STRATEGIES FOR IMBEDDING LEADER META-COMPETENCIES IN THE ARMY CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

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To function effectively in this new century, individuals and organizations must continually adapt, learn new skills, and continually assess their capabilities. In short, they must remain self-aware. Motivation for change within the business world is often profit-motivated. However, change within the government, including the Department of Defense, is usually driven by organizational restructuring or drastic changes in the global security environment, such as the fall of the Iron Curtain or the events of September 11th.

Many corporations and some government agencies have enjoyed success in effecting major changes within their organizations, including their organizational culture. Success of the Army's ongoing Transformation Campaign Plan may also depend upon its ability to adapt at the strategic level, to include changing the Army culture. One of the many outcomes of the Army's latest cultural audit of its commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant officers, as well as Department of the Army civilians - the ongoing Army Training and Leader Development Panel - has been the identification of required leader meta-competencies for success in the 21st Century Army.

Although the Army is now focused on resolving many of the training and leader development issues associated with the Transformation Campaign Plan, the task of imbedding these meta-competencies in the Army culture at the strategic level is unfinished. Although many ideas on how to change the Army's culture are being contemplated by the Army's leadership, a unifying vision of this process has not yet emerged.

This review of organizational and cultural change processes, of recommendations from a recently completed organizational climate survey of the U.S. Armed Forces, and of lessons learned from government agencies which have recently undergone cultural change will provide insights into the development of similar cultural change strategies for the Army.

In conclusion, this study recommends strategies for the Army to follow in imbedding leader meta-competencies in the Army culture.
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STRATEGIES FOR IMBEDDING LEADER META-COMPETENCIES IN THE ARMY CULTURE

MAJOR THEMES

Army Culture is out of balance. There is friction between Army beliefs and practices. Over time, that friction threatens readiness. Training is not done to standard, leader development in operational assignments is limited and does not meet officer expectations, and officers and their families elect to leave the service early. Army Culture is healthy when there is demonstrated trust that stated beliefs equate to actual practices. Such a balance is vital to the health of the profession of arms and to the nation it serves. The Army must narrow the gap between beliefs and practices.

— The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Final Report to the Army, 2001

This conclusion from the Final report of the commissioned officer portion of the Army's Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) defines the cultural challenge currently confronted by the Army and its members. The Army's culture, as in any organization, is a reflection of both individual and collective beliefs and practices. Until the ATLDP results were published, many in the Army were reluctant to admit the existence of an Army cultures—something beyond the mutually understood concept of organizational climate. Such a culture pervades everything that we believe, say, and do. As noted in the ATLDP results, every member of the Army shares responsibility for creating and for changing that culture. So narrowing the gap between these beliefs and practices—changing the Army's culture—requires a comprehensive strategy addressing all Army personnel and organizations.

Before the Army can develop an effective, comprehensive strategy oriented on the cultural change of both individuals and organizations within the Army, it must first establish a common understanding of both Army culture and the process of cultural change. This common understanding—which must be shared by not only the senior leaders of the Army, but by all ranks, down through and including the junior officers—is still under Army development.

Doctrine (the routine instrument for common understanding within the Army) on Army culture exists, but doctrine on cultural change within the Army is still being developed by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. As with all developmental efforts, communication of new policies, concepts, and strategies remains key to their acceptance by members of the organization, both in the near and long terms. Responsibility for the assessment of potentially applicable research on Army culture is assigned to the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, while responsibility for integration of all developmental efforts in Army culture is assigned to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
The ATLDP Final Report of the Officer Study identifies and defines the required leader ‘enduring’ or meta-competencies for success in the 21st Century Army—self-awareness and adaptability. It then addresses the requirement to imbed these meta-competencies in the Army culture. The ATLDP defines self-awareness “as the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses.” Further, the ATLDP defines adaptability “as the ability to recognize changes to the environment; assess against that environment to determine what is new and what to learn to be effective; and the learning process that follows…all to standard and with feedback.”

The Final Report did not offer a strategy for imbedding these meta-competencies in that same culture. Instead, it highlighted the need for continued cultural developmental work. Cultural imperatives from the ATLDP Officer Study Report acknowledge the strong relationship between Army culture and the quality of training and leader development programs. “To be a learning organization that supports this lifelong learning the Army must . . . provide the doctrine, tools, and support to inculcate the concept and practice of lifelong learning, self-awareness and adaptability in the Army’s culture.”

The ATLDP concludes that the Army will continue to depend on leaders and units that have these requisite leader meta-competencies to execute full spectrum operations, both now and in the future Army of 2010—the Objective Force. The ATLDP also defines the conceptual end-state for effectively imbedding these meta-competencies in the Army culture.

When the meta-competencies of self-awareness and adaptability are effectively imbedded in the Army Culture, the leader and unit will be able not only to assess the need for new competencies in a rapidly changing environment, but will also know how to develop those new competencies. Additionally, they must be able to transfer that learning and those new competencies to other leaders and units, as well as institutionalize that learning both in the Army’s culture and systems.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted the importance of military culture to our nation’s security in a recent report on military culture in the Armed Forces:

Sociologists and business executives have long known that highly successful organizations usually have vibrant organizational cultures. Given the military’s unique role of managing violence on behalf of society, a strong and incorruptible culture is not only important, but essential. It is no exaggeration to say that the nation’s security relies in large measure on the vitality of U.S. Military culture.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld continued this emphasis in developing new philosophies of leadership as a critical element of transformation within the Department of
Defense (DoD) in his recent comments regarding the DoD FY '03 budget request and its support of transformation:

"Transformation and the budget that supports it is about new approaches. I have never believed [that transformation is about weapon systems]. I don't think of it in terms of dollars." He added that new operational concepts and new philosophies of leadership would be among the most important elements of transformation.

General Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, likewise emphasized "people systems" in his January 2002 memorandum outlining progress-to-date on ATLDP Recommendations and Ongoing Actions:

Over two years ago now, we released The Army Vision, and it talked about three things: People, Readiness, and Transformation. That vision statement began by talking about people and it ended with talking about people. Our people are central to everything we do in the Army -- they are the keys to achieving ready Forces today and a Transformed Army tomorrow. Hence, training and leader development became drivers in our pursuit of force excellence.

The Army thus consistently cites people as the essential piece of its vision of transformation. In an era of competing priorities and resources, the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP) synchronizes the process for achieving the Army Vision. Unfortunately, cultural change processes and strategies are not yet fully integrated into the TCP.

The Army's Vision is about People, Readiness, and Transformation. People are the centerpiece of our formations, and leadership is our stock in trade. Essential missions for the Army remain to train soldiers...Finally, the Army must transform, to become more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. The Vision represents the goals for the Army, while the Transformation and the accompanying Transformation Campaign Plan is the vehicle for becoming more strategically responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. The TCP, developed, coordinated, and maintained by the Army DCSOPS, will ensure the synchronization of the transformation process with the day-to-day management of the Army. In brief, this campaign plan will be the institutional synchronizer and road map for achieving the Army Vision.

Contrary to popular belief, Army culture is not one of Forrest Gump's box of chocolates—'You never know what you’re going to get.' Without first addressing the need for a comprehensive cultural change strategy as part of the TCP, some of the culture-related policies and programs the Army has already put into place may not narrow the perceived gap between stated beliefs and actual practices which the ATLDP highlighted. In other words, before the meta-competencies of self-awareness and adaptability can be effectively imbedded in the Army culture, that imbedding process must first be understood as part of the larger cultural change process within the Army.
Cultural change theories within corporate America which have potential application to the Army include work by Edgar H. Schein, who asserts that cultural change is based primarily upon the growth stage of an organization. Additionally, John P. Kotter contends that cultural change occurs as the by-product of major organizational change. Finally, Jerry Haney asserts that cultural change occurs as part of an ongoing cultural renewal process. Each of these three theoretical positions has potential implications for development of the Army's own cultural change strategy.

Government agencies within the Washington, DC area which have undergone or are undergoing cultural change include the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) within the Department of State. A review of these agencies' cultural change processes, strategy, and lessons learned has implications for the Army's cultural change strategy development.

Further, CSIS completed a study of America's military culture in February 2000. This study surveyed over 12,500 military respondents across the Department of Defense and the US Coast Guard. Analysis of this organizational climate survey resulted in a series of findings and recommendations on military culture. This study should also be considered in the development of the Army's strategy for cultural change.

Thus, the Army need not re-invent the wheel of cultural change. Indeed, recent corporate experiences of cultural change, as well as experiences in some government agencies that have undergone cultural change, should be scrupulously considered and judiciously applied in the Army's development of doctrine, tools, and strategy for imbedding self-awareness and adaptability in the Army's culture. Such consideration of applicable cultural theories for the Army will identify essential elements of a comprehensive cultural change strategy for incorporation in the Army's TCP, thereby establishing a baseline for the Army's cultural change doctrine.

Without establishment of this comprehensive cultural change strategy for the Army, present and future policy decisions, leader development training and education efforts, and both individual and collective beliefs may continue to perpetuate the officer corps' perceived gap between Army beliefs and practices in the Army culture.

