THE AIR WAR OVER SERBIA:
DENIAL, PUNISHMENT, OR BALANCE OF INTEREST

BY
TROY R. STONE

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
JUNE 2001

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# The Air War Over Serbia: Denial, Punishment, or Balance of Interest

**Abstract**
The original document contains color images.

**Subject Terms**

**Number of Pages**
95
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Acknowledgments

There are several people I would like to acknowledge, without whose support I could not have finished this research project. I am grateful to my advisor Lt Col Forrest Morgan and my reader Col Stephen Chiabotti. They both shaped my research argument and had the tedious task of improving my grammar and writing style. I would also like to thank the staff of Air University Library and the Air Force Historic Research Agency, especially Stephen Chun and Joseph Caver who were instrumental in finding those proverbial needles of information in haystacks of data. Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my wife. Lisa not only gave birth to our second child during the school year, but she also took on the difficult roles of both mother and father to our children as I spent countless nights and weekends working on this study. Without her this research project, and my entire academic year at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, could not have been possible.
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About the Author

Maj Troy R. Stone (BS, Central Michigan University; MAS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) received a regular commission as a distinguished graduate of the USAF Officer Training School in 1988. After graduation from specialized undergraduate navigator training at Mather Air Force Base (AFB), California, in 1988, he was assigned as a weapon systems officer (WSO) in the F-111F and F-15E to Royal Air Force Base Lakenheath, United Kingdom, from 1989 until 1995. During his tour in the United Kingdom he flew 38 combat mission from Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm, and numerous missions from Turkey in support of Operation Provide Comfort. After transitioning to the F-15E in 1992, Maj Stone returned to the United States in 1995 to fly the F-15E at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, as a Formal Training Unit (FTU) instructor and evaluator. As a senior navigator with over 2,000 fighter hours, he has been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, Meritorious Service Medal, six air medals, and six aerial achievement medals. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. In July 2001, he was reassigned to Ramstein AB, Germany, 32nd Air Operations Group. Maj Stone married the former Lisa Henige and they have two children, Spencer and Julia.
Abstract

Since the days of Giulio Douhet, airpower theorists and practitioners have hotly debated the best use of airpower for achieving political objectives. Academics and airmen have written and tested several theories on the use of coercive air power. Currently, three main theories of coercive airpower are in vogue within academic and airpower circles—denial, punishment, and balance of interest.

This study examines NATO’s Operation ALLIED FORCE within the construct of these three theories. The first section summarizes the conflict from both a military and diplomatic perspective. It splits the 78-day conflict into four phases and uses foreign and domestic press reports, NATO-member after action reports, and US Air Force data to determine NATO and Belgrade’s objectives, strategy, and actions between March and June of 1999.

It then uses the historical record to ascertain the fit between the facts of the conflict and the three theories of coercion. Using the denial theory of Robert Pape, the punishment theory of Thomas Schelling, and the balance of interest theory of Alexander George and William Simons, section two of this study determines which theory best explains the outcome of NATO’s air war over Serbia.

Finally, the third section of this study reveals that two of the three theories are consistent with the historical record. Thomas Schelling’s punishment theory fits the operational-level history of the conflict and seems to explain why Belgrade capitulated. George and Simons’ balance of interest theory is also congruent with the facts, but it fits the geo-political history of the conflict and seems to explain the timing of Belgrade’s decision to accept NATO’s terms. This unexpected finding that two schools of coercion are supported by the same case study leads to the implication that different theories of coercion are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but are instead potentially complementary.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In crises placing less-than-vital U.S. interests at stake, policymakers and the public alike usually prefer coercion over unrestrained, ‘brute-force’ solutions.

Coercion is the cornerstone of air power. As one air power expert has written: coercion is not a “small subset [of air power], but rather its predominant form.”\(^1\) Because air power, unlike ground power, cannot physically occupy territory or physically force concessions on an adversary, its only option is to coerce an enemy into behavioral change. Successful air power is based on convincing an adversary that he should act in a manner more favorable to the coercer’s wishes. In other words, coercion is the essence of air power.

Coercion is best defined as the use of force, or the threat of force, to induce an adversary to behave differently then he otherwise would.\(^2\) It is usually broken down into the two subcategories: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence is the threat of force to persuade an adversary NOT to initiate a specific action. Deterrence is an attempt to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, compellence is an attempt to change the status quo. It is the threat or the actual use of force to persuade an adversary to change his behavior in a way that he otherwise would not.\(^3\) For the remainder of this study, coercion and compellence will be used interchangeably.

Theoretically, coercion works by manipulating the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus. A coercer attempts to raise the cost, or raise the expectation of cost, lower the benefits, or the expectation of benefits, in the adversary’s decision-making calculus.\(^4\) When, in a target-state’s decision-making process the aggregate value of cost is greater than the aggregate value of benefit, coercion occurs. In other words, using the decision equation developed by Robert Pape in his book, *Bombing to Win*, when ‘R’ is less than zero in the adversary’s decision-making apparatus, coercion occurs.\(^5\) Different theories of coercion argue about which variables to manipulate in order to force ‘R’ below zero.

\[
R = B \cdot p(B) - C \cdot p(C)
\]

\(R=\) Value of resistance  
\(B=\) Benefits of resistance  
\(p(B)=\) Probability of attaining Benefits  
\(C=\) Costs of resistance  
\(p(C)=\) Probability of suffering Costs\(^6\)

Denial theorists believe the variable \(p(B)\) is the key to driving \(R\) below zero. They contend the most efficient and effective means of affecting an adversary’s decision-making equation is to lower his evaluation of probability of attaining benefit. For denial theorists this usually takes the form of attacking the adversary’s military forces.\(^7\) Because an enemy’s military forces are his ultimate guarantors of benefit, attacking these forces will lower his probability of attaining benefit and, hence, drive his evaluation of \(R\) to less than zero. Denial theorists argue that the other variables in the equation are either beyond the control of a coercer, or that an adversary is generally insensitive to their manipulation.\(^8\)

\(^5\) Ibid, 16.  
\(^6\) Ibid, 16.  
\(^7\) Ibid, 69.  
\(^8\) Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 16-17
Conversely, punishment theorists believe C is the most sensitive variable in an adversary’s decision equation. These theorists argue that the quickest way to effect an adversary’s decision making process is to raise his cost of resistance. This usually takes the form of bypassing the opponent’s military forces and directly destroying, or threatening to destroy, those things that the adversary values.9 Punishment theorists maintain that attacking an adversary’s military forces is an inefficient use of power.

The third main school of coercion argues that both sides of an adversary’s decision equation are sensitive to coercer input. Unlike denial and punishment, balance of interest theory contends that the cost and benefit variables are both susceptible to coercer manipulation. It maintains that influencing the adversary’s evaluation of benefits and his evaluation of costs is the surest method for driving R below zero. However, the most significant difference between balance of interest and the other schools is its heavy focus on the geo-political environment within which coercion occurs. Balance of interest theory argues that an adversary’s evaluation of costs and benefits is ultimately dependent on nine contextual variables that define the geo-political environment. If the nine contextual variables did not favor the coercer, they contend, an adversary’s cost-benefit equation is largely immune to outside influence.10 Hence, whereas denial and punishment focus on their respective decision variables, balance of interest theory focuses on both the variables, as well as, the geo-political context of an adversary’s decision process.

The difficulty with all of these coercion theories is that they are very difficult to falsify. Often the same historical cases are used by all three coercion schools to support their respective theories. NATO’s recent conflict with the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is a case in point. Within weeks of the conflict’s termination, advocates from all three coercion paradigms were using operation ALLIED FORCE (NATO’s codeword for its conflict with the FRY) as evidence to support their respective theory.11 This study will attempt to untangle and inform that debate.

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The purpose of the study is to determine whether denial, punishment, or balance of interest theory best explains the FRY’s decision to accept NATO’s demands for terminating the conflict. Arguably NATO’s conflict with the FRY was a successful case of coercion. Belgrade chose to change its political behavior while it still retained the capacity for organized military resistance. Serbia withdrew all its military, police, and paramilitary forces, it allowed the return of all Albanian refugees, and it accepted a NATO-led occupation force in Kosovo, all while it still had the military capability to resist. The question is which coercion theory, if any, best explains that behavior?

Using the political, economic, and military record of operation ALLIED FORCE, this study will determine whether the historical record best supports a denial, punishment, or balance of interest theory-based explanation. NATO’s operational records, foreign press reports, and historical writings will provide the data, while Robert A. Pape’s *Bombing to Win*, Thomas C. Schelling’s *Arms And Influence*, and Alexander L. George and William E. Simons’ *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, will serve as the templates for the three different coercion theories. The results of this “best-fit” methodology will not prove the efficacy of a single theory, however they should indicate whether one theory explains this case outcome better than the others, thereby informing policy makers and practitioners charged with developing coercive strategies in the future.

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Chapter 2

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT

He [Slobodan Milosevic] did not acknowledge his guilt, he could not see his mistakes. So this all made it a very difficult matter.

Victor Chernomyrdin
Moscow Radio Ekho Moskvy
9 June 1999

On 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a 78-day bombing campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO’s air campaign used over 600 aircraft from 14 nations and attacked 5,476 targets in its attempts to settle a political dispute between the FRY and the ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosovo.¹⁴

The Seeds of Conflict

The seeds of conflict between the FRY and Kosovo can be traced back to the closing days of World War II. In the wake of WW II, Josip Broz, better known as Tito, reunited the state of Yugoslavia under a 1946 communist constitution following the Soviet federal model. The post-WW II constitution defined Yugoslavia as six independent republics and one autonomous region—Kosovo. However, the legal status of an autonomous region was never defined.¹⁵ To this day it is unclear if the 1946 constitution gave Kosovo “autonomous region” status within the state of Yugoslavia, or within the republic of Serbia.¹⁶

¹⁴ Air War Over Serbia Date Base (S), Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, A.L. Information extracted is unclassified.
¹⁶ ibid, 316.
The debate was made even less clear when the Yugoslav constitution was rewritten in 1974. Trying to walk a fine line between home-rule and federal-rule, Tito and the Yugoslav government wrote a new federal constitution granting wide-ranging autonomy to local provinces. One of the main benefactors of the new constitution was Kosovo. The new document gave Kosovo the rights of a republic, but not the legal title.\(^\text{17}\) This further confused the hierarchical relationship between the federal state of Yugoslavia, the independent republic of Serbia, and the autonomous region of Kosovo.

The 1974 constitution created a peculiar relationship between the republic of Serbia and the region of Kosovo. Under the new constitution Kosovo enjoyed virtually every right of a republic, yet it was still technically a sub-region of Serbia. Because Kosovo had the rights of a republic, it was allowed to convene its own legislature and dictate its own legal, judicial, and educational systems; but, because it was also a sub-region of Serbia, it continued to send representatives to the Serbian legislature. This had the effect of giving Kosovars a vote in internal Serbian matters, because of their representative in the Serbian legislature, but no Serbian vote on internal Kosovo matters. This odd relationship between a republic and its province lasted until Tito’s death in 1980.

The passing of an icon brought a flood of nationalism and a weaker central government to Yugoslavia. After 1980, Kosovar nationalists demanded further autonomy from Serbia and Yugoslavia, or outright independence. Serb nationalists on the other hand, demanded a greater Serbia and greater sovereignty over “their” Kosovo. These diametric demands coupled with the confused legal relationship between Kosovo and Serbia proved fertile ground for racists and opportunistic politicians alike.

Into this heated political atmosphere walked a little known communist apparatchik named Slobodan Milosevic.\(^\text{18}\) Born 1941 in Pozarevac Serbia, Milosevic showed few signs of political leadership. He graduated from Belgrade University in 1964 with a law degree and quickly went to work for the local communist government in Belgrade. He held several governmental posts throughout the 1960s and 1970s until

\(^\text{17}\) Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 328.
emerging as friend, deputy, and protégé to the then Serbian Communist Party President Ivan Stambolic.\textsuperscript{19}

On 24 April 1987, Stambolic sent Milosevic to Kosovo to speak to a group of Serbian and Montenegrin activists planning a protest march on Belgrade. While listening to the activists’ angered speeches in Kosovo Polje’s House of Culture, fighting erupted in the streets outside the hall between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanian Kosovar policemen. The fighting had been carefully orchestrated by a local Serb activist who later admitted to supplying the protesters with large quantities of rocks for ammunition.\textsuperscript{20} Milosevic went outside to quell the disturbance and uttered the words that would forever change his life—“no one should dare to beat you.”\textsuperscript{21} The crowd’s reaction and, later, the popular Serb reaction to those words launched him onto the national stage and propelled him into the Serb and Yugoslav presidencies.

Using his newly found fame and his recently acquired nationalist credentials, Milosevic fanned the flames of Serb nationalism and worked tirelessly at revoking Kosovo’s political autonomy. Thanks to the Serb media that replayed Milosevic’s Kosovo Polje speech thousands of times, Slobodan was elected to the Serb Presidency in 1987. He finally held the platform that would allow him to crush Kosovo’s autonomy.

In early 1989, under the direction of Milosevic, the Serb legislative assembly revoked Kosovo’s special status as an autonomous region. The Kosovo assembly met on 23 March to pass constitutional amendments that effectively stripped itself of autonomous status. According to eyewitness accounts, parked outside the assembly building were large numbers of Serbian tanks, while inside Serbian police mixed with the legislators and reportedly took part in the vote.\textsuperscript{22} Within days the Serb legislature approved the constitutional amendments that dissolved Kosovo’s control over its judicial,

\textsuperscript{21} Noel Malcolm, \textit{Kosovo: A Short History}, 341.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{ibid}, 344.
legal, and educational institutions. In 1990, Serb officials locked the doors on the Kosovo legislature in Pristina and officially dissolved the institution.23

Throughout the early 1990’s Belgrade continued to pass laws that favored Serbs over ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Even though Serbs only constituted 10 percent of Kosovo’s population, Serb officials in Belgrade passed laws that forbade ethnic Albanians from buying or selling land without special permission from Serb officials. They passed laws that in effect fired thousands of ethnic Albanians from government jobs, and in a final insult they modified the educational system in order to eliminate local culture and language from the schools.24

Meanwhile, ethnic Albanian Kosovars began to fight back. A political group calling itself the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) advocated a peaceful political strategy for regaining autonomy for Kosovo. Its policy was threefold; prevent violent revolt, internationalize the plight of Kosovo, and deny the legitimacy of Serbian rule. However, by 1997 the LDK and its non-violent strategy had gained nothing for the average Kosovar and was beginning to lose its credibility.

By late 1997 a dark and mysterious group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began filling the political void. At this time the group numbered less than 150 fighters, used small-group tactics to ambush Serbian policemen, and was mostly a rumor to the average Kosovar. However, when Serbian “police” used mortars and machineguns to bring a suspected murderer with KLA ties to justice in early 1998, they killed 58 Albanians and sparked widespread KLA violence in the process.25

From March until July, the KLA made a series of rapid military advances across Kosovo. Partly because Belgrade was apparently paralyzed with indecision, the KLA “liberated” large parts of Kosovo and recruited young fighters by the hundreds. However, four months into the KLA uprising, Belgrade decided to act. In July, orders went out to Serb security forces to roll up the rebellion. Knowing they had outstripped

23 Tom Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 64. Also see: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Kosovo As Seen, As Told,” Part 1 Chapter 1, 1. Available online: www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part1/ch1.htm
24 Tom Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 62
their ability to hold territory, and armed with only small caliber weapons, the KLA chose not to fight. With no visible adversary, the “Serbs fell into a public relations fiasco.”

