AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

18 HOURS ON GREEN RAMP: AIR MOBILITY COMMAND’S
SUPPORT TO 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION READY BRIGADE

by

Scott A. Haines, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Ladonna A. Idell

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Report Type</th>
<th>Dates Covered (from... to)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01APR2001</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Title and Subtitle**
18 Hours on Green Ramp: Air Mobility Command’s support to 82nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade

**Author(s)**
Haines, Scott A.

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)**
Air Command and Staff College Air University Maxwell AFB, AL

**Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)**

**Distribution/Availability Statement**
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**Supplementary Notes**
The original document contains color images.

**Abstract**

**Subject Terms**

**Report Classification**
unclassified

**Classification of this page**
unclassified

**Classification of Abstract**
unclassified

**Limitation of Abstract**
UU

**Number of Pages**
49
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation JUST CAUSE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of This Study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Mission Type</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Aircraft</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container Delivery System</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Equipment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current DRB Airdrop Requirements</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope AFB Support Requirements</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station Capability</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Port/Aircraft Maintenance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Support</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN ROUTE SUPPORT STRUCTURE</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Aerial Port Squadron</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>743d Maintenance Squadron</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outload Operations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETERMINING READINESS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand Alone Exercises</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

Figure 1 DRB Deployment Timeline ................................................................. 2
Figure 2 The DRB Cycle ............................................................................... 8
Figure 3 C-17 Dual Row Airdrop ................................................................. 9
Figure 4 C-17 Personnel Airdrop ............................................................... 11
Figure 5 3 APS Personnel and C-17 Aircraft ............................................. 17
Figure 6 C-17 Crew Chief ......................................................................... 19
Figure 7 Proposed AMSG Organizational Structure for Pope AFB ........ 31
Preface

America’s Air Force Vision 2020 stresses the role of Air Force core competencies as building blocks for the effective utilization of aerospace power. Recently, the capability to effectively execute one of our competencies, Rapidly Global Mobility, has witnessed intense scrutiny at the national level. There is a growing concern over an apparent airlift shortfall to meet our wartime requirements. The National Command Authority relies heavily on Air Mobility Command’s ability to support rapid combat power projection.

For two years, from 1998-2000, I had the privilege of supporting a major piece of our national power projection puzzle, the 82nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Outload of the division occurs on the world famous “green ramp,” located on Pope Air Force Base (AFB) (collocated with Fort Bragg). During this time, I developed an intense respect for the troopers of the 82nd as they shuffled day after day, night after night, through rain, bitter cold and stifling heat, to awaiting aircraft on green ramp. This paper is a tribute to them, as well as to the airlifters who support them.

I owe a debt of gratitude to many people for their support during the past several months of research and writing. A heartfelt thanks to my wife Mary, and my children Scott and Naneva, for their patience and understanding. Additionally, Capt Dominic Clementz of the 743d Maintenance Squadron provided invaluable assistance in obtaining information direct from green ramp. Finally, a special thanks to my advisor, Lt Col Ladonna Idell, not only for her support, but also for expecting nothing less than 100 percent.
Abstract

Upon receiving a call from the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters, the 82nd Airborne Division issues an alert order to the on-call Division Ready Brigade (DRB). Within 18-hours of initial notification, elements of the brigade must be in the air. Success of the DRB depends on the Air Force core competency of rapid global mobility. Several years have passed since the National Command Authority (NCA) deployed the DRB in support of vital national interests. During this time, the military experienced a significant reduction in personnel, decline in forward presence, and problems associated with aging weapon systems. Understandably, issues such as these cause concern over Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) readiness to support the DRB.

Outload of the DRB occurs on green ramp, located at Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina. AMC, most notably the 43d Operations Group (OG) outload operations section, 3d Aerial Port Squadron (APS), and 743d Maintenance Squadron (MXS), provide most of this support. Are these units poised to support the DRB if a call came from the NCA today? This paper will address the DRB support requirements for these organizations, current methods for determining their readiness to meet these requirements (surprisingly inadequate), and conclude with recommendations for improvement.

The Air University Library, located at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, provided a majority of the research assistance and information for this project. Additionally, internet resources proved invaluable in providing background materials, technical data, and access to periodicals and local newspapers. Finally, the author relied heavily on personal experience, and the advice and
assistance of personnel stationed at Pope AFB, and Headquarters Air Mobility Command, located at Scott AFB, Illinois.
Chapter 1

Introduction

*Force does not exist for mobility, but mobility for force.*

―Alfred Thayer Mahan

Tucked quietly away in a corner of the Pope Air Force Base (AFB) flightline, is the world famous “green ramp,” described as a precious national asset by one recent wing commander. Since the Vietnam War, members of the 82nd Airborne Division have departed from here in support of many significant military operations. Unfortunately, the United States military is not the same force that fought so effectively in the deserts of Southwest Asia 10 years ago. For example, recent figures on current military airlift capacity project a shortfall ranging from 17 to 30 percent. This causes significant concern regarding our ability to support national security objectives. A vital readiness concern directly related to this issue is the ability of AMC units at Pope AFB to effectively support the 18-hour contingency deployment requirement for the DRB.

The Mission

An appreciation of the readiness challenge AMC faces when providing support for the DRB requires an understanding of the mission of the 82nd Airborne Division. This mission, simply stated, is as follows: “Deploy world-wide within 18 hours of notification, execute parachute assault, conduct combat operations, and win.” Upon receiving a call from XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters, the 82nd issues an alert order to the on-call DRB. Within 18-hours,
elements of the brigade must be in the air, in support of vital US national interests anywhere in the world. (See Figure 1) Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 52-weeks a year, a contingent of the 82\textsuperscript{nd}, identified as DRB-1, remains on alert. The division is built around three airborne brigades. Each brigade, in-turn, is based on a reinforced parachute regiment. A former commander, Major General James H. Johnson, aptly described the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division, as “the only US combined-arms force with a capability to conduct forced entry and secure an area, while building enough combat power to fight, sustain itself and win the initial battle.”