ARMY CULTURE AND META-COMPETENCY DEFINED

Current definitions of Army culture address culture as the product of a set of shared values, experiences, and heritage—not as the product of cultural change mechanisms.
The Army's Field Manual (FM-1) cites the existence of a unique professional culture as one of the four fundamental characteristics of the Army. "The Army's institutional culture encompasses the customs and traditions, norms of conduct, ideals, and values that have evolved over 226 years of campaigns and battles, of shared hardship and triumph." In other words, FM-1 defines Army culture as an historical evolution, not as the result of a defined process that can be undertaken to achieve newly established or modified organizational goals.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) completed a military climate/cultural study in February 2000 of all the Armed Forces. The survey defined military culture in accordance with the definition of Army culture in FM-1. It is important to note that CSIS did not define a process of cultural change. Rather, it defined military culture as the product of past, present, and future service values, customs, and traditions:

Its essence is how things are done in a military organization. Military culture is an amalgam of values, customs, traditions, and their philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has created a shared institutional ethos. From military culture springs a common framework for those in uniform and common expectations regarding standards of behavior, discipline, teamwork, loyalty, selfless duty, and the customs that support those elements.

While acknowledging similarities between the military and civilian organizational cultures, CSIS highlights the necessary differences between those same cultures, as well as the reasons for those differences:

At the same time, a military culture by definition must differ significantly from civil culture in a democratic society, a fact recognized in U.S. law and supported by the Supreme Court. Because the driving imperative behind U.S. military culture is the unique responsibility to fight and win the nation's wars, basic individual freedoms in the military are often curtailed for the sake of good order and discipline, and the armed forces reserve the right to dictate strict rules of behavior that would be clearly inappropriate for a civilian employer.

CSIS continued by emphasizing the four elements of military culture across the armed services (which also have application to the development of the Army's cultural change strategy): discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps. CSIS defined the military cultural component of discipline as the quality "that enables military formations to operate in the most demanding of environments—combat. Although it is backed by the threat of punishment and reinforced though drill, modern military discipline emanates more from unit cohesion and the example set by inspiring leaders."

CSIS defined the military cultural component of professional ethos as a traditional set of military values:
- A willingness to engage an armed opponent and sacrifice self, if necessary, to accomplish the mission
- Physical and moral courage
- Discipline
- Obedience to lawful authority
- Respect for civilian control of the military
- Loyalty to and respect for comrades, unit, and nation
- Service and advancement based on merit

CSIS then defined the military cultural component of ceremony and etiquette—salutes, uniforms, ribbons and medals, and the playing of taps—as “institutional imperatives to acknowledge lawful authority, control or mask anxiety, affirm solidarity, and celebrate the unit or individual.” CSIS continued to observe that these ceremonies and etiquette bond armed forces and civilian society together. “Although excessive ceremonies or overly formal etiquette can dampen morale, ceremonies are more often a positive factor, especially when they serve to celebrate military prowess and connect the military to the nation and society that it serves.” Likewise, “Through such symbolism America demonstrates respect for its men and women in uniform, and the essential bond between the armed forces and civilian society is strengthened.”

Finally, CSIS defined the military cultural component of cohesion and esprit de corps:

Cohesion is the shared sense of sacrifice and identity that binds service members to their comrades in arm. Esprit de corps is pride in the larger unit and service as a whole. Morale, a close relative, represents the level of enthusiasm and satisfaction felt by individuals in a unit. All three are essential, but can become dysfunctional if they lead to a confusion of loyalties, impede integration of new personnel, or provide a motive for covering up illegal or unethical behavior. Cohesion and esprit de corps—the buy-products of bonding under the hardships that often typify military life—remain essential to combat effectiveness.

Having established a common foundation of cultural elements of the armed services, CSIS noted that each service developed its own distinct culture as an essential and powerful part of every service member's identity. CSIS defined the Army's distinct culture, relative to the other armed services, as follows:
- The oldest service
- The service most compatible with joint operations
- The service that counts itself in terms of divisions
The service that is the most resistant to structural change
The service with the most policy and operational success
The service that routinely receives high marks in human relations.20

Additionally, “Within each of the services, additional subcultures exist based on the type of unit (e.g., fighter squadron), branch (e.g., infantry) or, in the Navy, warfighting community (e.g., aviation, surface warfare, submarine, or special operations).”21

In order to develop strategies for imbedding meta-competencies in the Army culture, it is important to understand not only the definition of competency, but also the competency framework adopted by the Army and its relation to Army culture.

The ATLDP focused a portion of its discussion on methods for defining and developing current leader competencies to enable its leaders and units to operate successfully in the operational environment of the Army of the future—the Objective Force.

The panel defined competency as an underlying characteristic related to effective and superior performance. Competencies provide a common language to discuss leader and unit performance, and leader selection, development, and advancement. This common language enables the Army to assess leadership and units, and feed back the results into its training and leader development programs. Competencies also provide a roadmap, enabling leaders and units to know what they have to accomplish.22

While the Army’s current leadership doctrine develops leader competencies using both the values-based and research-based methods, “as the Army undergoes Transformation, it is using a third method (strategy-based) for developing leader competencies which is driven by the Army’s strategic direction. This strategy-based method enables the Army to position itself and its leadership for the future, even when the future is uncertain.” 23 Values-based competency methodology promotes irrefutable leadership competencies, which withstand all kinds of environmental change. On the other hand, research-based methods promote competencies that are based on past performance (skills, knowledge, and attributes analysis) of successful leaders.

The ATLDP concluded that Army leaders will need competencies matched to the new operating conditions of the Objective Force, but the panel also supported the requirement for lifelong learning.

The [ATLD] Panel concluded that given the ambiguous nature of the objective Force’s operational environment, Army leaders should focus on developing the “enduring competencies” of self-awareness and adaptability…Self-awareness and adaptability are symbiotic; one without the other is useless. Self-awareness without adaptability is a leader who cannot learn to accept change and modify behavior brought about by changes to his environment. Adaptability without self-
awareness is irrationally changing for change sake, not understanding the relationship between abilities, duties, and the environment. Because these two competencies are so important, the Panel describes them as meta-competencies. They enable lifelong learning and their mastery leads to success in using many other skills required in full spectrum operations. The operational environment requires lifelong learning by Army officers and units that have ingrained the meta-competencies of self-awareness and adaptability as the most important skills and characteristics requisite for mission success in the objective Force.24

Noted sociologist Edgar H. Schein highlights the interdependence of culture and leadership in all organizations, as well as the necessity for leaders to understand cultural change processes. He affirms what senior Army leaders have already learned about the relationship of leadership to cultural change in the Army, although the dynamics of cultural processes in the Army are still being discovered.

I believe that cultures begin with leaders who impose their own values and assumptions on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later generations of members what kind of leadership is acceptable. The culture now defines leadership. But as the group encounters adaptive difficulties, as its environment changes to the point where some of its assumptions are no longer valid, leadership comes into play once more. Leadership is now the ability to step outside the culture that created the leader and start evolutionary change processes that are more adaptive. This ability to perceive the limitations of one's own culture and to develop the culture adaptively is the essence and ultimate challenge of leadership. If leaders are to fulfill this challenge, they must first understand the dynamics of culture.25

RESEARCH APPROACH

My hypothesis is that while the Army continues to adapt to both external and internal challenges and demands, it is nonetheless practicing many of the key elements of cultural change theories utilized within corporate America without the benefit of an overarching cultural change strategy. In order to test this hypothesis, I began by reviewing available data and findings from the ATLDP regarding Army culture, as well as the ongoing efforts of Army organizations responsible for developing action plans that address those findings. In addition, I determined initial implications for the Army culture from potentially applicable theories in corporate America's studies of cultural and organizational change. In conducting my background research, I discovered a Military Culture survey that was completed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in February 2000, whose findings are relevant to the Army's development of its cultural change strategy.
Following this background research, I conducted interviews with individuals in government agencies that have also undergone recent cultural change to obtain their lessons learned and change strategies. Using this ‘real-world’ feedback, I developed initial recommended cultural change strategies for the Army and then discussed these strategies with senior Army leaders in order to assess their feasibility. Based upon this feedback, I then developed a recommended cultural change strategy for the Army.

FINDINGS

ONGOING ARMY EFFORTS IN CULTURAL CHANGE AND ARMY STAKEHOLDERS

Background research on Army culture includes not only the definitions cited earlier, but also the ATLDP Officer Study Final Report to the Army, which included several recommendations from the ATLDP’s Study Group on Army culture. From these initial ATLDP recommendations that were approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army, several imperatives related to Army culture and meta-competencies are still under development across the Army:

- Research, develop, and publish officer doctrine on Army culture
- Validate ATLDP-developed Army leader competencies
- Draft doctrine for lifelong learning, self-awareness, and adaptability
- Teach the importance of lifelong learning and meta-competencies in the Officer Education System

This study of Army culture has the potential to contribute most to the first and third of these cultural imperatives. Other Army efforts involving cultural change are still in the developmental stage. For example, the Army’s Strategic Vision explicitly addresses “Well Being” and “Training and Leader Development,” but not ‘culture’. The Transformation Campaign Plan addresses “Well Being” and “Training and Leader Development” in the ‘Trained and Ready Axis’, but not ‘culture’. Before a cultural change strategy can be effectively incorporated into any of the aforementioned documents, there must first be a common understanding of Army culture. Neither of these overarching documents acknowledges the previously mentioned interrelationship between leadership and cultural change.

