somalia, a clan was told that the task force would occupy a compound in 6 hours; immediately after the forceful occupation, the task force called the security committee into session and the task force commander addressed the gravity of the action and how to proceed from this point.

• Remember the unintended consequences on the civilian population who are at the execution end of their own politicians and military.

13. Getting Started

a. Act quickly once the agreement is signed to establish contact to the local level.

• You need to build on the momentum created by the agreement signing quickly. It gives you great leverage and authority and AGREEMENT which can wane over time as circumstances change.

• Preparation is key and at the beginning you have the leverage to convene the parties and may well be the only one that also has the assets.

b. Prepare simple rules on commission functions.

• Start slowly and build as you learn, giving yourself needed flexibility so that you deliver what you promise.

• Inclusive agenda setting should be a goal as it promotes joint problem solving and builds trust and confidence.

14. Leaving

a. Your success is tied to the parties’ success in learning to work together.

• They may be reluctant participants.

• Your challenge is to get each side to see that the solution to advancing its interests lies in gaining the agreement of the other side(s)—it is a JOINT problem.

b. The process is very much a process of persuasion.

• You are a party with interests, influence, and power who must strike a balance between roles of facilitator, mediator, negotiator, and convener.

• This must be made to work across the entire JOA in a coordinated fashion in all three dimensions—political, military, and humanitarian—with all the host of agencies and groups also present.

“Regardless of whether you are enforcing peace or not, this committee (joint commissions) must work by consent and consensus. The parties must take ownership in fixing problem or resolving/preventing conflict.”

Lieutenant General A. Zinni, USMC
25 October 1995
15. General Joint Military Commission Meeting Tips

Figure IV-6 provides “tips” for conducting joint military commission meetings based on specific situations encountered by IFOR (Implementation Force) in Bosnia during 1995-1996. These “tips” (extracted from the Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 96-8) should be viewed in conjunction with material previously discussed.

Colonel Henry W. Stratman, Chief for the Joint Military Commission for Task Force Eagle meets a Muslim Military Leader, Brigadier General Mahmucjin as he arrives in the 1-4 Cavalry area at CQ347027 to attend a Joint Military Commission meeting.
Joint Military Commission (JMC) Meeting Tips

**GENERAL**

- Avoid actions which might be perceived as favoring one party.
- Train in depth. All JMC officers or staff designated to support JMC efforts need to be trained and knowledgeable of overall JMC operations, policies, and plans.
- Always have the appropriate subject matter experts at meetings.
- "Stove-pipe" JMC information (up and down the chain of command JMCs).
- Speak with one voice--especially with regard to high priority issues (such as force protection and freedom of movement).
- Do not leave translation of documents to other parties.
- When using interpreters and translators, rehearsals are critical.

**BEFORE A MEETING**

- Know the desired outcome of every meeting.
- Prepare for each meeting as though you were preparing for battle.
- Prioritize your interests on all issues; learn interests of other parties.
- Coordinate the agenda informally; avoid surprises. Have translators and meeting presenters read through prepared scripts, and rehearse audio-visual/multimedia presentations.
- Identify easy issues for agreement.
- Anticipate how to deal with surprise issues.
- Anticipate how to handle deal-breakers.
- Anticipate how to defuse tension.
- Be cautious about giving any guarantees.

Figure IV-6. Joint Military Commission (JMC) Meeting Tips
JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC) MEETING TIPS

DURING A MEETING

- Make small talk before the meeting starts.
- First order of business at the JMC is to present the agenda--provide copies of key, referenced documents, and set and maintain control of the meeting.
- Identify easy issues for agreement at every meeting--set the stage.
- Do not focus on what is said. Find out why it is said--get past positions to identify interests.
- Remember that what is said at the negotiating table is hard to retract--be deliberate.
- Always use a competent, attentive recorder.
- Always use a process observer; use the same one every time.
- Joint press releases are serious business--watch for traps; draft early.
- Know when to take a break and interject small talk to break rising tension. Keep in mind that small talk can be dangerous; choose topics carefully.
- Do not minimize someone's interest.
- Be culturally correct and smart.
- Know when to end a meeting.
- Restate the agreed issues, expectations, and remaining points of contention which require resolution.
- The last order of business should be the agreement on when to hold the next meeting.

AFTER A MEETING

- All parties speak as one voice to the press (joint press release).
- Provide major items (maps, mine detection equipment) to parties in full view of the press; show the media that words are coupled with deeds.
- Hot-wash [critique] each meeting and share results up and down the JMC chain.
- Prepare meeting notes or after-action report. Send follow-up letters or documents that address concerns addressed at the JMC.
- Closely guide and monitor staff working groups.
- Begin preparation for the next meeting.

Figure IV-6. Joint Military Commission (JMC) Meeting Tips (Cont.)
16. General

a. In peace operations, you will be faced with difficult decisions in terms of your responsibilities to the local population. For example, what are the limits of your responsibility to keep order, maintain essential services, and protect the local populace from acts of violence?

“It’s like going into a domestic dispute between husband and wife; when you intervene, they turn on you, when you leave they pick up where they left off—fighting each other.”

Corporal A. Martin, USMC
Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team
American Embassy Mogadishu

b. In peace operations, to the forces legal obligation to the local populace is much more limited than during armed conflict, and is generally tied to the mission, local conditions, and force capability to provide a secure environment within the area you control.

During the first five months of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the JTF commander made it clear that the responsibility to police the local population only extended to areas within his control. For example, when a rape was occurring within sight of a guard post, US forces came to the aid of the victim and apprehended the assailant. When a local national killed a British relief worker in an outlying town and fled into the interior of the country, the crime was investigated by the United States as a possible violation of international law. In this case, the investigation was referred to international authority.

In Haiti during the first few days of the 1994 occupation, US troops were criticized in the press for failing to come to the aid of pro-democracy demonstrators who were being attacked by local police. This illustrates the challenge faced by commanders in protecting the local population.

- Detention of local nationals and other lawbreakers is a sensitive issue. This is especially true when there is no local law enforcement capability, or the law enforcement and judicial systems have

c. You should determine in advance what those limits are, and promulgate “good order” rules in a clear and concise format. ROE should provide some guidance here as well, such as the rules of deadly force to protect third parties and local citizens.
been compromised by the political situation.

- You will have to be prepared to detain local nationals in accordance with international standards. All detentions will be scrutinized by international and local groups.

17. Additional Considerations

a. During peace operations, questions also may arise about humanitarian and civic action projects, as well as medical treatment for local nationals. Clear guidance on these subjects should be issued by you early in the operation. This may help to prevent mission creep and projects that might violate US law and regulation, or projects disruptive to ongoing NGO and PVO or other development programs, even though these projects might be driven by good intentions. For example, subordinate commanders often may want to do things that help the local population, such as building an orphanage or conducting medical projects. **Clear written guidance early in the operation and coordination with NGO, PVO, and other civilian agencies working in the area will avoid problems later.**

b. There are a myriad of legal requirements, including who pays for services such as real estate and private property used by your force.

c. You have a responsibility to provide medical treatment to civilians that your force may injure in the area of operations.
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CHAPTER V
TRANSITION PLANNING

“... Transitions may involve the transfer of certain responsibilities to nonmilitary civil agencies. NGO and PVO may be responsible for the ultimate success of the peace operation, perhaps with significant US support, to include military forces. Transitions in peace operations may have no clear division between combat and peacetime activities, they may lack definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly political environment.”

FM 100-23, Peace Operations

1. General

a. Transferring control of an operation to the United Nations, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations requires detailed planning and execution.

b. Your mission analysis, an identifiable end state, and the political policy will all play an important role in the transition process.

c. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent and each one will possess unique characteristics and requirements. Nevertheless, this section will provide general guidelines and recommendations for the transition process.

2. Planning Considerations

a. As you near the redeployment stage for your forces, it is of utmost importance that your number one priority remain force protection.

“That phase (redeployment) of the operation can be the most hazardous in force protection because the tactical focus tends to shift towards redeployment and away from task force security.”

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-6

b. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning and mission analysis. It must extend throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. This planning must be as detailed as any other operational mission.

• Transition planning can be accomplished by a number of organizations within the JTF, such as the JPG, future operations cell, CMOC, J-3 Plans, or J-5. This will depend on how you organize the JTF.

• A “transition plan” should be developed as an initial step in the transition process. When possible, this plan should be “unclassified.”

• To commence plan development, identification of the following factors is important.

  • Issues and key JTF events (past, present, and future).
  • Work required to accomplish the transition.
  • Military force or other organization taking over control of the operation.
  • Most, if not all, of your staff sections can provide valuable input to the transition plan. Do not deny input from a staff section solely based on its work being “routine.” Nothing is “purely routine”
when dealing with the United Nations, multinational military forces, or civilian organizations.

- Staff sections should highlight in the transition plan how they are organized and how they function. Checklists should be developed to facilitate the transition.

- Additionally, the staff sections should provide a recommendation on how the incoming staff should be organized.

- Turnover files should be developed by your staff sections. These often are forgotten in the haste to redeploy.

- Planning should link the departure of your force with the anticipated arrival of the force or organization taking charge.

- Use of US military acronyms in the plan should be avoided.

**c. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount.**

- Dealing with the United Nations can be very frustrating because of its bureaucratic way of doing business.

- As previously mentioned, funding can be a major obstacle, especially when working with the United Nations.

- Another concern in working with the United Nations is to ensure a sufficient number of UN staff and officers are deployed for the transition process. The supported combatant commander can assist you in this endeavor.

- It is recommended that you collocate the incoming HQ with the JTF’s HQ. This may enhance your ability to truly incorporate the “new staff” with the old.

**d. The following questions may have an impact on transition.**

- Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

- Who will fund the transition?

- What is the JTF policy for transition and redeployment?

- What issues exist before the transition and what potential issues will exist for the transition force or organization once the transition is complete? Have these been provided to the incoming transition force or organization?

- Has the JTF’s end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the incoming transition force or organization?

- If there is a new mission, how can the JTF assist the incoming transition force or organization in preparing for it?

- What US forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?

- Is there a disposal plan in existence? If not, what arrangements have been made to facilitate disposal of commodities outlined in Chapter VI, “Logistics Support,” of this Handbook.

- What will be the command relationship for US forces during the transition and for those US forces remaining behind?

- Who will support US forces remaining behind?

- What will be the communications requirement for US forces remaining behind?
Transition Planning

- Will the United States be expected to provide communication capability to the incoming transition force or organization?

- Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?

- Will there be new ROE established for the transition?

- Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?

- Will the incoming force or organization use the same HQ facility as the JTF?

- What agreements have been developed with NGO, PVO, IO, HN, or others that may impact the incoming transition force or organization?

- Has a list of points of contact been developed for the incoming transition force or organization?

- What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?

- Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who will provide it?

- How will the turnover be accomplished?

- Who will handle PA for the transition?
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CHAPTER VI
LOGISTICS SUPPORT

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”

Jomini, 
Précis de l’ Art de la Guerre. 1838

1. General

a. Logistics in peace operations are just as important as they are in war.

b. The US military has unique logistics capabilities that are relevant to peace and humanitarian operations. These include the rapid capability to plan, deploy, employ and redeploy; a robust C2 capability; a sustained logistics capability, and security throughout operations. US military capabilities frequently requested are strategic and tactical airlift, infrastructure (e.g., port, airfield, road) security, water purification, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, arrival and departure airfield control groups, port and railhead operations groups, civil-military liaison cells, and limited infrastructure repair.

c. Logistics is particularly susceptible to “mission creep,” especially in peace or humanitarian operations. Evolutions both on the ground and in the political context of the crisis could lead to unexpected changes in the role and hence requirements of military forces.

d. Plan for mission termination.

- Analyze what logistics infrastructure, materiel, capabilities, and equipment will remain in-country for use by follow-on forces or organizations.

- What is required for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment.

e. While peace operations can be either under UN or NATO auspices, unilateral, or in cooperation with other countries, they are normally joint and multinational. Therefore, you may be required to participate in UN, NATO, or multinational logistics organizations.

f. Joint logistics should use existing individual Service policies and procedures whenever possible. If this is not possible due to inefficiencies or impracticalities, you should identify the differences to the supported combatant commander for resolution.

g. Logistics will have to support both military and nonmilitary humanitarian operations. Coordination with IO, NGO, and PVO will facilitate support to humanitarian operations. Establishment of a civil-military coordination element (e.g., CMOC) is essential to planning and execution.

h. Prioritization between conducting and supporting military operations and providing support to other government and humanitarian organizations needs to be carefully planned and executed.

“For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses—manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity—that only the military can deploy.”

Philip Johnson
President & Chief Executive Officer, CARE
nongovernmental agencies could become an issue.