![Figure 1 DRB Deployment Timeline]  

The Air Force provides DRB airlift support in the form of Strategic Brigade Airdrop (SBA). Outload of the DRB occurs on green ramp. Pope AFB has been an asset of AMC since its transfer from Air Combat Command on 1 April 1997. Before the transfer, the 624\textsuperscript{th} AMSG provided primary support to the DRB. This organization consisted of three primary elements: command and control, 3d APS, and the 624\textsuperscript{th} MXS, operating under the umbrella of the AMC enroute system. Currently, support for the DRB is provided by the 43d OG en route support
section, 3d APS, and the 743d MXS. Despite maintaining similarities in organizational structure, the transition from ACC to AMC had an adverse affect on determining readiness to support the DRB. This will be discussed in chapters four and five.

**Recent Operations**

Joint Vision 2020 continues to stress the importance of overseas basing in meeting our national security objectives, but places greater emphasis on continental United States (CONUS) based power projection capabilities.\(^6\) The effectiveness of the DRB during recent operations reinforces current operational concepts espoused by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Two of the more notable conflicts supported by the 82\(^{nd}\) DRB were Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A brief overview of these operations provides a good point of reference before addressing issues affecting readiness on green ramp.

**Operation JUST CAUSE**

On 17 December 1989, an alert order was transmitted to the 82\(^{nd}\) utilizing an Emergency Readiness Deployment Exercise (EDRE) as deception cover. The rapidly deteriorating situation in Panama had convinced the National Command Authority that it was time to act. The final Air Force package supporting the DRB portion of onload operations on green ramp consisted of 51 C-141 aircraft (20 personnel, 28 heavy equipment, and 3 Container Delivery System (CDS) aircraft). There were minor problems during the initial phases of the deployment, compounded by the fact that the DRB had just changed from the 3d, to the 1\(^{st}\) Brigade. However, the DRB was loaded within 24 hours, with the first aircraft fully loaded in 10 hours.\(^7\) In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the air assault of Panama began, to include over 30 C-130 and C-141 aircraft dropping airborne troops.
President Bush had four primary objectives during JUST CAUSE: protect American lives, ensure the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties, bring General Manual Noriega to justice, and restore democracy to the country of Panama.\textsuperscript{8} An effective combination of airborne, helicopter, and ground assaults on multiple objectives quickly ended the hostilities. The early morning assault originated primarily from bases in the CONUS, and was the largest personnel airdrop since the Korean War, and the largest nighttime parachute assault in history.\textsuperscript{9}

**Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM**

Elements of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} began returning home from Panama in January 1990. However, their respite from operational deployment was short lived. In early August 1990, Iraq invaded and quickly overran Kuwait. As Iraqi armored divisions stood poised on the border of Saudi Arabia, the National Command Authority (NCA) debated America’s response. On 6 August, King Fahd requested assistance, and President Bush quickly responded. The logical choice for an initial response was a rapidly deployable, light ground force. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade of the 82\textsuperscript{nd}, on call as the DRB, was ordered to Kuwait. The first C-141 aircraft transporting the brigade was airborne less than 14 hours from official notification.\textsuperscript{10}

Elements of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} represented the first ground troops in Saudi Arabia, as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Consequently, they were assigned the task of protecting the airfield and ports needed to deploy U.S. and coalition forces. General Norman Schwarzkopf described the role of the brigade as follows: “The 82\textsuperscript{nd} was nothing more than a trip-wire force. It was a show of resolve, a way to say to the Iraqis if you run down the highway by the way you are at war with the United States.”\textsuperscript{11} The brigade accomplished its mission, and remained deployed in support of Operation DESERT STORM, the eventual ground war that resulted in the liberation of Kuwait.
Limitations of This Study

There are many organizations within the Department of Defense bearing responsibility for the success of the 82nd Airborne DRB. This paper is limited to a review of three organizations supporting green ramp operations at Pope AFB today: 3d APS, 743 MXS, and the 43d Og en route support section. Primary focus is on the current readiness of these organizations to meet support requirements as delineated by XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 82nd Airborne Division.

The success of the DRB concept during the two operations discussed above is well documented and hard to dispute. However, the simple reality that the United States military does not currently maintain the same robust capabilities that it did a decade ago is also hard to dispute. Not surprisingly, the force reductions and other developments of the past ten years resulted in significant changes to the organizations on green ramp. Consequently, the question arises: can these units still provide the required support for the DRB? In fact, do we even have a current system in place to measure the readiness of these units? These two questions represent the focus of this study.

Weapon systems procurement and aircrew training/availability represent two issues not addressed by this study. These vital topics require separate research. Finally, the DRB continues to stand ready to conduct forced-entry operations 18-hours from a cold start. In an era characterized by smaller force structures and an aging airlift fleet, the airmen of green ramp must ensure the DRB can effectively answer the call in support of national security objectives.

Notes


Notes

3 Orientation Handbook for Family Members of the 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, 1.


5 Briefing, 743d Maintenance Squadron, subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.


8 Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring, Panama: Operation Just Cause, (Institute for National Strategic Studies), 5.


