WHITE PAPER

NATO and Russia: Bridge-Building for the 21st Century
Report of the Working Group on NATO-Russia Relations
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Preface

The Working Group on NATO-Russia Relations was developed in the fall of 2001, as a cooperative project by the RAND Corporation and the Institute for the U.S. and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Ambassador Robert E. Hunter and Dr. Sergey M. Rogov have served as co-chairmen of the Working Group. Members are listed at the end of this report. The Working Group held three formal meetings in Washington, D.C., on January 24–25, 2002; in Moscow on March 4–5, 2002; and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on April 11–12, 2002. It also held a number of informal discussions, including exchanges by email.

The Working Group was convened to bring to bear the expert opinion of a small group of Americans and Russians, all of whom have had experience in bilateral U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian relations, and all of whom also have had experience in issues of European security, including NATO. From the outset, the project was designed not to try second-guessing the negotiations that have been going on between NATO and the Russian Federation on the latter’s future relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, but rather to see whether there are additional ideas and a different perspective that can be developed, as well as helping to create support for the work going on at NATO Headquarters. In addition, while strictly nongovernmental, the Working Group has had informal briefings from U.S. and Russian officials; it has included some of these officials as observers at its meetings; and it has shared its ideas and findings, on a regular basis, with officials of the U.S. and Russian governments, as well as with senior leaders at NATO.

So far, membership in the Working Group has been limited to Americans and Russians. This is not to imply that somehow a bilateral relationship can be substituted for the negotiations that are conducted between NATO as a whole and the Russian Federation; nor that there can be a coming together of U.S. and Russian opinion on key issues that can somehow substitute for the interests, viewpoints, and deliberations of all the parties concerned, especially the full membership of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)—to which all NATO members and the Russian Federation also belong. Rather, this project has grown out of broader cooperation between RAND and the Institute for the U.S. and Canada Studies on other issues, many of which are properly bilateral; and it has recognized that there are ways in which the perspectives of American and Russian academics, former officials, and other experts can be useful in helping to determine what the possibilities and limits are for NATO-Russia relations, at least for now, in terms of these two key countries. Of course, what the Working Group considers can gain value only as it is directly related to the interests, concerns, views, and roles of similar nongovernmental observers from other engaged parties, and it is in this spirit that the analysis, ideas, and recommendations below are offered.
The project has been made possible by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York, and support from the Foundation for East-West Bridges (Moscow) and the RAND Corporation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center (ISDPC) of RAND’s National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for a broad range of clients, including the U.S. Department of Defense, allied foreign governments, the intelligence community, and foundations.

Robert E. Hunter
Sergey M. Rogov
Co-Chairs
April 12, 2002
Executive Summary

The security environment for both NATO and Russia has changed significantly, especially since September 11, 2001. NATO and Russia face many similar challenges to their security, including transnational threats such as global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is in their mutual interest to forge a new relationship, based on a genuine partnership that can help provide lasting security for all nations in Eurasia and can hasten Russia's integration into the family of democratic, market-oriented nations. Among other goals, this cooperation should help to build stable relations, confidence, and transparency; take fully into account the interests of all European states, including those in Central Europe; create new mechanisms for discussing and resolving inevitable differences; promote joint decisionmaking in agreed areas on the basis of consensus; and pursue a practical agenda of common tasks, both in the European space and beyond.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) have, to an extent, been successful. But Russia has been disappointed at what it sees to be NATO's unwillingness sufficiently to coordinate with Russia and to take its interests into account prior to making decisions—especially during the Kosovo conflict—or to treat it as an equal. Meanwhile, NATO has questioned Russia's willingness fully to utilize the potential for cooperation inherent in the PJC and NATO's Partnership for Peace. It is clear that the potential for NATO-Russia relations is far from fulfilled and that the possibility for major misunderstanding remains significant.

At the very least, Russians want their country to be consulted about NATO enlargement, even if they accept the firm NATO position that Russia will not have a veto; and they want NATO-Russia relations to develop more fully before further enlargement of the Alliance takes place. If the process of NATO enlargement is not accompanied by adequate measures to prevent the growth of political—and possibly military—tensions, many Russians argue that there could be a decline in confidence and, hence, of an overall sense of European stability.

Despite differences of viewpoint about the future of NATO enlargement, there is clear understanding of the importance that Russia be integrated into Europe as soon and as far as possible, even if Russian NATO membership is not a goal, at least for the near term. Russia remains in transition, and while it increasingly shares many values with Western democracies, democratization is far from complete. At the same time, steadily increasing economic interdependence will help deepen democratization in Russia and partnership with Western states. Yet differences will remain, for instance, on such issues as the precise definition of “terrorism,” the roles played by states such as Iraq and Iran, and what, if anything, to do in regard to them. To a significant extent, the Permanent Joint Council was a casualty of differences of interest and viewpoint over Kosovo; both
the Allies and Russia will need to exercise special care to keep the early stages of the new relationship from possibly suffering a similar fate because of differences over Iraq. It is also important for each party to take into account its actions that could have an impact on the interests and concerns of the other. For example, in the recent past, both NATO and Russia have carried out military exercises based on notional scenarios that seemed to suggest that the two were adversaries, rather than partners.

In general, an improved and more effective NATO-Russia relationship is crucial not just to accomplishing NATO’s goals, but also to freeing Russia from the remains of a Cold War mentality. The improvement of the overall climate will also be deeply affected by progress in the development of economic relations between Russia and the West, and especially the European Union.

But which should come first—new structures for cooperation between NATO and Russia, or actually getting to work on that cooperation, without first trying to solve all the issues of procedure? The Working Group believes there is a strong argument for emphasizing “cooperation first”: Instead of first agreeing on every aspect of a full set of formal rules and procedures for cooperation, to which concrete areas for common action would be added later, NATO and Russia could emphasize the development of areas of cooperation in the interests of all parties, and then matching the full elaboration of institutions with this progress. There is great virtue in seeking areas where interests are shared, where consensus decisionmaking is possible, where the stakes—at least initially—are relatively modest in terms of any differences of viewpoint between NATO and Russia, and where work that is actually done can be of inherent value while also increasing mutual confidence in the process. As with significant aspects of the struggle against terrorism, there are other areas where NATO quite possibly cannot succeed without cooperation with Russia.

Thus, identification of specific, limited projects for cooperative work is the most effective way to attain early, demonstrable successes. Clear, comprehensive, and joint plans should be developed for this small number of projects that can be rapidly implemented. Thus, NATO and Russia should seek some “demonstration projects,” even of a very limited nature, to be started, or at least planned and announced, immediately.

Two areas in particular where NATO and Russia have shared interests are major aspects of counterterrorism and emergency response—e.g., regarding natural and manmade disasters. Indeed, an early task for the new NATO-Russia Council should be to begin a continuing dialogue on the issue of terrorism in order to find common ground as opposed to differences of view and approach. Nonproliferation and peacekeeping are somewhat more contentious, but these are still areas for cooperation. In general, Russia and NATO should build their relations on the principle of shared responsibility for joint decisions.
Structural and institutional questions are also critically important. The new NATO-Russia Council will be the key institution. It must meet a number of key criteria, which the Working Group discusses in this report, regarding agenda; preparation of issues; “voting” procedures (especially about agreeing on common security actions); Russian relations with NATO staff bodies; possible informal limits on parallel, unilateral action by either NATO or Russia; and the protection of other countries’ interests.

