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MENTORSHIP: AN ARMY DILEMMA

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
MENTORSHIP: AN ARMY DILEMMA

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
The Army has debated the importance of mentoring with the meaning, specifically Army mentoring, at the root of the debate. Doctrine articulates mentoring as an improving action of leadership, while advocating mentorship as inclusive for all. In the corporate and academic worlds mentoring is by nature exclusive. Dissatisfaction exists in the Force due to a lack of mentorship because the expectation is mentoring for all. Many perceive mentorship negatively because the opportunity for mentoring has not been available for all. The Army's fix is DA PAM 600-XX, Army Mentoring Doctrine.

This research of the Army’s mentorship dilemma examines the questions: what does mentorship mean and how should we use it in the Army? Should the Army promote a concept that is exclusive by nature? It examines the proposed mentorship doctrine and attempts to predict the impact. The research concludes that the proposed doctrine is a comprehensive effort to redefine mentoring in the Force and focus on a culture of learning; yet it falls short of clarifying the meaning in inclusive terms and resolve conflicts with Army values. In the long run this will erode our culture. The Army should eliminate mentoring and focus on leader development.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge the supportive role that Colonel Steve Shambach, my project advisor, played in challenging me to explicitly express my concerns for our culture in this research. His constructive input was invaluable. His patience has been a lesson in leadership.

I also acknowledge the input of Major Michael Grojean, Office of Army, G1, who not only provided his working documents on the Army’s new Mentorship Doctrine, but also provided his experience as a behavioral scientist to provide clarification on the subject.

I acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel Donna Alberto, Center for Army Leadership, first for gaining the details of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report to the Army. Secondly, for her time and effort going through the report and pulling the mentorship data. But more crucially, I thank her for her trusted and supportive friendship.

I acknowledge the input of my peers who provided insight on the subject: Colonel Gregg Martin who provided a wealth of information and very inspiring thoughts; Colonel Diana Bodner who gave insight into her research; and Colonel Ruth Collins who encouraged my direction.

And, I give a special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Cassandra Roberts for providing her perspective on this dilemma and being a loyal supporter.

Finally, I acknowledge the soldiers who have shaped my understanding that the Army must value the worth of all its soldiers, not just a select few.
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MENTORSHIP—AN ARMY DILEMMA

"...It appears, though that the term (mentor) means different things to different people. What does it (mentoring) really mean, and how should it be used in the Army?"

—MG Kenneth A. Jolemore
Military Review, 1986

The Army is in a state of preparedness for change as it shapes its future toward the Objective Force of 2025. Every facet of the Army is engaged in the Transformation process either as planners, testers, researchers, or simply as observers. Those in the people business are equally engaged in an effort to determine the requirements for the Objective Force leader and make adjustments in Army programs to develop this future leader. One area of focus is leader development and specifically, mentorship. MG Kenneth A. Jolemore wrote the words above in a 1986 article debating the Army’s 1985 position on the proper role of mentorship in the Army as a result of Force concerns expressed about mentoring.1 MG Jolemore could be writing today. The Army definition of mentorship is no clearer today than in 1985 nor is resolution of Force concerns about mentoring any clearer than in 1985.

These concerns are rooted in the definition of mentoring. Although Army doctrine advocates inclusive mentorship, actual practice is selective. Army values provide the foundational base for the inclusion that doctrine advocates for mentoring. Yet, mentoring by classic definition is an exclusive practice. Because doctrine sets the tone for the culture of our Army, it is essential that one set of doctrine is not in conflict with another. The health of our culture will be compromised with a continued focus on this seemingly simply term, “mentoring,” which by Army standards has positive and negative functions. Functions such as sponsorship, protections, and the like, are contrary to the cohesive bond of an effective force. Thus, Army doctrine sets out to exclude the negative functions of this classic practice and foster the positive. The question is, can this be effectively done while upholding our core values? If the Army has to exclude certain functions of mentorship in order to blend with its values, maybe mentorship is not the term/concept to use. We gain all the positive aspects of mentoring in “leader development,” yet we eliminate the negative ones that are at odds with our values and the source of Force dissatisfaction.

This research looks at the Army’s mentorship dilemma by examining two major questions. First, what does mentorship mean? And secondly, how should we use mentorship in the Army? The research examines mentorship literature including two major Army studies. It also examines actions to shape Army mentorship focusing on doctrine development. And finally, the
research attempts to predict the impact the proposed Army mentorship doctrine will have on the culture of the Force. In conducting the examination, the research focuses on barriers to mentoring including multicultural issues. The research uses this focus to gauge the impact of the proposed doctrine on Army culture.

Literature reflects multiple terms (protégé, mentoree, associate, mentored) to describe the individual receiving mentorship. These terms are used interchangeably throughout this paper based on use in the references. Additionally, this research introduces the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study, ATLDP, in the next section. The ATLDP is actually a series of four studies. The first (officer) is complete and the report published while the others (noncommissioned officer, warrant officer and civilian) have not been completed. This paper is based on the officer study only and it refers to the study as the 2000 ATLDP.

BACKGROUND

In 2000 the Chief of Staff, Army directed a comprehensive study of the Army’s training and leader development processes to pinpoint what needed to be done to prepare future Objective Force leaders.

“The Army is transforming itself into a new force for the future. They (soldiers and leaders) must be agile and adaptive in order to employ the capabilities that the future Army must possess. The Army must begin now to train the soldiers and grow the leaders for the Objective Force.”

General Eric K. Shinseki
Chief of Staff, Army

This study, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study (ATLDP), convened “to assess Army training and leader development doctrine and practices to determine their applicability and suitability for the Interim Force.” With results released in 2001, the study is the Army’s most recent examination of itself.

Twenty-two-years prior to the 2000 ATLDP, the Army conducted the Review of Education and Training for Officer (RETO) Study in 1978 to determine changes required for developing officers. Approximately seven years later, to examine the effectiveness of implemented RETO recommendations, General John A. Wickham, Jr., who was at the time the Chief of Staff, Army, directed the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS), with results published in 1985. General Wickham saw the PDOS, as well as his other directed studies of civilian, warrant officer and noncommissioned officer leader development, as the “fast start” to the Army’s examination of leadership to prepare leaders for 2025. During both the PDOS and 2000 ATLDP, efforts were made to capture the opinions of leaders about the state of Army
training, leader development and future direction. Both had focus areas within the training and leader development realm to include a look at mentoring.

