THE 100/442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM'S RESCUE OF THE LOST BATTALION: A STUDY IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLE COMMAND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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NATHAN K. WATANABE, MAJ, USA
B.S., U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1988

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The 100/442D Regimental Combat Team’s Rescue of the Lost Battalion: A Study in the Employment of Battle Command

Abstract

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Approved by:

Christopher R. Gabel, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chairman

Harold S. Orenstein, Ph.D., Member

LTC Robert J. Rielly, M.A., M.S., Member

Accepted this 31st day of May 2002 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This thesis examines the application of battle command during the 100/442d Regimental Combat Team’s rescue of the First Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, the “Lost Battalion.” As background, this study presents a brief history of the Japanese in Hawaii and the United States, of the formation and record of the 100/442d RCT, and of the battle to rescue the Lost Battalion. The contemporary concept of battle command is defined as per Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (June 2001) and Field Manual 22-100, Leadership; Be, Know, Do (August 1999) and shown to encompass the World War II-era concepts of command and leadership.

This study examines how the tenets of battle command--visualize, describe, direct--were applied by the 36th Division and the 100/442d RCT during the operation. Specific examples from the battle will illustrate both the use and neglect of the precepts of battle command and illustrate the importance of sound command and leadership techniques as well as the value of unit cohesion in present-day operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study is dedicated to the leaders and men of the 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) and the 442d Regimental Combat Team, whose immense dedication, courage, and esprit de corps have given me a better understanding of my heritage and of my profession.

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<td>ABCS</td>
<td>Army Battle Command System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFATDS</td>
<td>Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJA</td>
<td>American(s) of Japanese Ancestry</td>
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<td>AMDWS</td>
<td>Air and Missile Defense Workstation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>ASAS</td>
<td>All-Source Analysis System</td>
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<td>ATCCS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Command and Control System</td>
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<td>Battlefield Operating System(s)</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity</td>
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<td>Combat Service Support Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>Died of Wounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td>French Forces of the Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEBA</td>
<td>Forward Edge of the Battle Area</td>
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<td>FLOT</td>
<td>Forward Line of Own Troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Line of Departure</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>Mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
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<td>OAKOC</td>
<td>Observation and fields of fire, Avenues of approach, Key terrain, Obstacles and movement, Cover and concealment</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Self-Propelled</td>
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CHAPTER I

BATTLE COMMAND, COMMAND, AND LEADERSHIP

The United States Army’s most highly decorated unit for its size and duration of active service is the 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (RCT), collectively known as the 100/442d RCT. It was activated during World War II and was unique in that it was a segregated unit composed primarily of Americans of Japanese Ancestry (AJAs). While segregated units were not uncommon, as evidenced by the 92d “Buffalo” Division and the “Tuskegee Airmen” of the 332d Fighter Group, the 100/442d was the only unit of its kind to be manned almost exclusively by personnel with ancestral ties to an enemy country. The 100/442d RCT saw considerable action in Italy as part of the US Fifth Army, but its most brutal battles were fought in southern France while assigned to the US Seventh Army and attached to Major General John E. Dahlquist’s 36th “Texas” or “T-Patch” Division.

This study will examine the regiment’s rescue of the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th Infantry Division—the “Lost Battalion”—specifically focusing on the concepts of battle command and leadership. It will compare the contemporary concept of battle command with World War II-era theory on command and leadership and will scrutinize the employment of battle command by the 36th Division and the 100/442d RCT during the action to relieve the separated battalion. It will explore the leadership dynamic of the employment of this unit in combat and will identify both the successful, as well as the ineffectual, applications of battle command in this engagement. This will show that, despite advances in weaponry, information technologies, and tactics, the human element in war and combat highlights the continued significance of leadership as
an element of combat power, reinforces the integrated nature of leadership and command, and further underscores the value and importance of effective battle command.

“Battle command” did not exist as a theory during World War II, although its principles, grounded in the application of leadership and command, have remained unchanged. While the foundations of leadership and command as doctrine have not changed since World War II, today more established guidelines exist to influence the application of these principles. Thus, while “visualize,” “describe,” and “direct” and their supporting elements are modern concepts, their applicability to warfare is timeless and examination of battle command in the historical rescue of the Lost Battalion yields lessons that apply today.

Combat power is the total force that a war-fighting unit can bring to bear against an enemy; it is the ability to fight. To defeat the enemy, friendly combat power must exceed that of the enemy.¹ Current United States Army doctrine identifies five elements of combat power: maneuver, firepower, protection, information, and leadership. Properly integrated, these elements are synergistic, producing a total greater than the sum of its parts. As the most dynamic element of combat power, leadership is the cornerstone of combat power and “serves as the catalyst that creates conditions for success”² that binds, blends, and amplifies the effects of the other elements. Leadership refers to the actions of the commander and his ability to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to his unit to complete the mission. Battle command is the application of these abilities in combat operations.
Battle Command--Visualize

While not a new concept, battle command, per se, is a relatively new term, having entered the Army’s vernacular in the early 1990s. Earlier Army doctrine addressed only “leadership” and “command.” Battle command is simply, “the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy.” It is an art demanding that the commander expertly visualize, describe, and direct his unit’s actions to ensure success. Through study, practice, experience, intuition, and reflection a commander develops and employs his sense of battle command and sharpens his judgment. This honed judgment best enables a commander to visualize a given situation and a desired outcome. He next describes the situation, operation, and end state to his subordinates, and then directs their actions to a conclusion. The commander is not alone in his efforts; his staff is vital to the mission. But it is the commander alone who must provide the vision, guidance, and direction, so that the staff and hence, the unit can best be employed to accomplish the mission. Inasmuch as a good commander can provide expert detailed guidance to a unit and overcome the disadvantages of an inexperienced staff to secure victory, so too can a poor commander retard even a strong staff to produce mediocre results. Thus, regardless of the merits of the staff, the responsibility for effective battle command lies on the shoulders of the commander. It is his responsibility, not the staff’s, to expertly visualize the situation and end state, to describe it and the concept of the operation to the unit, and to direct the unit to success.
Analysis of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations

Visualization encompasses a commander’s estimate of the situation and his conceptualization of the operational design. The estimate assesses the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) to provide an understanding of the situation. The commander’s concept of the operational design addresses elements, such as end state and military conditions, centers of gravity, decisive points and objectives, lines of operations, culminating point, operational reach, approach and pause, simultaneous and sequential operations, linear and nonlinear operations, and tempo.5

In defining the mission, the commander analyzes it and determines its overall purpose and essential supporting tasks. These specify the job to be accomplished. Once the mission is identified, it is analyzed in terms of the enemy. An assessment of threat capabilities, disposition, location, and current and future activities frames the mission and guides subsequent operations planning. Similarly, terrain is normally assessed in terms of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and movement, and cover and concealment (OAKOC).6 Weather is also evaluated in conjunction with the terrain, since both together establish conditions and limitations on the operation. The availability, condition, capabilities, and limitations of troops and support available must also be considered as part of the commander’s estimate and as part of his visualization of the conditions for battle. The amount of time available for planning, preparation, and execution of the mission will also determine, to an extent, the nature and character of the operation. Finally, should the operation be conducted in the vicinity of civilian populations, the potential impact of the operation on the local culture...
and customs should be considered, and diplomatic, informational, and economic means employed as necessary to mitigate the impact and consequences of military actions on the populace. The net result of METT-TC analysis is a determination of the mission and an assessment of the situation, defining what must be accomplished and under what conditions and constraints the operation will occur. In current doctrinal processes, these actions are conducted by the commander and his staff during the first two steps of the military decision-making process: “receipt of mission” and “mission analysis.”

Operational Design

Once the operating environment is defined and the situation understood, the commander visualizes the operation in terms of the nine elements of operational design: end state and military conditions; center of gravity; decisive points and objectives; lines of operation; culminating point; operational reach, approach, and pause; simultaneous and sequential operations; linear and nonlinear operations; and tempo. These elements guide the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation and are an established framework to aid in the visualization of strategic-level and operational-level campaigns and major operations. While not wholly inapplicable at the tactical level of warfare, the applicability and utility of these principles diminish at the successively lower levels. Thus, their relevance to tactical-level actions must be modified accordingly.

An end state must be envisioned and established to guide all aspects of the operation. The achievement of this end state accomplishes the mission. At the tactical level, an end state focused too broadly risks an overextension of forces, while conversely, one too narrowly focused or shortsighted risks failure in supporting higher-level operations. At the tactical level, end state centers on the attainment of objectives
From the strategic to the tactical level of warfare, centers of gravity (COG) may be considered a belligerent’s source of strength. They are “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” The ultimate goal of campaigns and operations is to attack and destroy or neutralize the enemy’s COG while protecting and sustaining the friendly COG. At the tactical level, this often translates simply into a focus on the objective.

The concepts of decisive points and objectives are interrelated. Decisive points may be geographic locations, specific events in time, or elements of the enemy force which, when controlled, exploited, or defeated, provide a marked advantage in the operation. Regardless of the level of application, decisive points are often objectives.

Lines of operations speak to the character of operations. Either internal (“interior”) or external (“exterior”) lines of operations describe the array of forces in time and space with regard to the enemy. Since this concept relates forces and operations to space, its applicability increases at the operational and strategic levels, where greater amounts of forces operate over larger areas.

“Culminating point” is an element of operational design with direct relevance to tactical level operations. In the offense, the culminating point is that point where continued offensive action becomes unsustainable and the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. In the defense, the defender can no longer maintain contact and must withdraw. Past culmination, attacking forces risk counterattack, defending forces face being overrun, and both face catastrophic defeat. At all levels of warfare, commanders attempt to avoid culmination.
While tactical-level operations are executed on a smaller scale than those of operational or strategic-level actions, the concepts of operational reach, approach, and pause are equally important at the lower levels of warfare. Operational reach and approach address the physical span or distance of employment of combat power in operations and the method of attack against the enemy COG, whether direct or indirect. An operational pause is a cessation of operations to prevent culmination. The tactical commander too must assess his ability conduct and sustain far-reaching operations against an enemy, whether to strike directly or indirectly, and when to halt to prevent collapse.

Operations must be planned and conducted simultaneously and sequentially. Simultaneity aims to overwhelm the enemy through constant and concurrent pressure throughout the depth and breadth of his area of operations (AO), while sequencing arranges friendly actions in supportable phases, enabling the massing of combat power at decisive points and times. This element of operational design, simultaneous and sequential operations, like others, has limited applicability at the tactical level of warfare due to the lesser physical scope of the tactical AO and the limitation of resources.

Linear and nonlinear operations are also considerations of the operational design. These considerations address the contiguous and noncontiguous nature of the battlefield. Linearity generally suggests contiguous, adjacent areas of operations with a common forward line of own troops (FLOT) and a common objective, while nonlinear operations are generally characterized by operations in nonadjacent geographical areas and possibly conducted along geographical and or logical operational lines. Larger-scale operations
tend to address more asymmetric campaigns and threats. Generally, the lower the echelon of activity, the more linear and conventional the fight.

The final element of operational design, tempo, addresses the speed with which an operation is conducted and applies equally to all levels of warfare. The commander controls and adjusts the tempo to gain and maintain the initiative in order to overwhelm the enemy. Initiative can be obtained and retained through simultaneity, economy of force operations, and through the maximizing of subordinate flexibility.

At once, visualization is both a process and an art. As a process, it is a methodical analysis of the mission and the environment of the operation to develop an understanding of the mission and the environment. It analyzes the mission and conditions in terms of the tasks to be accomplished; the nature of the capabilities of enemy forces to be encountered; terrain and weather in the AO; the availability and capabilities of friendly troops and support; the time available for planning, preparation, and execution; and civilian considerations. As the commander understands and appreciates the operational setting, he develops a concept of operations structured around the elements of operational design described above. These “checklists” are the foundation of the visualization process, but the commander himself turns visualization into an art. Through training, experience, intuition, and judgment, the commander develops and frames the battle space. He synthesizes the principles of war, the tenets of operations, and the elements of operational design into a cohesive plan. The commander envisions the ends, ways, and means of the operation and guides his staff and his unit towards them.
Battle Command--Describe

Once visualization is undertaken and an understanding of the operation and the environment gained, the concept must be described to the staff who will develop and flesh out the plan and to the units that will execute it. Current doctrine recommends that the commander describe the operation’s decisive, shaping, and sustaining efforts in terms of the elements of operational design and the operational framework. This is done through the commander’s intent, which specifies the desired end state, key tasks to accomplish, and the overarching purpose of the operation.10 The importance of the commander’s intent cannot be overemphasized. It provides the broad guidance necessary for units to continue the mission in the absence of further detailed orders and maximizes flexibility and ingenuity on the battlefield while maintaining the orientation of the unit on the final objective. Hand in hand with the commander’s intent is the commander’s guidance, or planning guidance. Whereas the commander’s intent provides the vision necessary to plan and execute the operation itself, planning guidance focuses specifically on the direction of the planning and other staff activities required to develop the commander’s concept into a workable plan or order. It frames the commander’s vision and directs the staff’s actions while still providing a margin of freedom to develop options.

Thus, once a commander assesses and analyzes a situation and visualizes the operational environment, the operation, and an end state, he communicates his vision to his staff and unit. He describes his vision to begin planning and commence action.
Battle Command--Direct

Once the plan is developed and activity begins, the commander directs his units. Current doctrine guides combat operations through the application of seven battlefield operating systems (BOS): intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support, and command and control. The BOS are a means of grouping like systems together to better synchronize and integrate the various activities on the battlefield; all combat operations must consider and integrate the various BOS.

Battlefield Operating Systems

The intelligence BOS is integral to all Army operations. Beginning with the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) step, the intelligence system spans all other BOS areas and continuously focuses on collecting, processing, and disseminating analyzed information about the enemy and environment. At the tactical level the commander ensures intelligence is planned for and conducted and the results are integrated into operations planning and execution.

Maneuver as an operating system seeks to position forces to gain an advantage over the enemy. Coupled with direct, indirect, or the threatened employment of weapons, maneuver systems defeat or destroy the enemy. The commander must ensure synchronization of all BOS and the elements of operational design to create conditions for the success of maneuver units.

The employment of both lethal and nonlethal fires in support of maneuver forces is addressed in the fire support BOS. This system integrates and synchronizes target identification and designation with surface, air, and nonlethal fires to destroy, neutralize,
or suppress enemy forces. While maneuver and fires may have different objectives and means at the operational level, at the tactical level, the two must be effectively synchronized.

In the face of enemy air forces, the air defense system protects friendly forces from air and missile attack and aerial observation. It is a system designed to integrate the actions of all organic maneuver and air defense-specific assets to protect the friendly commander’s freedom to maneuver.

Engineering capabilities on the battlefield are grouped under the system of mobility/countermobility/survivability. Under this BOS, mobility is an enabler to friendly maneuver, enhancing battlefield movement through operations, such as breaching, bridging, and road building. Countermobility seeks to limit enemy maneuverability through obstacle emplacement and mining. Survivability is a friendly force enabler and protects friendly forces through the establishment of battlefield fortifications and protective systems. At all levels, the commander must ensure a balance between mobility, countermobility, and survivability taskings and further integrate these efforts with the scheme of maneuver.

Combat service support (CSS) is the support of combat forces with men and materiel. This system carries equal importance at all levels of warfare and runs from the logistical base in the continental United States to the rear of frontline units. At all levels the commander must ensure that CSS is anticipated, coordinated, and executed in time and quantity to support combat operations.

“Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.”¹² The commander and his communications systems, intelligence systems, and signals systems comprise the command and control (C2) BOS. The C2 systems support the commander in his visualization, description, and direction of his operation. At the tactical level, the commander must ensure C2 is well integrated, as with the rest of the BOS, to support the execution of current operations, as well as the planning of future operations.

Command is “the authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.”¹³ Leadership is “influencing people--by providing purpose, direction, and motivation--while operating to accomplish the mission.”¹⁴ Command is inseparable from leadership, and both must be used with “firmness, care, and skill”¹⁵ to best accomplish the mission at least possible cost. Command, then, is integral to battle command as the command tasks of planning, organizing, and coordinating sustain the visualizing and describing aspects of battle command. So too, the directing and controlling aspects of command, as well as the very directing and motivating nature of leadership, make them essential to the directing element of battle command. Current doctrine provides concrete guidelines for visualization through METT-TC analysis and the elements of operational design, description through the commander’s intent and guidance, and direction through
application of the battlefield operating systems. The commander uses these guidelines and his lawful authority to accomplish the mission. Battle command is the employment of command and leadership in combat; it is the visualizing, describing, and directing of forces in contact with the enemy.

**Battle Command in World War II**

As previously mentioned, battle command is a relatively new term. It synthesizes both the lawful aspects of command and the visceral motivations of leadership. Through METT-TC analysis, the elements of operational design, commander’s intent and guidance, and the various BOS, battle command suggests a framework for visualizing, describing, and directing operations. In comparison, earlier Army doctrine addressed only “leadership” and “command,” though neither concept has changed appreciably over time.

**Leadership**

An integral element of battle command, leadership is not a new concept. Through the ages, armies have needed leaders to provide purpose and direction. In comparison to the current definition of leadership: “influencing people--by providing purpose, direction, and motivation--while operating to accomplish the mission,” the World War II-era definition is somewhat vague but still addresses the same leadership principles. “Be, Know, Do” is the current framework used to guide leadership actions. Its value is defined in the requirements for interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills and the importance of influencing, operating, and improving unit actions. And while FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulation: Operations*, the doctrinal manual for operations at the
outset of World War II, does not precisely define leadership, its simple statement that “leadership is based on knowledge of men” and its description of the requirements of good leadership mirror current doctrinal precepts. “A leader must have superior knowledge, will power, self-confidence, initiative and disregard of self,” and “must be cool and thoughtful . . . with a strong sense of the responsibility imposed upon them [sic]” echoes the requirements for character embraced by the current concept of what a leader must be. The “know” of leadership today is reflected in the field service regulation’s requirement for a leader to understand and empathize with his men, envision the needs of the unit and his men, and to be technically and tactically proficient. What a commander must do, then, is to integrate and form his men into a team, train them, “share their dangers and privations,” and employ them to the best of his understanding and their abilities.

Today’s Army has volumes dedicated to leadership in comparison to four pages in the 1941 Field Service Regulation, yet leadership has not changed—neither in character nor in its need for quality. A fundamental component of battle command, its value and importance were recognized and addressed in World War II doctrine and served to guide commanders during that time period.

Command

The concept of command has not changed over time. Then as now, it is the “authority which an individual in the military service lawfully executes over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.” It is inseparable from leadership and imbues in the commander an appreciation of responsibility and the need for vision, judgment, and decisiveness. The requirements of command then, during World War II, closely mirror
the current battle command tasks of “visualize, describe, direct,” though the tasks may be
named differently. Where commanders today visualize in accordance with the principles
of METT-TC and the elements of operational design, commanders in World War II
estimated the situation based on the “mission of the unit, the means available to him and
the enemy, the conditions in his AO including terrain and weather, and the probable
effects of various lines of action.”19 Where today the commander “describes” via the
essential commander’s intent and guidance, commanders then used combat orders and
disclosed their intentions only when necessary to ensure close cooperation between
adjacent units. Now, as then, commanders ultimately direct their forces in the conduct of
their operations. Today, combat is directed using the battlefield operating systems as a
framework. Then, it was led without the benefit of discrete operating systems, but the
commander’s supervision was still essential.