2. Logistics Authority

a. Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics, and may delegate this authority to the JTF for a common support capability within the JOA. It is critical that the JTF J-4 determine what, if any, logistics directive authority for a common support capability the supported combatant commander has delegated to the JTF and if the scope of the authority meets the JTF requirements.

b. The combatant commander’s directive authority does not negate the individual Service’s responsibility for logistics support or discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, nor is it meant to disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.

c. Each Service is responsible for the logistics support of its own forces, except when logistics support is otherwise provided for by agreement with national agencies, multinational partners, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The supported combatant command may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. In addition, the applicability of Standard NATO Agreements, Foreign Military Sales, agreements under the NATO Mutual Support Act, other bilateral and multinational agreements, and international programs vary from nation to nation, and the distinction between programs is often unclear. Determinations must often be made on a case-by-case basis.

d. Authority over logistics under multinational and UN operations is different and situationally dependent. Areas which must be clarified include funding, cross-servicing, and mutual support agreements.

e. Implementation and execution of logistics functions (Figure VI-1) remain the responsibility of the Services and the supported combatant commander’s Service components.

* OTHER SERVICES. These include other essential services and functions for a force, such as laundry, waste disposal services, administrative services, exchange services, postal, graves registration, and pay services.
3. Logistics Organization

a. JTF J-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation. To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistics functional areas: health services, supply systems, transportation, general engineering, maintenance, and miscellaneous services, plus experts in logistics plans and operations.

b. Logistics responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; therefore, it is recommended that the JTF J-4 staff have representatives or liaison personnel from each Service involved in the JTF. Since SOF rely on conventional Service counterparts for support, it also is recommended that the special operations components have representatives involved as well. Representatives should possess the necessary logistics expertise to interface within their Service channels.

c. It is recommended that you establish a logistics readiness center (LRC) to provide the following logistics control and coordination functions:

- Monitor current and evolving JTF logistics capabilities.
- Coordinate logistics support and maintain total assets visibility.
- Prioritization of logistics resources.
- Advise you on supportability of proposed operations or COA.
- Determine logistics sustainment requirements for planning and execution.
- Coordinate with the supported combatant commander’s LRC and act as the JTF agent and advocate for logistics support.
- Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.

d. The supported combatant commander’s LRC can assist the JTF by providing the link with the Joint Staff, the Services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies. This LRC:

- Manages the combatant commander’s directive authority over logistics and provides the coordination required to resolve logistics issues and problems.
- Acts as the JTF agent for requesting additional resources, deconflicting demands on common use resources (when demand exceeds capabilities), and coordinating logistics with other multinational forces at the Department of State and Joint Chiefs of Staff levels.

e. Past peace operations have shown the following staff billets require personnel experienced in joint and multinational operations and should be part of your J-4 organization:

- Postal personnel to coordinate transportation of bulk mail.
- Supply and contracting officer(s) (with appropriate warrants).
- Explosive ordnance disposal personnel (for mines and other unexploded ordnance).
- Transportation officer(s).
- Customs official(s).
- Engineer(s) or facility manager(s).
- Bulk liquid specialists—water and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
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f. It is critical that you establish effective logistics coordination and communications links with multinational forces. Logistics coordination and communications links with HN, IO, NGO, and PVO should be established through or in coordination with the CMOC.

g. Liaison representatives and interpreters and linguists on your J-4 staff will be essential in dealing with the HN, multinational forces, IO, NGO, PVO, and the civilian populace.

h. JTF J-4 should consider assigning one officer for preparation of the daily logistics status report (LOGSTAT) for the supported combatant commander. This single point of contact builds confidence and becomes the JTF expert for logistics status and issues. This has proven to be a significant advantage in past peace operations.

i. The capabilities of the NGO and PVO logistics organizations should be incorporated into the LOGSTAT. LOGSTAT should clearly identify what critical shortfalls exist and/or are anticipated, what actions are being taken to resolve the shortfalls, and if any assistance is required by Service components, DOD organizations, or any other organization.

4. Logistics Considerations

a. Logistics is a factor in determining objectives. Logistics almost always will affect a theater campaign and exert varying constraints on JTF operations.

b. Coordinate logistics planning with operational planning. Operations and logistics are inseparable. J-4 must coordinate closely with current operations, future operations, and future plans to be effective.

c. Forward Impetus. A system of continuous replenishment that requires either automatic (push) or requisitioning (pull) capability. JTF requirements should be reviewed periodically and refined if required. Service component commanders can help determine the best method of continuous replenishment. A system to capture cost associated with providing support to multinational forces must be established and the legal authority for the provision of support identified.

d. Balance of forces. You should consider not only US combat and combat support forces, but also multinational requirements. Regardless of any prior agreements, other nations tend to look to the United States for support; therefore, your US support forces may have to be larger than initially planned. JTF J-4 should pass JTF logistics requirements to the Service components, who then can best determine logistics force structure.

e. Unity of effort. Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistics operations in both joint and multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services, but also among governmental departments and agencies, IO, NGO, PVO, and multinational forces.

f. Apportionment and allocation. Apportionment is distribution for planning of limited resources, whereas allocation is distribution of limited resources among competing requirements. Failure to maintain a system of apportionment and allocation can cause inflation of priorities, ultimate breakdown of the priority system, and loss of control over the logistics system.

“You tell me your requirements, and I’ll match them with capability.”

Lieutenant General
D. SCHROEDER, USA
Commander, Joint Task Force,
Operation SUPPORT HOPE
g. **Logistics discipline.** True economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources required. Excess stock or unwise use of priorities decreases flexibility and drains transportation, facilities, and logistics resources from other operational priorities.

h. **Reserve Component Force Requirements.** Identification of your requirements for reserve units and personnel augmentation is essential as it may determine how fast an operation can proceed and the lead times for obtaining support. Once identified, reserve requirements should be made known to the supported combatant commander.

5. **Transportation**

a. Transportation by air, land, and sea, is the “linchpin” of your operation, your J-4 must understand the roles and functions of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF.

> “Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transportation is the stem without which it could never have blossomed”
>
> **Winston Churchill**
> **The River War, vii, 1899**

b. **Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations.** You need the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies coming into and within JOA. **Inadequate oversight of movement reduces efficiency and could cause bottlenecks.**

c. Coordination of movement through JOPES via GCCS is critical to deploying and supporting JTF forces.

d. **Prioritize your transportation;** if surface delivery is possible, use it. **Do not try to ship everything immediately by air.** Provide, through the supported combatant commander, your requirements and priorities to the USTRANSCOM and allow the Defense Transportation System to effectively move those requirements.

e. **Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated as operations progress.** Materiel arriving before off-load equipment is on hand or personnel deploying well in advance of their equipment can cause major problems.

- Integration of the strategic and theater flow and movement requirements is crucial to prevent congestion at transportation nodes (especially at seaports and airports).
- Establishment of an in-theater hub maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater distribution.

f. **USTRANSCOM can provide vital movement data to the JTF theater movement control system.** This data is important as it not only provides information for the direct delivery or for transloading passengers and cargo, but it also can be used to deconflict strategic movements with other theater movements. **USTRANSCOM:**

- Provides strategic air, land, and sea transportation and terminal services in peace and war.
- Procures commercial transportation services and activates (with Secretary of Defense approval) the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Ready Reserve Force, and the applicable sealift program (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement or Sealift Readiness Program).
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- Provides representatives to your assessment team to help evaluate seaports, airports, and inland transportation system requirements. In addition, representatives from USTRANSCOM (possibly through its transportation component commands (TCCs)) normally are available to provide continued support at airports, seaports, and transportation and movement control centers.

- Nominates (mission dependent) a director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR) to act as the single point of contact for air mobility expertise and for resolving strategic and theater air mobility issues. This focus will ensure a seamless air mobility system of USTRANSCOM assets and theater assets. DIRMOBFOR will be discussed in more detail subsequently in this chapter.

- Monitors movement data and maintains the JOPES database.

- Assists in coordination of movement and access to JOPES via GCCS.

g. There are many transportation considerations that affect logistics planning in theater movement operations. To include:

- Assigned airlift and sealift characteristics, capabilities, and allocations. Keep in mind the requirements to support both military and civilian airlift and sealift.

- **Airfields and seaports**, to include their capabilities and limitations, and **airland facilities available** in the departure and objective areas. Engineer effort and equipment requirements for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities.

- **Anticipated HNS** and measures to obtain local labor, transportation, and materiel resources.

- **Access to (including basing, transit, and overflight rights) operational areas and** USTRANSCOM schedules military and commercial transportation to move forces, equipment, and supply/resupply.
current SOFA within operational areas. Supporting combatant commanders can coordinate the political and diplomatic efforts to arrange for support, country and diplomatic clearances, and overflight rights, basing, access, and other forms of support with affected countries for forces that are in transit from one locality to another.

- Control of airfields and seaports is critical to success of the operation. Expect other nations’ military forces as well as NGO and regular civilian traffic to compete with slot times and vessel berthing. Establish a well coordinated movement control center to manage movements into and out of the air- and seaports of debarkation.

- In-transit visibility (ITV) is necessary to ensure smooth flow of supplies and sustainment. Plan to establish ITV procedures and ITV nodes at all ports of embarkation, transit points, and ports of debarkation. Lack of ITV will cause loss of confidence in the supply system and lead to unnecessary reordering, further clogging the supply lines.

h. **Director of Mobility Forces**

- Normally a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or JOA and possesses an extensive background in airlift operations.

- When established, the DIRMObFOR serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the area of responsibility or JOA, and for other duties as directed.

- The DIRMObFOR exercises coordinating authority between the airlift coordination cell, the air mobility element (AME), the Tanker Airlift Control Center, the JMC, and the air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of airlift problems.

- DIRMObFOR may be sourced from the theater’s organizations or nominated by USTRANSCOM or USACOM.

- The CJTF may request DIRMObFOR support through the supported combatant commander. The DIRMObFOR may deploy with an AME.

  - AME brings all the necessary functional experts to support, plan, monitor, and execute the theater air mobility mission (air refueling and airlift).

  - AME functions include: mission planning, C2, aerial port, intelligence, weather, logistics support, aircraft maintenance, and combat camera. If necessary, an AME can deploy with completely self-contained air mobile shelters that are used for work centers in remote areas.


6. Logistics Planning

a. Logistics for peace operations is complex due to the interdependence of Service components, DLA and other agencies, HN, and multinational forces.

“Forget logistics and you lose.”

General F.M. Franks, Jr., USA (RET)

b. Early involvement of your logistics staff is critical to the success of the operation and ensures that sustainment requirements are balanced with capabilities. The JTF assessment team logistics representatives’ responsibilities include:

• Reviewing lessons learned databases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas.

• Establishing liaison with HN, IO, NGO, and PVO to obtain the most up-to-date information concerning the crisis from a logistics perspective.

• Working with transportation specialists from USTRANSCOM and the TCCs to evaluate airports, seaports, and inland transportation systems’ capabilities and requirements. These specialists can determine personnel augmentation requirements and equipment for mission support. Additionally, early receipt of basing rights and diplomatic clearances is critical to mobility success.

• Assessing HN capabilities to provide support services, facilities, storage (particularly airport and seaport), and materiel.

• Assessing in-theater capabilities and resources of the United Nations, IO, NGO, and PVO.

• Determining the capabilities of existing infrastructure. Engineers or facility managers can provide critical information on the availability of existing permanent and semipermanent facilities (e.g., water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, bulk and retail fuel storage).

• Environmental planning is essential to ensure that all appropriate environmental reviews have been completed in accordance with applicable US and HN agreements, environmental laws, policies, and regulations.

• Coordination with legal and other appropriate staff officers (i.e., medical officer) to assist in documentation of current environmental conditions, such as water and soil contamination, epidemiological surveys, disease risk assessments, and compliance with legal requirements, including any SOFA agreement or other international agreements that may effect; identifying and recording information associated with environmental contamination for future remediation.

• Planning for the acquisition of real property and lease costs. A primary concern is the determination of what facilities and land are needed and whether they exist in the JOA. Priorities for property acquisition should be established taking into account when the property is needed.

c. Application of the principles of logistics, as shown in Figure VI-2, is essential to establishing effective support.

d. Logistics plans should be integrated with component commands and other organizations and agencies, as well as HN and multinational forces, to ensure success.
The JTF logistics plans need to be specific and address the tailored requirements of the local population being supported to ensure relief supplies are applicable (correct sizes, types). For example, the JTF at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, received clothing from the World Relief Agency which could not be used (i.e., wrong sizes of women’s clothing, flip flops which melted on the hot pavement).

Early determination of the support required to aid the civilian populace will assist in developing a supporting plan.

“The JTF commander should evaluate his ability to use local nationals. Where he can do so without giving the appearance of partiality, he gains a number of advantages: (1) he wins the hearts and minds of the people, (2) he begins to restore the local infrastructure, (3) he gains a source of information through use of indigenous employees, (4) he reduces his force support requirements, and (5) he avoids leaving a void caused by the departure of the peace operations force.”