Without an enemy to roll up, the Serbian forces went village to village looking for KLA members and burning houses as they went. The Serb offensive created 200,000 displaced persons and “galvanized the international community into action.”

**International Involvement**

Even though their officials in neighboring Bosnia had voiced concerns over the growing instability in Kosovo since early 1992, it was not until the Serb summer offensive that the United Nations (UN) took action. On 31 March the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160. The resolution condemned the FRY’s excessive use of force against the Kosovar “demonstrators” and established an arms embargo against the FRY.

In addition to working through the UN, American officials also attempted to pressure Belgrade through the Contact Group For The FRY—a diplomatic group sponsored and composed of members from the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia.

Sensing the growing international concern, and with no enemy to fight, Belgrade pulled its security forces out of Kosovo. As FRY forces pulled out, the KLA fighters reentered Kosovo. By summer, the KLA again controlled an estimated 40 percent of the province. As the KLA gained control of more territory it also changed their tactics. Before March, the KLA had limited its military activity to hit and run attacks on Serb policemen and isolated military outposts, but during the summer they started attacking

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Serb militia units and Kosovar-Serb civilians.\textsuperscript{30} The KLA also traded in its small arms for anti-tank rocket launchers, mortars, recoilless rifles, and anti-aircraft artillery.\textsuperscript{31}

In the wake of new KLA tactics, diplomatic initiatives picked up pace. On 23 September the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199. Without the express threat of force, Resolution 1199 called for an immediate cease-fire in Kosovo, and called for an international presence to monitor the cease-fire.\textsuperscript{32} In addition to the UN action, the US sent the lead negotiator of the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrooke, and US Ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill, to speak with KLA officials and leaders in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{33} In October, a final meeting between Holbrooke and Milosevic bore fruit. Milosevic agreed to a cease-fire allowing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to place an observation mission in Kosovo.

Despite the diplomatic activities and the OSCE observers, accusations of violence, repression, provocation, and retribution continued between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The KLA stood accused of kidnapping and killing Serb civilians and ethnic Albanian collaborators, while the Serbs were accused of killing, looting, and burning ethnic Albanian homes.\textsuperscript{34} Not surprisingly both sides openly talked of spring offensives. However, the spring was too long to wait for large-scale military action. On January 15, 1999, the OSCE observation mission reported the brutal massacre of 40 unarmed ethnic Albanian civilians in the Kosovar village of Racak; allegedly at the hands of Serb military forces. The OSCE report stated that the massacre “most graphically illustrates the descent into violence amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.”\textsuperscript{35}

Following the Racak massacre, Western powers and Russia decided that the situation in Kosovo had reached a breaking point and that both the KLA and the FRY

\textsuperscript{34} William Joseph Buckley, ed., \textit{Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions}, 113-114.
should be forced to accept a compromise peace. Using the above-mentioned Contact Group, Western powers and Russia invited Albanian leaders of Kosovo and Serbian government officials to Rambouillet, a chateau outside Paris, for negotiations. The Contact Group used overt threats of military force to ensure representation, and a Christopher Hill-authored peace plan as a baseline compromise.\textsuperscript{36}

On 6 February 1999, Serb officials, representatives of the KLA, and other more moderate Kosovars arrived at Rambouillet. The baseline compromise was a comprehensive 74-page agreement that satisfied no one. Part of the dissatisfaction can be traced back to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. The Kosovar delegation, or at least the KLA contingent, wanted autonomy from both Serbia and Yugoslavia, the moderate Kosovars wanted autonomy from Serbia, and the Serbs wanted neither. In the end, the week’s worth of diplomatic activity at Rambouillet came to naught. The Contact Group ended the summit with neither side signing, but both agreeing to a future meeting.\textsuperscript{37}

In a second round of talks, held in Paris, the KLA representatives decided to sign the baseline agreement.\textsuperscript{38} In the interim, they had returned to Kosovo to find widespread support for the original agreement. Even though the deal came short of independence, it did grant Kosovo most of its pre-Milosevic autonomy. However, on 18 March, for reasons still unclear the Serbian officials refused to sign. Even though they had been upbeat about the agreement at the end of Rambouillet, they arrived at the second round of talks asking for revisions that were obviously unacceptable to both the KLA and the Contact Group.\textsuperscript{39} Even under overt threats of military action, the Serbs refused to budge from their status quo position, and the talks collapsed.\textsuperscript{40}

In a last minute attempt to head off the promised military intervention, the Contact Group sought a final negotiation with Belgrade. The western leaders backed by NATO force, sent Richard Holbrooke to meet with Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade.

\textsuperscript{36} Tom Judah, \textit{Kosovo War and Revenge}, 195.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid}, 202-220.
\textsuperscript{39} William Joseph Buckley, ed., \textit{Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions}, 114.
Holbrooke later recalled that he told Milosevic in no uncertain terms that NATO was willing to bomb Serbia if Serbia refused to “accept Rambouillet as the basis of a negotiated” settlement. Holbrooke also recalled Milosevic’s response: “No more engagement, no more negotiations, I understand that, you will bomb us. You are a great and powerful country, there is nothing we can do about that.”\textsuperscript{41} Two days later, 24 March 1999, NATO bombs began to fall on Serbia.

**The Bombing Campaign**

NATO’s 78 day bombing offensive can be broken into four phases. Phase one ran from 24 March until 3 April and was marked by NATO’s short conflict mentality. Phase two lasted until 28 April, and was punctuated by renewed NATO solidarity. Phase three terminated on 21 May and was highlighted by the G-8 summit and its resultant peace plan; while phase four lasted until the conflict ended on 10 June.

**Phase One (24 March – 3 April)**

NATO’s political objectives during phase one were natural extensions of the Rambouillet negotiations. During the first week of the campaign NATO-member political leaders enumerated NATO’s political demands of Serbia as: 1) immediate withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo, 2) sign the Rambouillet agreement, and 3) allow an international military presence in Kosovo. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping told reporters that Belgrade had to agree to all three demands “transparently and verifiably.”\textsuperscript{42} Ironically, the first and third demands were explicit in the second.\textsuperscript{43}

NATO’s military objectives were also extensions of Rambouillet. A day before the air campaign began, US Defense Secretary William Cohen told a Department of Defense (DOD) briefing audience that NATO’s “military objective is to deter further

\textsuperscript{41} Tom Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 227.
action against the Kosovars and to diminish the ability of the Yugoslavian army to continue those attacks.”

President Clinton expounded on those objectives by stating that NATO’s “action had three objectives: 1) to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression, 2) to deter Yugoslavia from continuing and escalating its attacks on helpless civilians, and 3) to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future.”

Armed with these ambiguous objectives, NATO war planners conceived a three-phase air campaign. The plan was meant to demonstrate, deter, and damage. Phase one was designed to suppress enemy air defenses. It targeted the FRY’s integrated air defense system (IADS), airfields, and command and control facilities. Phase two focused on Serbian ground forces in Kosovo, and targeted military facilities and equipment south of the 44th parallel. Phase three was intended to strike targets north of the 44th parallel.

NATO’s initial military strategy reflected its Supreme Commander’s opinion that fielded forces were Belgrade’s center of gravity. NATO’s Supreme Commander, Gen Wesley K. Clark, told a NATO press conference on 25 March that “we are going to destroy [the Serbian] forces and their facilities.” Later in the conflict, Clark’s air commander Lt Gen Michael S. Short told a reporter that he was executing Gen Clark’s “number one priority—killing the [FRY] army in Kosovo.” However, the initial air plan also indicated a short conflict mentality on the part of NATO officials.

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Believing Slobodan Milosevic would capitulate after only four or five days of bombing, NATO’s air planning was truncated and shaped by a short war mentality.\textsuperscript{51} The final air campaign planning was not initiated until days before the actual campaign started, and once the air war did start, NATO commanders had only 219 targets prepared—less than a week’s worth of targets. An after-action report compiled by the United Kingdom’s House of Commons stated: “we believe that the hope that the campaign would last only a few days helped shape a strategy…”\textsuperscript{52}

NATO’s execution of the air strategy started at 2200 local on 24 March. Of the 444 targets attacked in the first 11 days, 87 percent fell into integrated-air-defense or fielded forces categories, while the remaining 13 percent fell into the strategic categories of industrial, leadership, electricity, and oil production targets.

\textbf{Figure 1. Phase One Attacks Against the FRY}

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{ibid}, Chapter 2, 22.
Yugoslavia’s political objectives before March 24th were at best obscure. After nearly two years of rhetoric and broken promises, and after less than an enthusiastic effort at Rambouillet, the FRY’s political objectives were less than clear. However, once the air campaign kicked off, Belgrade’s military actions betrayed its political objectives.

It appears the FRY’s first political objective was to clear Kosovo of armed Albanian separatists. Within hours of NATO’s first bombs, Serbian ground forces launched a massive offensive into Kosovo codenamed Operation HORSESHOE. The secretive plan was designed to “eradicate a rebel threat in Kosovo” within seven days. By 1 April FRY forces inside Kosovo numbered 40,000 and were supported by as many as 300 tanks and 150 pieces of artillery.

The FRY’s second political objective seems to have been the “permanent expulsion of all or at least most ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.” Using NATO bombs and their own offensive as cover, the FRY authorities sought to radically change the ethnic landscape of Kosovo. In the words of one Croatian reporter, Serbia wanted “a showdown…the Albanians would not recover [from] in the next ten years.” By 6 April over 400,000 Kosovars had fled across the border into neighboring Macedonia and Albania. In addition, after the bombing started, the FRY authorities apparently added two more political objectives.

First, they seemingly wanted closer diplomatic and military ties with their historic patron Russia; and second, they wanted to fracture NATO solidarity. Supporting the first additional objective, they “strove to emphasize that the Serbs were not alone in the world, holding out the prospect of …Russia intervening.” Two days after the war started,

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Boris Milosevic—older brother of Slobodan and Ambassador to Moscow—“urged Russia to supply Yugoslavia with arms.”\textsuperscript{59} The second additional objective offered Belgrade a means to curtail NATO bombing before Milosevic was forced to acquiesce. With his country under attack for the first time in over half a century, Serb President Milan Milutinovic granted an interview with a Greek newspaper and said: “we appreciate the very good stance of the Greek government… I believe Greece must raise a strong voice against the attacks…[you] understand us better.”\textsuperscript{60}

FRY military objectives also became clear in the first days of the conflict. The FRY military seems to have had two interrelated sets of objectives. The first targeted ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, while the second focused on NATO. Serbia forces sought to defeat the KLA as a military force and destroy “the civilian support structure upon which the KLA depended for intelligence, food, and shelter.”\textsuperscript{61} They also worked to limit the effectiveness of NATO air power.\textsuperscript{62} FRY officials doubtlessly knew they could not defeat the NATO air colossus, but they probably thought limiting its effectiveness would erode NATO cohesion.

The FRY military strategy also attempted to drive large masses of ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. As the FRY military forces attacked in southern and western

\textsuperscript{60} Kostas Papaetrou, “Serb President on NATO Raids, EU, Greece,” \textit{Athens Ta Nea}, 3 April 1999, FBIS NC030415999.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{ibid}, 56.
\textsuperscript{63} R. Jiffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “The Anatomy of a Purge.”
Kosovo, the paramilitaries started rousting the Albanian villages in the same area. There was clearly a coordinated effort between Serbian regular and irregular forces. In each instance, the military forces formed a cordon around an area while the paramilitary foot soldiers cleared the encircled villages of their Albanian inhabitants. To help ensure the Albanians could not return to Kosovo, the paramilitaries systematically confiscated their travel papers, identification cards, birth certificates, and any other official documentation that could facilitate their later return.\textsuperscript{64}

The FRY military was also adept at limiting NATO’s effectiveness from the air. Using concealment, camouflage, and inactivity, the FRY forces conserved their ground and air defense forces. These techniques had been perfected during the Cold War when Yugoslavia played the buffer between Cold War giants. They were also probably updated when high-ranking Serbian military officials made their well-publicized trips to Iraq in the weeks leading up to the conflict.\textsuperscript{65}

Both FRY military strategies were exceedingly successful during phase one. By early April FRY forces had pushed the rebels into the mountainous border region between Albania and Kosovo, and had largely eliminated the KLA as a serious fighting force in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{66} By 11 April even NATO and Pentagon officials acknowledged that the route of the KLA was nearly complete.\textsuperscript{67} And, as mentioned earlier, by 6 April as many as 400,000 ethnic Albanians had been evicted from their homes in Kosovo—nearly 25 percent of Kosovo’s Albanian population. However, FRY officials were less successful at attracting Russian diplomatic and military support.

After the diplomatic break down at Rambouillet and Paris, Russia found itself in a difficult political situation. On the one hand, they had been an integral part of the Contact Group and its overt threats of force, while on the other, Russia had also always been Serbia’s historic protector. This difficult diplomatic corner may account for Moscow’s mixed signals during phase one.

\textsuperscript{64} R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “The Anatomy of a Purge.”
\textsuperscript{66} R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “The Anatomy of a Purge.”
\textsuperscript{67} Steven Lee Myers, “Serb Forces in Kosovo Under Attack as Weather Clears.”
Initially it looked as though Moscow was completely backing Belgrade in its dispute with NATO. In the opening days of the conflict the Kremlin rattled its military saber, aborted Russian-American talks, and froze its low-level military contacts with NATO. On 24 March, enroute to Washington, Russian Prime Minister Yevgenny Premakov turned around over the North Atlantic after he was informed that NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia were certain. On 25 March, Boris Yeltsin told a Russian TV audience that “war in Kosovo means war in Europe, and perhaps even more.” Finally, by the end of March, Russia expelled the NATO Permanent Representative in Moscow, and recalled its representative from NATO Headquarters.

Confusingly, Russia also sent diplomatic signals that were almost supportive of NATO’s actions. One Russian newspaper called these confusing diplomatic signals “borderline psychotic.” On March 25th the Russian daily, Moscow Kommersant, reported that Yevgeniy Primakov—the same man who had aborted his trip to Washington—had “called on Milosevic urgently to sign the political agreement on Kosovo, which had been agreed [to] at Rambouillet,” and told Milosevic “that the document was the maximum that Belgrade could hope for.” Moreover, two days later Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the Russian Duma: “under no circumstances must we slide into confrontation…we have the firm directive of the President of Russia on that account…Russia was and remains a reliable, predictable partner [with NATO].” Moscow was obviously unsure of its own priorities as the conflict moved into phase two.

Phase Two (4 April- 28 April)

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Phase two marked a turning point in the conflict for NATO, the FRY, and the Russians. In the first week of April, NATO’s leaders began to realize that their relatively short air campaign needed to be expanded if it was going to have any chance of success. Yugoslav officials were adjusting their objectives and strategies, while the Russians grasped at a unified foreign policy.