Leadership, as the ability to influence and motivate men and organizations, is an
historical concept and has existed as long as men have served under others to achieve an
objective. So too, command, as the legal authority over subordinates, has existed in one
form or another since man organized himself into groups under a common authority.
Leadership and command are intertwined; command lawfully empowers a leader while
leadership charismatically empowers the commander, allowing him to better influence,
guide, and direct his men and his units. Battle command, as modern doctrine, is
grounded in these timeless principles and provides more defined, concrete guidelines for
leadership and command. Thus, the principal actions of battle command--visualize,
describe, and direct-- are as timeless as leadership and command themselves, and are a
relevant framework with which to examine historical leadership and command activities.
In the context of the 100/442d RCT, the unique nature of the unit forged cohesion and esprit, which were foundations for success. And from the rescue of the Lost Battalion, lessons about leadership and command arise that emphasize the human face of war and continued importance of battle command today.

1Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 14 June 2001), 4-3.

2Ibid., 4-7.

3While the 1993 final draft version of FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff – Final Draft and the subsequent 1996 final draft of FM 101-5, renamed Staff Organization and Operations addressed battle command, the 1993 final draft was not published. The discussion of battle command in the 1996 final draft was omitted from the 1997 printing of FM 101-5. The first approved doctrinal reference to battle command is the 1993 version of FM 100-5, Operations. At this point, FM 100-5, Operations, and the updated FM 3-0, Operations, became the doctrinal reference for battle command. It is also defined in FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, beginning with the 1995 final draft and the subsequent approved and published 1997 version.


4FM 3-0, Operations, 5-1.

5Ibid., 5-3 to 5-12.

6Formerly known as OCOKA, for observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. Department of the Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 8 July 1994), 2-10 – 2-20.

7The military decision-making process (MDMP) is the Army’s adaptation of the six-step problem-solving process. It is a “single, established, and proven analytical process” with the goal of producing an operations order. It consists of seven, generally
sequential, though often overlapping, steps: receipt of mission, mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis (or war gaming), course of action comparison, course of action approval, and orders production.

The analysis of a mission and the initial visualization of its operating environment starts during step one, Receipt of Mission, when the commander issues an initial warning order and his initial guidance designating the framework for planning. The Mission Analysis step “allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization” whereupon the tactical problem is defined, the operating conditions are identified, and another, more refined warning order is issued.


9FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-6.


12Ibid., 5-17.


14Department of the Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership; Be, Know, Do* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 31 August 1999), 1-4.

15FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-1.

16FM 22-100, *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do*, 4-2.


18Ibid., 23.

19Ibid., 25.
CHAPTER II
THE 442D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
AND THE LOST BATTALION

Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.¹

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

From its baptism of fire on the shores of Salerno in 1943 to V-E Day in 1945, the 100/442d RCT participated in seven major campaigns throughout Europe, including Naples-Foggia (Salerno-Cassino), Rome-Arno (Anzio), Southern France, Northern Apennines, the Rhineland, Central Europe, and Po Valley. Of these, the Rhineland Campaign was the combat team’s most challenging in terms of casualties, combat conditions, and continuous time spent on the line. Of the seven months of participation in this campaign, the first full month of action was the deadliest for the regiment. October 1944 was the culminating point for the Nisei (pronounced “nee-say”)² By November, the combat team had lost over 800 men killed and wounded, and while noteworthy actions followed in Austria and Northern Italy through 1945, these subsequent campaigns were anticlimactic in the face of the losses and bitter fighting in the Vosges.

If October 1944 tested and revealed the true mettle of the Nisei soldiers, then the rescue of the Lost Battalion, 25-30 October 1944, stands as the defining battle of the 100/442d Regimental Combat Team. A testament to the skill, cohesion, determination, and leadership of the unit, the rescue placed the regiment in rough, forbidding terrain, during soaking, frigid weather in a desperate mission against an enemy defending fanatically under one of Hitler’s edicts, or Fuehrer Befehls, that the defenses in the
Vosges be held at all costs. That the mission was accomplished by the Nisei regiment when two other regiments failed powerfully illustrates the “go-for-broke” spirit of the combat team, its AJA soldiers, and its leaders, and can serve as a model to examine both the strengths and shortcomings in the pragmatic exercise of battle command by the division and regiment leadership to accomplish the mission against formidable odds.

The Japanese in Hawaii and the United States

The story of the 100/442d RCT is rooted in the history of the Japanese in Hawaii and America itself. As the second generation of Japanese born abroad, or the first Japanese generation born in Hawaii and America through the early 1910s and 1920s, the Nisei were American citizens and part of the larger “greatest generation” to be of the right age to face the conflict of World War II. This generation of Japanese born abroad best personifies the blending of American and Japanese cultures that laid the foundation for a resolute, cohesive, and dedicated unit that accomplished every assigned mission without fail.

The importance of Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United States lies not in the fact that it did occur, but rather in how it occurred and in its consequences. Like many that came to America, the Japanese came for economic reasons. Unlike many Europeans, however, the bulk of the Japanese came to the United States not to escape the old country and settle in the new world, but rather with the intent to return home rich after a short period of contract labor, in what actually equated to indentured servitude. Many did not return and before long had established a solid and unique Japanese American culture--one that often faced severe prejudice. This immigrant culture and its
challenges molded the subsequent Nisei culture and the values of the men of the 100/442d RCT.

As far back as the thirteenth century, Hawaiian legend tells of Japanese fishermen lost at sea and carried by the Black Current, or Kuroshio, across the Pacific to the Hawaiian archipelago. Likewise, these easterly trans-Pacific currents possibly also carried shipwrecked survivors, much like the flotsam and jetsam of today, to the shores of North America, but with no more impact than the very same driftwood and debris brought by these currents. The earliest recorded Japanese landings in North America occurred in 1610 and 1613, predating the Pilgrims’ landing at Plymouth Rock by almost a decade. Some trekked from Acapulco to Mexico City, some ventured across Mexico and the Atlantic to Spain, while others settled in North America. Though Japanese continued to arrive in Hawaii and America sporadically through the early nineteenth century, it was not until Commodore Perry’s Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854 and the restoration of the Japanese Emperor in 1868 that Japanese emigration began to have a noticeable impact on the United States.

What had been a trickle of Japanese travelling abroad turned into a flood of immigrants to Hawaii and the United States. The 153 persons of the Gannen Mono, the “people of the first era of [Emperor] Meiji,” arrived in Hawaii in June 1868 and another handful of Japanese arrived in San Francisco in May 1869, harbingers of the thousands to follow. Coming from varied backgrounds—farmers unable to pay taxes, peasants pursuing dreams, now out-of-work samurai seeking new lives—all sought quick fortunes on the plantations of Hawaii or in the businesses on the West Coast.
In terms of business practices, Hawaiian and U.S. businessmen were remarkably similar during the late 1800s and early 1900s, so much so that, fearing an overpopulation of Chinese immigrants, they had turned to importing Japanese to work in the sugarcane and pineapple fields of Hawaii and assume odd jobs on the West Coast. Ironically, the end result was that over the forty-plus years from 1882, when the Chinese Exclusion Act signaled a boom in the emigration of Japanese, to 1924, when the Japanese Exclusion Act ended Japanese immigration, over 180,000 Japanese arrived in Hawaii and over another 80,000 in the United States, eventually outnumbering the Chinese. Concerns began to rise over the Issei, or the first generation of Japanese abroad--the first Japanese immigrants. Not only was there a dramatic growth in another Asian population, but also the new menial laborers, willing to work longer and harder for less, were displacing white American workers. Too, the Japanese situation was further aggravated by the uniqueness of the culture imported in whole by immigrants who expected to eventually return home. As contract terms expired, few Japanese had made their fortunes, and as more began to look upon Hawaii and the United States as their home, measures were taken against them. Alien land laws that prevented Japanese land ownership were passed in 1913 and 1920. A 1922 Supreme Court Ruling prohibited Issei from becoming naturalized citizens and the 1924 Exclusion Act ended Japanese immigration. Even as late as 1940, efforts were undertaken in Senate hearings to prevent the enlistment of minorities in the armed forces, including blacks and Japanese Americans.

Thus, the Issei, who had imported their culture in whole expecting to eventually return home, instead ended up creating a unique culture melding the American concepts of freedom and opportunity with such Japanese cultural mores as familial piety, loyalty,
obligation and *on* (a deep sense of gratitude and indebtedness), *ganbare* (a never quit attitude), and *haji* (an almost fatalistic drive to avoid shame and disgrace). While their heritage set them apart from other Americans, it also united them as a people by providing common ideals and values amidst growing anti-Japanese sentiment. Further tempered by the early events of World War II, these traits formed the bedrock of the character of the entire combat team. As the *Nisei* came of age and struggled to prove the loyalty of their people, the regiment’s shared values formed a solid base for the cohesion among the *Nisei* in uniform. This cohesion, along with the nearly unanimous goal of having to prove themselves and their people, gave great motivation to the men of the 100th Battalion and 442d Regimental Combat Team.

**Formation of the 100th Battalion and 442d Regimental Combat Team**

As America readied for war in 1940, *Nisei* in uniform faced a precarious situation. In Hawaii, the Selective Service Act brought much needed manpower to the defense of the islands, but over one-half of the 3000 inductees in the (now-federalized) Hawaii National Guard’s 298th and 299th Regiments were AJAs and a sizeable number also served in various Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments. By the time of the attack against Pearl Harbor, *Nisei* in uniformed service and registered with the selective service numbered in the thousands. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into World War II, all persons of Japanese ancestry throughout the services were at once branded disloyal and given restricted duty, removed from active service, or reclassified by the selective service as IV-C, ineligible for military service due to ancestry. The University of Hawaii’s ROTC detachment, after initially being activated and called to supplement the active and reserve forces in defense of the
Hawaiian Islands was soon disbanded, its Japanese American members discharged from service. The 298th and 299th Regiments were forced to release or, in many instances, even incarcerate its Nisei soldiers.\textsuperscript{12}

As severe as was the treatment of the Nisei in uniform, the plight of the AJAs not in uniform was worse. Almost 400 Issei, Nisei, and Kibei (AJAs educated in Japan) were interned in Hawaii, and many more targeted for surveillance and/or investigation. Those in military-related, sensitive, or otherwise vital labor positions were placed under armed escort and were issued special black “restricted” identification badges--loosely reminiscent of the Star of David worn by Jews in Nazi occupied Europe.\textsuperscript{13} Eventually, 1,444 Japanese, 979 aliens, and 525 other AJAs were interned in Hawaii, and another 981 were sent to mainland internment camps.\textsuperscript{14}

Beyond the regulations targeting the Nisei, the most visible example of anti-Japanese frenzy following the attack on Pearl Harbor was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order (EO) 9066. Signed on 19 February 1942, EO 9066 suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus, essentially stripped the Nisei of their Fifth Amendment right that no person should be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and incarcerated over 120,000 Americans of Japanese Ancestry in ten mainland relocation centers. Justified as “military necessity” by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command and head of security for the West Coast, this action ran contrary to the reports from advisors, the FBI, and even the U.S Army counterespionage section in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{15} Yet, Lieutenant General DeWitt concluded himself that the AJA population posed a significant threat on the West Coast. Likewise, his claims that “A Jap’s a Jap” and “an exact separation of the ‘sheep from the
goats’ was impossible” personified Nisei persecution in the Mainland and exemplified the prejudicial challenges faced by the mainland AJAs.

Against this backdrop of discrimination the concept of an all-Japanese American unit was born. The first unit began as AJAs in the 298th and 299th Regiments were dispersed and reassigned to noncombat units. It was soon apparent that another option was needed as combat support and combat service support units soon filled to authorized strength. Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, commander of the Army’s Hawaiian Department, then decided to group all AJA soldiers into a single unit. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, acting on these recommendations, authorized the formation of an overstrength all-Nisei battalion to be transferred to the mainland at the earliest opportunity and trained as an infantry combat unit. Thus was created the all-Nisei “Hawaii Provisional Battalion,” a unit born not of lofty ideals but of the simple necessity to determine what to do with the Japanese Americans already in uniform.

Initial composition of the Hawaii Provisional Battalion when it left Hawaii for the mainland in June of 1942 was about 29 officers and 1,300 enlisted men. Over 95 percent were sons of immigrants (Nisei), 35 per cent were dual citizens, and 2 percent were Kibei. At twenty-four years, the average age of the battalion was higher than the army average, but then so was the average of their Army intelligence scores, which at 103 was only seven points below the minimum required for entrance into the Officer Candidate School. Enroute to its new training site at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, the battalion was officially redesignated the 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate). This was a distinctive unit designation in that the Army’s regimental designation system during the period designated battalions assigned to parent regiments consecutively as “first,” “second,” and
“third.” Since the *Nisei* unit was separate, without a parent unit, it was given the unique battalion designation of “100” or as the Hawaiians called it in their Pidgin English vernacular, “One, Puka, Puka.”

As the separate battalion adjusted to life in the mainland and the Midwest through late 1942, Army and political officials were still wrestling with the issue of what to do with the *Nisei* in the internment camps. The successful performance of the 100th Battalion could pave the way for the formation of a larger Japanese American unit. Reactions to the employment of AJAs in combat were mixed. The AJAs themselves were enthusiastic for any opportunity to prove their patriotism and loyalty. But upon hearing of the possible formation of a larger *Nisei* unit, public outcry by individuals, as well as groups, was still high. Citizen’s groups, such as the Native Sons of the Golden West, Santa Monica Bay Parlor Number 267, as well as high-ranking officials, including Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Mississippi Senator John L. Rankin, opposed the enlistment of AJAs.

Ironically, what turned the tide for the formation of a larger *Nisei* regiment was propaganda. Imperial Japanese propaganda in Southeast Asia maintained that the war against Japan was a war based on racial discrimination and used EO 9066 and the relocation camps as evidence. Elmer Davis, director of the Office of Wartime Information, brought this matter to President Roosevelt, arguing that the formation of an AJA unit would discredit the enemy and have great propaganda value in itself. The propaganda value of the segregated regiment was dual purposed. In addition to discrediting enemy propaganda, the formation of an all AJA unit would serve as a sort of friendly propaganda to also prove the loyalty of the AJAs to the American people. When questioned by prospective volunteers about the logic behind the segregated unit, recruiters explained:

If your strength were diffused through the Army of the United States—as has already been done with many other Americans of your blood—relatively little account would be taken of your action. You would be important only as manpower—nothing more. But united and working together, you would become a symbol of something greater than your individual selves, and the effect would be felt both in the United States and abroad. All other Americans would long
remember you for what you had done for the country, and you would be living reproach to those who have been prejudiced against you because of your Japanese blood.\textsuperscript{22}

With the argument out in the open, others weighed in to argue that the formation of an all-\textit{Nisei} unit was good for the AJAs and for America. Proponents included Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, General George C. Marshall, and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who were astounded at the contributions of the \textit{Nisei Varsity Victory Volunteers} to Hawaii’s defenses during a mid-1942 visit to the islands.

Unencumbered by the racism of the West Coast or of the South (as we shall see), and since most members of the separate battalion were former National Guardsmen with previous military training, the 100th Battalion’s training at Camp McCoy progressed rapidly, well beyond expectations. Comments were highly positive from all corners. The 6th Service Command noted that “the 100th was one of the best trained outfits encamped in the Mid-West” and visiting generals and observers were routinely impressed with the battalion’s proficiency with weapons and tactics.\textsuperscript{23} The proficiency of the 100th added immensely to the argument for the formation of the AJA regiment. The matter was finally settled on 22 January 1943 when the War Department directed the formation of the AJA 442d Regimental Combat Team, composed of the 442d Infantry Regiment, the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, the 232d Engineer Combat Company, an antitank company, a cannon company, and additional service and support units. (see figure 1)

President Roosevelt endorsed the move saying:

\begin{quote}
The proposal of the War Department to organize a combat team consisting of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent has my full approval. No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that
\end{quote}
Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal American citizen should be given an opportunity to serve this country.²⁴

In January 1943, the 100th battalion moved to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for battalion and higher-level collective training. Shortly after, in February, recruiting began to fill the initial requirement for 4,500 volunteers for the Nisei regiment. Reactions to the call were mixed. Hawaiian Nisei, or “buddhaheads,” were elated with the decision. They would finally have an opportunity to prove themselves. The Mainland Nisei, previously subjected to blatant racism and having suffered through the internment centers, had different views. Many were bitter and angry. This was not the only source of disagreement between the two Nisei groups within the 442d RCT. The War Department had hoped to fill the 442d’s initial call for Nisei volunteers with roughly 3,500 from the mainland relocation centers and 1,500 from Hawaii. The Mainland Nisei, feeling betrayed, were reluctant to volunteer; only about 1,200 were recruited from the internment camps. In stark contrast, more than 10,000 volunteered from Hawaii, and 2,600 were accepted during the initial call. This imbalance would also be a source for continued friction between the Mainland-born “kotonks” and the “buddhaheads” from Hawaii. Too, the Hawaiian Nisei, who were part of the largest ethnic group in the islands and had not known prejudice or racism, were generally gregarious and outgoing. But the “kotonks,” raised as minorities in the mainland, were frequently more reserved and less outgoing than their counterparts from Hawaii. The difference in attitudes between the jovial “buddhaheads” and mainland-born “kotonks” caused minor scuffles between the two groups early on. Fights broke out during training at first, but subsided as the men
Figure 1 - 100/442d RCT Organization
bonded under combat. Still, the terms “buddhahead” and “kotonk” jokingly persisted throughout the war.\textsuperscript{25}

Despite minor, mainly colloquial differences, the men bonded together and the \textit{Nisei}'s proficiency continued to impress onlookers, including every unit to which the unit was attached. Still, the 100th Battalion and soon the 442d Regiment were subject to prejudice, not only from GIs already stationed at Camp Shelby, but from the surrounding Southern populace, who seemed confused and sometimes hostile towards the blur in the segregation between black and white caused by the brown-skinned \textit{Nisei}. In addition to the prejudice of other GIs and the locals, Army investigations continued to the extent that an inspector at Camp Shelby at one point was checking fingerprints on tableware! Another blow to the AJAs’ fight against racism was the loyalty test administered in the internment camps at the direction of Dillon S. Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority. While well intentioned to simply determine the willingness of Mainland AJAs to serve in the military, the loyalty test instead provoked riots. The \textit{Nisei} were United States citizens by birth, but now, on top of being imprisoned by their own country, they were being asked to forswear an allegiance to an enemy country to which they had never belonged. This slap in the face was enough to further hamper recruiting efforts in the relocation centers. No such test was administered to Hawaiian \textit{Nisei}.\textsuperscript{26}

While the 100th’s collective training continued, recruiting for the 442d concluded and individual, or basic, training for the regiment began in May 1943 and lasted through October. Training for the 442d progressed rapidly too, though not quite as rapidly as had the 100th Battalion’s, due primarily to the fact that the 100th Battalion’s men had more
military experience to start with and were, generally, older and more mature than the 442d’s complement.

**Combat**

While the regiment was still undergoing basic training, the call for deployment came for the 100th Battalion. Departing Camp Shelby on 11 August, it arrived in Oran, North Africa, on 2 September and moved on to Italy shortly thereafter. Following basic training, the 442d completed advanced unit training or Series ‘D’ exercises by March 1944, and after successful inspection and review by General Marshall, the commander of the 442d RCT, Colonel Charles W. Pence, was directed to prepare the unit for overseas movement.