Major General H. SMITH, USA Commanding General, 21st TAACOM
g. The United Nations, IO, NGO, PVO, and others, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, will likely cause transportation “choke points” en route to and within theater. A J-4 linkage with the CMOC may assist in providing a solution to this type of circumstance.

h. Logistics planners should identify requirements and pass them to the Service components for sourcing. Working with the Service components, your J-4 can determine whether the JTF support should be provided from the military (Services), civilian sources, HN, UN, or other nations.

i. Your planners must determine the JTF resupply requirements and make recommendations to the Services on the best resupply method (e.g., the “push” or “pull”) and the type of servicing (e.g., cross, common, joint) recommended.

j. **Disposal operations.** Disposal is an important link in the overall logistics chain, however, in virtually all plans it is not addressed.

- Inadequate understanding of disposal’s role causes:
  - Conflicts with public and international law.
  - Confusion over roles and requirements.
  - Increased costs.
  - Inefficient operations.

- Planning for disposal must take place from the onset of operations and continue throughout redeployment. Disposal operations may become the “long pole” in the tent during redeployment—cost becomes paramount.

- Figure VI-3 depicts various commodities that require disposal.

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As part of the initiative in Haiti to reduce the level of violence in the Haitian society, the United States offered to purchase private weapons from the Haitians. The results were wildly enthusiastic and more than 15,000 weapons were ultimately collected—enough to fill a 40 foot MILVAN. The Army then attempted to turn over the weapons to the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO). The DRMO stated that it does not accept custody or accountability for weapons. After much discussion of the options available to them, the Force commander opted to ship the container full of weapons to the United States, where they ended up at Letterkenny Army depot. The Army depot learned that in order to properly demilitarize the weapons, they were looking at a bill for more than $600,000. At this point, they asked for the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) help in finding an alternative method to cost effectively get rid of these weapons. DLA was able to offer the option of granting a waiver to use a local steel mill to melt down the weapons provided that proper oversight and surveillance was available. The waiver was granted, surveillance was performed, the steel mill got to keep the metal, and the US taxpayers saved more than $585,000.
COMMODITIES FOR DISPOSAL

- Usable Property and Scrap.
- Munitions List and Strategic List Items.
- Captured and/or Confiscated Weapons.
- Rations and Food.
- Ammunition, Explosives, and Dangerous Articles.
- Radioactive Materiel.
- Infectious and Non-Infectious Medical Waste.
- Classified Items.
- Drugs, Biologicals, and Controlled Substances.

Figure VI-3. Commodities for Disposal

Chapter VI

7. Multinational Logistics

a. It is to your advantage to attain as much control over logistics as possible through diplomacy, knowledge of multinational forces’ doctrine, and good relations with military commanders and civilian leaders.

b. It is essential that logistics be handled on a multinational basis, within the limitations of interoperability. The J-4 should establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between US forces and multinational forces.

- It is recommend that the JTF J-4 establish a Multinational Deployment Agency (MDA) to deconflict the movement of other deploying forces into the JOA.

- The MDA would be an expansion of your JMC and would be responsible for creating a combined multinational time-phased force and deployment list that would deconflict initial movement plans and the actual deployment.

c. Some nations will not relinquish directive authority over their logistics forces, assets, and systems. The creation of a single theater logistics command provides economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if multinational participants insist upon maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort.

d. **Funding authority to support multinational forces should be identified as early as possible.** Once funding authority is determined, procedures should be developed to ensure there will be no adverse impact on operations.

e. Consensus on multinational logistics issues and requirements should be formed early. **As the CJTF, you may not be able to direct or demand action—normally you can only request it.** Some of the major support issues that must be resolved by the multinational force commander include:

- Mutual logistics support must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. The Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Act, acquisition cross-Service agreement (ACSA) Authority, and the Federal Property and Administrative Service Act all have a bearing on the degree of support the United States can provide to or receive from other nations.

- Identification of common supplies and services that might be provided by one nation or a multinational organization.

- If, when, and how transfer of authority over national logistics assets (to include authority for cross-leveling national supplies) will be provided to the multinational force commander (a national decision between participating nations).

- ACSA procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations.

- Establishment of responsibility, and release procedures, for national assets.

- Development of the means to maintain national asset accountability (from the national sustaining base to the front line units).

- Ensuring compatibility of communications networks to include automated data processing interfaces between national logistics organizations of the multinational force and national support systems.
Logistics Support

• Prioritization, allocation, and use of common infrastructure capabilities (e.g., ports, airfields, roads) to support military operations.

f. Avoid potential problems by early identification of differences among the nations’ and Services’ logistics doctrine, stockage levels, interoperability, and accountability.

g. JTF J-4 staff should be aware of cultural differences (language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks) which may have an impact on logistics support to multinational forces.

h. Sustainment of forces is each nation’s responsibility; however, varying degrees of mutual logistics support can and should be developed for economy of effort. Some nations do not have deployable logistics capabilities and become totally dependent on the United States or the United Nations for support.

• The JTF should be prepared to support US forces, as well as forces from other nations and/or civilian organizations involved in the operation.

  • This support may include sustainment, airlift, and development of logistics structure.

  • For airlift support, close liaison with the theater airlift C2 structure can assist in coordinating approval, and facilitating such airlift once approved. Consider including a USTRANSCOM or Air Mobility Command liaison representative on the JTF staff.

• When support is required, ensure funding lines are clearly identified.

  i. You must plan for sustainment—it will not take care of itself. You may be in-theater for a long period of time, and unusual needs or requirements may occur (for example, the shipment of Christmas trees to Somalia and Thanksgiving turkeys to Haiti).

  j. Develop a list of current agreements with other participating nations that provide for logistics support. In some cases, members of the JTF will negotiate agreements governing logistics support with representatives of other nations of the United Nations. Negotiations must be initiated only after authorization by the Department of State in accordance with Department of State Circular 175.

  k. The use of civilian contractors and various HNS agencies often increases the logistics capability of the multinational force. Non-uniformed support agencies may be integrated into the logistics structure of the multinational force to ensure their most effective employment and use. Commanders should be prepared to assume all essential logistics related responsibilities in the event this support is terminated. As the CJTF, you should implement a system of internal control measures to ensure that the logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) contractors are used effectively and when only necessary in a manner which ensures that services provided are reasonably priced. The CMOC may be useful in coordinating with HN infrastructure.

  l. Your J-4 should establish quality controls and monitor compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as POL, water, and food.
“Successful participation in future UN operations requires US commanders and logisticians understand the unique UN logistics and budgetary procedures and the difference between US logistical support standards and UN allowance. In-survey, out-survey and requirements for requisition of goods and services are all unique within the UN contracting and requisition process. Further, US commanders must be aware of the requirements of US laws and regulations prior to transfer of good and services to any United Nation organizations.”

SUCCESS IN PEACEKEEPING
UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN HAITI:
THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

a. The UN logistics system relies on member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for a given length of time, normally 60 to 120 days. This period allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local Memorandums of Understanding which will provide logistics support for the forces involved in peace operations.

b. A UN survey/assessment team will evaluate the operation requirements and develop planning data for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, you should send a US logistics representative with the UN mission survey team, if possible. The JTF should coordinate with UN forces to improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.

c. Once established, the UN logistics support structure normally will provide a measure of continuing support through a system of Lead Nations, civilian contractual arrangements, a UN Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG), or a combination of the above.

• The Lead Nation concept. A Lead Nation is a nation assigned to provide the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement. Medium sized missions may be centered on one principal member state’s contingent. In such cases, the member state would assume responsibility for providing an agreed upon list of logistics support to other nations and would maintain resupply links to its home base. Other elements of the force would rely on the principal member state for the bulk of their administrative and logistics needs. There still will be a requirement for contingents to have national representation within the lead state’s logistics organization—national interests may be at stake.

• Force Logistics Support Concept. In the case of all but the smallest missions, support depends on the UN finding a member state, or states, to accept the responsibility of forming the structure of the FLSG—the US Army agreed to form the FLSG in Somalia. The FLSG will incorporate logistics units from the other participating nations referred to by the United Nations as National Support Elements. A member state accepting the FLSG role will be responsible, in coordination with the Chief Logistics Officer at the Force HQ, for the establishment of local contractual arrangement in support of the force. Despite the formation of an FLSG, there always will be a requirement for member states to be self-sufficient for unique national elements of resupply, particularly repair parts, clothing, food, and major end items replacement.

• Civilian Contractor. As the mission progresses, the UN will attempt to economize the logistics support through the use of civilian contractors. The general aim will be to achieve the most
economical logistics organization that will both meet the demands of the force and release military manpower for redeployment. The overall process will be coordinated by the force HQ and will be a unique solution for each mission.

- UN contracting, which the United States considers part of logistics, does not fall under the logistics division but rather purchasing and transport services division. While this structure may appear to work in UN HQ, there are times when the procurement officer will not support requests from the UN Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) or force commander for a variety of reasons.

- The procurement process within the United Nations is very bureaucratic and slow in providing items. Procurement by UN agencies is very decentralized—each agency virtually does their own, and often with different procedures. The United Nations is gradually moving towards standardization of its procurement. The UN Development Program’s Interagency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) is slated to become the UN standard for a common procurement system. IAPSO is developing a compendium of generic specifications for commonly used items in all types of operations.

f. For UN operations, you should determine what standards are to be followed in regard to support.

- US standards tend to exceed UN standards, (e.g., consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels). US military equipment and systems sophistication may be different than the standards of support the UN has agreed to provide or is willing to fund.

- UN standards must be clearly understood in regard to level and quality of support provided and funded. Logistics support that is significantly more extensive than what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable.

- The JTF must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.

g. Detailed logistics procedures for UN missions can be obtained from the “Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO),” United Nations.

9. Contracting Support

“Contracting is critical—in BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA setting up a fuel pipeline is a good example of contracting and using the local citizenry—stevedores to unload ships, truck drivers, and other locals to build, clean, wash, cook, etc.”

Major General H. SMITH, USA
Commanding General,
21st TAACOM
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a. Providing support may require contracting interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, NGO, and PVO. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces. When properly used, contracting is another essential tool for supporting your mission. Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy or before scheduled LOGCAP or HNS resources can provide support. Contracting also is valuable where no HNS agreements exist, or where HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support also is essential.

b. LOGCAP can provide a myriad of services such as: well drilling, laundry, power generation, portalets, cranes, and port support.

- Requests for LOGCAP support should be made to the supported combatant commander.

- LOGCAP can be an expensive program and funding guidance is required.

"From October 1992 to March 1994, the Army paid Brown and Root $77 million for food, fuel, water, transportation, and basic infrastructure support for operations in Somalia."

Margo MacFarland
Defense Reporter for Inside the Pentagon

- The LOGCAP program can be used to transition from military to civilian-controlled operations. In addition, it can be used to manage limited logistics resources—hire contractors instead of callup of military reservists.

- LOGCAP can be an expensive program and funding guidance is required.

- Requests for LOGCAP support should be made to the supported combatant commander.

- Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support also is essential.

• Identify your subordinate commands requirements that may be met by HNS, LOGCAP, or contracting support.

• Develop an area database containing all available data concerning local resources. The database may include area studies, locally developed logistics support data, a complete listing of existing LOGCAP and HNS agreements available in the JOA, and recommendations from State Department Foreign Service personnel.

• Outline the procedures and policies for implementation of contracting support in the JOA, assuring full utilization of HNS and LOGCAP resources.

• Ensure contracting solutions receive consideration during logistics planning and become part of OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

During IFOR (Implementation Force Bosnia) commanders were sometimes unaware of the cost ramifications of their decisions. For example, the decision to accelerate the camp construction schedule required the contractor to fly plywood from the United States into the area of operations because sufficient stores were not available in Europe, which increased costs. For example, the contractor reported that the cost of 3/4-inch sheet of plywood, 4 x 8 feet, purchased in the United States was $14.06. Flying that sheet of plywood to the area of operations from the United States increased the cost to $85.98 per sheet, and shipping by boat increased the cost to $27.31 per sheet.

- Develop an area database containing all available data concerning local resources. The database may include area studies, locally developed logistics support data, a complete listing of existing LOGCAP and HNS agreements available in the JOA, and recommendations from State Department Foreign Service personnel.
Information also may come from the United Nations humanitarian agencies, IO, NGO, and PVO already operating in the area. One immediate source of information on current global complex emergencies is the UNDHA’s Relief Internet site (http://www.reliefweb.int/) which contains maps and current field reports from IO, NGO, and PVO.