Chapter 2

Current Support Requirements

_Leaped to their feet a thousand men, Their voices echoing far and near; “We go, we care not, where or when”; “Our country calls us, we are here!”_

—Author Unknown, 27 April 1861 (to the New York 7th Regiment)

Understanding the DRB process and the requisite support for green ramp operations represents a crucial first step towards determining readiness. As an example, airlift support requirements of the DRB vary depending on the nature of the operation. While performing as DRB-1, the assigned battalions have their own 6-week rotation schedule. (See Figure 2) One battalion is designated Division Ready Force-1 (DRF-1). Personnel pre-rig all DRF-1 unit equipment for airdrop, and then transport it to a pre-staging area where it awaits loading onto Air Force and/or Reserve Component aircraft. Preparation of the equipment conforms to a standard loading process, awaiting customization during the 18-hour sequence based on mission requirements.¹

By default, Air Force support requirements depend primarily on the nature of the contingency supported by the DRB. One of the most critical areas to consider is the many different aircraft mission types. This drives personnel training, equipment procurement, and other support requirements at Pope AFB for organizations supporting operations on green ramp. Clear identification of these requirements will help ensure development of effective methods to determine readiness to support the DRB.
Aircraft Mission Type

Mission planners base requirements on four primary load types: personnel, container delivery system (CDS), heavy equipment (HE), and airland. This affects many readiness issues, such as availability of aircraft, support equipment, and training for support personnel. Additional considerations include aircrew availability, command and control, aircraft parking, and numerous miscellaneous support functions. Strategic airlift and tanker aircraft combine to provide the capability to respond on a moments notice anywhere around the globe. The C-141, C-5, and C-17 aircraft provide strategic airlift support for the DRB. The C-130 aircraft provides tactical airlift support.

Passenger Aircraft

The Hercules can transport 64 fully equipped paratroopers in side-facing seats. Of note, there are currently C-130E aircraft assigned to the 43d Airlift Wing at Pope AFB. The newer C-130J-30 model can accommodate 92 fully equipped paratroopers. The C-141 Starlifter can
carry 155 paratroopers, but is rapidly approaching the end of its service life. When the C-141 retires, the C-17 Globemaster III will provide the primary support to the DRB. The new Dual Row Airdrop System (DRAS), which uses a two-row, side-by-side rail system, supports 102 fully-equipped paratroopers. (See Figure 3). In contrast to the C-130, the C-17 can accomplish Direct Delivery to forward operating bases from aerial ports in the CONUS.

![Figure 3 C-17 Dual Row Airdrop](image)

**Container Delivery System**

Advantages of the Container Delivery System include increased accuracy, fewer rigging requirements, and minimal material handling equipment (MHE) requirements for loading. A-22 containers are normally used to package items rigged for CDS, with loads ranging from 250-2,200 pounds. The C-130E/H is capable of airdropping up to 16 A-22 containers at a time, and the newer C130J-30 is capable of airdropping up to 24. The C-141 and C-17 are both capable of airdropping up to 40 A-22 containers.
**Heavy Equipment**

The Heavy Equipment (HE) delivery system is capable of delivering larger and/or heavier loads than the CDS system. With HE airdrops, the user is responsible for rigging the loads, a labor-intensive process, which requires specialized materials. In contrast to the CDS method, however, HE requires significant MHE capability. Both the C-130 and C-141 are capable of delivering loads up to 42,500 pounds with the HE method. The C-17 can deliver up to 60,000 pounds using HE airdrop.

**Airland**

Aircraft utilizing the airland method land at the forward operating location and unload cargo and personnel. Airland is the safest and most efficient delivery method in terms of cargo delivered, and availability for return cargo. However, the goal of the 82nd is to be on the ground in 30 minutes. In contrast to airborne delivery, the airland method takes approximately 29 hours to deploy the DRB.\(^6\) The C-130, C-17, C-141, and C-5 are all capable of utilizing the airland method. Of note, C-5 SBA testing was conducted at Pope AFB in the mid-1990s using personnel airdrop, CDS, and HE delivery methods. However, the C-5 does not currently provide support to these three missions.

**Current DRB Airdrop Requirements**

The DRB requirement in fiscal year 1997 consisted of a formation of 64 C-141 aircraft broken down as follows: 24 personnel, 38 HE, and 2 CDS, with a 27-minute pass time.\(^7\) However, as previously stated, with the imminent retirement of the C-141, the C-17 is primed to assume the DRB support role. One recent projection for DRB support in fiscal year 2004 consisted of 71 C-17 aircraft with the following breakdown: 24 personnel, 45 HE, and 2 CDS.\(^8\)
Finally, the C-130 can adequately support DRB requirements for operations near enough to CONUS not to require aerial refueling (a capability not available on the C-130).

AMC recently completed three initiatives designed to ensure the ability of the C-17 to meet the Army’s 30-minute pass time requirement. In addition to installing the DRAS, personnel conducted airdrop testing at Pope AFB designed to reduce spacing between aircraft during personnel airdrops, and installed new equipment to facilitate tighter formations during inclement weather.\(^9\) (See Figure 4) These initiatives enable the C-17 to conform to the Army’s minimum tactical insertion time requirement, and reduces the total number of HE aircraft required from 45 to 25. Regardless of aircraft type or number, Pope AFB must be ready when the no-notice call comes to support the DRB.

![Figure 4 C-17 Personnel Airdrop](image)

**Figure 4 C-17 Personnel Airdrop\(^ {10} \)**

**Pope AFB Support Requirements**

**Command and Control**

A broad mixture of personnel accomplishes command and control functions on green ramp. Currently, green ramp controllers are assigned to the onload support section of the 43d Operations Group. The Deputy Operations Group Commander for Joint Operations (an 0-6
billet) provides oversight. Two Army officers provide ongoing interface with the 82nd: the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans (G3) for Air, and the G3 Airlift Coordination Office (ALCO), formerly known as the Ground Liaison Officer (GLO).

**Station Capability**

Maximum on Ground (MOG) and Hot Spot aircraft parking capability represent two key areas affecting station capability. MOG is the maximum number of aircraft (of a given weapon system) that personnel can work simultaneously. MOG is based on several factors, to include parking ramp space, maintenance servicing, and cargo loading capability. MOG can be improved through personnel augmentation and freeing up parking ramp space. For example, utilizing the entire airfield at Pope increases aircraft parking MOG to the following numbers: 63 C-141, 25 C-5 aircraft, or 61 C-17 aircraft.\(^\text{11}\)

Hot Spot parking is another issue affecting station capability. Safety concerns preclude aircraft transporting explosives (hot cargo) from parking near facilities or major thoroughfares. There are four primary hot cargo parking spots on Pope, all located across the runway from green ramp. These parking locations are sited for items such as 105mm ammunition, blasting caps, C-4, flares, and small arms ammunition.\(^\text{12}\) Additional parking spots on green ramp are sited for 1.3 and 1.4 net explosive weight items, such as flares and some small arms ammunition.