By the time the 442d reached the battlefront, the 100th Battalion had been in the combat zone for almost nine months, attached to the 34th “Red Bull” Infantry Division of General Mark W. Clark’s Fifth Army. It received its baptism of fire at Salerno and fought at Cassino and Anzio. Despite a warm reception and an in-theater integration, familiarization, and training program hosted by the seasoned 34th Division, initial losses were extremely heavy. Suffering over 900 casualties out of its complement of 1300, the 100th earned the moniker, “The Purple Heart Battalion.” Replacements were received from the 442d’s First Battalion still in training at Camp Shelby. Still, the AJAs of the 100th Battalion fought well. General Clark remarked:

I should mention here that a bright spot in this period was the performance of the 100th Battalion, which had recently been assigned to the 34th Division. This battalion was made up of Japanese-Americans and was to become one of the most valuable units in the Fifth Army. . . . Except for several months in southern France, the 100th Battalion fought magnificently throughout the Italian campaign. It won the Presidential unit citation for the destruction of a German SS battalion on mount Belvedere. . . . These Nisei troops seem to be very conscious of the fact
that they had an opportunity to prove the loyalty of many thousands of Americans of Japanese Ancestry and they willingly paid a high price to achieve that goal. I was proud to have them in the Fifth Army.  

Following the 100th’s participation in the Naples-Foggia Campaign from September 1943 to January 1944, which included action at Salerno, the Volturno River, Cassino, and Anzio, the regiment caught up with the 100th Battalion and the 34th Infantry Division at Civitavecchia, Italy, on 10 June 1944. Upon arrival, the regiment, less the First Battalion, was attached to the 34th Division and the 100th was attached to the 442d RCT. The 100th was not actually assigned to the 442d RCT until August 1944, and even then, due to its distinguished record, it was allowed to keep its distinctive numerical designation. The official title of the Japanese American outfit then became the “100th/442nd Regimental Combat Team.” The remainder of the First Battalion remained at Camp Shelby as training cadre for more Nisei replacements.

The first action of the combined 100th Battalion and the 442d RCT was on 26 June 1944, at the battle of Belvedere. The regiment’s Second and Third Battalions led the attack but were soon pinned down. Before the 442d’s first action became a rout, the veteran 100th Battalion, initially tasked as the 34th Division reserve, took the lead from the less experienced Second and Third Battalions and captured the town with renewed vigor. As a tactical objective, Belvedere had slowed the advance of the entire 34th Division. For this achievement, the battalion was awarded its first Presidential Unit Citation (PUC). The combat team continued in the Rome-Arno Campaign through September 1944, fighting at Hill 140, Leghorn, and across the Arno River.

Detached from the 100/442d RCT on 15 August 1944, the Anti-Tank Company glider-landed in Southern France during Operation Dragoon, foreshadowing the later
move of the entire regiment into the Southern France Theater. The regiment also gained credit for participation in the Rhineland Campaign, September 1944 to March 1945, where it rescued the Lost Battalion. The 522d Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the regiment to participate in the Central Europe Campaign, March to May 1945, where it was attached to no fewer than five divisions, including the 4th Infantry and the 101st Airborne, and helped liberate the camps at Dachau. The regiment’s final campaigns were back in Italy, in the Northern Apennines Campaign from September 1944 to April 1945 and in the Po Valley, April to May 1945, where, less the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, it was attached to the 92d “Buffalo” Division and played a crucial part in capturing Mt. Folgorito, Mt. Belvedere, Pariana, Mt. Pizzacuto, Bologna, and helped shatter the western defenses of the Gothic Line.

By war’s end, the 100th/442d Regimental Combat Team had fought in seven major campaigns in Italy and France and suffered over 9,500 casualties, including 650 killed in action. It became the most highly decorated Army unit of its size, having earned seven Presidential Unit Citations, two Meritorious Unit Plaques, an Army (Unit) Commendation (the equivalent of a DSC for the entire unit) and over 18,000 individual awards for valor, including:

21 Medals of Honor,
52 Distinguished Service Crosses (DSC),
1 Distinguished Service Medal (DSM),
28 Oak Leaf Clusters to the Silver Star,
560 Silver Star Medals (SSM),
22 Legion of Merit Medals (LOM),
15 Soldier’s Medals (SM),
Approximately 1,500 Oak Leaf Clusters for the Bronze Star Medal,
Approximately 4,000 Bronze Star Medals (BSM),
12 (French) Croix de Guerre,
2 (French) Palms to the Croix de Guerre,
2 (Italian) Croce Al Merito Di Guerra,
2 (Italian) Medaglia Di Bronzo Al Valore Militaire,
1 Air Medal,
468 Oak Leaf Clusters to the Purple Heart,
9,486 Purple Heart Medals (PH),
26 Army Commendations, and
87 Division Commendations.  

The Lost Battalion

Of the seven campaigns in which the 100/442d RCT participated, the most noteworthy was the Rhineland Campaign in France, while assigned to Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch’s Seventh Army. Of these seven months, the deadliest, most demanding month was October 1944, the first full month in theater, spent attached to Major General John E. Dahlquist’s 36th “Texas” Division in the Vosges Mountains. This was the defining moment for the Japanese American 100/442d Regimental Combat Team. It was the culminating point, both militarily and figuratively, in the existence of the unit and when it was over, the unit required dedicated recovery and reconstitution. By the end of the month, the regiment had earned three more Presidential Unit Citations;
liberated Bruyeres, Belmont, and Biffontaine; and rescued the Lost Battalion, but at a cost of over 800 casualties.

Like most “rescues,” the rescue of the Lost Battalion itself was not a planned operation, but an unforeseen development in the base operation, the Seventh Army’s advance through France and the VI Corps’ drive on St. Die. Following the Seventh Army’s landing on the French Riviera on 15 August 1944, Operation Dragoon had Major General Lucian Truscott’s VI Corps race through southern France to seize the Belfort Gap near the French-German-Swiss border. (see figure 2) By 19 September, the Seventh Army had reached the Moselle River but was then slowed, like Bradley’s Twelfth and Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Groups to the north, by severe supply shortages and also by stiffening German resistance as they approached the German frontier. On 29 September, Seventh Army issued new orders, changing the easterly direction of attack to a northeasterly one headed for Strasbourg.33 Before Strasbourg could be taken, however, the Seventh Army needed to breach the Vosges Mountains. Severely restricted terrain and worsening weather aided the German’s defense. Where the Seventh Army had advanced over 350 miles from the Riviera to the Moselle River in just under four weeks, advances in October were more accurately measured in yards.34 In the face of one panzer, one reserve, and four infantry divisions, the VI Corps needed to seize St. Die, the industrial center of the region, which controlled the mountain passes and straddled German defenses along the Meurthe River.

To the 36th Division fell the task of seizing Bruyeres, controlling one of the approaches to St. Die. The 100/442d RCT arrived in France on 30 September and closed on the front lines by 13 October. The regiment went into the line the following day and
SEVENTH ARMY ADVANCE THROUGH FRANCE
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1944

OPERATION ANVIL/DRAGOON 15 AUG 44

7 SEP 44
1 SEP 44
25 AUG 44

Figure 2
seized Bruyères on 19 October after bitter, often house-to-house, fighting. The 36th, with the 100/442d RCT attached, pressed on, in support of the 3d Division’s attack to seize St. Die. Biffontaine fell on 23 October. Although on the line for only ten days, the stress was unrelenting due to the continuous combat, wet and frigid weather, and the steep, densely wooded hills, factors totally unfamiliar to the Nisei, who had just come from the relatively warmer, more hospitable climes of summer in southern Italy. The Second Battalion, 442d RCT, came off the line and moved into Belmont for rest and recovery on 23 October, followed by the 100th and Third Battalions on the 24th. The respite was short lived for as the Nisei combat team came off the line, the 141st Regiment was beginning its attack that would lead to the encirclement and the rescue of its lead battalion.

Early on 23 October 1944, the 141st “Alamo” Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, began to advance eastward from Belmont through the Foret Domaniale de Champ to assault German positions near La Houssiere. The regiment advanced in column along the ridgeline almost seven kilometers long, but not even two kilometers wide, directly towards La Houssiere. The First Battalion, in the lead, advanced quickly, creating a salient and outdistancing itself from the rest of the regiment. Its A and B Companies, as well as platoons from C and D Companies, were soon cut off from the battalion headquarters and the rest of the regiment by elements of the German 16th Volks-Grenadier Division, 716th Volks-Grenadier Division, Grenadiers Regiment 933, Schnellabteilung (Mobile Unit) 602, Heeres Gebirgsjager Bataillons (Mountain Battalions) 201 and 202, and Reserve Battalion 285. It attempted a breakout from the encirclement with no success. The Alamo Regiment’s Second and Third Battalions
attempted to break through to their sister unit, also without success. The Lost Battalion’s 275 soldiers, six kilometers behind enemy lines, were now led by First Lieutenant Martin Higgins, voted into command by his peers in the perimeter. \(^3^7\)

With fewer than two days recovery following the battles at Bruyeres and Biffontaine, the 100/442d RCT was ordered to rescue the Lost Battalion. The Second Battalion, 442d RCT, relieved the Third Battalion, 141st Regiment, early on the morning of Wednesday, 25 October, and immediately engaged a German infantry company reinforced with machine guns, heavy mortars, and self-propelled guns. The 100th Battalion and the Third Battalion, 442d RCT, were ordered into the operation on the following day. As the main effort, the 100th Battalion advanced on the right (south) with an attached medium tank company, elements of a tank destroyer company, and elements of a 4.2-inch chemical mortar company. Third Battalion was in the center also with an attached medium tank company and a 4.2-inch chemical mortar company. The Second Battalion was on the left (north), maintaining contact with the 3d Infantry Division. The 133d Field Artillery Battalion reinforced the 100/442d’s organic 522d Field Artillery Battalion. \(^3^8\)

The fighting was fierce, progress slow, and casualties heavy. The dense woods and craggy, rugged terrain of steep hills provided excellent cover and concealment for the German defenses, which were centered around machine gun emplacements and company-sized reinforced road blocks on the few ragged logging trails in the area. Artillery fired into the high trees caused tree bursts that increased its lethality as fragments rained downward. Additionally, weather significantly impacted operations as
the rains, snow, and mud signaled the onset of the worst winter in the region in forty years.\textsuperscript{39}

The Lost Battalion’s situation was grim. Forced to defend an area less than 350 by 300 meters in size, it had only one radio, no food, and little ammunition. Water, while obtainable, was from a muddy hole that was also used by the Germans. Resupply was impossible over land. Instead, artillery shells and aircraft drop tanks were loaded with emergency (“D”) rations, radio batteries, and medical supplies in an effort to resupply the Lost Battalion. These efforts met with mixed success as the shells buried themselves deep into the French hillsides and the P-47s initially missed their drop zones inside the small perimeter. Patrols from the surrounded unit had no success in contacting outside units; one thirty-six-man patrol was destroyed and another fifty-three-man patrol returned to the perimeter with only five men.\textsuperscript{40}

The 100th and Third Battalions attacked abreast to the east without letup through the thick forests, battling the frigid weather, as well as snipers, roadblocks, machine-gun nests, airbursts, mines, and booby traps. By Friday, 27 October, the 100/442d’s battalions were on line heading slowly for the Lost Battalion under heavy clouds and freezing rain while the Second and Third Battalions of the 141st, as well as the sister 143d Regiment, balked and remained static.\textsuperscript{41} The Second Battalion, to the north, attacked Hill 617 to secure the flank of the main effort to the south. The narrow, restricted terrain at this point along the main ridgeline leading to the Lost Battalion forced the 100th and Third Battalions to converge and allowed only enough room for two companies to advance abreast. The 100th Battalion swung right, down the ridge in an attempt to outflank the German defenses, while the Third Battalion moved forward along

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the ridge. On 28 October, after gaining 350 yards, it was stopped by another heavily defended roadblock, which required direct-fire tank support to reduce. As another freezing night fell, the 100/442d RCT established defenses, unable to continue the attack in the pitch black of the deep forests.

On Sunday, 29 October 1944, the Nisei renewed the attack. Major General Dahlquist continued to press the 100/442d to rescue the Lost Battalion “at all costs.” His presence at the 100th Battalion’s and the 442d’s Command Posts throughout the crisis underscored the criticality of the situation. Not only was the momentum of the 36th slowed now that it was in the Vosges, but he was also in danger of losing one of his battalions. Finally, overcome with anger and frustration, the Nisei of the Third Battalion, 442d RCT, spontaneously fixed bayonets and conducted a classic bayonet charge which, together with a heavy artillery barrage, broke the German defenses. Early on the thirtieth, the 211 survivors of the First Battalion, 141st Infantry were relieved. The cost was high. The 100/442d RCT arrived in France on 12 October with 193 officers and 3,313 men. By the end of the rescue on 31 October, it had suffered over 800 casualties in two weeks of action through the seizure of Bruyeres, Biffontaine, and the rescue of the Lost Battalion, including 117 killed in action (KIA), 639 wounded in action (WIA), 40 missing in action (MIA), and 18 injured. In contrast, the 36th Division started October with 730 officers and 12,785 soldiers and battle casualties for the division for the same month numbered 1785, including 218 KIA, 1432 WIA, 154 MIA, and 38 died of wounds (DOW). Most companies, usually about 200 strong, were down to between forty and fifty men. Still, following the rescue of the Lost Battalion, the 100/442d RCT was directed to continue the attack. Finally pulled from the line on 8 and 9 November, the
regiment was at less than half strength. Senator, then-Second Lieutenant, Daniel K. Inouye best describes their situation following the rescue of the Lost Battalion:

When General Dahlquist called the regiment out for a retreat parade to commend us personally, he is reported to have said to the C.O., “Colonel, I asked that your entire regiment be present for this occasion. Where are the rest of your men?”

And Colonel Charles W. Pence, as bone-weary as any dogface in the outfit, replied, “Sir, you are looking at the entire regiment. Except for two men on guard duty at each company, this is all that is left of the 442nd Combat Team.”

And there we were, cooks, medics, band, and a handful of riflemen, a ragged lot at rigid attention, without a single company at even half its normal strength. One had only 17 men and was commanded by a staff sergeant [E-6]. My outfit, E Company, with a normal complement of 197 men, had exactly 40 soldiers able to march to the parade ground.

General Dahlquist looked at us for a long time. Twice he started to speak and choked on the overpowering feelings that took hold of him. And in the end, all he could manage was an emotional “Thank you, men. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.” And the saddest retreat parade in the history of the 442nd was over.45

By mid-November, the combat team was reassigned to what would later be called the “Champagne Campaign” in and around Nice and the Riviera. For four months replacements filled in and the wounded returned to duty, while the regiment patrolled the Alps and took advantage of the recreational opportunities offered by the region before heading back to Italy and the Fifth Army.

Significance

By the beginning of World War II, Americans of Japanese Ancestry could look back to the arrival of the Gannen Mono in Hawaii in 1868 upon a history that spanned over seventy years. At first hardly intertwined with American life, the contract laborers brought their customs to America whole and intact, fully expecting to return to their homeland. But as their prospects of returning to Japan faded, they quickly assimilated into American culture blending their strong family ties and feelings of obligation (on)
with the American concepts of freedom and equality. This produced a unique Japanese American Culture that, regardless of geographical origin, bonded the *Nisei* together when anti-Japanese hysteria turned the country against them and instilled in them the drive and perseverance to face adversity. The 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate), composed first of *Nisei* in uniform, paved the way for the formation of the all-volunteer 442d Regimental Combat Team and preceded them into combat as part of Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark’s Fifth Army. The cohesion and dedication of the unit shined through as the *Nisei* battalion proved itself in the Italian Campaign. The 442d RCT continued the exemplary record upon entering the theater, again showing the dedication and esprit of the *Nisei* soldiers.

Thus, when the 100/442d RCT was committed in the Vosges Mountains of France in the rescue of the Lost Battalion during the fall of 1944, Major General John E. Dahlquist had at his disposal a well-trained, battle-seasoned, supremely cohesive unit that, quite literally, would not quit. It was employed rescuing a surrounded battalion, the result of an operation gone awry, in the face of determined enemy resistance defending in difficult, unforgiving terrain and harsh weather. Actions by the division and the regiment, its leaders and their men illustrate both good and bad examples of leadership and command during World War II, what today is termed battle command (see figures 3 and 4).
Figure 3. Survivors from the Lost Battalion. *Source:* Tsukano, *Bridge of Love,* 267.

Figure 4. Three days later they were back on the line. *Source:* Tsukano, *Bridge of Love,* 267.
The term “Nisei” is a term of Japanese origin and refers to the number of generations a person is removed from the home country. The first generation removed from Japan, the “Issei” (pronounced “ee-say”), were the first to arrive in Hawaii and the United States in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s. Their children, born in the United States and the Territory of Hawaii are then the second generation removed from Japan or “Nisei.” As an example, since my paternal great-grandfather was the first to arrive in Hawaii, I am fourth generation removed from Japan or “Yonsei.”

AJA, or American of Japanese Ancestry, was a term often used throughout the period, the sentiment being that the Nisei were Americans first. The terms Nisei, AJA, and Japanese American are essentially synonymous.

United States Army, Seventh Army History: Phase Three, The Drive through the Vosges to the Rhine, file N-13215-C, Combined Arms Research Library Archives, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 476.


Ibid., 9.


Ogawa, 9; Hosokawa, 151.


Hazama and Komeiji, 132; Murphy, 54-56.

Interior Department, War Relocation Authority, *Nisei in the War Against Japan*; Murphy, 27-30.

Throughout the war, arguments flowed concerning Japanese American subversion and fifth column activities. Rumor even maintained that AJAs blocked roads and signaled attacking aircraft on 7 December 1941. Yet, there are no documented or substantiated cases of AJA activities against the United States to back up the accusations. Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, said at the time, “that there was no sabotage committed [in Hawaii] prior to December 7, on December 7, or subsequent to that time.” As an intelligence officer pointed out, “Many Niseis voluntarily contributed anti-subversive information to this [intelligence agency] and other governmental agencies. The Japanese consular staff, the central Japanese association and others known to be sympathetic to the Japanese did not themselves trust the *Nisei*.”

Crost, 296-297.

Murphy, 58-60.

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor AJAs continued to serve the U.S. As noted, AJAs in the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments were combined to form the Hawaii Provisional Battalion, later redesignated the 100th Battalion (Separate). *Nisei* members in the University of Hawaii’s ROTC detachment too, served in various groups. The UH ROTC detachment initially supplemented the Army’s defenses. The detachment was soon disbanded however, and its AJA members released. Still desiring to serve, they then formed the core of the Hawaii Territorial Guard. Inactivated on 19 February 1942 largely due to unfounded race-based arguments, the *Nisei* subsequently formed their own group called the Varsity Victory Volunteers (VVV) that assisted the Army Corps of Engineers with construction projects and ran numerous collections and drives. The VVV was disbanded in February 1943 so its members could join the 442d RCT.

Ibid., 68.

Rademaker, 62.

A Separate Battalion, as opposed to a regimental (or normal) battalion, is comparable to a Combat Team in that both units are self-sufficient. In modern terms it is a combined arms task force. Whereas a normal battalion was normally employed with two other battalions as part of a regiment, the separate battalion trained and fought with its own integral support elements, such as anti-tank, artillery, and support units. The all *Nisei* 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) ultimately consisted of one rifle battalion with two extra rifle companies, a service company, a transportation platoon, a medical section, and a service section.
“One, Puka, Puka” is Pidgin English for one-hundred. In Pidgin, “puka,” pronounced “poo-kah,” is a hole. Thus, to the Hawaiians, the 100 looked like a one followed by two holes or “One, Puka, Puka.” It has remained to this day, as the 100th Battalion Veteran’s Organization’s newspaper is called the “Puka Puka Parade.”