For NATO-Russia relations to be effective and to build mutual confidence, a means needs to be created to engage Russian officials and military officers in the planning and preparation of the substance of NATO-Russia Council meetings; progressively, there should be provisions for Russian liaison with the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff, developed in tandem with increased engagement on the part of countries belonging to NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

NATO, Russia, and the United States and other NATO members will each want to retain its sovereign right to act independently. The NATO-Russia Council should function on the principle, however, that when a consensus decision is reached, all sides should then abide by it—even where, as within NATO itself, countries implementing a decision may be limited to those both “willing and able.”

As creation of a NATO-Russia Council was being agreed in December 2001, it was assumed that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council should go out of existence. The Working Group considered whether there could be value in retaining this forum, at least for a brief period as a “confidence-building measure.” For example, the PJC could continue to consider issues, by current rules (“19 plus 1”), in areas where not all NATO allies are ready to permit discussion or decision “at 20.” It might also be useful to prepare issues at the PJC for discussion at the NATO-Russia Council, or to try shaping consensus on an informal basis. By contrast, retaining the PJC would be bureaucratically cumbersome, and there is merit in the view that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and Russia calls for qualitatively new structures from the outset.

In general, through joint discussions, decisions, and concrete projects, NATO and Russia can begin together to assume a larger share of responsibility for dealing with new challenges to security that threaten peace and stability in Europe and beyond. This can also help determine where Western and Russian interests coincide and where they do not, and the means for bridging differences and minimizing trouble. In the NATO-Russia Council, the Alliance and Russia will develop a political dialogue, share their security assessments, exchange information to enhance early warning of potential threats (e.g., international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction), cooperate in crisis prevention, and coordinate actions to prevent or respond to threats to security.

The new NATO-Russia Council should pay particular heed to areas of possible cooperation already set forth in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, even where so far
they have not been acted upon. This report singles out several for particular emphasis, in addition to areas listed above, including: conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, crisis management, and conflict resolution; Russian participation in operations involving Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs); exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defense policy, military doctrines, and budgets; exchanges on nuclear weapons issues, arms control, and nuclear safety; cooperation in Theatre Missile Defense; enhanced regional air traffic safety and possible cooperation on air defense; association of Russia with NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors; cooperation on conversion of defense industries; and cooperative projects in defense-related economic, environmental, and scientific fields.

The NATO-Russia Working Group has also developed other suggestions notable for their promise for developing NATO-Russia consultation, cooperation, and in some cases joint decision and common action. Other ideas will continually be added. Detailed in this report, the recommendations of the Working Group are clustered under several separate, but often overlapping, areas: military contacts and cooperation; Russian engagement with NATO institutions; counterterrorism and related threats; weapons of mass destruction and nonproliferation; air and missile defense; crisis management, settlement, and peacekeeping; arms control; defense industry and arms cooperation; regional cooperation; emergency preparedness and response; environment; education and training; and economic cooperation.

Discussion of each of these areas and specific suggestions are in the body of the report. They indicate the richness of the potential agenda, the wide variety of activities, based on common interests, that are possible, and the extensive scope for building patterns of cooperation. As noted above, however, the NATO-Russia Council should choose among the many possibilities a few "test" projects to demonstrate feasibility and effectiveness, and to build patterns of cooperation, one careful step at a time. In addition to possibilities discussed above, the following are illustrations:

- Establish a joint Russia-NATO training center in the Russian Federation, focused on peacemaking and peacekeeping; create a joint NATO-Russia brigade, to focus on counterterrorism or on peacekeeping, with the latter developing a joint peacekeeping doctrine; establish a Joint Naval Task Force and cooperate to develop "rules of the game" for submarine operations; and promote joint activities between Russian military units in Kaliningrad and the Polish-German-Danish Corps;

- Establish a Euro-Atlantic Regional Security Strategy Group to enable NATO and Russia to develop military-technical and political-military strategies; engage Russia and other Partnership for Peace countries in development of the CJTF concept;
• Develop a Counter-Terrorism Information Sharing Center, including a mechanism for assessing terrorist threats, sharing warning of specific threats, and coordinating efforts and joint actions to prevent terrorist acts; explore cooperation regarding weapons of mass “disruption”—e.g., the threat of attacks on computer and telecom networks; and develop common responses to nuclear/biological catastrophe (“consequence management”);

• Build on Biden-Lugar legislation, which proposes debt forgiveness for Russia commensurate with its dismantling chemical and other weapons;

• Create means for Russian firms to participate in modernization of weaponry of states that maintain Soviet equipment, and foster Russian firms’ capacity to build and repair to NATO standards;

• Develop cooperation to ensure the safe disposal of armaments such as land mines and chemical and biological weapons, including response to the environmental threat posed by chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic Sea after World War II;

• Expand the Russian and Central European role in the Marshall Center, the NATO School (SHAPE), and the NATO Defense College; develop a new NATO-Russia training center in Russia patterned after the Marshall Center; and

• Create a funding mechanism for the NATO-Russia Council into which Council members would make payments to help fund joint activities.

Finally, creation of the NATO-Russia Council will represent a fundamental change in Western dealings with Russia—a move in the direction of an enduring partnership and genuine collaboration that might be called an informal “alliance with the Alliance.” The key issue is Russia’s relationship with NATO, not—at least for now—Russia’s role fully integrated within NATO. That said, NATO-Russia cooperation requires a closer partnership than ever before, beginning with deeper and more comprehensive consultations on key issues. It may evolve into a sort of “associate” membership or simply “enduring partnership,” in which Russia, along with other concerned non-NATO countries, is increasingly involved in NATO decisions and actions, short of an Article 5 commitment.
The Setting

The security environment for both NATO and Russia has changed significantly in recent months. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States led to a turning point in relations between Russia and the West, and, specifically, opened the way for closer interaction and cooperation between Russia and NATO. Our common task is to get the relationship right this time: to devise and implement new mechanisms for consultation, joint decisions, and coordinated action.

It is clear that the members of NATO and Russia face many similar challenges to their security. These include transnational threats, such as global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as continued dangers posed by instability in regions of concern to them both. NATO must continue to adapt to meet these threats. In doing so, it recognizes that its efforts to deal effectively with 21st-century threats will be far more successful if they are accompanied by closer cooperation with Russia.

NATO and Russia today share similar perceptions of both threats and opportunities on several levels, and there are a number of areas in which they can work effectively together. Therefore, it is in their mutual interest that NATO and Russia should forge a new relationship based on a genuine partnership that can help to provide lasting security for all nations in Eurasia and that can hasten Russia’s integration into the family of democratic, market-oriented nations. NATO-Russian relations should be guided by the need to oppose common threats and by shared interests in protecting and extending the values of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

In order to transform shared views into effective common action while also respecting the broader needs and interests of both parties, it will be necessary to focus on several interrelated areas and tasks. NATO-Russian cooperation should therefore be pursued in a framework that aims to

- Build and maintain stable relations, confidence, and transparency that will guide the NATO-Russia relationship as it continues to evolve;
- Remain mindful of the critical nature of stability, confidence, and security in Europe, in a way that takes fully into account the interests of all European states, including those in Central Europe;
- Create new mechanisms for discussing and resolving inevitable differences (both between NATO and Russia and among NATO states themselves) and containing them or otherwise lessening their impact where they cannot be resolved;
• Implement the principle of shared responsibility for joint decisionmaking in agreed areas on the basis of consensus;

• Establish a practical agenda of tasks to be undertaken together in the European space;

• Relate what is done in the NATO-Russia framework to other institutions, such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations, and to bilateral relations;

• Use the above as a solid bridge to enhance the ability of NATO and Russia to act together in response to threats from beyond Europe, to serve as a “stability exporter” in helping to stabilize regions of the world that pose a potential danger to Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to help shape a more congenial future to mutual benefit and to the benefit of the international community as a whole;

• Maintain and strengthen international security and strategic stability by adapting existing arms control regimes to the new global reality; and

• Ensure the dissemination of information to the governments and publics of NATO members and the Russian Federation in order to maintain awareness of activities and efforts and to build popular and parliamentary support for them.