- Address security and quality control aspects of contracting, to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions.

  d. **Contracting Office(s).** You may want to establish joint contracting office(s), staffed by personnel, to include linguists and interpreters when required, from all the Services and multinational forces operating in the JOA. Joint contracting offices would:

  - Include some or all of the warranted contracting officers in the JOA. If more than one contracting office is required, contracting officers may have to be assigned to other smaller joint contracting offices to provide support on an area basis.

  - Provide coordination and cooperation among Services that maintain parallel contracting organizations within the JOA. **Preclude Interservice and multinational competition for local supplies or services, and obtain the most advantageous prices through consolidation of requirements to more effectively utilize scarce personnel resources.**

  - Establish coordination and cooperation with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.

  - Provide contracting representatives to your logistics organizational structure i.e., LRC.
e. It is critical, upon mission termination or redeployment, that the JTF ensures all records or files are closed out and submitted to the appropriate authorities for disposition.

10. Host-nation Support

a. Countries without a government infrastructure may only be able to provide limited logistics assistance.

b. Within the J-4, you should centralize the coordination of HN functions, i.e., requirement identification, procurement. This will help to identify the complete JTF logistics effort.

c. CA personnel assigned to the JTF are trained to identify and coordinate HN support resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

d. To negotiate for HN support, authority must be obtained through the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State.

- HN agreements should include the authority for you to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

- Develop a list of current HN agreements. Your assessment team should determine what types of support and supplies can be provided by the HN and how they can reduce your logistics footprint.

- JTF legal advisor should be involved in the development process for HN agreements.

e. Procedures and agreements should be developed for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire (wage scale), and customs regulations.

f. During the assessment process, JTF J-4 should evaluate current HN contractual arrangements among the organizations present (United Nations, IO, NGO, PVO) and evaluate their effectiveness. As required, determine the best lead agency (e.g., United Nations, Service, or other agency) for contracting and negotiating for support.

g. During the assessment process, JTF J-4 should determine and evaluate HN transportation, facilities, equipment, and other capabilities.

h. Coordinate distribution of humanitarian aid with the United Nations, IO, HN, NGO, and PVO present.

11. Additional Considerations

a. Identify additional funding requirements for renting facilities to support operations. In addition, develop a system for property accountability.

b. Identify special clothing and equipment requirements that may require a long-lead time.

Keep in mind that local procurement efforts, while they may bring beneficial impacts to the host nation, may also undermine other important goals. In the highly sensitive environment of peace operations, local suppliers may have important political connections and an otherwise innocent procurement decision may be interpreted to have political meaning in the host nation. Or, procurement may bid up local prices, with deleterious impact on local groups or nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations. In worst cases, local suppliers eager to do business with US military units, have dropped long-standing services to civilian organizations, causing disruption and controversy.
Logistics Support

b. Obtain funding codes from the supported combatant commander or Service component commanders and then determine what methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures.

d. Establish procedures for providing support (transportation, housing, messing) to diplomats and distinguished visitors. If established, the JVB (as mentioned in Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing,” of this Handbook) can assist in satisfying this requirement.

e. **Develop a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.** J-4 needs to continually assess all logistics requests, requirements, and actions to ensure they pass a “sanity check” and are valid with respect to the peace operation and authority given to the JTF.

f. Provide adequate security for logistics assets. Your combat service support units should be prepared to provide their own local (base) security.

g. Consider establishing a common “exchange” for the JTF. A well-stocked exchange will not only provide personnel support items, but will also serve as a morale booster.

h. Establish a system with the JTF J-2 to gather information from logistics sources such as truck drivers and engineers.

> “In BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA, some of our best information came to be called transportation intelligence. Drivers often had the best information on the road conditions, attitude of the local populations, locations of checkpoints, and our ability to get through.”

**Lieutenant Colonel R. ROBINSON, USA**
HQ AFCENT

i. Plan for seaport, airport, and railhead facilities having to be shared by NGO, PVO, UN or NATO personnel, multinational forces, and civilian contractors.

j. Develop mortuary plans to include procedures and policies for US forces, local civilians, and multinational forces. These plans need to be coordinated with Department of State.
k. Determine the best method for providing potable water: (1) land-based reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs), (2) ROWPU barges, or (3) bottled water. Each has its own advantages and drawbacks. **Bottled water may have an added advantage of enhancing troop morale.** It is essential that the JTF has an effective water support plan, to include inputs from engineers, medical personnel, and other staff officers—**Water is critical.**

12. **Logistics Boards, Offices, and Centers**

   a. While not all of the following joint organizations may be required, your J-4 should evaluate the need for each based on the projected operations.

   b. The following theater-level organizations may be established by the **supported combatant commander** to assist the JTF in coordinating logistics efforts:

      - **Joint Transportation Board** establishes priorities and allocates common-users transportation resources.

      - **Joint Petroleum Office (JPO)** coordinates POL planning and execution, as well as the supply of common bulk petroleum products. Normally, the supported combatant commander’s JPO provides wholesale bulk petroleum management.

      - **Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB)**, a temporary board, establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements.

      - **Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB)** evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, interservice support, and construction in compliance with the JCMEB. JFUB actions will be guided by the provisions of Joint Pub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

      - **CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB)** coordinates contracting operations with US Embassies and HN for acquisition of supplies and services.
eliminating duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting.

- **Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board** modifies and recommends priorities for allocation of materiel assets for both United States and multinational forces.

c. The following may be established by the CJTF to coordinate logistics efforts:

- **Joint Movement Center** implements the taskings and priorities for movement. Additionally, the JTF’s JMC coordinates the employment of all transportation assets, including multinational and HN within the JOA.

- **Subarea Petroleum Office**, when tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk POL in theater, is established by the JPO to coordinate, plan and execute common bulk petroleum products for the JTF.

- **Joint Mortuary Affairs Office**, routinely assigned to the Army component commander as executive agent, plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs and provides guidance to facilitate mortuary programs and maintain data.

- **JTF Contracting Office(s)**, working with the CLPSB, are established (with warranted contracting officers) to coordinate contracting requirements for and assisting in the acquisition of local facilities, supplies, services, and support. The contracting office coordinates contracting support requirements among Services to preclude Interservice competition for supplies or services in order to obtain effective utilization and advantageous prices through consolidation of JTF requirements.

d. A complete description of the functions for each of the logistics boards, offices, and centers can be found in the JEL under Appendix B to Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

*Feeding the local population, in coordination with civilian organizations working in the joint operations area, may be part of your mission.*
CHAPTER VII
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

“If you don’t understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisions in these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their values and in their taboos—you aren’t going to be successful.”

George Wilson-Commentary in Air Force Times

1. General

a. As a CJTF, you must recognize that in multifaceted and multinational operations sensitivities will exist when discussing intelligence. This may even extend to using the term “intelligence.” For example: In peace operations, the term “information” may be used instead of the term “intelligence,” “all-source intelligence gathering” is commonly referred to as “information gathering,” or the title “intelligence officer” may have to be changed to “information officer.” These sensitivities do not negate the JTF’s responsibility in developing a comprehensive intelligence plan that utilizes all available assets and programs.

b. The primary source of intelligence in peace operations is normally human sources.

- Interpreters are an integral part of this collection system.
- In peace operations, low-level source operations, elicitations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are the primary information gathering techniques.
- Assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance should increase the efficiency and capability of your force.
Chapter VII

- The best sources of information may be CA and PSYOP personnel, military patrols in local villages, military engineers, truck drivers, UN military observers, and others that have direct contact with the population. Approaches to NGO, PVO, and other civilian organizations for information should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the purposes for which information will be used, so as to avoid undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies.

- SOF also can provide in-depth knowledge and information of the projected JOA.

c. Consider requesting intelligence products available from PSYOP analysts—“Special PSYOP Studies and Special Assessments.” These can be tailored to address specific requirements relating to the local population and ramifications of JTF actions. Request these products through the supported combatant commander’s staff PSYOP officer.

d. Communications and an understanding of the local infrastructure can lead to successful situational awareness.


2. Commander’s Direction

a. Use all sources to gather information (intelligence).

b. Provide your J-2 with a clear assessment of the mission, your intended objectives, and prioritized intelligence requirements.

c. Establish a collection system and a means to evaluate information gathered “on the street.”

d. Emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being information conscious.

e. Provide basic guidelines for all personnel to improve their information gathering capability.

- During peace operations, free exchange of information between military forces of different nations may not exist. This causes nations to conduct regional analysis independently which may not support your overall plan.

- Changes in the behavior of the local populace may suggest a significant change is required in your operational strategy.

For example, “In a crisis [Operation SEA ANGEL] such as the aftermath of [Cyclone] Marian, food is not as important as clean water and shelter. Consequently, the food-bridge to the time when regular staples can be distributed is the high protein power bar. When these protein bars began to show up on the black market as well as being used as a means to barter, CARE recognized that the first stage of the crisis was over. If the people could physically afford not to eat the bar and thus trade it, they were no longer in a life-threatening situation. It is measures of effectiveness like this one that signaled the end of Phase One and the transition to Phase Two.”

The U.S. Military / NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions Chris Seiple
• Every item of operational information has potential importance in peace operations. (An obvious statement but one that may not be clear to all military personnel.)

• Classification may present a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as feasible will improve interoperability and trust among multinational partners.

• Do not forget the media in this endeavor. If you keep the media informed, they may become more willing to exchange information with your staff.

3. Operational Considerations

a. There are no standard templates for structuring intelligence support to peace operations. Use the same approach for these operations as you would for wartime operations. Intelligence organizational resources, methodologies, and products should be established, flexible, exercised regularly, and applicable in any type of military option or scenario.

b. In peace operations, intelligence systems support must be tailored to satisfy specific mission requirements. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) provides a common platform which, combined with the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) communications, can provide automated intelligence support to the JTF. Other DOD Intelligence Information System standard workstations also may be employed to provide an equivalent or specialized capability. Regardless of workstation platform, JWICS provides sensitive compartmented information connectivity to access worldwide intelligence centers, databases, imagery products, and personnel. In the event, JWICS is unavailable, other theater or tactical communications may be used to satisfy intelligence exchange requirements.

c. Because peace operations scenarios often eliminate the maneuver, posture, and fire options, you must consciously undergo an intellectual adaptation to a new and complex environment. In addition, the nature and intensity of a potential threat in a peace operation can change suddenly and dramatically. Therefore, the JTF intelligence resources should be flexibly structured to support potentially changing requirements aggressively and proactively.

d. The intelligence effort must be unified. The integration of intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level will result in complete access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities without regard to organization or command configurations.

e. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations.

f. If you have extensive contact with the indigenous population, cultural information is of critical importance in gauging the potential reactions of the local population to the activities of the peace operation. Knowledge of such factors as shown in Figure VII-1 (Ernst Cassirer’s Six Categories of Human Culture) is vital in avoiding misunderstandings and improving the effectiveness of operations.

g. Biographic information and leadership analysis are integral to understanding the nature and proclivities of adversaries or potential adversaries, their method of operation, and how they interact with their environment.
Chapter VII

JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations

and systems by foreign intelligence services. CI also determines the ability and willingness of HN forces to protect DOD resources and personnel.

1. You should, through your J-2, prioritize component intelligence requirements to manage the flow of intelligence and information more effectively and efficiently to meet time-sensitive requirements.

4. Joint Task Force J-2 Organizations

a. JTF Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE)

- The JISE, through the J-2, is the focus for intelligence support to joint operations in the JOA and is responsible for providing the JTF with complete intelligence.

- A tailored subset of the theater joint intelligence center (JIC), the JISE provides intelligence support to JTF operational forces and performs common intelligence functions. The JISE is the principal J-2 organization supporting joint operations.

- By design, the JISE is scalable and can expand to meet the needs of the JTF, and it is tailored to fit the operating environment based on identified CJTF requirements.

- JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems. Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all sources; a JISE’s capability for joint

h. Nonmilitary information factors such as those shown in Figure VII-2 become critical elements when evaluating potential problem areas that can impact the success of peace operations.

i. In many peace operations, your knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions and fissures in the JOA, along with the historical background of the hostilities underlying the deployment, will be vital in complying with the mandate, preventing unintentional mission creep, and ultimately achieving the objectives of the operation.

j. It is imperative to consider what must be done, as well as what must not be done, to trigger an undesired or hostile action.

k. Recognize CI (UN operations may inhibit collection of CI information) as a source of information. CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services. CI also determines the ability and willingness of HN forces to protect DOD resources and personnel.

Figure VII-1. Categories of Human Culture

Figure VII-1. Categories of Human Culture

- RELIGION
- HISTORY
- SCIENCE
- MYTH
- ART
- LANGUAGE

Figure VII-1. Categories of Human Culture
Intelligence Support

and all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.

- JISE should support “upward” to the supported combatant commander’s JIC, CJTF, and the JTF staff and should support “downward” to components, units, and elements assigned to or in support of the JTF.