21 Crost, 60; Duus, 57.
22 Interior Department, War Relocation Authority, Nisei in Uniform.
23 Murphy, 82-85.
24 Rademaker, 19.
25 Lawrence Sakamoto, Hawaii’s Own: Picture Story of 442nd Regiment, 100th Battalion and Interpreters (Honolulu: Lawrence Sakamoto, 1946), 62-63; Murphy, 114-115. According to the Hawaiians, the mainlanders’ heads made the noise “kotonk-kotonk” when they were beaten in their many fights. The islanders, on the other hand, were called “buddhaheads” which may have stemmed from the Hawaiian colloquialism that was a general reference to any Japanese person. Alternatively, it may have been derived from the Japanese word buta, or pig, referring to the Hawaiian’s seemingly unrefined behavior.

The animosity between the Hawaiians and the mainlanders was primarily a problem for the 442d Regiment since the original men of the 100th Battalion were all from the Hawaiian National Guard 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments. During training at Camp Shelby, tensions eased when some of the “buddhaheads” visited AJA internment camps in Arkansas and word spread amongst the Hawaiians about the hardships faced by the “kotonks.” When required following action in Italy, mainland replacements for the 100th were easily integrated without friction due to the maturity of the 100th Battalion members and the “big brother” relationship between the veterans and the replacements.

27 Murphy, 118-119.
28 Chester Tanaka, Go For Broke; A Pictorial history of the Japanese American 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1997), 51.
By definition, a regiment is “an administrative and tactical unit of the Army. A regiment is larger than a battalion, smaller than a brigade or division, and is usually commanded by a Colonel.” In fact, a regiment is usually composed of three battalions, or about 4000 men. A combat team can be equated to today’s concept of a task force. By comparative definition, a combat team (in 1944) was “two or more units of different branches acting together in battle” as was the case with the 442d RCT. The 442d Regimental Combat Team would ultimately include a Headquarters Company, three battalions; the 100th, Second, and Third; the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, the 232d Engineer Combat Company, an Anti-Tank Company, a Cannon Company, a Service Company, a Medical Detachment, and a band.


In comparison, the 141st Infantry “Alamo” Regiment, through five years of service in World War II earned 3 Medals of Honor, 34 Distinguished Service Crosses, 12 Legion of Merit Medals, 492 Silver Star Medals, 11 Soldier’s Medals, 1,685 Bronze Star Medals, and 40 foreign decorations.

33 Seventh Army History: Phase Three, The Drive through the Vosges to the Rhine, 444-446, 472-476.

The change in direction of attack was due to a boundary shift; the First French Army was then given the task of seizing Belfort.

34 Ibid.


37 Ibid., 25; Huff, np.

38 United States Army, 442d RCT, Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21250, Location 270/63/18/4, National Archives.

39 Keynote address by Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim to the Club 100 40th Anniversary Banquet, 3 July 1982. Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, Las Vegas, Nevada.

40 Huff, np; Steidl, 81.
41Duus, 201; COL(R)Young O Kim, interview by author, 1 December 2001, Las Vegas, Nevada.

42Shirey, 65; 442d RCT, Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44; Steidl, 86.

43Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44; Rademaker, 79; Duus, 200-201.

Not insignificantly, the 442d’s adjacent units sat idle during the rescue of the Lost Battalion in the Vosges Mountains. The 141st, the parent regiment of the Lost Battalion, gave up after only one day and the 143d Regiment, within earshot of the 442d, refused to advance.


An issue exists regarding the number of casualties suffered by the 100/442d RCT during the rescue of the Lost Battalion. Most accounts maintain that the Nisei regiment “suffered over 800 casualties in the rescue.” This is incorrect. The regiment sustained 814, killed, wounded, injured and missing in action through the entire month of October, as listed, by name, in the 100/442d RCT’s Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44.


Interestingly, then-Second Lieutenant Inouye, who was the second to the last man drafted for the 442d in 1943, missed the battle to rescue the Lost Battalion. Selected for a battlefield commission on 23 October 1944, he was removed from the line and taken back to regimental headquarters for a physical examination and other administrative matters relating to his commissioning. He returned to his unit on 6 November and led his platoon through the subsequent campaigns in the Maritime Alps and the Po Valley, where he was seriously wounded and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), later upgraded to the Congressional Medal of Honor.
CHAPTER III

VISUALIZE

Therefore I say: “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory then will be total.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The first requirement of successful battle command is visualization. In the context of military operations, visualization encompasses seeing, understanding, and, most importantly, appreciating the situation surrounding the mission. It involves determining the mission, end state, and tasks to be accomplished. It requires an accurate assessment of the enemy forces and capabilities involved, as well as an appreciation of the restrictions and limitations created by the terrain and weather in the region. It demands a frank and honest assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the friendly troops and forces available. It necessitates a realistic estimation and expectation of what can be done in the available time. Visualization also requires that civil factors that affect and shape the operation be addressed to minimize the impact upon the local area and inhabitants.

Once the situation and end state are understood and appreciated, battle command visualization employs the elements of operational design to design and develop a plan that achieves the desired end state. The envisaged plan addresses decisive points and objectives. Actions are arranged simultaneously, sequentially, or both, with the limitations of operational reach buttressed by realistic limits of advance. If necessary, operational pauses are planned to prevent culmination.
During the rescue of the Lost Battalion, visualization was haphazard and often less than thorough from the division down to the battalion level. This was primarily due to the unplanned nature of the operation, but also due to the command styles of the key leaders. This, in turn, made an arduous mission more difficult and increased the challenges encountered by the Nisei regiment in their operations in the forests of the French Vosges Mountains.

**METT-TC Analysis**

By late-September 1944, the Allied advance through France slowed as combat units over-stretched logistical support and German resistance stiffened with the Allies’ approach to the Fatherland. In support of Lieutenant General Patch’s goal to enter Germany prior to winter, Major General Truscott’s VI Corps, consisting of the American 36th, 3d, and 45th Divisions, was tasked with breaching the Vosges Mountains and securing the Saales Pass running from St. Die to Strasbourg. The 36th Division, with the 100/442d RCT attached, was initially designated the main effort and advanced on this axis with the 45th Division supporting on its left (north) and the 3d Division in reserve. By mid-October, the 3d Division had been brought out of reserve and assumed the main effort between the 45th and 36th Divisions for the push on St. Die. The 36th Division had seized Bruyeres, but the advance slowed in the Vosges Mountains, a few miles past the town. In his bid to be the first into Germany, Major General Dahlquist was anxious to breach the mountains and press forward. On 23 October 1944, the division sent an ill-defined order to the 141st Regiment to send “a patrol of company or battalion strength to work down a trail through the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP to the high ground (350570) north of LA HOUSSIERE (345555).” The regiment set out in column with its
First Battalion in lead and was soon heavily engaged. By the evening of the 24th, elements of the First Battalion were cut off from support, nearly a kilometer short of their objective, and dubbed by the press as the “Lost Battalion.”

Mission

By the time the 100/442d RCT was given the mission to relieve the Lost Battalion on 25 October 1944, the Texans had been cut off from their parent regiment for nearly thirty-six hours. Efforts by the battalion’s two sister units had proven futile. At the division level, the mission was clear: rescue the Lost Battalion.

As part of visualization, the commander determines the mission, focusing on identifying and specifying the tasks that must be accomplished, as well as the mission’s overarching purpose. The determination of the mission also specifies which units will accomplish the tasks, as well as where and when the operation is to take place.\(^4\) Since these elements will be more thoroughly addressed through the remainder of the METT-TC analysis, this discussion of the mission at hand focuses on the tasks and the purpose of the operation.

Missions originate from orders from higher command or are developed from ongoing operations. Missions that follow other missions, or plans that follow the conclusion of a given mission are sequels. Branches are options built into the original base plan. Since the rescue originated neither as a planned outcome (sequel) nor as an anticipated option (branch), it was a wholly new, though hastily defined, mission. Yet, although hastily developed, the task was unambiguous: the cutoff unit needed to be rescued.
Less clear was the purpose behind this task. Plainly, the relief of an isolated force is tactically necessary to minimize the loss of lives and preserve combat power, to maintain morale, and to maintain the momentum of the advance, but the Lost Battalion episode had additional and arguably less noble motivations. At the start, the Lost Battalion comprised only some 275 men commanded by a lieutenant; it was not a battalion, but only the size of a reinforced company. Additionally, the commander of the First Battalion, 141st Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel William Bird, as well as his staff, was not even located with the cut off force. Thus, the losses suffered by the 100/442d RCT through the six-day effort to rescue the trapped men raise the question as to the actual worth of the entire operation: was the relief of 211 men worth the culmination of an entire regiment?

Tactical considerations notwithstanding, the consensus amongst the veterans of the rescue is that Major General Dahlquist needed to rescue the trapped battalion to save his career, the assumption being that the loss of one of his nine infantry battalions would surely have cost him his command and prevented him for reaching his eventual four-star rank. That Major General Dahlquist repeatedly ordered the Nisei regiment to effect the rescue “at all costs” adds a further element of doubt to the motivations behind this mission also, especially in light of the fact that the rest of the 141st Regiment sat idle during the fight. Still, regardless of the purpose and personal motivations behind the formulation of the mission, the task was clear and it stood: rescue the Lost Battalion.

To avoid encirclement and annihilation by the Allied Third and Seventh Armies, General der Infanterie Heinrich Friedrich Wiese’s Nineteenth Army began Operation

Prisoners taken by the 100/442d RCT during this period indicate that they were fighting the 933d Regiment, the 201st and 202d Mountain Battalions, as well as elements of the 338th Division and the 198th Fusilier Battalion in their area of operations during the rescue.

While the forces facing the 36th Division seem impressive, closer scrutiny reveals that the divisions were severely undermanned with the approximate strength of a regiment, or about 2,000 men, and utilized significant amounts of less-capable older men and teen-aged boys, or *Volksturm*, to fill ranks depleted through the retreat across France. To overcome these deficiencies in the face of the American VI Corps advance through the Vosges, Operation Dogface, the Germans bolstered their meager defenses with an additional 3000 reinforcements and established a defense in depth well integrated with the terrain. Plans were developed to utilize dedicated *kampfgruppen* and “fire brigades,” as well as “alarm units” composed of rear-echelon support troops to counterattack any significant breakthroughs. 

In addition to the available typical infantry small arms, German armament included additional machine guns (twenty additional battalions to the
Army Group), mortars, and larger assets, such as Nebelwerfer multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled artillery, and tanks. To further strengthen the defenses, vast quantities of mines and artillery were employed. Mines of all types, including “Bouncing Betties” and the difficult-to-detect, nonmetallic schuh mine, were employed to great effect. Artillery fire was incessant, the effects of which were magnified by the tree bursts caused by the dense forest and tall trees.

If the strength and quality of the forces facing the Allies and the 100/442d RCT in their efforts to relieve the Lost Battalion were less than intimidating, the Americans also had to face defenders fighting with the fervor inspired by decrees from higher command. The first Fuehrer befehls, issued by Hitler as the Allies approached the German frontier, mandated that German forces “hold at all costs.” The enemy would be fighting to defend his homeland, with his back to the wall. A second decree later demanded a battle “to the death” to capture the Lost Battalion and prevent its rescue for morale and, undoubtedly, propaganda purposes.

By early October, this enemy situation at the start of the rescue by the 100/442d RCT was vague and, unfortunately, misinterpreted. This poor grasp of the enemy situation contributed directly to the predicament of the Lost Battalion and continued to hinder the Nisei in their efforts. Since the seizure of Bruyeres on the 19th, resistance had apparently lightened and the 36th Division was generally optimistic. Major General Dahlquist erroneously assumed that the German defenses were broken or were located at least another fourteen kilometers further to the east, as evidenced in his orders to the 141st Regiment:
We’ve taken six hundred German prisoners in the past six days, not counting the number of men we have killed or wounded. We have either broken his line, or he has completed another one here [pointing to the Meurthe River]. General Truscott is trying to make up his mind this morning about the attack. If we break through, we will not have to fight terrain and enemy, we’ll just have to fight terrain.13

His intelligence section mirrored his assessment and, without any mentionable reconnaissance efforts, told the 141st regiment to expect only “light to moderate resistance” in their advance on 23 October.14 This error contributed heavily to the First Battalion, 141st Infantry being cut off as its formation, advancing in column along a single, narrow trail, easily lent itself to being enveloped. Additionally, further errors in judgement surfaced once the 100/442d RCT was committed as rates of advance were overestimated in the face of the mistaken assessment of the enemy’s strength and disposition. These errors would have to be disproved through direct action and the intelligence gained through close quarters combat, action that would see Major General Dahlquist’s aide, Lieutenant Wells Lewis, killed.15 Yet, even when the information was gained, it was often distrusted or written off by the division as the general openly questioned the integrity and judgment of his subordinates on the line. Often, too, what little intelligence was known was not passed down to the troops on the line, although to many of the men, the intelligence information would have seemed superfluous anyway.16

Thus, the enemy forces facing the 100/442d RCT in their task to aid the trapped battalion had been in retreat for over two months and had suffered massive losses. Unit strengths and capabilities were low, but were soon bolstered by additional units and manpower. While outnumbered, the Germans were motivated and had to their advantage a significant ally in the terrain of the Vosges Mountains. Still, faulty intelligence and an
incorrect assessment of the enemy situation, based solely on the number of captured prisoners and unsupported by reconnaissance, were the overriding factors that magnified the problems faced by the 36th Division and the *Nisei* regiment. It was this poor visualization of the enemy situation that led to the predicament of the Lost Battalion and made the 100/442d RCT’s task more difficult.

**Terrain and Weather**

Terrain and weather for an operation are usually assessed in terms of the factors of OAKOC, observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and movement, and cover and concealment. These factors are interrelated. For example, many of the conditions that limit observation and fields of fire may conversely enhance cover and concealment. These same factors may also amplify obstacle effects and obstruct movement. In general, the terrain and weather in the Lost Battalion area of operation favored the defenders and proved to be serious hindrances to the *Nisei*.

The Vosges Mountains, separating Alsace from Lorraine in eastern France, run generally from the cities of Saverne and Strasbourg in the north to Belfort in the south, and are the last natural barrier in this region before encountering the Rhine River and the German border. As the 36th Division approached Germany, it was operating in the Epinal region and sought to seize the Saales Gap in support of the 3d Division’s attack on St. Die. When the First Battalion, 141st Infantry began its advance on 23 October 1944, the Alamo Regiment had passed through the 100/442d RCT and begun operations in the Foret Domaniale de Champ east of the town of Bruyères, about ten kilometers southwest of St. Die. (see figures 2 and 5) The exact operational area of the 100/442d RCT and the Lost Battalion thus encompassed roughly 60 square kilometers, dominated by the Foret
Domaniale de Champ and the towns of Belmont, Biffontaine, and La Houssiere. The entire region, heavily wooded, with steep mountains and ridges and few roads, combined with the miserable wet and cold weather to give a decided advantage to the Germans, who fought from well-prepared positions in a defense in depth well ahead of and along their main line of resistance at the Meurthe River Winter Line.\textsuperscript{17}

The region is mountainous, with the highest peaks in the Vosges reaching over 1400 meters. The terrain in the 100/442d RCT’s sector itself is rough and undulating, with peaks reaching almost 700 meters in elevation and with numerous steep ridges with between 45 and 60 percent slopes. The actual ridgeline along which most of the fighting occurred runs about seven kilometers from the west to the east and southeast and is characterized by numerous fingers and draws extending north and south off the primary ridgeline (see figure 5). The forests, too, are forbidding. At the time, the primary industries in the region were forestry and logging, with the result that some areas were thick, managed forests while other areas were overgrown and junglelike, with considerable underbrush (see figure 6). The few roads in the area were mostly on low ground and high-speed approaches were limited by the canalizing effect of the narrower streets in the numerous towns and villages strewn along them. The forest itself had only a few firebreaks and one or two logging roads. Only a single trail ran the length of the single ridgeline from the units’ line of departure to the Lost Battalion and their objective. Additionally, the early onset of the worst winter in forty years, which brought blustery winds, freezing temperatures, and a steady, penetrating rain, turned the ground to mud and made conditions miserable for the soldiers and nearly impossible for vehicles. Taken together, these factors conspired with the Germans’ defenses to constitute a formidable
obstacle, which was not thoroughly appreciated by the 36th Division or higher echelons, as evidenced by the demands of the VI Corps to press on and maintain the momentum of the September advance through southern France.

Figure 6. The Forêt Domaniale de Champ. *Source: Tsukano, Bridge of Love, 262.*

In this area, the hilly terrain, heavy forests, and thick vegetation combined to limit observation and fields of fire, provide abundant concealment, restrict avenues of approach, and acted as a huge obstacle, drastically hindering movement. Whereas the *Nisei* had been accustomed to the vast stretches of Italy that offered observation measured in kilometers, the dense foliage of the Vosges proved challenging, obscuring enemy positions until within only a few meters. As Colonel (retired) Young O. Kim,
then-S3 for the 100th Battalion, described it, the Vosges were “Tommy gun country” versus the “M-1 country” of Italy. The steep, rugged terrain and heavy forests severely limited the number of avenues of approach in the region in general, and in the 100/442d RCT’s area in particular. What roads and trails that did exist in the area soon became impassable either due to the incessant rain, the enemy’s strongpoints and roadblocks, or both. As mentioned in the Seventh Army History, “for six weeks, from 1 October to 15 November, their advances might be more easily measured in yards than in miles” indicative of the obstacle effect of the terrain and vegetation.

The dense forests also had an adverse psychological factor on the men. The unknown enemy disposition and darkness created by the tall trees proved more intimidating than previous conditions and compounded the problems of advancing through these obstacles. Said another Nisei soldier, “These forests would be garden spots for summer camping but they’re no place to fight a war. I would rather take Italy’s barren rocks than these damned trees where it’s never dry and the sun shines through only once a week.” Where the “little iron men” of the 100/442d RCT once seemed “without nerves and without fear,” the cold and the unending shelling and tree bursts began inflicting “shell shock” and combat fatigue on a few of the Nisei.

Key terrain is defined as “any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.” Inasmuch as the objective of the operation of both sides centered on the Lost Battalion, any terrain that directly influenced its rescue or destruction could be considered key. The remnants of the First Battalion, 141st Infantry were isolated on high ground immediately north of La Houssiere, and while no single terrain feature in the immediate vicinity offered a marked advantage to
the German defenders or the *Nisei* rescuers, the very ground occupied by the Lost Battalion was key to its continued existence and eventual rescue. Had the Lost Battalion been located on less defensible terrain, it might have been easily overrun and the employment of the 100/442d RCT might well have been superfluous. Other than the location of the Lost Battalion itself, the ridge upon which the fighting occurred possesses no one location that offers any greater advantage to either side (see figure 7).

![Approximate Location](image)

**Figure 7.** Location of the Lost Battalion north of La Houssiere.  

The weather aggravated the situation. October 1944 brought cold rains that penetrated the men’s ineffective early-war issue clothing, steadily wearing down the combat effectiveness of men. The number of trench-foot cases soared, debilitating men and decreasing frontline strengths as effectively as enemy fire. The weather also hampered the employment of armor and other combat vehicles. Trails became
impassable to all but the infantry, who were, likewise, slowed in their advances. The Nisei 232d Engineer Combat Company was kept busy clearing and building lanes for armor in the advance and fortifying roads for their supply vehicles in addition to clearing the dozens of minefields encountered by the infantry. Air support was nullified by heavy clouds and low ceilings; only a handful of days through October were clear enough to allow tactical air missions in the region.\textsuperscript{25} In sum, the weather worked increasingly against the Allies with their overextended supply lines and favored the Germans, who with their internal lines of communications, were fighting from their prepared positions.

