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TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF TRANSFORMING A NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONAL BRIGADE TO AN INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

BY

COLONEL ULYSSES BROWN, JR.
United States Army

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To Determine the Feasibility of Transforming a National Guard Divisional Brigade to an Interim Brigade Combat Team

by

COL Ulysses Brown, Jr
US Army

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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No element of national power is more clearly viewed as a visible sign of American determination to shape the international environment than the presence of ground forces overseas. The President and Secretary of Defense have used the Army over the years to flex American muscle in many places around the world. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has struggled to adjust to requirements as well as maintain a healthy total force. Our reliance on Reserve Component units to accomplish the mission has been expanding during this period. Use of Army Reserve and National Guard forces has increased and will continue to play a vital role in US Army operations stateside and abroad. Four significant actions have taken place to enhance Army capabilities to project the nations will. First, the concept of Total Force is attributed to Defense Secretary Laird who directed in 1970 that a Total force be considered when planning, programming, manning, and equipping DOD forces. Second, congressional mandates for Active Army support to the Reserve Components initiatives were started to close the gap in relations and to improve training and readiness. Third was consistent support of senior Army leadership to forge the spirit of cooperation of all components. And fourth was the Current CSA announcement and selection of a National Guard Brigade to be one of the first six Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) as the Army builds momentum for the Objective Force. This thesis will focus on the feasibility of transforming a Divisional National Guard Brigade to an IBCT and its relevance in shaping the Objective Force.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSFORMING A NATIONAL GURAD DIVISIONAL BRIGADE TO AN IBCT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE BERLIN CRISIS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE McNAMARA REFORMS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VIETNAM WAR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC CRISIS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR CHANGES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPS PACKAGING/TEAMING</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE LEGACY FORCE</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE INTERIM FORCE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE OBJECTIVE FORCE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28TH DIVISION AND TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING STANDARDS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMING A NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONAL BRIGADE TO AN IBCT

During its entire history, the US Army has depended on all of its components to fight the nations wars, abroad and domestically. The role of the Army Reserve and the National Guard has been and will remain to reinforce the Active Army, enhance its capabilities, ensure Army forces are responsive and full spectrum dominant, and to maintain itself as the most dominant ground force in the free world. No element of national power is viewed more clearly as a visible sign of American determination to shape the international environment than the presence of ground forces during deterrence or at the outbreak of conflict. The President and Secretary of Defense have used the Army over the years to flex American muscle in many places around the world. However, since the end of the Cold War, the Army has struggled to adjust to changing requirements as well as maintain a healthy total force. The reliability on Reserve Component (RC) units to accomplish the mission has been expanding since this period. Use of the Army Reserve and National Guard forces has increased and will continue to play a vital role in US Army operations stateside and abroad. Four significant actions have taken place to enhance Army capabilities to project the nations will. First, the concept of Total Force is attributed to Defense Secretary Laird who directed in 1970 that a Total force be considered when planning, programming, manning, and equipping Defense Department Forces. Second, congressional mandate for Active Army support to Reserve Components initiatives were started to close the gap in relations and to improve training and readiness. Third, was consistent support of senior Army leadership to forge the spirit and cooperation of all Army components. And fourth was the current CSA announcement of Army Transformation and selection of a National Guard Brigade to be one of the first six Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) as the Army builds momentum for the Objective Force.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the feasibility of transforming a Divisional National Guard Brigade to an IBCT and its relevance in shaping the objective force. The concept for future Army design will be dependent on all components in order to respond to the needs of the President and Secretary of Defense, and to upon arrival in their respective AOR's provide CINC'S with capable forces.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to understand the current environment concerning AC/RC integration, and its impact on National Military Strategy, it is important to understand how the Army has reached
this point. Cold War crisis and changes in American society played a significant role in shaping the US Military and Strategy. The threat of war in Europe and the Caribbean kept the Army on edge during the sixties. Viet Nam raged during the sixties and early seventies, un-rest in America cities and tension around the world all strained the military element of national power. During these sensitive times, several major events shaped the military's strategy on use of the National Guard and Army Reserve. They are implementation of the Total Force, the beginning of the all volunteer military, and the increased service of minorities. During the seventies several significant events occurred that helped shape strategic policy.

