JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

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PREVENTING FUTURE SHOCK: A Case for Addressing Future
Threats to America's National Security

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Executive Summary

The U.S. has emerged as the sole superpower in the world for the foreseeable future. Despite this, there remain numerous threats to U.S. vital national interests, including *developing* threats that have the potential to become significant threats in the future. We propose a National Security process that looks separately at future threats, as well as existing ones. In addition, we propose a reconsideration of the National Security Council's evaluation process and its coordination of national security and foreign policy among the various departments and agencies.

To illustrate the problem of focusing primarily on more current threats, we present two very different but significant threats to the future of the national interest of the U.S.: the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa and the approximately forty thousand tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the fissile material both within them and in stockpiles throughout Russia. Both issues have far-reaching international implications in the next 10-20 years that could be reduced to a much lesser level of threat, if not fully eliminated, by a concerted and appropriately funded effort now.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa is a U.S. national security threat with far reaching international implications that, if left unconstrained will develop into a depopulation crisis of the African continent of as much as a 50-80% over the next twenty year. The net effect would be reflected in the numbers of key professionals and skilled workers critical for the mining and production of minerals that are unavailable from any other part of the world, as well as 20% of all crude oil imported by the U.S. The cost of eliminating and controlling HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa over the ten years is currently estimated to be \$50 billion, comparable to the Marshall Plan in 1952 that pumped the equivalent of \$88 billion into Europe.

A second threat we explore is the theft or diversion of former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, weapons components, and fissile materials, as some Third World nations and terrorist organizations seek nuclear weapons capability as a way to increase status. The control and accountability of tactical nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia remains a major threat to U.S. national security. Over 80% of Russian weapons and

fissile material remain inadequately protected and accounting errors suggest that up to 4,000 weapons equivalents could exist throughout Russia that do not appear on inventory records.

A related problem is nuclear “brain drain,” with thousands of former Soviet nuclear workers either unemployed or unpaid for months at a time. We have a steadily decreasing opportunity to help Russia protect former Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile material, and keep the expertise of former Soviet nuclear specialists off the world market. We can significantly reduce the overall Cold War nuclear legacy by expanding existing programs.

We believe the National Security Council (NSC) and NSC staff should return to its size and function during the Eisenhower Administration, more fully include all of the departments and agencies of the Executive branch in national security policy issues, and add a Future Threats Interagency Working Group (FTIWG), to look as far as 20 years ahead to identify future threats which are relatively small now but are likely to be significantly more of a threat later. Further, the National Security Council staff should be reduced to a low profile group of 40-45 senior, experienced professionals who coordinate department and agency input to national security policy issues and support a more formal NSC process.

Introduction

A Broader National Security Strategy for the World's Sole Superpower

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent near-collapse of the Russian economy and state, the U.S. has emerged as the sole superpower in the world for the foreseeable future. Despite this, there remain numerous threats to U.S. vital national interests, including *developing* threats that are currently relatively small or considered to be less than so-called “level 1” threats, but have the potential to become significant threats in the future. Because of the change of Administration caused by the election of a new President, we see an opportunity to take a fresh approach to national security threats and the way we consider them.

We propose a National Security process that looks separately at future threats, as well as existing ones, evaluating current risks and their potential development in the next 20 years if the risks were not eliminated sooner. In addition, we propose a reconsideration of the National Security Council's evaluation process and its coordination of national security and foreign policy among the various departments and agencies. In a continuing atmosphere of smaller government and budget constraints, we believe this is paramount to ensure the success of effective foreign policy and aid.

In the first chapter, we discuss the nation's focus on the recent Presidential campaign and the relative lack of attention given to the National Security Strategy during that campaign. We will map the processes that the National Security Council staff must work through to assess current threats and develop suggestions to mitigate or contain the threats. We also will explore the current manifold of agencies within the Executive branch that control pieces of the tools for which National Security objectives are orchestrated. We will delve into the National Security Council's history, structure and planning process with arguments on the role that the NSC should have in developing and accessing future threats. Exploratory concepts are introduced as a “thought process” that will lead the reader to the conclusion that the NSC must play a substantial role in the

development and execution of National Security Policies through efforts to coordinate interagency programs and the departments of the Executive branch, whether these actions involve trade sanctions, economic aid or military deployment, rather than direct them.

In Chapters 2 and 3, we present two very different but significant threats to the future of the national interest of the U.S. to illustrate the problem of focusing primarily on more current threats and missing opportunities to reduce the severity and/or cost of future ones by dealing with them more comprehensively now. The issue of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa and the problem of identifying, controlling, protecting and de-weaponizing the approximately forty thousand tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the fissile material both within them and in stockpiles throughout Russia, are both good examples to illustrate this.

Although they are completely separate issues existing on separate continents, and one is man-made while the other reflects a natural catastrophe, both issues have far-reaching international implications in the next 10-20 years which could be reduced to a much lesser level of threat, if not fully eliminated, by a concerted and appropriately funded effort now. Through a series of interviews with experts in academia, the private sector and the Administration, we learned that, while both of these threats are currently being addressed, experts uniformly agree that current funding levels are inadequate to significantly impact on them and that the numerous programs addressing them lack coordinated planning, execution and oversight.

Our concluding chapter will focus on the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) and also suggest a framework to support the interagency coordination that was lacking in that Administration. Our recommendation will align the NSC staff's operational mode to resemble the procedures used by the Eisenhower Administration with emphasis placed on current risks that may develop in the next 20 years into major national security threats.

Chapter 1

The National Security Council

Overview

In this chapter we discuss the nation's attention to the Presidential campaign and the lack of attention given to the National Security Strategy. We will look at the differing branches of the government that actively participate in the drafting or execution of the National Security Strategy. We will examine the difficulty that the Executive branch experiences when dealing with the various departments and agencies established under the Cabinets of the Administration. We will look at the history of the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Staff as they developed from the Truman Administration to the Clinton Administration and the need to restructure the National Security Council and Staff.

A Neo-Isolationist Presidential Campaign

The U.S. has been absorbed by the recent Presidential election, but the campaign was revealing more in what issues it did not emphasize than in what issues it did. Throughout the campaign, Americans were preoccupied by internal issues and concerns, such as prescription drugs for seniors, Social Security reform, and managing the surplus (either through domestic spending programs or tax cuts). Virtually ignored were two key issues: the declining capability of the Executive branch to engage foreign countries, corporations, and organizations in a time of rapidly expanding global commerce ("globalization"); and the increasing menace to U.S. vital national interests by developing foreign threats. These two issues are closely related in that they are both key components of the *National Security Strategy*. We call the recent election "neo-isolationist" because for the first time in 65 years, a presidential election campaign had no immediate threats to the vital interests of the U.S. looming over it. Not since the rise of Japanese and German militarism in the 1930's has the U.S. been in this position, and never in our history or the history of the world, has a single country had such an overwhelming position of power.

A National Security Strategy that Looks to the Future

The *National Security Strategy* drafted by the NSC staff with the participation of the departments and agencies of the Executive branch and released by the President, outlines and prioritizes the Administration's assessment of current threats and suggests in general terms how the Administration will lead U.S. efforts to mitigate or contain them. Key to these efforts is the capability and capacity of the Administration to engage the appropriate entities internationally to negotiate treaties, agreements and other vehicles to manage these threats; and to fully coordinate and synergize the interagency system to deal with them. Closely related is the issue of working with the Legislative branch to adequately fund the programs to resolve the threats and the diplomatic initiatives to implement them. What has been neglected in the National Security Strategy process in the past is adequate attention to future threats.

Comprehensive long-range planning (ten years and out), placed in the control of the National Security Council, is the most logical course. The NSC should consider the plethora of agencies and agendas that currently exist that have profound impacts on national security issues. Realization of a bold approach to national security strategy lies in the restructuring of the Executive branch's capability to harness the overabundance of information from the departments and agencies within the Administration.

Within the confines of this research, there have been ten identified government departments and agencies that either directly or indirectly support humanitarian, nation building efforts, financial conglomerations and coalitions, trade development, agricultural development, and arms controls. Each agency is independent of the others, serving under separate Secretaries and Administrators who each answer directly to the President. The State Department, the lead agency for foreign policy development and implementation, depends upon the National Security Council to frame the strategy of the President's foreign policy agenda through coordination and agreement of the President, the Vice President, the State Department and the Department of Defense. The National Security Council strategically maps out the "risk" from foreign governments, rogue factions, and potential "hotspots," and determines what, if any, national interest threat will be posed towards the United States.

Undoubtedly, the State Department is the primary agency responsible to prevent the waging of war, utilizing diplomatic negotiations to appease and temper the social ills of the less affluent countries of the world. The U.S. basically gives trade rights, foreign aid in currency, loan guarantees, humanitarian assistance, medical assistance, educational and training assistance, and sundry other support to third world countries in efforts to prevent wars caused by hunger, greed, corruption, and poverty. To negotiate effectively, the State Department must know all of the aid that the U.S. is providing to the particular country with which they are holding negotiations.¹ This proposition is difficult due to the fractured structure of the various departments that handle the different, and sometimes the same, sources of aid.

The various departments that are major contributors of assistance to foreign countries include the Department of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, and Labor, along with the Treasury Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Housing and Urban Development Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Coupled with the U.S. government agencies are the international organizations that include the heavily U.S. supported World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Regional Development Banks and the World Trade Organization. Bilateral donors, those countries that also support aid to impoverished countries, include Japan, Germany, European Union, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. There are a host of international organizations, non-governmental organizations that have emerged as strong supports and advocates in the war against hunger and poverty, human rights, and medical relief. The United Nations also plays a vital role, soliciting aid and support from its member nations.

The Department of State, widely held as the lead expert and top negotiator for U.S. foreign policy, must work with various U.S. agencies to determine the scope of their involvement in every foreign country. The massive coordination effort required for tracking U.S. involvement in a foreign country is coupled with the depth and breadth of the excess of U.S. agencies. For example, the U.S. Treasury, an agency that most citizens

¹ United States Department of State. State Department: What We Do. 5 Mar 2001 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/rem/biocrm/index.cfm?docid=431&clid=264>>.

would view as a national agency, not international, does indeed support the International Affairs Office. Within their auspices, the International Affairs Office is engaged on behalf of the U.S. government in negotiations on trade and foreign investments, actively working with the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. The International Affairs Office works issues on export subsidies, economic aid and development finance, technical assistance, tracking of developments in foreign exchange markets and third world debt relief of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). It also monitors the oil markets.²

One would conceive that the areas mentioned above that are covered by the Treasury Department, should instead be covered by the Department of State or the Department of Commerce. Delving into the realm of the Department of State finds functions that are duplicated and further exploration of other agencies and departments reveal the complexity and mix of different types of aid that form foreign policy aid. In the Office of the Coordinator for Business Affairs' Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, there are three offices: the Office of Development Finance, the Office of Investment Affairs, and the Office of Monetary Affairs. These offices ensure that the U.S. government promotes U.S. economic development through global economic stability. They assist in international development, U.S. policy on international investment matters and global financial and macroeconomic issues while acting as leads in the debt negotiations.³

The Department of Defense, one of the highest profile departments, not only fights conflicts when mobilized, but also provides humanitarian aid through nation building projects and medical aid throughout Third World developing countries. Consideration of any foreign aid or national security strategy must consider the capabilities of the Defense Department, whether evaluating the war-fighting capabilities or the military technological capabilities as measured against each foreign country's capabilities. Other agencies that assist in the development of foreign policy include the

² United States Department of Treasury. International Affairs Office Structure. 27 Oct 2000 <<http://www.ustreas.gov/oasia/iastructure>>.

³ United States Department of State. Office of the Coordinator of Business Affairs. 27 Oct 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/ifd_index>.

Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Council, which is made up of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Air Force, Army, Marine and Navy Intelligence, the National Imagery & Mapping Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, along with the many “think tanks” such as the Brookings Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Regional or functional experts from the U.S. government, academia, and the private sector produce reports on issues of critical importance to the national security policy makers. These institutions evaluate and assign risk levels to various social and governmental activities throughout the world, aiding the National Security Council in its assessment of threats to the U.S.⁴

The Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also play roles in foreign policy. The Department of Commerce efforts are pivotal in the development of policy on intellectual property rights, both home and abroad and negotiating a convention to protect endangered sea turtles, whales and other limits to trade that threaten endangered species. Their reach is global on issues of development of marine and coastal protected areas and their commitment to protect and develop healthy ecosystems.⁵ The U.S. Trade Representative works to ensure that trade between the U.S. and its trading partners is fair and that international development of trading partners coincides with human rights concerns and fair labor practices.⁶ Not to be overlooked is the Department of Labor’s Office of International Economic Affairs. This division is active in development, negotiation, and implementation of special commodity agreements with foreign governments as well as providing input into trade policy areas as they relate to national security investigations and import relief. The Enterprise of the Americas Initiative works toward increasing trade, investments, and reduction of official

⁴ United States Intelligence Community. Who We Are and What We Do. 15 Jun 1998, 12 Apr 2001 <<http://www.odci.gov/ic/functions.html>>

⁵ United States Department of Commerce. Strategic Plan for 1997-2002. Washington: GPO, unk.

⁶ Fisher, Richard Personal interview U.S. Trade Representative Office, 28 Nov 2000.

debt to the U.S. owed by Latin American and Caribbean countries.⁷ The Department of Agriculture is instrumental in the trade of subsistence as exemplified in grain and beef sales worldwide.⁸ The Housing and Urban Development assist foreign countries in economic aid through development of housing.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was formed in 1961 to separate military and non-military aid. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act capitalized on U.S. desire to limit the spread of communism, assisting developing countries based on counter-insurgency and democratic and economic development. Education of leaders of newly independent countries and social-economic development of those countries was considered as the conceptual requirement of the agency. Today, the agency's fundamental roles include; immunization programs, family planning programs, water and sanitation programs, agricultural technology and practice programs, education programs, small business start-ups and improvements, exportation of U.S. food and agricultural machinery, HIV/AIDS prevention programs and treatment, and reconstruction of devastated countries, whether caused by war or natural causes.⁹

The Department of Energy is the prime agency responsible for the monitoring and disposal of fissile materials. The Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, operated by the Department of Energy is currently responding to the physical security and material accounting procedures at Russian facilities that handle fissile materials.¹⁰ The Environmental Protection Agency works with foreign countries to ensure that air and water quality standards are established and followed by developing nations. They work with non-government environmental groups in pursuit of eliminating

⁷ United States Department of Labor. Office of International Economic Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Affairs. 27 Oct 2000 <<http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/programs/oiea/commodit>>.

⁸ United States Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Service. 8 Nov 2000 <<http://www.fas.usda.gov>>

⁹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A Brief History of Foreign Assistance. 27 Oct 2000 <<http://www.usaid.gov/about/usaidhist>>.

¹⁰ United States Department of Energy. The Russian Nonproliferation Program Office Mission. 8 Mar 2001 <<http://rnp.lanl.gov/rnp/Rnphp.nsf/pages/Mission>>.

dangerous deforestation and mining practices that potentially harm the ecological globe.¹¹

Rounding out the vast number of U.S. government agencies in support of foreign policy is the Peace Corps; a volunteer-based organization formed in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy. The Peace Corps serves in 76 countries, working to bring clean water to communities, teach children, help start new businesses and stop the spread of AIDS.¹²

The problem of establishing a comprehensive accounting of who does what and with whom is perplexing. The amorphous system currently employed lacks structure and is ambiguous. The Department of State works with the National Security Council in its assessments on risk of each country's actions as they relate to the U.S. national interest. The NSC, as well as the Department of State, does not control or direct all the activities of the various agencies involved in foreign policy, whether those actions are trade sanctions or humanitarian relief. At best, both the Department of State and the NSC discover the degree of aid to, and involvement with a "rogue" government after the fact and when that developing nation has become a "risk" to the U.S. national interest.

The opportunity exists for restructuring the National Security Council's methods of developing and assessing the country's strategy by developing a comprehensive plan to evaluate each foreign government, both on military and social/economical/political strength. A collective report of each governmental agency's contribution of aid to all the countries of the world must be produced and meshed with the activities of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization and the non-governmental organizations (NGO) and charities' efforts. Long-range planning, a minimum of ten years out, to address the conditions of each country would focus on potential "hot spots" on a regional basis. Aid to foreign governments would then be based on the risk assessed to the most impoverished and potentially dangerous country. Aid could be given to two countries in a region even while both are at war with each other as in the case of Israel and Palestine.

¹¹ United States Environmental Protection Agency. Strengthening EPA's Interantional Programs: A Report to Congress. Mar 1997, 8 Nov 2000 <<http://www.epa.gov/oia/repcong>>.

¹² United States Peace Corps. This is the Peace Corps: Today's Peace Corps is Still the Toughest Job You'll Ever Love. 27 Oct 2000 <<http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/index>>.

Comprehensive planning would not necessarily replace existing aid programs administered to friendlier developing countries, but the plan would call for more aggressive funding, including additional funding by Congress, to address the potential “hot spots.”

Restructuring should also concentrate on the dysfunctional and splintered foreign policy programs. The Department of State should have cursory program and budget reviews over all agencies supplying aid to foreign governments, regardless if that agency comes under the control of a different department or agency. These reviews would allow the State Department to monitor all sources of foreign aid. Proposals for the implementation of foreign aid would be initialized by the Department of State in pursuit of compliance with the risk assessment of each country as the NSC identifies it. Administrative control of each agency would remain in the agency. Restructuring and streamlining of the government agencies to eliminate duplication of efforts not only would allow the Department of State to keep better track of foreign aid; it would also capitalize on saving tax revenue.

Addressing Future Threats in the Executive Branch

The main obstacle to addressing future threats adequately under the existing national security framework is that the number and scope of current threats are so pressing and complex while the size of the National Security Council staff is limited. In discussions at several levels of the NSC staff, we learned that they have difficulty directing the attention of senior decision makers more than several days into the future, much less 10-20 years out, and that any case to be made for addressing future threats would have to be extremely compelling to even begin to compete with current threats. A very senior member of the Clinton Administration’s NSC said near the end of his term that it was possible for an extremely determined and passionate NSC staffer to get a threat not currently on the NSC agenda on the table, but that it would require tenacity, perseverance, and courage. What senior NSC staffers concede is missing was a *process*, perhaps led by or connected to the NSC staff, for addressing future threats as a separate effort, and then engaging the NSC staff at the appropriate entry point with a fully developed proposal.

We understand that it is difficult to project what the actual threat will be in the future and that there are so many other current, more pressing threats to consider. We have focused on two threats in the following chapters, HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa and Tactical Nukes and Fissile Materials in Russia, as examples of current threats that a restructured NSC should focus on. However, many of the present threats being addressed, however pressing they may be, are much less of an overall threat to vital U.S. national interests than our two examples, or other equally good ones, have the potential to be in the future. We submit that it is at least equally important, if not more so, to consider the gravity of possible *future* threats now, as it is to prioritize current threats according to their current magnitude. What is needed is a mechanism to adequately address those future threats separately from, but concurrent with, current threats. We believe that mechanism is best found in returning to the Eisenhower model of the NSC and NSC staff, more fully including all of the departments and agencies of the Executive branch in national security policy issues, and by adding a future threats component to the restructured, refocused NSC staff.¹³

NSC Background

In Preventive Defense, the authors define the book's title as a proposal "to forestall dangerous developments before they require drastic remedies."¹⁴ They call for long range strategic thinking to identify those future threats and find ways to deal with them now. The problem is the National Security Council was not set up to deal with these post-Cold War threats and is not currently staffed or organized to do so. In Keeping the Edge, the authors discuss the challenges of the current NSC structure that revolve around the way the Executive branch does business.¹⁵ Agencies develop their own programs and budgets, and there is rarely, if ever, any central authority to coordinate the overall U.S. effort on any given topic. The Office of National Drug Control Policy

¹³ Carter, Ashton B., and John P. White. Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Unknown: Puritan P, 2000, 277.

¹⁴ Carter, Ashton B., and William J. Perry. Preventive Defense. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999, 9.

¹⁵ Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, 270.

(ONDCP) attempted to do so for a number of years, but ended up only being able to compile statistics and to “certify” agencies drug budgets and programs as being in accord with the National Drug Control Strategy. This semantic nicety gave ONDCP no budgetary or oversight “teeth,” but was at least a start in requiring agencies and departments to think about how their individual efforts contribute to the collective U.S. effort. For the most part, what we end up with are overlapping, conflicting, uncoordinated programs which lack any central planning, oversight or collective accountability.

The NSC, composed of a “core” membership of DOD, State, and the White House, was created in 1947 to execute the U.S. national security policy of “containing” the Soviet Union. This monolithic threat, which overshadowed everything else for the next 44 years, was appropriately managed through that structure. However, the numerous threats emerging in the multi-polar world of the 21st Century require a restructured and refocused NSC whose process and philosophy emphasize centralized deliberate planning and full interagency involvement on present threats as well as future ones. However, this does not have to be a completely new process. Two good models for developing this process are the Eisenhower Administration’s NSC and *Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56)*, the Clinton Administration’s plan to coordinate complex contingency operations.

When discussing the National Security Council it is important to differentiate between the NSC and the NSC staff. Following World War II, as the U.S. became a nuclear superpower, the Office of the President of the U.S. became the principal source of developing U.S. national security policy.¹⁶ Under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council was composed of just four statutory members: the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The NSC was created to be an advisory mechanism for the President, with additional Cabinet members and experts to be invited as needed to contribute to deliberations on issues of national security significance. It was intended to both assist and restrain the President with a

¹⁶ Greenstein, Fred I. “The Qualities of Effective Presidents: An Overview from FDR to Bill Clinton.” *Princeton Studies Quarterly* 20.1 (Mar 2000): 179.

formal statutory entity to replace the *ad hoc* policy development style of President Franklin Roosevelt during WWII.¹⁷

The National Security Council staff, on the other hand, has ranged from a handful to more than 200 people, depending on the administration, and has become a *presidential* staff presided over by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, commonly called the National Security Advisor. In its original incarnation, the NSC was a forum for debating and developing policy with a neutral coordinator and small staff of detailees from agencies to represent their agencies interests and views.¹⁸ As it has grown in size over the years, the NSC has become a de facto agency within the Executive Office of the President, shaping policy and focusing increasingly on immediate issues.¹⁹ While Congress can hold hearings on NSC staff activities, they can not compel testimony nor do they have confirmation authority over NSC staff appointees.²⁰ This lack of any Legislative branch oversight has contributed to the NSC staff becoming the President's personal policy development staff.

The changes in the NSC system over the years have not necessarily served the Office of the President well. What was a well-intentioned effort to assemble personally loyal experts who view foreign policy from the President's perspective to assist him in national security decision-making has become a limiting mechanism on open debate by the departments and agencies. The NSC has lost much of the synergy potential of the interagency system. In her detailed study of the NSC in Flawed by Design, Amy Zegart notes that the hallmarks of the modern NSC system are: a powerful political presidential advisor (the National Security Advisor); a greatly increased power, jurisdiction and capability of the NSC staff; and a concurrent decline in the formal NSC, replaced by the NSC staff and informal meetings.²¹ Zegart's study reveals how successive presidential administrations transformed the NSC staff into its current form. A review of presidential

¹⁷ Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999, 54.

¹⁸ Zegart, 88.

¹⁹ Dalder, Ivo, and I.M. Destler. "A New NSC for a New Administration," Policy Brief 68, Brookings Institution 1 (Nov 2000) <<http://www.brookings.org/comm/policybrief>>

²⁰ Zegart, 103.

²¹ Zegart, 85-87.

uses of the NSC and NSC staff is useful to see how the NSC has changed over the years and where it was most effective in the national security process.