The Army began this cultural change task by conducting a cultural survey and analysis (also known as a cultural audit in the corporate world) of nearly 14,000 officers, NCOs, and civilians. The results of that survey were published in the ATLDP Officer Study Final Report to the Army. This cultural analysis continues through the ATLDP-sponsored surveys of the Army’s Active, Reserve, and National Guard noncommissioned and warrant officers, as well as its Department of the Army civilians. As they are completed, these survey results, analyses, and
ensuing action plans will be reviewed and approved by the senior Army leadership. In any cultural analysis, cultural audits and surveys provide essential feedback to organizational leadership on individual perceptions and beliefs.

As noted in a recent update from the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) to the entire Army, work continues on many of the recommendations from the Final Report of the officer study by an implementation process action team. This team is responsible for working with major commands and respective Army staff agencies to develop implementation plans for all recommended actions, to include the imperatives listed above. Although the CSA cited progress on many of the recommended actions related to Army culture in the Final Report of the Officer Study, none of the cultural imperatives listed above were specifically cited. However, the CSA reaffirmed the Army’s commitment to examine and develop long-term solutions to all the ATLDP’s recommendations.

We must maintain our focus. We are making significant progress, but there is much work to be done. Many of these issues are extremely complex and have no easy solution. The important point to recognize is that we have identified these issues, are committed to dealing with them, and are fully engaged as a force to resolving them.

As a component of this Army cultural analysis, the ATLDP addressed the three frameworks for competencies. The panel considered each framework and in the Army Officer Study Final Report concluded that the Army competencies must be derived from a combination of the three competency frameworks: values-based, research-based, and strategy-based, not any one of them individually, in order to harness the potential of its leaders. “The strategy-based method enables lifelong learning through the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability for an uncertain and constantly changing environment.”

Subsequently, “the Panel concluded that given the ambiguous nature of the Objective Force’s operational environment Army leaders should focus on developing the enduring competencies of self-awareness and adaptability.” The Final Report of the ATLDP Officer Study recommended a commitment by Army leaders to life-long learning, including the need to “Provide the doctrine, tools, and support to inculcate [imbed] the concept of life long learning, self-awareness, and adaptability in the Army’s culture.”

The issue of how to imbed these ‘enduring competencies’ in the Army culture by modifying both collective and individual behavior through cultural change is still being addressed.

To aid in developing a strategy for cultural change within the Army, we must not only understand the definition of Army culture, but also understand the endstate for meta-
competencies being effectively imbedded ('ingrained') in the Army culture. As the ATLDP summarizes, once self-awareness and adaptability are imbedded in the Army's culture, both the leader and unit will:

1. Be able to assess the need for new competencies in a rapidly changing environment
2. Know how to develop those new competencies
3. Be able to transfer that learning and those new competencies to other leaders and units
4. Be able to institutionalize that learning in the Army's culture and systems

These standards for effectively imbedding meta-competencies in the Army culture, by their very design, indicate a shared responsibility between both the operational, senior staff, and institutional organizations of the Army. The primary focus of the operational Army is to train and deploy units that are not only capable of deploying, but actually do deploy into harm's way. On the other hand, the institutional Army develops and executes both the initial entry and follow-on professional development training to these same standards. The senior staff of the Army at the Division, Corps, Major Command, and Army levels develops strategies and plans for accomplishing these standards, given available resources.

To effectively develop a cultural change strategy for the Army, we must also understand the potential Army stakeholders in this development process, specifying their responsibilities to the Army culture.

- The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, DAMO-Training & Leader Development Directorate is assigned responsibility for integrating all Army efforts related to training and leader development, including all the imperatives from the ATLDP Officer Study Final Report.
- The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate is assigned the Army staff proponent responsibility for leadership & leadership policy development, which directly impacts the collective leadership behavior of Army personnel.
- The Army's Training and Doctrine Command is the major Army command responsible for doctrine & training development, including the commissioned officer, noncommissioned officer, & warrant officer education systems. This educational system is one of the major institutional means to educate and train Army personnel in new Army culture initiatives through initial entry and follow-on professional development training.
- The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) is the Army's lead agency for leadership analysis, leader development integration, and leadership doctrine development. CAL also is assigned
responsibility for assessing potentially applicable research on Army culture, including this research effort.

- The United States Military Academy's Department of Behavioral Science & Leadership's is currently conducting a study of officership and service ethic. Service ethic, according to FM-1, is one of the key elements of the Army's institutional culture.33

- The US Army War College (USAWC) is the Army's institution of higher learning for strategic level leadership. Most Army officers and some officers from other branches of the service, including foreign countries, who are competitive for promotion to colonel, attend a year-long professional development opportunity at Carlisle Barracks, PA. One of the USAWC's key academic missions includes the preparation of selected military, civilian, and international leaders for strategic leadership responsibilities by advancing their understanding of strategic leadership systems and processes.34 The USAWC is potentially one of the major institutional means to educate and train senior Army leaders in Army culture initiatives.

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civilian Personnel Policy is the Army proponent for civilian personnel policy, leader development & leadership training. Although the ATLD is now focusing on commissioned, non-commissioned, and warrant officers, plans call for a follow-on effort focused on Department of the Army civilians—an essential component of the Army’s past, present, and future success and culture.

- The Army, as a developer and potential user of this cultural change strategy, remains the largest stakeholder.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE FIELD OF STUDY REVIEW

A review of literature on cultural change and change mechanisms provides a working terminology for civilian organizational culture, which can be adapted to the Army organization. According to Kotter, “Culture refers to norms of behavior and shared values among a group of people. Norms of behavior are common or pervasive ways of acting that are found in a group and that persist because group members tend to behave in ways that teach these practices to new members, rewarding those who fit in and sanctioning those who do not.”35 Kotter’s definition of culture is consistent with the Army’ definition of culture in FM-1.

Just as the ATLD defined key leader competencies for the Army, in the increasingly competitive business markets, civilian organizations are also looking at new methods for improved competitiveness, including executive performance. Competency development has become one of the increasingly popular methods for selecting organizational leaders. This
trend has implications for the Army’s culture. Consider Douglas T. Hall and Jon P. Briscoe’s observation:

Why have competencies suddenly become so popular with executives? We believe that the competitive demands placed on today’s organizations have caused them to look at every possible area for improved competitiveness—including executive performance. As one woman who participated in the research said, “We had a growing awareness that we were expecting a great deal from our leaders.” Competencies are perceived as an important tool in helping to define and improve superior executive performance.36

Briscoe and Hall cite civilian organizations that use the same three major competency approaches—the research-based, values-based, and strategy-based approaches—all of which the Army is utilizing. Hall and Briscoe emphasize that the competency approach must focus on continuous learning. Then they propose the concept of a meta-competency “a competency that is so powerful that it affects the person’s ability to acquire other competencies. An analogy would be reading; once a person has the ability to read, all sorts of other learning that are communicated through the written word become accessible to that person.”37

Briscoe and Hall identify the two key learning meta-competencies for any organization—adaptability (utilizing the same definition adopted by the ATLDp) and identity—“the ability to gather self-related feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept, as appropriate.”38 Briscoe and Hall’s definition of ‘identity’ is essentially the same as the ATLDp’s definition of self-awareness.

They propose two guidelines using a competency framework: “Be strategic and clear about which competency method you are using, and use it to its fullest advantage.”39 The ATLDp Final Report met this guideline by clearly stating the competency approaches that the Army will follow—the research-based, values-based, and the strategy-based approaches. The report then explained each of the approaches’ linkages to the Army’s past, present, and future. However, communication of these competency approaches across the Army must continue beyond the Final Report of the ATLDp Officer Study before the Army’s efforts can be considered ‘strategic and clear’. The Army’s use of these competency methods to their ‘fullest advantage’ will occur when the Army’s development of doctrine, tools, and cultural change strategy includes these approaches.

The second guideline, “Value your values ...using values to inform competencies is not only ‘all right’ but may be reinforcing the greatest advantage some companies have-their culture.”40 The ATLDp also met this guideline by clearly stating the necessity for utilizing the
values-based competency approach—thereby linking that competency approach to Army
values, the irrefutable heart and soul of the soldier’s profession.\textsuperscript{41}

Briscoe and Hall also propose two imperatives for applying this competency framework. First, “Don’t let the means become the end: Apply your model...all of the work in development is wasted if it is not actually used in improving [leader] selection, development, and other applications.”\textsuperscript{42} The Army is still in the process of validating the competency frameworks before they can be effectively applied to the Army’s leader selection and development processes.

Second, the competency framework should provide a common language. Briscoe and Hall assert that:

Competency frameworks need to be simplified to increase their use. The easiest way to do this, no matter which foundation is used, is to use the executives’ language in defining competencies. It not only makes the competencies more familiar to their ultimate end-users, but [also] provides involved executives with a sense of pride and ownership.\textsuperscript{43}

The ATLDP began this process of providing a common language by involving senior leadership in the competency development process during the review and approval of the ATLDP recommendations. Senior leadership involvement must continue, however, as the Army’s leader selection and development processes incorporate these meta-competencies and the Army’s cultural change strategy is developed further.