THE BERLIN CRISIS

President John F. Kennedy entered office in Jan 61 and rejected the Eisenhower Administrations policy of nuclear deterrence. President Kennedy favored “flexible response,” which was the broader use of conventional forces. In the summer of 1961, President Kennedy was put to test when the Soviets began construction of a formidable wall splitting Berlin. President put the military on alert and sought to mobilize the National Guard. Within one week, Congress authorized the call-up of 250,060 Guardsmen and Reservist for twelve months. The Soviets acknowledging US will to fight eventually backed down. The Berlin crisis was the first time a reserve component mobilization was used as an instrument to deter war. The National Guard call-up demonstrated the country’s resolve to friends and foes alike. Guard units constituted an important ready reserve force.¹

THE McNAMARA REFORMS

The Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara viewed the Berlin Mobilization as a sign of US resolve however, he thought it showed inefficiencies. He took several steps to improve readiness. Reserve Component units begin to conduct training overseas with active component (AC) counterparts for the first time since WW II. He also made significant cuts in the Army National Guard structure by reducing the Guard from 27 divisions to eight. These cuts caused restructuring which resulted in 18 new separate brigades. All changes were made in an attempt to enhance readiness.²

THE VIETNAM WAR

North Vietnam commenced operations in 1960 to conquer South Vietnam. The US took a stand against the communist expansion and by 1963 the US had deployed over 16,000 soldiers. Loopholes in the draft laws had a profound affect on the National Guard and Reserves. Numerous educational and professional deferments permitted young men to evade the draft.
Anyone entering the Guard could avoid the draft but had to serve for six years. By the end of the war, many Americans considered the Guard a haven for draft dodgers. This view was incorrect to some degree as many Guardsmen volunteered and many Reservist and National Guard units served in SW Asia. In 1968, over 9,000 guardsmen were mobilized and deployed.³

DOMESTIC CRISIS

The war raged on in Vietnam much to the dissatisfaction and outcry of many Americans back home. The National Guard was tasked to respond to civil disturbances throughout America. The first major civil disturbance started on August 11, 1965 in Watts area of Los Angeles when a confrontation between black youths and policemen sparked a widespread riot. Riots occurred in Detroit in 1967 after police raided a black nightclub and again in 1968 in the aftermath of Martin Luther King’s assassination. The most unfortunate moment for the Guard was during the 1970 Kent State anti-war demonstrations when four students were killed after Guardsmen unleashed a volley of fire after being attacked by protestors. Again, in 1990, National Guard troops were mobilized to respond to riots in Los Angeles. These actions were of significance in shaping strategy for employment of the National Guard. Army Reserve and National Guard units and individuals have played significant roles as first responders for disaster relief as well as federal military missions.⁴

ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

The end of the draft came as a direct result to the nations bitterness of Vietnam. After assuming office in 1969, President Nixon promised to end the draft. Realizing an all volunteer force was inevitable, the armed forces launched programs to ease the transition to volunteerism. The military increased its recruiting force, improved family and bachelor housing and raise education benefits. America’s draft ended in 1973 however it did have effects on manning in the Reserve Components, particularly the National Guard. In 1977 alone, over 104,000 guardsmen fled and its strength bottomed out. Increased minority participation allowed the Guard to endure the personnel crisis. In 1971, the National Guard included only 4,961 black soldiers. As a result of an intense recruiting effort, black participation in the Army National Guard skyrocketed. Within five years the ranks had grown to over 46,696 black soldiers.⁵

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The concept of Total Force is widely attributed to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who in 1970 directed that a total force be considered when planning, programming, and equipping Defense Department forces. It was designed to meet Cold War requirements to fight a
European war between huge mechanized militaries. Ten Years ago a total force policy remained important but proved inadequate to meet the need for increased use of the Reserve Components (RC) in response to challenges posed by a smaller Army, with a more diverse mission, and more frequent deployments. In 1973, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger announced that the services were to fully integrate their active and reserve forces into a "homogenous whole". Without a draft, the Guard and Reserves were to be the initial, primary and sole augmentation to active forces.6

The Total Force Policy drew the National Guard and Active Army and the Air Force into closer harmony. In an effort to strengthen the Army, Gen Creighton Abrams initiated the "Round-out Program". This program aligned National Guard combat brigades as the third combat brigade of AC divisions. The intent was to form a vital link between the American people and the Army.7

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army's senior leaders have sized, shaped and justified the Army to fight two Major Theaters of War. The Army is now structured for the active forces to provide the Army's primary combat forces. At the same time, they organized the Army's Reserve and National Guard to provide critical individuals and units to augment and reinforce active forces in time of war or national emergency.8 To conduct the secondary Shape and Respond missions, senior leaders have generally drawn from the MTW forces under the assumption that they could be quickly extracted from a small scale contingency. This logic seemed reasonable at that time however contingencies were historically the exception and not the rule. The United States responded to a total of 16 contingencies during the entire Cold War period from 1947 to 1989. But from 1989 to 1997, the United States responded to a burdensome 45 contingencies. In 1997, on average, more than 31,000 soldiers were deployed every day to 70 different countries around the world.9 This factor alone forced the Army to increase its use of National Guard forces to conduct current missions and relieve active force deployment op-tempo. This same period demanded stringent changes in AC/RC initiatives to enhance and improve overall Army readiness.