In his 1986 article, MG Jolemore, challenged the definition of mentor or mentoring. He was responding to the 1985 PDOS approach to mentoring, as well as a Military Review article written by the PDOS Director, LTG Charles W. Bagnal in 1985. Both the study report and LTG Bagnal’s article labeled mentoring as an “approach to leadership” where the senior leader develops subordinates with a “teaching and coaching style.” He also recommended vesting this approach into Army culture as the key to developing leaders of the future. MG Jolemore agreed with the importance of mentoring, but he disagreed with this approach. Thus the Army has had at least a 15-year discussion of the proper place for mentorship in the Force with only minor shifts in terminology and change in practice.

MENTORSHIP LITERATURE

In recent years the military has increased its focus on mentoring. Civilian literature documents the benefits of mentoring for the junior and senior members of the mentoring team, as well as for the organization. Lois J. Zachary, author of Mentor's Guide, indicates that mentoring is grounded in learning. Thus, it makes sense that the Army, a learning organization, would have a focus on mentoring. This section examines literature that establishes the concepts explored in this research. It looks at the definition of mentoring and the Army use of mentoring. Of particular interest to the research was military literature.

WHAT IS MENTORSHIP AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO THE ARMY -- DEFINITION

Mentor originates from Greek mythology in Homer’s Odyssey. The goddess Athena manifested herself in the form of Mentor and provided guidance and counsel to Telemachus, Odysseus’s son while Odysseus was away on his 10-year journey. She monitored his activities and become a close and trusted friend. Random House defines a mentor as “a wise and trusted counselor or teacher; an influential senior sponsor or supporter...” Webster's Third New International describes “...a close, trusted, and experienced counselor or guide; teacher, tutor, coach...” Kathy E. Kram’s (Boston University) Mentoring at Work is referenced in most literature for providing the classic definition of mentoring. She defines a mentor as “…someone who may provide a host of career development and psychosocial functions, which may include role modeling and sponsoring.”
Army Definitions

The culture of the Army is different from that of the business world\textsuperscript{14} thus, the Army has attempted to adapt the concept of mentoring to its culture. In doing so, it attempted to move away from the classic definition noted by Kram and others by eliminating functions such as sponsoring and defining mentoring in a more generic manner.\textsuperscript{15} The Army's leadership doctrine, Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, places mentoring in the developing category under the improving actions of direct leadership. The doctrine explains that "mentoring is totally inclusive, real-life leader development for every subordinate."\textsuperscript{16} It defines mentoring "(in the Army)"\textsuperscript{17} as:

"the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader's charge."\textsuperscript{18}

The emphasis placed by noting "(in the Army)" highlights that the Army use of mentoring is different from the commonly accepted practice outside the Army. The focus on inclusion contradicts the mentoring noted in literature as well as that commonly practiced. The doctrine describes mentoring at each level of leadership, tactical (direct), operational and strategic, and the different functions mentoring should play at each level. Colonel Gregg F. Martin, U.S. Army War College, in a 2002 Strategic Leadership curriculum paper, analyzed the doctrine and concluded that "the Army doctrine describes mentorship as the actions of good interpersonal leadership (teaching, coaching and counseling), caring for people and growing its own future leaders, all performed by a good role model that juniors (officers) would like to become."\textsuperscript{19} Missing from Martin's synopsis is the fact that the doctrine requires leaders to mentor all subordinates. Finally, he concludes that "...by not addressing the classic (traditional) notion of mentorship, which is by its very nature not equally inclusive and fair to everyone, Army doctrine has inadvertently sown confusion and misunderstanding" in the Force about mentoring.\textsuperscript{20}

The 2000 ATLDP offered no definition to its survey participants but concluded that the "Army's mentoring definition ...needed revising" and proposed the following definition:

"Mentoring is a proactive commitment to foster growth in Army leaders based on mutual trust and respect, sustained through careful listening, sincere caring, and sharing of professional knowledge and life experiences for the betterment of the individual and the Army. Mentoring reinforces Army values and develops leaders who can meet the challenges of the future."\textsuperscript{21}

Recent research conducted by the Colonel Thomas A. Kolditz, U.S. Army Military Academy, offered this definition of a mentor to its respondents:
"a senior person with whom one has an intensive and lasting developmental relationship. A mentor relationship is beyond a typical senior-subordinate relationship in that it is both professional in focus, yet personal in tone. Mentors may provide many of the following functions for the protégé (or protege): sponsorship, role modeling, coaching, counseling, providing exposure, protecting, friendship, giving challenging assignments, and providing acceptance and confirmation."

A common thread of the current FM 22-100 definition and the proposed 2000 ATLDP definition is inclusion. The current definition states the importance of inclusion and the 2000 ATLDP recommended definition implies it. In contrast, the Colonel Kolditz's definition suggests the more classic use of mentorship by adding the personal side, the human dimension. This human dimension moves away from a focus on inclusion because the personally toned relationship requires comfort between the participants which may not exist when differences are involved. As pointed out by Martin, "if one accepts the classic notion of mentorship, it is not possible to be totally inclusive..."

Although the 2000 ATLDP offered no definition for mentoring, its focus group and interview participants were asked or they brought up the meaning of mentoring 329 times during the study process. The majority responses described mentoring as "sharing all knowledge and experience with subordinates; answering questions; guidance; support; training; coaching; counseling." This set of responses was mentioned more frequently (41 more times) than the next most mentioned set of responses, "grooming process; showing the ropes; taking under wing; career path; vested interest in junior officers career/vested interest in the junior officers; responsibility." Although not completely clear, this would seem to indicate that at least the majority of these respondents do not see sponsorship within Army mentoring.