Finally, Briscoe and Hall specify two ways to manage change effectively. When developing or revising competency frameworks, “seek personnel to participate in the process who already demonstrate the new competencies—from both inside and outside the company.”\textsuperscript{44} The Army met this guideline in the initial development of the meta-competencies by the ATLDP: Members of the ATLDP have been and continue to be selected from a cross-section of society, not only of active duty and retired military, but also experienced academicians and consultants. This broad-based executive oversight must continue as the competency framework is developed and implemented across the Army.

The second way to manage change is to include the learning meta-competency for executives. As Briscoe and Hall note, “Despite its best efforts, no company is smart enough to anticipate every possible competency executives will need in the future.”\textsuperscript{45} Executives must also be taught “learning meta-competencies that will help them develop the ‘just-in-time’ competencies they will need in order to adapt to ongoing, short-term challenges and the personal competencies that will help them endure and lead through multiple waves of change.”\textsuperscript{46} Once the learning meta-competency is developed, the Army must conduct initial
executive training [colonel and general officer] in meta-competencies through both the Senior Service College and the general officer training courses.

Briscoe and Hall’s program should be applied to the Army’s efforts in the following ways:

- Communicate these competency approaches across the Army beyond the Final Report of the ATLDP Officer Study so that the Army’s efforts can be considered ‘strategic and clear’. The Army’s use of these competency methods to their ‘fullest advantage’ will occur when the Army’s development of doctrine, tools, and cultural change strategy includes these approaches.
- Continue clearly stating the necessity for utilizing the values-based competency approach and linking that competency approach to Army values
- Upon completion of validating the competency frameworks, incorporate them into the Army’s leader selection and development processes.
- Continue to involve senior leadership in the development of a common competency language, as the Army’s leader selection and development processes incorporate these meta-competencies.
- Continue a broad-based executive oversight of the competency framework development and implementation across the Army.
- Once the learning meta-competency is developed, conduct executive [colonel and general officer] initial training in meta-competencies through both the Senior Service College and the general officer training courses.

As an organization, the Army continues to adapt to both external and internal challenges and demands. Without the benefit of an overarching cultural change strategy, the Army is nonetheless practicing many of the key elements of cultural change theories utilized within corporate America. Theories for imbedding cultural change that have potential application to the Army include work by Edgar H. Schein, who asserts that cultural change is primarily based upon the organizational growth stage of an organization. Secondly, John P. Kotter asserts that cultural change occurs as the by-product of major organizational change within an organization. Finally, Jerry Haney asserts that cultural change occurs as part of an ongoing cultural renewal process.

Organizational growth stage-based cultural change

According to Schein, cultural change mechanisms should be devised for given stages of organizational growth. His underlying strategy for imbedding cultural change is development of a set of sequential steps in cultural change. These sequential steps include: unfreezing, which
generates motivation for change; cognitive restructuring, which redefines some of the core concepts in the assumption set; actual behavioral change; and refreezing, which locks in the new behavior and set of conditions to be reinforced. Cultural change mechanisms should be appropriate to the stage of organizational growth (founding and early growth, midlife, maturity and decline). After determining which growth stage an organization is in, proponents of change apply the most relevant cultural change mechanisms. While there are many implications for the Army efforts at cultural change in Schein’s theory, there remains no unifying cultural change strategy for the Army that integrates these organizational growth stage-based mechanisms into a long-term and comprehensive plan.

CULTURE-IMBEDDING MECHANISMS

Schein considers these cultural change mechanisms in the founding and early growth stage of an organization as culture-imbedding mechanisms. Schein defines the founding and early growth stage of an organization as the period of founder or family ownership where culture imbedding is essentially a socialization process during which most of the socialization mechanisms are in the hands of the leaders.

These culture-imbedding mechanisms include both primary imbedding mechanisms and secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms that are most effective in the founding and early growth stage of an organization. However, these same mechanisms may also be used to support cultural change in the organization during later organizational growth stages. Many of these culture-imbedding mechanisms are familiar to Army leaders, since they are already being taught in professional development schools and practiced on a day-to-day basis by Army leaders.
Primary Embedding
Mechanisms

Secondary Articulation and Reinforcement Mechanisms

What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis

Organizational design and structure

How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises

Organizational systems and procedures

Observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources

Organizational rites and rituals

Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching

Design of physical space, facades, and buildings

Observed criteria by which leaders allocate rewards and status

Stories, legends, and myths about people and events

Observed criteria by which leaders recruit, select, promote, retire, and excommunicate organizational leaders

Formal statements of organizational philosophy, values, and creed


FIGURE 1. CULTURE-IMBEDDING MECHANISMS

However, an established organizational culture may not remain dynamic, indeed may atrophy. "Once the culture has stabilized in a mature organization because of a long history of success, leaders find that such manipulations are often limited or superficial in their effects. They discover that changing deeply imbedded assumptions requires far more effort and time."49 That is, organizations tend to resist change, especially when they are well established and successful. "At different stages in the evolution of a given organization's culture different possibilities for change arise because of the particular function that culture plays at each developmental stage."50

Listed below are the growth stages and Schein's most relevant cultural change mechanisms for each growth stage. As Schein observes, these mechanisms are cumulative in the sense that at a later stage, all the prior change mechanisms are still operating but additional
ones become relevant. For example, if the Army is considered a mature organization by Schein's definition, change mechanisms for that developmental stage should become the primary focus for changing the Army's organizational culture. However, change mechanisms for both the founding and early growth stage, as well as the midlife growth stage, still apply, but to a lesser degree than those for the mature growth stage.

A review of these cultural change mechanisms will highlight their potential application to the development of a cultural change strategy for the Army.
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FIGURE 2. CULTURAL CHANGE MECHANISMS
FOUNDING AND EARLY GROWTH STAGE CULTURAL CHANGE MECHANISMS

For an organization that is in its founding or early growth development stage, Schein asserts that four cultural change mechanisms are most relevant: First is incremental change, which through “general evolution involves diversification, growing complexity, higher levels of differentiation and integration, and creative syntheses into new and higher-level forms.” This change through general evolution has been used effectively in the Army, as in the integration of women and other minorities into the Army since the 1950’s.

Second is specific evolution, which is “the adaptation of specific parts of the organization to their particular environments and the impact of the subsequent cultural diversity on the core culture. This is the mechanism that causes organizations in different industries to develop different industry cultures and subgroups to develop different subcultures.” Change through specific evolution has also been used effectively in the Army, as in the development and subsequent success of the Army’s Acquisition Corps in the early ’90’s, which responded to the growing Army need for procurement, research, and development.

Third is organizational therapy, which is the process of collectively examining and developing insights on organizational culture, to include, if necessary, redefining some of the widely-recognized elements of that culture. Perhaps the best example of this change through organizational therapy is the Army’s After Action Review (AAR) process that involves all ranks across the Army. In this process, all participants can speak their mind, share insights, and lessons learned, resulting in a continuous self-assessment process that is both healthy and accepted.

Fourth is the promotion of hybrids, which is a gradual and incremental change through systematic promotion of insiders whose own assumptions are better adapted to the new external realities. Because they are insiders, these individuals accept much of the cultural core and have credibility. However, because of their personalities or life experiences in their subcultures in which they developed, they also hold assumptions that are in varying degrees different from the core and thus move an organization gradually into new ways of thinking and acting.

Change through promotion of hybrids has been used effectively in the Army. Consider the leader selection process during which promotion boards annually review personnel files, relative to peers across the organization to assess promotion potential. Change within the Army from this mechanism, however, is much slower than in civilian organizations where the promotion process is less methodical and routine. Finally, without specific guidance concerning ‘hybrids’ to Army promotion boards, those boards usually select those officers for promotion who are
most like those sitting on the promotion board, as opposed to those who may best meet the future requirements of the Army.

MIDLIFE STAGE CULTURAL CHANGE MECHANISMS

Schein defines a midlife organization as a publicly owned organization with at least two generations of general managers. “This definition highlights the importance of a diffusion of ownership feelings and a psychological distance from the original founder and family that allows cultural evolution to occur more broadly.” Schein contends that “as organizations grow into midlife, they have to differentiate themselves across major bases, to include: functional/occupational, geographical, product/market/technology, division, hierarchy, merger/acquisition, joint venture/strategic alliance, and structural opposition groups.” He further notes that “The strength of the midlife organization lies in the diversity of its subcultures.” Midlife organizations exhibit complex cultures:

At this stage it is more difficult to decipher the culture and make people aware of it because it is so embedded in routines. It may even be counterproductive to make people aware of the culture unless there is some crisis or problem to be solved. Managers view culture discussions as boring and irrelevant, especially if the company is large and well established.

The Army is differentiated along functional lines and the Army is ‘publicly owned’. Many more than two generations of general managers have run the post World War II Army. The Army surely meets Schein’s requirements for a midlife organization. Cultural change in midlife organizations “is a matter of meshing the different subcultures by encouraging the evolution of common goals, common language, and common procedures for solving problems.” Although Schein’s generation-based definition of organizational midlife doesn’t neatly fit the Army, his relevant cultural change mechanisms for a midlife organization have applicability.

Schein defines three cultural change mechanisms that are most relevant to an organization in its midlife development stage. The first of these mechanisms, systematic promotion from selected subcultures, is a slow process.