MAJOR CHANGES

Since the mid-1990's, active and reserve component (AC/RC) integration programs and initiatives have tried to address the challenges associated RC training and readiness. In 1993, Congressional guidance drove actions to improve AC/RC initiatives to advance training and readiness. The statutory language that drove Army Leadership is listed on the following page and was used as a driver to promote change.
In 1997, Secretary Cohen launched a number of initiatives that began what is now referred to as a revolution in military affairs. He initiated programs to reconnect America with its military and to increase reliance on the private sector through privatization. He also focused the Department's leadership toward a truly seamless integration of active and reserve forces. These initiatives helped reduced or eliminated the structural and cultural barriers and resulted in a phenomenal transformation in attitudes about RC service. Despite differences, AC and RC leadership relations greatly improved as a product of the forced operational interdependence among components. All realized each hold distinct institutional imperatives for roles each feels it should play. The ARNG and USAR can be counted on to oppose any degree of amalgamation that leads to loss of their identity and culture. During this period Forces Command, the Army's executive agent for AC/RC integration, began to aggressively focus and provide resources to enhance RC training and readiness. Several manning initiatives were adopted along with focused review of Active Component support to the Reserve Components. The intent of these programs was to provide full-time support to Reserve Components, to assist in training, and to ensure readiness standards to meet deployment criteria after mobilization. The chart left shows the growth in AC/RC support beginning in the early 1990's to present.

The first major program to improve training and readiness was BOLD SHIFT. BOLD SHIFT was implemented to overcome shortcomings

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>How Did We Get Here?</th>
<th>AC to RC 1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
delineated in DAIG Report of the ARNG Combat Brigades mobilized during Desert Storm and to fulfill 1992 National Defense Authorization Act. It was intended to refocus and re-prioritize the core training program in the Reserve Components. The intent of the program was to implement Ground Forces Readiness Exercises (1) Designed to train high priority RC combat, combat support, and combat service support TO&E units with focus on: Force Support Packages (FSP), Separate Brigades (Enhanced Brigades), Round Out Units and Early Deployers (Latest Arrival Dates < 30) (2) establish resource priority always to FSP and e-SB's (3) Provide residual training to “all others” (4) eliminate TDA units. These moves led to enhanced training opportunities and feedback to the Army leadership on National Guard and Reserve Component readiness.12

In 1997 Forces Command implemented Training Support XXI, this initiative was due to impart by mandate of the FY93 National Defense Authorization Act. The mission of Training Support XXI was and still remains to reorganize, streamline, and improve the quality of reserve component training support. FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Army Relationships, prescribes policy, responsibilities, and implementation guidance for programs and initiatives that feature relationships between Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units. It establishes relationships for AC/RC Associations, Mentorship, Army Teaming, integrated divisions, multiple-component units, and corps mission alignment; defines Training Support XXI (TS XXI) structures and functions; and outlines resource management processes that support these programs.13 FORSCOM/ARNG/USAR Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training, provides the guidelines to effect training and readiness within the AC/RC umbrella. The evolution and growth of the Active and Reserve component Training TSXXI mandate is to enhance training readiness through a dedicated AC/RC support. The chart at left shows the relations between AC/RC activities and its desired impact on readiness. This effort is executed by a myriad of
organizations and missions under a single command and creates the "One Stop Shopping" approach. What that means is for combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units, TS XXI provides the training support that was previously scattered throughout the Army. TSXXI, as the end-state is in part an outgrowth of the Gulf War and some of the lessons learned on RC deployability. Although TS XXI has been highlighted, there are several other programs that relate to AC/RC integration. However, this paper will focus on regulations and programs that impact on National Guard unit training, manning, readiness and missioning. These initiatives includes programs such as the CSA Teaming and Corps Packaging programs. Both are designed to enhance AC/RC participation and to ensure readiness is meet by aligning units with a sister Division or Corps.

TSXXI has been very successful and has placed highly competent and competitive officers in the AC/RC arena in order to provide the best training support possible. For the Army senior leadership and commanders, it is a decided decrease in OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and DEPTEMPO in support of RC training for AC Corps and Division Commander's. It has provided the doctrinal framework in training thus providing CTC like experience at the platoon and company level during annual training, provides training oversight for CONOPS, and has helped to reduce mobilization training time which impacts on strategic readiness. All of these factors played a significant role in enhancing RC readiness and training, and the Army's missioning RC with operational requirements. The program was designed to strengthen AC/RC integration to enhance readiness across the full spectrum of RC day to day operations. Initiatives to enhance RC readiness and the drawdown of Active Components lead to further requirements for use of RC units. Army National Guard commanders have always wanted to be included in war plans for several reasons. First if included in war-plans, resourcing would improve and secondly, they wanted to demonstrate the capabilities of ARNG units.