During the Truman Administration, after the NSC was created, President Truman rarely attended the infrequent NSC meetings, preferring instead to be advised of the results afterwards. He did, however, recognize that the NSC could be easily taken over by the newly created Department of Defense as it established itself in the Pentagon, so he had the NSC staff set up its offices in the Executive Office Building adjacent to the White House. When the Korean War flared up, Truman began presiding over most sessions of the NSC, which began to convene weekly, and he limited attendance to promote a more focused debate.²² This was the beginning of the transformation of the NSC from presidential advisory body to presidential personal staff.

When President Eisenhower took office in 1952, he further refined the NSC framework, creating a rigid system that required policy papers to be prepared by the agencies and departments and then represented by Assistant Secretaries on an interdepartmental Planning Board. Eisenhower also created the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, later to be known as the National Security Advisor, to coordinate the efforts of the Planning Board and to insure they provided the President and the NSC with what Zegart calls “clear, viable policy options.” Eisenhower made it clear that his National Security Advisor was there to serve his needs as the decision-maker.

Once these policy papers had been fully developed by the Planning Board, they were brought before the formal NSC for debate in meetings that were much longer and more frequent than in the past.²³ Every week, Eisenhower would gather the NSC members with their agencies’ option papers and recommendations, and preside over an open debate until he felt he had a consensus to support his decisions.²⁴ This framework served him well just two years into his first term, when the French forces were besieged at Dien Bien Phu and the French government asked for U.S. military assistance. By fully exercising the Planning Board and NSC, Eisenhower received the full spectrum of

²² Zegart, 79-80.

²³ Zegart, 80-81.

²⁴ Greenstein, 181.

political and foreign policy advice from his Administration and wisely chose to decline to become involved in what would have likely been a disastrous intervention for the U.S.²⁵

When President Kennedy took office, however, he slashed Eisenhower's NSC from its then fifty staff members down to just ten, who served him directly on the issues of the day.²⁶ As Kennedy increased the autonomy and independence of the NSC staff from the NSC, he also used the NSC less and less. Following the Bay of Pigs disaster, where Kennedy felt he had been grossly misled by the State Department and the CIA, Kennedy moved the National Security Advisor's office to the West Wing of the White House. In addition, he had the White House Situation Room and Communications Center built in the White House basement, capable of monitoring all cables in and out of the departments and agencies, as well as communicating secretly and directly around the world. Kennedy also greatly increased the power of his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, by also giving him the duties of the NSC staff secretary, thus combining the responsibility for long term planning with day-to-day management.²⁷ From Eisenhower's model of a NSC staff supporting the formal debate of the NSC itself, Kennedy shifted the NSC staff to a personal policy making staff and the formal NSC itself was rarely convened. This trend was to continue through the Clinton Administration, under which the formal NSC, when it met, merely approved decisions debated and decided elsewhere.²⁸

In the last forty years, the only exceptions to the NSC staff dominance of foreign policy has been during the Ford and Bush I Administrations, and both were due to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who served as a "neutral broker" in the foreign policy process rather than as an advocate for any position.²⁹ Scowcroft captured the spirit and essence of Eisenhower and his NSC process with a low key, balanced

²⁵ Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and Modern Presidents. New York: The Free P, 1990, 296-300.

²⁶ Dalder and Destler, 3.

²⁷ Zegart, 83-84.

²⁸ Zegart, 76.

²⁹ Nelson, Michael, ed. The Presidency and the Political System. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly P, 2000, 427-428.

approach to his assignment that made him a valued personal sounding board.³⁰ When President Carter took office, he was determined to completely dismantle what he saw as the remnants of the White House-centric Nixon NSC, despite Scowcroft's moderating influence under Ford, and return the NSC staff to a more supporting role. With his micromanaging style consuming his attention and time, however, Carter soon found himself also depending increasingly on the NSC staff to develop and recommend foreign policy options.³¹ Even Ronald Reagan's attempt to return to a "Cabinet government" failed after just a year. Reagan had reduced National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen's status to subordinate to White House Counselor Ed Meese. Within a year, difficulties in getting acceptable foreign policy options caused him to replace Allen with Judge William Clark, who accepted the appointment only after being assured of unlimited access to the President. To date, Allen has been the only National Security Advisor to not have direct access to the President.³²

Although the NSC was created to help the President coordinate foreign policy, whether he uses it is his choice, ironic in that presidents have frequently chosen to bypass those who should be their most trusted advisors on national security policy – the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Vice President.³³ Presidents since Eisenhower, consumed by the endless series of crises and issues, have all ended up running foreign policy from the White House because their NSC staffs have better access to them and respond immediately to their needs, avoiding the frustrating bureaucracy of the interagency system.³⁴ The NSC staff ultimately becomes a "praetorian guard" for the President's foreign and national security policies because the President sees them as the only entity in the national security process that is wholly loyal to him and not to agency bureaucracies.³⁵ As Zegart succinctly describes the problem:

³⁰ Pfiffner, James P. The Managerial Presidency. College Station: Texas A&M UP, 1999, 91.

³¹ Zegart, 90-91.

³² Zegart, 92.

³³ Nelson, 540.

³⁴ Pfiffner, The Managerial Presidency 15.

³⁵ Zegart, 100.

“Departments and agencies filter information through self-interested prisms. It is no secret that bureaucrats have their own agendas, missions, cultures, routines and ways of viewing the world.”³⁶

It is then little wonder that Presidents have seen the NSC staff as a convenient and parochial mechanism to provide them with suitable policy options.

As a result of this, the NSC staff has become so politicized as spokesman for the White House and developer of policy options that they spend all their time preparing talking points and policy papers on the issues of the day to sell the President’s policy to the American people (via the media) and to Congress. This has tended to leave the State Department increasingly out of foreign policy issues and the Department of Defense out of national security issues. Moreover, the myriad issues facing the White House involve many more than the four statutory members of the NSC. Virtually every department and agency is involved in one or more of the issues the NSC staff contend with on a daily basis.³⁷ The politicization of the NSC staff, combined with the capabilities of the White House Communications Center and Situation Room, has undermined the State Department, bypassed the Defense Department, distracted the NSC staff, and failed to fully harness the collective capability of the Executive branch.

While it is unrealistic to expect any office in the White House to be completely detached from politics, the NSC staff should do so as much as possible. Even the National Security Advisor, a political appointee, should refrain from taking partisan positions.³⁸ Since the Kennedy Administration, except for Scowcroft during the Ford and Bush I terms, the NSC staff and the National Security Advisor have dominated the foreign policy making process due to their access, staff resources and the willingness of the President to let them.³⁹ As the NSC became more and more like an agency, it became rigid and inflexible. With such a large staff, it took on a life of its own, in essence

³⁶ Zegart, 96.

³⁷ Dalder and Destler 4-5.

³⁸ Lake, Anthony. Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them. Boston: Little, 2000, 261-262

³⁹ Nelson, 426.

representing the White House on all issues relating to national security.⁴⁰ The downside of this NSC staff autonomy was best illustrated by the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, where the opposition of the Secretaries of State and Defense over becoming involved in the arms for hostages exchange with Iran was circumvented by the NSC staff. The NSC staff handled the arms transfers, leaving out the CIA and DOD policy and operation staffs, as well as Congressional intelligence oversight. That the arms sales would eventually become known, and embarrassingly so, would have been obvious to any one of those bypassed.⁴¹

The key features of the NSC staff (small size, insulation from Congressional oversight, and responsiveness to Presidential needs) have enabled it to play a decisive role in national security decision making.⁴² With the NSC staff caught up in the day to day management of issues, though, they have lost the ability to do what is more important – analyzing foreign trends, anticipating problems before they grow too large, developing options and coordinating policy. With over 180 countries vying for a place at the world's table presided over by the world's sole superpower, the sheer number of issues requiring the daily attention of the White House since the end of the Cold War has overwhelmed the NSC staff.⁴³ Most recently, the Clinton Administration NSC staff failed to properly coordinate policy issues at the working level with the interagency system, so issues of contention rose to be resolved at higher levels, inefficiently stymieing State and Defense Department senior staffers, who had to wait for the National Security Advisor or the President to make a decision.⁴⁴ The irony is that PDD-56 was an outstanding model and process to fully harness the collective capability of the Executive branch departments and agencies, yet the Administration failed to fully utilize it. We will discuss PDD-56 and its potential utility to the Bush II Administration in Chapter 4.

⁴⁰ Dalder and Destler, 1.

⁴¹ Nelson, 185-186.

⁴² Zegart, 3.

⁴³ Dalder and Destler, 4,7.

Chapter 2

HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa

Overview

“The AIDS pandemic has already killed more people than all the soldiers killed in the major wars of the last century, and exceeds the toll taken by the bubonic plague in 1347... The bad news is that we probably are still only in the early phases of the AIDS pandemic.” This statement by David F. Gordon of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, expresses more potently the crisis of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. The United States can not turn its attention away from this crisis, allowing the pandemic to eventually affect the country’s national security. In this chapter, we will cover the gravity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa and the epidemic’s effects on the people and their governments, as well as the effects on the national security interest of the United States if the HIV/AIDS pandemic is left unchecked. The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa is a prime example of a crisis the National Security Council and the Future Threats Interagency Working Group (FTIWG), as proposed in Chapter 4, would identify and pursue as a national security threat that should be dealt with immediately to prevent the demise of the African continent twenty years in the future. In this chapter we will explore the current situation of the Sub-Saharan countries affected by HIV/AIDS. We will look at causes of the

⁴⁴ Pfiffner, James P. The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running. Lawrence: UP of Kansas, 1996, 159.

spread of the virus and the lack of Sub-Saharan African governmental support to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS. We explore the potential breakdown of the African governments as the plague devastates the social, economical and political aspects of the countries. We will then focus on why HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa is a national security threat to the United States. Our recommendations for solutions to the crisis conclude the chapter. It is important to note that until the NSC acknowledges that this example is a national security threat and gives the support needed to stop the pandemic, that the situation will only grow worse.

Background

The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa is a national security threat with far reaching international implications that, if left unconstrained, will develop into a depopulation crisis of the African continent unseen in modern history. AIDS is the number one cause of death in Africa.

Today, an estimated 71% of the global total of HIV-positive people, 24.5 million out of 34.3 million, live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over eight percent (8.6%) of all adults in Sub-Saharan Africa are HIV positive compared to 0.6% of Americans. The epidemic has claimed 14.8 million Africans, with 2.2 million deaths occurring in 1999 alone. UNAIDS, the United Nations' leading body fighting AIDS, estimated that 55% of all HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa have been among women, who contract HIV at a younger age than men, peaking around 25 years of age. Prevalence among men occurs 10-15 years later and generally in lower numbers.⁴⁵ The average life expectancy of an individual after contracting HIV/AIDS is estimated to be around 10 years. Over 30% of all children born to HIV infected mothers in Sub-Saharan Africa will be HIV positive

⁴⁵ United States Census Bureau. World Population Profile 2000. The AIDS Pandemic in the 21st Century: The Demographic Impact in Developing Countries. by Karen A. Staneki. Washington: US Census, July 2000, and National Institutes of Health. Fact Sheet. 20 Sep 2000 <<http://niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/aidsstat>>.

either through the birth process or due to breast feeding, leading to an infant mortality rate nearly double that of the infant mortality rate without AIDS.⁴⁶

The infection rate varies from country to country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Close to 25% of adults living in four Sub-Saharan countries have AIDS. In seven other Sub-Saharan African countries, at least one out of five adults are living with HIV/AIDS, while yet another nine Sub-Saharan African countries, one out of ten adults are HIV positive.⁴⁷ In the eight Sub-Saharan African countries where at least 15% of today's adults are infected, conservative analyses show that AIDS will claim the lives of around a third of today's 15-year-olds.⁴⁸ The pandemic has precipitated an uncontrollable aggregate of orphans, repeating the same geographical patterns of HIV prevalence among the population. By 2005 there will be an estimated 36 million orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa. The increase in orphan rates lags behind HIV infection levels by about ten years, the time it takes the average person who contracts the virus to succumb to full-blown AIDS.⁴⁹ The population pyramid for Sub-Saharan Africa has developed into a new shape, "the population chimney," reflecting the trend that by 2020 there will be more men than women in all age groups. The vicious cycle of older men infecting younger and younger women will continue due to the decreasing number of women available to males seeking partners.⁵⁰

The HIV epidemic is driven by sex between an infected individual and a non-infected partner. It is believed that conservatively, nine-tenths of HIV positive individuals do not know that they are infected.⁵¹ Education of the population of the causes of HIV/AIDS transmissions and their prevention is required to slow-down the

⁴⁶ United States Census Bureau. World Population Profile 2000, and National Institutes of Health. Fact Sheet.