In sum, the changing security environment presents an unprecedented opportunity for the United States, NATO, and Russia not only to review their relationships with each other, but also to recognize their dependence on each other for vital security needs that none can meet alone. This concept also applies to areas that are not strictly about “security,” but which reflect the potential for cooperation in other areas. Areas of cooperation where success has been attained, such as the International Space Station, Sea Launch, and International Launch Services (ILS), have all depended on an acceptance that each participant could contribute something to a common endeavor or bring something to the table that none of the others could do. Of course, accepting dependence on others, particularly in the security arena, is difficult for states to do. But if mutual need and reliance can at least become part of political discourse, then many of the challenges to cooperation can, over time, be overcome.

Lessons of the Past

In order to develop a positive, lasting relationship between NATO and Russia, it is first necessary to lay to rest vestiges of mutual mistrust remaining from the Cold War.
It is also important to understand what has happened in this relationship during the past several years, and to draw appropriate lessons.

From the moment that President George H.W. Bush proclaimed the goal of a “Europe whole and free,” through the efforts of President Bill Clinton and his allied partners to transform NATO and to make it relevant for the 21st century, and to the meetings between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the issue of Russia’s role in relation to NATO has been firmly on the agenda.

The last 10 years of NATO’s evolution has focused on maintaining U.S. strategic engagement in Europe; preserving the most valuable aspects of the Western Alliance, including the integrated military command structure; helping (with the EU) to integrate the Central European states in Euro-Atlantic institutions; ending conflict in the former Yugoslavia and setting it on a hopeful course; and engaging Russia fully in the outside world. This has been an ambitious agenda; and the last-named offers Russia, like other countries in Europe, a viable and equal place in the broader scheme of European security. However, many Russians feel that NATO’s efforts to engage Russia have been inconsistent and have seemed to be largely a form of “damage limitation” in face of NATO enlargement. In the future, they argue, the Alliance should give higher priority to NATO-Russia cooperation. At the same time, NATO countries believe that Russia has so far not taken sufficient advantage of the opportunities that already exist.

At the outset of the most recent round of discussion and debate, it was not clear whether the new environment creates a need for new institutions for engaging NATO and Russia, or whether existing frameworks are sufficient. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which the Act created, have proved to be important starting points, and to an extent they have been successful. Indeed, from the Alliance’s perspective, the very existence of the PJC has shown that NATO is ready to consider a new relationship with Russia and some broader engagement: By simply “being,” even without “doing” very much, the PJC has had political value. Its meetings have often been desultory; but, save for the break in continuity for a time during and after the Kosovo conflict, when NATO and Russia had major differences of view, the PJC has met and met regularly; and it has provided a place for NATO and Russia to “jaw, jaw,” rather than “war, war”—even psychologically.

At the same time, however, Russia has been disappointed at what it sees to be NATO’s unwillingness sufficiently to coordinate with Russia and to take its interests into account prior to taking decisions. From the Russian perspective, PJC meetings have in general seemed to be pro forma, rather than efforts to take Russian views seriously. NATO military operations in the former Yugoslavia have been a primary focus of these Russian concerns, along with NATO enlargement. Russia has also questioned NATO’s authority to undertake peace enforcement (as opposed to peacekeeping) missions in other states. Further, some Russians have expressed dissatisfaction with the mechanisms of
Russia’s involvement in NATO peacekeeping. They argue that Russian units, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, cannot be expected to take orders, even indirectly, from a political body to which they do not belong and in which their country lacks a decisionmaking role.

By contrast, the United States and many of its NATO partners have questioned Russia’s willingness to utilize fully the potential for cooperation inherent in the PJC—especially in view of the long list of areas of potential cooperation that are spelled out in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The allies have sought, in vain, to get Russia deeply engaged in the activities of the Partnership for Peace; and, in the early period of the PJC, they questioned Russia’s support for Serbian policies in Bosnia and Kosovo, long after it was clear (at least to the West) that these Serbian policies were at variance with requirements for European security and democratic development.

Meanwhile, Russia has been concerned that its defense industry is being frozen out of competitions for orders in Europe, including in areas of Central Europe that had a long association with Soviet weapons system. Thus, Russian defense industry lost its traditional markets. In response, allied officials argue that, as early as Russia’s accession to Partnership for Peace, NATO had made clear that Russian defense industry could compete in Central Europe, but that it would need to adopt NATO standards, which are becoming common throughout the region. Russians have doubted the sincerity of these declarations and, from their viewpoint, resolving this issue of competition for markets could be an incentive, especially among Russian military officers, to take a more positive attitude toward NATO.

Furthermore, lack of resources remains a significant inhibition to greater Russian cooperation with NATO. Due to lack of funds, Russia cannot participate in many NATO activities. At the same time, Russians often feel that they are not being treated as equals. For instance, curricula at the Marshall Center, the NATO School (SHAPE), and the NATO Defense College are developed entirely by Western states, without significant Russian participation.

As these examples illustrate, the potential for NATO-Russia relations that is contained in the Founding Act and PJC—as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace—is far from fulfilled, and the possibility for major misunderstanding, including about the overall political intentions of each party, is significant. The PJC has certainly so far proved to be insufficient to deal effectively with some crucial challenges to security or adequately to seize opportunities for cooperation. The NATO-Russia relationship of the last five years has thus not lived up to the expectations and hopes of either side. Yet the growing realization of expanding common interests can provide the impetus needed to create more comprehensive cooperation for the future.
NATO’s Evolving Role

Examining past experience, especially during the period since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, is useful for “clearing the air” and for helping to understand some of the critical criteria that will need to govern NATO-Russian relations for the future. It is most important that NATO and Russia focus on the issues that unite them, such as countering terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rather than those issues on which they disagree.

A major element in defining the scope and potential for NATO-Russia relations is the question of NATO’s evolving role. For NATO, the central issue is emerging as a choice between its developing as primarily a European regional organization or its pursuing challenges that have the potential, now or later, to threaten or otherwise impact upon the European heartland. Yet regardless of whether NATO’s future role is limited to the Continent or extends farther “outside of area,” the events of September 11 demonstrated that tomorrow’s threats will not be geopolitically limited. This also means that many areas of possible—and necessary—cooperation between NATO and Russia similarly extend beyond Europe. These include issues that cannot be looked at on the regional level alone, such as cooperation against international terrorist groups and proliferation of WMD. September 11 further demonstrated the very serious potential for Article 5 threats to NATO members—and not just the United States. Thus, NATO has little choice but to look beyond Europe even if it wants to continue limiting its formal guarantees to the security of the North Atlantic region.

This issue of scope and coverage remains a matter of major debate within the Alliance. To a significant degree, Russia and the United States share a broad perspective of threat in many areas removed from Europe, and it is possible for them to develop some patterns of bilateral cooperation within or outside NATO. Pursuing the latter option, however, would mean foregoing NATO’s considerable capabilities and resources and is therefore very much a second-best option. Moreover, insofar as NATO’s practical area of action and responsibility can expand in response to this recognition of a wider base of threats, the opportunities for Russian engagement with NATO would expand as well.