- Analytical efforts of the JISE should have an operational focus, with responsibility for helping the CJTF better understand how the adversary thinks, e.g., how an adversary will conceptualize the situation, what options an adversary will consider, and how an adversary will react to the JTF actions.

- When the CJTF is engaged in planning operations, the JISE assists by:
  - Identifying and nominating attainable military objectives.
  - Identifying and nominating deception objectives that will help attain military objectives.
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When the CJTF and subordinate commanders are engaged in conducting operations, the JISE assists by:

- Orchestrating, in conjunction with J-3 watch teams and collection managers, all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance which are necessary for understanding the situation, identifying objectives, providing warning to forces, and assessing the effects of operations.

- In addition, the JISE also may be used to manage intelligence resources and efforts and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and supporting commands’ intelligence activities.

b. Joint Force J-2 Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Staff Element (J-2X)

- A JTF-J-2X also may be activated. This concept is designed to integrate human intelligence (HUMINT) and CI by combining the Human Intelligence Operations Cell (HOC) with the Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA), both of whom comprise the J-2X.

- A TFCICA coordinates Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations; maintains tactical source registry; maintains liaison coordination; and conducts CI collection management support functions.

- A HOC coordinates operations, sources administration, and requirements with the Country Team; establishes liaison and tasks HUMINT collection elements against identified priority document and foreign material acquisition requirements; and guides HUMINT operations toward elimination of intelligence gaps.

- The J-2X

- Controls and coordinates all HUMINT and CI collection activities and keeps the JTF J-2 informed on all human intelligence and CI activities in the JOA.

- Deconflicts source operational interest to minimize duplication of effort.

- Ensures proper resource application to provide a coordinated and integrated HUMINT collection and reporting effort for the JTF.

c. National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)

"The Haiti JTFs were all supported by National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) drawn from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. NISTs can be requested by joint force commanders from CJCS and—on approval of the Secretary of Defense—tailored to meet operational requirements based on arrangements between theater J-2s and the Defense Intelligence Agency and J-2, Joint Staff."

Joint Force Quarterly
Spring 1995

- A NIST provides a mission-tailored national intelligence “reach-back” capability to fulfill the stated intelligence requirements of the supported JTF.

- Normally, it is composed of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and other intelligence resources, as required.

- At a minimum, the personnel deployed in a NIST provide access to agency unique information and supporting analysis. A basic NIST is supported by JDISS.
Intelligence Support

• It is requested by the JTF, through the supported combatant commander, and is tailored to meet operational requirements based on arrangements between the supported combatant commander’s J-2 and the Joint Staff J-2.

5. Multinational Operations

a. There are close analogies between joint and multinational doctrines that result from similar needs. One example is to establish a seamless cooperative force and unity of effort.

b. Concepts applicable when establishing information (intelligence) support to multinational peace operations include:

• Adjust for national differences. You should be flexible enough to facilitate required adjustments to national concepts for intelligence support to make the multinational action effective. For example, a single director of intelligence should be designated in-theater with intelligence and information being exchanged.

• Strive for unity of effort to achieve a common mission. The mission should be viewed from a national as well as multinational perspective and a threat to one element of the force by a common adversary should be considered a threat to all members.

• Determine and plan intelligence. When possible, multinational intelligence requirements should be agreed upon, planned, and exercised in advance of the operation.

• Seek full exchange of information.

• Plan complementary intelligence operations. Strengths can be enhanced and weaknesses overcome when multinational intelligence resources and capabilities are applied against the entire operation.

• Establish a multinational intelligence center. This center should include representatives from all participating nations. (There will still be a requirement for a US-only intelligence center.)

• Exchange liaisons. This exchange will eliminate potential problems between cultures, languages, doctrines, and operational intelligence requirements. The requirement for linguists and interpreters is further accentuated by the following quote.

“[Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR]. Multinational lines of communication. Complicated lines of communication intensify any confusion that exists, which is further exasperated by the lack of a common language. ... Not only did we have to establish guidelines for passing information, but we also had to learn to gather and assimilate intelligence from three very different international organizations: Italians, French and British. Eventually, we became an integral part of the Italians’ intelligence collection plan. The Italians gave us access to their assessments of the current situation, including force protection issues. Translators were not available; occasionally, an allied soldier spoke some English, but in most instances neither party could communicate effectively.”

Captain John H. Campbell, KSARNG 161st Field Artillery (Target Acquisition) FA Journal, January-February 1997
Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER VIII
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA

“From their inception, contingency operations are high visibility. The American/world publics, families of Service members, the news media, and the government have an insatiable demand for information that must be made readily and immediately available.”

Joint Universal Lessons Learned
No. 70344-88264 (06186)

1. General

a. Dissemination of information to the world’s public is now, more than ever before, a media event. Cameras are rolling and stories are filed before forces even “hit the beach.”

b. The relationship you and your PA staff develop with the media will be critical to the operation as you seek to have your story accurately told. The media may be of more importance to the military in MOOTW (e.g., peace operations) than war.

c. The media can be an ally and an additional source of information—how much of an ally may depend on you.

2. Public Affairs

a. Upon arrival in country, you must be prepared for a tidal wave of media attention—your media policy must be developed before deployment.

b. You need to rehearse what you are going to say to the media prior to your arrival in the JOA (obtain guidance from higher HQ on the “story” to be provided the media—substance and strategy). A predeployment media relations “refresher” will enhance your ability to address varied interests and agendas of the international media.

c. To help in handling the media and providing maximum coverage of all important events, the JTF should deploy with PA assets as part of the command group.

• It would be better to initially deploy additional personnel and equipment and scale back rather than lose initial control of the media impact on operations.

“From the beginning of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, media representatives were in the mountains reporting on the plight of displaced Kurds. We decided from the outset that President Bush’s objectives for this humanitarian relief operation could be met best by ensuring full access for the media. Therefore, we placed members of the media on our helicopters, in our C-130 aircraft, on our convoys, in our relocation camps, and with our ground forces, including SOF units. Interestingly enough, even though we made several mistakes that were observed by the media, those mistakes never made it to the nightly news. Apparently, our evident commitment to relieving human suffering and our openness to coverage of all aspects of the operation persuaded the media to provide well-balanced, objective coverage of our endeavors and to place in proper perspective those mistakes we did make.”

General J. P. McCarthy, USAF
Deputy Commander in Chief
US European Command
Peace operations are normally more open to the public and therefore more information is expected to be released.

d. PAO should be viewed as a force multiplier, be part of the planning process, and establish goals based on your guidance.

e. PAO and PSYOP staffs should coordinate efforts.

- PSYOP can use PA announcements and releases. However, PA cannot employ PSYOP.

- News media coverage of PSYOP activities can benefit the JTF.

f. **Joint Information Bureau**

- Establish a JIB.

- JIB should facilitate and control PA coverage within the JOA.

- It may help in improving dissemination of information to internal and external audiences.

- JIB provides a central location for news and media access and support.

- A representative from the JIB should be present at your meetings and briefings. Additionally, a representative also should attend the CMOC or similar CMO meetings.

g. Internal information is important to your personnel and their families at home. Depending on the scope and duration of the operation, establishment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service may be a way to provide news and communicate with members of the JTF.

- Ensure your PAO is getting the good word on your activities back to the “homefront.” Positive feedback is a

*Navy SEALs coming ashore in Somalia—surrounded by a horde of media.*
must—remember, at times, American values may be at odds with the operation.

- The morale of the Service member often is influenced by what the spouse and other family members report they have seen or heard on television and radio.

h. Make as much of the operation unclassified as possible; this may enhance the flow of information.

i. Encourage the PAO to become familiar with the local media, both organizationally and individually, to establish a working relationship in which two-way communication can occur for the benefit of the media, the public (internal and external audiences) and the JTF.

3. Procedures in Working with the Media

a. Some rules and procedures for dealing with the media are as follows:

- These rules should be promulgated to all participating military personnel as well as the media.

- A coordinated media policy must be established. A system to provide credentials for the media may have to be established—this allows for some control over who attends JTF briefings.

- In working with the media, be honest, accurate, and prepared to provide support when possible (e.g., transportation, meals, billeting, emergency medical treatment, liaison personnel).

- In dealing with the media, the United States must speak with one voice, both politically and militarily. Coordinate with the combatant commander, Department of Defense, and State Department (country team).

- The media should see the identifiable end state and progress in moving toward it.

- Aggressively counter inaccurate information with subject matter experts.

“CNN is everywhere, and where CNN goes, all the other media outlets swiftly follow. Censorship today is virtually impossible, with backpack satellite-broadcast systems and telephones that allow reporters to file their copy from anywhere in the world. That access gives the news an immediacy that drives the political process in ways that can be very unhealthy, particularly when so many of the decisions makers have no experience of the world about which they are making decisions of life and death.”

James Adams
Washington Bureau Chief
London Sunday Times

b. The media will want to talk to the field commanders and their troops.

- Generally, this is a good idea.

- Avoid “dog and pony” shows. Most experienced media will immediately spot them.

- It is better to let the media talk to the troops. (They will anyway.) Guidance to the troops should be:

  ** You are free to talk to the media.

  ** Everything you say is “on the record” and “for attribution”—meaning what you say will be quoted by your name.
Do not discuss classified or sensitive information. Do not comment on policy.

Be honest. If you do not know the answer, say so. Do not speculate and stay within your area of expertise.

Listen to the questions. If you are unsure of a query, ask the reporter to clarify it.

Treat equally and respect their deadlines.

Respect HN sensitivities and speak slowly.

Keep your answers brief and to the point.

Always maintain eye contact with interviewer.

Avoid military or technical jargon.


c. Facilitate media coverage of a highly successful NGO or PVO operations. Such operations often are good yardsticks to measure success or failure with the media.

d. It is important not to put the media in a position of appearing as your agent.

e. The media normally will go to great lengths to remain impartial; however, some individuals may have their own agendas and biases.

f. Expect a wide range of competencies among the media.

- Most are very professional, courageous, highly ethical, and as dedicated to their profession as you are to yours.

- They often have no military background; however, they will usually work to gather the facts and present an accurate story.

- Treat them with the respect you expect and never underrate their capability to gather information.

- They can be tenacious and may have sources of information not available to you.

“In general, there is a bell curve; the good journalists are willing to share the same hardships as the military. Less capable journalists are more often found filing their stories from five star hotels.”

Colonel F. Peck, USMC
Public Affairs Office,
Headquarters Marine Corps

g. Most of the professional news organizations come prepared (either with the necessary logistics support or money to buy it). As a rule, if you invite the media to come with you, either be prepared to provide them with transportation or include their vehicles in your entourage.

h. If the media chooses to accompany the military, they will be under your protection and rules. If they choose to leave, they are on their own.

i. More accurate and positive reporting will be made by the media if they are familiar with your mission.

j. Be aware that countries other than the United States will be interested and following your operation. The media dispatched to cover your activities will have an international makeup and will report from a widely diverse perspective. In fact, some journalists may be politically aligned with organizations with an
opposing or unsympathetic view of your position.

k. Your command has an important story to tell. Your force’s activities are “news” to both international and national audiences. **You are the most believable spokesperson to represent the force.** Preparation and practice on your part will result in newsworthy, informative articles and programs that may be read and seen by millions of readers and viewers.

l. News travels fast and rumors travel faster. Be aggressive and proactive in your media and PA activities. Facilitating coverage of your activities is a media control measure. **Market your good works to the media.**

- A lack of communication capability and cultural differences in Third World countries may require you to communicate face-to-face with these countries’ representatives.

- Regular briefings keep information flowing to and from the media.

m. Remember as the situation changes, the media also may change its focus—the “main reporters” may leave and be replaced by “area specialists.”

n. In the past peace operations, CJTFs held one-on-one discussions with media representatives to better articulate JTF activities and operations. These should be conducted in addition to regularly scheduled press conferences.

o. A “media survival guide” is shown in Figure VIII-1.

p. An excellent source to obtain additional information on dealing with the media is an appendix to the “Operational Law Handbook.” Refer to the JEL Peace Operations database for this reference.

MEDIA SURVIVAL GUIDE

“Generally, it is in the institution’s best interest to deal honestly and in a timely manner with the media. If you do not play, you surrender to your critics who will be eagerly at hand.

Understand the media’s obsession with speed, and through daily contact, keep working to win the battle of the first media perception.

Leaders must learn to take time to articulate their positions to the media. They must use short, simple language that the media will use and the public will understand.

Use the media to inform the public proactively, not just to react to critics.

Understand that the news is almost always skewed toward the side of those willing to talk to the media, and against those who say “No comment.”

Remember that CNN will correct the television record, while other networks rarely will do that because of time constraints.

Realize that there are reporters who do want to be accurate and have balanced stories. Too often editors or television producers get in the way and interject the political or budget spin on an otherwise positive story about our people. Getting reporters out to the fleet, field, or factory floor is a beginning.