It is the deviation between advisor, counselor or teacher and sponsor in defining mentor that creates the most disagreement in the Army. The concept of sponsoring is described as the mentor's use of power to ensure opportunities for the mentored, meeting the right people and getting the right jobs. MG Jolemore points out that sponsorship was key to the mentoring relationship of General John J. Pershing and General George C. Marshall, as well as General Marshall's mentoring of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. These type relationships are routinely noted as positive proof of the benefit of such mentoring relationships to the Army. It is clear that Marshall and Eisenhower, as well as other World War II leaders, were sponsored. However, with the exception of the leaders of the Pershing-Marshall era of the Army, history notes few examples of this principle. And what is not known in the case of these examples is how many
other promising young officers were not mentored because they were not selected by the senior
leaders of the time.

Another View

Although the popular Marshall-Eisenhower type relationship is referenced as perfect
examples for Army mentoring, Colonel Diana Bodner, U.S. Army War College Class of 2002,
suggests that this was “strategic mentoring” far above and isolated from the ranks of the unit-
level leader. Colonel Bodner’s thoughts have merit. FM 22-100 indicates that mentoring at
the strategic level is a “moral responsibility” ... “giving the right people an intellectual boost so
that they make the leap to operations and thinking at the highest levels.” Colonel Bodner’s
view of “strategic mentorship” focuses on the small group of officers who will become the
CINC’s, division and corps commanders of the future. This, she proposes is where the
Marshall-Eisenhower type relationships resides in today’s Army.

Accepting Colonel Bodner’s proposal removes these high profile examples from the
discussion when attempting to shape mentorship for the entire Army. Although the Pershing-
Marshall and Marshall-Eisenhower relationships produced leaders who were good for the Army,
replicating those same relationships across an entire force is more difficult. Even MG Jolemore,
who argued for the importance of these type relationships, admitted to their uniqueness and the
fact that they could not be universally applied. He concludes by saying “the overall health of the
military will benefit more from leaders who are teachers and coaches than from the selection of
individuals under a mentoring approach that is predominantly sponsoring.”

RESEARCH REVIEW

The 1985 PDOS and 2000 ATLDPO, both Army-wide studies on training and leader
development, provided interesting perspectives on mentoring. When reviewing the results of
these studies, the feelings expressed by junior leaders are very much the same. Officers
supported mentoring in the Force, felt it was not done well enough and most did not view
themselves as having mentors.

Both studies approached mentoring as a factor of professional development by posing
questions relative to the importance of mentoring to the developmental process. However, the
1985 PDOS looked at mentoring as a “style” or “approach” to leadership. While the 2000
ATLDP, which provided no definition of mentoring, seemed to view mentoring separate from
leadership. This is an important distinction because it influences what actions are taken based
on the study outcomes.
Although fifteen years apart, the fact that both studies found junior officers feeling a lack of mentorship is interesting. This would indicate that the very leaders accused of falling short on their mentoring role in the 2000 ATLDP, were the same who felt they were not receiving mentorship in their company-grade and early field-grade years as they indicated in the 1985 PDOS.

Both studies showed that officers felt the Army should place more emphasis on mentoring, but that there should not be a formal program or assigned mentors. And, the 2000 ATLDP found that officers felt that the senior leader should initiate the mentoring relationship, but did not feel the senior leader should take responsibility for their mentoring.

In fairness, the studies also gave positive indicators. Although the studies approached questions differently, officers indicated positive mentorship from tactical-level leaders. In the 1985 PDOS, "junior officers felt that they were being mentored by company commanders and battalion and brigade-level staff officers." In the 2000 ATLDP, when asked to what extent a list of people would be a good mentor to you, fifty percent or more of the officers indicated tactical-level leaders (e.g., their rater, a trusted noncommissioned officer, their senior rater, a senior officer [colonel/general officer] outside the chain of command, and a senior officer from a pervious assignment).

Both of these studies generated a great deal of discussion throughout the Force. Colonel Martin described the confusion over the term mentorship in his paper and records the frustrations of lieutenant colonels and colonels who felt the senior leadership blamed them for the negative state of mentoring in the Army. Although the 2000 ATLDP study did not show overwhelming appreciation for the state of mentoring in the Army, it did give these leaders some positive scores as discussed above. During the 2000 ATLDP when indicating why mentoring was not working in their unit, the responses that focus groups gave most often were: OPTEMPO, no time, too much work. In other words, the junior leaders recognized that senior leaders have a multitude of demands on their time. Although there were responses such as "micro-management," these type responses were given to a much lesser degree than were the ones acknowledging a lack of time.

Conducting more focused research, Colonel Kolditz's study was to pinpoint factors that contribute to the initiation and maintenance of mentoring relationships. The work focused on Army majors attending the Army Command and General Staff College and isolated a group of officers who indicated they had mentoring relationships. The primary conclusion of the study was that feedback-seeking behavior can influence the initiation of mentoring relationships. The
study suggests that if leaders are trained to effectively seek feedback, their chances for establishing a mentoring relationship increases.\textsuperscript{41}

A variety of recommendations for the application of mentorship in the military have resulted from research by military leaders. Colonel Carrie Kendrick, U.S. Army War College Fellow Class of 1998, recommended the Army establish formal mentoring, as well as a tool for measuring the success of the process. She cites these recommendations in her solutions to problems noted in her research of areas affecting African American officer progression in the Army. Colonel Kendrick also advocated that the Army should seek the assistance of private associations, such as ROCKS (not an acronym), to help the Army in this mentoring process.\textsuperscript{42}

In his 2000 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College masters degree thesis, Major Robert A. Harney, Jr. recommended establishing a formal mentorship program in the Army with "... the pairing of protégés with nonchain of command mentors." He further indicates that this pairing "... should be voluntary since all subordinates do not desire such mentoring relationships."\textsuperscript{43} By contrast, Lieutenant Colonel Beth A. Robinson in her 1999 U.S. Army War College strategic research paper examined mentorship of women in the Army and recommended an informal program with training embedded in Professional Military Education.\textsuperscript{44}