Leaders develop midlife organizations culturally by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different subcultures and then biasing the total culture in favor of one of the subcultures. Leaders do this by systematically promoting people from that subculture into power positions in the total culture. This is an extension of the previously mentioned use of hybrids, but it has a more potent effect in midlife because preservation of the total culture is not as big an issue as it was in the young and growing organization... Whereas the diversity of subcultures is a threat to the young organization, it can be seen as an advantage in midlife. The only disadvantage to this change mechanism is that it is very slow... If the pace of cultural change is to be increased, systematic organization development projects must be launched.
Change through systematic promotion from selected subcultures has not been used effectively in the Army. An example of this change through systematic promotion from selected subcultures within the Army culture is the senior leader selection process. Personnel files are reviewed annually to assess promotion potential. As a general rule, the promotion process is viewed as equitable and merit-based. But it does not provide Army leadership with the opportunity to promote only from selected subcultures.

The second of the midlife cultural change mechanisms, change through organizational development, has not been used frequently within the Army as a whole. But it has the potential for success, as in the case of the ATLD. Schein describes the organizational development process as “managed from the top, taking into account both the technical and human sides of the organization and using inside or outside consultants in the planning and implementation of the changes to be made.” Schein also notes the necessity for all organizational subcultures to be involved in the process:

The managerial subculture usually becomes the agent of change and the initial target of change, but the ultimate client system is the organization as a whole in that the interests of all the stakeholders must be considered. Though the projects may be initiated by individual leaders, it is essential in OD projects that the client system be broadened to at least the top-management subculture and preferably the other hierarchical subcultures, as well.

Change through organizational development has not been used often in the Army. But it has been effective, when used. An example of this effective change within the Army culture is the ATLD, which enabled ‘inside consultants’ to analyze initial results of the officer study and recommend changes. Another example of this change mechanism within the Army is the new plan to reorganize the Army Staff and Secretariat, which is now being implemented. As a general rule, Army leadership is less receptive to outside consultants’ analysis unless it is supported by extensive Army experience.

The third of these midlife cultural change mechanisms, change through technological seduction, involves the deliberate and managed introduction of technologies designed to cause new behavior by individuals and groups within the organization.

One of the less obvious ways that the leaders of midlife organizations choose to change cultural assumptions is through the subtle, cumulative, and sometimes unintended impacts of new technology... At one extreme we can observe the gradual evolutionary diffusion of technological innovation where a new technology such as the automobile displaces not only the horse and buggy but eventually many of the assumptions and rituals that accompanied the old technology. At the other extreme, [change through] technological seduction involves the deliberate, managed introduction of specific technologies for the
sake of seducing organization members into the new behavior, which will in turn require them to reexamine their present assumptions and possibly adopt new values, beliefs, and assumptions.  

Change through technological seduction mechanism has been used effectively in the Army.  “Technology has a continuing effect on the Army...rifled musket, artillery, telegraph, machine-gun, aircraft, helicopter, parachute, and radio to name a few.  Today it is the information-sharing system that has changed and will continue to change the Army...its doctrine, organizations, equipment, training and leader development processes.”  

Another example of this is the introduction of personal computers and electronic mail as a technological innovation to enable everyone to more effectively communicate with each other.  This new technology produced some unfortunate negative effects: Some Army leaders used the additional information to extend their control, but reduced their interpersonal contact with subordinates in favor of electronic contact.  

The Army is in the process of increasing the effectiveness of educational intervention as a method of technological seduction to introduce cultural change.  Senior Army leaders recognized that until the Training and Doctrine Command, the Army’s major command that is responsible for institutional training and doctrine, transformed, the Army’s Transformation would be incomplete.  Efforts are currently underway to accomplish this transformation of the Army’s institutional training.

Maturity-and-decline stage cultural change mechanisms

Schein defines a mature-and-decline growth stage of an organization as an organization whose products or services have become obsolete:

Organizational “maturity is not necessarily correlated with age, size, or number of managerial generations but rather reflects the interaction between the organization’s output and the environmental opportunities and constraints.  Continued success creates strongly held shared assumptions and thus a strong culture.  If the internal and external environments remain stable, this is an advantage.  However, if there is a change in the environment, some of the shared assumptions can become a liability precisely because of their strength.  The mature stage is reached when the organization is no longer able to grow because it has saturated its markets or become obsolete in its products.”  

Some would argue that the Army’ external environment has now changed to the point that some of its shared cultural assumptions have now become a liability and must be reexamined, even though the Army’s products, soldiers, and their capabilities are not obsolete.

As with any mature organization, there can be resistance to changing key organizational assumptions.
If an organization has had a long history of success with certain assumptions about itself and the environment, it is unlikely to want to challenge or reexamine those assumptions. Even if the assumptions are brought to consciousness, the members of the organization are likely to want to hold onto them because they justify the past and are the source of pride and self-esteem. Such assumptions now operate as filters that make it difficult for key managers to understand alternate strategies for survival and renewal.

Schein describes six cultural change mechanisms that are most relevant to an organization in its maturity or declining development stage. The first of these mechanisms for cultural change within a mature organization—a rapid transformation of a part of the organization or by a total reorganization—has potential application to the Army as part of the ongoing transformation process. But this process is only beginning.

Cultural change within a mature organization can either be through a rapid transformation of a part of the organization or by a total reorganization through an event such as a merger or takeover:

In such a situation, the basic choices are between more rapid transformation of parts of the culture to permit the organization to become more adaptive once again through some kind of turnaround and the destruction of the organization and its culture through a process of total reorganization via a merger, an acquisition, or bankruptcy proceedings. In either case, strong new change managers or ‘transformational leaders’ are likely to be needed to unfreeze the organization and launch the change programs. As I have emphasized before, such unfreezing must not only involve the disconfirmation and induction of guilt or anxiety; it must also offer psychological safety by providing a new vision, a new set of alternatives, and a plan for how to get there that reassures members of the organization that change is possible.

The Army is undergoing cultural change for a mature organization through rapid transformations of portions of the Army. In both the operational (standing-up of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams) and senior staff elements of the Army (merging of the Army Staff and Department of the Army Secretariat), rapid transformations of parts of the Army provide opportunities for broader cultural change. Additionally, the culture of the Legacy Force is changing as the Army recapitalizes and modernizes them. However, no cultural change strategy is currently planned in support of these organizational transformations.

The second mechanism for cultural change within a mature organization - managed change through infusion of outsiders – is not as effective in the Army as it is in civilian organizations. Schein's cultural change theory assumes a relatively stable work force, in terms of arrivals and departures, within the organization.

Shared assumptions can be changed by changing the composition of the organization's dominant groups or coalitions. The most potent version of this
change mechanism [managed change through infusion of outsiders] occurs when a board of directors brings in a new CEO or when a new CEO is brought in as a result of acquisition, a merger, or a leveraged buyout. The new CEO usually brings in some of his or her own people and gets rid of people who are perceived to represent the old and increasingly ineffective way of doing things.

Change through infusion of outsiders has not been used effectively in the Army, although a routine infusion of outsiders (from outside the unit, but not outside the Army) occurs each year in the personnel assignment process. Normal Army personnel assignments result in complete organizational turnover of Active Duty personnel every three years. “Change through infusion of outsiders (from outside the Army) does not work in the Army because, for example, it takes 20 years to grow a battalion commander, 22 years to grow a brigade commander, and 27 years to grow a division commander. The Army cannot hire a leader from elsewhere in the industry...we are the industry.”

With a possible exception, the planned complete infusion of outsiders in leadership positions within the Army doesn’t occur at a single point in time, as it may with changes in civilian organizations. An exception to this more deliberate change through infusion of outsiders within the Army culture occurs when general officers assume new positions and bring members of their previous personal staff from their previous position along with them.

On the other end of the organizational turnover spectrum are organizations that are manned by Department of the Army civilians. These organizations are closer to civilian corporations, since Army civilians tend to ‘stay put’. However, there is much more administrative job security for DA civilians than for corporate civilians. Therefore, in Army organizations, the potential effectiveness of this change mechanism is reduced relative to civilian organizations.

The third of these mechanisms for cultural change within a mature organization - change through scandal and myth explosion - has occurred in the Army.

As a company matures, it develops a positive ideology and a set of myths about how it operates, ... At the same time, the company continues to operate according to the assumptions that have worked in practice, ‘theories-in-use’, which more accurately reflect what actually goes on. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the espoused theories, the announced values of the organization, come to be in varying degrees out of line with the actual assumptions that govern daily practice. ... When such incongruities between espoused value and actual assumptions exist, scandal and myth explosion become relevant as mechanisms of culture change.

Change through scandal and myth explosion has been used effectively in the Army. Although this mechanism is available to the Army, it is used infrequently. An example of this
scandal and myth explosion within the Army culture is the recently released results of the ATLDP on the state of ‘open communications’ between senior leaders and junior officers. The ATLDP survey analysis revealed the espoused values of open communications between the senior leaders of the Army and its junior officers—which were perceived as ‘open’ by senior leaders—were in fact viewed as ‘closed’ by those same junior officers. Cultural imperatives are being developed to reduce this gap and other disparate cultural perceptions between junior officers and senior Army leaders.