NATO’s role in the evolving security environment does not require a European-based “enemy” to sustain the Alliance’s raison d’être. Rather, NATO has value, now and for the future, for the stability it fosters, the integration of military forces that it engenders, and the relationships it helps to sustain, beyond the military realm into “security” in the broadest sense of the term. Indeed, this was a key element of NATO’s transformation in the 1990s: to pursue the goal of a “Europe whole and free” in which each state that subscribes to the overall vision stands to gain from the development of the post–Cold War strategic framework. NATO-Russia cooperation has the capacity to widen the scale of the original NATO framework, even as Russia and NATO together respond to new common threats. September 11 contributed to recognition by Russia, the
United States, and Europe that, in several critical areas, they have more in common with one another than with countries in many other parts of the world.

As NATO evolves and changes, the need for effective and positive relations among the three sides of a triangle—the United States and Russia, the United States and Europe, and the European states (EU) and Russia—will become increasingly clear. Of course, the United States and Russia do not entirely share the same global perspective, nor do they—or will they—always agree on security issues, including aspects of the challenge posed by international terrorism. But while Russia does not want to see NATO or the United States as a “global policeman,” it does want to cooperate with NATO and the United States to respond to common security challenges. This can create complicated balances of views and interests within Russia. For instance, Russia alone would not have taken on al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, though it benefits from U.S.-led efforts there. By contrast, Russian feelings about current U.S. involvement in Georgia are mixed. But whatever Russia’s lack of enthusiasm for U.S. efforts so near its own territory—and concern about long-term U.S. encroachment in areas long part of the Russian glacis—Russia does want to see the terrorist threat posed from Georgian territory ended.

The new security environment has led to an ongoing examination of the interests of each state, including Russia, to define common goals and approaches. There can be little doubt that this will lead to changes in NATO as it is pressed to take on counterterror and counter-WMD proliferation tasks to a far greater extent than in the past. Insofar as these efforts involve a variety of military, intelligence, political, law-enforcement, emergency response, economic, financial, and other institutions from a wide range of states, they will create new challenges for the Alliance and its members. These new challenges will also provide new opportunities for the West to work with Russia.

Nevertheless, the adversarial history of NATO and Russia makes it difficult for many Russians to accept fully that NATO is no longer a threat. Even many Russians who accept Russia’s long-term interest of integration in the West and who champion the development of NATO-Russian relations to the fullest possible degree still express concerns about NATO’s further enlargement. At the very least, Russians want their country to be consulted about NATO enlargement, even if they accept the firm NATO position that Russia will not have a veto; and they want NATO-Russia relations to develop more fully before further enlargement of the Alliance takes place—a point the United States and its allies see as desirable but not as an acceptable precondition. At the same time, many Russian observers, while continuing to believe that NATO enlargement has been both unnecessary and a mistake, also recognize that it was—and is—likely to happen. Few see it as a serious military threat. But, if the process of NATO enlargement is not accompanied by adequate measures to prevent the growth of political—and possibly military—tensions, many Russians argue that there could be a decline in confidence and, hence, of an overall sense of European stability.
Issues Related to NATO’s Enlargement

Most important at the moment is the possible entry into NATO of the Baltic states, with invitations to join possibly being issued as early as the NATO Prague summit in November 2002. Some Russian experts suggest that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should accede to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) prior to their accession to NATO, in order to create some treaty-enforced limits on force deployments in these three states. They also express concern about possible deployment of foreign (NATO) troops in the Baltic states.

There are a number of possible solutions to this issue. One Russian idea is that, if the Baltic states do join NATO, both they and Kaliningrad should be demilitarized (or the region’s military forces could be significantly limited in size and scope). However, it has been recognized that it would be difficult to convince the Baltic states that such a solution is in their best interests. An alternative would be for the Allies to reiterate the kind of “unilateral statements” that were incorporated in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. On that occasion, the allies included the following statements:

The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so. NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

Despite differences of viewpoint about the future of NATO enlargement, in particular to include the Baltic states, there is clear understanding of the importance, shared by all that Russia be integrated into Europe as soon and as far as possible, even if Russian NATO membership is not a goal, at least for the near term. One possibility is to define soon what the long-term results of evolving NATO-Russia cooperation should be (e.g., eventual membership for Russia, a novel form of “associate” membership, continued cooperation without membership, simply a recognition of an enduring partnership, or some other alternative). This definition of a desired end state could help in identifying means and topics of cooperation that could advance that chosen goal. By contrast, it might be more useful and productive to set aside the question of the “final” goal of cooperation and to let interests, attitudes, and actions evolve over time, even while both sides continue to work together in areas of shared goals and mutual needs. Russia remains in transition, and while it increasingly shares many values with Western democracies, democratization is far from complete. By the same token, steadily increasing economic
interdependence will help deepen democratization in Russia and partnership with Western states, but Russia and the United States will retain differing views on some issues, just as the United States sometimes disagrees with other NATO allies. For example, while the United States and Russia agree in general that international terrorism is a common enemy, they do not agree on such issues as the precise definition of “terrorism,” the roles played by states such as Iraq and Iran, and what, if anything, to do in regard to them. Indeed, not all these points are completely agreed within NATO.

Given current debate about Iraq, its possible role in terrorism, and its apparent ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction, NATO-Russian (as well as U.S.-Russian) relations will necessarily be affected by what transpires in the next several months. To a significant extent, the Permanent Joint Council was a casualty of differences of interest and viewpoint over Kosovo; both the Allies and Russia will need to exercise special care to keep the early stages of the new relationship—perhaps with the new NATO-Russia Council—from possibly suffering a similar fate because of differences over Iraq.

As part of evolving cooperation, it is also important to take into account actions of a bilateral or multinational nature undertaken by NATO, by NATO countries, or by the Russian Federation that could have an impact on the interests and concerns of other parties. For example, in the recent past, both NATO and Russia have carried out military exercises based on notional scenarios that seemed to suggest that the two were adversaries, rather than partners if not also friends. One approach would be to arrange for a larger Russian role in NATO exercise planning (rather than only being invited to observe NATO exercises), and vice versa.

In general, an improved and more effective NATO-Russia relationship is crucial not just to accomplishing NATO’s goals, especially in regard to threats emanating from beyond Europe, but also to freeing Russia from the remains of a Cold War mentality. Whether this is accomplished through structural changes in NATO or simply through increased cooperation, the further diminishing of Russian perceptions of NATO as a military threat will enable Russian planners to shift their focus from worst-case scenarios regarding potential conflict with NATO states to more likely and dangerous possibilities of conflicts that Russia may, in fact, face in the future.

Of course, the improvement of the overall climate will also be deeply affected by progress in the development of economic relations between Russia and the West, and especially between Russia and the European Union—a process that needs to move smartly in parallel and in tandem with the development of NATO-Russia relations. Furthermore, Russia is developing a relationship with the European Union’s new European Security and Defense Policy, which could, in time, include some engagement with the EU’s Headline Goal Task Force (Rapid Reaction Force). The continuing development of Europe’s view of this force and its role vis-à-vis NATO will clearly have
an impact on Russia’s relationship with it and needs to be coordinated with the Atlantic Alliance.