CORPS PACKAGING/TEAMING

After the end of the Cold War the Army National Guard combat units were omitted from war plans. Lacking specific missions, they were low priority when it came to dividing resources, leaving them with older equipment and less money for training. At that time many in the Pentagon referred to the Guard divisions as excess. With this in the mindset of many political leaders, the Army Teaming initiatives were further expanded in Sep 2000, when the CSA announced a new concept called "Corps Packaging". This program aligned all with National Guard combat divisions and 15 enhanced separate brigades with active component divisions at
the corps level. This program is an extension of the divisional paring former Chief Of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer announced in September 1998. The previous alignment was training focused

**Army National Guard Divisions**

**Corps Packaging**

On 14 Sep 00, the CSA announced some of the results from the deliberate planning process at the 122d National Guard Association of the United States in Atlantic City.

only, the end state of the new alignment is to maximize Guard capabilities to augment, rotate, backfill and reinforce active units. The new concept has been employed as National Guard combat units have been missioned, and as appropriate JSCP apportioned, based upon CINC provided requirements. With this new vision and concept, National Guard forces are paramount to the Army's vision for the future. As JCSP apportioned forces, they must maintain readiness standards in order to meet the CINC's demands. FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 Army Relationships, prescribes policy, responsibilities, and implementation guidance for programs and initiatives that feature relationships between Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units. It establishes relationships for AC/RC Associations, Mentorship, Army Teaming, integrated divisions, multiple-component units, and corps mission alignment; defines Training Support XXI (TS XXI) structures and functions; and outlines resource management processes that support these. This initiative helped shaped current Army Strategy to provide capable forces to meet the demands in all spectrum of operations. National Guard units are now embedded in go to war plans and will be integral parts of warfighting formations of the Objective Force Army. Today these units provide the CINC's the capability to fight two near simultaneous Major Theaters of War (MTW's). They are absolutely essential in providing swing forces for the near second MTW fight and must transform with Active Forces to provide interoperable capable forces for future conflict.

8
TRANSFORMATION

The CSA goal is to transform the Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant on every point in the spectrum of Operations. In the long term, to produce a force that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, and sustainable. The Transformation campaign plan describes how the Army will reach this goal over the next 30 years, while maintaining essential war-fighting readiness to execute national Military Strategy.21 The Army has competing requirements that are in constant, daily tension.

First is The Army’s requirement to have a trained and ready force to fulfill its non-negotiable contract with the American people to fight and win our Nation’s wars decisively. That mission is significantly enhanced by being fully engaged around the globe with our allies, partners, and sometimes our potential adversaries to promote stability, to gain influence, and to ensure access in times of crisis. Further, as contingency operations become long-term commitments, the mission tempo – both training and operational – increasingly strains force structure.

Second, but most important, The Army must transform itself into a force for the 21st Century, strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations and prepared to meet a growing array of requirements including threats to our homeland.22 The mission of The Army remains unchanged: to fight and win the Nation’s wars.22

Strategically the root cause for change is the Army’s readiness dilemma and its ability to respond to CINC generated requirements. The increased risk for the Army is the cumulative result of many factors including a strategy that overreaches the military current capabilities, increased deployments with fewer forces, a smaller budget, and competing budget requirements for modernization. These factors and the increase use of forces required re-thinking our strategy in order to shape the Army for the future. However, the critical task for the Army is to maintain the linkage between the Legacy and Interim Force to prevent compromise of near-term war-fighting capabilities.23

THE LEGACY FORCE

The legacy force is what we have now and is the means to guarantee near term war-fighting readiness. The plan is to enhance this current force capabilities by recapitalizing and modernizing selected equipment, procuring some new equipment, and ensuring a high state of readiness. The combat arms portion of the legacy force will be reduced from the current sixty-eight combat brigades to about fifty-five over the next five to seven years as six to eight
brigades (most AC, one or two ARNG) are changed into Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and six ARNG brigades are transformed into CSS. From FY 2010 to FY 2031, the legacy force will gradually transition into the Objective Force. The ARNG brigades will begin conversion in FY2012 and the last will complete conversion in FY 2031, six years after the last AC brigade completion. Creating a limited number of reorganized IBCTs will add near term capability for strategic responsiveness, particularly regarding the Army's frequent participation in small scale contingencies. These newly organized brigades become the basis of the interim force. The new IBCTs will complement other existing forces to provide a full spectrum capable Army today, while The Army simultaneously builds the entire (mid-term) Interim Force and pursues Transformation to the longer-term Objective Force described in the CSA Vision. 24

THE INTERIM FORCE

The Interim Force will be fielded primarily with off-the-shelf equipment and technological insertions and will provide immediate deployability and breakthrough maneuver capabilities to bridge the current gap between the Army's heavy and light forces until technology developments make fielding of the Objective Force possible. These initial Brigades will also provide feedback to the Army to assist in establishing training tactics, techniques and procedures, doctrine, and provide CINC's full wartime capable units.