⁴⁷ United Nations and World Health Organization. Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic. UNAIDS/WHO Jun 2000.

⁴⁸ United Nations and World Health Organization, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2000. 11 5 Mar 2001 <http://www.unaids.org/wac/2000/wad...port/css/WAD_epidemic_report_2>.

⁴⁹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Children on the Brink, Executive Summary: Updated Estimates and Recommendations for Intervention. by Susan Hunter and John Williamson. Washington: Synergy Project, 2000, 3.

⁵⁰ United States Census Bureau. World Population Profile 2000, and National Institutes of Health. Fact Sheet.

⁵¹ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 11.

spread of the epidemic. The behavioral and social factors of the population must be addressed.

The World Health Organization has identified high level social risk factors as:

- little or no condom use
- large percentages of the adult population with multiple partners
- overlapping (as opposed to serial) sexual partnerships – individuals are highly infectious when they first acquire HIV and thus more likely to infect any concurrent partners
- large sexual networks (often seen in individuals who move back and forth between home and a far-off workplace)
- “age-mixing,” typically between older men and younger women or girls
- women’s economic dependence on marriage or prostitution, robbing them of control over the circumstances or safety of sex.

Biological factors include:

- high rates of sexually transmitted infections, especially those causing genital ulcers
- low rates of male circumcision
- high viral load – HIV levels in the bloodstream are typically highest when a person is first infected and again in the late stages of the illness.⁵²

The impact to the African continent is grave and conjecture of positive population growth and stability is fractured. Many experts portend as much as a 50-80% depopulation of the continent over the next twenty years that will prove to be a national security crisis to the U.S. Currently the work forces of South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have been decimated. In a region that would have calculated life expectancies to reach 70 years of age by 2010, many will see life expectancies fall to around 30 years. In many other countries, life expectancies have already fallen from 50-60 years to 30-40 years.⁵³

⁵² United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 8.

⁵³ United States Census Bureau. World Population Profile 2000, and National Institutes of Health. Fact Sheet.

The net effect is reflected in the numbers of trained teachers, professionals, peacekeepers and police, diamond mine workers, and industrial workers that are lost to the work force during their illnesses and demise. When 20-30% of these workers are eliminated due to HIV/AIDS, a choke point will be set, wreaking havoc on the staffing of the work force and economies of these countries. New skilled replacement workers can not be trained fast enough to replace those who have died, leaving a gap in the groups most critical to the economies of the countries affected. Teacher shortages are threatening in many Sub-Saharan African countries.

In Zambia, teachers are increasingly dying of AIDS and many more show up to teach class only sporadically because they are sick. Swaziland estimates that it will have to train more than twice as many teachers as usual over the next 17 years just to keep services at their 1997 levels. Without this extra teacher training, class sizes will balloon. Together with sickness and death benefits for teachers, Swaziland's extra hiring and training costs are expected to drain the treasury of some \$233 million (US) by 2016 – more than the 1998-1999 total government budget for all goods and services.⁵⁴

A 1999 study among miners in southern Africa found that over a third of employees in their late 20's and 30's were infected with HIV, along with a quarter of young and older employees. In a sugar mill, 26% of all workers were living with HIV. The HIV rates were higher among unskilled workers than among managerial-level workers.⁵⁵ Without a solid workforce, countries will be unable to afford even the interest on the foreign debt owed to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The backbone and stability of the governments themselves are at risk of chaos. In Malawi, the parliament has lost legislators to AIDS. Military strengths of many Sub-Saharan governments have been reduced due to soldiers with HIV/AIDS and a declining population from which to recruit. There is the instability factor of an already fragile political system in the countries that are losing their leaders to AIDS while still in denial that the pandemic is an issue.⁵⁶ Internally, ethnicity and tribal conflicts that erupt within the country's borders will be more frequent and severe without a strong peacekeeping

⁵⁴ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update. 15.

⁵⁵ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update. 15.

⁵⁶ Delay, Paul and Ross, Alex Personal interview USAID, 17 Nov 2000.

force in the country. Opportunist leaders may find the hardships of a weak neighboring country as an irresistible invitation to invade. Countries overpowered by warring neighbors could witness the realignment of borders to reflect ethnic and tribal boundaries, along with genocide. The risk of collapsed governments without strong militaries to protect current U.S. friendly regimes may lead to failed-state regions that harbor terrorist groups and drug cartels. These risks are paramount to the national security interest of the U.S.

There already exists an immense overloading of the limited community social services throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in response to the children that have lost one or both of their parents to AIDS. These children are more likely to drop out of school, contract HIV, or be forced to work in order to survive. Many have taken the responsibility to act as nursing aides to their parents during the parents' illness. Once the children are orphaned, many extended family members refuse or simply cannot afford to support the children. The stigmatization of AIDS orphans singles them out, further traumatizing the child. They suffer the hardship of denied closeness of family, lack of love, attention and affection, and are often treated harshly or abused by step or foster parents. Many children are pressured into becoming sex workers to help pay for necessities that their families can no longer afford. Some of the children are exposed to the corruption of the extended family members, exploited when the child's inheritance and property are stolen. Chronic malnutrition is widespread and orphan caregivers are predominantly poor women. Female-headed households are generally poorer than a male headed household largely because women have less access to property and employment.⁵⁷

While most governments have professed increased support for children in response to the child rights movement of the early 1990's, investments in social infrastructure actually declined in the 1980's and 1990's as economic conditions deteriorated.⁵⁸ Most developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa rely on local fund raising and support from non-government organizations to support and set up clinics, education programs, and child care/foster parent programs.

⁵⁷ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Children on the Brink, 5.

The Threat

Most incredulous Americans will query, “Why is this a threat to the United States?” Without a deeper look into the pandemic, the question is understandable. Aside from the notion that curtailing and eliminating the spread of HIV/AIDS is the “humanitarian thing to do,” it is also an economic and potentially a military concern of the United States. There are many arduous questions that need to be asked. What happens to a continent that is depopulated? Where are the proletariats that support the various industries? Where are the safeguards for preserving the land, the wildlife, and the environment from pirates of fortunes? Who may attempt to re-colonize the continent? Will other countries from Europe and Asia stake claims to the land as was done during the great colonialization of the world in the 1600’s-1800’s? Will corporations from across the world stake their claims on the vast minerals and natural resources of the continent? How will the depopulation effect the import levels and prices of oil and minerals that the United States is dependent upon? Will the remaining population be at war with each other in hopes of expanding their bounty? What happens to a continent that is depopulated?

The United States should be alarmed with these conjectures. The U.S. imports \$17.3 billion (US) of African products and exports \$10.6 billion (US) of U.S. goods to Africa each year (averaged for 1995-1999).⁵⁹ Some of these products include minerals that are unavailable from any other part of the world. Diamonds, gold, platinum, silver, and titanium imports are widely used throughout the civilian and defense sectors. Minerals and precious gems account for \$1.836 billion (US) of the imports annually.⁶⁰ Crude oil and petroleum account for over 10.1% of the world’s production. Crude oil imported annually from Africa totals 20.07% of all crude oil imported by the U.S. Only

⁵⁸ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Children on the Brink, 5.

⁵⁹ United States Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. U.S. Commodity Trade by Geographic Area (1995-99). 8 Mar 2001 <<http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/tabcom>>.

Mexico and Canada under the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), the Middle East and South America supply more of the United States' demand for oil and then the percentage difference between Africa, the Middle East and South America is only 1%. Other oils imported from Africa account for 16.22% of the totals imported by the United States. Together, both crude oils and other oils, the U.S. annually imports \$11.5 billion (US) worth of oil from Africa as shown in the charts that follow.

The U.S. also imports \$261.2 million (US) in liquefied gases each year from Africa. U.S. petroleum corporations have extensive exploration sites throughout Africa in such areas as South Africa, Nigeria, and Congo. Additionally, untapped reserves of oil rich land and offshore sites will account for 76.5 billion barrels of the world's oil reserves.⁶¹

Crude Oils Imported by US (Five year average, 1995-1999)⁶²

Country	Millions of Dollars	Percentage of US Imported
NAFTA (Mexico & Canada)	\$12,957.8	27.45%
Middle East	\$9,932.8	21.04%
South America	\$9,849.4	20.87%
AFRICA	\$9,475.2	20.07%
Western Europe	\$2,204.0	4.67%
All others	\$2,781.8	5.9%

All figures are 5-year averages from 1995-1999.

Other Oils Imported by US (Five year average, 1995-1999)⁶³

⁶⁰ United States Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. U.S. Commodity Trade.

⁶¹ United States Geological Survey. U.S. Geological Survey World Petroleum Assessment 2000: World Conventional Oil Resource by Basin. Table of Oil Reserves, Africa. 8 Mar 2001 <http://energy.er.usgs.gov/products/papers/world_oil/oil/africa_tab>.

⁶² United States Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. U.S. Commodity Trade.

⁶³ United States Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. U.S. Commodity Trade.

Country	Millions of Dollars	Percentage of US Imported
South America	\$3,459.0	27.24%
Western Europe	\$3,432.0	26.95%
AFRICA	\$2,060.2	16.22%
European Union	\$2,038.2	16.05%
Caribbean	\$1,007.6	7.93%
All others	\$703.0	5.54%

All figures are 5-year averages from 1995-1999.

The U.S. nation security interest in trade with Africa is important on a global aspect. Comparisons with other regions that trade with the U.S., indicate that the U.S. exports more of its goods to Africa than Eastern European countries (Russia), Central American countries, and the Caribbean countries. The U.S. imports more goods from Africa than the Eastern European countries, Non-European Union countries, Australia and Oceania countries, Central American countries, and the Caribbean countries.⁶⁴

Without the Sub-Saharan African governments and people, the industries will be defunct. In South Africa, the epidemic is projected to reduce the economic growth rate by 0.3-0.4% annually, resulting by the year 2010 in a gross domestic product (GDP) 17% lower than it would have been without AIDS and wiping \$22 billion (US) off the country's economy – more than twice the entire national production of any other country in the region except Nigeria. Even in diamond-rich Botswana, the country with the highest per capita GDP in Africa, in the next 10 years AIDS will slice 20% off the government budget, erode development gains, and bring about a 13% reduction in the income of the poorest households.⁶⁵ This will equate to a shrinking tax base to governments that are heavily burdened with support of the social and medical needs of the AIDS patients and the millions of children orphaned by AIDS.

The weakness of governments and existing industries will attract foreign corporations and countries that will prey upon the Sub-Saharan African countries rich natural resources, subjugating all within their paths. Non-government organizations such

⁶⁴ United States Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. U.S. Commodity Trade.

⁶⁵ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 4-5.

as the Red Cross will be saturated with refugee flows from warring countries, tapping into and limiting the resources of this and other aid organizations. Loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will go into default due to failed governments. A greater economic depression will be created in the neighboring countries that have remained solvent. Corruption of existing tenuous governments, led by unscrupulous tribal or ethnic leaders, will ensure that clandestine agreements for the land's riches are made between them and opportunists. Avaricious marauders will descend upon the mines to steal its jewels. A black market will emerge to supply the remaining population with its vital sustenance, leading to a devastating inflation rate and the eventual collapse of each country's monetary system. The risk of collapsed governments may lead to failed-state regions that harbor terrorist groups and drug cartels that directly target the United States and thus become a national security threat.

The AIDS/HIV pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa has already received the attention of Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, who declared amid considerable criticism that the pandemic was a national security threat. Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, has also joined the vanguard, addressing the U.S. House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on the gravity of the pandemic.⁶⁶ However, emphasis to mobilize and push forward with a meaningful plan of action and funding to fight the pandemic is nil. The perplexing question remains: do we wait and see what happens or do we invest now to prevent chaos later? The ostensible answer is to invest now.