Play the media game. Understand there are times for a low profile, but more often, a media opportunity to tell your story should not be lost because of fear. We need to tell people, through the media, what we are about.

Do not be thin-skinned. We will not win every media engagement, but we must continue to communicate to our people and to the public.”

Rear Admiral Brent Baker, USN (RET)

Figure VIII-1. Media Survival Guide
CHAPTER IX
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES

“Joint legal staffs are needed in joint operations. Each Service should have at least one senior staff judge advocate (SJA) at the [joint task force] JTF headquarters.”

1. General

   a. Legal support is critical in peace operations. This support should include legal assistance attorneys to handle a wide array of legal assistance issues for members of the JTF.

   b. Peace operations involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic, in addition to the normal constraints associated with deployments and operations. Your legal advisor (SJA) is usually in the best position to access these sources. Legal advisor and SJA will be used synonymously throughout this chapter.

   c. Peace operations may require subordinate commanders to become involved with local governments and/or conduct negotiations among competing factions. You will need a legal advisor of sufficient rank (recommend grade of 0-6) to influence the decisionmaking process.

   d. Your “operational lawyer” should be immediately available to advise, not only on the legal restraints upon operators, but on the rights to employ force.

   e. Legal Responsibilities

      • Legal services provided to you and your staff include operational law (including Law of Armed Conflict, ROE, Law of the Sea, Airspace Law, SOFA, and general international law), military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law (including environmental law, contracts, and fiscal law).

      • Many of the subject areas overlap one another, requiring knowledgeable and effective planning by the SJA.

         • SJA drafts Appendix 4 (Legal) to Annex E (Personnel) of your OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan; develops a legal services support plan; drafts general and restrictive orders; provides advice and assistance in the development, interpretation, and modification of ROE; and oversees execution of the legal services support plan at the JTF and component level (component judge advocates are primarily responsible for the execution of the legal services support plan, except as it concerns JTF staff members).

         • The entire OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan should be reviewed for legal sufficiency. In the role of operational and international law advisor, the SJA will be responsible for providing advice to the various staff sections and boards as requested on the entire range of operational and politico-military issues. SJA or representative is a member of the ROE Planning Cell—critical area of legal support is providing advice and counsel on the development and promulgation of ROE.
• Legal advisors also can help with a wide range of issues to include weapons confiscation policy; reviewing existing OPLANs, OPORDs, and campaign plans; developing policy guidance letters for you; and developing negotiation strategy, as necessary.

• Even if provided for by a SOFA or other international agreement, negotiation with local governments may be necessary concerning a variety of issues, including procurement matters, property seizure for military purposes, and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction.

• Legal advisors can advise and represent you on all these issues, as well as ensure all adverse actions are properly administered.

f. Your legal advisor should be a vital part of the planning team before deployment. Besides reviewing OPLANs, OPORDs, and campaign plans for legal sufficiency and identifying legal issues, the legal advisor can draft a General Order to establish basic policy for the JTF regarding prohibited and permitted actions while deployed. In addition, your legal advisor can provide details of the Uniform Code of Military Justice considerations for the JTF.

g. A good legal advisor is a force multiplier, and will assist you in accomplishing your mission in a lawful manner.

2. International Agreements

a. Your legal advisor should be very familiar with “international agreements” that might affect your mission.

b. The supported combatant commander’s legal advisor often can provide your legal advisor a description and analysis of applicable laws.

c. There are usually UN Resolutions or other international directives which can form the basis for US action. These may become important in your mission analysis.

• International agreements may cover such issues as HN support, diplomatic status and foreign criminal jurisdiction, use of deadly force, environmental matters, and medical treatment of civilians.

The contractor was not included in the status-of-forces agreement with the Hungarian government. The result was the contractor paid about $18 million in value added tax to the Hungarian government, which was subsequently billed to the US Government as a contract cost. The Army is working to recoup these taxes from the Hungarian government.

• Chapter I, “Mission,” of this Handbook discusses one type of these agreements—SOFA.

3. Additional Legal Considerations

a. Immediately request release authority for riot control agents—NCA approval required in wartime; supported combatant approval required in peacetime. If you anticipate a requirement for riot control agents do not delay the request to the supported combatant commander.

b. Your legal advisor can assist in many areas including refugees; displaced and detained civilians; PSYOP and CA, local culture, customs, and government; military and political liaison; claims; investigations; environmental regulations, both United States and HN; and contingency contracting.
• The SJA also can provide advice on such matters as the legality of landing fees, interpretation of transit agreements, and the requirement for participation agreements (e.g., in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, NATO required participating countries to conclude a participation agreement with NATO to bind each country to NATO’s way of doing things).

• Another area that may require SJA attention is tax preparation assistance, when appropriate. The SJA should develop a tax preparation assistance program for US members of the JTF.

c. A comprehensive understanding of regulations and laws applicable to both military forces and other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, is essential to promoting unity of effort and achieving success.

d. In multinational operations, coalition partners and the HN should be integrated into the planning process to ensure all legal requirements are identified. Your legal advisor should help establish liaison with multinational and HN legal officials early in the operation.

e. Be prepared to liaise and coordinate with the local police force. This is an important element in retaining law and order. Be aware that US law places limitations on permissible support.

f. Be prepared to liaise and coordinate with local authorities and court officials who administer the judicial system to handle thieves and trespassers.

g. Invariably, the International Committee of the Red Cross or other international organizations will monitor your actions. Your legal advisor should be their single point of contact.

Forces must avoid unnecessary apprehension and detention of the local populace.
Chapter IX

h. Two areas of sensitivity usually will arise in all peace operations.

- Detention of local nationals or others who attack or otherwise disrupt the JTF or its personnel is a delicate issue. You must be sensitive to apprehension and turnover procedures. This is important especially where there are distinct cultural differences in the JOA.

- Claims. In all likelihood, your force will injure people or damage property, incidental to your operations. Your legal advisor must implement a claims system to pay for these incidents to assist in good community relations.

i. You will encounter fiscal restraints involving activities that are not directly related to your mission. They are often technical and statutory in nature. They may arise in logistics assistance to NGO, PVO, multinational forces, or others.

j. Your legal advisor can be a major contributor in solving many issues if used to full advantage.

k. In summary, Figure IX-1 highlights legal issues that may impact on JTF operations.
Legal Responsibilities

LEGAL ISSUES

- Joint Military Justice
  - Uniformity versus Efficiency
  - Courts-martial Asset Sharing
  - Divergent Command Philosophies

- Claims
  - Foreign Claims
  - Single-Service Claims Authority

- Legal Assistance
  - Asset Utilization and Interoperability

- Environmental Law
  - Applicability of US Law Abroad
  - Environmental Treaties and Agreements

- Fiscal Law/Contracts
  - Fiscal statutes and Appropriations Acts

- International Law
  - Treaties
  - Conventions and Protocols (Hague/Geneva)
  - Customary International Law (Law of Armed Conflict)
  - National Policy Issues (Asylum and Refuge)
  - Execution Orders (Riot Control Agents)

- Operational Law Issues
  - Overflight of National Airspace
  - Freedom of Navigation
  - Basing Rights (intermediate staging bases and forward operations bases)
  - Displaced Persons
  - Humanitarian Assistance
  - Status-of-Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreements

- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
  - An Operations (J-3) Responsibility
  - Legal Advisor may be the most experienced and educated in ROE Development

Figure IX-1. Legal Issues
CHAPTER X
FORCE PROTECTION

“In a multinational environment such as this one [Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR], this subject [force protection] can be somewhat controversial as armies’ philosophies of military operations are different. The fact is, the American Army focuses on force protection as a dynamic incumbent of military operations. ... Commanders must take care of the sons and daughters entrusted to them to accomplish the nation’s military missions. Force protection multiplies combat power, ensures you have the soldiers to get the job done right. ... Force protection makes us more proficient and credible as a warfighting force. ... Force protection is more than sweat and sand bags; it’s aggressive acts to keep the peace.”

Major General William L. Nash, USA
Commanding General, 1st Armored Division
and Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-Herzegovina
FA Journal, January-February 1997

"The tragedy of the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon cannot be lost on leaders." Special Warfare, April 1994

Flowers adorn the remains of the Marine barracks in Beirut.

1. General

a. Force protection must be a top priority during the “life” of a JTF. It commences from the time units are alerted to move their equipment to the sea and aerial ports of embarkation, to redeployment, and everything in between. It is your responsibility and all other commanders within the JTF. The intent should be to accomplish the mission with the least loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies. In the event of a terrorist attack, it is imperative that qualified personnel are available to provide accurate casualty reporting to the respective Service casualty offices. In this regard, the importance of
b. **It is important to remember that** many factors influence force protection to include political considerations.

c. Conducting the mission analysis process should assist in determining the policy for force protection. Additionally, it should identify the type of forces and equipment required to support this policy.

d. In some peace operations, banditry and terrorism may play a major role in disrupting the JTF’s security efforts. A plan must be developed to counter this threat—US forces often are targets of violent acts.

e. You should not allow the philosophy of “unarmed peacekeepers” to minimize your responsibility for force protection.

f. Combat service support units (e.g., logistics commands) normally provide their own local (base) security.

g. NGO, PVO, the media, and others also may request some form of protection.

h. The protection afforded to these organizations and groups may serve to enhance your credibility with them and provide you with a “window of opportunity” to further advance a cooperative and workable environment.

i. **The higher the level of focus for force protection procedures, the less likely the chance of disaster.**


“Force protection for US forces will always be a significant issue in any military operation, and be an especially high priority in peace operations missions. In OJE [Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR], US force protection took on a higher degree of importance than we have seen in other military operations. In fact, force protection was a formal part of the OPLAN [operation plan] mission statement and permeated all aspects of mission execution. Furthermore, many participants [Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I conference participants] agreed that US force protection measures seemed to be politically motivated and clearly not based on a realistic threat assessment.”

**Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I Conference Report**
2. Force Protection Considerations

“My initial concern for the task force deploying to Operation ABLE SENTRY was force protection. Some UN military commanders don’t understand our preoccupation with this issue because they are not faced with the same threat as US forces. They don’t understand that because we are the American Army, we are an isolated target of opportunity.”

Major General W. H. Yates, USA
Commander, Berlin Brigade

The below force protection considerations are provided as a guide. They will have to be adapted to the JTF’s peace operations mission and situation.

a. ROE. ROE provide a means to influence force protection.

b. Protection from potential threats. In peace operations, you must be able to establish a mechanism to identify potential threats to the JTF. These threats may not always be transparent.

In Haiti (United Nations Mission in Haiti), force protection teams were formed to identify potential threats to the force.

c. Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance. You must keep personnel healthy and maintain high morale. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. You also must ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations,” discusses health support for joint operations.

d. Safety

• You make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk.
• Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks.

• Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful operations and the preservation of military power.

  • You may reduce the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, conducting a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. The safety program should begin with training conducted before deployment and be continuous.

  • Training will include factors that could have an effect on safety, such as the environment, terrain, road conditions and local driving habits, access or possession of live ammunition, unlocated or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment such as tanks and other systems that present special hazards.

  • Safety also is important during off duty and recreational activities. If possible, the safety officer and staff should coordinate with local authorities concerning environmental and health concerns.

• In multinational operations, it also is essential to coordinate these measures with multinational forces to ensure their understanding and concurrence.

f. Technology. Every means of force protection must be examined. Technology can assist in providing lethal and nonlethal capability (e.g., sensors, secure communications network, unmanned aerial vehicles, personnel dyemarkers, sponge grenades, rubber bullets) to the JTF.

g. Nonlethal Force

• The use of nonlethal weapons is a rapidly developing area for military operations. The term is really a misnomer because any object, even a tent peg, can be lethal in certain circumstances.

• Nonlethal technologies are designed to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed hostile elements. These situations are likely to be encountered in peace operations, and the CJTF needs to have the maximum tools at the JTF’s disposal to reduce the threat to the JTF, and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily.

• The CJTF must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how the force is trained to use it, and how the ROE authorize its employment.

h. Individual Awareness. All JTF commanders, “from top to bottom,” must stress to the “troops” and others (e.g., media personnel, other government agencies’ personnel, and civilian organizations) the significance of security and the importance of individual awareness (be aware of what is going on around them).
3. Risk Management (RM)

a. Uncertainty and risk are a fundamental part of all military operations. A time-tested tenet of success of the joint operations of the United States is taking bold, decisive action, and a willingness to accept the associated risk. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to various hazards. Carefully determining the risks, analyzing and controlling as many hazards as possible, and executing a supervised plan that accounts for these hazards contributes to the success of the application of military force. RM is the process by which decision makers reduce or offset risk. The RM process provides leaders a systematic mechanism to identify and choose the optimum COA for any given situation. RM must become a fully integrated element of planning and executing an operation. The RM process is applicable to all levels of military operations — strategic, operational, and tactical. Commanders are responsible for the routine application of RM in the planning and execution of military operations.

b. Risk Management Process

- **Identify Hazards.** Consider all aspects of current and future situations, environment, and known historical problem areas.