In transformation jargon these would be the strategic preclusion forces designed to stop aggressors dead in their tracks before the shooting ever starts. Conceivably, this could be the preserve of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington. Despite the fact that the ARNG owns over 54 percent of the total Army combat forces, with its most-ready units requiring a minimum 90-day mobilization lag, that high percentage will not weigh as heavily on the AC by 2025. Due to past actions, most would consider the concept for distributing knowledge-based assets in the future, it will almost certainly not include ARNG combat forces.

However, the decision was made to select a National Guard brigade as part of the interim force. This decision was paramount to ensure the integrated force structure utilized the unique capabilities of the National Guard and reinforced the "One Army" concept. Strategic Implications for Guard units: the goal and end-state for IBCT's is to be fully deployed in 96 hours capable of conducting Brigade level operations. This requirement will have a major impact on National Guard training and be a formidable challenge. The level of preparedness will increase due to the stated readiness end-state. To assist in analyzing feasibility of change, the Army must determine what's different for the units of the future. 25
THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

At the strategic level, the Objective Force will continue to meet the Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people to fight and win our Nation's wars. Our unique contribution to national security is prompt sustained land dominance across the full spectrum. The Army's strategic responsiveness, forward presence and force projection capability assists strategic shaping of the environment, deters would-be aggressors, and provides options to the President, Secretary of Defense and war-fighting CINC's in regions of U.S. national interest.

The Objective Force will be the future full spectrum force: organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations. Army Objective force units will dominate land operations, providing the decisive complement to air, sea and space operations. They create synergy within the Joint Task Forces by controlling ground where people and political authorities reside and by defeating our opponents in their protective sanctuaries or forcing them into the open where they can be destroyed with joint fires. The objective force contributes to decisive joint operations by conducting simultaneous, distributed and continuous, combined arms air-ground operations, day and night, in open, close, complex, and all other terrain conditions throughout the battle space to establish land force dominance, wrest the initiative from the enemy, force him onto the defensive, and defeat him in detail. Objective Force units are designed to operate at a tempo that affords the enemy no rest or relief and no means of responding effectively. They develop situations out of contact, maneuver to positions of advantage, engage enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons, and destroy them with precision fires and, when necessary, by tactical assault at times and places of their choosing. They support and are supported by joint precision joint fires, maneuvering to force the enemy to expose himself to those fires and exploiting them to make permanent their otherwise transient effects. To achieve these results, Objective Force formations must see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively. These are major changes in how we currently fight today. The forces of the future will fight on its own terms based on the capabilities prescribed in draft doctrine and will include elements of the National Guard. All Army components must embrace and understand the concept of the Objective Force.

In July of 2001, the CSA selected the 56th Brigade of the 28th Division of the PAARNG as one of the Army's six Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT's). This decision was important in maintaining the CSA plan and vision of "One Army" for the future. While many believe the decision was political, the relevance of the National Guard is more important today as any time in our history. This manuscript has shown National Guard units have been employed throughout
our history, are now JSCP apportioned, and will play a significant role in executing future national military strategy. The inclusion of the 56th PANG will ensure continuity for future force development, doctrine and training, and help close the gaps between active and National Guard capabilities which will benefit the entire Army. Failure is unacceptable and would setback many years of senior leaders efforts to move forward to bring the Army together as one. Success is clearly defined as meeting the standards as set forth in the CSA vision.

28TH DIVISION AND TRANSFORMATION

There is no doubt our Army requires an Interim Force element in the Army National Guard. The 56th Brigade will perform the critical mission as the lead National Guard echelon to initiate and inform as the most effective course of action to execute the Army National Guard transformation to the Objective Force. However in the event resources are not equal to the requirements to achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY08, the Army must be prepared to address compensating strategies. Pre-mobilization training at the platoon vice company level of proficiency; field training exercises certification at Fort Indian Gap vice Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation; battalion Command Post Exercises (CPX) vice Field Training Exercises (FTX); etc. 

Of utmost concern to most, in particular those AC members who fully understand the pain of waning resources will be the National Guards ability to transform, meet, and maintain readiness standards. Many who have become involved with RC training fully understand their limitations due to their unique internal challenges. However, the standards for the IBCT will be higher than any previous standard ever applied to a National Guard combat arms unit. Training issues and standards will be addressed later along with the proposed training plan/concept to meet those prescribed standards.