**Aerial Port/Aircraft Maintenance**

3d APS and the 743d MXS are the two biggest force providers on green ramp. From initial touchdown at Pope AFB, to departure for the Forward Operating Base (FOB), their personnel ensure aircraft are fully mission capable and safely loaded for transport of the DRB. The next chapter will address their roles in detail.
Miscellaneous Support

Many organizations on Pope operate behind the scenes providing support to the DRB. For example, the 43d Support Group provides services support (billeting, food services, etc), security forces, fire department, and communications. The 43d Operations Group provides intelligence support, air traffic control, and weather. Transportation, supply, contracting and additional maintenance support is provided by the 43d Logistics Group, and the 43d Medical Group coordinates all medical support.

Notes

4 Briefing, 743d Maintenance Squadron, subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.
7 Briefing, 743d Maintenance Squadron, subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.
8 ibid.
10 Courtesy, 743d Maintenance Squadron.
11 Briefing, 743d Maintenance Squadron, subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.
12 ibid.
Chapter 3

En route Support Structure

Through mobility we conquer.

—Motto, The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, c. 1930

AMC defines the en route system as, “an interdependent global network of manpower, material, and facilities that provide command and control, maintenance, and aerial port services to air mobility forces performing AMC worldwide missions.”¹ With the dissolution of the 624th AMSG in 1997, Pope AFB ceased to function as an en route. Despite changes in manpower and organizational structure, the green ramp mission continued relatively unchanged. Interestingly, the functions of the organizations supporting this mission continue to mirror those that define the AMC en route system.

Command and Control

The 624th AMSG utilized 44 manpower authorizations to accomplish the command and control function on green ramp. The current organizational structure reduced this number to 23.² These 23 positions were dispersed between 43 OG, wing command post (CP), 3 APS, 43d Operations Support Squadron (OSS), and wing plans and programs (XP). The 43 OG Deputy for Joint Operation is the focal point for en route activities. However, this position lacks the necessary authority to ensure unity of effort for the organizations supporting the DRB, as well as clear guidance for determining readiness.
Several different offices on Pope now perform command and control functions for operations on green ramp. These responsibilities mirror current AMC en route guidance: “timely and accurate flow of information, and direction of operations relating to mission movement, aircrew status, aircraft status, load configurations, loading of passengers and cargo, and coordination with host base services.”

Primary command and control functions are coordinated by, and through, the 43 AW CP, to include indirect support such as contracting, billeting, and transportation. This facility contains the Operations Management Controllers, Maintenance Activities Coordination Center (MACC), ALCO section, 3 APS Aerial Port Information Controller (APIC), and Emergency Action Cell. Personnel from OSS develop the aircraft parking plan, ensuring that MOG is not exceeded on green ramp. The MACC coordinates and documents all logistics activities.

The G3 ALCO represents a critical link in the support process. The responsibility of this section includes, “liaison and coordination between Army and Air Force operational and support elements for all inbound and outbound aircraft utilizing Pope AFB.” The ALCO mans two positions in the CP, collocated with the CP controllers. These personnel provide a vital link between all elements involved in airlift operations, to include supported units assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division, US Army Special Operations Command, and all supporting active duty and reserve Air Force units. This requires an in-depth understanding of the capabilities of both Army and Air Force assets, thereby ensuring the success of joint operations.

3d Aerial Port Squadron

All aircraft upload and download activities conducted on Pope AFB are controlled by 3 APS. The primary mission of the unit is, “to operate a fixed tactical air terminal facility
supporting airland and aerial delivery of personnel and equipment.”

The air terminal operates 24-hours a day providing support to XVIII Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division, Joint Special Operations Command, host wing, HQ AMC, Tanker/Airlift Control Center, Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises, Air Reserve Component, humanitarian and contingency missions. Ongoing Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) events are also supported by 3 APS.

The mission of 3 APS is unique, earning it the nickname “The All American Port,” in reference to support for the 82nd Airborne Division. Unit capability includes: “provide passenger and cargo onload and offload support to all AMC and commercial aircraft, command and control, load planning, fixed heavy equipment scales, joint inspections, joint airdrop inspections, staircase requirements, rigging and recovery for wing training loads, all required fleet service requirements and space available travel service.”

Requirements are normally coordinated through the Air Terminal Operations Center (ATOC). Augmentation is required when working MOG exceeds 5 aircraft in 5 hours for airdrop missions, and 9-12 aircraft for airland.

Providing support to such a wide variety of missions and aircraft poses many challenges to the unit. Consequently, training must focus on different types of loads, utilizing different types of MHE, on several different airframes, while ensuring compatibility with Army equipment and materials. An example of the challenges faced by leadership is the large number of inspectors required to conduct Joint Airdrop Inspections (JAI) due to the mission of the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 82nd Airborne Division. After an aircraft is loaded, a requirement exists to conduct a JAI in the presence of the user and a qualified Air Force representative. MHE capability increased dramatically in recent years with procurement of the 60K Tunner Loader. AMC also plans to procure 264 Next Generation Small Loaders (NGSL), as the remaining 25K loaders reach the end of useful service.
AMC en route units are traditionally considered forward deployed for their wartime tasking, ensuring the rapid transport of personnel, equipment, combat forces, and supplies around the globe. When the 624th AMSG ceased to exist, most of the rules normally applied to the en route system were no longer applicable to green ramp operations. As such, 3 APS currently supports a Designated Operational Capability (DOC) statement, which requires the capability to conduct an aerial rapid deployment operation during a contingency or humanitarian relief operation. When AMC tasks 3 APS for deployment overseas, much of the capability honed through daily training with the 82nd Airborne Division goes with it. When this happens the 53 APS, a reserve unit also stationed at Pope AFB, fills the gap. This unit also has the advantage of training with the Army for the past several decades. As an operation continues, additional active duty and reserve units provide augmentation in terms of personnel, JAI qualified loadmasters, and MHE.