- **Assess Hazards.** Assess hazards to determine risks. Assess the impact of each hazard in terms of potential loss and cost, based on probability and severity.

- **Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions.** Develop control measures that eliminate the hazard or reduce its risk. As control measures are developed, risks are reevaluated until all risks are reduced to an acceptable level.

- **Implement Controls.** Put controls in place that eliminate the hazards or reduce their risks.

- **Supervise and Evaluate.** Enforce standards and controls. Evaluate the effectiveness of controls and adjust and/or update as necessary.
CHAPTER XI
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force.”

Lieutenant General T. Montgomery, USA
Senior Military Representative to NATO

1. General

a. Training needs to be a continuing process for both personnel and units. It should be accomplished with as many of the multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations associated with the operation as possible.

b. You should establish a training program based on your assessment of the mission and projected JOA.

c. Training for peace operations may not be entirely different from training for warfighting except that the uniqueness of peace operations requires warrior training to be expanded and enhanced.

d. Predeployment training can be accomplished, even in a time-sensitive operation, as long as it is based on anticipated operations to be conducted. The following are potential training areas.

- Individual military skills.
- Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.
- First aid—Individual and “buddy.”
- Terrorism awareness and prevention.
- Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory)—based on projected operations.
- Staff training to include training with multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations (when applicable)—you may be faced with working with a diverse set of militaries and organizations. The more multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations participate in your training the more you will learn how they think and operate and the more broad-minded your staff will become—team building.

“Peace operations commanders and staff planners—even in companies and battalions—may find their efforts require a level of political knowledge and sophistication formerly associated only with soldier-statesman at the highest level.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned May 1996
Chapter XI

- Customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, economic, and historical background of the situation and population of the projected JOA.
- Adversary capabilities—as appropriate.
- How to effectively communicate to the public through the news media.
- Negotiation and mediation.
- Language training—key phrases.
- Situational awareness.
  - Mine and booby trap awareness.
  - Recognition of weapons and weapons systems.
- ROE (to include both CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces,” and any supplemental measures approved for the theater or operation).
- Law of war (law of armed conflict).
- Crowd control—use of and employment of riot control agents.
- Embarked forces aboard Navy ships also can accomplish some training (e.g., individual skills, classes on ROE, working with the media, and cultural aspects of the JOA). An attempt should be made to bring these forces ashore for appropriate training.
- Training may be accomplished once the JTF arrives in the JOA, but it probably will depend on the situation and be based on specific requirements and functions—force protection requirements also may impact on areas available for training. If the situation permits, allow nonmilitary organizations to participate in your training—NGO and PVO have much to offer and require your attention.
- Exercises may be conducted to rehearse the OPORD or new missions.
Training Requirements

For example, “at Battamburg, a freak wind came up. The UN team suddenly heard small arms fire breaking out at the far end of town. The UN started to call for an extraction, when some of the folks looked outside and saw in fact that the Cambodians were just firing up in the air to ‘stop the wind.’ That’s a normal Cambodian practice. When it is windy, when a storm approaches, they shoot in the air and the wind stops, hopefully.”

Major G. Steuber, USA, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

- Training in the JOA also may advertise your capabilities which may serve as a deterrent.

- Some exercises and training (e.g., live firing) will require HN approval—situationally dependent.

  g. Success of the operation, in part, will depend on the training the JTF receives prior to and during the operation.

2. Additional Considerations

All it takes is one Service member, acting improperly, to “poison the well.” Training and emphasis on proper personal conduct may prevent this.

  a. Continue emphasizing ROE to ensure all understand it—to include when and how to use force.

  b. Emphasize that all military personnel, but especially junior officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers, receive instruction in the “understanding” of peace operations. Inappropriate individual statements and actions may offend forces from other nations, HN, or NGO and PVO, and create negative perceptions of the United States or the JTF. Individuals should not

In-country training programs must support multinational forces.
assume that derogatory statements made in English will not be understood by others. The same is true for gestures and slang terms.

“There is no doubt in my mind, that the success of a peace-keeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.”

Brigadier M. Harbottle, UN Forces Cyprus

c. Ensure JTF staff augmentees participate in training events. Additional training for these individuals should evolve through the combatant commanders’ exercise and training program. Normally, these augmentees bring extensive expertise to your staff.

d. Review the supported combatant commander’s Joint Mission Essential Task List for guidance on military force capability as it relates to training requirements.

e. Provide training to all units or individuals whom you plan to lend equipment.

f. Evaluate training opportunities offered by other Services and nations. For example: 7th Army Training Command in Germany, the United Nations Training Advisory Team in the United Kingdom, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre. These all have extensive experience in training units and individuals for peace operations.
CHAPTER XII
REFUGEE, DISPLACED PERSON, OR MIGRANT
CAMP OPERATIONS

“The United States armed forces are becoming increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance operations around the world. Operations such as those involving Cuban and Haitian migrants, Kurdish and Rwandan refugees, and internal disaster relief are likely to continue as a result of other wars, natural disaster, and political or economic turmoil. We have adapted well to these challenges by forming joint task forces (JTFs) and using our command and control systems, logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities in innovative ways. We must build from these experiences as we prepare for future challenges.”

General J. J. Sheehan, USMC
Commander in Chief
United States Atlantic Command

In Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SEA SIGNAL, the United States was involved in camp management operations. This section of the Handbook discusses various aspects of these operations without expounding on topics (e.g., PA, ROE, linguists, force protection) that are discussed elsewhere in the Handbook, and focuses specifically on situations where the JTF is tasked with camp management. In many peace operations involving HAO, JTF personnel may encounter camps for refugees managed by organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or camps for conflict-displaced groups managed by the United Nations or NGO. In this latter situation, previous guidance on civil-military relations and other guidance in the Handbook would apply.

1. General

a. Humanitarian Assistance Operations

- HAO, often, complement peace operations.

- These types of operations vary according to the events that caused them.

b. US participation may involve a variety of tasks that range from holding refugees, displaced persons, or migrants in camps to processing and arranging for their ultimate resettlement.

c. As with peace operations, you must understand the scope of the legal authority for the operation: Is it governed by US statutes, Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, treaty obligations, or other international agreements? Existing international agreements may constrain US forces; agreements negotiated during the course of the operation could provide additional flexibility for expanded operations in neighboring countries. Likewise, agreements also may define the legal rights and responsibilities of US forces in dealing with refugees, displaced persons, or migrants, as well as host-country officials.

2. Planning and Operations

a. Mission Analysis

- Continued mission analysis is vital to achieving the mission.
- Over time, the nature of the mission
likely will change. For example, in the early stages of the operation the emphasis will be on emergency measures to house, feed, and provide necessary medical care for these people. As this is completed, the JTF may initiate efforts to improve the quality of life for them and prepare for the end of the operation.

- Cultural awareness provides a framework for rendering assistance to, as well as resolving problems with, the refugees, displaced persons, or migrants.
  - An analysis of the region and people should be reviewed prior to deployment to understand the operational environment.
  - This should include information on customs and habits: gender or family relations, food, taboos, religious requirements, as well as information on the refugee’s, displaced person’s, or migrant’s country, the site of the mission, and data on any previous related operations.

b. **Basic Policy**

- Basic policy issues affecting the JTF may be addressed by an Interagency Working Group in Washington that is organized for the specific operation. This group probably will consist of representatives from the National Security Council staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, and, in many instances, the Coast Guard, and the Department of Justice. Policy issues may include housing, food, medical services, mail, donations of goods and services, camp programs, religious requirements, immigration policy, and transportation of refugees or migrants to the United States (if appropriate).

- Visits to the area by policymakers who have a direct impact on the mission should be encouraged as well as visits by the supported combatant commander and staff and all the agencies involved in the daily execution of the mission.

- A JTF formed specifically to conduct migrant camp operations on a US facility, such as JTF 160 at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba will likely be organized differently from a JTF in a foreign country with a broad mission, only part of which is assisting in the establishment and operation of camps for refugees and displaced persons.

c. **Civil-Military Relations**

- As in peace operations, the role of other US agencies and their potential involvement and impact on these operations must be understood by the JTF.

- The goal is to gain consensus on major policy decisions and encourage a team approach between the military and governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
  - It is likely that there will be participation of IO, NGO, and PVO in most of these operations.
  - The challenge will be to integrate these organizations into the JTF operations. Different organizational structures and agendas of these organizations will complicate this task.

d. **Camp Operations**

- Policies should be developed regarding interaction between JTF troops and camp occupants. Specifically consider what
types of commercial transactions and charitable acts are to be permitted.

- The effective operation of camps requires a well-developed organization, detailed operating procedures, and personnel sensitized to dealing with refugees, displaced persons, and migrants.

- These people will be provided with food, clothing, and shelter in the camps that will be their home for an indeterminate time. You must set the tone for the operation and ensure that JTF personnel understand that these individuals are human beings and not just numbers.

  - These people must be treated with dignity and respect.

  - It also is important to remember that these people are not military personnel; as such, they are not used to being given orders. Random searches, for instance, only should be carried out for security purposes.

- Each camp operation is likely to be different, but you should try to involve refugees, displaced persons, and migrants in the operation of the camp. Developing self-governing bodies can be a prime factor in the peaceful and efficient operation of the camps. JTF personnel should identify potential refugee, displaced person, and migrant leadership as soon as possible and support those leaders who are willing to work toward mission accomplishment. Employment of refugees, displaced persons, or migrants within the camp also should be considered. Specific conditions of the operation will determine whether payment of cash for these services is feasible or advisable.

- Organized recreational activities can ease boredom and restlessness. Daily camp life offers very little opportunity for productive activity. Organized programs such as physical training and sports can enhance the US relationship with these people as well as improve their morale and quality of life. When people are afforded the opportunity for physical activity during their idle hours, they are more manageable and less likely to protest their conditions or cause problems.

- The following four principles may contribute to mission accomplishment:

  "Tomorrow [16 April 1997] marks the beginning of the end of Joint Task Force Operation PACIFIC HAVEN when the last of 6600 Kurdish evacuees brought to Guam for political asylum depart the island—heading for new lives on the U.S. mainland. This 218-day humanitarian effort was established Sept. 16, 1996, to serve as the instrument of care for the evacuees. While on the island, the Kurds were provided shelter, food, clothing, medical care, and assimilation classes to help them adjust to a new way of life in the United States. This was a joint effort by about 1600 individuals, including military members from all services and U.S. interagency professionals from around the globe. ... 'The cooperation between U.S. military, federal and local government, and non-government organizations and the community ensured the mission's success,' said Maj. Gen. John Dallager, Joint task Force commander. 'Our success will undoubtedly be a role model for future humanitarian efforts.'"

News Release Reference Number: No. 177-97
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
**Accountability.** There must be an accurate accounting of all refugees, displaced persons, or migrants at all times. An automated, networked system, such as the Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking System (commonly referred to as DMPITS), in conjunction with an identification card with a permanent number, issued and controlled at the JTF level, is needed to ensure positive, real-time accountability for the population.

**Control.** Positive control of the camp population is the key to successful camp security and operations. The dissemination of information is an important means of population control. Use refugee, displaced person, or migrant leadership to disseminate information within the camps. This should be coordinated through an organization such as a military information support team (PSYOP activities). It is imperative that the population be given a message of hope for their future.

**Security.** Provisions for camp security and the enforcement of law, order, and discipline within the camps are essential. This is a delicate area since, with very few exceptions, these people are not criminals nor are they prisoners of war and should not be treated as if they are part of either group. It will be necessary to develop consistent and fair standards for disciplinary segregation and detention of people. Military legal officers and in some cases Justice Department personnel should develop these. A well trained security force with clear ROE protect both the civilians and JTF personnel. In some instances, it may be necessary to provide separate housing for families, single women, or other groups for which there may be special security concerns.

**Communications.** Effective communications can convey important messages that help form opinions and attitudes that contribute to good camp morale. This includes keeping the population informed of their status and US intentions toward them. Communications also convey your interest in their well being. Camp newspaper, radio, and face-to-face meetings are very effective means to dispel rumors and communicate important information.

e. **Medical.** Infectious diseases pose one of the greatest threats to JTF personnel and camp populations. Proper sanitation and preventive medicine early in the operation can contribute to mission success. Food preparation, potable water, sewage and refuse sanitation, and animal control are critical to maintaining public health and preventing epidemic diseases.

f. **Logistics.** Joint logistics planning and coordination are essential to successful camp support. The logistics structure devised to conduct operations in these camps may vary from what would be considered “normal operations.” JTF 160 (Operation SEA SIGNAL) used a Joint Logistics Support Command to provide support for both JTF personnel and the migrant population.