**Structure and Procedures**

1. *Practical Cooperation First?*

   Despite the time required to change attitudes after the end of the Cold War, it can be argued that the shortcomings of NATO-Russia cooperation following the conclusion of the Founding Act were less a factor of “Cold War thinking” than a failure of approach. The rules and structures for the relations were created first, and then efforts were begun to achieve practical cooperation within that rubric. An alternative approach would be to reverse the process for the next stage in NATO-Russia relations: Instead of first agreeing on a full set of formal rules and procedures for cooperation, to which concrete areas for common action would be added later, NATO and Russia could begin by developing areas of cooperation in the interests of all parties, and then matching the development of institutions with this progress. Under this second approach, both the goals advanced directly by practical efforts of working together and the broader goals of building a wider cooperative relationship could be attained. This pragmatic method may appeal more to NATO countries (with more of a tradition of experimentation) than to Russia, with its heavier emphasis on formal agreements: And there is merit in both positions.

   Certainly, clarifying the approach so that it is acceptable to both sides is important in view of some mutual mistrust that does remain. In general, NATO governments are concerned about limiting the extent of Russian involvement in what are seen to be European and NATO internal issues. Meanwhile, Russia is still worried that its interests will be largely ignored in significant decisions taken by NATO that can have a major impact, directly or indirectly, on Russian’s interests, whether in or beyond Europe.

   In general, Russians are concerned that the development of new forms of “formal” cooperation, such as the NATO-Russia Council, will be seen in the West as primarily “compensation” to Russia for NATO enlargement—as was true to a significant degree with the negotiation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and creation of the PJC prior to the July 1997 NATO Madrid summit—or perhaps a “reward” for “cooperation,” which Russia sees as isolating it from the European security process. On the contrary, for all parties to European security, NATO-Russian cooperation is necessary regardless of NATO enlargement, for other, shared purposes. If properly structured, the new NATO-Russia Council could help to make up for the perceived divisiveness of NATO enlargement by providing a more inclusive model for European security. This means, however, that there should be mechanisms in place to provide for true decisionmaking as a group that includes Russia. Russians don’t ask for a role in decisions on all NATO matters; just on those where a decision could be made that directly affects Russia and its
interests. Thus, the discussion of NATO enlargement and that of NATO-Russia cooperation should not be linked.

With this background, whether NATO and Russia agree to put relative primacy on pragmatism or formality, there is great virtue in seeking areas where interests are shared, where consensus decisionmaking is possible, where the stakes—at least initially—are relatively modest in terms of any differences of viewpoint between NATO and Russia, and where work that is actually done can be of inherent value while also increasing mutual confidence in the process. Indeed, the objective is not to find useful things that NATO and Russia can do together, but rather to see where shared interests indicate a need to cooperate and then organize to make it happen. As with significant aspects of the struggle against terrorism, there are other areas where NATO quite possibly cannot succeed without cooperation with Russia. These areas, then, are where cooperation should be built first.

Regardless of how the issue of formal structures is dealt with, identification of specific, limited projects for cooperative work would thus be the most effective way to attain early, demonstrable successes. Clear, comprehensive, and joint plans should be developed for this small number of projects that can be rapidly implemented in order to address concerns and thus show all sides what they have to gain from cooperation. In this way, it will be possible to attain the early demonstrations of effectiveness and usefulness that are needed to create the momentum to sustain the new NATO-Russia Council and to lay the foundation for more and broader cooperation. Thus, as discussion continues on structural arrangements, NATO and Russia should seek some “demonstration projects,” even of a very limited nature, to be started, or at least planned and announced, immediately.

Two areas in particular where NATO and Russia have shared interests are major aspects of counterterrorism (despite some differences regarding definitions and views of the specific nature and locus of threats) and emergency response—e.g., regarding natural and manmade disasters. Indeed, an early task for the NATO-Russia Council should be to begin a continuing dialogue on the issue of terrorism in order to define critical elements and to discuss those areas where the allies and Russia find common ground as opposed to differences of view and approach, which remain significant.

Nonproliferation and peacekeeping are somewhat more contentious in terms of differences of views held by Russia and some, if not all, of the NATO allies; but these are still possible areas for cooperation. In regard to these and other issues related to strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic region, Russia and NATO should build their relations based on the principle of shared responsibility for joint decisions. Further examples of possible NATO-Russia cooperation are listed and discussed later in this report.
2. **Formal Structures**

Of course, structural and institutional questions—regarding the means of fostering, organizing, debating, deciding, and implementing cooperation—are critically important to the future of NATO-Russian relations, even if practical cooperation is likely to spell the success of the venture. Indeed, institutionalizing a new NATO-Russia partnership is connected to a larger agenda of integrating Russia into the global community. The new NATO-Russia Council will be the key institution to manage this security interaction. How it is structured and how it functions will no doubt evolve over time, but some key issues must be decided at the outset.

At the time this report was prepared, NATO and the Russian Federation were actively negotiating the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, pursuant to decisions taken in December 2001 at the ministerial level in the North Atlantic Council and the Permanent Joint Council. Those negotiations would necessarily overtake any specific recommendations on this score made by outsiders. However, this process should be expected to answer—now or later—a number of key questions, including the following:

- When and under what circumstances should the NATO-Russia Council meet, including in crisis situations? Should any NATO country or the Russian Federation be able to summon, at will, a meeting of the Council?

- How can issues be placed on the agenda (and by whom) and, once there, how can (if at all) they be removed from the agenda? What issues, if any, should be considered “permanent” matters for consideration and which, if any, should be excluded in advance (e.g., NATO decisions on enlargement)? Should Russia have a presumptive right of consultations in the NATO-Russia Council whenever the North Atlantic Council is considering the use of force?

- How should issues be prepared before reaching the NATO-Russia Council? And how (and through what procedures, mechanisms, controls, and review) should they be implemented once they are decided?

- Should all issues be decided by consensus (the North Atlantic Council model), or are there some issues that might appropriately be decided by other means?

- How can Russian officials be engaged with the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff?

- What role, if any, should there be for the Russian military at NATO commands, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters—especially in regard to any joint decisions and joint action concerning the use of force?
• What agreements should be reached, either in advance or on a case-by-case basis, to meet Russia's requirement that it should have a leading role in the political control of multilateral forces and operations to which it contributes?

• What limits, if any, should be accepted by NATO and Russia in terms of their taking separate, unilateral decisions and actions in regard to issues that had been placed on the NATO-Russia Council agenda and, more particularly, where decisions have been reached and joint positions or actions agreed upon?

• How can the interests of other countries, including in Central Europe, be fully protected, both in reality and in perception? Indeed, should deliberations of the NATO-Russia Council be “transparent” to other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and perhaps also subject to parallel discussion in that forum?

Of particular significance is the way in which the NATO-Russia Council will function in relation to other NATO bodies. For NATO-Russia relations to be effective and to have the best chance of building mutual confidence, Russian involvement with the Alliance, and with its structures and procedures, cannot be limited to the PJC (today) or the NATO-Russia Council (tomorrow), and Russia should usefully take part to varying extents in other NATO structures and activities.

Clearly, means need to be created to enable Russian officials and military officers to be engaged in the planning and preparation of the substance of NATO-Russia Council meetings; progressively, there should be provisions for Russian liaison with the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff, though developed in tandem with increased engagement on the part of countries belonging to NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), in general. In this emerging liaison relationship, NATO could develop a “Chinese wall” to insulate work related to the NATO-Russia Council from that pertaining to regular NATO business. It has done this in the past, for example, when France was not a member of the NATO Military Committee.