During phase two, NATO both softened and added to their political demands. Almost in unison, NATO leaders began changing the tone of their demands. Whereas in the beginning NATO spoke of the getting Belgrade to sign the Rambouillet Accords, on 6 April they began speaking about getting Belgrade to agree to the basic principles of Rambouillet. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott gave the first indication of softened demands when he told a Greek newspaper that “the basic principles of Rambouillet remain in effect.” The softened demand became final when on 12 April NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana told reporters that one of the conditions for peace was Belgrade’s “willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords.”

NATO also added two new political objectives during phase two. After FRY forces launched their military offensive into Kosovo, NATO had to adjust its objectives to counter the open warfare and its resultant displaced persons—nearly half a million by the end of phase two. Secretary General Solana told reporters on 12 April that the changing ground situation in Kosovo dictated two new NATO demands: 1) the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced people, and 2) a verifiable halt to all military action and an immediate end to violence and repression.

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75 Timothy Gaton Ash, “The War We Almost Lost,” Guardian Unlimited, 4 September 1999.
76 “G. Papandreou Discusses Kosovo Crisis With Talbott,” Athens News Agency, 6 April 1999, FBIS NC0604091499.
77 ibid.
During phase two NATO’s military objectives shifted to meet the new political objectives. Starting the first week in April, NATO began to de-emphasize denying, damaging, and destroying FRY military forces, and began to emphasize coercing or pressuring Serbian leadership. Even though NATO’s Supreme Commander still told reporters that his mission was “a race, trying to damage Serb [military] supplies and equipment faster than the Yugoslav military could replace…it,” other leaders in the NATO hierarchy hinted at the alliance’s shift in focus. Nearly two weeks before General Clark’s comment, NATO’s Military Committee Chairman, German General Klaus Naumann, said, “If we start to chip away at the institutions that keep him [Milošević] in power, he may think it over…we clearly intend to break his will to continue.”

A United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee after-action report acknowledged this shift in military strategy from: “Denying the Yugoslav forces the ability to prosecute their campaign” to “Dissuading Milošević and his henchmen from directing” their campaign.

NATO’s military strategy also shifted to match its evolving objectives. Most of this shift came in the form of increased effort. Between phases one and two there was a 74 percent increase in the number of targets attacked. In phase one allied aircraft struck an average of 43 targets a day; in phase two that average increased to 74 targets a day. This increase reflected the increased number of allied aircraft available for tasking. The US alone increased its number of aircraft available from 207 on 25 March to over 400 on 15 April. However, the shift in strategy was also reflected in a shift in targeting.

During phase two NATO increased its percentage of strikes aimed at strategic targets. Where in phase one only 13 percent of the targets could be classified as strategic, by phase two this percentage had more than doubled to 30 percent. Between 4 April and 28 April NATO struck 446 leadership, industry, electricity, and oil production and targets in the FRY. The per day rate of these targets increased from 5 during phase one to 15 during phase two.

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83 Air War Over Serbia Data Base (S), Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, A.L. Information extracted is unclassified.
FRY officials intensified their efforts to cleave the NATO alliance during phase two of the air campaign. In its 24 days, FRY officials cut off the flow of refugees, declared a unilateral cease-fire, and signed a “peace treaty” with the by-then-discredited
Kosovar leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova— all in an apparent attempt to create policy disagreement between NATO-member capitals.  

On 5 April Belgrade newspapers announced that an agreement had been reached between Belgrade and Kosovar leaders ending the violence. Unfortunately, Rugova’s authority over Kosovar Albanians had long since disappeared. Two days later, after forcing nearly 400,000 ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo, Belgrade abruptly closed its border crossings and forced tens of thousands of awaiting refugees back into Kosovo. Finally, on 9 April FRY announced a unilateral cease-fire and declared: “Peace has been restored to Kosovo.” In an obvious attempt to gain sympathy from the less resolute NATO members, FRY officials said after their cease-fire announcement: “Clearly, NATO’s criminal activities are aimed against all those who strive for a joint life, peace, unity, and understanding.”

FRY officials also refocused their energy on fostering diplomatic and military ties with Russia during phase two. In a strange and apparently unsolicited bid, the Yugoslavian Parliament voted to “join in a union of Russia and Belarus.” FRY President Slobodan Milosevic called the vote a “historic step on the road to integration, the strengthening of stability, security and peace on the eve of the millennium.” Official Serbian television said the new union would safeguard “the security and a high level of the state’s defence capacity.” Ironically, after learning of the vote, Russian officials said they would have to examine the offer; and Russian President Boris Yeltsin called the Yugoslav vote “unworkable” and “inappropriate” under current circumstances.

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85 “Tanjug Cites FRY, Serbian Cease-Fire Offer,” Belgrade Tanjug, 6 April 1999, FBIS AU0604173099.
FRY military strategy closely followed Belgrade’s focus on anti-NATO objectives. The Serbian military continued their strategy of preservation. Air defenses only attacked NATO warplanes when their chances for success were high, and the ground forces continued to use concealment, camouflage, and inactivity to stymie NATO airman. In accordance with this strategy, Yugoslav air defense units perfected what NATO airmen called shoot-and-scoot tactics. Missile units set up in each position, quickly fired their missiles, and then immediately changed locations before allied airman pinpointed their locations. The tactic optimized self-preservation, but not military victory.

Russian diplomatic signals were also more dichotomous than “psychotic” during phase two. Beginning in early April, two persistent, yet opposing, messages emanated from Moscow. The executive branch and foreign ministry propagated the first, while the Defence Ministry and the Duma where the loci of the second.

The diplomatic messages coming from the Foreign Ministry and the executive branch were described as “somber” by some NATO officials and anti-Serb by FRY officials. During the first week of April, a Czech newspaper quoted the Czech ambassador to NATO as saying that Russia “reacted without destroying fundamental achievements...they have neither torn to pieces...nor withdrawn...nor abolished organs of” NATO-Russian cooperation.”91 Four days later, Serbian Vice Premier Milovan Borjic called these same Russian reactions a betrayal to Serbia. He told a Russian newspaper: “Serbs need weapons from Russia not advice,” and accused Moscow of betraying its Orthodox brother.92

Conversely, diplomatic signals from the Ministry of Defence and the lower legislature were hotly anti-NATO. On 10 April the official newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, Krasnaya Zvezda, ran an article that said “military operations against Serbia are a declaration of war against all Eurasia, Russia, [and] Moscow....”93 Two days earlier the chairman of the Russian Duma, Gennadiy Seleznev said: “No military blackmail will

92 Gennadiy Sysoyev, “Moscow Diplomatic Effort ‘Timely’,” Moscow Kommersant, 6 April 1999, FBIS MM0604115399.
93 Aleksandr Dugin, “Russian, U.S. Geopolitical Roles Seen,” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 April 1999, FBIS 99R03326A.
break the will of the Serbs. But if NATO launches land operations against Yugoslavia there will be a sea of blood.”

Russian policy solidified during phase two, but it occupied two opposing camps.

**Phase Three (25 April-20 May)**

Phase three of the air war over Serbia was marked by three pivotal events—NATO’s summit in Washington, the G-8 summit in Petersburg Germany, and the Russian offer to mediate between Belgrade and Western leaders.

NATO’s 50th Anniversary summit marked a major milestone in the conflict. It provided NATO commanders with an expanded target list and gave FRY leadership a more unified and articulate adversary. The expanded target list was meant to increase pressure on Belgrade. US National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger told reporters during the summit that NATO leaders wanted “more, not less, stronger, not weaker” military force against the FRY. The summit’s Heads Of State Communiqué stated: “We are intensifying NATO’s military actions to increase pressure on Belgrade.”

The summit was the first meeting between all 19 members of the alliance, and it ended with a list of political demands that would go virtually unchanged until the end of the conflict. The Heads Of State communiqué stated that in order to bring the conflict to an end, “President Milosevic must:”

--Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo
--Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and para-military forces
--Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
--Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and

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94 “Seleznev: Belgrade Ready For Talks If NATO Raids Stop,” Moscow Interfax, 8 April 1999, FBIS LD0804163399.
95 United States Air Force, “Air War Over Serbia (S),” Chapter 3, 26. Information extracted is unclassified.
--Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework based on the Rambouillet accords.  

The second watershed during phase three was the G-8 (organization of the World’s seven most industrialized nations, plus Russia) Foreign Minister’s summit held in Petersburg Germany on 6 May. The Russians had been calling for a G-8 summit to discuss the conflict since 1 April, but it was not until after NATO solidified its own solidarity in Washington that the NATO members of the G-8 agreed to the meeting.  

The importance of the G-8 summit was that it was the only forum that included both NATO members and the FRY’s historic patron Russia. When the G-8 announced its “proposed political solution to the Kosovo crisis” it not only spoke for NATO, but it also spoke for Russia. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright said of the G-8 summit and resultant agreement: “The Russians have now come on board.” When the G-8 summit closed on 7 May, there was little doubt that NATO and Russia spoke with one voice.

The G-8 peace plan was an expanded and arguably softened position, but it was also obviously based on the Washington summit communiqué. The G-8 solution called for:

--Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
--Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces;
--Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
--Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
--The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;

--A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK [Albanian initials for the Kosovo Liberation Army];

--Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.\textsuperscript{100}

If the G-8 summit softened NATO’s political objectives, the Washington summit hardened its military objectives and strategy. Armed with an expanded target list, and the realization that Serbian forces were enduring their bombing efforts, NATO leaders continued their shift toward targeting FRY leadership. General Wesley Clark spoke of NATO’s bombing effectiveness against Serb military forces when he told reporters, “if you actually added up what’s there on any given day, you might actually find out that he’s [Milosevic] strengthened his forces [in Kosovo].”\textsuperscript{101} NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea spoke of NATO’s shift to targeting FRY leadership when he said: “We want him [Milosevic] to know we have our finger on the light switch, we can turn the power off whenever we need or whenever we want to.”\textsuperscript{102} This shift to targeting political will caused one reporter to write: “The [new] attacks have crossed a new threshold, spurring question about whether the alliance is striking strictly military targets.”\textsuperscript{103}

NATO’s shift in targeting and its increased level of effort crossed thresholds during phase three. In the first month of the conflict NATO jets attacked an average of 4 so-called “non-military” strategic targets a day. After the NATO summit, this average increased to 15 a day until the end of the conflict—an increase of over 275 percent. Additionally, NATO’s level of effort increased from 63 targets per day in the first month to 147 through the last 45 days of the conflict. NATO attacked 2,083 targets from 24


March to 28 April, but attacked 6,625 targets from 29 April to 10 June—a 74 percent daily increase. John Keegan called these changes in targeting and tempo a break point. Mr. Keegan pointed out after the conflict that NATO’s efforts against Yugoslavia embraced “two air wars, the first lasting a month, the second six weeks.”

![Figure 3. Total Attacks Against the FRY](image)

FRY political objectives also changed during phase three. By the end of April, Belgrade’s political objectives had shifted to acquiring a favorable peace settlement. Belgrade officials started publicly responding to NATO peace proposals, instead of ignoring them, near the end of May. Milosevic started giving interviews to western media companies, and state-run media were allowed to print opposition-party views that were critical to the Belgrade regime. During phases one and two, FRY media limited its coverage to Belgrade’s proposals for peace, but during phase three they started printing Belgrade’s acceptance, and counter proposals to NATO demands. In addition, Milosevic gave two interviews to western reporters during this phase, one of which he opened with:

Source: Air War Over Serbia Data Base (S), Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL. Information extracted is unclassified.

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“America is a great country and Americans great people.” On 9 May, Milosevic’s former Deputy Prime Minister admitted to Serbian crimes when he told a Russian television reporter: “I cannot forgive a single crime committed by the Serbs against the Albanians.” A Croatian paper interpreted Belgrade’s phase-three actions as “preparing the Yugoslav public for capitulation,” while an American official called them “effort[s] to show he [Milosevic] can be reasoned with.”

Serbian military objectives and strategy changed little during phase three. Reports of FRY and KLA fighting were limited, refugee flows were spasmodic, and the FRY military forces still seemed more interested in self-preservation than in putting up a stout defense. On 20 May BETA Belgrade reported the KLA was only active in and around four small border towns between Albania and Kosovo. On the same day, local reporters in Pristina said that the sound of small arms battles could no longer be heard around the city. By the end of May, the KLA and FRY forces were still stagnated in their early April battle positions along the Albanian-Kosovo border.

However, the FRY did experience its first symptoms of war weariness during phase three. Starting in mid-May and running until the end of the month, no less than six towns either openly protested against the Belgrade regime or against the army’s call-up of reserve forces. The first government protest occurred in the central Serbian town of Cacak. On 18 May the citizens of Cacak formed their own “Civic Parliament” and announced they would work to “end the bombing, save human lives, and promote economic recovery.” The leaders of the Civic Parliament decided to form their

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organization at an anti-war rally and openly called on the government to “remove all military equipment that could attract NATO aircraft.”\textsuperscript{112}

Various other anti-war movements emerged in the towns of Krusevac, Aleksandrovac, Baljevac, and Raska during the second half of May.\textsuperscript{113} In the town of Krusevac, 110 miles south of Belgrade, several sources reported more than 3,000 protesters taking to the streets and demanding an end to the war and the return of military reservists serving in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{114} In the town of Raska the residents became so agitated that the commander of Yugoslavia’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army in Nis was called in to speak to the residents.\textsuperscript{115} On 22 May General Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, “arrived in Raska at 1030… met first with the head of the Raska municipal assembly and then spoke with the citizens at the cinema hall.” General Pavkovic told his audiences that “Yugoslavia was at war,” and that the “defence of the country was a duty.”\textsuperscript{116} In the end, Belgrade took no action against the anti-war protesters.

Also during phase three, Moscow continued to consolidate its Kosovo policy and it became the tacitly sanctioned, but unofficial, mediator. In the third week of April, Moscow shut down the uncoordinated diplomatic activity that had marked earlier Russian efforts and appointed a single point of contact with the title “Special Envoy to the Balkans.” In the first 30 days of the conflict, no less than eight different high-ranking Russian Officials had visited Belgrade and had proposed radically inconsistent solutions to the conflict. However, on 2 May Russian President Boris Yeltsin called US President Bill Clinton and asked him to meet with his newly appointed Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin.\textsuperscript{117} Within two weeks Chernomyrdin had visited Washington, Bonn,

\textsuperscript{112} ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Bernhard Kueppers, “The People’s Unity With the Regime is Breaking Down,” \textit{Munich Sueddeutsche Seitung}, 21 May 1999, FBIS AU2105024299.
\textsuperscript{117} Jane Perlez, “Clinton to Meet With Russian Envoy on Balkans as Diplomacy Picks Up Pace,” 3 May 1999.
Paris, London, Brussels, and Belgrade and had given Russian Balkan policy a single, if somewhat pro-Western, voice.

Victor Chernomyrdin’s long time association with US vice president Al Gore and his active part in drafting the 7 May G-8 peace proposal did not go unnoticed in Belgrade. On 14 May, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj told a Belgrade television station that Belgrade was “disappointed in Russian diplomacy.”