TRAINING STANDARDS

Due to the significant changes in how the future Army will fight, training standards and readiness will be critical to meet the CSA intent to provide CINC's with capable forces trained and ready to fight full spectrum operations. This will be a significant challenge for the National Guard due to constraints in training, resourcing and manpower shortages. Current standards for national guard combat units IAW FC Reg 350-2, Reserve Component Training requires units to maintain platoon level proficiency prior to mobilization and meet Bn/Bde level proficiency post-mobilization. Pre-mobilization training is inextricably linked to post-mobilization training. A critical objective is to identify achievable, sustainable training requirements, which provides the focus for effective pre-mobilization unit training. RC commanders will train their units to achieve
established pre-mobilization floor requirements. Minimum pre-mobilization training proficiency level requirement is for 70% trained at the platoon level, 75% qualified at respective soldier proficiency. DMOSQ and professional development at 85% of assigned strength when deploying for CTC. These pre-mobilization training proficiency requirements are floors and must be met by all combat units. Pre-mobilization training programs must be balanced between gunnery, maneuver/mission, sustainment, survival skills, and leader development. The Infantry, Armor, and Cavalry pre-mobilization training objectives focus on platoon maneuver and gunnery training during pre-mobilization. Although the maneuver commander must balance unit training between maneuver and gunnery, this balance is not necessarily an equal balance, particularly for heavy maneuver units.\(^{28}\)

Given future training will be indisputably more complex, the commanders of the IBCT companies face a far greater challenge. Currently, company commanders in legacy force units are struggling to meet training requirement standards. The new IBCT organization will require additional sustainment training to compensate for additional vehicles, improved technology and more modern equipment than in previously designed TOE’s in order to maintain proficiency. For National Guard Company commanders, the current standard, which is maintaining platoon level proficiency is a difficult task. Annual Training periods today are built around collective training to maintain proficiency at the platoon level. IBCT standards will require units to be ready at the company level. The decision level for moving to company level collected training is the brigade commander.\(^{29}\) For most Active component members, these standards do not appear difficult, however it is extremely challenging for National Guard units due to the following factors which challenges the Guard leadership to meet and maintain standards. These are foremost the most difficult challenges, (1) available training days, (2) MOSQ shortfalls, and (3) resourcing constraints within units. Shown is the PAARNG developmental training plan for the IBCT and the AC proposed developmental training plan for an IBCT. Both plans are contingent on available resources within TRADOC to support training. Additional

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**Five-Year Developmental Plan**

*(Road to IOC)*

**TY-06:**
- Collective Training
  - Company Lanes
  - BN/Bde CPX
  - BCBST
  - Bde Warfighter

**TY-07:**
- Rehearsal for CTC Validation in TY 08
  - Table Gunnery
  - Company EXEVAL
  - BCT Validation
  - Battle Staff Training
  - NCO Management
  - Officer Management

**TY-03:**
- DMOSQ/Reclass
  - Selected NETs
  - TOCs
  - SIG

**TY-04:**
- C4ISR NETs
  - Bde(+) NETs

**TY-05:**
- IAV NET
  - PLT Lanes
  - VTX
  - LTP

**FIGURE 5**
resources to support virtual, constructive and live training exercises is required to meet both timelines.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{IBCT DEVELOPMENTAL TRAINING MODEL}

\textbf{BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM}

\textbf{FIGURE 6}

Training day availability is a major challenge for Guard units. By congressional mandate, units are only authorized thirty nine training days per year for annual training. With the focus on collective training, National Guard company level leadership is challenged to ensure soldiers are trained on individual and crew level task. As an example, the Bosnia Task Force Program (KFOR) in Aug 2000 completed its first rotation with a National Guard Division Headquarters in command of RC, AC, and other Nations troops. Touted as a highly successful rotation, the required pre-mobilization training caused the average per person active duty days to exceed the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority by over 30 days. These readiness requirements coupled with mission requirements could become a major issue for National Guard troops and leadership.\textsuperscript{51}

It is extremely important based on the organization design of the IBCT and the proposed changes in doctrine and leader training to provide adequate training time. Leaders within units must develop sustainment training plans that include individual MOS specific, battlefield function specific, and stove-pipe collective functions. As an example, supply operations within the infantry will require some stovepipe training from the company supply to the Brigade Support Battalion. This type training must be done during a collective training period in order to facilitate the system of systems approach to training. Another example is integrated snipers at the Battalion and company levels for infantry units. Sniper current sustainment requirements exceed AC training day availability and will need to be addressed as we apply the same metrics to National Guard units. A third example is the challenge of sustainment training requirements for the network centric integrated systems such as the FBCB2 system. These are merely a few examples of requirements that the IBCT brings as task for company level commanders. The impact of change will be significant across the Army as the Army moves forward in transformation. A recent FORSCOM study indicates AC company commanders have struggled
meeting requirements today and will be further challenged in the future IBCT’s. For a Guard company commander, this challenge will be further exacerbated due to their thirty-nine day training period per year restrictions, DMOSQ shortfall and other Guard particular challenges. These issues are of strategic significance if we are serious about changing leaders, organizations, doctrine and concepts.