The fourth of these mechanisms for cultural change within a mature organization—change through coercive persuasion mechanism—has been mostly ineffective in the Army, since the Army remains a volunteer force whose members have an established service duration that can only be extended voluntarily. In other words, the “exit opportunity”, as described by Schein, is all too available in the Army:

The concept of [change through] coercive persuasion was originally derived from my studies of prisoners of war who had undergone major belief and attitude changes during three to five years or more of captivity during and after the Korean War. The key to understanding some of the dramatic changes that the captives underwent is to realize that if one has no exit opportunity, one is subject to strong unfreezing forces, which sooner or later will motivate one to find new information that will permit cognitive definition to occur.72

The fifth of these mechanisms for cultural change within a mature organization—change through turnaround—is now being effectively used within the Army.

Turnaround as a [change] mechanism is really more a combination of many of the foregoing mechanisms fashioned into a single program by a talented change manager or team of change agents. In turnaround situations I have observed or heard about, what strikes me is that all the mechanisms previously described may be used in the total change process. The first condition for change, as always, is that the organization must be unfrozen... Once the organization is unfrozen, change is possible if there is a turnaround manager or team with a clear sense of where the organization needs to go, a model of how to change culture to get there, and the power to implement the model.73

Schein cites two different leadership models for managing turnarounds, both of which are familiar to Army leaders. The first of these is the strong vision model, wherein “the leader has a clear vision of where the organization should end up, specifies the means by which to get there, and consistently rewards efforts to move in that direction.”74 This model is most applicable where the future is reasonably predictable and a visionary leader is available – such as in tactical, or to a lesser extent, operational scenarios.

An alternative is the fuzzy vision model:
The new leader states forcefully that the present is intolerable and that performance must improve within a certain time frame but then relies on the organization to develop visions of how actually to get there. The 'we need to change' message is presented forcefully, repeatedly, and to all levels of the organization. As various proposals for solution are generated throughout the organization, the leader selects and reinforces the ones that seem to make the most sense.\footnote{5}

Change through turnaround utilizing the fuzzy vision model is being used effectively in the Army in the development and execution of the Transformation Campaign Plan. Although GEN Shinseki attempted to unfreeze the Army in his first year as CSA, the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} dramatically completed the unfreezing process, lending relevance to most of what he initially proposed. He continues to consider many proposed concepts for the Army's Transformation, selecting and reinforcing the ones that seem to make the most sense. The fuzzy vision model is very applicable in the current world situation. The future remains uncertain as the Army begins to learn how to change its own assumptions.

The sixth of these mechanisms for cultural change within a mature organization—change through reorganization and rebirth—is much better understood within the Army than in civilian organizations, in view of the Army's frequent deactivation and reactivation of units. Schein admits that:

Little is known or understood about the process of [change through] reorganization and rebirth, so little will be said about it here. Suffice it to say that if one physically destroys a given culture, by definition that culture is destroyed and whatever new organization begins to function begins to build its own new culture. The process is traumatic and therefore, not typically used as a deliberate strategy, but it may be relevant if economic survival is at stake. . . . Change at this level sometimes results from mergers, acquisitions, or leveraged buyouts if the new owners are willing to get rid of most of the key managers of the old culture in the process.\footnote{76}

Reorganization and rebirth have relevance to the Army: the method is used effectively in cases where units or organizations are 'stood down' or merged into others. Such a cultural event will occur if the planned reduction of the Army Headquarters Staff is executed, as planned.

Schein's comprehensive analysis of organizational change has several specific applications to Army transformation:

1. Given that the Army is no longer in a founding or early growth stage of an organization, its cultural change should focus on those mechanisms most relevant to a midlife or mature organization (see 3-9 below). To date, most of the Army's efforts, in terms of implemented policies since the ATLDP officer study Final Report was
released, have been on culture-imbedding mechanisms—those most relevant to the founding and early-growth stage of an organization.

The Army should:

2. Continue using culture-imbedding mechanisms that are familiar to new Army leaders, since they are already being taught in professional development schools and practiced on a day-to-day basis by Army leaders.

3. Change through specific evolutionary stages has been used effectively in the Army, as in the development and subsequent success of the Army’s Acquisition Corps in the early ‘90’s.

4. Change through organizational therapy amongst all leaders, as exemplified by the AAR process. The Army needs a forum for this same organizational therapy at lower ranks across the Army, in the same manner that the ATLDPane became a discussion forum for issues important to officers, NCOs, warrant officers, and DA civilians.

5. Improve educational intervention as a method of technological seduction to introduce cultural change. Senior Army leaders recognized that until the Training and Doctrine Command, the Army’s major command responsible for institutional training and doctrine, transformed, the Army’s Transformation would be incomplete. Efforts are currently underway to accomplish this transformation of the institutional Army’s training. Separate efforts in accomplishing this transformation of the institutional Army’s education system that involve Army culture are still being developed.

6. Continue to rapidly transform parts of the Army as part of the ongoing transformation process, while integrating a cultural change strategy into that transformation.

7. Continue using scandal and myth explosion to effectively appropriate transformation, as opportunities present themselves.

8. Continue using the two different leadership models for managing turnarounds, both of which are familiar to Army leaders.

9. Continue using reorganization and rebirth in cases where units or organizations are 'stood down' or merged into others.

However, the Army has no unifying cultural change strategy that integrates these organizational growth stage-based mechanisms into a long-term plan. The Army needs an overall cultural change strategy that includes the foregoing recommendations.
Major organizational change as a catalyst for cultural change

According to Kotter, cultural change is anchored in a culture only as the by-product of successful major change within an organization. Efforts at transforming organizations fail for a number of common reasons. Kotter asserts the change management process must anticipate these common pitfalls:

The methods used in successful transformations are all based on one fundamental insight: that major change will not happen easily for a long list of reasons. Even if an objective observer can clearly see that costs are too high, or products are not good enough, or shifting customer requirements are not being adequately addressed, needed change can still stall because of inwardly focused cultures, paralyzing bureaucracy, parochial politics, a low level of trust, lack of teamwork, arrogant attitudes, a lack of leadership in middle management, and the general fear of the unknown. To be effective, a method designed to alter strategies, reengineer processes, or improve quality must address these barriers and address them well.  

Kotter also notes that in any organization, effective change management must include both leadership and management throughout the process. In reviewing past organizational success stories, Kotter identifies two key lessons learned:

“First, change tends to be associated with a multi-step process that creates power and motivation sufficient to overwhelm all the sources of inertia. Second, this process is never employed effectively unless it is driven by high-quality leadership, not just excellent management”

Kotter acknowledges the importance of culture in the change management process, focusing on the importance of the individual’s indoctrination; individual and collective behaviors’ representation of culture; and the inherent challenge of changing culture.

“Culture is powerful for three primary reasons: 1. Because individuals are selected and indoctrinated so well, 2. Because the culture exerts itself through the actions of hundreds or thousands of people, 3. Because all of this happens without much conscious intent and thus is difficult to challenge or discuss.”

Kotter asserts that successful change in an organization involves an eight-step sequential process that addresses the eight most common barriers to change (see Figure 3). “Although an organization can operate in multiple phases at once, skipping even a single step or getting too far ahead without a solid base almost always creates problems.” In other words, he strongly advocates a progressive and sequential process. The last step of this eight-step process, ‘Anchoring New Approaches in the [organizational] Culture’, requires leaders to effectively articulate the connections between new behaviors [demonstrated meta-competencies] and
organizational success. As also noted by Kotter, “Because corporate culture exerts this kind of influence, the new practices created in a reengineering or a restructuring or an acquisition must somehow be anchored in it; if not, they can be very fragile and subject to regression.”

Kotter acknowledges the connection between behavioral change and cultural change. “Culture changes only after you have successfully altered people’s actions, after the new behavior produces some group benefit for a period of time, and after people see the connection between the new actions and the performance improvement. Thus, most cultural change happens in Stage 8, not stage 1.” He points out, however, “this does not mean that a sensitivity to cultural issues isn’t essential in the first phases of transformation. The better you understand the existing culture, the more easily you can figure out how to [implement each of the eight steps].”

Kotter asserts that throughout this eight-step change process, culture must be analyzed at each step as a means to understand how to imbed change in the culture as part of the last step. Effective change management must include both leadership and management throughout the process.

In summary, Kotter’s underlying strategy for imbedding cultural change is that cultural change comes last, not first, in the process. Cultural change finally depends on results that are recognized by the organization as successful, as well as an understanding of the connection between those results and the new behaviors that led to those successes. Change requires a lot of talk (verbal instruction and support). It may involve personnel turnover. Decisions of succession may be critical.
1 ESTABLISHING A SENSE OF URGENCY
   > Examining the market and competitive realities
   > Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities

2 CREATING THE GUIDING COALITION
   > Putting together a group with enough power to lead the change
   > Getting the group to work together like a team

3 DEVELOPING A VISION AND STRATEGY
   > Creating a vision to help direct the change effort
   > Developing strategies for achieving that vision

4 COMMUNICATING THE CHANGE VISION
   > Using every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision and strategies
   > Having the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of employees

5 EMPOWERING BROAD-BASED ACTION
   > Getting rid of obstacles
   > Changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision
   > Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions

6 GENERATING SHORT-TERM WINS
   > Planning for visible improvements in performance, or "wins"
   > Creating those wins
   > Visibly recognizing and rewarding people who make the "wins" possible

7 CONSOLIDATING GAINS AND PRODUCING MORE CHANGE
   > Using increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that don't fit together and don't fit the transformation vision
   > Hiring, promoting, and developing people who can implement the change vision
   > Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents

8 ANCHORING NEW APPROACHES IN THE CULTURE
   > Creating better performance through customer- and productivity-oriented behavior, more and better leadership, and more effective management
   > Articulating the connections between new behaviors and organizational success
   > Developing means to ensure leadership development and succession


FIGURE 3. THE EIGHT-STAGE PROCESS FOR CREATING MAJOR CHANGE
Agents for Army change should attend closely to some specific Kotter propositions. Cultural change comes only as a result of major organizational change. All eight of the most common barriers to change must be addressed explicitly in the Army’s cultural change strategy as part of the Transformation Campaign Plan. Although an organization can operate in multiple phases of Kotter’s process at once, skipping even a single step or getting too far ahead without a solid base almost always creates problems. Kotter’s change process is a sequential and progressive process.