Solutions/Recommendations

The National Security Council, through the channels of the Future Threats Interagency Working Group (FTIWG), will be alerted to the Sub-Saharan Africa pandemic and its grave possibilities of a future threat to the national security of the United States. The National Security Council would be the coordinating body that brings

⁶⁶ Holbrooke, Richard C. "Statement for the Record Submitted to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services." US Ambassador to the UN. 8 Mar 2000. 20 Sep 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_re...000/000308_holbrooke_hiv-aids>.

together the State Department, the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture, as well as the manifold of agencies, such as US AID, U.S. Trade Representative, and the Peace Corps, unifying their efforts into one concerted front in determining what foreign aid packages would go to the Sub-Saharan African countries. The Administration could then petition Congress to supply the funding and legislation that would support the following recommendations.

USAID personnel have calculated an annual requirement of \$5 billion per year of aid for the next ten years to abate the spread of the virus in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁷ The World Health Organization estimates that achievable targets for a five year period to respond to AIDS at a scale that might have a major impact on the Sub-Saharan Africa epidemic would be at least \$1.5 billion (US) a year for implementation of all the major components of successful prevention programs. These would include sexual, mother-to-child and transfusion-related HIV transmission, and would involve approaches ranging from awareness campaigns through the media to voluntary HIV counseling and testing, and the promotion and supply of condoms. At least another \$1.5 billions (US) a year would be needed to care for orphans and for people living with HIV or AIDS. Making a start on coverage with combination antiretroviral therapy to prolong the lives of those already infected would add several billion dollars annually to the bill.⁶⁸

As the economic hegemonic power, the U.S. is in the position to support an aid package of this magnitude. The cost of eliminating and controlling HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa over the ten years is currently estimated to be \$50 billion, no small amount, indeed, but certainly not outside the realm of reason when compared to the potential cost to the U.S. if military forces, either as peacekeepers or to protect American access to oil and strategic metals and materials, are detailed into warring countries due to poverty and death from AIDS. Historically, the U.S. has invested more in restructuring war-torn countries as illustrated by the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952 that pumped \$13 billion into Europe's parched economies. That would be equivalent of \$88 billion

⁶⁷ Delay, Paul and Ross, Alex Personal interview USAID, 17 Nov 2000.

⁶⁸ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 20.

today.⁶⁹ The current level of aid provided by the U.S. to Sub-Saharan Africa for the HIV/AIDS pandemic is minuscule at only \$342 million for 2001. Japan, one of the G-8 countries will contribute \$3 billion (US), over the next 5 years, to the prevention of AIDS and malaria. Canada has committed to \$100 million (US) in the fight against aids.⁷⁰ In comparison with other G-8 countries, the U.S. ranks far below many of these countries, when compared to gross national product percentage. By stepping up its aid budget to \$5 billion a year, the U.S. would then be on a solid foundation to request that other G-8 nations also expand their donations to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Another immediate action that the U.S. should undertake is to empower and energize the G-7 in executing debt relief to the countries suffering the greatest due to HIV/AIDS epidemics. Debt relief to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) remains one of the few benefits the U.S. can extend to a developing country in exchange for influencing its policies. Reducing the poorest countries' debt removes the hurdles that currently prevent these countries from addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in a proactive mode. Current health expenditures based on economic conditions is lower than 2.7% of the 1995 Gross Domestic Product for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Malawi.⁷¹ African governments are now transferring four times more to international creditors for debt servicing than they spend on basic education and health.⁷²

COUNTRY	1997 GDP (in US \$ billions)	Military Expenditure (% of 1996 GDP)	Health Expenditure (% of 1995 GDP)
Kenya	10.2	2.2	2.7**
Tanzania	6.9	2.5	2.5
Uganda	6.6	3.8	1.6
Zimbabwe	6.52*	2.7	1.7
Botswana	5.1	3.2	-

⁶⁹ Clinton, William J. "Commemorative Event for the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan." US President. Hall of Knights, Binnenhof, The Hague, Netherlands. 28 May 1997. 27 Oct 2000 <<http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/clinton>>.

⁷⁰ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts on HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases. 7 Sep 2000, 5 Mar 2001 <<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/usafr/p0090801>>.

⁷¹ Government of Finland. Human Development Report 1999. 24 Sep 2000 <<http://global.finland.fi/lomenet/english/maat/>>.

⁷² Speth, James Gustave, UNDP, National Press Club, 14 Oct 1998.

Zambia	3.9	1.1	2.9
Malawi	2.5	0.8	2.3

* 1995 GDP ** % of 1990 GDP Data from Human Development Report 1999, <http://global.finland.fi>

Tanzania spends 40% of its annual revenue on interest payments to the IMF, World Bank and other loans.⁷³ Zambia, along with other HIV/AIDS affected countries have committed to using funds freed up by debt cancellation to fight the spread of HIV. The U.S. Congress passed into public law the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2001 with amendment H.R. 4811, that increase the bill's funding for debt relief for the world's most impoverished countries from \$69 million to \$225 million.⁷⁴ But this is not enough. Total debt relief will allow the HIV/AIDS pandemic countries to focus their spending on other health related issues including HIV/AIDS and other emerging infectious diseases. These governments will also be able to spend their funds on social welfare programs and education, culminating in the stimulation of the economic growth of the country and the stability of the ruling governments.

The U.S. could also pressure drug companies in the U.S. to furnish HIV/AIDS drugs 'at cost' to Sub-Saharan African governments. Tax credits could also be extended to these companies that furnish drugs free to the afflicted countries. U.S Pharmaceutical Market for 1998-99 revealed sales of \$107.1 billion, up 15.6% from 1998. Promotional spending was \$5.9 billion.⁷⁵ Arguments by scholars Richard Laing of Boston University and Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University suggest that the U.S. Pharmaceutical companies not only have the wealth to support drug access to the Sub-Saharan AIDS epidemic countries, but they also have the responsibility to their shareholders to develop effective drugs that can also be cost effective to both show profitably and reduced cost to the governments of the HIV/AIDS pandemic countries.⁷⁶

⁷³ Pooley, Eric. "The IMF: Dr. Death?: A case study of how the global banker's shock therapy helps economies but hammers the poor." Time Magazine 155.16 24 Apr 2000, 28 Sep 2000 <<http://www.time.com/t...zine/articles/0,3266,43183,00>>.

⁷⁴ 106th United States Congress. Bill Summary & Status of the 106th Congress. 8 Mar 2001 <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery>>.

⁷⁵ "IMS America Business Watch." Medical Marketing & Media May 1999. 8 Mar 2001 <<http://www.cpsnet.com/pub>>.

⁷⁶ Laing, Richard. "IP Protection and Public Health: The Case of AIDS Drugs and the HIV Situation in Africa." School of Public Health. Boston University, Boston. 13 Sep 2000.

Education of the Sub-Saharan African population as to the cause and spread of HIV/AIDS is paramount if the epidemic is ever to be contained. In South Africa, it is currently unacceptable to even discuss AIDS or how the disease is transmitted. Even the South African President stated that HIV does not cause AIDS. The U.S., as the world leader in medical research and education, must convince the leaders of the African countries that a public forum for educating its population concerning HIV/AIDS is in the best interest of that country's leaders. The leaders, too, must grasp the gravity of the pandemic and sanction medical education of the general population by demonstrating that they are spearheading the movement. Regardless of the amount of aid, both in funds and medicine, if the people do not change their behavioral patterns, then the spread of HIV/AIDS will continue from sex worker to soldier to wife to medicine man to the young girl coming of age, a vicious cycle that repeats itself daily in today's Sub-Saharan Africa.

There is strong evidence that if countries will carry out effective prevention programs aimed at educating the masses, testing of individuals for HIV, and encouraging abstinence, fidelity and safer sex, then the long-term predictions of depopulation of the continent could be reversed. A crucial factor is promoting use of condoms, both male and female, and making good-quality condoms cheaply and conveniently available. Condoms are protective irrespective of the age or mobility of the partners, the scope of their sexual networks or the presence of another sexually transmitted infection.⁷⁷

In addition, voluntary testing services must be convenient and expedient to the clients in the areas where HIV prevalence rates are high. Uganda's AIDS Information Center (AIC) is a Kampala-based NGO that has served 350,000 clients with confidential counseling and HIV testing since 1990. Clients receive their results on the same day. Previously, clients had to wait two weeks to receive the HIV test results and 25-30% did not return to get them.⁷⁸ Same day results and education of the client on how to prevent the transmission of HIV would eliminate many of the future cases that would have been transmitted during the high infectious period of HIV.

Another area of education that must be addressed is that of the overall education of the population as a whole. The better-educated segments of the population in the

⁷⁷ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 8.

industrialized countries of Sub-Saharan Africa were the first to adopt lifestyles that were health conscious. The lower educated population is more likely than the better educated to contract HIV. As information about HIV becomes more available, the more educated people will be better equipped to act on prevention information and will be less at risk to exposing themselves to HIV. This is especially true with women. By 1995-97, the infection rate of educated women had dropped almost half, whereas it had fallen much less for the illiterate women.⁷⁹

Orphaned children have also been effected by the lack of education. In the rural areas, farming skills have not been passed on from parents to children. The net effect is that the children rarely are able to cope with the agricultural tasks left to them as their means of survival. In Namibia, children left with small livestock, chicken and goats, saw many of their animals die simply because they did not have the experience to care for them properly. In a Kenyan study, four out of five orphans who were farming in one rural area said they did not know where to go for information about food production.⁸⁰

The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa presents the United States with a national security threat. Both the U.S. and the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa must grasp the challenge of curtailing and eliminating the spread of HIV/AIDS. Bringing health care, support, and solidarity can bring the threat to submission to a growing population of people with HIV related illnesses. A reduction of the annual toll of new infections by enabling individuals to protect themselves and others can be accomplished through funding and education. Finally, coping with the cumulative impact of over 17 million AIDS deaths on orphans and other survivors, on communities, and on the developing nation must be addressed in the form of debt relief, funding to support orphan care, and rebuilding of the nation's workforce training.

U.S. aid directed at the HIV/AIDS pandemic would tend to stabilize the Sub-Saharan African governments, alleviate the decline in the population growth, significantly reduce the millions of potential orphans that drain the country's resources

⁷⁸ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 11.

⁷⁹ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 14.

⁸⁰ United Nations and World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic Update, 13-14.

for social services, and stimulate the economy by ensuring a trained and skilled workforce with a longer life expectancy exist.

Chapter 3

Tactical Nukes and Fissile Material

Overview

This chapter discusses a future national security threat very different from the Sub-Saharan Africa HIV/AIDS pandemic as previously discussed. The issue of former Soviet Union nuclear weapons and fissile material is both complex and far reaching. We discuss the magnitude of the problem of accounting for and adequately protecting former Soviet Union nuclear weapons and stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium. We outline the existing U.S. programs in support of the Russians, highlight the growing threat of theft and diversion of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as HEU and Plutonium in bulk and in weapons component “pits”, and explore the growing future threat to U.S. national security. Finally, we recommend significantly increased funding of existing programs and additional measures necessary to prevent nuclear weapons or the HEU or plutonium to build them, from getting into the hands of rogue nations, terrorist organizations, or organized crime.

Former Soviet Nuclear Weapons

The dissolution of the Soviet Union left Russia as the largest and (arguably) the “successor” state of the Soviet Union, to deal with the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal. There were three basic parts to this responsibility for Russia: consolidating the strategic weapons and delivery systems (ICBMs) in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan; consolidating the tactical nuclear weapons which were scattered throughout the former Warsaw Pact countries and in all but one of the 15 former Soviet republics; and preventing the “nuclear leakage” of fissile materials, weapon components, and other

nuclear technology.⁸¹ The Russians have met with some success in accomplishing the first two, perhaps better with the strategic than the tactical, but “nuclear leakage” of fissile materials remains a very real and highly dangerous threat, and the sheer numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and their wide dispersal during the Cold War, pose a grave threat to U.S. national security interests.