The 100/442d’s assessment of the terrain and weather was more realistic, if not more simplistic, than the division’s assessment. With the experience gained from continuous time on the line and with intimate knowledge of the conditions in the mountain forests of the Vosges, many in the Nisei regiment expected slower rates of advance and a tougher time against the German defenses. Given their way, the advance would have been more thoroughly planned and much more deliberate. But, just as the commanding general’s personal involvement in previous attacks tended to hinder the 100/442d’s plans and operations, so too, his involvement with the Lost Battalion operation led to a costly, uninspired frontal attack.\textsuperscript{26}

The net result of the terrain and weather of the Vosges Mountains was decidedly unfavorable for the advancing Nisei. The tactics employed by the defending Germans proved far different and much more challenging than what the Nisei were accustomed to in Italy. In the wide-open, unobstructed terrain of Italy, the Germans employed delaying tactics along a series of defensive lines organized on favorable terrain. In Italy, a two or three days’ fight against crack German troops was followed by a brief respite as the
Germans fell back and reorganized on subsequent defensive belts. In the Vosges, however, the Germans adopted a defense in depth throughout the wooded mountains, employing light defenses and squad and platoon-sized strong points throughout the depth of the battle area designed to waste the attacker’s strength, whereupon a counterattack could then be mounted. The defensive tactics employed were ideally suited to the terrain, and, aided by the weather, effectively slowed the Allied advance towards the Rhine River and Germany.

**Troops and Support Available**

When a mission is formulated, consideration must be given to which unit or units will conduct the mission and what support will be provided. By this time, shortly after the capture of Bruyeres and Biffontaine, the 36th Division’s front covered over thirty-five kilometers; the divisional regiments were stretched thin. Having just seized the towns and spent ten continuous days on the line, the 100/442d RCT was in division reserve, relishing the opportunity to rest, take hot showers, and change into dry clothes.

The mission to rescue the Lost Battalion fell to the 100/442d RCT for several reasons. First, the 141st Regiment was incapable of rectifying the situation. The remnants of the First Battalion, who were not surrounded, including the battalion commander and his staff, did not possess the mental stamina and combat power necessary to affect the problem. Likewise, the 275 men that constituted the “Lost Battalion” were incapable of breakout and were barely able to maintain their perimeter. After two patrols made unsuccessful attempts to reach friendly lines, their efforts to fall back ceased altogether. The Second and Third Battalions of the 141st had attempted, but made no progress in their efforts, to relieve the First Battalion. Ultimately, the 141st Regiment
held fast and “protected” the 442d in its advance to rescue the Lost Battalion.  

Second, the 142d and 143d Regiments were thinly spread across the division front and could not assist with the rescue. Third, regardless of whatever personal motives Major General Dahlquist may have had, it was his duty to employ all means available to extricate his men; the Nisei of the 100/442d RCT were his last and best chance at effecting this rescue.

One of the weaknesses of employing the Nisei regiment, however, was its personnel strength situation. The 100/442d RCT had started operations in France near full strength, with over 3,500 officers and men. Following the fighting at Bruyeres and Biffontaine, the regiment was down to only two-thirds of its original strength and many of the casualties were key leaders, including primary staff officers at the regiment and battalion levels, as well as most company commanders and platoon leaders. Company B of the 100th Battalion, for instance, had lost its commander and platoon leaders, was down to about fifteen men and was led by a private first class assistant squad leader.  

The ramifications were obvious. Lacking many key leaders, the unit’s visualization of the operation during planning as well as the execution of the operation was hindered just as the lack of its full complement limited the maneuver options available to the regiment. The mission to many of the companies, now led by junior enlisted soldiers, involved little in the way of planning and became mere “follow me and fight” missions. Regardless of the condition of the unit, the mission was quickly assigned to the Nisei regiment, and eventually even the entire 141st Regiment was subordinated to the 100/442d RCT.

Once the Nisei regiment undertook the rescue mission, it became the division’s main effort and a true combined arms operation. Additional 4.2 inch mortars from the
83d and 3d Chemical Weapons Battalions were attached to the 100th and Third Battalions and howitzer fires from the 133d Field Artillery reinforced those of the Nisei 522d Field Artillery. Despite the severely restrictive terrain, M-4 Sherman medium and M-5 Stuart light tanks from the 753d Tank Battalion and M-10 Wolverine tank destroyers from the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the 100th and Third Battalions to add firepower for the operation. While French Forces of the Interior (FFI or “partisans”) were available and did serve as guides or scouts for some of the Division’s regiments, none were employed by the Nisei in this operation.

Controversy still lingers amongst the veterans of the 100th Battalion and the 442d Regimental Combat Team about the employment of the Nisei in the rescue of the Lost Battalion. That they were called upon to effect the rescue cannot be questioned; it would have been a far worse moral failing had the commanding general allowed the Lost Battalion to be destroyed. What still remains unsettled is how Major General Dahlquist effected this rescue, or his order to rescue the Lost Battalion “at all cost.” Almost to a man, Nisei veterans agree that Major General Dahlquist was a difficult man, disliked by most and with a strong, self-centered personality. Many claim that Major General Dahlquist used up the 100/442d RCT in the rescue because they were “only Japs” and thus “expendable” or “cannon fodder.” While nothing points to this decision to rescue the Lost Battalion at all costs being racially-based, it is more likely that the 100/442d RCT was employed because it was in reserve, and unlike the other divisional regiments that had stagnated, it could get the job done. More than just a motto, the Nisei “Go For Broke” battle cry was a way of life and death for the men who had to prove the loyalty of themselves and their people to a doubting nation. They were supremely motivated and
capable. It is also felt that the “at all cost” mission fell upon the Nisei unit in particular because the 100/442d RCT was attached and not organic to the 36th “Texas” Division since it was the Texans of the 36th Division he was trying to look after. It is also plausible that the Nisei, being relatively new to the division, had not yet accustomed themselves to Major General Dahlquist’s overbearing, micromanaging style, and so acceded to his orders, while the divisional regiments, well experienced with the general, adopted more discriminating and pragmatic responses to his methods.\textsuperscript{32}

If there is any unforgivable act of the rescue, it is that once the 100/442d RCT was fully committed, the other regiments did very little to assist. Major General Dahlquist applied no similar “at-all-cost” pressure to the division’s other, organic regiments; there was no general advance on the flanks by the 142d and 143d, and the 141st merely held its positions, “protecting the 442d.”\textsuperscript{33} Even the Lost Battalion itself, with over 210 men, ceased its efforts to breakout, voting down Lieutenant Higgins’ orders to try.\textsuperscript{34}

Time Available

In considering time when analyzing and framing the mission, the commander must address not only when the mission is to take place, but also how long it should take. Due to the hasty development of the mission and the immediacy of the rescue, no times were specifically designated, either for start or duration. It did not have to be, for it was understood at all levels that it should begin immediately and be conducted and concluded as quickly as possible, to recover the Lost Battalion before it was annihilated.

Resting in Belmont following the capture of Biffontaine, the Second Battalion, 442d RCT, was alerted for the mission at 1400 on 25 October and moved out less than 13
hours later. After another half day, the 100th and Third Battalions were alerted at 1730, 26 October, and started their advances less than 12 hours later. On average, the battalions had a day and a half of rest following ten uninterrupted days on the line and, once alerted, had less than 12 hours to plan and prepare for the upcoming fight which would last, uninterrupted, for another five days. In conjunction with the depleted and decapitated ranks, the time available for planning and preparation led to a simple frontal advance, which proved costly.

Civil Considerations

Commanders must also bear in mind political, economic, and cultural concerns when addressing civil considerations during METT-TC analysis. The effects military operations will have upon the daily way of life, commerce, and cultural and religious activities in the area will shape the nature of the operation. Media and public opinion also impact civil considerations. These factors intend to minimize the negative impacts of military operations upon the region’s local populace, ease the transition to post-combat operations, and minimize the adverse affects civil involvement may have on the military operation itself.

Due to its location in one of the passes through the Vosges, the Epinal region was not unaccustomed to military occupation. The area had been heavily contested and occupied beginning in 1870 with the Franco-Prussian War and continued through 1940 as both the Germans and the French garrisoned and fought over and through the region. In 1944, the 36th Division had to contend with minimizing damage in the numerous towns and villages in their large sector, but encountered a very receptive and accommodating civilian population that was weary with German occupation. The 100/442d RCT,
however, had no population centers in the Foret Domaniale de Champ, the area of the rescue, and thus did not share this concern. Identification between friend and foe was a concern since both sides employed Frenchmen in their efforts, the Germans employing French militia and French SS, while the Allies employed members of the FFI as guides.\textsuperscript{37} This was easily overcome through closer coordination with the FFI and was not a factor for the \textit{Nisei}, since these forces were not involved with this particular operation.

Generally, media and public opinion influenced the immediate rescue of the Lost Battalion very little. Although Major General Dahlquist may have sought to avoid a potential career-ending media embarrassment, the media were not a driving factor in this action. Unlike modern times, reporting then had no immediate broadcast capabilities and created no “CNN effect” whereby current actions on the battlefield have immediate and broader popular, often strategic, impact. Thus, reporting then had very little capability to influence the operation either way. Additionally, the media then were much more amicable towards the military than in current times, with the net result being that the media had not issued any reports based merely on sensationalism, had refrained from reporting on the action while underway, and reported, both in print and on film, only the final, successful outcome of the operation.

In terms of METT-TC analysis, visualization of the mission to relieve the isolated First Battalion of the Alamo Regiment was inadequate. The mission, though simple and straightforward, was clouded by misunderstanding surrounding its purpose. The enemy situation was misinterpreted in terms of strength, capabilities, and, worse, location. The effects of these errors were further aggravated by a lack of appreciation for the severity of the terrain and weather and the exhausted state of the troops, even despite efforts to
reinforce the 100/442d RCT for this mission. Time and civil considerations were essentially nonfactors for the Nisei, for simply, the mission needed a conclusion as soon as possible and their sector, lacking civil population centers, required little concern in that sphere. These shortfalls in METT-TC analysis would further hinder the development of a sound operational design.

Elements of Operational Design

As part of visualization, once the commander has framed the situation and determined the mission in accordance with the factors of METT-TC, he develops a concept of his plan, applying the elements of operational design. Army FM 3-0, Operations, maintains that the elements of operational design, when properly employed conceptually link the ends, ways, and means of a mission. Additionally, since the usefulness and applicability of the elements of operational design decrease at successively lower levels, at the division and regimental levels, centers of gravity are not addressed or are addressed with decisive points and objectives; lines of operations are largely dependent upon the scale of tactical operations; and operational reach, approach, and pauses translate into limits of advance. In essence, the linkage provided by the elements of operational design is a quick recipe to ensure the synchronization of all efforts in planning and in executing an operation towards a common goal. The elements of operational design help the commander address all possible points of significance in a complex plan and assist in visualizing or conceptualizing the plan. When employed properly, the resulting plan is thorough and leaves little room for doubt. If not employed, or employed improperly, the resulting plan will have deficiencies that increase the risk to the mission.
End State and Military Conditions

The consideration of an end state and military conditions at the conclusion of the operation should shape an operation. At the tactical level, end state focuses on the attainment of objectives and ensures forces are positioned at the end of the mission in support of the greater, overall purpose. When the First Battalion, 141st Infantry failed to seize its objective north of La Houssiere, it created a problem for VI Corps. Besides slowing the advance of the 36th Division, it also created a vulnerable flank for the 3d Division to the north, as it moved on St. Die. Thus, the end state for the subsequent operation to relieve the Lost Battalion involved two requirements: the isolated unit had to be relieved, and the advance had to be maintained to keep abreast of the 3d Division to the north and protect its flank.

At the tactical level, the division’s end state equated to the attainment of the envisioned objectives, but this was rarely appreciated by the men who executed the orders. While they could understand the need behind rescuing the separated men of the Alamo regiment, given the conditions and strength of the Nisei units following the rescue, it was absurd--many maintain unforgivable--to continue the drive and keep abreast of the 3d Division. Even Major General Dahlquist recognized that his troops were spent and requested relief for his troops from Major General Brooks. Relief for the 36th Division was denied despite two fresh divisions, the 100th and 103d, being assigned to the VI Corps. The Nisei and the Texans of the 36th Division would have to press on.39

Regardless of the emotions involved, the immediate end state was achieved, albeit at high cost, and the isolated unit was relieved. While this prevented any sort of propaganda victory for the Germans and sustained Major General Dahlquist’s career, it
also positioned the Nisei to assume the 141st Infantry’s original mission, and they ultimately completed the original mission and seized the high ground north of La Houssiere on 31 October in the face of an entrenched enemy and heavy artillery fire. The secondary condition, to press the attack in support of the 3d Division, proved more challenging due to personnel losses in the 100/442d RCT, as well as in the 36th Division, but this too was tackled by the Nisei until detached from the 36th Division on 8 and 17 November (see figure 8).\textsuperscript{40}

Decisive Points and Objectives

Inasmuch as the objective of the VI Corps was the rail, road, and industrial center of St. Die, this made it the operational-level decisive point. At the tactical level, the decisive point for the 36th Division was its initial objective for the battalion-sized patrol of the 141st Alamo Regiment, the high ground north of La Houssiere, in support of the 3d Infantry Division’s drive towards St. Die. But once the 141st Regiment was interdicted and the First Battalion separated, the decisive point, and hence the main effort, for the 36th Division became the Lost Battalion itself.

A decisive point “is a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy.”\textsuperscript{41} The decisive point and the objective for the entire ad hoc, unforecast rescue mission undertaken by the 100/442d RCT was the remnants of the Lost Battalion itself. The ground in the immediate area of operations afforded no key terrain, nor did any specific enabling system give either side a marked advantage. The battle was fought brutally force-on-force, and at times hand-to-hand, all focused on determining the fate of the 200-odd survivors of the Lost Battalion. Simply put, had the Germans succeeded in destroying the
THE RESCUE OF THE LOST BATTALION
25 - 30 OCTOBER 1944
SCHEME OF MANEUVER

Figure 8
Lost Battalion, the battle for the Nisei and the 36th Division would have been lost, the Germans would have enjoyed a propaganda victory, the advance by the 36th Division would have been stalled, and all friendly efforts would have been for naught. Conversely, that the Lost Battalion survived and the 100/442d RCT ultimately effected their rescue resulted in a failure for the Germans and in the continued American advance through the Vosges.

The rescue of the Lost Battalion boiled down to a direct confrontation between the strengths and wills of the Nisei sent to rescue the Texans and the German defenders seeking to destroy them. No particular location, no piece of terrain was decisive, nor did the popular wills of the people in the soldiers’ respective homelands influence this mission. All friendly efforts became focused on defeating the enemy forces and bolstering the Nisei effort. Major General Dahlquist, reversing his tendency to centralize his attached armor battalion under his direct control, task organized companies of the 753d Tank Battalion and the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion to the 442d’s 100th and Third Battalions. Likewise, the fires of the 100/442d RCT were reinforced by the 4.2-inch mortars from the 3d and 83d Chemical Weapons Battalions and howitzer fires from the 133d Field Artillery Battalion. In addition to these efforts at fortifying the Nisei advance with as much available resources and firepower as possible, extraordinary measures were also taken to attempt to sustain the Lost Battalion. Division and regimental artillery fired in artillery shells loaded with medical supplies and emergency rations, while P-47 Thunderbolt aircraft from the 371st Fighter-Bomber Group dropped ammunition, water, and radio batteries in attempts to sustain the men of the Lost Battalion.
The commanders’ actions in reinforcing the *Nisei* in their efforts as well as the focusing of all efforts towards the sustainment and rescue of the Lost Battalion illustrate an appreciation for the decisiveness of combat power in this operation and an awareness of the importance of the ultimate objective of this operation, what in today’s terminology is designated as the decisive points and objective of an operation. Although no clear evidence points to the modern concept of decisive point being identified as such by either Major General Dahlquist or Colonel Pence, it was nonetheless properly addressed and shows a commendable grasp for its significance.

Culminating Point

The concepts of culmination and a culminating point—‘that point in time and space where the attacker’s effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender’s or the attacker’s momentum is no longer sustainable, or both.’[^4][^4]—played heavily on the minds of Major General Dahlquist and his subordinate commanders. Yet the mission to relieve the isolated battalion was of such importance that little could be done to avoid it. Already, the First Battalion of the Alamo Regiment had culminated and soon so had the entire regiment. Ultimately, the *Nisei* pressed on to conclude the rescue, and by the end of the mission it too had reached its culminating point.

Following the amphibious landings in southern France and the rapid pursuit across France, the 36th Division was worn out. By the time the Texas Division reached the Vosges Mountains, the pace of advance slowed considerably as German resistance increased, the terrain became increasingly difficult, and supplies slowed to a trickle. By early October, with his organic regiments exhausted, Major General Dahlquist took to rotating the regiments off the line for rest and refit. This measure was only partially
successful and the division, as a whole, was still tired and weary as the advance continued. The situation improved slightly with the arrival and attachment of the Nisei regiment to the Texas division, but it too was soon depleted after continuous combat for the towns of Bruyeres and Biffontaine in the cold, wet forests.

Both the First Battalion, 141st Infantry, and the Alamo Regiment itself reached culmination quickly. By 26 October, the First Battalion had given up its efforts to break through to its trapped men and its trapped men had given up trying to extricate themselves. It could no longer function as an effective fighting force. Shortly thereafter, the 141st Regiment assumed positions to support and “protect” the 100/442d in its efforts, with little contribution to the fighting. By 28 October, the situation was so grim that Colonel Lundquist, commander of the 141st Regiment, was relieved and replaced by the 36th Division Chief of Staff, Colonel Charles Owens. Major General Dahlquist was later to remark that “the regiment is rotten.”

It was in the face of these challenges that the “Go For Broke” regiment was employed. The situation had already driven an entire regiment to its culmination and stalled two others. Now the Nisei would try. Up to this point in the war, they had captured every assigned objective, had never lost any ground, and had shown that they would give their all in any circumstance. To be sure they gave of their fullest efforts, the commanding general himself was going to be intimately involved in directing the attack, with near-ruinous results.

Though the mission to rescue the Lost Battalion ultimately succeeded in freeing the isolated Texans, in the end, the 100/442d RCT, at near 50 percent strength, had culminated. It too could no longer effectively function at its intended level and required a
dedicated reconsolidation period in order to refill its ranks and retrain its personnel to bring it back up to combat capable status. Controversy arises again, for in preventing the loss of one battalion, Major General Dahlquist, through his “at all cost” order and (as we shall see) his personal direction, effectively drove another regiment to its culminating point.

Operational Reach, Approach, and Pause

Interrelated with the concept of culminating point, operational reach, approach, and pauses are balanced to ensure victory is achieved before culmination is reached. At the tactical level, this translates into a defined limit of advance to prevent over-extension. While the rescue of the Lost Battalion was a success in that it freed the isolated Texans, in terms of culmination and operational design, the mission illustrates a lack of an appreciation for the severity of the terrain and an overestimation of the condition of the troops by the corps and division commanders as they pushed their troops farther. It was this failed assessment that led to the crisis.

Operational reach, “the distance over which military power can be employed decisively,” is a limitation established by the capabilities of the friendly forces available. Given the weakened states of his regiments, Major General Dahlquist should have established realistic limits of advances, just as Major General Truscott should have decreased the distance of VI Corps' operational reach. At the outset of the 141st Regiment’s original mission, the limitations of the severely weakened units of the 36th Division should have been better considered. Instead, the already exhausted unit overextended itself, exceeded its operational capabilities, and was easily isolated and cut off. Once the 100/442d RCT was committed, it too faced the same conditions: exhausted
troops, understrength units, forbidding terrain, frigid weather. However, additional measures were taken to ensure the same fate did not befall the \textit{Nisei}. Armor, artillery, engineers, as well as enhanced logistical supply and air support, were furnished to the 100/442d to extend and bolster the \textit{Nisei} regiment’s operational reach and forestall its culmination. Lines of communications (LOCs) were shortened as supplies were moved further forward. Even the commanding general collocated with the 100/442d headquarters.