If cultural change is effected only as the result of major organizational change, then the Army must develop an action plan for accomplishing the desired cultural change and then ‘strike’ at the appropriate time when that part of the Army is undergoing major organizational change.

The Army’s actions and strategy in executing its Transformation Campaign Plan have already incorporated four of the first five of Kotter’s eight-step process. Army change agents should now incorporate the final three steps into the TCP: Generate short-term wins, consolidate gains and produce even more change, and finally, anchoring (imbed) new approaches in the culture.

In summary, Kotter’s by-product of organizational change cultural change theory has limited applicability to the Army. The theory presupposes the ability to identify and plan a major organizational change as a precondition for planning and conducting cultural change. In other words, without major organizational change, cultural change will not occur. The Army as made some progress in the eight steps identified by Kotter, but will be challenged to finish because of the Army’s inherent personnel turnover.

Cultural renewal as a cultural change process

According to Jerry Haney, culture imbedding mechanisms are part of a larger ongoing cultural renewal process. Haney asserts organizations are always changing, but that organizations fail to reach their true potential without the support of an effective culture. “Today, more than at any other time, a company’s long-term survival requires a strong and adaptive organizational culture that inspires the loyalty of its customers, nurtures pride within its workforce, and thrives on the dynamics of change.”

Haney further maintains that building a strong and adaptive organizational culture requires embracing six critical cultural elements, while acknowledging their interdependence. These six cultural elements include core values, products and services, direction, structure,
measurements, and rewards. Haney asserts that organizations with strong and adaptive cultures can effectively manage any change. These cultural elements are also familiar to Army leaders, since the Army exhibits them.

Haney asserts that an organization's ongoing cultural renewal process includes eight cultural processes, which the Army already promotes. Change then occurs through four sequential steps:

At least eight cultural processes exist that will always invigorate, inform, and sustain an organization through whatever change it undergoes: Orientation, Training & Development, Communication, Decision Making, Problem Solving, Organizational Learning, Change Management, and Succession Planning.

Army leaders are trained in and use all but the last three of these cultural processes, as defined by Haney. Haney defines orientation as

A clear discussion of core values; the purpose and vision of the enterprise and its subcultures; the organization's goals and objectives; a description of the structure and the various operational responsibilities; an understanding of measurements and rewards; how decisions are made; and the kind of problem solving used by the organization to insure peaceful and positive resolution of issues.

All soldiers experience an orientation in these same topics during their initial-entry Army training, both enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers.

Haney notes that investment in training of an individual leads to increased confidence in their skills, empowerment of the individual with greater responsibility for their roles and processes, and feelings of pride. Each soldier experiences training and development during their initial-entry Army training, at unit level, and thereafter, during any subsequent professional development programs of instruction.

Haney defines communication in terms of its goal within an organization, "to have ongoing communication between all associates using a variety of media... By centralizing a limited number of communications efforts each year, the top management has an opportunity to talk directly with and even listen to every level of the organization." Leaders in the Army, especially unit commanders, are taught the value and methods of communicating intent, vision, and purpose, as well as the necessity of obtaining feedback.

Haney defines decision-making in terms of a process where the decision-makers first consider the impact of their decisions on the stakeholders before finalizing and implementing the decision—a process he calls the "Balanced Decision Making." "The concept is intended to cause any decision maker to take into consideration the impact of a decision on all the stakeholders. Your responsibility is to let associates and organizations most affected by your
decision know before you finalize and implement it. This allows people to know a decision is coming, and gives them an opportunity to prepare in a positive way.\textsuperscript{92} Army leaders are routinely trained in this communication process as part of normal staff coordination on an issue.

Haney defines problem solving as settling the differences between associates or between an associate and their immediate supervisor. “So people need to be able to go up the ladder of authority with their dispute or unsettled differences. The key is to go up the ladder with the supervisor’s full understanding and support. One way to make this work is to allow a grievance to rise up the chain of command until the matter is fully aired, allowing the problem to be solved at the lowest level possible.”\textsuperscript{93} Army leaders and soldiers routinely use this method to resolve interpersonal challenges.

Haney defines the organizational learning process as one of passing on knowledge and skills from the most talented associates to the associates who will follow them.

This philosophy allows your organization to keep its edge, as associates claim entrepreneurial ownership in sustaining the enterprise’s competitiveness and tackling market changes with fresh and innovative ideas. By institutionalizing organizational learning through the free flow of ideas, encouragement of risks, balanced decision-making and sharing new skills, you create a reservoir of intellectual power.\textsuperscript{94}

Army personnel pass on knowledge and skills through both the institutional and operational Army’s training programs, as well as through individual mentorship.

Haney defines the change management process as a method to constantly evaluate the organization’s progress, adapting to the challenges of the journey. “Our first priority is to be broadly aware of our customers’ present and future needs, wants and values. Cultural leaders in the enterprise must ask themselves, are we customer-focused? Are we communicating to our associates where we are headed, and are we making decisions within the context of our purpose and mission?”\textsuperscript{95} At all levels within the Army, we are constantly evaluating our organization’s ability to accomplish its assigned mission—meeting the needs of our customers, the Congress and the U.S. people—assessing the need for organizational change.

Haney defines succession planning as a challenge for every organization to address in order to sustain itself.

When you look at the very best cultures in American business, they all tend to have one thing in common—they promote from within whenever possible... To maintain a strong, adaptive culture, the most consistently successful organizations, as a rule, bring leaders up through the ranks. This is the best way to insure the new leader understands the organization’s overarching beliefs and values and can relate to the subcultures throughout the enterprise.\textsuperscript{96}
The Army leader development and selection process nurtures its own leaders and has for centuries.

In summary, the Army is already successfully using Haney’s cultural processes as necessary prerequisites in the cultural renewal process. Haney asserts that cultural change is the result of an ongoing cultural renewal process that proceeds through four essentially sequential steps:

1. Commitment to cultural change from the executive through associate levels within an organization
2. Assessment of the current state of culture within the organization
3. Confirmation of the cultural foundation of the organization
4. Training of subcultural leadership in the cultural renewal process, focusing on:
   - Role of culture in the life of an organization
   - A leader’s role in establishing subcultural priorities by
     1. Establishing subcultural priorities
     2. Developing and executing the subcultural plan
     3. Evaluating cultural changes
     4. Participating in the cultural renewal process as part of an annual planning process.

Haney’s cultural renewal process is graphically depicted in Figure 4.
The Army is already integrating some of these cultural renewal processes into day-to-day operations. The Army is effectively assessing its current state of culture through organizational climate surveys, ATLD surveys, and other instruments. The Army is effectively affirming the Army’s cultural foundation by conceiving, communicating, and institutionalizing its values, purpose, and vision.

Improvements are necessary in two key areas:
Formalization of the strategy for development of a cultural renewal process within the Army, as noted by Haney, is a necessary first step—not a conclusion. Continue transforming parts of the Army as part of the ongoing transformation process, while integrating a cultural renewal strategy for that part of the Army being transformed into the Transformation Campaign Plan.

Commitment to cultural change is required at the Cultural Executive (CSA), Executive Team (key four stars), Subcultural Leaders (subordinate General Officer commanders), and Associate Engagement (soldiers and junior leaders) levels. Part of the strategy for formalizing a cultural renewal process within the Army should include developing and executing leader training in the cultural renewal process.

In summary, the elements of Haney's cultural change process will be the most familiar of the three theories to Army leaders. Not only is the change process progressive and sequential, but the Army is already executing elements of the key cultural change processes that Haney identifies. Finally, Haney's theory includes an annual cycle that involves both cultural assessment and the training of newly assigned personnel, an element that supports the Army's inherent personnel turnover. Adoption of Haney's overall theory for cultural change should provide the basis of the Army's overall cultural change strategy with little effort, relative to the other two theories presented.

REVIEW OF THE MILITARY CULTURAL SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a cultural survey of military respondents and focus groups to assess the organizational climate of military organizations within the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in order to assess the organizational culture in those organizations. "The central purpose of this study is to identify those actions that must be taken to preserve and improve the essential U.S. military culture and, thus, enhance the effectiveness of U.S. military forces in the next century." An underlying assumption of the CSIS study is that there is a linkage between the climate factors analyzed in the report and the resulting military culture.