• **Food Service.** The quality and reliability of food service can be a major factor in maintaining tranquillity in the camps. An effective food services operation requires the participation of the JTF staff (medical, food service, and CA). The lack of consistent food service and quality of food served can be a source of significant discontent. Migrants should be used as much as possible in food services operations.
Refugee, Displaced Person, or Migrant Camp Operations

“In a migrant camp environment, meals take on an elevated importance. Food service personnel at Guantanamo [Operation SEA SIGNAL] determined the cultural and nutritional needs of the migrant population and provided menus tailored to the specific culture of the migrants. Camp leaders were consulted to identify any food prohibitions or preferences before feeding plans were established.”

Migrant Camp Operations: The Guantanamo Experience

• **Camp Construction.** The design and construction of the camp will be a significant part of mission accomplishment. The camp will become the equivalent of a small town with all the infrastructure required to support the needs of the population. Early on, you should decide construction standards for the camps as this will dictate personnel and equipment requirements.

  - Planning for the camps should include a site survey.
  - A primary consideration should be the anticipated length of the operation and the requirements to meet the initial surge of migrants. If the operation continues for an extended period, it may be necessary to transition from temporary facilities to semipermanent construction.
  - Maintenance of the civilian and JTF camps is critical. Separate engineering units should be tasked with camp maintenance.
  - Camp construction will have to support various groups of people—families, single women, single men, detention centers.
  - Another important consideration is planning for the eventual termination of the operation. Retrograde planning should be included even as camps are being constructed.

• **Contracting.** Consideration should be given to using contractor support. Use of contractors to fulfill such requirements as food service support, public works support, supply support, and/or linguists services may be possible early in the operation. Contract support should not be assumed to be available during the initial phase of an operation. Its best use would be to meet long-term requirements.

• **Funding.** Every effort should be made during the planning stages to determine funding responsibilities and sources. The interagency group in Washington, D.C. will determine which non-DOD funds sources also may be available. The supported combatant commander may provide funds to the JTF for specific purposes, but these funds usually are very limited.

  - If possible, you should obtain authority for the JTF to control its own budget. Future operations likely will be subject to austere funding and will not operate effectively without direct funding control and visibility.

  - JTF and Service components should carefully track and record costs connected with the operation. This will allow the Department of Defense to recoup costs through later supplemental appropriations as appropriate. Additionally, a high priority should be placed on property accountability due to frequent turnover of temporary personnel.

• **Legal.** The rights of migrants attempting to enter the United States are severely limited. The United States Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does
not have extraterritorial effect; therefore, migrants do not have the same rights in an offshore safe haven as they would in the United States. In each safe haven situation, the Department of Justice will determine the extent to which the INA is applicable. Even though migrants do not have the same rights as US citizens, JTF personnel must not act arbitrarily and capriciously toward them.

- An early determination should be sought to identify the legal status of the migrants (e.g., whether grounds exist for a refugee determination) and their ultimate disposition (which may include resettlement in a third country).

- This determination will impact upon the mission’s end state and ultimate conclusion of the operation.

- The issue of the legal basis of the operation is very important, not only from a fiscal law standpoint but also from an international law perspective.

  i. For more detail see “USACOM’s TTP for Migrant Camp Operations,” and USACOM’s Handbook titled “Migrant Camp Operations: The Guantanamo Experience.”
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 25

The current administration’s policy on reforming multilateral peace operations can be located in the JEL database for peace operations under the title “Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).” This directive addresses six major issues of reform and improvement. The executive summary of PDD 25 follows.

1. Policy Directive

“1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support—both when we vote in the security council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with US troops.

• To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for US support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to US participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing US national security interests in some circumstances, but both US and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.

2. Reducing US costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.

• To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.

3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.

• The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of US forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to place US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, including in Operation DESERT STORM.

• The greater the anticipated US military role, the less like it will be that the United States will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over US forces. Any large scale participation of US forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.

4. Reforming and improving the UN’s capability to manage peace operations.

• The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs US support for strengthening the UN’s planning, logistics, information, and command and control capabilities.

5. Improving the way the US Government manages and funds peace operations.
Appendix A

- The policy directive creates a new shared responsibility approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the United States Government. Under this approach, the department of defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve US combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not US troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component.

- The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve US combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN mission in New York.

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.

- The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and congress; the President believes US support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with bipartisan support of congress and the American people.”

2. Role of Peace Operations in Foreign Policy

- The current administration defines the role of the United States in peace operations in the following summary. (Extracted from the administration’s policy on reforming multilateral peace operations, May 1994.)

- Voting for peace operations:

- US military involvement in peace operations must support diplomatic efforts to allow combatants the opportunity to resolve their differences and failed societies to commence the rebuilding process. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified time frame tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political and military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate.

- The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of peacekeeping operations. The administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation.

- UN involvement advances US interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination or the following:

  - international aggression, or;

  - urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;

  - sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits
Summary and Highlights of Presidential Decision Directive 25

on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

• For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.

• For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

• The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

• The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

• The operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

• These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

• In addition, using the factors above, the US will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the US will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The US will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.

• Participating in UN and other peace operations:

  • The administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that US personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:

  • Participation advances US interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable;

  • Personnel, funds and other resources are available;

  • US participation is necessary for operation’s success;

  • The role of US forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for US participation can be identified;

  • Domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshalled;

  • Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

  • Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant US participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:

    • There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;

    • There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;

• Participating in UN and other peace operations:
There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.

Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

The role of regional organizations:

In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The United States will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the United States will support efforts to improve regional organizations’ peacekeeping capabilities.

When regional organizations or groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement, US support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.

Refer to the JEL Peace Operations database for other portions of PDD 25.
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF UN CHARTER
CHAPTERS VI, VII, and VIII

“The first of the purposes of the United Nations listed in its Charter is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”

The Blue Helmets

United Nations Headquarters in New York City.

• The UN Security Council is vested with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter are the vehicles used to achieve this purpose. Below is a brief
Appendix B

summary of these chapters. Consult the JEL Peace Operations database to view the Articles of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII.

• Chapter VI—PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. This chapter provides that international disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security can be brought to the attention of the UN Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council is expressly mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to propose actual terms of a settlement. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves, acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

• Chapter VII—ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION. If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, the Security Council may employ the broad powers given it in Chapter VII of the Charter. In order to prevent an aggravation to the situation, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide, under Article 42, such action by air, sea, and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. For this purpose, all members of the UN agree to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, the necessary armed forces, assistance and facilities. Plans for the use of armed force are to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of a military staff committee.

• Chapter VIII—Regional Arrangements—Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for the creation of “regional organizations” or agencies to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions (see Article 52). Regional organizations are required to encourage peaceful settlement of international disputes, and must prohibit the aggressive use or threat of force in international relations. Additionally, Article 53 of the UN Charter requires that enforcement action may be carried out by a regional organization only if sanctioned by the UN Security Council and that such enforcement actions must always be consistent with the principles of the Charter. Finally, the Security Council may use regional organizations for enforcement actions under its own authority.
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT
Department Level

SECRETARY GENERAL

Senior Political Adviser
Inspections and Investigation
Executive Office
Senior Political Adviser

Peace-Keeping Operations
Public Information
Policy Development and Sustainable Development

Political Affairs
Administration and Management
Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis

Humanitarian Affairs
Legal Affairs
Development, Support and Management Support

Figure C-1. United Nations Secretariat
Figure C-2. United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
Note: US Forces performing peacekeeping operations under the direction of multinational peacekeeping organizations will be assigned to a combatant commander unless otherwise directed by the NCA.

Figure C-3. Sample Chain of Command for Multinational Force and Observers
Figure C-4. Generic Multinational Command Structure
Figure C-5. Notional United Nations Organizational Relationships
1. General

a. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority. JTF establishing authority may be the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or an existing JTF. In most situations, the JTF establishing authority will be a combatant commander. Figure D-1 illustrates JTF organizational options.

b. A JTF is established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.

- The mission assigned should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination of local defense of a subordinate area.

- Execution of responsibilities may involve air, land, sea, space, and special operations in any combination executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations.

Figure D-1. Joint Task Force Organizational Options
Appendix D

c. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

2. Establishing Authority

a. The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander and assigns the mission and forces. Figure D-2 depicts other responsibilities of the establishing authority.

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

- Exercising command and control of the JTF.
  - Determining, in coordination with commander, joint task force (JTF), the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.
  - Allocating or requesting forces required.

- Defining the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography and/or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified).

- Ensuring the development and approval of rules of engagement tailored to the situation.

- Monitoring the operational situation and keeping superiors informed through periodic reports.

- Providing guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execution orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).

- Promulgating changes in plans and modifying mission and forces as necessary.

- Ensuring administrative and logistics support.

- Recommending to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.

- Establishing or assisting in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.

- Determining supporting force requirements.

- Preparing a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).

- Approving CJTF plans.

Figure D-2. Joint Task Force (JTF) Establishing Authority Responsibilities
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APPENDIX E
REFERENCES

The development of the “Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations,” is based upon the following primary references:

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions
   a. CJCSI 3110.14, “Supplementary Instruction to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 96; Military Operations Other Than War.”
   b. CJCSI 3121.01 W/CH1, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.” (SECRET)
   c. CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy.” (SECRET)

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
   a. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II Planning Formats and Guidance.”

3. Joint Publications
   e. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”
   h. Joint Pub 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”
   i. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”
   m. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

o. Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volumes I and II.”


t. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”


4. Other Publications


c. “US Atlantic Command Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures (TTP) for Migrant Camp Operations.”

d. FM 100-23, “Peace Operations.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition cross-Service agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>Allied Forces Central Europe</td>
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<td>AME</td>
<td>Air mobile element</td>
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<td>B-H</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
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<td>Civil affairs</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief administrative officer</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CAREUSA)</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander’s critical information requirements</td>
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<td>CFST</td>
<td>Coalition forces support team</td>
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<td>Counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CJCSM</td>
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<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<td>Course of action</td>
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<td>Disaster assistance response team</td>
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<td>Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking System</td>
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<td>Field manual</td>
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<td>G-5</td>
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<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>humanitarian assistance operations</td>
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<td>Human Intelligence Operations Cell</td>
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<td>identification</td>
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<td>Implementation Force (Bosnia)</td>
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<td>inspector general</td>
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<td>Immigration and Naturalization Act</td>
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<td>in-transit visibility</td>
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<td>Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System</td>
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<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
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<td>Joint Information Bureau</td>
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<td>joint intelligence center</td>
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<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>joint movement center, joint military commission</td>
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<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDAO</td>
<td>United States Defense Attaché Office</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>USNR</td>
<td>United States Navy Reserve</td>
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<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<td>VTC</td>
<td>video teleconferencing</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme (UN)</td>
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antiterrorism—Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs agreement—An agreement which governs the relationship between allied armed forces located in a friendly country and the civil authorities and people of that country. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations—Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations center—An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

goal—A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism—Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism—Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team—The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)
director of mobility forces—Normally a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in airlift operations. When established, the director of mobility forces serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the area of responsibility or joint operations area, and for other duties as directed. The director of mobility forces exercises coordinating authority between the airlift coordination cell, the air mobility element, the Tanker Airlift Control Center, the joint movement center, and the air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of airlift problems. The director of mobility forces may be sourced from the theater’s organizations, United States Transportation Command, or United States Atlantic Command. Also called DIRMOBFOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

displaced person—A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (Joint Pub 1-02)

end state—What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection—Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human intelligence—A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

INTERACTION—An association of 154 US-based private humanitarian organizations working in 180 countries.
The central focus of its work is to alleviate human suffering and to promote sustainable development. (InterAction)

**international organizations**—Organizations with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. See also nongovernmental organizations; private voluntary organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**law of war**—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**logistic assessment**—An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**logistics**—The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military operations other than war**—Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mission creep**—Occurs when armed forces take on broader missions than initially planned. (JFQ Forum, winter 1993-94, Dixon, p. 28)

**multinational operations**—A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**National Command Authorities**—The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national intelligence support team**—A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called NIST. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**nongovernmental organizations**—Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. (Joint Pub 1-02)
peace building—Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace enforcement—Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations—A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations—Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” is often used synonymously with the term “nongovernmental organizations.” Also called PVO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement—An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism—The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)
To provide greater access to the most current joint publications, and other appropriate databases and to expedite staffing, the JEL was created. The JEL, depicted above, provides the joint community on-line access via the World Wide Web. It contains all unclassified approved joint doctrine, key Service publications, selected research papers and documents, and all approved terminology. Action officers, planners, researchers, and operators everywhere can access this vital information through their desktop computers using the Internet (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine).

Most of the databases on the JEL on-line system are periodically loaded onto CD-ROM for worldwide distribution. A Peace Operations CD-ROM is enclosed.
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