In addition, it is clear that NATO, Russia, and the United States and other NATO members will each want to retain its sovereign right to act independently. The NATO-Russia Council should function on the principle, however, that when a consensus decision is reached, all sides then abide by it—even where, as within NATO itself, countries implementing a decision may be limited to those both “willing and able.” As cooperation grows, in fact, it is to be hoped that there will be progressively fewer areas where either NATO or the Russian Federation—or individual members of NATO—will seek to take unilateral (or multilateral) actions that are at odds with the interests of other parties.

Also as the agenda for cooperation evolves, it may become possible for NATO to address progressively more issues through the NATO-Russia Council rather than solely
within the North Atlantic Council on its own. But this process of increasing the relative role of the NATO-Russia Council as opposed to the North Atlantic Council would require changes of attitude on the part of all sides. Experience would be an important teacher. It would further require the creation of effective means for ensuring that the interests of other European states are fully protected, perhaps through a novel form of association to the NATO-Russia Council or parallel decisions taken in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Barring Russian membership in NATO for the foreseeable future—a development requiring a two-step process of decision by Russia and then by NATO—the end point of the process could be a form of “associate membership” or “enduring partnership” for Russia, in which it is presumed that it will take part as much as possible in a range of NATO actions that do not involve Article 5 commitments.

Further, NATO and Russia will need to decide whether to duplicate on the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council particular issues that are already in the province of other institutions and agreements—e.g., the OSCE, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls. In general—accepting the risks of duplication—the test should be what NATO and Russia, together and with others, can do to be effective in increasing the storehouse of security, both in Europe and beyond.

The Future of the Permanent Joint Council

As the creation of a NATO-Russia Council was being agreed in December 2001, it was widely assumed that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council should go out of existence (certainly, it will be important that none of the cooperation started at the PJC be lost, such as the areas referred to at the December 2001 PJC ministerial meeting, including the “struggle against terrorism”). Yet there could be value in retaining this forum. For example, it could consider issues, by current rules (“19 plus 1”), in areas where not all NATO allies are ready to permit discussion or decision “at 20.” It might also be useful to introduce issues at the PJC (a “lower” level), in order to prepare them for discussion at the NATO-Russia Council, or to try shaping consensus on an informal basis before elevating complex issues to the NATO-Russia Council for final decision.

By the same token, in some areas where NATO is itself only now developing its patterns of alliance cooperation—notably counterterrorism and counter-WMD (in the latter case, beyond work done since the 1994 NATO summit)—there is value in the Alliance’s retaining a capability to sort out some of its own collective views, as a matter of alliance management, before going to the “at 20” format. This would be different from the allies’ coordinating views in regard to specific engagement of the Russian Federation, where the NATO-Russia Council is designed to supersede the PJC’s “19 plus 1” format. Otherwise, the NATO allies might find themselves unable to reach agreement within the NATO-Russia Council, even where that is in every member’s interest.
Arrangements for retaining the PJC could just be temporary. Thus, maintaining the PJC as a form of safety net, by means of which NATO as a whole could discuss issues with Russia, might be useful for the first year or two of the new Council's existence. During this period, the PJC could continue its efforts to implement existing and new programs for cooperation and interaction between NATO and Russia in the military sphere, including military-technological cooperation. This could be a useful confidence-building measure.

By contrast, it can be argued that retaining the PJC would be bureaucratically cumbersome—NATO already has a plethora of bodies that sometimes seem to overwhelm focus on central issues. Retaining two “NATO-Russia” bodies could also unduly complicate discussions and create confusion about what was being decided where, by what process, and with what political focus and effect. Furthermore, there is strong merit in the view that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and Russia calls for qualitatively new structures. At most, therefore, retaining the PJC should be seen only as a transitional step.

Agenda for NATO-Russia Cooperation

Through joint discussions, joint decisions, and concrete joint projects, NATO and Russia can begin together to assume a larger share of responsibility for dealing with new challenges to security that threaten peace and stability in Europe and beyond. This can also be a critical part of the process of determining where Western and Russian interests coincide and where they do not, and what the appropriate mechanisms are for seeking to bridge differences and to maximize the potential for coalescence and cooperation. By creating the NATO-Russia Council, the Alliance and Russia will develop a political dialogue, share their security assessments, exchange information to enhance early warning of potential threats (e.g., international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction), cooperate in crisis prevention, and coordinate actions to prevent or respond to threats to security. The work within the Council can develop joint approaches to the problems of security and find ways to solve those problems together by defining and implementing joint action.

While the initial work of the NATO-Russia Council should focus on “doable” projects—in order to build patterns of cooperation, means of working together, and a record of success—its ambitions should be broad and expanding.

In assessing the value of the Permanent Joint Council since its creation in 1997, there is risk that the range of issues under its mandate will be considered “old hat.” In fact, the NATO-Russia Founding Act presents a list of 19 separate areas for potential cooperation; most of them remain valid and should be the starting points for issues to be considered by the new NATO-Russia Council, whether as “permanent” issues on the
agenda or at the discretion of the membership. In the Working Group’s judgment, the most pertinent suggestions from the Founding Act, “where the two parties will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree,” are the following: 8

- conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management, and conflict resolution;
- combating terrorism;
- joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, and including as well Russian participation in operations involving Combined Joint Task Forces;
- exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defense policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes; increasing transparency, predictability, and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of NATO member states and Russia; reciprocal exchanges on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy; arms control; nuclear safety; cooperation between respective military establishments;
- preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combating nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defense aspects of proliferation;
- cooperation in Theatre Missile Defense;
- enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges; measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defense and related aspects of airspace management/control; possible cooperation on appropriate air defense related matters;
- association of Russia with NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors; conversion of defense industries and cooperative projects in defense-related economic, environmental, and scientific fields;
- combating drug trafficking;
- civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief; and
- improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia.
These should be considered the basic set of NATO-Russia cooperative projects, developed at a pace and extent that proves mutually satisfactory.

**Policy Suggestions**

What follows are ideas developed by the NATO-Russia Working Group, on its own and in consultation with others. They are arranged by general subject area and in regard to their promise for developing NATO-Russia consultation, cooperation, and in some cases joint decision and common action. Several areas the Working Group deems worthy of support have already been suggested by the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and thus are merely endorsed here. Some properly fit into more than one subject area. All are not of equal merit; each should be judged on its merits, and—even where those merits are high—political judgments must be made about the most opportune time for the NATO-Russia Council to take up a particular subject or to act upon it. Other ideas will continually be added; experience will be a sure test of feasibility; but—as in other endeavors—the “reach” of NATO-Russia cooperation should exceed its “grasp.”

**Military Contacts and Cooperation**

- Expand discussion and development of military doctrines and defense plans to include cooperative work on principles of use of force—e.g., in counterterrorist cooperation and joint peacemaking and peacekeeping;

- Increase Russian involvement in NATO exercise planning and implementation, as well as NATO’s involvement in Russian planning of relevant exercises. A political group, including Russia, that assists exercise planners may be a mechanism to avoid potentially offensive or provocative exercise scenarios;

- Establish a joint Russia-NATO training center in the Russian Federation focused on peacemaking and peacekeeping;

- Create a joint NATO-Russia brigade—as was proposed during the Clinton administration. It might, for instance, focus on counterterrorist cooperation and perhaps include one of Russia’s paratrooper brigades; or it might focus on peacekeeping and help foster the development of a joint peacekeeping doctrine;

- Establish a Joint Naval Task Force and cooperate to develop “rules of the game” for submarine operations; and

- Promote joint activities between Russian military units in Kaliningrad and the Polish-German-Danish Corps, perhaps including the integration of the Kaliningrad forces into the Polish-German-Danish corps or some other international
formation. Alternatively, consider, with all regional states, force reductions in the area.