Still, if an operational pause, a halt to operations to prevent culmination, had been used prior to the 141st Infantry’s advance to rest and reorganize, this entire episode could have possibly been avoided. Although Major General Dahlquist himself noted that his troops were tired, exhausted, and weary and asked for relief, his command pressed on, relief denied by VI Corps.\textsuperscript{48} The predicament was even more dire for the \textit{Nisei} because their replacements, being from a single racially segregated source, were far fewer. When the operation was over, the unit had, in fact, reached its culminating point and was forced into an operational pause.

Had a limit of advance or an operational pause been better considered, it is probable that the Lost Battalion would never have gotten cut off. Despite subsequent efforts to reinforce the 100/442d RCT in its mission and extend its operational reach indicating efforts to forestall culmination, no evidence suggests a grasp of operational design. The frontal attack, or the direct operational approach through thickly wooded, heavily defended terrain conducted when the forces involved should have instead undertaken an operational pause, shows that both VI Corps and 36th Division command lacked an appreciation for the operational situation.
Simultaneous and Sequential Operations

In terms of operational design, simultaneity and sequential operations address the timing and resourcing of an operation. Ideally, the simultaneity of friendly operations applies pressure throughout the enemy’s entire defensive zone, preventing him from massing his forces or the effects of his forces against any particular friendly area. Simultaneity attempts to overpower the enemy’s ability to command and control his forces and thus seeks to create exploitable weaknesses. Additionally, friendly forces may arrange their operations in phases, seeking to concentrate combat power at certain times or places. However, since this mission was a small-scale operation in a confined operational area and of limited duration, sequencing or phasing was unnecessary as all actions generally ran continuously.

While the 100/442d RCT executed its mission with a great deal of simultaneity, its efforts were hindered by a general lack of synchronization (or lack of effort) at the division level, which, in turn, increased the difficulty of its task. By 26 October, all three battalions of the 100/442d RCT were on line, advancing against the German defenses. The Second Battalion maintained contact with the 3d Division and secured the northern flank during the advance while the 100th and Third Battalions advanced directly through the Forêt Domaniale de Champ towards the Lost Battalion and the objective. The simultaneous advance by all three battalions, supported by the 522d Field Artillery Battalion, applied equal pressure against the entrenched defenders. This concurrent pressure slowly overwhelmed the Germans in the local area, but since the 141st, 142d, and 143d regiments of the 36th Division remained static, the Germans, with the benefit of their internal lines of operations, were able to shift forces against the Nisei from other
areas not in contact. Had the entire 36th Division undertaken a more forceful general advance, greater pressure along a larger front would have been created, possibly easing the burden against the 100/442d RCT and shortening the effort to free the Lost Battalion.

Linear and Nonlinear Operations

Like many of the battles fought during World War II, the fight in the Vosges to rescue the Lost Battalion, while challenging, slow, and deadly, was quite typical and very conventional. It was a linear operation where the Nisei battalions moved forward in contiguous areas of operation towards a common objective arrayed in line across the battlefield. While not evidently attributable to any precise planning, the linear nature of the operation did simplify its planning and conduct, especially with regards to the securing of friendly LOCs.

In the near static conditions of the Vosges, the severely restricted terrain prevented the establishment of any sort of security zone by friendly forces. Thus, the friendly FLOT was essentially collocated with the friendly forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and generally ran on a north-south axis through the town of Biffontaine and the Forest Domaniale de Champ. This was the start point for the First Battalion, 141st Infantry, and subsequently, for the 100/442d RCT in their relief effort. Thus, the operation was generally linear and contiguous, as all efforts emanated from a central location, near Belmont and the FLOT/FEBA, towards the objective near La Houssiere. Significantly, it was the Germans’ ability to interdict the single line of operation of the First Battalion in the original mission that resulted in the Lost Battalion episode. The Nisei would have to traverse the same terrain, with the same limitations, to effect rescue. Instead of advancing in column, as did the 141st Regiment, however, the 100/442d
advanced eastward with battalions online: the Second Battalion was in the north abreast of the Third Battalion in the center, and the 100th Battalion was in the south. This gave breadth to the attack and allowed the 100/442d to not only converge on the Lost Battalion objective, but also secure its own lines of operation and avoid the costly mistake made by the hard-luck Alamo Regiment.

Against this, the Germans operated with relatively secure internal lines, ideally suited to a defense with numerically inferior forces. While the Germans’ ability to mass fires and shift forces proved challenging to the Nisei advance, ultimately the lack of adequate intelligence, resources, and personnel forced the defenders to yield and fail in their efforts to destroy the Lost Battalion.\textsuperscript{49} Inasmuch as the 36th Division and the VI Corps were conventional infantry organizations possessing no special troops or capabilities, such as airborne or ranger units, options to employ nonlinear operations in support of the Lost Battalion did not exist.

\textbf{Tempo}

Closely related to the time available for an operation, tempo is the “rate of military action” that is key to gaining or maintaining the initiative.\textsuperscript{50} The importance of tempo is that it allows friendly units to act and react quicker than the enemy and thus gain and maintain the initiative. It helps create situations generally more favorable to friendly forces than to the enemy. Much like the consideration of time in this mission to extricate the isolated battalion, tempo did not receive much planning emphasis. While not addressed during planning, the very nature of the mission implied a high tempo, for since it was a rescue, it had to be effected as soon as possible before the Lost Battalion was
annihilated. Tempo did, however, receive great emphasis once operations were underway.

**Conclusion**

In broad terms, the visualization of the rescue of the Lost Battalion at the 36th Division headquarters was hasty at best, and the results not fully grasped or acted upon. Some efforts point to quick assessments of METT-TC and a hasty determination of end state, the linear nature of the mission, and tempo. At worst, visualization was neglected, and little or no consideration given to the forbidding terrain, the abysmal status of the friendly forces tasked with the mission, their culminating point, or supporting simultaneous attacks and operations. Indeed, many of the failures in envisioning and designing the rescue mission contributed earlier to the failure of the Lost Battalion’s original mission. Illustrative of these failings were the lack of reconnaissance to confirm German strengths and dispositions, the commanding general’s erroneous and unsupported determination of the location of German defenses, and the vulnerable single-line advance in column of the 141st Regiment. Worse still, whatever visualization may have been conducted was worth less because it was not disseminated (nor appreciated) and, as we shall see, the operation was over-direction and micromanagement negated much of the command and leadership functions at the lower levels.

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2Seventh Army History, 476-477; and Steidl, 19.

3Headquarters, 141st Infantry Regiment, United States Army, “Regimental History for Month of October 1944, and Conclusions of Operations,” RG 407, Box 9947, Folder 1, 442d Veteran’s Club Archives, Honolulu, Hawaii, 27.
Perhaps the best-trained resources available for the German defense in the Vosges were the 1,000-man 201st and 202d Mountain Battalions. Not unlike the 100th Battalion (and later the 442d RCT), the battalions were Army-level assets and, just as the 442d RCT had been attached to the 36th Division, the “Edelweiss” battalions were attached to the 16th Volks-Grenadier Division for operations in the Vosges. Initially composed of select individuals who had undergone rigorous special mountain-warfare training, by late-October, these units were composed of recovering veterans from the Eastern Front as well as new recruits. While highly trained at the individual level, they had not had much collective, battalion-level training.

The Germans had captured copies of Operation Dogface and so knew where and when to expect the Allied push, leading to the reinforcement effort.

Lieutenant Wells Lewis was the son of author Sinclair Lewis.
Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author. The M1928A1 or M1A1 Thompson submachine gun, or “Tommy Gun,” fired the potent, but short-ranged .45 caliber pistol cartridge, giving it an effective range of about 50 meters. The M1 rifle, or “Garand,” however, fired a .30-06 caliber bullet and had a much greater range of 500-600 meters.

Seventh Army History, 472.

Hajime Yamane, interview by author; Stanley Akita, interview by author, tape recording, Honolulu, HI, 18-19 December 2001.


Hajime Yamane, interview by author. Illustrative of the challenges that encumbered the Allies was the acute supply problem. The *Nisei* regiment, as well as the 36th Division, was still issued early-war uniforms and equipment. The basic uniform worn during this period consisted of the lightweight, windbreaker-type M-1941 “Parsons” field jacket, wool shirt, and M-1937 wool trousers, together with the low-cut “roughout” service shoes and M-1938 gaiters which proved totally inadequate for the cold and humidity. The troops received new, improved uniforms on 4 November immediately following the Lost Battalion episode. The new uniforms included the longer and heavier M-1943 combat field jacket and trousers and insulated rubber shoe pacs. Interestingly, while heavy overcoats were available, they were too cumbersome to be worn in combat and were generally not worn by most soldiers on the line.

Seventh Army History, 475-476; Shirey, 51, 69; Steidl, 123-124.

Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author.


Hajime Yamane, interview by author.


100/442d RCT, *Americans, the Story of the 442d Combat Team*, as well as Franz Steidl’s comprehensive *Lost Battalions* erroneously list the 752d Tank Battalion as being attached to the 100/442d RCT. The 752d only served in Italy. The 753d Battalion served in both the MTO and the ETO and was attached to the 36th Division, and was further attached to the 100/442d RCT for this mission.

31 Stanley Akita, interview by author; Don Shimazu, interview by author; Hajime Yamane, interview by author.

32 Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author; Duus, 201; Steidl, 190. The controversy over this order continues to linger long after the war. After the war, Colonel Singles, commander of the 100th Battalion during the rescue, refused to shake hands with [four-star] General Dahlquist during a visit to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Ironically, Major General Dahlquist was from Minnesota and by this time in the war, the bulk of the 36th Division was no longer from Texas, due to the procedures of the personnel replacement system.


34 Steidl, 81.

35 442d RCT, Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44.


38 FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-6.

39 Steidl, 119-123. The First Battalion, 141st Infantry, now consolidated, was sent back into the line on 2 November, two days after rescue. Its sister Third Battalion became combat ineffective the following day and the entire regiment was regarded as “rotten.”

40 United States Army, Headquarters, 442d RCT, “Narrative of Events, 1-30 November 44,” RG 407, Entry 427, Box 21250, Location 270/63/18/4, National Archives. The 100/442d RCT was subsequently sent to southern France to reconstitute and reorganize. The 100th Battalion was detached from the 36th Infantry Division on 8 November 1944 in recognition of their outstanding service record by the regiment prior to the remainder of 442d Regiment being detached from the division on 17 November.


43 Ibid., 331; Shirey, 65; 442d RCT, *Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44*; Steidl, 87.


45 Clarke and Smith, 284-285, 313.

46 Steidl, 83, 132.

47 FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-10.

48 Steidl, 57.

49 Clarke and Smith, 331.

50 FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-12.
None of us is as smart as all of us.¹

A Former Brigade Commander

The second action of battle command following the visualization of the mission is the describing of the concept of the operation in terms of purpose; decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; and battlefield organization. To do this, under current doctrine the commander issues his intent and planning guidance. The commander’s intent expresses his vision of the operation using the operational framework and elements of operational design and provides the direction necessary for subordinate units to execute the mission in the absence of further guidance. Planning guidance provides a framework with which the staff develops the plan and ensures all efforts are synchronized towards the commander’s vision. Much as visualization was nonexistent or haphazard, the describing of the operation to free the encircled First Battalion, 141st Infantry was often nonexistent, again due to the haste in which the mission arose, as well as the leadership styles involved. On the few occasions where any planning was conducted, it was generally hasty and lacked substance, resulting in overbearing micro-management in apparent attempts to compensate for the lack of guidance and concrete planning, which actually hindered Nisei initiative.

Commander’s Intent

According to current doctrine, the commander’s intent should address the broader, overarching purpose of a mission, its end state, and key tasks essential to the successful
execution of the operation. It should also address “what the force must do,” as well as “the conditions the force must meet to succeed in respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state.”² During the drive through the Vosges, and in the haste to press forward and then to rescue the Lost Battalion, little time was taken at all levels to fully flesh out operational plans and orders, thus, any broad intent or guidance was usually given verbally, if at all, with the resultant vagaries that are associated with verbal communication. Few written orders were issued and few directives included the now-commonplace commander’s intent paragraph.

Major General Dahlquist’s initial intent was simple, that is, rescue the Lost Battalion, but it lacked the depth and breadth necessary to be useful to the 100/442d RCT in their mission. It failed to link the ends, ways, and means of the mission. While too much direction can stifle and suppress subordinate initiative, in this instance, the commanding general’s vague instructions hampered the Nisei effort by not delineating anything more than the rescue task. Ultimately, this imprecision required the general to be more directive. No guidance was given regarding the ultimate end state or the condition and array of forces once the rescue was effected, nor was any explanation of purpose offered. This led to frustration, confusion, and controversy that have continued to this day as the value and broader purpose of the mission remained unclear. Without the higher commander’s guidance, for his part, Colonel Pence, commanding the 100/442d RCT, could give no further guidance of his own lest he contradict and undermine the mission intended by his higher commander. Additionally, with Major General Dahlquist constantly located at the headquarters of the regiment, its subordinate battalions, or at the
front lines, little room was left in which the Nisei and their commanders could operate and exercise their initiative.

Unlike current doctrinal manuals, the World War II-era FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulation: Operations*, does not directly specify the need for a commander’s intent. In fact, it recommends that a commander limit “any statement of reasons for measures adopted” only to “what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates,” essentially contradicting current doctrine requiring subordinate awareness of the grander purpose and scheme of maneuver. Thus, while World War II doctrine cannot fault the commanders for not providing sufficient guidance or intent to their commands, the end result still resulted in micromanagement, which undermined the efforts of subordinate commanders in their efforts to direct their units. At one point, left with no alternatives due to the overbearing direction of higher command, Lieutenant Colonel Pursall, commanding the Third Battalion, 442d Infantry, personally led one of the final bayonet charges directly into the enemy defenses. While heroically admirable, this episode illustrates how the commanders and staffs at the lower levels were underutilized and misused by the lack of guidance that negated their planning functions. Coupled with the over-directing efforts of the commanding general and his changing and confusing orders, the resultant operation lacked coherence.

**Planning Guidance**

In addition to the commander’s intent, as part of the task of describing the operation, the commander develops and issues guidance to his staff and subordinate commanders that conveys his visualization of the mission and focuses their planning. This guidance should address the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, as well as
the elements of operational design. While again, these are modern concepts, the bases for their use is unchanged and their lack of employment in the framing and the conveying of the concept of operations shows weakness in command.

Very little guidance appears to have been issued by General Dahlquist to his staff for planning or to Colonel Pence and the subordinate commanders in the 100/442d RCT for either planning or execution, owing to his personal command style. Instead of relying on his staff for estimates and operations planning, the division commander, placing himself well forward in the area, apart from his planning staff, often relied upon his own judgement and his own personal direction, with the consequent shortcomings of relying on over-centralized operations. While Major General Dahlquist reinforced the decisive operation of the 100/442d RCT with additional combined arms assets, no supporting effort—what today’s doctrine refer to as “shaping operations”—were assigned to or conducted by the other divisional regiments, and no appreciable efforts were made to reinforce sustaining operations. At the 100/442d RCT, Colonel Pence managed the battle somewhat better. In addition to reinforcing the decisive effort by the 100th and Third Battalions with tanks, tank destroyers, and additional mortars, the Second Battalion conducted what current doctrine would call a shaping operation by seizing Hill 617 to the north and protecting the regiment’s left flank. Pushing logistics as far forward as possible bolstered sustainment for the companies and battalions on the line.

Compounding the confusion created by a lack of planning guidance, most missions were simplistically briefed in vague, general terms and often did not include graphic overlays. When the Alamo Regiment was first assigned the task to seize the high ground north of La Houssiere, the division merely issued a verbal order and pointed to
the general objective area on the map.\textsuperscript{5} No written order, graphic overlay, nor any
detailed analysis was initially provided. On the few occasions orders and overlays were
issued by the 36th Division, they were often inaccurate or confused, in sharp contrast to
the procedures the \textit{Nisei} had enjoyed under Major General Ryder’s 34th Division in Italy.
This was indicative of Major General Dahlquist’s “sandwich attack” style, where efforts
were thrown together haphazardly, with no appreciable coherence or common goal.\textsuperscript{6}
This lack of comprehensive planning was common throughout the various chains of
command, even within the 100/442d RCT. At the company level, mission orders were
often drastically simplified in order to expedite execution. The first, last, and only time a
full orders briefing was conducted in B Company, 100th Battalion, was prior to its first
combat action in Italy. Thereafter, a more expedient, practical approach was adopted. To
make matters worse, by the time the regiment received the mission to relieve the Lost
Battalion, most key command and staff were dead or wounded and the junior enlisted
personnel who took command often did not have the planning experience necessary to
develop and coordinate larger-scale actions. So again, the orders planning process was
bypassed and the mission deteriorated into a simple “follow me” mission with vague
objectives.\textsuperscript{7}

Compared to today, wartime doctrine to guide command actions and the
production and issuance of operational orders is unsubstantial. Instead of mandating a
commander’s intent that states the purpose, endstate, and key tasks of a mission, the field
service regulations stress clarity and brevity and advise only on the production and
distribution of orders. No instruction is offered on what is today termed planning
guidance; instead of addressing the guidance to issue to planning staffs and subordinate commanders, the field service regulations suggest only that staffs should be kept austere. The doctrinal field service regulations did not mandate very detailed description of the operation. Compounding the lack of doctrinal guidance, Major General Dahlquist tended to hastily formulate his own conclusions, and, during this mission, operated well forward of his own command posts, rendering them useless as he developed courses of action off the cuff. This severely handicapped the leaders of the subordinate units, most notably Colonel Pence of the 100/442d RCT, as the lack of guidance and concomitant micromanagement limited his options. Combined with the lack of visualization, the net result was that a detailed, in-depth, integrated plan was not developed or disseminated from the top (division-level) down (to company level) and this would invite and even necessitate more involved direction.

1FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, 6-21.
2FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, 5-9; FM 3-0, Operations, 5-14.
3FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, 31.
4Steidl, 88-89.
5Ibid., 56.
6Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author.
7Hajime Yamane, interview by author.
8FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, 30.
CHAPTER V

DIRECT

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.¹

General George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It

Once the situation and mission are envisioned and an intent and concept are formulated and issued, the final action of battle command is to direct the planning and action to conclusion. Directing is not a single step in itself, but rather it is integrated with the previous steps of visualizing and describing. Through the various BOS, Army FM 3-0, Operations, provides a framework for the guiding and directing of forces in battle. Current doctrine, like that during World War II, also addresses the significance of the commander’s personal impact on the operation through his presence and his will.

Battlefield Operating Systems

Effective direction synthesizes the intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, engineering, CSS, and C2 systems into a single focused effort. During the five-day battle to relieve the First Battalion, 141st Infantry, however, relatively little contribution was made by the air defense and combat service support operating systems. Effective participation by air defenses was precluded by the general lack of a German air threat and, if anything, proved a hindrance, shooting down friendly aircraft from the 371st Fighter-Bomber Group during resupply airdrops to the Lost Battalion.² Aside from standard logistics operations, the only noteworthy logistical effort undertaken in support of the Nisei advance was the locating of the company and battalion support trains as far
forward as possible to shorten lines of supply, quicken resupply and casualty evacuation, and prevent disruption of support.  

**Intelligence**

The intelligence system encompasses a continuous process that “plans, directs, collects, processes, produces, and disseminates intelligence on the threat and environment” in support of operations. Its main function is to assist in the visualization of the environment and the enemy situation. As previously discussed, the process of visualization was less than thorough for the initial advance of the First Battalion, 141st Infantry, as well as for the subsequent mission by the 100/442d RCT. Accordingly, intelligence, as a BOS, was not well employed by the division or the regiment.