First Lieutenant Kristopher Singer, U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology, in his masters degree thesis, \textit{An Assessment of Mentoring Functions and Barriers to Mentoring}, validated measures that organizations could use to build and appraise mentoring programs. From his statistical analyses of the U.S. Coast Guard Mentoring Program, he concluded that access to mentors is the most important barrier (to mentoring) to remove.\textsuperscript{45}

The Army is a diverse organization that requires programs and systems that address diversity to be consistent with its values, especially the values of \textit{Loyalty} and \textit{Respect}. Army doctrine explains that Army values form the identity of the Army, they must be consistent, and you cannot follow one value and ignore another.\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Loyalty}, the doctrine indicates, is a gift given by subordinates because leaders "... train them well, treat them fairly, and live up to the concepts you (leaders) talk about."\textsuperscript{47} The doctrine also indicates the value of \textit{Respect} as "recognizing the inherent dignity and worth of all people."\textsuperscript{48} The doctrine continues to explain that the cultural diversity of America dictates a culturally diverse Army. Thus, leaders must foster climates which ensure that regardless of race, gender, creed or religious belief, every member is treated with dignity and respect, and that the leader is the example for that treatment. The value of \textit{Selfless Service} is labeled as "doing what's right for the nation, the
Army, your organization, and your people—and putting these responsibilities above your own interests. .....you don’t take actions that help your image or your career but hurt others...

Thus to employ the concept of mentoring, the Army must address diversity in its mentoring concept and ensure that the concept is not at conflict with its values, especially Loyalty and Respect. Much of the military research on mentoring does not recognize requirements dictated by the multicultural environment of the Army. However, mentoring research focused on issues of diversity notes special requirements to ensure organizational programs are inclusive. David A. Thomas, Harvard Business School, documented that there are distinct patterns of advancement for majorities and minorities. Interested in determining why talented minorities rarely advanced to executive status, Thomas found that talented high-potential majorities tend to enter the “fast track” early in their careers, while talented high-potential minorities take off much later, typically after they reach middle management. He found that the commonality between people of color who advance, was a strong network of mentors and corporate sponsors.

Kathy E. Kram is noted for establishing the framework for mentoring as it is viewed today. Her 1985 book, *Mentoring at Work*, defines developmental relationships and distinguishes between the types of mentoring and outlines two types of functions achieved through mentoring: career functions and psychological functions. Career functions are actions that advance the protégé such as sponsorship, exposure and giving challenging assignments. Psychosocial functions such as role modeling, counseling, and acceptance, are actions that contribute to the protégé’s competence. Kram indicates that formal mentoring has risks and the best opportunity for success comes with informal mentoring relationships. Kram’s research is also noted as the first to creditably deal with obstacles to mentoring.

On the subject of multicultural mentoring, Faye Crosby, University of California, Santa Cruz, examined research from Kram’s classic work to Thomas’ look at race and Belle Rose Ragin’s 1997 study on gender. She comments that “because most senior people in organizations today are still White men, insisting on the close emotional bond between a mentor and protégé as the only vehicle to career advancement may unwittingly serve to reinforce the old (White) boys’ network.” Thus in some cases when multicultural differences exist, career benefit for the protégé comes best from instrumental (career) functions (sponsorship, exposure...) without psychosocial functions (role modeling, acceptance...) because psychosocial function require emotional involvement on the part of the mentor.
SUMMARY

Army dialog on the subject of mentorship stems from business and academic discussions. There is no shortage of research, writings, and how-to manuals on the subject of mentoring and developing mentoring programs. Much of the research has resulted in fundamental frameworks for effective mentoring relationships to include highlighting obstacles to overcome. A large amount of research documents special precautions necessary for effective mentoring in multicultural environments. As a learning organization with core values that dictate that all programs address each soldier, the Army must ensure that its mentoring concept addresses the growth potential of all members. However when looking to the literature to aid the development of an Army mentorship approach, as noted by Crosby, “… answers … are hard to glean from the existing literature because … the term mentor means different things to different scholars.” Thus, the resulting outcomes are different. The same holds true within the Army as one reviews military literature on the subject, most of which resulted not from specific mentoring research but rather from broader studies that included mentorship. Yet the commonality of business and academic research is a focus on mentoring in the classic sense. The Army approach to mentoring is inclusive, but often uses exclusive relationships, (Marshall-Eisenhower) as its best examples of mentoring in the Army. Therein lies the underlying Army mentorship dilemma: how to use an exclusive concept to establish an inclusive Army mentoring approach that will not conflict with the Army values of loyalty and respect and diminish selfless service.

A MENTORSHIP DOCTRINE?

The Force has provided its perspective on the state of mentoring in the Army through the 2000 ATLD and other recent mediums; the Force now awaits the institutional response. The previous section reviewed the data collected from the Force including a glance at mentorship data collected 15-years earlier. This section looks at the Army plan to respond to the Force. There is an inherent danger in discussing an action plan before its implementation. However the direction the Army intends to go on the subject of mentorship is a timely discussion. To omit this discussion would render this research incomplete and its conclusions outdated.

DA PAM 600-XX – ARMY MENTORSHIP DOCTRINE

Traditionally the Army publishes doctrine to provide the fundamental principles and concepts from which the Force should operate. Appropriate for this research, FM 100-5, Operations, explains that, “doctrine permeates the entire organizational structure of the Army and sets the direction for modernization and the standard for leadership development and soldier training.” Thus, the Army will resolve its mentorship dilemma by establishing a
doctrinal base. DA PAM 600-XX is in the drafting stage with the Army G1 as its proponent. The authors have examined current research and reviewed literature both military and civilian in developing the proposed doctrine. Due for publication in FY03, the action to publish this doctrine is now an element of the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. As currently proposed, the Army's mentorship doctrine will accomplish three purposes:

a. Establish a common vocabulary.
b. Stimulate professional thought and discussion.
c. Serve as a reference for Army leaders (both mentor and mentored).