The United States does not treat the danger of (non-strategic) nuclear aggression as a threat to vital U.S. interests, but it should. During the Cold War, the West sought to contain nuclear proliferation throughout the world for several reasons. Primarily, the U.S. wanted to prepare the way for a free world with limited nuclear weapon threats to complicate the spread of democracy. Even small numbers of nuclear weapons radically alter the balance of power in any given region and can complicate or even immobilize international efforts toward non-aggression and compromise. Indeed, nuclear weapons are seen by many formerly Third World nations as the “great equalizer” in dealing with the West and their neighbors. While the United States sought to keep a lid on proliferation in the interests of international order and stability, in his epic work The Clash of Civilizations, Sam Huntington describes these nations as looking upon non-proliferation as serving the interests of the West.⁸²

In the post-Cold War reordering of the international balance of power, some Third World nations are seeking a position of power through attainment of nuclear weapons capability. Following the lead of Pakistan and India; North Korea, Iran, and Iraq all see nuclear weapons capability as a way to increase their stature on the world’s stage and to give their interests more status in regional affairs. Regardless of how the nations of the world view nuclear weapons, one fact remains clear and key: nuclear weapons cannot be made without fissile material and fissile material is extremely hard to produce.

Although there is fissile material in a number of countries that have joined the “nuclear club”, the only two countries that possess it in large quantities are the United States and Russia. The control and accountability of fissile material in the United States

⁸¹ Allison, Graham T., Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath and Steven E. Miller. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. Cambridge: The MIT P, 1996, 3.

is a model of multi-layered redundancy, but this is clearly not the case in Russia. One of the most important actions that can be taken in the world today is to assist Russia with a rapid and all-inclusive program to properly secure all of the fissile materials inherited from the Soviet Union; in weapons, reactors, stockpiles, and research facilities.⁸³

Due to its exclusive nature, fissile material holds a great attraction to countries and non-state actors interested in becoming nuclear powers. It is extremely difficult to produce, yet once one has it, the actual construction of nuclear weapons is relatively simple as the technology for creating nuclear weapons is both widespread and well understood. For this reason, “nuclear leakage” is the key to preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, yet eminent Russian scholar Graham Allison cites four simple reasons why nuclear leakage from Russia is likely to get worse: the general public disorder in Russia; widespread corruption and rampant criminal enterprise; a weak, ineffective government control throughout much of the country; and the sheer size and complexity of the former Soviet nuclear infrastructure. In the upheaval Russia is experiencing as it continues to attempt to rise from the legacy of the USSR, anything of value is susceptible to theft and sale, and the fact is not lost on anyone that fissile material is a very valuable commodity to the right customer.⁸⁴

Securing all of Russia’s fissile material, as well as nuclear weapons, ought to be at the very top of the U.S. national security agenda. The threat of nuclear attack or terrorism on the United States, its deployed military forces, and its friends, as well as a lowering of the international nuclear threshold, should be seen as what it is: a clear and present threat and one that will continue to grow. The two keys to securing Russia’s fissile material are security and accounting.⁸⁵ Although a number of initiatives were established in the early to mid 1990’s and have been ongoing throughout much of the decade, their progress has not been commensurate with the magnitude of the threat. Even

⁸² Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon, 1996, 191.

⁸³ Bunn, Matthew. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Materials. Cambridge: Joint publication of Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom and the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Apr 2000, v.

⁸⁴ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 24-31.

⁸⁵ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 9.

though hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent thus far, the problem requires billions of dollars more.⁸⁶ Although Americans have been looking for a “peace dividend” since the Soviet Union was disbanded, and elected a new President at least partly due to a promised tax cut to return a surplus to them, the threat of nuclear proliferation should be a much more important issue. It will only take a small nuclear detonation in any American city to quickly bring that threat to the top of the list. We submit that it is far better to preempt it.

Since 1994, the *Cooperative Threat Reduction* program, also known as Nunn-Lugar after their Senate sponsors, has funded substantial improvements in the security and the “de-weaponizing” of Russian fissile material. Nevertheless, over 80% of Russian weapons-grade fissile material remains inadequately protected and less than 10% of weapons grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) has been “blended down” to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), which renders it unusable for a nuclear weapon but retains its value as fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors.⁸⁷ Many facilities in Russia that inherited fissile material following the dissolution of the Soviet Union are reluctant to give up what represents their chief, or even sole, purpose for existence. With the economic problems of the average Russian citizen, a job in a nuclear-related facility may be the only hope of income for its staff, yet the presence of small amounts of fissile material at numerous sites substantially increases the probability that fissile material will be stolen, sold, or otherwise diverted from government control.

The Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, operated by the U.S. Department of Energy, has met with some success but there are no apparent plans to accelerate the program.⁸⁸ The security and accountability inadequacies of the enormous Russian stockpile of fissile material are only being slowly whittled away at, yet START II remains under consideration for implementation and START III negotiations may soon begin. The supreme irony is that the imminent reduction of even more nuclear

⁸⁶ Bunn, *The Next Wave*, vi.

⁸⁷ Bunn, *The Next Wave*, vi.

⁸⁸ Bukharin, Oleg, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth Luongo. Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerating Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union. Princeton: Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), Aug 2000, 9.

weapons from ready strategic forces will further swell the stockpile of fissile material and therefore actually increase the opportunities for nuclear leakage.⁸⁹

The key danger of nuclear leakage is that otherwise small and relatively powerless states may obtain or build nuclear weapons, and thus gain instant influence far beyond what they had, or that non-state actors will obtain the ultimate terrorist weapon, and that proliferation will run rampant as other states drop out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop their own weapons program for their own protection.⁹⁰ The threat of nuclear terrorism in particular is increasing as technology becomes more widespread and the amount of fissile material remains high. The larger the number of state and non-state actors who possess a nuclear weapon, the greater the risk that one of them will use it.⁹¹ In the past, it has been assumed that terrorist organizations are too small and technologically deficient to build and deploy a nuclear device, however, the reality is that once a group obtains HEU, a nuclear device is relatively safe and easy to assemble and transport (including into the United States).⁹² Similarly, should a group succeed in obtaining an assembled FSU tactical nuclear weapon and the codes to detonate it, the immediate threat to the U.S. is greatly magnified. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons are engineering masterpieces with incredible destructive power for their size.

The destructiveness of even a crude nuclear device, even a “dud” that failed to fully detonate, would be nothing short of devastating. The blast effect of a 1 Kiloton nuclear bomb detonated on the ground in a U.S. city would destroy most buildings within several hundred yards and kill up to 20,000 people. Who would want to do such a thing? One increasing potential for such violence is religious fanaticism. Cataclysmic violence may be seen as a sacramental act, providing a cleansing dictated by a group’s theology.⁹³ As we have seen recently in the Middle East and Sri Lanka, many terrorists deliberately blow themselves up along with their device, creating a threat which is difficult, if not impossible, to defend against.

⁸⁹ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 8.

⁹⁰ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 50.

⁹¹ Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer. America’s Achilles Heel. Cambridge: MIT P, 1999, 213.

⁹² Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 12-13.

⁹³ Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer, 182-185.

Magnitude of the Problem

The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) defines a “significant quantity” (enough to build a nuclear weapon) of fissile material as 8 kilograms (Kg) of Plutonium or 25 Kg of HEU. This represents the bare minimum amount necessary to build a basic, first-generation weapon. Advanced designs require even less.⁹⁴ To put this in context of size and potential destruction, a grapefruit-sized mass of HEU weighing 50 Kg would yield a blast equivalent to 10-20 thousand tons of TNT and destroy virtually everything within a mile.⁹⁵ Highly advanced designs with a similar yield could be built from just 1 Kg of Plutonium or 3 Kg of HEU. These statistics represent the power of the average tactical nuclear weapon, each of which carries the destructive power of a Hiroshima-sized device, which killed 70,000 people. When considering that Russia’s nuclear arsenal includes 7,000 active strategic warheads, 7,000 tactical weapons, 12,000 weapons in storage and a stockpile of weapons grade fissile material the equivalent of 70,000 additional weapons,⁹⁶ one can begin to grasp the magnitude of the fissile material threat. Overall, it is estimated that Russia has 1,000 metric tons (one million kilograms) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and 200 metric tons of Plutonium, half of which is contained in active or reserve weapons while the other half is dispersed in more than 300 buildings at over 50 different sites.⁹⁷

So far, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (Nunn-Lugar) has provided over \$2.5 billion toward reducing the number of nuclear weapons and controlling the fissile material in their warheads. Under Nunn-Lugar, 4,800 nuclear weapons have been dismantled and three of the four “instant” nuclear nations created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) have become non-nuclear by transferring all of their inherited weapons to the fourth, Russia.⁹⁸ But Russia still has the fissile material to contend with as well and its nuclear custodial system, designed to

⁹⁴ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, 6.

⁹⁵ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 1.

⁹⁶ Zoellick, Robert and Philip Zelikow, ed. America and Russia: Memos to a President. New York: Norton, 2000, 20-21.

⁹⁷ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, 6-7.

operate within the rigid control of an authoritarian state, has been overwhelmed over the past ten years. The problem is well illustrated by *Project Sapphire*.

In the early 1990's, authorities in newly independent Kazakhstan contacted the United States with a problem. They had uncovered a large amount of previously unknown, and unprotected, HEU at a former Russian navy nuclear fuel facility in their country. Anxious to know the extent of what they perceived as a dangerous threat to their country, they offered to sell the entire inventory to the United States. Through a covert operation known as "Project Sapphire," the U.S. took inventory of the stockpile, packaged it, and flew it to the United States. There are two significant aspects to the *Project Sapphire* story. The first is that the stockpile was over 600 Kg's of weapons-grade (enriched to greater than 94% U-235) HEU. The second is that the total amount found was 104% of that which was recorded in the facility's inventory records, reflecting a disturbing lack of precision for so critical an accounting issue.

With a total Russian stockpile of 100,000 critical masses of fissile material, this margin of error suggests that up to 4,000 weapons equivalents could exist throughout Russia that do not appear on inventory records.⁹⁹ The significance of this is simple yet staggering. If the directors of research centers or the commanders of units with nuclear weapons or of nuclear storage facilities knew what their inventory called for and found that they had additional materials, the possibility for diversion becomes very high, particularly in the strained economic conditions in Russia. In the chaotic and uncertain environment of present day Russia, the temptation to spirit away a "golden egg" for retirement could be too much to resist.

To address this very threat, the United States through the Department of Energy funded the MPC&A program to upgrade the physical security and material accounting procedures at Russian facilities that handle fissile materials. DOE plans originally called for a twenty year program funded by the U.S. Congress at \$150M per year, but DOE has already asked for at least \$20M additional just for FY01.¹⁰⁰ MPC&A requires so much more. Already, at many Russian facilities, fissile material storage has been significantly

⁹⁸ Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense*, 76.

⁹⁹ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 38, 48.

¹⁰⁰ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, 8-9.

improved and consolidated. The problem is that the scope of the program does not match the threat. Until all Russian fissile material facilities are adequately protected, the risk of nuclear leakage continues. Once the material is diverted, it will be very hard to trace as the loss will not be detected for some time, if ever. Poorly protected material that does not show up on an inventory is ripe for introduction onto the world black market.

The reason it is so critical to safeguard existing fissile material is that HEU and plutonium are so difficult to produce. It is very hard to hide the production of HEU or plutonium, as the processes to create them are both very complex and readily apparent to the international atomic energy community. Once an entity is in possession of fissile material from a diversion, though, it is very hard to track. During the 1950's, for example, the U.S. produced man-portable nuclear weapons to be backpacked into battle by soldiers, as well as nuclear artillery shells that weighed just 250 pounds, both easily concealable in an automobile trunk. Both of these were simple "gun-type" weapons, activated by a nuclear "bullet" fired down a tube into a nuclear mass, thus initiating a chain reaction.¹⁰¹ While this design is fairly simple, and thus the most likely to be deployed by a non-state actor, it is also much more likely to detonate prematurely than the "implosion" weapon, a far more complex but efficient design.