The failure of intelligence to accurately support the operation began with insufficient information, erroneous analysis, and a lack of reconnaissance at the division level. Then, due to time constraints, these same faults plagued the Nisei regiment’s intelligence efforts as well. To begin with, visualization of the terrain and enemy situation was poor. Major General Dahlquist, with little to support his assessment, estimated that German defenses were broken and the new MLR was further east, nearer the Meurthe River. Based primarily on the numbers of prisoners taken in the preceding actions at Bruyeres and Biffontaine, not only was this assessment wrong, but no additional reconnaissance was conducted to confirm or refute this assumption. No air, ground, or mechanized reconnaissance was conducted prior to the 141st Regiment’s advance and the division’s 36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, numbering almost 150 officers and men, played no discernable role in gathering intelligence prior to or during the advance. By the time the 100/442d RCT was employed to relieve the Lost Battalion,
no time was available to allow any detailed reconnaissance for the Nisei advance. The only reconnaissance efforts by the 100/442d RCT were primarily leaders’ reconnaissance, and, while of value for tactical maneuver by squads and platoons, this reconnaissance was worth less at the regiment and division levels.

In addition to the lack of reconnaissance hampering intelligence and operations, the credibility of the intelligence was also suspect. Apparently, little appreciation of the situation was gained at division from the reports sent by the regiments due primarily to Major General Dahlquist’s lack of trust in his subordinates and his micromanaging style. Often, the commanding general, located to the rear, lost his temper with the Nisei at their the slow rate of advance and, still clinging to his original assessment that the German defenses were further east, did not believe their reports of heavy enemy resistance. Short-tempered, quick to judge, and single-minded, Major General Dahlquist often made rash decisions and, though proven a sound staff planner, proved to be a mediocre tactician. For these reasons too, division assessments were often mistrusted by the subordinate units, including the division’s organic regiments.

Thus, the intelligence systems of the 36th Division and the 100/442d RCT were uncoordinated, inefficient, and worsened the effects of hasty visualization, further decreasing the value of the poor assessment of the terrain and the enemy situation. Nonexistent intelligence collection planning and the lack of reconnaissance combined with the poor staff relationship between the division and the regiment to hamper the intelligence produced and disseminated between both headquarters.
Maneuver

Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positions of advantage over the enemy through the direct or indirect employment or threat of employment of firepower. Overall, maneuver, as a system, was uncoordinated at the division level. At the regimental level, the mission was made more manageable through better coordination between the battalions and other supporting elements.

At the start of the initial advance by the Alamo Regiment, the severely weakened division undertook only a single-pronged thrust by the 141st Regiment, which led to the isolation of the Lost Battalion. The 142d and 143d Regiments made uncoordinated limited advances that allowed the German forces to mass against the 141st’s flanks. Subsequently, too, when the 100/442d RCT was employed in the rescue, the divisional regiments failed to advance or draw pressure from the Nisei effort. For its part, once committed to the effort, the 100/442d RCT advanced with its battalions abreast, pressing the German defenses back along a wider front, unlike the 141st that had advanced in column.

A notable effort by the division to increase the maneuver and capabilities of the 100/442d RCT in this operation was the attachment of the tank and tank destroyer units to the Nisei regiment. The merit of task organizing the division’s armor and anti tank assets to the 100/442d RCT is lost, however, considering that the effectiveness of these assets was severely hindered by the terrain and density of the Foret Domaniale de Champ. Although the additional firepower initially benefited the Nisei early in their advance, the mechanized units may have been better employed in the rescue of the Lost Battalion if they had been employed as they had been earlier in the capture of Belmont,
as a “Felber Force” a self-contained armored task force. In this way, the armored task force may have possibly been able to advance more quickly and easily along the road network south of the Forêt Domaniale de Champ and reach the Lost Battalion through La Houssiere.

Fire Support

The fire support system encompasses all target acquisition and indirect fire systems, including aircraft delivered ordnance and other lethal and nonlethal means, to “delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy forces, systems, and facilities.” It directly supports land forces in their missions. Although generally hindered by the terrain, weather, and vegetation, the fire support BOS was generally used to the best of its potential.

Although those at the very front of the fighting may not have fully appreciated the favorable tactical effects of artillery and air support because of the heavy forests, many efforts were made to support both the Nisei and the Lost Battalion with fires. The regiment’s 522d Field Artillery Battalion was reinforced with 105 mm howitzer fires from the division’s 133d Field Artillery Battalion, while the 100th and Third Battalions were augmented with 4.2 inch mortars. Additionally, aircraft from the 371st Fighter-Bomber Group also supported the 36th Division’s operations. In addition to the employment of lethal fires, the artillery and air support assets were also used in unorthodox attempts to resupply the isolated unit by shooting propaganda leaflet shells filled with rations and medicines and dropping aircraft wing tanks filled with ammunition and supplies into the Lost Battalion’s perimeter.

Although the trees prevented accurate delivery of surface fires and the rough terrain and poor weather limited the effectiveness of air support, both the conventional
and the unorthodox efforts by the division’s fire support section were admirable and show a willingness to employ the fire support BOS to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, these efforts did benefit the Lost Battalion as limited amounts of supplies and ammunition made it into their perimeter and the Nisei benefited from preparatory and counter battery fires in their advance.

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability

The engineering system is divided into efforts focused on mobility, countermobility, and survivability. In the advance to relieve the isolated Texans, engineering efforts were focused almost solely on maintaining mobility and ensuring the attacking forces and support units could advance. If the work done by the 36th Division’s 111th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 100/442d RCT’s 232d Engineer Combat Company was conventional and unglamorous, it was still vital to the rescue effort and no less challenging.

Both the division and the regiment employed their engineering assets in the conventional tasks of clearing mines, reducing roadblocks and obstacles, and building roads. Operating close behind the attacking infantry, the engineers suffered fifty-seven casualties through the operation but were still able to build a log and plank road over seven miles long in the effort to rescue the Lost Battalion. Constructed and maintained despite frequent shelling, minefields, and heavy rain and snow that undermined its foundation, this path was the single route for the forward movement of supply and the rearward evacuation of casualties. In recognition of their efforts, the 36th Division’s 111th Engineer Combat Battalion was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. 

Without this artery to facilitate the movement of support forward, the rescue would have been
much more difficult. Thus, the engineering system was employed, albeit conventionally, to great effect in concert with the maneuver and support operating systems.

Command and Control

The employment of the command and control battlefield operating system by the leadership of the 36th Division and the 100/442d RCT produced mixed results. The command and control operating system, consisting of the commander and his supporting communications, intelligence, and signals systems, was generally doctrinally employed, but while command post emplacement supported the overall operation, communications were poor and the division commander tended to locate himself too far forward, with negative results. Both the division and the regiment employed the standard forward, main, and rear command posts with required communications contact via wire and radio with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. At one point the 100/442d RCT did collocate its forward command post with that of the 141st Regiment, but this was merely standard practice while the Nisei were passing through and assuming the mission from the Alamo Regiment.¹²

Two notable shortcomings in the command and control system were with communications and the location of the commanders. Communication was generally hindered and intermittent all through operations in the Vosges. The tall peaks and dense forests severely interfered with radio communications and communication wires were often cut by shell fire or enemy action.¹³ This undoubtedly contributed to the commanding general choosing to locate himself at the regimental or even at the battalion command posts and, on occasion, even at the front line, far forward of his own divisional forward command post, in efforts to more forcefully direct the operation himself. Major
General Dahlquist’s presence at the command posts of the 442d Regiment and the 100th Battalion, while advocated to a certain extent by both earlier and current doctrine, often hindered subordinate plans and initiative and generally interfered with the operations of the 100/442d RCT, illustrating some of the potential the drawbacks of the commander’s forward presence.

The Personal Impact of the Commander

The most contentious issue with command and leadership during the Lost Battalion ordeal was the personal impact of the commander, specifically with the actions of Major General Dahlquist, commanding the 36th Division. By this time in the war, Colonel Charles W. Pence, commanding the regiment, and his battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Singles (100th Battalion), Lieutenant Colonel James Hanley (Second Battalion), and Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Pursall (Third Battalion), were seasoned veterans well familiar with their Nisei units. Having led them in action at Salerno, Cassino, Anzio, Rome, Belvedere, and Bruyeres, they knew the innate potential and capabilities of their men and led them well. For all their caring and understanding to this point, however, their efforts to best command their men were stymied and smothered by the overbearingness of Major General Dahlquist.

The commander adds his own personal impact to the operation through his presence and his will. The commander’s location should enhance his awareness of the situation and lend emphasis to the main effort, just as his will should provide the drive and motivation necessary to the success of the mission. World War II-era FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulation: Operations*, suggests that after issuing operations orders “the commander places himself where he can best control the course of action and exert his
Likewise, the current FM 3-0, *Operations*, advises that commanders “locate where they can not only exercise command but also sense the battle. Sometimes this is at the command post; sometimes it is face to face with subordinate commanders and soldiers.” Thus, while his locating forward was sanctioned and even suggested, in this particular case Major General Dahlquist’s direct leadership, actions, and instructions nonetheless cast doubts on his judgement and his tactical competency, and his locating at the Nisei headquarters, like his direction, hindered the efforts of his subordinate units more than it helped.

Throughout operations in the Vosges and indeed, throughout operations all through France, Major General Dahlquist was often located with the lead regiments and battalions, well forward of his own divisional forward command post. The first division commander ashore during Operation Dragoon, he was a courageous, though overbearing and over-controlling personality, often giving personal direction to battalions, companies, and even platoons and squads. Despite the motivation provided by his direction and courage, his forward presence had its drawbacks. Too often, his direction was piecemeal and not well explained, leading to the haphazard, uncoordinated employment of his units and missions with ill-defined purposes, as illustrated by the 100/442d’s seizure of Bruyeres. On 17 October 1944, as the 100th Battalion was organizing its attack on Hill A, a heavily defended knoll north of the town, the commanding general came upon the reserve platoon of the battalion’s reserve company. Dissatisfied with the platoon leader’s explanation for apparent inaction, the general ordered the platoon to attack, unsupported. This independent action, while the rest of the battalion was preparing for the main attack which was to kick off in fifteen minutes, not only resulted in the death of
the platoon leader, Second Lieutenant Masanao Otake, but also prematurely initiated the 100th Battalion’s attack and is representative of the commanding general’s interference and costly micro-management. Through his presence and direction, he effectively bypassed and rendered ineffective his subordinates’ chains of command and, worse, often gave orders that did not conform to any general concept.

Another drawback to the forward presence of the commander was the limited command and control systems available at the lower levels. Simply put, the regimental and battalion-level command posts, focused on and equipped for missions in their respectively smaller areas of operation, lacked the communications systems necessary to maintain comprehensive situational understanding of the entire division. This restricted Major General Dahlquist’s overall situational understanding and further limited his control over his other units. By staying at the lower levels for extended periods, he essentially isolated himself from access to higher-level information and limited his appreciation of the division’s situation, further enhancing his fixation on the predicament of the Lost Battalion and the efforts of the 100/442d RCT.

Compounding this, the lack of comprehensive command and control systems at the lower levels likewise limited the breadth of his control. By constantly locating with the 442d Regiment, its 100th or Third Battalions, or their forward companies, the general could only influence those with whom he had direct contact. In his direction, he personally piecemealed units as small as squads in the attack. Like many others, then-Private First Class Hajime Yamane, leading the forward squad of B Company’s advance, was astounded to turn around and see the two stars of the division commander behind him constantly demanding they advance without knowing the enemy situation directly to
their front. Lacking direct communications with the neighboring 142d and 143d Regiments may also have contributed to their inaction and thus to the concentration of German defenses against the *Nisei* advance. Thus, Major General Dahlquist, located forward, essentially “could not see the forest for the trees” and, due partly to the lack of command and control systems at the lower levels, failed to employ many of the resources at his disposal and over-directed those units nearest him.

Perhaps the most controversial issue regarding command and control in this operation was the leadership style of Major General Dahlquist. Brooding, introspective, and prone to making quick, unfounded decisions, the general was not well liked and was not respected as a tactician. Temperamental and emotional, he failed to build a cohesive team and integrate the 100/442d RCT and did not foster trust between himself and his subordinates. Worse, to many of those who fought under him, his single focus appeared to be self-glorification.

The commanding general made little effort to understand or be understood by the *Nisei* under his command and, failing to empathize with the fully capable *Nisei* regiment, handicapped them instead by building misconceptions and provoking mistrust. Despite the fact the *Nisei* had been in theater and attached to the 36th Division for almost two weeks prior to employment, Major General Dahlquist made no effort at integrating the 100/442d RCT into the 36th Division, unlike Major General Ryder’s warm welcome and integration of the 100th Battalion to the 34th Division in Italy. This aloofness and lack of empathy has contributed significantly to the continuing impression that he employed the *Nisei* regiment as “cannon fodder” and explains, to some extent, the “at all cost” nature of the mission. Added to this, he failed to acknowledge the record and credibility of his
newly attached unit. From the beginning of their operations in France, at Bruyeres, he showed his mistrust of the unit by openly, and often angrily, doubting the reports of enemy strength and disposition, insisting that there was no resistance and that the reports were fabricated to mask malingering and cowardice. The situation deteriorated to the point that when then-Captain Kim, S3 of the 100th Battalion, questioned a tactically unsound order, Colonel Pence explained: “I can’t go into details.”

Captain Kim responded: “Is he there?”

When Colonel Pence responded in the affirmative, Captain Kim fully understood that the commanding general was there, at the regimental headquarters, personally issuing instructions and overriding any directions of the regiment.

Of any single episode, the climax of the operation on 29 October 1944 vividly portrays the general’s shortcomings, the consequences of which fell upon the Nisei. By this fifth day of the effort, the 100th and Third Battalions were less than 700 meters from the Lost Battalion. Major General Dahlquist again arrived at the front line and immediately began to urge the attack. At the regiment and battalion command posts he admonished the commanders: “I want the men to crawl and run forward because that’s the only way to push the enemy back. Battalion and company commanders are to go up to front [they already were] and drive their companies!” “Keep them going and don’t let them stop. There’s a battalion about to die up there and we’ve got to reach them.”

Many of the front-line riflemen, stunned to see the general so far forward, were urged “Soldier, you can’t do anything here. MOVE!” or “Soldier, keep going. Keep going” in the face of heavy resistance that went unrecognized. At one point, Major General Dahlquist, still doubting the enemy situation, approached Lieutenant Colonel Singles,
hunkered behind cover with his men. As the general moved forward to discuss the situation over a map with the 100th Battalion’s commander, the enemy opened fire, killing his aide. Reeling from the death and losing his situational understanding, he ordered artillery to “shoot on Hill 345573.” Were it not for the alertness of the 522d Field Artillery Battalion’s fire direction center and their adjusting the firing order, the general would have fired on the Lost Battalion. 25

A short time later, in the Third Battalion’s sector, where the commanding general sought to execute the main attack, the men of the Third Battalion witnessed the battalion commander and the commanding general argue over the situation and course of action. According to Third Battalion rifleman Rudi Tokiwa:

General Dahlquist came up to Colonel Pursall and I heard him say: “Order your men to fix bayonets and charge.” Pursall got real angry, literally lifted the general and shook him. I saw this with my own eyes. He told the general, “Those are my boys you’re trying to kill. You’re not going to kill my boys. I won’t let you kill my boys. If there’s any orders to be given for my boys to attack, I’ll give the orders personally and I’ll lead them.” . . . The conversation between them became quite heated. The general thought we were moving too slowly. 26

For five long days the advance against mines, snipers, tree bursts, and machine gun nests in the dark, frigid forests was painfully slow and costly. The lead companies by now suffered over 80 per cent casualties. The men were numb. Ruthlessly pressed and pushed from behind, left with no options, there was nothing left to lose. The men from the Third Battalion’s I and K Companies, nearly simultaneously, rose up and moved forward. There were no fixed bayonets, no glorious yells of “Go or Broke!” or “Banzai!” Firing from the hip, they advanced and fought, hand to hand at times, to finally break the last German defensive line between them and the Lost Battalion. 27
One of the modern concepts that have evolved over time is the differentiation between strategic, organizational, and direct-level leadership based on the span of control, the level of the headquarters, and the extent of the influence exerted by the leader. Rank of the leader alone does not always indicate the position’s leadership level. By today’s definitions, as the 36th Division commanding general, Major General Dahlquist was an organizational leader. As such, he leads through his subordinates; employs staffs to assist with plans, resources, and personnel; and should influence operations less directly and more through policies, plans, and the integration of systems. Herein lies perhaps the greatest failure in battle command during the operation in the Vosges. As the division commander, Major General Dahlquist had the responsibility to develop and implement a comprehensive, broad-scoped plan and fully integrate the division’s systems in support of that plan. Instead, in addition to piecemealing his instructions, by locating forward, he operated more at the direct leadership level than at his more appropriate organizational level. Surely, with part of one of his battalions at risk, Major General Dahlquist had the responsibility to effect its rescue. However, by operating at the direct leadership level through personally directing the battalions, companies, and platoons, he became too mentally and emotionally involved, fixated on the situation of the Lost Battalion, and neglected his organizational leadership duties with the consequent neglect of the rest of the division. He failed to visualize the larger impact on the organization and mission and to employ the division to its best effect. He neglected to provide direction and allow latitude for subordinates to execute and he failed to empower his subordinates, in contradiction to the current necessities of organizational leadership.
Conclusion

Direction, as it applies to battle command, encompasses coordinating the various battlefield operating systems to form a synchronized plan, as well as the actions and positioning of the commander to best control and influence the battle. Intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, engineering, CSS, and C2 are combined during planning and executed under the commander’s influence, guidance, and control in a coherent effort towards the envisaged concept of the operation and end state. The forward locating of the commander was and is still doctrinally approved, but this must be balanced with the need to maintain situational understanding and command and control at the higher headquarters. Too, there comes a time when the presence of the commander not only is no longer required but actually adversely impacts the mission.

In an extension of the lackluster visualization by the division and the regiment, intelligence was not well collected or scrutinized and the system contributed little to the operation. Similarly, the command and control system produced mixed results. Poor communications, problematic from the start, were never wholly overcome and the commanders, most notably Major General Dahlquist, were located too far forward. Although some notable efforts were undertaken to enhance the maneuver abilities of the regiment and the battalions, maneuver was generally uncoordinated and employed with mixed results. Fire support and engineering operating systems, however, proved to be dramatic force multipliers and sustained the Lost Battalion as well as they supported the Nisei advance.

Perhaps the greatest drawback upon the rescue effort of the 100/442d RCT was the impact of Major General Dahlquist. While his personal courage is unquestionable
and his locating forward was doctrinally sanctioned and even suggested, his micromanagement and tactical instructions cast doubts on his judgement and his competency. Coupled with this, his locating himself at the front, in and amongst the lead battalions and platoons, like his direction, further hindered the efforts of his subordinate units. More significantly, beyond stifling the initiative of Colonel Pence and most of his subordinates, Major General Dahlquist usurped the authority of his subordinate commanders and fundamentally operated beneath his necessary organizational level to influence actions at the direct leadership level, with disappointing consequences.

1George S. Patton, Jr., War as I knew It (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1947), 357

2Steidl, 83.

3Hajime Yamane, interview by author; Satoshi Don Shimazu, interview by author.

4FM 3-0, Operations, 5-16.

5Steidl, 56.


7Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author; Hajime Yamane, interview by author; Steidl, 23-24.


9FM 3-0, Operations, 5-16.

10Hajime Yamane, interview by author. Then-Private First Class Yamane recalls never having requested or received artillery support during the battle to rescue the Lost Battalion, even as he was leading the remnants of his company.