**Phase Four (May 21 – June 10)**

NATO’s political objectives remained unchanged during phase four. Throughout this period NATO and Western government officials consistently quoted the G-8 peace plan and held firm to its objectives: 1) end of hostilities, 2) withdrawal of all forces from Kosovo, 3) return of all refugees, 4) international military presence in Kosovo, and 5) a political agreement based on the Rambouillet Accords.

NATO military objectives and strategy, however, were not so firmly rooted. In late May another round of the ground invasion debate kicked off between Western capitals. The last round had been silenced when NATO members found the subject so contentious that they all agreed to remove it from the formal NATO agenda in Washington. However, several ambiguous statements made by President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Albright in mid-May sounded the bell for another round of debate. After Clinton and Albright told reporters that: “all options are still open” for gaining victory over Serbia, German, Italian, and US Congressional leaders made immediate and categorical “declarations” that forced entry was not an option in Kosovo.

On 20 May German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder gave what reporters called a “blunt NO” to a ground-troop option in Kosovo. When asked to comment on President Clinton’s hint that a forced entry strategy was still an option, Schroder said: “the strategy

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of an alliance can only be changed if all the parties involved agree on it. I am against any change of NATO strategy.”

Italian foreign minister Lamberto Dini took a similar position when he said: “we must not even think about an intervention on the ground.”

The same day, US Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott said “it was all right if the 50,000 troops are a factor of peace, but not if they are a factor of war, in that case we will not authorize the President to use them.” In the end the NATO allies never initiated a ground option during phase four, but they did intensify efforts to coerce FRY leadership from the air.

NATO’s military objectives accelerated their phase-three shift from destroying Serbian military forces to coercing FRY leadership. Increasingly, NATO spokesmen used words like “pressuring” FRY leaders instead of “deterring” or “denying” the FRY’s military capabilities.

On 13 May, even NATO field commanders were speaking of “compelling” instead of “denying”. In his only interview during the conflict, NATO air Commander Lt Gen Michael Short told his interviewer that NATO must “strike at the leadership and the people around Milosevic to compel them to change their behavior in Kosovo and accept the terms NATO has on the table.”

NATO spokesman Jamie Shae was thinking in a similar vein when he told a group of reporters that NATO’s new targets were intended to pressure Milosevic. Finally, another indication of NATO’s shift to pressuring Serbia’s leaders was its support for the International War Crime Tribunal’s indictment of Milosevic on 27 May. NATO leaders welcomed the indictment because they said it would help make the FRY leader think about what he was doing in Kosovo.

NATO’s military strategy also continued its phase-three increase in effort. The increased effort was applied to all target categories; however, the increased effort against

125 “Two Months of Air Campaign Agaisnt Yugoslavia,” Belgrade BETA, 27 May 1999, FBIS AU2705143599.
strategic and Belgrade targets was especially significant. During the last week of May, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Yury Kotov, told a Russian newspaper that he “had not seen this scale of attacks” in Belgrade since the war began.\textsuperscript{126} During phase four NATO nearly doubled its daily attacks on the FRY. During phase three NATO jets attacked an average of 93 targets a day, but in phase four that average climbed to an astounding 163. A large proportion of this increase went into strategic targets located in the Belgrade area. Phase four accounted for only 39 percent of the conflict’s duration, but it accounted for 71, 66, and 56 percent of the leadership, electricity, and oil-reserve targets attacked.

Yugoslavia’s political objectives during phase four were dominated by Belgrade’s quest for a peace plan free of humiliation. Belgrade spent the last 31 days of the conflict slowing gravitating towards NATO’s demands. Starting in late May, heated rhetoric, calls for Russian support, and ultimatums vanished from state-controlled media.

On 20 May FRY officials started voicing their incremental acceptance to each of the G-8 proposals.\(^\text{127}\)

Using NATO’s demand for an international presence as an example, Belgrade’s official position went from “NO foreign Troops” in mid-May, to “UN Civil Mission” on 20 May, to “lightly armed” UN presence on 30 May, to “UN peace keeping force” with no restrictions on 2 June.\(^\text{128}\) Similarly, on the issue of troop withdrawal, Belgrade went from “partial withdrawal,” to withdrawal to “pre-war” troop levels, to complete “withdrawal” between 20 May and 3 June.\(^\text{129}\) This incremental acceptance of all the proposals ran until their complete acceptance of the G-8 peace plan on 3 June.\(^\text{130}\)

Unfortunately, the FRY military forces kept pursuing their objectives and strategy until their final withdraw from Kosovo on 10 June. In the first week of June the FRY military forces handed the KLA its biggest defeat of the conflict. In a futile attempt to show NATO and the FRY that they were still in the fight, the KLA launched its first and only major assault of the conflict. Operation ARROW, involving up to 4,000 guerrillas, was to drive into Kosovo from two points on the Albanian border, capturing control of the highway linking Prizren and Pec. However, even with NATO air support, the KLA could not overcome FRY artillery and maneuver forces, and the operation was defeated.\(^\text{131}\)

The defeat of operation ARROW was the FRY’s last military action in Kosovo. On 3 June an emergency session of the Serb Parliament voted unanimously to accept the G-8 peace plan. On 10 June FRY President Slobodan Milosevic used a televised address...
to tell his nation: “The aggression is over, peace has prevailed over violence…we have demonstrated that our army is invincible and the best in the world.”132 Within hours, NATO officials verified a FRY withdrawal from Kosovo and called a halt to the bombing.

On 12 June NATO Commanders signed a “military technical agreement” with the FRY commander in Kosovo, and NATO, UN, and Russian troops moved in to control the province—the air war was over.133 Large-scale violence and repression in Kosovo had ended, FRY forces were leaving, an international military presence was entering, refugees were returning, and NATO was implementing a political framework for Kosovo’s autonomy. In other words, all arguments to the contrary, by 12 June NATO had achieved its political objectives.134

134 Ivo H. Daalder, “Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo,” Foreign Policy, Fall, 1999.
Chapter 3

DENIAL THEORY

Denial theory accounts for nearly all the variance in the pattern of success and failure in the universe of coercive air campaigns.

Robert A. Pape, Jr.
Bombing to Win
1996

Operation ALLIED FORCE was a successful case of coercion. After 78 days of bombing, the FRY chose to act in a way that it otherwise would not have acted. On 10 June Belgrade withdrew its military forces from Kosovo, it allowed the return of all refugees, it permitted NATO-led military forces to occupy Kosovo, and finally, it agreed to negotiate a political settlement to the underlying cause of the conflict—Kosovo’s political autonomy. But, which theory of coercion, denial, punishment, or balance of interest, best explains this successful case of coercion? Do the facts of ALLIED FORCE best fit a denial, a punishment, or a balance-of-interest theory of coercion? Each of the next three chapters will compare a single theory of coercion with the facts of ALLIED FORCE to determine which theory is best supported.

This chapter will examine the fit between denial theory and the facts of ALLIED FORCE. First, it will define denial theory as articulated by one of its most ardent advocates Robert A. Pape. Second, it will compare denial theory’s basic tenets to the historical record of ALLIED FORCE. And third, it will apply the facts to a test Robert Pape derived for predicting the success or failure of denial-based coercion. If the facts of ALLIED FORCE fit denial’s basic tenets, and if Pape’s denial test predicts the

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operation’s success, this chapter will ascertain that the successful coercion in this case may have resulted from a denial mechanism.

**Theoretical Foundation**

Denial theory argues that the best way to manipulate an adversary’s cost-benefit decision calculus is to lower his expectations of attaining benefits.\(^{137}\) Returning to Robert Pape’s cost-benefit equation, denial theory contends that manipulating the adversary’s perception of probability of attaining benefits, \(p(B)\), is the surest means of convincing him that his costs will outweigh his benefits. In other words, the easiest way to convince a target-state that \(R\), the value of resistance, is less than zero—the theoretical point at which coercion occurs—is to lower its expectations of attaining benefits through its undesired course of action. Robert Pape argues that the other variables in the cost-benefit equation are beyond the control or are insensitive to coercer-state action.

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R = B \cdot p(B) - C \cdot p(C)
\]

- **R** = Value of resistance
- **B** = Benefits of resistance
- **p(B)** = Probability of attaining Benefits
- **C** = Costs of resistance
- **p(C)** = Probability of suffering Costs \(^{138}\)

For denial theorists the benefit of resistance, or the value of \(B\), is virtually beyond the control of a coercer. In *Bombing to Win*, Robert Pape states: an adversary’s perceptions of “benefits are not usually manipulatable by the coercer.”\(^{139}\) Pape contends that “since the coercer, by definition, poses a threat to the target state, it is in no position” to manipulate the value of benefits in an adversary’s decision making calculus. Denial

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\(^{138}\) ibid, 16.

\(^{139}\) ibid, 16.
theorists argue that the value target-states assign to benefits “tend to be fixed within the time of a dispute, because they emanate from pressure that changes slowly.”

Denial theorists also argue that C, the adversary’s cost of resistance, and p(C), the perceived probability of having to pay that cost, are insensitive to coercer action. Because coercion normally occurs during conflict, target states have already indicated the high value they place on benefits by entering the conflict. Hence, the level of cost they are willing to endure is generally beyond the coercer’s ability to inflict—short of using nuclear weapons. Robert Pape argues that modern nation-states are often willing to tolerate immense levels of cost to attain the benefits they seek. Therefore, by default, Robert Pape and other denial theorists believe the only efficient means for manipulating an adversary’s decision making calculus is to lower his probability of attaining benefits—p(B).

**Basic Tenets**

The first tenet of denial theory is that benefits are represented by a target state’s political objectives. If a coercer state can persuade an adversary that he can deny him his political objectives, the coercer has effectively lowered the adversary’s perceived probability of attaining benefits to zero. If the probability of attaining benefits is zero, then the value of benefits is zero and any cost, or probability of cost, the adversary expects to incur in the course of the conflict will outweigh those benefits; and coercion will be successful—R will be less than zero. However, because states exist in an anarchic environment, military force is the ultimate tool for attaining or denying political objectives.

The second tenet of denial theory is that a target state’s military strategy is its plan for attaining political objectives. Because military force is the ultimate guarantor of

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140 Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 16.
political objectives, the surest way of denying an adversary his political objectives is to frustrate his military strategy for obtaining those objectives. Until an adversary’s military strategy is denied, and its military can no longer take the objectives it seeks, the probability of attaining benefits is greater than zero. And, as long as \( p(B) \) is greater than zero an adversary will accept some unknown level of cost to attain the benefits he seeks. On the other hand, if his military strategy for attaining benefits is denied, an adversary has no probability of attaining benefits and any cost incurred will again outweigh the value of benefits.\(^{144}\) Pape argues that denial seeks “to thwart the enemy’s military strategy for taking” objectives, thereby compelling concessions to avoid incurring futile costs.\(^{145}\)

The third tenet of denial theory is that the best way to thwart adversary’s military strategy is to destroy his military forces, more specifically, his ground forces. Pape states that denial “entails smashing the enemy’s military forces, weakening them to the point where friendly ground forces can seize disputed territory.”\(^{146}\) Denial theory maintains that until the enemy’s ground forces are destroyed its military strategy is always feasible. Robert Pape writes: to “coerce” a state must “drive the enemy off disputed territory” and “occupy the territory itself…denial…can obtain concession only over the specific territory that has been denied to the opponent.”\(^{147}\) In conclusion, the basic tenets of denial are: (1) smashing a adversary’s military forces will thwart his military strategy, (2) thwarting his military strategy will deny him his political objectives, and (3) denying his political objectives will lower the adversary’s perceived probability of benefits to such a level that any cost incurred will outweigh potential benefits and coercion will occur.

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\(^{146}\) *ibid*, 69.

\(^{147}\) *ibid*, 31.
Tenets versus The Historical Record

If ALLIED FORCE supports denial theory the historical record should support the theory’s basic tenets. The facts of the conflict should indicate that NATO denied the FRY its political objectives, or frustrated its military strategy, or significantly damaged its ground forces.

An evaluation of the historical record indicates that NATO never denied the FRY its political objectives. Physical control of Kosovo—the FRY’s number one political objective—was never in jeopardy during the conflict. Neither the KLA nor NATO showed a military capacity to control Kosovo during ALLIED FORCE. As mentioned in Chapter Two, as early as 17 April, only three weeks into the conflict, the KLA no longer represented “a significant force in Kosovo.”\(^{148}\) And as late as 21 May, the KLA still only controlled a “thin strip of tree-covered mountainside” inside Kosovo. Only days before Belgrade’s capitulation, “FRY artillery and agile troops” soundly defeated the only major KLA offensive of the conflict, Operation ARROW.\(^{149}\)

Likewise, NATO forces never threatened Belgrade’s control of Kosovo. Even if NATO-members could have agreed on a forced-entry option into Kosovo, which must have seemed highly unlikely to FRY leaders, they would have had months of strategic warning. The day bombing ended, NATO had only 50,000 peacekeepers in the theater, nowhere near the 200,000 combat soldiers they themselves estimated they would need for a ground invasion of Kosovo.\(^{150}\) The US Joint Chiefs of Staff found the prospect of ground invasion so remote that the subject was not even on the agenda during their 2 June meeting with President Clinton—the only such meeting held during the conflict.\(^{151}\)

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British official told a western reporter after the conflict that the earliest NATO could have launched a ground invasion was early October—four months after the FRY conceded.152

Milosevic, had to consider the prospect of a NATO ground invasion. The man in Belgrade was probably aware that 50,000 NATO troops were in the region, and that US Army engineers were strengthening the only road between the Albanian port city of Durres and the interior of Kosovo.153 He was also obviously aware that US Army helicopters—Task Force Hawk—were stationed along the Kosovo border. Nonetheless, any NATO ground invasion was still months in the future when he decided to accept NATO’s terms.

When he decided to capitulate, NATO could not even agree to start planning for such an operation, let alone agree on actually launching one. Britain, who had promised the largest contingent to any potential ground invasion, had not even sent out the reserve call-up letters that would have been required to meet its promised troop strength.154 The French, while not flatly ruling out an invasion option, argued that there wasn’t time to prepare for invasion before the Balkan winter. And, Gen Clark did not get permission to strengthen the Albanian road to MA1A standards until three days before the Milosevic capitulated.155 Ergo, the idea that a four-month distant ground invasion had anything more than a slight impact on Milosevic’s decision making process seems remote.

The FRY’s second political objective, altering the ethnic makeup of Kosovo, was also never threatened during the conflict. When Belgrade mysteriously halted the refugee flow out of Kosovo, the overwhelming majority of the province’s ethnic Albanians had already fled their homes.156 On 19 May an estimated 796,743 ethnic Albanians had fled

to neighboring countries, while another 600,000 were displaced inside Kosovo. 157 The United Nations (UN) estimated that over 75 percent of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population had been displaced by 13 May. 158 Short of the unlikely NATO ground invasion or a KLA victory, NATO had no hopes of denying the FRY its ability to alter the ethnic makeup of Kosovo.