Tactical Nukes

For most of the Cold War, by far the largest number of nuclear weapons were non-strategic (i.e. tactical), which were not included in arms negotiations or agreements, since the threat of a strategic nuclear exchange far overshadowed the individual or even collective threat of the smaller yield weapons.¹⁰² Russia inherited a tactical weapon stockpile of over 12,000 deployed weapons, which by the late 1980's were deployed in every Soviet republic but one, and in most of the Eastern European countries, as well as aboard surface ships and submarines of the Soviet Navy. By late 1991, the Soviet tactical

¹⁰¹ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 178-179.

¹⁰² United Nations. Department for Disarmament Affairs. Arms Control and Disarmament: A New Conceptual Approach. Comp. Adam Daniel Rotfeld. DDA Occasional Papers No. 4., 21. New York: United Nations, 2000.

nukes were all withdrawn from Eastern Europe and by the next summer, had been removed from all of the Newly Independent States as well.¹⁰³ Due to its efficiency, plutonium was the material of choice for many of these weapons.¹⁰⁴ Today in Russia, as many as 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons are believed to exist, each a potential target for proliferators.¹⁰⁵ All Russian tactical nuclear weapons are believed to have safety devices and/or “locks” to protect them from both accidental and deliberate (unauthorized) discharge. Permissive Action Links (PAL’s) involve a coded lock that must be enabled by a code from a higher echelon command. Environmental Sensing Devices (ESD’s) are safeties designed to prevent the detonation of the weapon unless it senses that its operational parameters have been met, such as an artillery shell reaching a tube velocity and trajectory height. Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety (ENDS) systems are links that are designed to fail in arming or fusing mechanisms in case of accident.¹⁰⁶ These safety features, however, will not completely defeat a determined individual with technical expertise from disabling or bypassing them. They are designed only to buy time, should they be diverted, until the proper authorities can recover them.

In the post-Cold War environment, it is estimated that the United States will retain only about 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons in its inventory, while the Russians are expected to retain significantly more, perhaps around 2,000.¹⁰⁷ They see the tactical nukes as compensating for their vastly diminished conventional military strength just 10 years ago, and are more important now for defense planning toward Asia.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, this would leave as many as 18,000 “surplus” tactical nuclear weapons in storage.

The HEU Deal

¹⁰³ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 178-179.

¹⁰⁴ Campbell, Kurt M., and Ashton B. Carter. et al. Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union. Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard U, 1991, 25.

¹⁰⁵ Sauer, Tom. Nuclear Arms Control. New York: St. Martin’s, 1998, 32.

¹⁰⁶ Blackwill, Robert D., and Albert Carnesale. New Nuclear Options. New York: Council on Foreign Relations P, 1993, 103-117.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations. Arms Control and Disarmament, 39.

¹⁰⁸ Zoellick and Zelikow, ed., 129.

As Nunn-Lugar funding from the CTR program subsidized the dismantling of former Soviet nuclear weapons in Russia, the HEU in those weapons, as well as the HEU stockpile, required a solution for disposal. Although the MPC&A program focused on accounting for and protecting fissile materials, the ultimate objective was to eliminate the HEU and its utility for nuclear weapons. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 created a U.S. government-owned corporation, the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), to take over the operation of the Department of Energy's two facilities for enriching uranium as a fuel for nuclear power facilities. The original intent was for USEC to function as a for-profit company in the private sector and 100 million shares of USEC stock were sold to the public in July 1998. The problem with the privatization of USEC is that it has interfered with the US anti-proliferation policy.¹⁰⁹

The 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase agreement, "the HEU deal", was an agreement between USEC and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) which called for USEC to purchase a total of 30 metric tons of Russian HEU annually, assembled from numerous small stockpiles, to be "blended down" to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). This would serve several purposes: the LEU would be sold as fuel for commercial nuclear power plants; the HEU which was blended down would be removed from the overall world stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material (LEU is not usable for weapons); and the number of sites in Russia which required MPC&A funding would be reduced.¹¹⁰ As originally envisioned, over a 20 year period, 500 metric tons of HEU would be converted to LEU, cutting the overall Russian stockpile of 1993 in half. In its first 7 years, however, the HEU deal has drawn down just 95 MT, though the Russians are anxious to sell much more.

The cause of this under-performance of a grand idea is simple. The U.S. government negotiated the HEU deal but left the specifics up to USEC to negotiate later. USEC, as a privately held company, had to make a profit for its shareholders, yet the cost of the HEU under the 1993 agreement with Russia made the Russian HEU cost one third more than it would cost USEC to produce it at its two enrichment plants. USEC leadership, operating under common business philosophy, was understandably reluctant

¹⁰⁹ Falkenrath, Richard A. "Uranium Blues." The Milken Institute Review 2.4, 2000: 35-36.

to “buy high and sell low”, so they only purchased the absolute minimum amount required by the “HEU deal”. The basis of the HEU deal was to remove HEU from the world stockpile, but the economic realities of USEC as a business require it to blend down HEU at a pace consistent with the world market for LEU. The current USEC deal with the Russians to purchase HEU expires this year and will end unless a new agreement can be negotiated.¹¹¹ A proposed “HEU II” deal calls for blending down much larger stockpiles of HEU from Russia, but will require the participation of an executive agent designated by the U.S. government to consider U.S. national security interests separate from USEC business interests. An alternative would be for the USG to repurchase USEC and operate it as a government enterprise based on national security interests.¹¹² Released from business demands, a government-owned USEC could develop a plan, such as a U.S. government subsidy, to purchase as much HEU as Russia is willing to sell as rapidly as possible, blend it down to remove it from the world’s HEU stockpile, and then add it to either a U.S. or world “reserve” to be drawn upon as commercial reactor fuel demand requires.¹¹³

Plutonium, the “other” fissile material, is a different story. Plutonium is not useful for anything other than building nuclear weapons and remains a critical threat to international security, so a “plutonium deal” needs to be negotiated to purchase excess plutonium from Russia, perhaps by placing it under international control in the interim, and then seeking long term disposal methods, including either burning it in special reactors, or “vitrifying” it with other nuclear waste into a very toxic, but not weapons useable, form.¹¹⁴

The Threat

Traditionally, in formulating national security strategy, “vital national security threats” have referred to threats that would be of catastrophic proportions should they occur, but are not considered very likely of occurring. Two good examples would be a

¹¹⁰ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, 18.

¹¹¹ Falkenrath, 37-43.

¹¹² Falkenrath, 47.

¹¹³ Bunn, *The Next Wave*, viii.

¹¹⁴ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 157-166.

strategic nuclear missile attack on the United States or a military invasion of the U.S. homeland by an enemy. In the post-Cold War era, neither of these are considered very likely, yet one threat which is becoming increasingly possible is an attack on the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon covertly introduced by a rogue nation or non-state actor. After nearly 50 years of the primary American fear being a Soviet strategic nuclear attack, Americans are having a hard time adjusting to this new threat. The source of the new threat is not the Russians, but terrorists using nuclear weapons either obtained from the Russian weapons stockpile or constructed from stolen Russian HEU.

In 1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh told Congress that the greatest long-term threat to the security of the United States was the vast amount of former Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia.¹¹⁵ Current U.S. defense policy is focused on the threat of ballistic missile attacks (National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense), but not on the simpler forms of delivery more likely to be used by a terrorist organization seeking to detonate a nuclear weapon on U.S. territory.¹¹⁶ While Mr. Freeh noted the primary U.S. concern over Russian nuclear weapons and materials, the Russians are facing so many other challenges vital to their national security and survival as a country, that their weapons and fissile materials are of much less concern to them than to us. Rampant corruption, a near absence of central control, and pervasive organized crime, not to mention a fragile economy, are of a greater concern to them than accounting for and protecting their overall nuclear stockpile.¹¹⁷ If the Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and fissile material is much more a U.S. problem than a Russian one, then we need to address it, if it's going to be adequately addressed, to insure American national security. To protect our way of life, the U.S. should carefully consider the potential for future attack on the U.S. homeland and more vigorously prepare to defend against it now.¹¹⁸

In the past, terrorists have pursued soft targets with tactics that endanger small or moderate loss of life. In the current age, though, terrorists are much more likely to be

¹¹⁵ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 97.

¹¹⁶ Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer. America's Achilles Heel, xx.

¹¹⁷ Zoellick and Zelikow, ed., 10.

¹¹⁸ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 121.

fanatical (either religious or philosophically) and interested in making a “big bang.”¹¹⁹ Indeed, Bruce Hoffman coined the term “amateur terrorism” to describe the threat from like-minded individuals who come together to commit a single violent act, like the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and the Atlanta Olympics.¹²⁰ The number of violent groups is increasing and the level of violence required to get significant international media attention is rising.¹²¹ For terrorists to get the attention of the general public after Pan Am 103, the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, Khobar Towers, Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi, they will have to cause steadily increasing levels of horror and carnage as the international public becomes increasingly inured to the violence they see on CNN. Waiting to see which group will go nuclear first is a poor policy. We should be preparing for it now.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the probability of the theft or diversion of a complete tactical nuclear weapon system increased, as well as the probability that fissile material would get into the hands of a terrorist organization.¹²² Literally thousands of tactical nuclear weapons remain controlled by military units and storage depots, guarded by unpaid or underpaid military guards, with a dubious accounting system discussed earlier in this paper.¹²³ The increased danger of a tactical nuclear weapon over fissile materials is simple: a tactical nuclear weapon diverted from the Russian stockpile for sale on the world market is likely to be of an advanced plutonium-based implosion design, and therefore relatively small, light, and man-portable. To locate such a weapon once it had been stolen and sold (assuming that the theft was even detected) would be very difficult to do. There are sophisticated detectors, but they are dangerous to operate around people, and require highly trained operators who must be physically close to the device to detect it.¹²⁴

Once a stolen nuclear weapon or one assembled from stolen Russian HEU is in the hands of a terrorist organization, it becomes surprisingly easy to get it into the U.S.

¹¹⁹ Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon, 1996, 187.

¹²⁰ Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer. America's Achilles Heel, 199.

¹²¹ Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer. America's Achilles Heel, 181.

¹²² Sauer, 35.

¹²³ Campbell and Carter. et al., 38

homeland undetected, where it can be concealed until the planned attack. Over sixty years ago, in a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, Albert Einstein presciently foresaw this, noting that “a single {nuclear} bomb... carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”¹²⁵

Related to the possibility of stolen tactical nuclear weapons or weapons built from stolen Russian fissile material is a third potential threat that should be addressed within the topic of “loose nukes,” and that is nuclear “brain drain”. Thousands of former Soviet military and civilian nuclear workers remain in Russia, with many of them either unemployed, severely underpaid or completely unpaid for many months at a time. Although the U.S.-funded International Science and Technology Center was opened in Moscow in 1994 to employ former Soviet nuclear scientists and weapons technicians, only several thousand of the hundreds of thousands of former Soviet workers were hired. We have a great opportunity, along with purchasing and de-weaponizing former Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile material, to find meaningful employment for these specialists in disposing of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and thus keep them and their expertise off the world market as well.¹²⁶

Solutions/Recommendations

The most important recommendation regarding the threat from former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and fissile materials is to raise the stature of the problem to the very top of the agendas of the President, Vice President, Energy Secretary, and National Security Advisor, and for them to work closely with congressional leaders to insure adequate funding and personnel.¹²⁷ The next step would be to assign an NSC director to have day to day responsibility for managing the overall problem and to develop a comprehensive strategic plan to do so, and providing regular reports via a NSC senior director to the President.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 67.

¹²⁵ Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer. America's Achilles Heel, xix.

¹²⁶ Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 89-90; Bunn, The Next Wave, ix.

¹²⁷ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, v-xi.

¹²⁸ Bunn, The Next Wave, xi.