The doctrine will examine the roles, responsibilities and characteristics of the mentor as well as the mentored. In most cases mentorship literature has addressed both sides of the mentoring relationship, although the Army has traditionally only addressed it from the senior leader perspective.58 Thus, the mentorship framework outlined in the doctrine will describe a two-way relationship that results in the personal and professional development of the mentored, as well as the mentor, producing more valuable leaders for the Army.

The doctrine will introduce a mentorship model with four types of mentoring each playing a role in the professional development of the individual. These mentoring types are: traditional mentoring, peer mentoring, supportive mentoring, and self-mentoring. As discussed in the proposed doctrine, traditional mentoring is that mentoring routinely expected in traditional leadership positions, two levels down with a senior rater or rater as the mentor, or a senior leader to a junior leader. Peer mentoring is simply learning from peers of the same grade, position or experience. Supportive mentoring describes bottom-up mentoring, that is received from subordinates, such as noncommissioned officers mentoring lieutenants or even colonels. And self-mentoring addresses the research, reading, education, ... that the Army currently refers to as “Self-Development.”59 The discussion of the mentoring types will suggest that the mentored will benefit both personally and professionally, at the intersection of the four mentoring types. (See Figure 1) The doctrine cautions, however, particularly in the case of supportive mentoring and traditional mentoring that these types of mentoring contain risk of creating negative perception. Thus, the doctrine warns that mentoring can lead to or be seen as favoritism. The doctrine will further stress that favoritism and careerism, as well as other pitfalls, are not goals of Army Mentorship.

Figure 1 Mentoring Types
The doctrine will provide a cycle of mentorship showing the stages of the mentoring process and the activities that occur in each stage. As illustrated in Figure 2, the doctrine discusses, how over the course of the career of the mentored, he or she requires less guidance as the mentored gains greater experience resulting in an experienced leader prepared to assume the mentor role. The doctrine will also discuss the essential elements of a mentoring relationship, including time, trust and respect. The mentor must make time available for the mentored. And there must be mutual trust and respect between the mentor and mentored. The doctrine will explain that these elements bond the mentoring relationship and make the outcome possible. It will provide a description of the skills and behaviors necessary for both the mentor and mentored to be effective. It also points out that these behaviors can occur in other types of relationships, such as leadership and sponsorship. This is a deviation from current doctrine where mentorship is an element of leadership under leader development.

The doctrine will provide the following as the common definition of mentorship:

*Mentorship refers to the voluntary, developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience.* The doctrine will not establish an Army mentorship program, but rather emphasize a culture in which informal mentoring is the key.

The doctrine authors’ intent is to outline the framework of Army mentorship as a combat multiplier at each pillar of the Army’s Leader Development Process, yet still distinguishes mentorship from leader development. With a common definition provided and doctrine designed, the Army’s Mentorship Campaign Plan calls for training and educational institutions, as well as units and organizations to develop programs for leader development using this doctrinal base. This Plan targets the brigade as the appropriate level to create the change in Army culture the doctrine requires. The Army will execute a Strategic Communication Campaign to circulate the language of the doctrine throughout the Force.

REVIEWING THE PROPOSED DOCTRINE

The above overview of the proposed Army Mentorship Doctrine illustrates the Army’s plan to publish a comprehensive document in an attempt to clarify how the Force should apply mentoring. As previously discussed mentorship literature provides a variety of positions and opinions on the subject making it difficult to determine a direction. Thus, the authors of the proposed doctrine have sifted through the literature to compose what they believe is the best
approach for the Army. The intent of this proposed doctrine is to reinforce a culture of development in the Army. In the attempt to do so, will this doctrine negatively impact the very environment it intends to help? Or, if not negatively impacting the environment, will it eliminate the dissatisfaction over mentoring noted in the 2000 ATLD and other studies? This section looks at the proposed Army doctrine applying various current literary concepts. It also looks at the impact the doctrine will have on mentorship programs currently existing within in the Army. For this examination, the research uses four mentorship programs. And finally the section concludes with an overall assessment of the impact of this doctrine on our culture.

The New Definition

The proposed doctrinal definition focuses on the voluntary nature of the mentoring relationship. It differs from the existing Army definition in that it eliminates the list of mentoring functions, as well as references to equal treatment and applicability to all. At first glance, it appears that the proposed doctrine will move away from the Army's commitment to inclusion. However, although not directly addressed in the proposed definition, the doctrine will discuss cross rank, cross gender and cross race mentoring as critical elements of the Army mentoring process. In this respect the proposed doctrine will deal more directly with these possible obstacles to mentorship than does the current FM 22-100. Also relative to applicability to all, the proposed doctrine will discuss mentoring within all populations of the Army (officer, warrant, and enlisted). And the proposed doctrine will exclude sponsorship as an element of Army mentorship because sponsorship conflicts with Army values.

If the doctrine is to be successful, the Force must accept the new definition. The doctrine may eliminate sponsorship in definition, but I do not believe leaders will eliminate it in practice. Redefining an established concept, mentoring, for Army purposes while continuing to use the terms of common practice will require a vast amount of effort to ensure understanding throughout the Force. Until this understanding is achieved, the definition remains ambiguous and confusing.

Addressing Barriers to Mentorship

The doctrine’s clarification of the four types of mentoring will be valuable, but it was the lack of the traditional (senior to junior) type of mentoring that resulted in dissatisfaction in the Army. In this regard, the limited number of senior officers in the Army, alone, could contribute to a lack of traditional mentoring. For example, in Colonel Kolditz’s study of feedback seeking behavior, 88% of the protégés reported having a senior officer as the primary mentor.62 The
Army's pyramid structure creates a senior to junior officer imbalance that will always result in a shortage of leaders of greater experience to voluntarily perform the traditional mentoring role. There is also a limit to the number of effective mentoring relationships in which a mentor can participate. Since under the new doctrinal concept any unbalanced combination of the four mentoring types will result in sub-optimal performance achieved by the mentored as illustrated in Figure 1, shortages of traditional mentors is a possible barrier the doctrine cannot resolve. This will further complicate the barrier of access to mentors. The proposed doctrine does not include methods to overall issues of access to mentors.