Similarly, a review of the facts indicates that NATO never thwarted the FRY’s military strategy—the second tenet of denial theory. At no time during the conflict did NATO even illustrate an ability to frustrate the FRY’s military strategy. The terrain, weather, and NATO’s self-imposed rules of engagement made Serbia’s guerrilla-style strategy of concealment, camouflage, and inactivity nearly impervious to NATO’s chosen instrument of force—air power. As then United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Commander General John Jumper remarked after the conflict, “We still don’t have anything that can find a tank under a tree [from the air]...it doesn’t work.” 159 NATO air power simply could not stop the guerrilla-style strategy employed by FRY forces inside Kosovo. 160 In the words of one former European defense under secretary: NATO and Serbian forces fought “two very different wars.” 161

In the end NATO was never able to credibly threaten the FRY’s military forces—denial’s third basic tenet. Even the most liberal estimates of FRY military loses in Kosovo are far short of a level that could be classified as smashed. For example, the US Air Force’s official estimate of FRY tanks “hit” in Kosovo was only 11 percent of the FRY’s total inventory. Less interested parties put the estimate of tanks destroyed closer to

2 percent.\textsuperscript{162} “Jane’s Intelligence Review,” with help from analysts on the ground, estimated that “about a hundred” tanks, artillery pieces, and armored personnel carriers (APCs) were destroyed in Kosovo by both NATO and the KLA. A figure that equates too less than 6 percent of the FRY’s total inventory.\textsuperscript{163} In either case, the FRY forces that withdrew from Kosovo were not seriously damaged. NATO officers in Kosovo during the FRY withdrawal called Serbian forces “tired…[but not] broken.”\textsuperscript{164}

In summary, the historical record suggests that the basic tenets of denial theory were not fulfilled in Operation ALLIED FORCE. NATO military forces never denied Belgrade its political objectives, thwarted its military strategy, or smashed its military forces. Pape himself states that denial-based coercion requires “the coercer to demonstrate the capacity to control the disputed territory”—something NATO never accomplished during the conflict.\textsuperscript{165}

\begin{center}
\textbf{The Pape Test}
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In his book \textit{Bombing to Win} Pape devised a test for predicting the success or failure of denial-based coercion. Applying his test to what he perceives to be the “universe” of cases in which air power coercion was used, Pape argues that his test successfully predicted the outcome in 37 out of 40 of these cases of coercion.\textsuperscript{166} In another attempt to determine if the outcome of ALLIED FORCE supports denial theory, the facts of the case will be submitted to Pape’s test. If the test predicts NATO success, the historical record can be said to support denial theory; on the other hand, if it predicts failure then we have further collaboration that denial fails to explain ALLIED FORCE’s success.

The first step in Pape’s test is to determine if the case in question is applicable to denial theory. According to \textit{Bombing to Win} this means the case study must meet three

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{163} Kosovo: a bomb damage assessment, “Janes Intelligence Review,” September 1999, 11.
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{ibid}, 13.
\textsuperscript{165} Robert A. Pape, \textit{Bombing to Win}, 31.
\end{footnotesize}
criteria. First, the coercer must demand the adversary “give up important interests.”

Pape defines these as “reductions in political aims, agreement to cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, or even surrender by states that retain the capacity for continued military operations.” ALLIED FORCE undoubtedly meets this criterion. Pape’s examples of important interests are nearly carbon copies of the agreement that ultimately brought the conflict to a close.

Second, the coercer must not “have a monopoly of power.” Pape defines monopoly of power as “domestic police actions or post-war concessions.” Even though FRY and NATO military forces were far from equal, ALLIED FORCE was clearly not a domestic police action or a post-war concession enforcement.

Third, the coercer’s threats and demands must be clearly identified. Pape points out that if the threats and demands are not clearly understood his test cannot determine whether a coercive failure was due to insufficient threats or to communication gaps. In the case of ALLIED FORCE, Belgrade was intimately familiar with both NATO’s threats and NATO’s demands. Richard Holbrook told FRY President Slobodan Milosevic two days before the bombing began: “You understand what will happen when I leave here today if you don’t change your position...[the bombing] will be swift, it will be severe, it will be sustained.” Milosevic responded, “No more engagement, no more negotiations, I understand that, you will bomb us.” Overall, ALLIED FORCE undoubtedly met all three of Pape’s criteria for a valid case study.

The second step of the Pape test is determining the adversary’s military vulnerability. In terms of the cost-benefit decision equation, military vulnerability represents the combined effects of benefits and probability of attaining benefits. According to Pape, military vulnerability refers to the target-state’s “expectations of

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166 Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 51
167 *ibid*, 48.
168 *ibid*, 48.
169 *ibid*, 48.
170 *ibid*, 50
172 *ibid*.
being able to take or hold the disputed territory with military force.”\textsuperscript{173} In regards to ALLIED FORCE, this amounts to whether FRY leaders expected to be able to hold Kosovo with military force.

Pape argues that military vulnerability is low if “there is some risk that the territory can not be held.” It is medium if controlling the territory “is definitely in jeopardy,” but the threat can be reduced by military measures. Military vulnerability is high if a successful defense of the territory cannot be assured, while very high means “the likelihood of loss of control over the territory approaches certainty because both defense and heavy attrition of enemy forces are impossible.”\textsuperscript{174}

Using Pape’s scale of low to very high the historical record indicates that the FRY military vulnerability was low during ALLIED FORCE. During the conflict FRY control of Kosovo may have been at some risk, but it was never definitely in jeopardy, or its defense unassured, or its loss a certainty.\textsuperscript{175} As mentioned above, at the time of Belgrade’s capitulation, the KLA’s only major offensive had been defeated and NATO was at a minimum four months away from a ground invasion. In the end, FRY military vulnerability must be coded as low throughout the conflict.

The last step of the test is to make the prediction. Pape states that his test predicts denial success if the target state’s military vulnerability is coded as high or very high, and failure if its coded as low or medium. Because the FRY’s military vulnerability was low throughout the conflict, Pape’s test incorrectly predicts ALLIED FORCE failure. However, since ALLIED FORCE was in fact a coercive success, Pape’s test indicates that denial theory fails to explain its outcome.

The historical record of ALLIED FORCE, overall, does not support denial theory. The facts do not support any of the theory’s basic tenets. NATO never denied the FRY its political objectives, it never seriously frustrated its military strategy, or significantly threatened its military forces. Additionally, Robert Pape’s own denial test incorrectly predicted the operation’s outcome. NATO successfully coerced Belgrade, but denial theory fails to explain why Serbian leaders complied with allied demands. Therefore we

\textsuperscript{173} Robert A. Pape, \textit{Bombing to Win}, 51.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{ibid}, 51.
\textsuperscript{175} Robert A. Pape, \textit{Bombing to Win} 51.
must look for some other coercive mechanism to explain the outcome of ALLIED FORCE.
In addition to seizing and holding, disarming and confining and obstructing, and all that, military force can be use to hurt. In addition to taking and protecting things of value it can destroy value. In addition to weakening an enemy military it can cause plain suffering.

Thomas C. Schelling
Arms And Influence
1966

If denial theory does not seem to explain the outcome of Operation ALLIED FORCE, perhaps an alternative theoretical framework will? This chapter interprets the historical record in terms of that alternative framework, punishment theory. In his book *Arms And Influence*, Thomas Schelling lays out the theoretical foundation of punishment theory and articulates five basic tenets against which this chapter will compare the historical record of the conflict. If the events in this case conform to Thomas Schelling’s basic tenets, this study will conclude that punishment theory provides an adequate explanation for ALLIED FORCE’s successful outcome.

**Theoretical Foundation**

As laid out by Thomas Schelling, the theoretical foundation of punishment theory rests on the adversary’s expectations of cost. Like Robert Pape, Schelling employs a linear cost-benefit decision calculus, but his punishment theory asserts that compellence occurs when the adversary realizes that the cost he is paying to resist the coercer inevitably outweighs any benefit he hopes to gain in resisting. Whereas denial argues that denying benefit is the key to manipulating an adversary’s cost-benefit calculus, punishment theorists argue that raising his expectations of future cost is the most efficient
means of reducing his resistance to coercive demands. As Thomas Schelling himself writes: punishment “is meant to raise the cost of not coming to terms.”

Basic Tenets

Schelling’s punishment theory can be reduced to five basic tenets. The first states that a coercer must inflict cost on those people in the target-state that have influence on the collective decision-making process. If a coercer wants to raise the level of cost in a target-state’s decision calculus, it must know where decisions are made in that state. Schelling argues: punishment must inflict cost on those people that “have influence on whether the war is continued or on the terms of a truce,” the coercer must know “who is in charge on the other side.”

But knowing who is in charge on the other side is only part of the story. The second tenet of punishment theory argues that the coercer must also know what those decision-maker(s) value and fear. In order to raise their evaluation of cost the coercer must threaten to destroy what they treasure. If he does not know what the adversary values, any attempt to raise his costs to the point at which they outweigh benefits will be inefficient at best and impossible at worst.

Punishment theory’s third tenet argues that, within the context of the cost-benefit equation, expectations of future cost is more important than past cost. This is not to say that past cost does not play a role in the adversary’s calculus, which will be discussed next, it is only to point out that punishment theory’s coercive leverage is heavily dependent on what the adversary’s expects in the future. Because past costs cannot be regained by a change in behavior, its value is largely irrelevant to an adversary’s decision calculus. However, because the adversary can avoid paying future costs by changing his behavior, these cost have the greatest coercive leverage. Thomas Schelling speaks directly to punishment’s third tenet when he says successful punishment “depends more

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177 *ibid*, 29, 176.
178 *ibid*, 3.
on the threat of what is to come than on damage already done… to be coercive, violence has to be anticipated and it has to be avoidable by accommodation.”

However, damage already done does play a part in punishment theory’s fourth basic tenet. That tenet argues that threatened cost is meaningless unless the coercer’s threats are credible, and credibility comes from cost already inflicted. This proposition creates a strange dialectic between past cost and future cost and gives punishment based violence a unique characteristic. The dialectic is the fact that credibility only comes from past destruction while coercive leverage only comes future destruction. A coercing power has to inflict cost to generate credibility, but once the cost is inflicted it has little coercive leverage. This strange relationship between past and future cost gives punishment-based violence its escalatory characteristic.

In order to maximize both credibility and anticipation of future cost, punishment theory argues that cost inflicted should escalate with respect to targets, geographical extent, or timing. Punishment theorists contend that escalating the level of violence and pain in any one of these regards will not only communicate the coercer’s political will and military capability, but will also maximize the value of cost the adversary knows it can avoid by capitulation. In short, escalating violence maximizes the adversary’s evaluation of cost.

Punishment theory’s last tenet argues that any traditional force-on-force military battle between the antagonists is largely irrelevant. Because punishment theory focuses on the adversary’s calculation of cost and not on his ability to take or hold benefits, force-on-force battles are academic. As Thomas Schelling himself argues: punishment is not about “seizing and holding, disarming and confining, penetrating and obstruction…[its about] cause[ing] plain suffering.” Nevertheless, in some situations force-on-force battles may be important, but only in terms of the value the adversary places on his military forces, and then only if the battles threaten to destroy a significant portion of

those forces. In these cases the traditional outcome of battle is still not important, but the threatened destruction of the target-state’s forces is.

**Tenets versus The Historical Record**

Starting with punishment’s last tenet first, the facts do seem to indicate that the traditional force-on-force battle was largely irrelevant to the conflict’s outcome. For one thing, neither NATO nor the KLA seriously effected the FRY’s military forces in Kosovo. Even Gen Clark had to admit after 2,375 air attacks, “if you actually added up what’s there on any given day, you might find out the he’s [Milosevic] strengthened his forces in there [Kosovo].”

More to the point, in the conflict's last thirty days, and after 6,076 air attacks, FRY security forces in Kosovo continued to both ethnically cleanse defeat KLA forces attacking from Albania. During the last month of ALLIED FORCE, over 40,000 ethnic Albanians were forced from their homes and fled to neighboring Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the KLA’s only major offensive of the war, Operation Arrow, was repulsed. Add to this the fact that NATO could only claim successful “hits” on 11 percent of the FRY’s inventory of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery, and it becomes evident that the traditional force-on-force battles were largely irrelevant to the conflict’s outcome.

The historical record of ALLIED FROCE also seems to fit punishment theory’s third and fourth tenets. NATO probably generated credibility and raised the prospect of future cost by escalating its level of violence with regards to targets, geographical extent, and timing. As the graphs and statistics from Chapter Two indicate, NATO broadened the types of targets it was attacking throughout the conflict. It progressively moved from strictly military targets during the first weeks of the conflict to a much heavier emphasis

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184 Air War Over Serbia Data Base (S), Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, A.L., Information extracted is unclassified.
on “dual-use” and strategic targets in late April until the conflict’s end in early June. The number of days between the NATO summit and the conflict’s end only represent 50 percent of the conflict’s 78 days, however, they account for 100 percent of the electricity, 87 percent of the leadership, and 58 percent of the oil production targets struck during ALLIED FORCE.

NATO also steadily increased it operational tempo throughout the conflict, and that probably contributed to NATO’s credibility and Belgrade’s expectations of future costs as well. The number of NATO’s in-theater air assets more than doubled between the conflict’s first and last week, while the number of targets attacked over the same period multiplied by over 450 percent. NATO attacked 259 targets during week one and 1,696 during week nine. Even in late May, Belgrade knew NATO’s bombing efforts had not reached their apogee. On 31 May a Serbian newspaper correctly reported that 36 additional US long-range “bomring planes” were enroute from the US to Turkey. The article’s author was reporting from the US and again correctly pointed out that these additional planes would give NATO the ability to attack Serbia from the east as well as the west.  

In addition to tempo and targets, NATO’s campaign also escalated in geographical extent. As NATO started to focus on strategic targets, and as the number of valid targets in Kosovo diminished, the bulk of NATO’s effort moved ever closer to Belgrade and northern Serbia. Once again, using the first week of the conflict as a benchmark, in the first seven days NATO only struck 28 targets north of 44 degrees north latitude, however, it struck 560 targets north of the line during the first seven days of May.

NATO also matched word with deed; as NATO’s violence escalated so did its rhetoric. During the first week of the conflict, FRY decision-makers heard NATO leaders say, “I don’t think you can characterize [the Administration’s goal] as total victory, that’s not what I’m asking for” and “we have no interest in destroying more targets in Serbia than is absolutely necessary. We dislike using power, really.”  

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the NATO summit and the resultant increased bombing effort, Serb leaders heard similar officials say, “the intensified bombing will make life so miserable to Mr. Milosevic…that Yugoslavia will see the light” and Mr. Milosevic “runs the risk that his entire country will be bombed into rubble.”\textsuperscript{188} Whether NATO deliberately escalated its violence and rhetoric or whether those changes were the product of cumulating force and frustration, the ultimate effect seems to have maximized the credibility of allied threats and persuaded Belgrade that it would have to pay substantial costs to continue resisting NATO demands.

The facts also indicate that ALLIED FORCE threatened what FRY decision-makers valued and feared, thereby fulfilling punishment theory’s fist and second tenets. Without knowing the exact dynamics inside the FRY government, it is hard to speculate where ultimate decision-making power and influence rested. However, three generic groups of decision-makers can be identified, and the facts do seem to indicate that NATO was able to credibly threaten what all three groups treasured.