Second is to recognize that Russia's transition from a totalitarian state to a democracy is very hard for them, and that we must constantly encourage their democratic process and support their desire to develop as a European power.¹²⁹ Despite their great decline from a superpower just ten years ago, Russia remains a great power not only due to its inheritance of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but also geographic location and intellectual, cultural, economic and military potential.¹³⁰ The key to success with the Russians is to achieve their buy-in through courting and including, vice dictating and distaining. We must partner with them to reduce the overall Cold War nuclear legacy. Much like the Marshall Plan after World War II, the U.S. as the "winner" of the Cold War would best serve its interests by assisting the "loser" in cleaning up the aftermath though extensive employment of Russian personnel with their superior knowledge, ability to work the Russian system, and familiarity with Russian equipment.¹³¹ We must convince both the U.S. Congress and Russia of the magnitude and urgency of the threat.¹³²

Third would be to build on successes of existing programs such as the Nunn-Lugar CTR program and the "HEU deal."¹³³ Specifically, we should expand the MP&A program to get all fissile material under close Russian or international control, dismantle all excess warheads down to HEU and plutonium "pits", and then as rapidly as possible blend all HEU down to LEU and vitrify or burn as reactor fuel all excess plutonium, reduce FSU facilities and find employment for FSU scientists and technicians.¹³⁴ In conjunction with these steps, we should help the Russians develop self-sustaining joint ventures with U.S. companies and other revenue producing opportunities such as commercial nuclear waste processing and storage.¹³⁵ Should the option discussed earlier of the USG repurchasing USEC be exercised, this would enable USEC to dramatically increase the scale of its purchase of HEU from dismantled warheads, a national security success in itself, as well as achieving the further foreign policy options with Russia

¹²⁹ Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, 46.

¹³⁰ Zoellick and Zelikow, ed., 9.

¹³¹ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, 57-58.

¹³² Allison, Cote, Falkenrath and Miller, 15.

¹³³ Zoellick and Zelikow, ed., 25-26.

¹³⁴ Bunn, The Next Wave, viii.

including overall nuclear weapon reduction and consolidation/disposal of fissile material.¹³⁶

In Renewing the Partnership, the authors estimate that an accelerated MPC&A program could accomplish initial consolidation and upgrades by 2008, but the Russians are looking for long-term employment for their people, not just for the next seven years. In redoubling efforts with the Russians, we must send the right people and the right message. Previous MPC&A efforts were frequently counterproductive as U.S. representatives marginalized their Russian counterpart by dictating decisions to them rather than partnering, and had such a high turnover in U.S. personnel that consistency and relationship building was minimal. U.S. project leaders must work jointly with their Russian counterparts, allowing them to “save face” despite their country’s reduced global influence, and must have a strong familiarity with Russian mores and negotiating style to build trust and effectiveness.¹³⁷

New revenue producing options include developing spent fuel storage facilities and “debt for security,” where Russia’s foreign debt could be traded down for lesser investments in nuclear security.¹³⁸ A variation of this idea would be for the U.S., Europe and Japan to collectively fund the establishment of “international fissile material repositories” where fissile material would be deposited, or “banked”, under international protection and control, and from which withdrawals for peaceful means such as commercial reactor fuel could be made.¹³⁹ Similarly, the U.S. and other nations could allow Russia to pay off its foreign debt with “in kind” payments of HEU blended down to LEU. The U.S. would fund the conversion and then accept the LEU in lieu of hard currency payments, thus sharing in the Cold War legacy.¹⁴⁰

Fourth would be an expanded START III treaty that spelled out numbers of total warheads (strategic, tactical, reserve, and disassembled components or “pits”) in addition

¹³⁵ Bunn, The Next Wave, x.

¹³⁶ Falkenrath, 48.

¹³⁷ Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo, xii.

¹³⁸ Bunn, The Next Wave, x.

¹³⁹ Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense

¹⁴⁰ Bunn, The Next Wave, xi.

to delivery systems, and further addressed weapons-grade fissile material and goals for future arms control goals.¹⁴¹

Chapter 4

Conclusions

Overview

It is clear from our studies of the HIV/AIDs crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa and from our look at former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and fissile material contained in stockpiles of both HEU and nuclear weapon “pits” that there exist significant threats to future U.S. vital national security interests which are not being adequately addressed today.

Ironically, the prior Administration had in place an outstanding model in PDD-56 for coordinating policy issues at the working level interagency systems. However, the Clinton Administration failed to properly harness the collective capability of the Executive branch departments, agencies, and the NSC. In this chapter, we will review PDD-56 and its processes, explore the Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group (CPIWG) and conclude with our recommendations of utilizing the PDD-56 format while further developing the CPIWG concept into a Future Threats Interagency Working Group (FTIWG). Our recommendation will align the NSC staff’s operational mode to resemble the NSC Planning Board under the Eisenhower Administration. The defining difference will be the ability of the FTIWG to evaluate current risks and their potential risk 20 years into the future, if the risk is not eliminated sooner.

¹⁴¹ Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, 86-87.

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56)

President Clinton signed PDD-56 in May 1997. Derived from the hard lessons learned during the chaotic U.S. interventions in Haiti and Somalia in the early 1990's, it reflected the need for military and civilian agencies to operate in a more synchronized manner during complex contingency operations through effective interagency coordination and planning. Its key concept was unity of effort, meaning all parts of the U.S. government involved in any complex contingency operation would be required to work together under an integrated leadership toward a common goal.¹⁴²

PDD-56 has five key parts that insure this unity of effort is achieved. First, any complex contingency operation being considered by the National Security Council staff is brought before the Deputies' Committee for consideration. The Deputies Committee, composed of the Deputies to Cabinet officers, charts an Executive Committee (EXCOM) of Assistant Secretary-level officials from each involved department and agency who are then held politically accountable for carrying out the EXCOM's responsibilities. Second, the EXCOM convenes an interagency process to create a Political-Military (Pol-Mil) plan that clearly develops every possible component of a complex contingency operation, from reason for undertaking to exit strategy and desired end state. Third, once the Pol-Mil plan is completed, the plan is rehearsed before the EXCOM, several times if necessary, to achieve an acceptable product. Fourth, following the completion of the proposed contingency operation, should the President elect to authorize it, an after-action review process is convened to compile lessons learned and recommendations to improve the process for the next contingency. Finally, PDD-56 calls for an institutionalized training program, to include individual training as well as annual full-scale 3-5 day complex contingency operation exercises, complete with a comprehensive exercise scenario, interagency planning sessions, drafting of a Pol-Mil plan, and rehearsal before an exercise EXCOM.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Institute for National Strategic Studies. August 2000 INSS Report. Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56 – Revisited. Washington, DC: National Defense U, 18 Aug 2000, 2-1.

Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group (CPIWG)

The PDD-56 process continued to develop between its signing in May 1997 and December 1999, culminating in the establishment of a standing Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group (CPIWG). The CPIWG was assigned the task of identifying potential crises around the world and developing options papers for them. The CPIWG in essence acted as a warning entity for the NSC and the Deputies' Committee, giving recommendations for convening of the full PDD-56 planning process.

In late December 1999, shortly after the CPIWG was formally established, the Deputies' Committee chartered a Burundi EXCOM to consider events occurring in that country and possible outcomes. A Senior NSC Director directed a planning group from State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, the CIA, the Treasury Department and several others that developed three scenarios and policy options for high-level consideration. This illustrates the utility of the PDD-56 process as a deliberate planning process and the CPIWG as a standing entity and source of policy options for the President.¹⁴⁴

The CPIWG considers present day global conflicts and issues, and looks for possible places where the U.S. may need to intervene in some fashion, through military intervention, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, or any other similar action short of theater warfare. They prepare option papers for the NSC senior leadership so they may be more fully prepared with recommendations for the President when crises flare up.

The PDD-56 process was an extraordinary improvement over the previous ad-hoc methods of complex contingency operations, and institutionalizing the concept in the CPIWG further enabled the NSC and the individual agencies and departments to learn to coordinate and synergize their efforts. We propose that this be taken one step further.

¹⁴³ Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2-2.

¹⁴⁴ Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2-7.

Recommendations

We propose that the CPIWG concept be duplicated in a Future Threats Interagency Working Group (FTIWG), which would function in much the same way as the CPIWG. The FTIWG, however, would be a standing IWG of strategic planners and thinkers throughout the Executive branch who would collectively look as far as 20 years into the future to identify future threats which are relatively small now but are likely to be significantly more of a threat later.

Our two examples of HIV/AIDs in Sub-Saharan Africa and former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia demonstrate why this is important. There are numerous efforts currently going on throughout the many departments and agencies in the U.S. government that are not coordinated by anyone and therefore fail to effectively address the problems. This leads to inefficiency as well as failure to adequately predict and prepare for future threats. A FTIWG would regularly bring together experts who would compile all of the available information on future threats, and then prepare warning and options papers that would define the problem, discuss what is currently being done, project what was likely to happen in the future based on scientific evidence and hard data, and develop options to be taken now to mitigate or eliminate those threats. The FTIWG, similar to the CPIWG, would report its efforts to a Senior Director who would be responsible for bringing their recommendations to the attention of the National Security Advisor and the National Security Council. However, the FTIWG is not a solution in and of itself, as there exists no mechanism to act on their efforts. This brings us to our second recommendation.

We believe the National Security Council staff requires a significant overhaul. A recent Brookings Institution study, “A New NSC for a New Administration,” has a number of excellent suggestions to refocus the NSC staff toward *managing* an effective policy process. They recommend a small staff of 40-45 senior, experienced professionals who would give the President substantive advice, chair interagency working groups, coordinate policy and ensure that the President’s decisions are carried out. This staff would be a low profile group, trusted to fairly represent department and agency views,

but to leave implementation and operational responsibilities to the departments and agencies.¹⁴⁵ This NSC staff would operate much like the Planning Board under the Eisenhower Administration, with formal NSC meetings considering carefully crafted and debated policy issues that the National Security Advisor and NSC staff would place on the NSC agenda when ready.

In managing policy development and implementation, the NSC staff would have to coordinate interagency programs to insure that the efforts of the departments and agencies are conducted with unity of effort.¹⁴⁶ The mechanism to do this is the establishment of a standing PDD-56 process, where Assistant Secretaries are tasked with serving on one or more EXCOMs chartered to address specific programs, such as HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa or “loose nukes” in Russia. The EXCOMS, would meet monthly to review the work of lower level interagency working groups composed of the experts who deal with the appropriate issues from day to day.

The EXCOMS would then report to the NSC staff via the regional and functional Senior Directors. Through the EXCOMS and the NSC staff management process, departments and agencies would be required to justify and defend not only their individual performance, but also their contribution to the collective performance of the Executive branch. The NSC staff, exercising the leadership of the Executive Office of the President and coordinating legislative interaction with Capitol Hill, would be in a much stronger position to secure the funding levels required to address future threats (and present ones) by presenting coordinated, comprehensive, and fully developed proposals to the Legislative branch.

Change in Washington is a very slow process, allowing few fundamental alterations in the way of doing business within a single Presidential Administration, but with strong presidential leadership and cooperation with Congress, change is possible.¹⁴⁷ The key is to adequately address the need for change so that it is apparent to all parties. Over nearly four years, the PDD-56 process was never fully or uniformly implemented, but it did achieve high level “buy-in” in the Clinton Administration. The career civil

¹⁴⁵ Dalder and Destler, 8-10.

¹⁴⁶ Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, 126-127.

¹⁴⁷ Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, 285.

service and military personnel who worked with the PDD-56 process found it to be highly effective for both crisis and deliberate or advance planning.¹⁴⁸ The new Bush Administration has an opportunity to build on that success and significantly improve the national security of the U.S. against threats present and future by adopting the PDD-56 process for managing complex contingency operations, the CPIWG process for deliberate planning, and the proposed FTIWG process for identifying future threats, all under the coordination and leadership of a streamlined NSC.

Presidents always have full plates, more than anyone else in government, so their attention is in short supply. It is no surprise, then, those Presidents since Truman have sought a “personal” NSC staff to look after their national security responsibilities.¹⁴⁹ The challenge in the new post-Cold War international arena is to provide the President with that assurance, while fully exercising the collective capabilities and responsibilities of every department and agency. A new NSC staff and process, as we have discussed, would provide that assurance and synergy, while also having the ability to fulfill their responsibility to look at all threats, present and future, and have the time and capacity to fully consider them and thus, ameliorate them.

¹⁴⁸ Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1-1.

¹⁴⁹ Zegart, 28.