CSIS provided the results of their analysis, including initial findings and follow-on recommendations regarding culture, to service representatives in February 2000. For the Army, those recommendations were judged as relevant and incorporated into the initial planning for the ATLDP. This cultural survey and recommendations should be considered in the development of the Army's cultural change strategy.
In preparation for the Military Culture/Climate Survey, CSIS defined military culture, identified contemporary military cultural strains—environmental influences, and identified characteristics of each service’s culture, to include Army culture.

As noted earlier, CSIS did not define a process of cultural change in their study. Instead, it defined military culture as the product of past, present, and future service values, customs, and traditions. While acknowledging similarities between the military and civilian organizational cultures, CSIS specified differences between the cultures, noting reasons for these differences.

CSIS identified contemporary military cultural strains—environmental influences that are shaping the current military culture. These strains (unique dynamics) still include:

A profound stress on the armed forces created by these unique dynamics: a smaller but busier force, under-resourced at the cutting edge; the demands of nontraditional missions and frequent conflicts; older personnel who are often married who are in high demand in a robust civilian economy; and revolutionary changes in technology and threats.99

CSIS’ definition of culture is similar to the definition of Army culture provided in FM-1, but stops short of defining a process for changing that culture. Instead, the report provides a list of 12 policy recommendations that address issues raised in the organizational climate surveys. The key inference by CSIS is that changing collective behavior will change individual behavior, resulting in cultural change. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense did not approve all for the results from the CSIS survey, nor did it develop an action plan to implement the project’s recommendations:

1. Improve public understanding of the necessary differences between civilian and military cultures and the many demands being placed on military personnel and their families; civilian and military leaders must take a greater effort in telling the military’s story to the American people.
2. Reiterate and emphasize to the public that combat operations remain the essential competency of the Department of Defense.
3. Reduce the high levels of stress in the operating elements of the armed forces by correcting the current imbalances between available resources and mission requirements; either resources must be increased or redistributed, or missions must be decreased or redesigned.
4. Provide senior decision makers with accurate, timely information and reinforce the value of candor within the chain of command; therefore, the services need to redesign their systems for assessing and reporting unit readiness, and they also need to develop reliable systems for determining the morale and cohesion of their units.
5. Improve procedures for developing, selecting, evaluating, and promoting officers in all the services.

6. Work to eliminate the gap in perceptions between the Pentagon and the operating forces about such matters as readiness, adequacy of resources, and quality of recruits; this will help to avoid a general erosion of trust within the chain of command and improve understanding.

7. Encourage and reward appropriate risk taking at every level; this will help eliminate risk aversion and a zero-defects mentality.

8. Address in the curricula of all senior service colleges the issue of service cultures - their distinctness, their potential positive and negative impact on joint activities.

9. Maintain vigilance on equal opportunity of all racial groups and work to eliminate severe racial imbalances in certain branches, occupational communities, and functional areas of the armed forces.

10. Study job performance and cohesion problems that are related to gender integration in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

11. Meet the reasonable quality-of-life expectations – especially in pay and medical care – of service members and their families; this will help to recruit and retain competent men and women in the armed forces.

12. Create a special task force on military culture that will provide the necessary oversight and institutional stamina needed to carry out the recommendations of this study; this task force, composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense and Transportation and the military services, should assess the implementation of the recommendations and report periodically to senior officials about organizational climates and military culture.  

Three of these recommendations, 1, 8, and 12, refer directly to military culture, but have not yet been acted upon by either DoD or the Army.

The CSIS survey has specific implications for Army culture:

- Changes in the organizational culture of the Army can be affected by implementing policies that impact the Army’s organizational climate (collective vs. individual behavior).
- The Army needs a shared understanding of the similarities and differences between the civilian and military organizational cultures.
- Neither DoD nor the Army have developed an action plan to execute the project group’s cultural recommendations, although the CSA reviewed the results of the
survey and assessed these results as relevant to the development of the ATLDP process.

- The Army must develop and use appropriate organizational climate instruments to continue assessing progress towards carrying out the project group’s recommendations, which will foster desired cultural change.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES’ CULTURAL CHANGE STRATEGIES AND LESSONS LEARNED

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in Bethesda, MD is in the process of undergoing organizational and cultural change. My interview with NIMA senior leadership revealed that their most important lesson learned was that organizational change is the primary mechanism for cultural change, which confirms Kotter’s cultural change theory.

NIMA is currently in the midst of executing an organizational and cultural change for which the initial strategic planning was completed almost a year ago. The initial catalyst for this planned cultural change was technological change associated with their primary products – imagery. The changeover of the NIMA Director in September 2001 and the events of September 11, 2001 combined to rapidly compress the initial timeline for organizational change from years to months.

Directorate reorganizations have occurred and continue to occur. As a result, interrelationships between NIMA directorates are being redefined as missions dictate and 'captured' for formalizing into a set of procedures in the near future.

NIMA is a mini-Department of Defense in that it is comprised of different services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines), Department of the Army civilians, and contractors. Accordingly, many of NIMA’s Lessons Learned may also be directly applicable to the wider DoD Transformation efforts.

Interviewees indicated their experience with organizational change management mechanisms was that organizational change is a necessary precursor to cultural change. Each had little knowledge of the ATLDP competency imperatives or their frameworks, but maintained that leader competencies will be changed only after organizational culture is changed.

U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute

The U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA has also undergone organizational and cultural change. My interviews with FSI senior leadership revealed that their most important lessons learned were that cultural change cannot be
accomplished without support of the cultural change process from the senior executive all the way down to the associate level and that cultural change cannot occur unless an organization’s institutional learning incorporates these same processes. These insights confirm both Schein’s growth stage-based theory on midlife cultural change by educational intervention (a form of technological seduction) and Haney’s cultural renewal process theory, which advocates cultural training of subcultural leadership.

RECOMMENDED CULTURAL CHANGE STRATEGIES FOR THE ARMY

This study has drawn on evidence in the officer ATLDLP Final Report. It has analyzed in detail current organizational literature on organizational culture and change, assessing its applicability to Army Transformation. It has finally summarized anecdotal evidence of current efforts to transform specific government agencies. It concludes now with specific recommendations for imbedding critical meta-competencies in the Army culture, which will facilitate successful Army Transformation.

- The Army must acknowledge that the cultural change process in any organization is an ongoing process.
- Organizational leadership from the chief executive through associate level must be trained in the cultural change process.
- Organizational leadership from the chief executive through associate level must demonstrate their understanding and commitment to cultural change.
- ATLDLP results indicate differences in key Army cultural perceptions between the junior officers and senior leaders

Currently, successful Army Transformation is jeopardized by three critical shortfalls:

- There is currently no unifying strategy for cultural change within the Army.
- Army leaders do not share a common understanding of the cultural change process.
- Army doctrine and leadership training in cultural change is still under development.

Recommended the Army utilize Haney’s cultural renewal process theory as a baseline strategy for Army efforts at cultural change. Haney’s cultural change process remains the most familiar of the three theories to Army leaders. Not only is this cultural change process progressive and sequential, but the Army is already executing elements of the key cultural processes that Haney identifies. Finally, Haney’s theory includes an annual cycle that involves both cultural assessment and the training of newly assigned personnel – an element that supports the Army’s inherent personnel turnover.
Utilizing Haney's cultural renewal process theory, recommend the following strategy for Army cultural change:

1. Continue annual assessments of Army culture through organizational climate surveys, ATLDP surveys, and other means.
2. Continue confirming the Army's cultural foundation by conceiving, communicating, and institutionalizing its values, purpose, and vision.
3. Continue transforming parts of the Army as part of the ongoing transformation process, while formalizing and integrating cultural renewal strategy for that part of the Army being transformed into the Transformation Campaign Plan.
4. Develop and execute a plan to build commitment to cultural change at the following levels: Cultural Executive (CSA), Executive Team (key Four stars), Subcultural Leaders (subordinate General Officer commanders), and Associate Engagement (soldiers and junior leaders) levels.
5. Develop and execute leader training in the cultural renewal process, focusing on:
   - Role of culture in the life of an organization
   - A leader's role in establishing subcultural priorities by
     a. Establishing subcultural priorities
     b. Developing and executing the subcultural plan
     c. Evaluating cultural changes
     d. Participating in the cultural renewal process as part of an annual planning process.

Given this cultural change strategy, recommend the following strategy for imbedding meta-competencies in the Army culture:

- Communicate these competency approaches across the Army beyond the Final Report of the ATLDP Officer Study so that the Army's efforts can be considered 'strategic and clear'. The Army's use of these competency methods to their 'fullest advantage' will occur when the Army's development of doctrine, tools, and cultural change strategy includes these approaches.
- Continue clearly stating the necessity for utilizing the values-based competency approach and linking that competency approach to Army values.
- Upon completion of validating the competency frameworks, incorporate them into the Army's leader selection and development processes.
• Continue to involve senior leadership in the development of a common competency language, as the Army’s leader selection and development processes incorporate these meta-competencies.

• Continue a broad-based executive oversight of the competency framework development and implementation across the Army.

• Once the learning meta-competency is developed, conduct executive [colonel and general officer] initial training in meta-competencies through both the Senior Service College and the general officer training courses.

WORD COUNT = 14,755
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