At the top of the FRY decision-making pyramid was Milosevic and his inner circle of associates or, as some have called them, Milosevic’s capitalist cronies.\textsuperscript{189} NATO threatened what Milosevic himself valued by aggressively targeting the support structure of his regime. Starting in April, NATO actively targeted state-run media, internal security forces, Milosevic’s political party, and his personal residences. The first significant attack on Milosevic’s support structure was NATO’s 21 April attack on an office building in downtown Belgrade. The 23-story structure housed the offices and transmitters of four state-controlled television stations, Milosevic’s political headquarters, and the offices of his wife’s political party.\textsuperscript{190} Two days later, NATO also attacked Milosevic’s official residence only hours before he was to meet with Russian envoy Victor Chernomerydin; four cruise missiles destroyed Milosevic’s “bedroom, dining room, and living room.”\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{190} Steven Erlanger, “NATO Raids Send Notice To Milosevic: Businesses He Holds are Fair Game,” \textit{New York Times}, 22 April 1999.
Finally, during the last week of April NATO also attacked, for the first time, the downtown Belgrade offices of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior (MUP), and Army Headquarters.

Starting about the same time, NATO also began targeting the things that his capitalist cronies arguably valued. NATO inflicted cost on these cronies by destroying and threatening to destroy their industrial holdings. By the end of the conflict NATO had attacked the Smederevo steel plant, the Bor Copper smelting plant, several cigarette production facilities, and a host of other industrial targets that had little or no military value, but did, as one analyst put it, have the value of “pressuring insider ‘cronies’ to force Milosevic to end the war, because their economic interests were being damaged.”

NATO capitalized on the anticipatory value of these attacks by reportedly running a secret campaign called “Matrix.” Matrix “targeted Milosevic’s industrial cronies by calling in or faxing warnings that their factories would be bombed within 24 hours.” One source close to the operation told reporters that the Yugoslavs at the other end of the line were often unnerved, and responded with such comments as, “How did you find me?”

ALLIED FORCE also seems to have inflicted cost on lower ranking decision-makers by threatening the state’s economic well being. The damage inflicted on the FRY economic infrastructure was undoubtedly severe. Estimates of damages range from 20 to 100 billion dollars. Danitza Popvitich, a Belgrade economist, put the rebuilding price tag at 35 billion in US dollars. One group of FRY economists estimated that it would take 16 years for the FRY economy to recover to pre-conflict productivity. As a meaningful frame of reference, even Popvitich’s low-end estimate of

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35 billion in damages equates to three years worth of the FRY’s pre-conflict gross national product.  

Not surprisingly, this level of economic damage more than doubled the FRY’s unemployment rate and bankrupted the central government. By 7 June the FRY’s official unemployment rate stood at 30 percent, while some unofficial estimates put the figure much higher. By the end of the conflict the economy had come to such a standstill that the central government was unable to pay pensioners or army reservists returning from Kosovo in cash and had to resort to paying them with coupons.

This economic devastation, and the anticipation of more, seems to have motivated several mid-level Serb officials to openly pressure the central government to capitulate. Starting in the last week of April, Serb politicians started speaking out about the level of pain and suffering their country was bearing and about the long-term consequences of further damage. On 27 April, the former Mayor of Belgrade told an Italian paper: “There is no alternative…we must either accept, or pay with the country’s complete destruction.” The same day, Belgrade’s former deputy foreign minister told another reporter: “over 400,000 workers have lost their jobs because their factories have been destroyed by the bombs. This is collective punishment of a nation…Milosevic will be unable to explain why they must continue to suffer.”

Perhaps less intentionally, the conflict also inflicted cost on Serbia’s lowest level decision-makers—the population at large. It may seem strange to talk of the FRY polity as decision-makers, and undoubtedly this group had the least amount influence. However, their potential influence on governmental decisions should not be disregarded. They were the decision-makers that ultimately brought Milosevic to power through the ballot box in 1987 and used the same mechanism to kick him out of office in October of 2000.

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198 “I Do Not Think Milosevic Is Willing To Compromise, Interview with Zoran Djindjic,” Milan Corriere della Sera, 27 April 1999, FBIS FTS19990427000545.
199 “Interview with FRY Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic,” Rome La Repubblica, 27 April 1999, FBIS FTS19990427001339.
NATO’s air campaign threatened what this group arguably valued and treasured the most—their economic and physical well-being. Belgrade’s first and only public opinion poll taken during the conflict, in late May, indicated that over 96 percent of all respondents suffered “psychological problems caused by worry for their own future and the future of their families.”

The first tangible indication of this fear was the dwindling number of rock concert attendees in downtown Belgrade. At the beginning of the conflict, these state-sponsored concerts regularly drew more than 10,000 nightly attendees. By the end of April, however, the number of attendees had fallen to no more than a few hundred, many of them pensioners or teenagers with nowhere to go because schools were closed.

Part of this fear was surely caused by the economic hardships all of them suffered. The same bombs that inflicted costs on Milosevic’s cronies inflicted economic costs on the population at large. After the first 30 days of the conflict, the value of the dinar plummeted 10 percent, unemployment doubled, and many employees had their salaries cut in half.

In late May one Serb journalist reported that the average working Serb income had dropped to the equivalent of 90 US dollars per month. Even a state-controlled daily told a story of a professional-class working family in Belgrade that was forced to “borrow money…just to meet their food bill.”

However, NATO’s bombs did not only threaten their economic safety, several civil demonstrations indicated that NATO’s bombs also threatened the common Yugoslav’s physical safety. Starting in late May a number of civil demonstrations were held in the Serb towns of Drusevac, Aleksendrovac, Baljevac, Raska, and Cacak. Even

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though most of these demonstrations seem to have grown out of fear for the physical safety of army reservists in Kosovo, several of them voiced specific concerns over the safety of their town’s own inhabitants. For example, the demonstrators in Cacak formed their own people’s parliament and demanded that the local Army command station all military equipment outside the city in order “to prevent additional airstrikes.”205 This concern for personal safety was echoed when a Belgrade journalist said: “the message from the various demonstrations has been identical—namely that the war should be ended as soon as possible and the priority must be lives, not the political future of Kosovo.”206 As another Serb put it: “I did not realize the bombing would be so drastic, that civilians would be killed. I thought it would just be in Kosovo.”207 In the end, the facts strongly suggest that FRY decision-makers from top to bottom were suffering the cost of NATO’s military efforts.

In conclusion, whether by design or circumstance, the strategy NATO leaders employed in Operation ALLIED FORCE fulfilled the five basic tenets of punishment theory, and Belgrade’s behavior is consistent with the outcome that construct would predict. NATO’s escalating violence against the FRY seems to have generated fear in Yugoslavia by credibly threatening what decision-makers at all levels treasured. Serb testimony and behavior indicate that citizens feared economic ruin and physical danger, mid-level politicians feared state destruction, while Milosevic, or at least his inner circle of associates, feared a loss of power and industrial wealth. Finally, the historical record offers persuasive evidence that the traditional force-on-force battle between NATO and KLA forces and the FRY military did not play a role in Belgrade’s decision to capitulate. The facts indicate that Milosevic may well have chosen to capitulate because NATO was making further resistance so costly.

205 Bernhard Kueppers, “The People’s Unity With the Regime is Breaking Down,” Munich Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 21 May 1999, FBIS FTS19990520002104.
Chapter 5

BALANCE OF INTEREST THEORY

We recognize that the ultimate success may be determined by several factors outside the policy maker’s direct influence—or even that of his opponent.

Alexander L. George and William E. Simons
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
1994

The third paradigm of coercion is balance of interest theory. This theory is unique in that it goes beyond the parsimonious decision equation used in denial and punishment theory and takes into account the geo-political environment within which coercion occurs. In their book The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Alexander George and William Simons admit that coercion ultimately depends on an adversary’s calculation of his costs and benefits, however, they argue that nine contextual variables will largely determine if that calculation can be manipulated by a coercing power.208 Using George and Simons’ tenets and nine contextual variables this chapter will determine if the historical record and outcome of ALLIED FORCE supports the third paradigm of coercion.

At a fundamental level, balance of interest theory is not unlike denial or punishment. It views the adversary’s decision making process as a rational choice between cost of resistance and benefit of concession. George and Simons write that balance of interest theory assumes that the adversary will correctly evaluate the question whether the costs and risks of not complying will outweigh the gains to be expected from concession.209 However, instead of focusing exclusively on either the benefit or the cost side of an adversary’s calculus, balance of interest theory argues that both sides are vulnerable to manipulation. This holistic view of the cost-benefit equation alludes to the two tenets of George and Simons’ theory—the use of threats and accommodation.

The logic behind the use of threats is nearly synonymous with punishment theory. The coercing power manipulates an adversary’s decision equation by raising the cost and the threat of cost for non-compliance. George and Simons write: “the intent…is to back a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to persuade him that is in his interest to comply with the demand.”

Interest theory’s second tenet attempts to alter the adversary’s action by manipulating the benefit side of his decision calculus. However, instead of lowering the probable benefit of non-compliance, as is the intent in denial theory, balance of interest theory attempts to increase the benefit associated with compliance. Increasing the benefit of compliance, or in other words, accommodation can take the form of balanced quid pro quo or minor face saving concession. In either case the intent is to convince an adversary that he has more to gain from capitulation that he does from resistance.

These tenets of threat and accommodation give balance of interest theory a “carrot” and “stick” approach to coercion. George and Simons maintain that the art of coercion is in determining what combination and sequence of sticks and carrots a coercer should offer an adversary. They argue that what determines when, and if, carrots and sticks will have an effects on an adversary’s cost-benefit analysis is the geo-political environment within which they are applied.

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210 *ibid*, 2.
Contextual Variables

George and Simons describe coercion’s geo-political environment using nine unique contextual variables. The first variable, which is obviously outside the coercer’s direct influence, examines the type of provocation that triggered the conflict. George and Simons contend that a successful fait accompli, an internal upheaval, or irregular forms of aggression are extremely difficult for a state to stop or undo through coercion. On the other hand, clear attempts to alter the status quo through violations of recognized boundaries or flagrant disregard of international norms tend to be much easier to stop or reverse.\(^{212}\)

The second contextual situation considers whether the coercer is able to diplomatically and militarily isolate the adversary. George and Simons argue that the task of coercion is exceedingly difficult and complex when an adversary is supported diplomatically or militarily by external powers. In these cases coercive leverage must be applied to both the adversary and his external supporters if it is to be successful. Conversely, manipulating an adversary’s cost–benefit analysis is much easier if he is without the tacit or overt support of allies.

Whether the coercer is alone or part of a coalition also influences his ability to manipulate an adversary’s decision-making process. Balance of interest theory argues that “coercion is likely to be more difficult to carry out when it is employed by a coalition of states rather than by a single government.”\(^{213}\) Even though coalitions bring international pressure to bear on the adversary, their “unity and sense of purpose may be fragile.”\(^{214}\) If a coalition’s unity and sense of purpose is less than resolute, it will have difficulty articulating clear and consistent threats and offers of accommodation to the adversary.

Clarity of objective is balance of interest theory’s fourth contextual variable. Having a clear and consistent objective favors successful coercion for two reasons. First, it assists policy-makers in selecting among several response options; and second, it helps

\(^{212}\) *ibid*, 272.
\(^{213}\) *ibid*, 272.
\(^{214}\) *ibid*, 273.
persuade the adversary of the coercer’s strength of purpose. Both conditions add vital credibility to the coercing power’s use of threats and accommodations.

Another closely related contextual variable is the coercer’s strength of motivation. Balance of interest theorists are quick to point out that the coercer’s “motivation must be strong enough to encourage national decision-makers to accept the costs and risks inherent in steadfastly pursing a coercive strategy.” If strength of motivation is lacking, they contend, the coercer will find it very difficult to convince an adversary that threats, demands, and positive inducements are credible.

This lack of credibility can come from what George and Simons call asymmetry of motivation—their sixth contextual variable. If the coencer pursues ambitious objectives that go beyond its own important interests or its demands infringe on important interests of the adversary, the asymmetry of motivation will favor the enemy and make successful coercion much more difficult. However, the coencer can influence this asymmetry of motivation by either demanding only what is essential to protect its own self-interest, or by offering positive inducement that reduces the adversary’s strength of motivation.\(^{216}\)

Balance of interest theorists also assess the coercing power’s level of domestic and international support. They contend that domestic and international support directly influences what the adversary perceives to be the coencer’s strength of motivation. If adequate domestic or international support does not seem to exist, it will adversely effect the asymmetry of motivation between the antagonists and will diminish the adversary’s sense of isolation. In this sense, political support is not only important in its own right, but it also directly effects two other contextual conditions—strength and asymmetry of motivation.

The second to last contextual variable is clarity in the terms of settlement. George and Simons argue that, while clarity of objectives and demands are important, they may not suffice. In some cases, especially when the adversary is asked to concede important interests, it may be necessary to formulate specific terms regarding the terms of settlement. If the adversary perceives that the coencer has in mind a broader, more

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\(^{216}\) *ibid*, 281.
sweeping interpretation of the peace formula, or will be tempted to push for even greater concession after the initial agreement, he may not be able to rationally compute his costs and benefits. In these cases precise settlement terms may be required to for the adversary to rationally compute his aggregate costs and benefits of concession.

As in denial and punishment constructs, balance of interest theorists also argue that successful coercion depends on the unacceptability and credibility of threats. They content that coercion is more likely “if the initial actions and communications directed at the adversary arouse his fear of an escalation to circumstances less acceptable than those promised by accession to the coercing power’s demands.”\(^{217}\) In simpler terms, the more horrible and credible the image of future punishment, the more motivated the adversary will be to concede.\(^{218}\)

**Theory versus The Historical Record**

A close look at the historical record indicates that NATO not only used threats during the conflict, but it also made extensive use of accommodation. One of the more graphic examples of overt threats occurred during Richard Holbrook’s eleventh hour meeting with Slobodan Milosevic on 22 March. Holbrook was obviously attempting to raise Belgrade’s expectations that resisting NATO demands would be costly when he told Milosevic: “You understand what will happen if I leave here today if you don’t change your position…It will start very soon after I leave…You know it’s 6:00 a.m. in Washington, people are getting up. I have to report to Washington.” Holbrooke further articulated his threat by telling the Serb leader, [military action] “will be swift, it will be severe, and it will be sustained.”\(^{219}\)

Less overtly, but no less obviously, NATO also used accommodation. When NATO changed its overarching demand from “sign the Rambouillet Accord,” to “agree to negotiate a political settlement based on the Rambouillet framework,” it was clearly


\(^{218}\) *ibid*, 272.

offering Belgrade what George and Simons call a “face saving concession.”

Moreover, NATO offered a more substantial inducement when it removed from the final peace plan all reference to a Kosovo referendum and explicitly stated that the final political solution for Kosovo would take into “full account the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the FRY.

Unlike NATO’s use of threats and accommodation, determining how George and Simons’ contextual variables factored into the conflict’s outcome is somewhat more difficult. Taken as a whole, the geo-political context in which NATO was forced to operate seems to have favored the FRY during the early phases of ALLIED FORCE. However, either through deliberate action or unintentional consequence, the international environment seems to have shifted in favor of NATO as the conflict progressed.