DMOSQ is a challenge that impacts National Guard unit readiness that must be managed more efficiently, especially for the future IBCT since the new technology training for the advance equipment will be extremely perishable. A recent FORCOM study indicated that MOSQ standards are not being met across the board in legacy force units today. The chart at left highlights FORSCOM DMOSQ 2000 study results. The information concerning DMOSQ is not new, Army Reserve and National Guard units have struggled with the requirements from the very beginning. The reality is 15-20% of a typical unit is awaiting training. A known but unofficial policy within the RC/NG is RC/NG commanders first priority is unit strength, not DMOSQ. Several other reasons also impact this shortfall. Soldiers want to train with units during AT, not go to school; Non DMOSQ is a disadvantage to the unit, not the individual soldier, and collective training is emphasized during AT. FORSCOM is developing a campaign plan to provide guidance and assist with this challenge. It is a major concern especially for transformation due to past historical knowledge on how change effects guard units. As an example, a major TOE change can break a unit for up to 2 years. Personnel changes and moves for the creation of the IBCT must be carefully managed to prevent the unit from missing windows in its glide-path. Requirements must be adjusted in terms of MUTO /yr. Research indicates that units require 48 MUTO/yr vs a proposal for 68 Multiple Unit Training Assemblies (MUTO) yr, this adds approximately 10 days per year for 3 years. The constraint of troop availability is a reality within the guard forces. This impacts on their ability to conduct collective training as well as maintain unit basic functions. As an example, to meet platoon

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**FIGURE 7**
level training standards for CTC rotations, National Guard units require a six-year training strategy to be proficient at the platoon level. This strategy is currently being executed by enhanced brigades who routinely receive more resources than a divisional brigade due to their status as early deployers in comparison to divisional combat units. (FC Reg 350-13, Major Theater of War Backfill).  

The 56th /28th PANG has designed training plans to meet the requirements IAW AC IBCT standards. Their training plans are based on several key assumptions. Listed at left are the training assumptions as briefed to the Vice CSA on 10 Dec 01. While these assumptions were accepted as valid and forwarded to Department of the Army staff for validation, final approval rest with CSA in order to ensure resourceing is available to support the proposed plan. These assumptions establish the baseline for transforming from a divisional brigade to an IBCT.  

Furthermore, this plan is resource intensive and requires additional resources and major infrastructure changes to support the training strategy. It is consistent with doctrine where the battle focus is oriented on JSOCP'd mission set, primary focus on SSC, and includes secondary mission requirements. Certification requirements and post mob requirements remain constant with current programs per FORSCOM guidance as executive agent for AC/RC integration.
INFRASTRUCTURE

This chart shows the PANG required infrastructure to support training initiatives required of the new IBCT. This requires upgrade in facilities and indicates the additional resources needed to ensure units can meet training requirements. It requires significant upgrades to existing facilities, specifically to electric power availability and network (IT) backbone. Alterations to most existing armories will be required to support the added power and IT requirements. The timely completion of these upgrades directly impacts the ARNG IBCT’s ability to reach FOC. As a result of additional simulation and “reach-back” requirements, alterations to existing armories will be required. These alterations will include additional electrical power to support the required computers and training devices, and increased IT “backbone” support infrastructure to install IT cabling. Depending upon the stationing plan, maintenance support requirements will increase facilities requirements. Given that service intervals will double, there are reasons to expect required maintenance personnel and facilities space to increase. If an ARNG Training center is used for an IBCT mobilization and deployment site, additional infrastructure such as loading docks, warehouses, pre-positioned equipment and munitions storage, road and airfield upgrades, will all be required to ensure deployment timelines can be met. These changes will ensure the brigade will be brought up to a base level of modernization in order to facilitate training. The following chart indicates the PAARNG sustainment training plan. This is a battle focused collective plan and end-state is company level proficiency.
This sustainment training plan is shorter than the strategy currently used by enhanced combat brigades of the legacy force today. It is also projected for units to maintain proficiency at the company level. Today’s requirements is for units sustainment at the platoon level. A concern at the strategic level is the realistic ability to meet company level proficiency considering new equipment, no significant changes in available training days, and additional training required to implement organization and doctrinal change.36