Theoretically the Force should understand the doctrine's intent to ensure the inclusive practice of mentoring based on the discussion of the pitfalls to mentoring and cross rank, cross gender and cross race mentoring. Yet, discussion of these obstacles will not eliminate them. Issues associated with multicultural mentoring are well documented indicating a propensity for mentoring relationships to be influenced by gender, race, and event rank (seniority). David Thomas in his article, "The Truth About Mentoring Minorities: Race Matters," explains that "a significant amount of research shows that cross race (as well as cross gender) relationships can have difficulty forming, developing and maturing." Colonel Kendrick's research revealed that 64 of 100 Caucasian officers felt minorities have been unfairly advanced over more qualified majorities. General Henry Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff at the time, in his 1998 tasking to his research group on women's issues said, "...It is hard for me to imagine an officer, NCO, or DoD civilian, succeeding without the benefit of sound advice from experienced superiors. Yet, by sometimes putting artificial gender barriers around the mentoring process, we've prevented women from gaining full benefits of the process... So the first task... is eliminating artificial barriers to what I believe is an important component of professional development (mentoring)." Conversely, Lt Singer disregarded race and gender as possible barriers to mentorship because he "believes these issues are minimal in a military setting." Clearly if members in the Force do not feel others advance based on individual merit, as evident from Colonel Kendrick's research, this is more than "minimal." David's research noted that minorities tend to withdraw from mentoring relationship when peers suggest they do not deserve the benefits resulting from mentoring.

The Army culture has not significantly changed from 1998 when General Shelton recognized gender as a barrier to mentoring. Nor when Colonel Kendrick captured survey results that documented how Caucasian officers view their minority counterparts. Thus, simply addressing the need to mentor across multicultural lines and train "away" issues of access to mentors may prove insufficient to properly deal with these possible barriers because they
require individuals to alter their behavior in areas they may feel uncomfortable. The human
dimension enters the process and doctrine will not dismiss this phenomenon.

Impact on Current Mentorship Programs

Many across the Army are currently engaged in mentoring processes using models and
techniques of their choosing. The 2000 ATLDP data indicates that those involved in mentoring
relationships believed that theirs were effective relationships. Thus, the following reviews
selected mentoring programs currently ongoing within the Army to see the impact with the
proposed doctrine applied. These programs are: the Quartermaster Sergeant Master Mentoring
Program as a noncommissioned officer example, the Air Defense Artillery Mentoring Program
as an officer example, the Warrant Officer Mentorship Program as the warrant officer example,
and the Resource Management Mentorship Program as the civilian example. Although the
discussion in this research generally concerns officers, the mentorship doctrine will apply to all
populations; therefore the research looks at a program focused on each population.

The Quartermaster Sergeants Master Mentoring Program links students of the
Quartermaster Advance Noncommissioned Officer Course and Basic Noncommissioned Officer
Course with command sergeants major and sergeants major assigned to Fort Lee to provide
senior leader mentoring. The goal of this program is to provide the students guidance and
information concerning career progression from senior leaders in their career field. This is a
short-term program that has the potential to result in long-term relationships; however, long-term
mentoring relationships are not the intent of this program. It has many of the characteristics
emphasized in the proposed doctrine; however, the program does not fall within the realm of
any of the four types of mentoring outlined in this doctrine. This program is similar to the
traditional mentoring concept, but because the school leadership prescribes the relationship
based on career field, this program falls outside the new doctrine’s emphasis. However,
because this program is part of an academic experience, with some changes to its intent, the
program could serve as the mentoring training discussed in the new doctrine.

The Air Defense Artillery Mentoring Program is a web-base source of mentors that
enables would-be protégés to select mentors. The site lists the names of officers who have
volunteered to be potential mentors as well as highlights of their career experiences. Persons
interested in mentorship have the responsibility to contact the potential mentor by email to
initiate the mentoring process. The target audience for this site/program is cadets interested in
selecting Air Defense Artillery as a branch or junior officers interested in senior mentorship. The
site also allows mentors to volunteer online. This program provides a resource for possible
mentoring relationships, but does not fall within the scope of the new doctrine because it has no other structure. However, it establishes a possible means of access to mentors that the potential mentored may otherwise not have available.\textsuperscript{71}

The Warrant Officer Mentorship Program is a web-based resource for mentoring spearheaded by the Warrant Officer Association (WOA). The program addresses roles and responsibilities of both the mentor and mentored as well as provides areas for the mentor/mentored to focus during the mentoring process with links to most of this information. Because this program outlines focus areas and provides direct links to this information, it is a resource for the \textit{self-mentoring} discussed in the proposed doctrine. The program makes no attempt to link mentoring teams, but the Association requires its chapters at installations throughout the Army to have a mentorship committee. The Association also sends a monthly report to its chapters notifying them of the new warrant officers inbound to their location. At a minimum, this may facilitates initial contact. Otherwise with the doctrine published, this program's site would only articulate the new doctrine with emphasis on the warrant officer and would have to ensure that its information was in line with doctrine. Additionally this program offers an organizational approached to mentoring not addressed in the doctrine. That is "professional association" mentoring. Although generally organized along functional areas, professional organizations such a WOA can provide invaluable "mentorship advertisement" and training by encouraging their members to mentor or maybe even establishing mechanisms for mentoring.\textsuperscript{72}

The Quartermaster Warrant Officer Mentoring Program takes the Warrant Officer Mentoring Program of information sharing and adds a "Planned Mentoring Policy." This policy mandates that graduates of the Quartermaster Warrant Officer Basic Course initiate mentoring relationships with senior warrant officers upon arriving at their new duty stations. The program provides each graduate a list of potential mentors assigned to the new location. Armed with this list, the program requires the new warrant to request mentorship in writing from one of the senior warrants on the list. When the senior officer agrees to enter into a mentoring relationship with the new warrant, the new warrant emails the Director, Warrant Officer Basic Course with the mentor's name. The Director maintains a list of mentoring teams and dispatches to the mentor a note of appreciation from the Quartermaster General. Within six months of arriving at the new duty station, the new warrant must complete an online assessment of the mentoring process. The program uses the assessment "to determine the viability and usefulness of the mentorship program."\textsuperscript{73}

As a resource, the program has an online Mentorship Guide that provides a "map to successful mentoring" that suggests that it be used as "a job aid" for mentors and mentees. The
guide provides links to other government mentoring websites, Army references and articles on mentorship. And although optional for use, the guide additionally provides a "No Fault Agreement" that the mentoring team may use to initiate their relationship. This program goes beyond simple information sharing because it has a built in assessment tool that will allow the school leadership to monitor the effectiveness of their program. Examined against the new doctrine, this program falls into the traditional mentoring category, although its mandated nature appears to fall outside the new doctrinal intent of informal mentoring. However since this program is part of the curriculum of a training institution, training could be the justification for the mandated element. As well, the program only mandates the participation of the new warrant officer; participation by the senior warrant is voluntary.