Engagement with NATO Institutions

- Increase joint representation, with more NATO representatives at Russian defense/security structures (the first NATO representatives to the Russian Ministry of Defense have only recently arrived there), just as there are NATO representatives in the security structures of member states;

- Review structures and tasks within NATO to consider how these might be revised/reallocated to make it easier to involve Russia;

- More deeply engage Russia at SHAPE. Specific areas of integration include the annual generation of force goals, which could support Russian modernization in ways compatible with NATO’s, and joint development of operational concepts. Russian military personnel at SHAPE should be increased, and more broadly involved in the range of SHAPE activities, particularly at working group levels, where possible “inside the wire” (i.e., within the headquarters, in addition to the Partnership Coordination Cell). These arrangements should reflect the importance and special competence of Russia; and

- Establish a Euro-Atlantic Regional Security Strategy Group to enable NATO and Russia to develop their military-technical and political-military strategies in ways that are compatible with each other.

Combined Joint Task Forces

- Engage Russia in the development of the CJTF concept, in order to foster agreement on purposes, activities, employment concepts, and requirements (force structures, C³, etc.). CJTF development could support creation of a NATO-Russia Naval task group or land force brigade formation, as well as cooperative development of joint activities, techniques, and procedures to advance interoperability. At the same time, the CJTF should be seen as only one possible mechanism for NATO-Russia military cooperation; others, both ad hoc and permanent, should also be developed; and

- Insofar as possible, integrate other Partnership for Peace states in CJTF development in order to involve non-NATO European states, reassure them about Russia’s role, and help make sure that states designate forces.
Counterterrorism and Related Threats

- Develop a Counter-Terrorism Information Sharing Center under the umbrella of the NATO-Russia Council. Since Russia and the United States have recently been sharing intelligence in the counterterror effort, this could put at least some aspects in a wider framework, within appropriate limits, to the benefit of other NATO members as well as to Russia and the United States. Other EAPC states should be associated with this Center;

- Create a mechanism for assessing terrorist threats, sharing warning of specific threats, and coordinating efforts and joint actions to prevent terrorist acts, with a particular focus on preventing the use of WMD by terrorists. In addition to fostering the exchange of intelligence and other information (above), the Council should organize support for NATO countries and Russia in training specialists in the field of counterterrorist activities, and promote cooperation in extradition of suspected terrorists;

- Take the lead in developing an international, counterterrorism “COCOM”—patterned on the West’s Cold War Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls—in critical areas such as intelligence cooperation, border control, police cooperation, and financial controls;

- Develop U.S.-Russian cooperation as an example for other NATO states on key issues that the U.S. and Russia increasingly recognize as important security concerns. These include homeland defense against terrorism and the increasing threat to sovereignty posed by international organized crime and the drug trade. The latter can be an important arena for potential U.S.-Russian cooperation, which could then be expanded to include NATO; and

- Explore cooperation in fighting and responding to weapons of mass “disruption,” e.g., the threat of attacks on computer and telecom networks.

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, Air and Missile Defense

- Move forward with the Joint U.S.-Russian Early Warning Center planned by the Clinton administration. Consider involving NATO states, or perhaps creating a NATO group within the Center;

- Pursue continent-wide European air defense cooperation;

- Develop conceptual, technological, and arms control aspects of the creation and functioning of European ballistic missile defenses, including NATO-Russia battlefield and tactical missile defense development cooperation; and

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• Exchange information concerning possible violations of existing agreements on nonproliferation and, where necessary, develop new arrangements. Agree to take political and other measures to support nonproliferation regimes.

Crisis Management, Settlement, and Peacekeeping

• Create a framework for joint or coordinated peacekeeping operations and agree on requirements for planning, command, logistics, and support of peacekeeping operations, including the designation of “stand-by” forces for rapid action. Conclude a special agreement on procedures to conduct joint or coordinated operations in accordance with international law. Organize joint training for peacekeeping operations.

Arms Control

• Consider measures, within the NATO-Russia Council and in the EAPC, to maintain and strengthen arms control regimes, including the CFE Treaty and its possible extension to other European countries; and

• Build on Biden-Lugar legislation, which proposes debt forgiveness for Russia commensurate with its dismantling chemical and other weapons; involve NATO states, such as Germany, in similar assistance programs for Russia.

Defense Industry and Arms Cooperation

• Create means for Russian firms to participate in the modernization of the weaponry of states that maintain Soviet equipment (this depends in part on Russian firms’ capacity to build and repair to NATO standards) and potentially to be engaged in joint development and production of some weapons systems for both Russia and NATO countries;

• Associate Russia with the Conference of NATO Armaments Directors (CNAD)—as proposed in the NATO-Russia Founding Act; ¹⁰

• Adopt a more open policy allowing NATO allies to buy Russian arms. While this would not produce massive new contracts for the Russian weapons, symbolically, such a policy change would help to demonstrate that NATO expansion is not an arms export promotion policy for Western producers;

• Develop joint defense industry projects and gear them to increasing NATO-Russia cooperation in the military-technical arena. The goal should be to create an environment where Russia could eventually compete in the global market.
However, given the difficulty that the United States and Europe have had advancing armaments and military technology cooperation, NATO-Russia cooperation should begin in limited areas—e.g., cooperative development of rescue/response equipment for special operations forces involved in combating international terrorism; and

- Consider European allies’ use of Russian/Ukrainian transport aircraft (Antonov AN-124) for airlift in NATO military missions.

Regional Cooperation

- Expand cooperation in Central Asia, to include peace support, crisis management, and emergency relief. Identify specific regional areas of cooperation, to include not only Central Asia, but other zones of current or potential instability;

- Organize allied assistance for Russia’s evacuation of the 14th Army and its weaponry from Moldova. Russia cannot afford to move the weapons to Russia, but destruction of the weaponry in Moldova could be hazardous and dangerous; and

- Work with other institutions (e.g., the EU) to make Kaliningrad an “economic showcase” of development within Russia, including acceptable solutions to the complicated political, economic, transportation, humanitarian, and other problems.

Emergency Preparedness and Response; Environment

- Pursue cooperation on response to nuclear/biological catastrophe, possibly in the context of a joint planning structure that provides a forum for cooperation among scientists, military personnel, and emergency response personnel;

- Promote cooperation in search and rescue operations and cooperation in the preparation for joint operations in civil emergency situations;

- Develop cooperation to ensure the safe disposal of armaments such as land mines and chemical and biological weapons, perhaps through a joint organization tasked to devise secure and safe methods of dismantlement and destruction; and

- Develop a cooperative response to the environmental threat posed by chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic Sea after World War II, which now endanger the Nordic and Baltic states.
Education and Training

- Increase and expand the Russian (as well as Central European) role in the Marshall Center, to include curriculum development and instruction; parallel developments should take place at the NATO School (SHAPE) and at the NATO Defense College; and

- Develop a new NATO-Russia training center in Russia patterned after the Marshall Center.