The first contextual condition seems to have shifted in favor of NATO because of subsequent FRY military action in Kosovo. When the conflict started, Belgrade’s provocation favored Serbia. Kosovo’s internal upheaval and the FRY’s irregular aggression against the KLA and its civilian support structure was, as George and Simons point out, extremely difficult to reverse or stop. However, after the FRY initiated Operation HORSESHOE, their provocation turned into “clear attempts to alter the status quo…and flagrant disregard of international norms.” Both of which gave the coercing power legitimacy and helped add coercive leverage to its demands. In the end, through its own action, Belgrade shifted balance of interest theory’s first contextual variable in favor of NATO.

For similar reasons the theory’s second contextual condition also shifted in favor of NATO. Early in the conflict ALLIED FORCE suffered from the limitations of coalition-based coercion. Even though NATO could devote the resources of 19 nations to the task, its unity and sense of purpose was less then resolute. NATO solidarity and

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credibility were in doubt both in Belgrade and NATO capitals because ALLIED FORCE was clearly outside the official NATO mandate and it was an out-of-area operation.

However, the alliance’s WAashigton and G-8 summits turned NATO’s weaknesses into what The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy calls coalition strengths. The Washington summit provided NATO with a much-needed forum to demonstrate its unity and sense of purpose. Any thought that less-resolute members did not support the alliance’s actions over Serbia was diminished by the summit’s Head OF State Communiqué, which, as mentioned earlier, clearly articulated NATO’s purpose and objectives. The G-8 summit had a similar effect on the non-NATO members of the G-8—specifically Russia. Any idea that Russia did not support NATO was diminished by the G-8’s post-summit peace plan that was a virtual carbon copy of the Washington summit communiqué.222 Even if these summits did not completely extinguish doubts about NATO’s sense of purpose or unity, they at least minimized the perception that NATO was on the verge of collapse.

The G-8 summit also increased Belgrade’s sense of isolation—balance of interest theory’s third contextual condition. In the early stages of ALLIED FORCE, NATO’s efforts to compel the FRY to comply with its demands were complicated by the fact that Belgrade believed that Russia, as well as other countries, would rally around Serbia.223 Belgrade was convinced that countries outside NATO would see an attack on Serbia as it did, an American and NATO grasp for European hegemony. This belief in outside support is highlighted by an 18 March public opinion poll that indicated 62.5 percent of Serbs believed Russia would defend Yugoslavia in the event of war with NATO.

However, after Russia signed onto the G-8 peace plan, and the hopes of third-party support evaporated with the passage of time, Belgrade had to admit to its own diplomatic and military isolation. On 27 April, the FRY Deputy Prime Minister told reporters: “We must tell the Serbs the truth…We are on our own. And it is impossible to

wage war on the whole world.” Belgrade’s evolving sense of isolation undoubtedly helped NATO manipulate Serbia’s cost-benefit analysis.

Balance of interest theory’s fourth contextual variable also shifted in favor of NATO as the conflict progressed. In the early stages of the conflict NATO was unclear about its objective. Strobe Talbott told a interviewer after the conflict that NATO’s objectives lacked clarity because “you had the European Union setting a set of conditions, you had the G-8…setting conditions, the United Nations, particularly Secretary General Annan was saying things, and then you had NATO taking its own position.” But ironically, Belgrade’s own actions, along with the Washington summit, clarified NATO’s objective and swung this contextual variable in favor of the allies.

Before the FRY expelled hundreds of thousands men women and children from Kosovo, NATO found it difficult to consolidate 19 different political agendas and financial interests into a clear set objectives. But after the FRY embarked on its ethnic cleansing, humanitarian concerns became the foundation upon which NATO could build a unanimous set of objectives. By mid April, after Serbian atrocities became undeniable, public opinion polls in Italy, Germany, and France indicated a surge in public support for military action against Serbia. For example, in Italy alone, public support for military action went from 27 percent in late March, to 40 percent in early April, to an astounding 62 percent by 12 April.

But if the ethnic Albanian refugees gave NATO a clarified objective, it took the Washington summit to officially articulate it. As Strobe Talbott said after the conflict, the NATO summit “closed the gaps that existed among the various parts” which had allowed Milosevic “to finagle and maneuver.” Proof of this post-summit clarity of objective is the fact that the demands articulated in the Head OF State Communiqué were virtually identical to those articulated in the G-8 plan and to those officially accepted by Belgrade on 3 June.

224 “Interview with FRY Deputy Minister Vuk Draskovic,” Rome La Repubblica, 27 April 1999, FBIS 19990427001339.
Not surprisingly, the Albanian refugee flow also helped balance of interest theory’s fifth contextual variable swing in favor of NATO. George and Simons point out that “a coercing power must be sufficiently motivated…to encourage…decision makers to accept the costs and risks inherent in steadfastly pursuing a coercive strategy.”

They argue that if the perception of important interest is not present, the coercing power will find it difficult to communicate the level of credibility required for successful coercion. The facts indicate that NATO suffered from this exact problem early in the conflict.

Throughout late March and early April, NATO officials made public comments that brought NATO’s level of interest and credibility into question. An example of NATO level of interest in Kosovo was seen in President Clinton’s late March comment: “I don’t intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.” Or when he told a group of German reporters on 6 May, “It’s not a conventional thing, where one side’s going to win and one side’s going to lose.” Later, a NATO official reportedly said, “Nobody but the people who live there [Kosovo] have real interests.” However, the alliance’s level of interest, and more importantly its perceived level of interest, increased dramatically when the harrowing stories of Serb atrocities became public, and NATO’s own long-term credibility and viability became an issue. As many post-Kosovo analysts have stated, the FRY decision to create Europe’s largest population migration since WW II was its greatest strategic blunder because it gave NATO the moral high ground and a unifying objective.

In addition to the moral high ground, several other factors allowed an asymmetry of motivation to development between NATO and the FRY. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy points out that the “relative motivation of the two sides plays an important role in determining the outcome.” Asymmetry of motivation is based on each side’s conception of what it has at stake in the dispute, and the importance each side attaches to the interests engaged. George and Simons argue that a coercer can influence the

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asymmetry of motivation by: (1) demanding of the opponent only what is essential and by making demands that do not engage his vital interests, and (2) offering incentives that reduce the adversary’s motivation to resist demands. Arguably by design, NATO swung asymmetry of motivation in its favor by engaging in both techniques.

NATO’s phase one demands undoubtedly engaged Belgrade’s vital interests. When NATO demanded Serbia unconditionally accept the Rambouillet, it was asking Serbia to cede temporary sovereignty and risk permanent sovereignty over the part of Serbia that most Serbs considered sacred. Annex B to the Rambouillet agreement gave NATO’s implementation forces sovereignty over all of the FRY. Paragraph eight of Annex B demanded:

NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.

Provisions of Annex B may have been temporary, however, the provisions called for in Chapter 8 were regarded as permanent by FRY officials. Paragraph 3 of Chapter 8 called for a “mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts… and the Helsinki Final Act.” The paragraph may have been written in “legalese,” but most FRY officials considered it a demand for Kosovo’s self-determination and independence. Given the fact that most Serbs considered Kosovo the cradle of Serbian culture and the fact that Slobodan Milosevic had based his entire political career on Serb domination of Kosovo,

232 *ibid*, 280.
it is not surprising that the FRY had a motivational advantage over NATO during the conflict’s early stages.\textsuperscript{234}

However, this asymmetry began to change in favor of NATO by phase-three of the conflict. NATO’s level of interest began to climb as news of Serb atrocity became public and the prospects of NATO “defeat” became less remote. As the international community became aware of the plight of Kosovo’s Albanian refugees, NATO felt compelled to end the conflict and get the refugees back to their homes before the Balkan winter set in. Additionally, fearing a NATO defeat would eventually fracture the alliance, NATO officials began viewing Kosovo as a battle for the alliance’s long-term survival.

As NATO’s level of interest peaked, it took active steps to lower Belgrade’s level of interest by its leaders incentives to cooperate with allied demands. The G-8 peace offered Belgrade three concessions. First, unlike the Rambouillet Agreement, it stated that the future autonomy of Kosovo would take into full account “the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of…other states in the region.” Rambouillet had mentioned the territorial integrity of the FRY, but the G-8 plan’s awkward reference to the territorial integrity of “other states in the region” was clearly intended to serve as a carrot.\textsuperscript{235} Second, it specifically called for “the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).” Unlike Rambouillet, which only explicitly called for the demilitarization of “regular army and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) forces in Kosovo,” the G-8 peace plan conspicuously called for the “demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army.”\textsuperscript{236}

And finally, the G-8 peace plan offered further incentive by raising the prospect of post-conflict economic aid, something not found in the Rambouillet text. The G-8 plan did not specifically mention aid to Serbia, but it clearly put economic aid on the table by offering a “general approach to the economic development of the crisis region, [in order]…to advance…economic prosperity.”\textsuperscript{237} The results of a 7 May public opinion strongly suggest that all three of NATO’s incentives had some impact on Belgrade’s level of interest. By the first week in May over half of the Serb population indicated that they were now willing, for the first time, to accept foreign occupation troops in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{238}

FRY brutality in Kosovo also seems to have shifted a related contextual variable in favor of NATO—adequate domestic and international support. George and Simons argue that “a certain level of political support at home is needed for any serious” coercion.\textsuperscript{239} They point out that if the coercer’s constituency does not “have much interest in the situation,” or “does not back their leader’s position” it can potentially weaken the coercer’s credibility to such a level that coercion becomes exceedingly difficult. NATO suffered from this exact problem until Serb atrocities galvanized public opinion in most NATO countries. An analysis of NATO-state public opinion polls indicates that NATO had less than overwhelming public support during the early days of the conflict, however, starting in early April, public opinion began to favor NATO’s application of force in Kosovo.

In late March, public opinion polls in Italy, Britain, and France indicated that only 25, 38, and 59 percent of the respective populations supported NATO’s use of force in Kosovo. However, after the international community became aware of the results of Operation HORSESHOE, public support for ALLIED FORCE shot up to 62, 70, and 70 percent in the same three countries. Such a dramatic increase in public support must have

\textsuperscript{238} “Poll Suggests 75% of Yugoslavs Favor Unarmed Monitors,” Belgrade Tanjug, 7 May 1999, FBIS 19990507000473.
\textsuperscript{239} Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 284.
helped NATO agree on a more aggressive military strategy, and undercut any FRY hope for fracturing NATO by way of international sympathy.\textsuperscript{240}

Balance of interest theory’s eighth contextual variable is clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy argues that if the coercer’s demands are extreme, the adversary will want precise settlement terms to safeguard against the possibility that the coercer has in mind a borderer interpretation of the peace plan. Once again, the facts seem to indicate that this contextual variable shifted in favor of NATO as the conflict progressed.

Starting with the NATO summit and concluding after the G-8 summit, the alliance’s demands and terms of peace became much more concrete and well-articulated. As previously stated, NATO’s demands in the early stages of the conflict were inconsistent and nebulous. Recalling from Chapter Two, depending on the day or the nationality of the NATO official, FRY leaders heard “sign Rambouillet,” to “agree to a Rambouillet-like agreement,” to “agree to negotiate on a political solution based on the Rambouillet framework.” But once NATO officials articulated their demands in the Heads OF State Communiqué, and once Russia signed onto to those demands at the G-8 summit, the alliance’s terms of settlement became clear and consistent. The Washington summit formulated what George and Simons called “specific terms regarding the termination of the crisis,” while Russia’s G-8 concurrence “safeguard[ed] against…greater concession”\textsuperscript{241}

Finally, balance of interest theory’s last variavle also came to favor NATO in the conflict’s closing days. George and Simons argue that coercive success depends on the unacceptability and credibility of the coercer’s threats. Unfortunately for NATO, its pre-conflict and phase one threats were not credible or unacceptable. Having seen ten years worth of US air strikes in Iraq and the results of US action against Afghanistan and Sudan, Belgrade probably believed they had little to fear from daily or one-time air


\textsuperscript{241} Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, \textit{The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy}, 284.
attacks. NATO credibility probably also suffered from a French informant that reportedly told Belgrade that NATO war plans only called for light attacks.\(^{242}\) After the conflict, Richard Holbrooke was quoted as saying, “my instinct tells me that he [Milosevic] got information via intelligence, from one of the NATO countries…that it [bombing] would be light.”\(^{243}\)

However, by the beginning of phase three, Belgrade could no longer doubt NATO credibility or deny the unacceptability of its military action. After 45 days of bombing, any analogy between recent US action against Iraq, Afghanistan, or Sudan and NATO’s action against the FRY clearly evaporated. After NATO began systematically destroying economic infrastructure and the personal property of Serbia’s elite, the word “light” no longer described NATO’s bombing efforts. As one Serb said after the conflict, “I did not realize the bombing would be so drastic.”\(^{244}\)

In conclusion, NATO either intentionally or inadvertently used balance of interest theory’s two basic tenets throughout the conflict. Threats were used to raise Belgrade’s cost of resistance, while accommodations were used to raise its benefits of capitulation. Clearly NATO actions affected both sides of Serbia’s cost-benefit analysis.

The theory’s contextual variables also seem to explain a great deal about historical events as they played out in Operation ALLIED FORCE. Surprisingly, the variables not only help explain the outcome, but they also help explain why the conflict lasted so much longer than most NATO officials predicted. In the conflict’s early stages, virtually all of the theory’s contextual variables suggested coercion would fail. For example, Belgrade was fighting an internal upheaval and it thought it was fighting for the territorial integrity of Serbia. All of this may have accounted for Milosevic’s reluctance to capitulate to NATO’s demands during the conflict’s early stages. But, after the FRY embarked on Operation HORSESHOE, NATO leaders met in Washington, and the Russians tacitly approved NATO’s demands at the G-8 summit, the geo-political context, as enunciated in George and Simons’ variables, seems to have shifted in favor of NATO. By the conflict’s later stages, balance of interest theory’s contextual variables suggested


\(^{243}\) Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 229.
coercion would succeed. NATO was fighting to stop ethnic cleansing and Belgrade realized it was no longer fighting against foreign occupation of Serbia. In the end, balance of interest theory not only fits the facts of ALLIED FORCE, it also seems to explain the timing of Belgrade’s capitulation.

Chapter 6

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.

Niccolo Machiavelli
The Prince
1538

Before reviewing the findings and implications of this study, we should consider some of its limitations. When asked why Belgrade finally accepted NATO’s demands after 78-days of bombing, Gen Wesley Clark responded: “You’d have to ask Milosevic, and he’ll never tell you.” Gen Clark’s retort highlights the greatest limitation of any study that attempts to ascertain the reasons behind a nation’s decision to capitulate. Without access to critical governmental archives and the personal correspondence of national leaders, any attempt to decipher a state’s decision-making rational is somewhat speculative to say the least. In the case of ALLIED FORCE, the job of disentangling Serbia’s collective decision-making process is made all the more difficult by its xenophobic nature, authoritarian regime, and state-controlled media. Hence, one should not take the results of this study as the final word.