"The Resource Management Mentorship Program (RMMP) is a formal mentoring program with an emphasis on skill development and acquisition. It links less experienced resource managers with senior level careerists based on career interests, goals, and needs." The program also has extensive web-based reference material that originates from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management. The site contains resource information to assist the mentor and associate to establish an effective mentoring relationship. This program provides a great database for learning about the process. However, with publication of the Army Mentorship Doctrine, just as with the Warrant Officer Association’s program, the RMMP will have to match the information on this site with the doctrine. The mentoring discussed in this program falls into the traditional mentoring category, but would fall outside the proposed Army doctrinal intent because there is formal assignment of mentor and associate teams.

Of the programs discussed above, none of them falls directly within the concept of the proposed doctrine, although each of them would qualify as an informational and/or a training resource. All of the programs discuss mentorship in the classic context, rather than the current or proposed Army doctrinal context. And all of them attempt to facilitate access to mentors by providing some means to identify mentors, an element missing from the Army concept worth pursuing.

Overall Impact

An assumption of the Army Mentorship Campaign Plan is that the proposed doctrine will deconflict misconceptions within leader development doctrine as the Plan distinguishes mentorship from leader development. An unstated assumption is that doctrine will so educate the Force that multicultural obstacles and other barriers to mentoring will be minimized. The Campaign Plan recognizes that a cultural change is required to fully implement the new
doctrine. Overall, doctrine (leadership, leader development, training, equal opportunity and the like) has generally been effective in achieving an inclusion environment in the Army. The new voluntary approach of the proposed mentorship doctrine may not achieve the same success and may actually reverse some of the success already achieved. This is not endorsement of involuntary or formal mentoring; but rather it is acknowledgement that the proposed doctrine’s mentoring relationship is personal. Eighty-four percent of Colonel Kolditz’s respondents indicated their mentoring relationships were more personal than official. The personally toned voluntary approach will continue to breed exclusive relationships or the perception of them. Reality or perception, the negative impact on our culture is the same.

SUMMARY

The proposed Army doctrine moves closer to establishing a common language within the Force. However, the deviation from classic mentorship ensures that the Army language is not common to the generally understood mentorship discipline. Thus, if the Army leadership approves this definition, the doctrine must clearly point out the difference between Army traditional mentoring and the classic mentorship referenced in civilian literature and practiced in other institutions. Without clearly defined implementation of this doctrine, leaders will continue to expect and practice the classic model of mentorship.

As well, the Army must understand that the simple mention of multicultural mentoring within the doctrine will not negate individual bias in mentor/mentored selections. And finally, the doctrine should directly address access to mentoring if it is to respond to the dissatisfaction in the Force. (Although multicultural mentoring was a focus of this analysis, the nonmentored includes majority as well as minority leaders.) These voids in the new doctrine will intensify conflicts to the Army values of loyalty and respect and eventually jeopardize selfless-service. Lieutenant General (Retired) Walter F. Ulmer, Omar Bradley Chair of Leadership, U.S Army War College, after years of studying Army leadership and Army culture recently voiced this concern in regards to mentoring. "My conclusion now is that “mentoring” has so many potential pejorative overtones that the word is not compatible with Army culture!"

OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION

Faced with the Army mentorship dilemma, this researcher, concerned that a mentorship doctrine is not the approach to take, considered possible options to address the issue. Although there may be other variations, three options for resolving the Army mentorship dilemma come to mind: do nothing; emphasize a mentoring style in leader development; establish mentoring as a separate role.
Doing nothing would only serve to fuel the dissatisfaction already acknowledged by the Force, as noted in the 2000 ATLDP Report to the Army. In fairness, the fact that this study did not provide a definition to it participants clouds the understanding of what they told us. If nothing else, the 2000 ATLDP outcomes validated that some adjustments need to be made to address the dissatisfaction with mentoring. Doing nothing will not improve the situation.

Option two, emphasize a mentoring style leader development, would enable the Army to address the issue of dissatisfaction while keeping leadership paramount to the discussion. Attempting to shape the Army’s thinking on mentorship in 1985, LTG Bagnal and associates suggested that we look at mentorship as a style of leadership. They described this style as the leader’s coaching of subordinates while additionally sharing his frame of reference including sharing his values. The emphasis of this style is on the development of the subordinate, not sponsorship. Although current doctrine shows mentoring as a leadership tool to develop subordinates, the expectation today seems to be mentorship in the classic sense. The proposed doctrine sets out to separate mentorship from leader development indicating that sharing of the leader’s frame of reference and sharing of values are unique to mentorship. Since the Army is creating a new definition, why not redefine leader development to include these “unique” elements?

The following example describes leading with a mentoring style. One could easily say that this session with the brigade commander was mentoring. However, the brigade commander was not a mentor. He was using his experience to coach and develop a young lieutenant under his charge as described in the leadership doctrine.

As a first lieutenant while serving as a company executive officer, I was told to report for an office call with the new brigade commander. When I arrived the colonel entered into what turned out to be a 30 minute “life goals” (my term) discussion. During our discussion the colonel asked questions about my goals and expectations. He asked, “what do you want from your Army career? How many children do you plan to have? What do you want to do after the Army?” and the like. Based on my response to each question using a butcher pad the colonel plotted my career patch highlighting what I needed to best prepare myself to achieve my goals. For example, because I wanted to command a divisional supply company, but had not served in a division, the colonel plotted a 4-year window, indicating locations that would give me the best chances to reach my goal and advised what positions to seek in preparation. As well, he plotted promotions and schools. When complete, the colonel had sketched my career timeline including key positions, promotions and even windows of opportunity to start graduate school and have children. I still have the sheet of butcher paper today.