Economic and Related Cooperation

- Pursue integrated, continent-wide civilian and military airspace management;

- Create a funding mechanism for the NATO-Russia Council into which Council members would make payments to help fund joint activities, such as training, exercises, education, and seminars carried out by Council members; and

- Coordinate NATO-Russia developments (including the NATO-Russia Council) with parallel NATO-EU and Russia-EU developments, in furthering the overall objective of bringing Russia fully within the West and Western institutions;

Overall Cooperation

- Help promote a leadership role for Russia in multilateral efforts, wherever this is feasible; and

- Develop a new “culture of cooperation”—the spirit of flexibility, understanding, and compromise that is essential for effective consensus-based cooperation among nations with security perspectives and priorities that still differ in significant respects. This is the way NATO works, and it is the way that NATO-Russia relations also will need to work. Success will require changes in attitudes on both sides, and not just changes in procedures.

Conclusions—Toward an “Alliance with the Alliance”

Creation of the NATO-Russia Council will represent a fundamental change in Western dealings with Russia—a move in the direction of an enduring partnership and genuine collaboration that might be called an informal “alliance with the Alliance.” The key issue is Russia’s relationship with NATO, not—at least for now—Russia’s role fully integrated within NATO; Russian membership in the Alliance is not on the agenda for the foreseeable future. The NATO-Russia Council will not give Russia the ability to veto NATO actions in any area, and is not a back door to NATO membership. Moreover, the
NATO-Russia Council will remain separate from the North Atlantic Council, which will continue to meet and make decisions on the full range of issues on NATO's agenda, just as the Russian Federation will continue to pursue its own independent interests and actions in particular areas.

That said, NATO-Russia cooperation requires a closer partnership than ever before, beginning with deeper and more-comprehensive consultations on key issues. It may evolve into a sort of "associate" membership or simply "enduring partnership" in which Russia, along with other concerned non-NATO countries, is increasingly involved in NATO decisions and actions, short of an Article 5 commitment.

At some point, Russian membership in NATO may become possible and even necessary for overall security, either in Europe or beyond. One alternative could be a bilateral mutual security (not mutual defense) treaty between Russia and the United States, matched by similar arrangements between Russia and other NATO member states. These agreements could formalize and recognize bilateral security relationships, while stopping short of formal alliance.

In any event, what is happening now opens a new chapter for European security, for Russia, for America's role in Europe, for NATO, and for the entire compass of relations that span the Continent—and which can help the 21st century, in this critical part of the world, redeem the tragedy that so marked the 20th. It is a cause for commitment; it is a call for leadership on all sides.
• reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;

• coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below;

• pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia with NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors;

• conversion of defence industries;

• developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;

• conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;

• combating terrorism and drug trafficking;

• improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.”


10The NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors is the “senior body under the North Atlantic Council dealing with production logistics. Promotes NATO armaments cooperation and considers political, economic and technical aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces.” See NATO Handbook, Chapter 13: “Key to the Principal NATO Committees and to Institutions of Cooperation, Partnership and Dialogue,” Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, August 2001.
Russian Security Concerns | Mechanisms and Activities | NATO Security Concerns
---|---|---
Structural Arrangements (e.g., NATO-Russia Council) | Arms Control and Other Agreements | Other means


“In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest. They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:

- issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in this area;
- conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organisations in these fields;
- joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;
- participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
- exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes;
- arms control issues;
- nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;
- preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combating nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;
- possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence;
- enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters;
- increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia;
mechanisms beyond the current format will be in place for, or prior to, our meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. . . .”

(3) Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué:


“5. . . We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We therefore welcome the decision of Foreign Ministers on 7 December to give new impetus and substance to the partnership between NATO Allies and Russia, with the goal of creating a new NATO-Russia Council to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. To that end, the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session has been tasked to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. NATO’s fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities. As Defence Ministers, we are determined to enhance the NATO-Russia partnership in the defence and military field. . . .”

(4) Press Statement, NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting at the Level of Defence Ministers held in Brussels on 18 December 2001:

“The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) met at the level of Defence Ministers on Tuesday, 18 December 2001 in Brussels. Ministers fully endorsed the decision of Foreign Ministers on 7 December to give new impetus and substance to the partnership between NATO Allies and Russia, with the goal of creating a new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. Ministers committed themselves to enhance their partnership in the security and military field.”

NATO-Russia Joint Statement issued on the Occasion of the Meeting of the Permanent Joint Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 7 December 2001, op cit., paragraph 4. “We are intensifying our cooperation in the struggle against terrorism and in other areas, including crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and civil emergencies, which represents a major step towards a qualitatively new relationship.”

19 plus 1” refers to the current arrangements in the Permanent Joint Council, whereby the NATO allies seek to reach consensus on the positions they will take in consultations with Russia before the PJC meets. To underscore this relationship, the PJC has a “troika” chairmanship—the NATO Secretary General, who is also Chairman of the North Atlantic Council; the Russian PJC representative, who has been the Russian ambassador to Belgium; and a NATO member, on a rotating basis. Under the NATO-Russia Council provision for operating “at 20”—or “at N,” where “N” is the number of NATO allies plus Russia—in theory, all members of the NATO-Russia Council are “equal.” The Council, by this logic, would have only one chairman, likely to be the NATO Secretary General.

The following matrix can help guide thinking for the future. Filled in, it can provide a useful framework that can help assess how the mechanisms and activities that might be undertaken (notionally listed across the top, horizontal axis) address the security concerns of Russia and NATO (represented by the left and right, vertical axes). Including both NATO and Russian concerns enables a clearer identification of areas where mutual solutions are possible as well as of potential problem areas where agreement will be difficult to reach.
ENDNOTES

1 See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, Section IV, “Political-Military Matters,” which continues: “This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.”

2 Ibid. It continues: “Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”


4 The following are extracts from relevant December 2001 documents:

(1) Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001:

“... 2. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest. We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating, with Russia, a new NATO-Russia Council, to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. To that end, we have tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We intend that such cooperative mechanisms will be in place for, or prior to, our next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. NATO’s fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities....”

(2) NATO-Russia Joint Statement issued on the Occasion of the Meeting of the Permanent Joint Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 7 December 2001:

“1. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship between NATO Allies and Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand up to new threats and risks to our security. We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating a new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.

“2. We, the Ministers, will continue our dialogue on the process on which we have embarked today. Regular working contacts will also be maintained between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and NATO. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has also tasked its Ambassadors to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We intend that such cooperative
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<td>Former Ambassador to Russia</td>
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<td>U.S. Members</td>
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The Role of the NATO-Russia Working Group

This report concludes the first phase of the work of the NATO-Russia Working Group. But its members see merit in its continuing to advance ideas regarding the NATO-Russia relationship as it develops. The Working Group can continue to serve as a means of placing on the table ideas that are not yet politically feasible, as well as in identifying added areas of cooperation that could be implemented, either in the near or medium term. Of course, on some issues, ongoing government- and institution-level negotiations could overtake the group’s thinking and discussions, but the Working Group can maintain a value-additive role in building a strong relationship.

Thus, the Working Group on NATO-Russia Relations will continue, contributing analysis, ideas, and recommendations as NATO-Russia cooperation evolves, while also helping to guide that evolution with concrete ideas and concepts. In its next phase, it will also broaden its perspective by including academics, former government officials, and other experts from other states concerned with this relationship.

Working Group Membership

The following is a partial list of the individuals who have taken part, in one form or another, in the activities of the Working Group on NATO-Russia Relations. This list does not include government observers at Working Group meetings. Not all members agree with every part of this report.

Members of the Working Group (listed alphabetically next page) take part in their personal capacities. Affiliations are included for identification purposes only.