Figure 5 3 APS Personnel and C-17 Aircraft

743d Maintenance Squadron

The 743 MXS, has the following motto prominently displayed in their squadron: “The Center of Gravity for Strategic Contingency Operations.” The primary mission of the squadron is as follows: “directly support the XVIII Airborne Corps, 43 AW, Joint Special Operations
Command, and other special operations units in the Pope/Ft Bragg community as well as units/aircrews transiting Pope AFB. To provide timely and responsive maintenance in order to meet customer requirements in peacetime and during contingencies. In 1997, the 624 MXS was deactivated and re-designated as the 743 MXS. The unit was subsequently realigned under the 43d Logistics Group (LG), while the other primary organizations supporting the DRB remained in the OG.

The 743d is also a unique squadron. There is no other unit with a similar mission in the Air Force. On the surface, the unit functions much like an AMC overseas en route. Responsibilities include launch, recovery, and on-equipment maintenance for en route aircraft, to include the C-141, C-17, C-5, C-130, KC-10, and KC-135. The primary difference between the 743d and AMC en route units is the support provided for airborne operations. The 743d hosted C-17 and C-5 aircraft airdrop testing, to include DRAS from both aircraft, and C-17 personnel airdrop. The 743d proudly maintains the reputation for being the authority on launching mass formation combat airdrop missions.

The unique mission on green ramp, combined with the changing face of air mobility, poses many challenges to the 743d. The role of the C-141 aircraft as the workhorse of the airborne mission led to the development of a strong core of C-141 maintainers. Normally, first-term airmen do not man a unit of this nature. Experienced personnel adapt easier to working on maintaining qualifications on several different airframes. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to find training opportunities to maintain proficiency. As the C-17 assumes the DRB support role, the importance of growing a core of experienced C-17 maintainers becomes more pronounced.

Unlike 3 APS, the 743d does not have a DOC statement. Unit maintainers are not on mobility status, as they focus on supporting green ramp operations. However, the current size of
the unit does not provide capability for increased sustained operations tempo during a contingency. Similar to 3 APS, when the workload exceeds working MOG, augmentation is provided from other active duty and reserve units. This comes in the form of personnel and commonly used supply parts. Additionally, aircraft flying crew chiefs normally accompany their aircraft, providing both experience and familiarity with the status of the aircraft. The logistics flight at an overseas en route maintains a forward supply location (FSL), stocked with C-17, C-141, and C-5 parts. Some locations also maintain spare aircraft engines. The 743 MXS does not have an FSL or spare engines.

![Figure 6 C-17 Crew Chief](image)

**Outload Operations**

Command and control, 3 APS, and the 743 MXS represent the three primary support units for green ramp operations. The Deputy Operations Group Commander for Joint Operations conducts a weekly meeting to address issues affecting the outload mission. Indirect support organizations such as services, safety, transportation, and security forces, as well as tenant units such as the 23d Fighter Group also attend. However, the issue of readiness continues to
represent an illusive topic during these meetings. The following chapters will address methods of determining readiness to support the DRB, and provide recommendations for improvement.

Notes

2 Air Mobility Command Programming Plan 97-05, *Pope AFB Ownership Transfer From Air Combat Command to Air Mobility Command*, 1 March 1997, B-II-4.
5 ibid.
8 Briefing, 743d Maintenance Squadron, subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.
10 Briefing, 743d Maintenance Squadron, subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.
12 Courtesy, 743d Maintenance Squadron.
Chapter 4

Determining Readiness

_The man who is prepared has his battle half fought._
—Cervantes: Don Quixote, 1605

The demonstrated capability of the United States military was a crucial factor in ending the Cold War. Unfortunately, victory in the Cold War and the corresponding absence of a clearly defined threat actually witnessed an increase in operations tempo. Aging weapon systems, a declining force structure, and an increased focus on a CONUS-based force increasingly brought readiness issues to the forefront in recent years. Ultimately, these issues necessitated changes in the way readiness is measured.

The Air Force continues to focus on people, training, equipment, logistics, and infrastructure to define and measure readiness.¹ These factors are evident in inspection methods utilized by AMC, 21st Air Force (21 AF), base level units, and the XVIII Airborne Corps. However, as the following pages will illustrate, these organizations do not effectively employ these methods to measure current readiness of the primary AMC units providing support to DRB onload operations on green ramp.

**Air Mobility Command**

The AMC inspection program forms the basis for determining readiness to respond anywhere around the globe on short notice, as part of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF)
concept. In so doing, AMC places emphasis on the following Air Force Tasks: Provide Information Superiority, Provide Global Attack, Provide Rapid Global Mobility, Provide Agile Combat Support, and Provide Command and Control.\(^2\) Methods used by the AMC Inspector General (IG) to determine unit readiness include stand-alone exercises, Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspections (EORI), and En Route Readiness Inspections (ERI). Philosophically, AMC uses a combination of these methods to determine mission readiness on green ramp.

**Stand Alone Exercises**

The stand-alone exercise is a valuable tool utilized by the AMC IG. For example, 3 APS could deploy to Dover AFB, Delaware, and provide support to the 436\(^{th}\) APS during a peak workload period. However, the focus is more on measuring deployment capability, and less on home station missions, such as supporting outload operations on green ramp. For example, 743 MXS personnel do not maintain currency for mobility. Unit members do not possess required equipment, or receive training beyond initial mobility qualification. Consequently, they are not susceptible to a stand-alone exercise tasking. Exercises of this type are useful for measuring the readiness of a unit to deploy in support of a contingency, but not for determining readiness of Pope units to support outload of the DRB on green ramp.

**Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspection (EORI)**

The IG uses an EORI to evaluate the ability of a unit to meet its wartime tasking. This inspection emphasizes Unit Type Codes (UTC), and measures readiness against standards published in the Air Mobility Command Task List (AMCTL). A UTC, “identifies a deployable package of resources (personnel, equipment, or both) configured to provide a specific wartime capability.”\(^3\) Any AMC unit that has a DOC statement, or is included in the Air Force-wide...
UTC Availability and Tasking Summary (AFWUS), is susceptible to an EORI tasking. An EORI normally includes personnel from different locations and does not generate an overall wing/group grade. Demonstrated operational capability and IG Exercises (IGX) represent the two types of EORI inspections.

The most effective measure of readiness is unit performance during real world operations, both exercise and real. Demonstrated operational capability inspections consist of direct observation of events such as AEF deployments, CJCS exercises, contingency operations, and significant JA/ATTs (a significant JA/ATT uses seven or more aircraft, not including KC-10s, to complete a mission). These inspections assess home station deployment activity, unit operations at deployed locations, and strategic airlift operations. Obviously, the most opportune time to discover operational deficiencies is not during a real-world contingency. However, all phases of an operation, to include mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment, provide valuable opportunities to evaluate readiness. The IG periodically observes real world missions to evaluate unit performance, but does not inject exercise scenarios into the operation.

An IGX is a complex event involving UTCs from approximately 15 units, combined into an expeditionary air wing. (EAW) The exercise is normally conducted at a Combat Readiness Training Center (CRTC), but may be held elsewhere. The intent of the exercise is to emphasize team building and foster an expeditionary culture, “thus mirroring real-world operations.” The focus is on anticipated response to a crisis, with an obvious emphasis on what the Air Force brings to the fight. The EAW receives all inbound aircraft, and then uploads outbound aircraft under simulated wartime conditions (not unlike a significant JA/ATT). The exercise typically lasts from 6 to 14 days.
Although the concept of the IGX has applicability, AMC has not directly utilized this program to determine readiness on green ramp. 3 APS is susceptible to the IGX concept, and is required to participate based on assigned UTCs. However, readiness requirements measured during an IGX primarily reflect their wartime deployment role. As previously stated, the 743d does not have a mobility commitment, nor does it support any UTCs. Consequently, the unit is not currently subject to an IGX inspection. Applicability to the command and control aspect of green ramp operations is also minimal.

**En Route Readiness Inspections (ERI)**

In 1997, Pope AFB ceased to function as an en route in the eyes of AMC and, consequently, the 43 AW is not currently susceptible to an ERI. However, the purpose of an ERI is to, “evaluate a unit’s ability to move passengers and cargo effectively and expeditiously through the Defense Transportation System (DTS).”

Major graded areas include readiness, aerial port, logistics, and command and control, all applicable to the three primary green ramp support units.

Readiness evaluates the ability to move cargo and personnel to meet deployment requirements, and to “effectively transition from peacetime to contingency/wartime operations.”

The aerial port grading criteria evaluates the ability of the air terminal in support of aircraft, cargo, and passengers. Aircraft maintenance and supply support for all AMC en route aircraft represent the primary focus of logistics grading criteria. Finally, the command and control function stresses, “effective decision making, direction, coordination, execution, and reporting of deployment and readiness activities.” Consequently, the ERI concept is ideally suited for determining the readiness of 3 APS, the 743 MXS, and onload operations command and control elements.
21 AF

The 43 AW is assigned as a subordinate unit to 21 AF, currently located at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Numbered Air Forces perform as a tactical echelon, providing operational leadership and supervision. They are responsible for measuring and ensuring the readiness of assigned units. The mission of 21 AF is, “to command and assure the combat readiness of assigned air mobility forces in support of Global Reach.” To accomplish this, senior leadership continuously monitors personnel, equipment, infrastructure, and training issues associated with readiness, and provides guidance and/or assistance when required. Methods for providing feedback on green ramp readiness issues include Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs), significant JA/ATT Situational Reports (SITREPS), and post-JA/ATT video teleconferences. Of note, a recent Air Force Audit Agency Report concluded that Numbered Air Force personnel failed to conduct readiness assessment visits at 11 en route locations reviewed. These required assessments represent a critical tool for assisting senior personnel in determining the readiness of assigned units.

Staff Assistance Visits

Personnel from various 21 AF functional areas periodically conduct SAVs at assigned units to gain knowledge of readiness issues. The uniqueness of the green ramp mission increases the value of such visits. Critical issues, such as infrastructure improvement and logistics support, are often difficult to grasp without actually viewing the landscape. For example, the Army is currently in the midst of a $105 million outload enhancement project on green ramp, with a 2004 completion date. This project will eventually expand green ramp to include approximately 240 acres on what is currently Fort Bragg. Pope AFB requires assistance from 21 AF and AMC to ensure organizations supporting operations on green ramp receive commensurate improvements.
**SITREPS and Video Tele-conferences**

During a Significant JA/ATT, the AMC mission commander drafts a SITREP at the end of each day’s flying activity. This report is a concise recapitulation of events throughout the entire day. Included is statistical data on actual versus planned airdrops, and any issues associated with the aircraft loading, launch, and recovery process. The mission commander transmits the SITREP to the 21 AF/CC, providing an opportunity for immediate, as well as post-event, feedback. Additionally, the 21 AF/CC normally chairs a video-teleconference with all major players as soon as practical after the event to ensure constructive feedback is provided prior to the next Significant JA/ATT. These initiatives represent invaluable tools for determining readiness to support the DRB.