Neither should one over-generalize its conclusions. Anyone attempting to apply an Operation ALLIED FORCE template to other cases of coercion should fully understand its unique characteristics. One, the conflict was fought for limited objectives, at least from NATO’s perspective; two, ALLIED FORCE was an attempt to coerce a international pariah; Belgrade had no overt diplomatic or military allies; and three, it was a conflict between grossly mismatched adversaries; Serbia was a third-rate power, while NATO represented 19 of the World’s richest nations.

That said, neither should future strategists ignore the lessons of ALLIED FORCE. America’s lack of a peer competitor, its public’s aversion to casualties, and its government’s self-proclaimed concern for human rights, all indicate that its armed forces will increasingly be called upon to use airpower where only peripheral interests are at stake. A 1996 RAND study came to a similar conclusion when it stated, “many post-Cold War security threats post at most an indirect…risk to vital U.S. national interest,… [therefore,] airpower is…an attractive coercive tool because the amount of force employed can be discrete and limited, resulting in relatively few casualties on either side.”

Hence, instead of repeating NATO’s trials and tribulations over Serbia, future strategists should cautiously learn from its use of airpower to resolve a humanitarian concern.

Without a near peer competitor on the strategic horizon, America’s policymakers will increasingly look too coercive, rather brute-force, solutions to their political problems. Additionally, the American public’s aversion to casualties will also force the military into limited rather than unlimited applications of military power. And finally, the US government’s proclaimed interests in securing human rights will also put increased pressure on the military to use restrained rather than unrestrained military strategies. Under these geo-political conditions, the US military will inevitably find itself in more, not less, Kosovo-like operations for the foreseeable future.

Conclusions

This study set out to discover which coercion theory—denial, punishment, or balance of interest—best explains the outcome of Operation ALLIED FORCE. After interpreting the historical record through the lenses of all three theories, this study found the facts of ALLIED FORCE consistent with not one, but two different coercion theories. The first theory that proved consonant, and seems to explain the conflict’s outcome, is Thomas Schelling’s punishment theory.

246 Danial Byman, Matthew C. Byman, and Eric C. Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument (Santa Monica C.A.: RAND 1999), 2, 3.
Schelling, in his book *Arms And Influence*, writes that punishment theory is based on five tenets: (1) identify the adversary’s national level decision-makers, (2) threaten what those decision-makers value, (3) expectations of future cost are more important than costs already suffered, (4) escalating violence maximizes credibility and expectations of future costs, and (5) the traditional force-on-force battle is largely irrelevant. After applying the facts of ALLIED FORCE to Schelling’s five tenets, Chapter 4 of this study found punishment theory completely consistent with the conflict’s outcome.

First, the traditional force-on-force battle between the antagonists was largely irrelevant to the conflict’s eventual outcome. The traditional land battle between both the KLA and NATO and the FRY forces in Kosovo had no perceivable impact on Belgrade’s decision to capitulate. Second, NATO’s bombing escalated with regards to targets, geographical extent and operational tempo. Finally, NATO threatened what FRY decision-makers at all levels valued and treasured. The alliance threatened what Slobodan Milosevic, his cronies, mid-level government officials, and the Serb population at large valued, their power, their economic well-being, and their personal safety.

However, not only did Thomas Schelling’s punishment theory help explain the outcome of Operation ALLIED FORCE, this study also found Alexander George and William Simons’ balance of interest consistent with the facts.

In their book, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, George and Simons admit that coercion is based on an adversary’s rational calculation of future costs and benefits, but they contend that its ultimate success is largely depends on nine contextual variables that define the geo-political environment within which it occurs. They argue that the geo-political context plays the dominant role in determining if a coercer can manipulate an adversary’s decision making-process through the use of threats and accommodation. After viewing the historical record through the lenses of George and Simons’ nine variables, this study found that the facts where not only in agreement with balance of interest theory’s contextual variables, but that they also helped explain the timing of Belgrade’s capitulation. Chapter 5 of this study found that all nine contextual variables favored Belgrade during the conflict’s early stages, but then shifted in favor of NATO as it progressed.
Two of the contextual variables—type of provocation and international support—shifted in favor of NATO because of a strategic blunder on the part of Belgrade. Before Operation HORSESHOE—Serbia’s military efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo—Belgrade’s military actions in Kosovo were meant to quell an internal upheaval and NATO lacked overwhelming international support. Both of which, George and Simons argue, make successful coercion exceedingly difficult. However, once Belgrade embarked on large-scale ethnic cleansing, NATO’s international support skyrocketed and Serbia’s provocation became a “flagrant disregard of international norms,” which George and Simons argue adds to a coercer’s leverage.247

NATO played a bigger role in shifting the other seven variables in its favor. Clarity of objective and clarity of demand were two variables that shifted in favor of NATO after the alliance’s Washington summit. George and Simons argue that opaque objectives and demands dilute a coercer’s credibility and limit the adversary’s ability to rationally compute costs and benefits. Before the NATO summit the alliance’s objectives and demands where anything but clear. However, NATO’s post-summit Heads Of State Communiqué changed this by clearly and concisely articulated what NATO wanted and what Belgrade had to do to stop the conflict.248

The communiqué also deleted any requirement for the FRY to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. This had the effect of shifted two other contextual variables in favor of NATO—strength of motivation and asymmetry of motivation. Because Belgrade ostensibly believed Rambouillet called for Kosovo independence, Serbia had a motivational advantage over NATO; the FRY was fighting for vital national interests while NATO was fighting for limited interests. Therefore, when NATO’s communiqué removed the requirement for Serbia to “sign Rambouillet,” the antagonists’ strength of motivation and asymmetry of motivation shifted, relatively, in favor of NATO.

Balance of interest theory’s last three variables shifted in favor of NATO after the G-8 summit. Before the G-8 summit, Moscow’s sympathies were still a matter of debate. However, after Russia joined its G-8 partners in proposing its own Kosovo Peace Plan

that was a virtual copy of the Heads Of State Communiqué, Serbia could no longer
delude herself with the idea that Russian support was forthcoming, or that Russian
diplomatic pressure might fracture the NATO alliance. After Moscow tacitly approved
of NATO’s operations by agreeing with the G-8 peace plan, Serbia was unquestionably
isolated diplomatically and militarily, and NATO’s credibility and solidarity had renewed
vigor. Overall, the G-8 summit shifted George and Simons’ last three contextual variables
in favor of NATO, it diplomatically and militarily isolated the target-state, it strengthened
the coercer solidarity, and it gave credibility to the coercer’s threats.

In sum, the facts of ALLIED FORCE are congruent with balance of interest
theory. The theory’s contextual variables not only fit the historical record, but they also
seem to help explain the timing of Belgrade’s capitulation.

Conversely, this study found that denial theory fails to explain the outcome of
ALLIED FORCE. In Bombing to Win, Robert Pape argues that denial-based coercion is
based on three tenets: (1) smashing an adversary’s military forces will thwart his military
strategy, (2) thwarting his military strategy will deny him his political objectives, and (3)
denying his political objectives will lower his perceived benefits of resistance to such a
level that coercion will occur. However, after analyzing the facts of ALLIED FORCE
within the context of Pape’s tenets, this study found no correlation between the theory
and Belgrade’s capitulation.

First, the FRY’s political objectives were never seriously threatened during the
conflict. Neither the KLA nor NATO could deny Serbia the ability to control Kosovo or
alter its ethnic makeup. Second, NATO never thwarted the FRY’s military strategy for
achieving its political objectives. Throughout the conflict, FRY forces continually
defeated KLA forces and expelled ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. And finally, NATO
was never able to put the FRY’s military forces at risk. Even after 6,076 bombing attacks,
Serb forces were tired but not broken when they withdrew from Kosovo on 10 June.²⁴⁹
Ergo, denial theory can not explain ALLIED FORCE’s outcome.

²⁴⁸ NATO Press Communiqué, Statement on Kosovo, 23 April 1999, Available on-line:
Why Two Theories?

Since the intent of this study was to use a single historical case to support a single theory of coercion, an analysis of the theories should help explain how two different theories can be consistent with the same historical record. Put differently, how can ALLIED FORCE support both punishment and balance of interest theories?

In reviewing the two theories, it seems punishment and balance of interest theories are not mutually exclusive. Punishment is largely a prescriptive, operational-level theory, while balance of interest is mainly a descriptive geo-political-level theory. Punishment is prescriptive in that it specifically addresses how to coerce an adversary by raising his cost of resistance above that of his expected value of benefits. Punishment is also an operational-level theory in that it focuses exclusively on the application of military force. In his book *Arms And Influence* Thomas Schelling goes into great detail describing how military force can be used to manipulate an adversary’s decision-making calculus. However, he devotes less attention to the geo-political environment within which coercion occurs or the other instruments of power that can be brought to bear on an adversary.

In this way, punishment is much like denial: both are prescriptive and directed at the military-level of coercion. But instead of prescribing the use of military force to raise an adversary’s expectations of cost, denial theory advocates using it to lower his expectations of future benefits. Denial theory argues that a coercer must lower a target-state’s expectations of benefits by thwarting its military strategy. Not only that, denial goes as far as to prescribe exactly which enemy targets, once destroyed, will convince an enemy that his expected benefits are not worth his expected costs. Denial theory, as articulated by Robert Pape, goes into great detail about how to use military force, but it largely ignores the geo-political environment or the potential of other instruments of national power.

On the other hand, balance of interest is a descriptive theory that addresses strategy at the geo-political level. Whereas denial and punishment prescribe how a

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coercer can manipulate an adversary’s cost-benefit calculus, balance of interest describes the geo-political environment within which coercion is likely to succeed. In their book *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, George and Simons give the preponderance of effort to describing the geo-political conditions which either help or hinder a coercive effort, and the actions a coercer can take to tilt these contextual variables in his favor. The authors freely admit that an enemy’s cost-benefit equation must be manipulated to alter his behavior, however, they see the success of that manipulation largely dependent on the favorability of the strategic context.

In this sense balance of interest theory is a stand-alone political-level theory of coercion, while denial and punishment are opposing military-level theories. Balance of interest theory describes when an enemy’s cost-benefit calculus is likely to be vulnerable, while denial and punishment prescribe how to manipulate it. Viewing the three theories from this perspective, it seems natural that a successful case of coercion would support two theories of coercion, one pertaining to the geo-political environment, balance of interest theory, and the other prescribing the use of military force, either denial or punishment.

**Why Punishment and Not Denial?**

If punishment and denial are the only competitive theories among this study’s three theories, why does punishment, and not denial, explain the outcome of ALLIED FORCE? Why did punishment seemingly effect Belgrade’s decision-making process, but denial did not?

In *Bombing to Win*, Robert Pape persuasively argues that “punishment does not work.” He contends that when an adversary is fighting for important interest and a coercer is limited to conventional weapons, punishment does not work. His argument is that target-states fighting for important interest are willing to accept extreme levels of punishment, conventional weapons can not generate extreme levels of punishment, and that escalation actually reduces essential “credibility because the coercer’s restraint tends

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to be attributed to political constraints rather than free strategic choice.” However, contrary to this argument, this study found that even when the FRY was fighting for important interests and NATO was limited to conventional weapons, punishment was a viable strategy.

In the case of Operation ALLIED FORCE, punishment worked because given Serbia’s vulnerabilities, NATO was able to capitalized on Thomas Schelling’s prescriptive tenets. The alliance threatened what Milosevic valued, his position of power and personal safety, what his inner circle of capitalists cronies valued, their economic holdings, and what mid-level politicians and the Serb population valued, their economic and physical well-being. Additionally, NATO’s strength and size also enabled it to credibly threaten future cost by continually escalating the conflict. The alliance expanded the conflict with respect to targets, geographical extent, and operational tempo.

Nonetheless, NATO’s capabilities were only half the story, the FRY’s vulnerabilities also played a role in allowing NATO to capitalize on punishment’s tenets. Because the FRY was a proto-democratic and capitalistic European country, the identity of its decision-makers and what they valued were not difficult to threaten. If the FRY had been a failed-state or pre-industrial society the task would have been significantly more difficult and punishment may not have been a viable coercive strategy. In the end, punishment worked in Kosovo because NATO’s capabilities and the FRY’s vulnerabilities allowed the alliance to capitalize on the theory’s tenets.

This study also found that denial was not a viable strategy given the characteristics of the antagonists. Robert Pape argues that “denial strategies offer more coercive leverage than punishment” if the target-state is fighting for important interests, it uses mechanized forces, and the coercer does not possess a monopoly of power. Here again, Pape’s conditions were present during ALLIED FORCE but denial was not consistent with the outcome.

In reviewing the historical record, this study found that denial was not a viable strategy during ALLIED FORCE because the FRY’s vulnerabilities did not allow NATO to capitalize on the theory’s prescriptive tenets. Given the alliance’s chosen instrument

\footnote{251} ibid, 21, 22, 28.
\footnote{252} Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 48-49.
of military force, self-imposed rules of engagement, and Kosovo’s weather and terrain, NATO could not deny Belgrade’s its political objectives, thwart its military strategy, or smash its military forces in Kosovo. In other words, denial could not work because the theory’s tenets did not match the antagonists’ characteristics. In the end, this finding does not prove denial theory invalid, it only suggests that under certain conditions denial is not a viable coercive strategy.

Implications

Too much should not be made of any one case study, however, these findings do point to three implications. First, at both the political and military level, balance of interest and punishment theory are more synergistic than they are competitive. Drawing sharp lines of distinction between these two theories may help scholars think, professors teach, and students learn about coercion, but it is assuredly stifling for those attempting to implement a coercive strategy against a real-world adversary. Much like air, land, and sea power should be seen as complimentary, this study suggests that balance of interest and punishment theory are more complimentary then they are competitive.

The second implication is that balance of interest theory is vitally important at both the political and military level of strategy for assessing the geo-political environment. At the political level, George and Simons’ contextual variables can help policy-makers assess the likelihood of coercive success and plan political courses of action that shift the greatest number of variables in the their favor. Even though some of these variables are potentially difficult to control, just understanding their existence can help political-level strategists understand the geo-political dynamics of coercion. For similar reasons, balance of interest theory is also applicable to the military strategist. Strategists at the operational-level have even less control of the theory’s contextual variables, but a firm understanding of their existence could help ensure military operations do not inadvertently tilt the geo-political environment in favor of the adversary.

The final implication of this study is that at the military-level of coercion the antagonists’ characteristics may play a decisive role in determining its success. This
study did not prove or disprove the validity of either punishment or denial theory, but it did indicate that for a coercive theory to work the antagonists characteristics must be congruent with its prescriptive tenets. In Kosovo, punishment did not work because it always works. The record indicates that punishment worked because the coercer’s abilities and the adversary’s vulnerabilities allowed it to work. In the same vein, this study did not disprove the validity of denial theory, it only suggests that when the adversary’s vulnerabilities and the coercer capabilities do not allow the coercer to capitalize on its tenets, it will not work. This suggests that military strategists should spend less time debating if punishment or denial can work and more time debating under which conditions they will work. In other words, future military strategists should spend less time debating the existence of square or round pegs and spend more time debating the shape of the hole.


Air War Over Serbia Date Base (Secret), Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Information extracted is unclassified.


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