Personnel issue: Manning concerns while serious across the National Guard do not appear to be a challenge for the 28th Div PAARNG or the 56th Bde. Current personnel projections show the unit at 98% strength per the IBCT TOE. The challenge will be creation of units such as the RSTA Squadron, the MI Company and Signal Company. These units present a significant challenge and will be the most significant personnel issue for the 56th. Figure 12 shows the PAARNG force lay down to transform a divisional brigade to an IBCT. 37

Of significance is the 28th Division’s ability to maintain the Division(-) as it transforms the 56th BDE. This sustainment plan will not preclude the 28th from other mission requirements. This plan is based on current manning of the 56th, long term retention and recruitment will have a significant impact on maintaining these figures.
These are raw numbers and do not reflect issues such as DMOSQ shortfalls which will be addressed throughout the National Guard as the Army tries to fix a long term challenge within a very personal system.

RESOURCING CHALLENGE

The biggest challenge of resourcing is balancing requirements today against transformation in order to maintain effective legacy force units. While this issue is sensitive and complex, it will be further exasperated as transformation continues. Low priority units within the National Guard already receive less resources than enhanced Brigade's and high demand units. This issue may also impact homeland security readiness as the leadership struggles to define the National Guard roles to execute this vital mission. Readiness is directly linked to resources, without adequate resources units will not be able to meet war-fighting requirements. All of these considerations are real and will become reality in the near future.

Projected cost to transform the 56th Brigade is $1.73 B over the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The ARNG believes that $1.14B is programmed. However, these costs do not include Interim Armor Vehicle procurement or FORSCOM training support cost. These estimated cost are significant and requires a deliberate decision process regarding prioritization of these funds. While this is critical, FORSCOM does not support any reprioritization of resources that will negatively impact the training readiness, modernization and recapitalization of the Legacy Force or the development of the AC Interim Force.38

The cost to Transform is significant and will be an issue for the long term. Recouring within the National Guard has impact both politically and militarily. The Army must ensure resources are applied to meet the requirements while ensuring other unit readiness is not degraded.

CONCLUSION

The Army is well on its way in transforming. Inclusion of the National Guard is a must if the Army continues to rely on National Guard and Reserve components to respond to needs of CINC's. It is critically important to strategic readiness to maximize the capabilities of all components and provide ready trained units to respond in according to National Military Strategy, which has changed since the end of the Cold War. Challenges identified for the 28th Div PAARNG are Army challenges that must be addressed in order to maintain “One Army” in the future. These challenges are considerable and impact overall Army relevance. In order to maintain The CSA vision to Transform the Army and include all components, it is critical that National Guard combat units be included early in the Transformation process. To ensure
success for the 56th and the National Guard as a whole, the Army must ensure the following actions are addressed at the appropriate levels and resources are provided to support decisions.

First, FORSCOM as the Army's executive agent for Reserve Component issues in particular training readiness, should be given resources and authority to ensure readiness standards are achieved. This provides Army oversight on what is a major political and strategic change in military preparedness. It is imperative that the communication and bias's that currently exist between National Guard and AC senior leadership be put aside.

Second, the structure of training oversight responsibilities is Training Support XXI, commanded by Commanders Numbered Armies (CONUSA), requires additional support to ensure mission requirements above legacy force Reserve Component training requirements can be executed. Today, CONUSA are responsible to execute the AC/RC integration program but have limited resources to execute the mission. Recently the CSA reduced AC/RC support structure while simultaneously increasing tiered FSG level 1 units. To meet oversight of these additional responsibilities, TSXXI units require additional personnel to include personnel for missions such as Army Battle Command System (ABCS) equipment and training, and interim force unique training requirements.

Third, the IBCT proposed training strategy is dependent on Training and Doctrine Command development of Army on-line internet based distributed training programs particular for digitized specialty (Digitized University). Critical requirement for National Guardsmen whose training days are limited, this must be available in order to meet individual training requirements since focus AT will most certainly remain collective training focused. Institutional training base support is the most critical enabler to support Guard training and readiness requirements for the new IBCT.

Fourth, for the PANG to be successful, Military Construction Army and other Procurement Authority must be allocated to meet the requirements. These requirements must be in synch with fielding timelines for new equipment. Support facilities are required to implement individual training which is directly linked to company level proficiency. Of concern is the managing of the fielding process to preclude conflict with on-going AC fielding. The fielding plan must stay on course in order to ensure Guard units meet projected timelines.

And finally, the Senior leadership of the Army, the key civil leadership, and the National leadership must agree on the role and mission priority of the National Guard; specifically for the IBCT unit. If all requirements as described above can be achieved, the transformation of the
Divisional Brigade to an IBCT is feasible and will provide needed continuity in building the Army's Objective Force.

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