**Base Level Units**

The OG Deputy Commander for Joint Operations provides critical oversight for green ramp operations. Though lacking formal authority, this individual develops comprehensive guidance for all issues affecting support for outload operations, to include the DRB. Primary support organizations provide representation at the weekly Outload Working Group, where they share information and discuss current and potential problems. This meeting represents the primary forum for determining readiness at the base level. The commanders of the 743 MXS and 3 APS are key figures in this process, even though they report to the 43 LG/CC and 43 OG/CC respectively.

Unfortunately, the nature of the DRB support mission makes it difficult to identify objective factors for measuring readiness from an Air Force perspective. No other base in AMC has a similar mission. Consequently, senior leadership of the three primary support organizations must continuously look for indicators to assess the readiness of their units to meet the 18-hour
deployment requirement. Assessments typically focus on factors such as personnel availability, training, and support equipment. The challenge is to identify objective factors in these areas pertinent to DRB support. However, in the end, the best indicator is performance. Short of an actual contingency, the most practical way to determine readiness is through training events such as the Army’s EDRE.

The Army

The EDRE represents one of the primary tools used by the Army to determine readiness to execute the mission. It allows the division to test the 18-hour deployment concept by executing the tasking with no notice. In fact, the DRB normally does not know if the alert call is an EDRE or a real-world contingency. The exercise is beneficial for determining Air Force readiness as well, although key personnel assigned as “trusted agents” are in-briefed early in the process. Organizations supporting green ramp operations receive early notification to ensure availability of adequate support.

Current Readiness

This chapter addressed several different methods for determining readiness at different organizational levels. Theoretically, the tools discussed here should provide senior leadership with a clear picture of the current state of readiness to support the DRB on green ramp. However, upon closer review it becomes apparent that there is no process in-place to determine readiness to support DRB outload operations at Pope AFB. The next chapter will provide recommendations to correct this oversight.
Notes


5 Air Mobility Command Operation Order 17-76, Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training, 12 September 1999, 4.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


Chapter 5

Recommendations

Every unit that is not supported is a defeated unit.

—Maurice de Saxe, 1732

The DRB onload support mission is unique to Pope AFB. Many rules, regulations, and procedures normally associated with AMC (and AMC gained) units are not applicable to green ramp operations. Maintaining the capability to project timely combat power around the globe necessitates a nonstandard approach to ensuring readiness. Possible areas of improvement include regulatory guidance, organizational structure, inspection criteria, conduct of exercises, and training, equipment, and personnel.

Regulatory Guidance

When Pope AFB belonged to ACC, the 624 AMSG functioned as an AMC en route tenant unit. The commands developed Memorandums of Agreement and Understanding, delineating responsibilities of the units providing support to green ramp. Currently, guidance exists only in the form of AMC Operation order 17-76, Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training, and Pope AFB Instruction 11-105, Air Mobility Task Force Combat Air Delivery Operations. These publications do not provide adequate guidance.

Lack of concise official guidance makes it difficult to clearly define the DRB support mission, and thus, how to effectively measure readiness. Official recognition of DRB support as
A primary mission by AMC could alleviate this problem. A DOC statement with a clearly defined mission, requiring some method of reporting and, consequently, accountability may solve this problem. A clearly stated requirement would also support adequate funding for infrastructure improvements and procurement of support equipment.

**Organizational Structure**

The primary organizations providing support to the DRB are aligned in different Groups within the 43 AW. The Deputy Commander for Joint Operations has coordination and oversight responsibilities with these organizations, but no formal authority. Interestingly, the nature of the mission, combined with the capabilities of supporting units, is ideally suited for the AMC en route organizational structure. The en route system is designed to support aircraft transiting the European and Pacific theaters, and consequently, there are no CONUS en route organizations. However, this organizational structure worked well at Pope, until it fell by the wayside when the base realigned under AMC.
Reestablishing an AMSG at Pope would have little or no impact on normal operations. Manpower authorizations for 3 APS and the 743 MXS would remain the same. AMC ownership of the base negates the need for additional authorizations for command and control and leadership functions. The 43 AW could continue to provide support in areas such as weather and intelligence. The 3 APS would continue to support all aircraft upload and download operations, and the 743 MXS would provide support to organic aircraft as the workload permitted. Minor realignments of additional support personnel, such as ramp controllers and ALCO personnel would also be necessary. Support requirements for the XVIII Airborne Corps, 82nd Airborne Division (most notably the DRB), and JSOC warrant consideration of this proposal. The Deputy
Commander for Joint Operations would once again retain the status of group commander, with commensurate authority. AMC should otherwise consider eliminating this position.

**Inspections**

The current organizational structure for outload support on green ramp does not lend itself to evaluation under the AMC inspection system. In fact, the 743d Maintenance Squadron is not currently in the database of the AMC IG as an inspected unit. The EORI concept can measure the ability of 3 APS to forward deploy, but is not geared towards measuring home station outload support readiness. By contrast, the AMC ERI is an ideal tool for measuring readiness to support the DRB mission. However, Pope is not currently susceptible to an AMC ERI inspection. Obviously, establishment of an AMSG at Pope would solve this problem. However, even if this does not happen, AMC should consider developing guidance to inspect the outload support mission based on the ERI concept.

**Exercises**

In one sense, capabilities on green ramp are tested, on average, at least once a month. This comes in the form of Significant JA/ATT training events, such as Large Package Week, and CAPSTONE (an orientation course for newly appointed general officers and senior ranking civilians), and Combat Aerial Delivery School/Weapons Instructor Course (CADS/WIC) graduation exercises. However, significant advanced planning normally accompanies events of this nature, an advantage not available during a DRB recall. From an Air Force perspective, an EDRE has similar disadvantages. The EDRE represents the Army’s primary tool to determine the readiness of the DRB. AMC should consider including Air Force support units at Pope in the
no-notice portion of an EDRE to test readiness. Unfortunately, the Army relies heavily on “chutes in the air,” and normally hesitates to risk failure during an exercise of this nature.