11Huff, np.
12442d RCT, Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44; 141st Infantry Regiment, “Regimental Journal, October 1944.”

13Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author; Hajime Yamane, interview by author.

14FM 3-0, Operations, 5-17,18; FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, 29.

15FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, 29.

16FM 3-0, Operations, 5-18.

17Steidl, 23; Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author; Hajime Yamane, interview by author.

18Ibid., 41-42; Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author; 442d RCT, Narrative of Events, 1-31 October 44; 141st Infantry Regiment, “Regimental Journal, October 1944.”


20Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author; Stanley Akita, interview by author; Don Shimazu, interview by author; Hajime Yamane, interview by author; Steidl, 24.

21Steidl, 23; Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author.

22Colonel (Retired) Young O. Kim, interview by author.

23Steidl, 83; Duus 189.

24Tsukano, 263-264.

25Duus, 203-204; Tsukano, 260-266; Steidl, 87; Crost, 190-191.

26Tsukano, 264-265.

27Duus, 192-194-204; Tsukano, 263-266; Steidl, 88-89; Crost, 192-195.

28FM 22-100, Army Leadership; Be, Know, Do, 1-10, 1-11.

29Ibid., 1-11.

30Ibid., 6-2.
CHAPTER VI
SIGNIFICANCE

The art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. But one thing does not change, the heart of man. In the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale. In all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. It is rarely taken into account; and often strange errors are the result.¹

Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies*

Once forces are engaged . . . winning comes from the courage and competence of our soldiers, the excellence of their training, the confidence in their equipment, the soundness of their doctrine, and above all, the quality of their leadership.²

General Eric K. Shinseki

War is timeless. As long as men have ranged the face of the earth and have fought each other, and despite dramatic advances in weaponry, technology, and tactics, the very earliest recorded battles are comparable to present-day operations around the globe in the need for leadership and competent command. Whether undertaken with stone or sword, rifle and machine gun, or tank and helicopter, close combat requires leaders to instill motivation and direction to the troops who will do the fighting. In this regard, lessons can be drawn from the past that still have relevance today.

For six blustery days in October 1944, the 100/442d Regimental Combat Team fought in the dense, unforgiving forests of the Vosges Mountains to rescue the 211 men of the isolated First Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment. Already severely understrength, the *Nisei* regimental combat team undertook a hastily defined, poorly envisioned mission. Lacking the time and opportunity to thoroughly coordinate a general advance, the 36th
Division largely overlooked staff input and rushed the regiment into a mission where two others had already failed. Thus, as issued, the concept of the operation rested primarily on the imperfect visualization of the division’s commanding general. This led to a piecemealed attack and consequent micromanagement and overdirection in efforts to force it to succeed. That the mission was a success points not to the successful employment of battle command and organizational leadership, but rather to the inherent strength of the unit born of remarkable cohesion and a rare indomitable esprit, and the success of direct leadership in harnessing that potential. Thus, while the operation had its strengths, it perhaps better illustrates the failings of battle command. In effecting the rescue, the challenges faced by the *Nisei* regiment, as well as their actions, illustrate the continued significance of leadership and command, what is today termed battle command; the worth of leadership and command at the appropriate levels; and the supreme value of esprit de corps and proper leadership to harness that cohesion.

The Timeless Relevance of Battle Command

In spite of the advances in technology, the worth of the individual man is still decisive. ³

*FM 100-5, Operations*

Bearing in mind that battle command is a contemporary term, its concept, encompassing leadership and command in battle, is timeless. While the underlying theories are timeless, modern doctrine has expanded, codified, and explained more in the ways of leading and commanding, and visualizing, describing, and directing men and units in combat. This has provided a more tangible and detailed framework to better harness the abilities and capabilities of staffs and soldiers on the battlefield. The rescue of the Lost
Battalion during the Vosges Campaign provides insights into World War II-era leadership doctrine, and, when compared and contrasted with current concepts, emphasizes the importance of sound battle command principles.

By today’s doctrine and standards, battle command was employed haphazardly and incompletely during the rescue of the Lost Battalion. The greatest fault lay in poor visualization and a poor assessment of the mission in accordance with the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. At the division, hasty, unfounded assessments of the enemy situation combined with the lack of reconnaissance and a lack of appreciation for the difficulties posed by the terrain and weather to defeat the advance of the Alamo Regiment and slow the rescue by the Nisei combat team. Additionally, the current exhausted states of the units were not taken into account, leading to less comprehensive planning because of the loss of many key leaders, overestimation of capabilities, and even slower going. These faults continued at the regimental level, for, as the situation became more dire, the regiment’s and battalions’ staffs were rendered helpless by the overbearing direction and micromanagement of the division commander, who personally directed their operations.

Additionally, the commanders failed to fully visualize the mission in accordance with the elements of operational design although, to their merit and despite the lack doctrinal guidance, some of these issues were still addressed in their plans. The addition of armor, antitank, artillery, engineer, and tactical air support forces to the 100/442d RCT’s rescue effort reveals a gut-level understanding of weighting the main effort, forestalling culmination, and targeting the mission’s decisive points and objectives. Although the
division failed to employ simultaneity, the regiment, advancing with three battalions abreast, more successfully employed simultaneous operations across their smaller frontage.

While these efforts testify to the timelessness of the modern principles of operational design, the Texas Division still failed to address several of its elements. Culmination and the exhausted states of the divisional regiments were not considered at the outset of the Alamo Regiment’s original mission, contributing to the its predicament. Likewise, the 36th Division failed to simultaneously commit all its regiments in the rescue, and erroneously estimated the operational reach of its units, resulting in their over-commitment. The Nisei regiment too, hamstrung by the overdirection and micromanagement of Major General Dahlquist, was forced to commit many of the same errors and pushed blindly forward.

Commanders today will do well to recognize the significance of proper, thorough visualization in battle command and can take lessons from the Lost Battalion rescue. While it is easy to blame Major General Dahlquist and the leaders of the 100/442d for their failings, it must be recognized that the precepts of battle command, in any form, were not as robustly defined during World War II as they are today. Then, Field Service Regulation FM 100-5, Operations, simply addressed leadership and command in a scant fifteen pages, compared to today’s treatment of these subjects in FM 3-0, Operations; FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do; and FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Moreover, in addition to thorough doctrine, today’s commanders have at their disposal an arsenal of new tools and systems, such as the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) or the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) to assist them with the battle command tasks of visualizing, describing, and directing.
The ABCS is a confederation of subordinate computer systems that can greatly enhance the ability to visualize a situation and formulate a mission in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. Terrain and enemy analysis are conducted with the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), while the Maneuver Control System (MCS), the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) assist with visualizing and synchronizing various battlefield operating systems. Similarly, the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) assists with coordination and synchronization of logistics functions. In addition to facilitating visualization and providing quicker, more comprehensive, and up-to-date analyses and assessments, ABCS and ATCCS also expedite orders production and dissemination, the “describe” function of battle command, and promote better situational understanding and quicker decision-making during execution through near real-time feeds and updates. Together, this confederation is a powerful tool at the disposal of the commander that can better enable him to “visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct the military action required to achieve victory.”

But the systems are only as good as their operators and are accompanied by caveats. Information technologies are not a substitute for tactics and training. To best exploit the capabilities of modern systems, commanders must first be well versed in the fundamentals of tactics and operations. While the systems can gather and process information, they cannot analyze it, determine its importance, or make decisions. The commander, aided by his staff, does this. Too often the products of the advanced technology systems--the “pretty pictures”--are seen as ends in themselves, but have little relevance because they lack critical analysis in their production. Similarly, too much attention is often paid to format
and presentation versus content. While professional presentation is important in
disseminating information, it should not override clarity and simplicity and should not take
the place of analysis. Here too, the continued relevance of past doctrine in Field Service
Regulation FM 100-5, *Operations*, shows: “Clarity is more important than technique.”

The principles of leading men and commanding units are timeless. While labels
have changed from leadership and command to command and control to battle command,
the principal actions of assessing a situation and envisioning an operation and an end state,
describing and developing a concept to achieve that end state, and then directing and
leading to victory remain constant. Commanders must recognize the value of these actions
and employ them in order to fully prepare for and successfully undertake operations.
Modern doctrine exists in detail to guide commanders in their use of battle command, as
does a slew of information technology systems. But one without the other is less than
optimal, and today, just as in the past, commanders must fully understand how to visualize,
describe, and direct their operations to achieve victory.

**Command and Leadership**

Command and leadership are inseparable.  

*FM 100-5, Operations*

Man remains a fundamental in the conduct of war and so too, just as command is
unchanging, leadership, to guide and direct these men, is as important today as in the past.
Time has only allowed more study and greater codification of its principles. Leadership, as
the cornerstone of combat power, “serves as the catalyst that creates conditions for
success” and must be employed by the successful leader at all levels to blend the other
elements of combat power: maneuver, firepower, protection, and information. It is the
ability of the commander to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to his unit to complete the mission. Inasmuch as strategic leadership deals with direction and guidance at the national and theater levels, the rescue of the Lost Battalion deals more appropriately with organizational leadership, at the brigade through corps levels, and direct leadership, or that from the squad to the battalion level. In addition to illustrating the characteristics of these two levels of leadership, this operation highlights their differences and dramatically shows the importance for leaders to operate at their appropriate levels.

From the start, Major General Dahlquist operated below his organizational level and neglected to fully employ his staff and the resources at his disposal, such as the divisional cavalry troop, in the assessment of the situation, as well as in the development and implementation of the operational plan. The results were a faulty, narrowly scoped assessment of the situation and a poorly coordinated plan. Both current and World War II-era doctrine recommend that the commander locate himself near the main effort to lend his emphasis to it, but by constantly locating himself forward at the regimental or battalion command posts, Major General Dahlquist became fixated on the predicament of the 100/442d RCT, shifted focus and operated at the direct leadership level, and lost sight of the broader situation. This contributed to his failure to employ the other divisional regiments in simultaneous actions to draw enemy pressure away from the Lost Battalion and the 100/442d RCT. The result was ill coordinated, unsynchronized action. Worse, his presence and constant personal direction and micromanagement down to the platoon and squad levels bypassed much of the chain of command and effectively suppressed the opportunities for the regimental and battalion commanders to command and direct their units. Fearful that their relief would only bring successors who would kowtow and blindly
and carelessly push their units on, only a few field grade leaders in the 100/442d, such as Lieutenant Colonel Pursall, directly challenged the commanding general’s directions. Most company grade officers and enlisted soldiers were often left without options.

Today’s modern automated command and control systems, such as ABCS and ATCCS, can dramatically assist with leadership processes when employed correctly, judiciously, and not abused. These systems offer the commander increased capability to disseminate guidance and intent more clearly and quickly than before, and also promote greater situational understanding through quicker feedback and assessment of the situation through the near-real time dissemination of the common operational picture to more levels of command. As the ability to see more of the various levels of command becomes more reliable and commonplace, the temptation to control and direct the actions at those levels arises and may draw less disciplined commanders to overstep their bounds and overcontrol their lowest level units. As the Lost Battalion episode has shown, this can be detrimental to the concept of the operation as fixation leads to the neglect or omission of other assets and responsibilities and micromanagement leads to undermining the authority of subordinates.

The importance of leadership has not changed over time, regardless of the advances in technology and information systems. Current technology makes it even more important that leaders employ all available resources and remain focused at the appropriate level. As opposed to today’s modern, more mature concepts of leadership espoused in FM 22-100, "Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do,” World War II leaders had barely four pages of doctrinal guidance on the subject in Field Service Regulation FM 100-5, Operations. These few pages are woefully inadequate to provide instruction on leadership, are more descriptive than prescriptive, and fail to provide firm guidance. Still, the shortcomings in
previous leadership doctrine and the failures in the previous applications of leadership illustrate the importance and completeness of current doctrine. Leaders today face the same challenges as before, but just as new capabilities can reduce these challenges, they also create new ones.

Cohesion and Esprit

An essential ingredient in any fighting man is pride—pride in himself, pride in his unit, and the men around him. The seemingly nonsensical swagger of paratroopers, their special insignia, their carefully nurtured arrogance, seemingly in conflict with most decent, democratic practices, makes sense only when what paratrooper must do is considered. . . . It is this final basic pride—what will my buddies think?—that keep most soldiers carrying on, beyond the dictates of good sense, which screams at them to run, to continue living and to hell with war.8

T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

This is a fundamental truth: soldiers perform because they don’t want to let their buddies down.9

FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do

The relief of the trapped Texans of the Alamo Regiment by the Nisei of the 100/442d RCT demonstrates some minor successes but also many failures in the application of battle command by the leadership of the 36th Division and its subordinate regiments. Yet, the mission to extract the beleaguered First Battalion succeeded, despite the forbidding terrain, frigid weather, and fanatical and well arranged enemy defenses. In spite of the unimaginative, overcontrolling leadership of the division, the 100/442d RCT succeeded where two other regiments had failed. Not unlike the 36th Division’s assigned regiments, the 100/442d was also dramatically understrength at the start of the rescue. It was no better equipped and received no greater support than had the other regiments when
they undertook their attempts to relieve the First Battalion of the 141st Regiment. In that
the organizational leadership and direction provided by the division proved ineffective,
what accounted for the success of the mission was the intense cohesion of the Nisei
Regiment. Likewise, the impact of direct leadership, from those leaders in direct contact
with the Nisei, living, fighting, and dying with them, cannot be ignored, for it was that
which ultimately harnessed and guided the enormous esprit of the unit and translated it into
success.

Cohesion is a combat multiplier. It enables soldiers to accomplish more together
than as individuals. Cohesive units perform better than units lacking esprit and are better
empowered to work together, meet or exceed standards, execute tasks quicker and more
thoroughly, thrive on challenge, learn and progress from their experiences, and take pride
in their accomplishments.\(^\text{10}\) Cohesion is a self-generating cycle built upon training,
competence, trust, and esprit. Training builds competence, which, in turn, fosters trust as
team members come to rely on the proficiency of their leaders and their team members. As
trust within the unit grows, experience is gained and success is achieved. Unit success,
then, fosters greater cohesion amongst its members and increases motivation, again
benefiting training. The 100th Battalion (Separate), due to the maturity and prior military
experience of its men, quickly achieved success in training and, formed first, paved the way
for the 442d Regiment. The “younger brothers” of the 442d Regiment could look on the
achievements of the 100th Battalion as a source of pride and emulation.

Yet the rigor and depth of its training was only a part of the formula that built the
cohesion and the success of the regiment. The commonality of the deep-rooted Japanese-
American values of its soldiers played an enormous part in forging the cohesion of the
Nisei in the 100/442d RCT. This solidarity went far beyond anything the Army alone could instill in the soldiers. AJA culture of the early 1900s added the values of loyalty and obligation, perseverance, and responsibility to Yamato Tamashii, the innate, purely Japanese martial spirit and intrinsic pride nurtured and instilled by the Issei, and, combined with the need to prove themselves, formed a firm foundation for solid cohesion and fierce motivation within the unit. The 100th Battalion and 442d Regimental Combat Team were supremely motivated, far more than other units cobbled together from men coming from across the country, with disparate backgrounds and upbringings, whose unity was built solely upon the commonality of their military training. Though predominantly Caucasian, the leaders in the 100th Battalion and the 442d Regiment recognized this advantage and, through effective direct leadership, used it to good effect. Like many of the commanders that followed, Lieutenant Colonel Farrant L. Turner, the first commander of the 100th Battalion, was able to harness the potential of the unit and direct it with great success. Having served in Hawaii prior to the war, he personally knew many of the battalion’s men, was wholly integrated with their customs and culture, understood the men and their motivations, and had gained their respect and trust. Thus armed, he took the unit, with its shared common values, and instilled direction to further its successes. The regimental commanders, as well as the Second and Third Battalion commanders, also took the effort to understand the men of their unique unit and, too, employed the units with great effect through effective face-to-face leadership.

Once casualties mounted in combat, replacements became necessary. The replacement system during World War II centered on the individual replacement of combat losses. Individuals were assigned to units and often had little chance to integrate into the
unit or build cohesion and esprit. However, because the combined 100/442d RCT was a unique segregated unit, it benefited from having only a single pool of replacements, the vast majority of whom, coming from the same cultural background and upbringing as their “older brothers” in the unit, already shared the same values. They came to the unit already sharing pride in its achievements, were eager and willing to become part of the team, and, thus, more easily sustained the level of cohesion and motivation in the unit. The *Nisei* veterans, for their part, received and integrated their replacements more readily than in other units because, quite literally, the replacements often were their younger brothers.

The *Nisei* 100/442d Regimental Combat Team was effective. A product of cohesion based on common values and tough, effective training, this effectiveness was also sustained, despite dramatic personnel turnover. Commanders today can study the United States Army’s most highly decorated unit for clues to building strong cohesive teams, but must also recognize the differences. Shared common values, based on Japanese and American principles, were the cornerstone for commonality and cohesion within the 100/442d RCT. Its soldiers and leaders felt the same and were motivated in much the same way because they shared in common beliefs based largely upon their culture. Today, soldiers in the Army come from diverse cultures and backgrounds but have in common the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. More than just words or fuzzy concepts, these values are the common ground for soldiers today and identify “who we are.”

The concept that we, as soldiers, share the same values must be nurtured and reinforced in the unit to establish cohesion. To further build teams, tough, realistic training is required to challenge the unit and build its collective competence. In this way, the unit can enter the cohesion-training-competence-trust-esprit
cycle. This takes “hard work, patience, and quite a bit of interpersonal skill,” and may require the application of the “crawl, walk, run” methodology as the unit builds competence and trust but is not yet totally successful in its endeavors. The challenges are not insurmountable and are well worth the payoff.

Born of common cultural values and embodied in their “Go For Broke” motto, the unity and camaraderie of the men of the 100/442d RCT enabled the unit to overcome the greatest adversities, from terrain and weather to determined enemy resistance to poor command. An immeasurable force multiplier, the unit’s esprit was harnessed and perpetuated through challenging training and the growing record of the unit. Today, regardless of the nature of the unit, common values must be instilled in and shared by the members of the command to establish a solid foundation for cohesion. While today’s elite units benefit from an abundance of training resources and a relative lack of training distracters, most others will need to overcome the challenges of securing the time and resources to conduct the training that will foster cohesion and unit esprit de corps.

But cohesion and esprit de corps alone are not enough. Solid leadership, the cornerstone of combat power, particularly at the direct level, is needed to form the unit, guide its cohesion, and harness its capabilities, just as the direct leaders in the 100/442d RCT guided existing Nisei cohesion with military training to form an unbeatable unit. This leadership must also address the issues appropriate to its level of operations and influence. It should not focus on problems too great for its scope nor micromanage those levels below it, unlike the leadership of the 36th Division during this mission. It should make use of the capabilities of current systems to disseminate guidance and direct action to the extent required, but not abuse, overdirect, or micromanage. Micromanagement leaves valuable
resources untapped, as fixation ignores some assets and others are bypassed or overrun. Modern information systems can assist greatly with the key battle command task of visualization. In conjunction with the sound application of doctrinal fundamentals, commanders will be enabled to thoroughly assess a situation and formulate a concept of operation and an end state for any given operation. This is a timeless procedure, regardless of the effects of technology, and were it better known and adhered to by command during the Lost Battalion rescue, the operation may well have been less costly and less dramatic.  


2FM 3-0, _Operations_, Foreword.

3FM 100-5, _Field Service Regulations: Operations_, 18.


5FM 100-5, _Field Service Regulations: Operations_, 31.

6Ibid., 23.

7FM 3-0, _Operations_, 4-7.


9FM 22-100, _Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do_, 5-19.

10Ibid., 5-19.

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