In 1999, Pope conducted a large exercise entitled GRYPHON WARRIOR 99-01. This event consisted of 94 C-130, C-17 and C-141 airdrop and airland missions during a five-day exercise, to include engine running off-load (ERO) sorties conducted at night. Exercises of this nature, conducted in a realistic environment on a semi-annual basis, could also assist in determining readiness to support the DRB mission.

Training, Equipment, and Personnel

Operational requirements must be clearly defined to ensure effective training. With the imminent retirement of the C-141, the C-17 will assume primary responsibility for DRB support. Consequently, green ramp personnel must shift their training focus to the C-17. This includes sending personnel to Charleston AFB for training, in addition to ensuring maximum use of transient aircraft for ground training. Special Experience Identifiers (SEI) must be a priority when assigning new personnel, to help overcome the challenge of training on multiple airframes. AMC should continue to focus on a new generation of MHE, in addition to pre-positioning support equipment at Pope AFB, such as aircraft tow bars, engine change equipment, and applicable test equipment.

Personnel assignments also represent a crucial piece of the readiness puzzle. The current policy to only assign second-term, or longer, aircraft maintainers to the 743 MXS is a success story in this area. AMC should also consider placing limits on the length of tour in primary outload support organizations, much like an overseas en route unit. Personnel also need the training advantage offered by the home station environment.
Notes

1 Developed by the author.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

‘Tis time to leave the books in dust, And oil the unused armor’s rust.

—Andrew Marvell

In September 1994, the NCA appeared convinced that a peaceful solution for restoring democracy in Haiti was not in the offing. The 82nd Airborne DRB was alerted, and a task force was airborne in minimum time. However, the aircraft never reached Haiti. “The 82nd’s eminent arrival influenced Haitian government leaders to agree to a peaceful solution.” The ability of the DRB to respond rapidly anywhere in the world with significant combat power represents a valuable deterrence tool for national leadership. The importance of air mobility as a force multiplier remains central to ensuring the capability to protect our national interests. This also includes humanitarian interests, as witnessed by the use of the DRB in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in southern Florida in 1992.

Pope AFB performs a central role in determining the effectiveness of the DRB. Over the years, regardless of base ownership or organizational structure, AMC (and reserve component) personnel remained firmly committed to ensuring the success of this vital mission. However, several years have passed since the DRB was called upon in support of a major national crisis. During this time, the U.S. military witnessed a major reduction in personnel, forward bases, and airlift resources. Consequently, a periodic evaluation of current readiness is required to ensure timely correction of deficiencies.
This examination of current methods for determining the readiness of AMC to support the DRB revealed the absence of an effective system. Consequently, in reality, the question posed by this paper remains unanswered. This could have an adverse affect on training, safety, and the ability to accomplish the mission. Areas identified for possible improvement include regulatory guidance, organizational structure, inspections, exercises, and training, equipment, and personnel. Additionally, a DOC statement with a clearly defined mission would assist in overcoming the current absence of concise regulatory guidance. Finally, an organizational structure with effective command and control (an AMSG) would ensure synchronization of effort in the DRB support role.

A clearly defined mission and organizational structure will ensure development of an effective inspection program designed to examine mission capability and support operations. In turn, the exercise program should focus on meeting established mission requirements, such as responsiveness to the DRB. Clear guidance in these areas will help facilitate development of effective training programs, equipment and infrastructure improvements, and personnel assignments focused on mission success.

In a time of fiscal constraint, and apparent uncertainty for the future of air mobility (and a rapid deployment force), these proposals may appear trivial. The importance of the DRB is often under appreciated during times of peace. At this very moment, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division stands ready to guard America’s national interests. The organizations supporting green ramp represent a vital ingredient for ensuring this capability. An effective system must be in-place to determine their readiness.

Notes

Glossary

A/C Aircraft
AFB Air Force Base
AFWUS Air Force-Wide UTC Availability and Tasking Summary
ALCO Airlift Coordination Office
AMC Air Mobility Command
AMCTL Air Mobility Command Task List
AMSG Air Mobility Support Group
APIC Aerial Port Information Center
APS Aerial Port Squadron
ATOC Air Terminal Operations Center
ATSO Ability to Survive and Operate

CADS/WIC Combat Aerial Delivery School/Weapons Instructor Course
CDS Container Delivery System
CLACC Central Loading Area Control Center
CONUS Continental United States
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CP Command Post
CRTC Combat Readiness Training Center
C2 Command and Control

DOC Designated Operational Capability
DRAS Dual Row Airdrop System
DRB Division Ready Brigade
DRF-1 Division Ready Force-1
DTS Defense Transportation Center

EAF Expeditionary Aerospace Force
EAW Expeditionary Air Wing
EDRE Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
EORI Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspection
ERI En Route Readiness Inspection
ERO Engine Running Onload/Offload

FOB Forward Operating Base

GLO Ground Liaison Officer
G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Heavy Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGX</td>
<td>Inspector General Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA/ATT</td>
<td>Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAI</td>
<td>Joint Airdrop Inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Joint Inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>Joint Mission Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOC</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Logistics Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Maintenance Activities Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOG</td>
<td>Maximum on Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MXS</td>
<td>Maintenance Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGSL</td>
<td>Next Generation Small Loader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>Operations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Operation Support Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHA</td>
<td>Personnel Holding Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAV</td>
<td>Staff Assistance Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>Strategic Brigade Airdrop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>Tanker/Airlift Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>Unit Type Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XP</td>
<td>Plans and Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Air Mobility Command Operation Order (AMCOO) 17-76. *Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training*, 12 September 1999.

Air Mobility Command Programming Plan (AMCPP) 97-05. *Pope AFB Ownership Transfer From Air Combat Command to Air Mobility Command*, 1 March 1997.


Briefing. 743d Maintenance Squadron. Subject: Strategic Brigade Airdrop, 30 August 1999.


*Orientation Handbook for Family Members of the 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division*. No date.