The brigade commander was neither my rater nor senior rater. Yet in a very personal-toned discussion he showed legitimate interest in helping to shape my vision of the Army as an
institution where I could achieve my goals, both personally and professionally, and at the same
time he shared a frame of reference and values. I assumed he did this with all his officers. This
was part of his leadership behavior. I do not consider this mentoring, but rather leading with a
mentoring style. This was leader development.

The complicating factor with the Army is using an established concept, mentoring/
mentorship, but limiting the application of the concept. Using a mentoring style is one thing;
saying the Army will practice inclusive mentorship is another. If all the elements of mentoring
are not applicable to the uniformed Army, if the Army does not want to endorse exclusion as
evident by the existing definition and proposed doctrine, mentoring is not the concept to
emphasize. Emphasizing a mentoring style in leadership may in fact produce better results
because the focus is leading. We should remain focused on leadership with the positive
descriptors that embed its understanding. The Army can only benefit from a leadership doctrine
that describes the developing category of improving actions as teaching, coaching,
developmental-counseling and assessing emphasizing the personal aspect of sharing the
leader's frame of reference to include sharing values. The absence of the term mentoring from
this list of descriptors would take nothing away from the concept of developing leaders as the
doctrine conveys. Yet, the absence of the term mentoring would end a great deal of debate and
confusion in the Army.

Establishing mentoring as a separate role is the third option and the one the Army has
pursued. The Training and Doctrine Command is experimenting with mentoring techniques with
contractors acting as mentors for students attending the Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth. The Army's Military Academy Behavior Science Department is looking to
develop training to teach future lieutenants how to increase their chances of finding mentors by
training them to seek feedback because research indicates feedback seekers significantly
increased their chances of gaining mentors. These are just a few ongoing actions in the
search of the proper way to incorporate mentoring into the Force.

The most significant action is the decision to publish a separate mentorship doctrine.
Although the 2000 ATLD recommended developing doctrine for mentoring, it recommended
including that doctrine under Leadership. The plan to separate mentorship doctrine from
leader development places an importance on mentorship that is not beneficial to the Force.
This change will conflict with Army values and impact cohesion because the doctrine cannot
eliminate barriers to mentoring or the exclusive nature of the practice. Elevating the importance
of mentoring will perpetuate the problem that has led to Force dissatisfaction.
A senior Army official addressing the Army War College Class of 2002, was asked if the Army needed a separate mentorship doctrine. Responding first by explaining the importance of leader development, the official said, "...mentoring is a part of leadership. No we don't need a separate mentorship doctrine." Yet this is our course of action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To this point, the research has examined the contradictions in defining mentoring, and attempted to assess the effectiveness of the proposed mentorship doctrine for the Army. Review of the proposed doctrine indicates an excellent effort to establish a common framework and neutralize the negatives of mentoring. Nevertheless, it the negative factors of mentorship will continue to be part of the equation because the doctrine does not provide guidance for overcoming or eliminating obstacles to mentoring; it merely points them out. This will cause cultural erosion to continue.

Thus, my major recommendation is clear: set aside mentorship and focus on leader development with mentoring elements included. Although this will not eliminate the issues of barriers to mentorship and exclusion, it subordinates the concept of mentoring under the higher discipline (leadership), focusing on leader development, which does have existing mechanisms for monitoring such issues. More importantly, every soldier believes they will be led. No amount of effort will convince them that they all will be mentored given the exclusive and personal nature of the practice.

Since the decision to separate mentorship from leader development has been made, the following are recommendations to minimize the issues and assist with effective application of the doctrine. Recommend the Army:

a. Ensure a clear and defined linkage of mentorship under the broader concept of leadership. The doctrine authors outline plans for establishing the relationship and mirroring mentoring doctrine through other doctrinal references. This must occur with a focused discussion of Army values.

b. Distinguish between Army mentorship and classic mentorship in the doctrine. If the definition remains as proposed, it does little to clear up current confusion over the meaning. The doctrine must directly address the differences and why Army mentoring has to be different. The conflict with Army values is the best justification for this requirement. Leaders must understand that classic mentoring erodes the Army at the core. The proposed doctrine does not go far enough to eliminate the confusion in definition and will result in continued cultural erosion. The Strategic Communication Campaign may assist this effort.
c. Adopt Short-term Initial Mentoring for New Officers. Draw off the recommendations of Colonel Kendrick and the focus of the Quartermaster Basic Warrant Officer Mentorship Program by establishing initial mentoring experiences for new officers upon arrival at their first duty stations. Assign this mission to each service school requiring them to maintain a feedback/assessment mechanism. Although this deviates from the voluntary nature the doctrine conceives, a short-term program could "level the playing field" to a degree. The Army could use the program to eliminate access to mentors, hesitation and other like barriers to mentoring which will benefit the organization overall. This initial mentoring experience may in fact not lead to a more long-term relationship, but it will introduce the junior officer to the process, allow the senior officer to assess the needs of the junior officer and possibly lead to a referral for a better mentor/mentored match.

d. Develop an assessment mechanism to measure the effectiveness of mentoring. The assessment should measure leader attitudes on mentoring, the degree to which leaders understand the mentoring process, the existence of barriers to mentoring and the effectiveness of mentoring training. The assessment should distinguish between attitudes on doctrine from those on specific mentoring relationships. As well, the assessment tool should monitor the initial mentoring program for new officers. The assessment process should be done using Army Knowledge Online. The Army Research Institute's Fiscal Year 2002 Program includes a research effort "to determine the differences in mentoring as a function of relative position, supervisor, peer, or subordinate." The research "will survey soldiers and officers to see who indicates they are being mentored and how helpful they deem various mentoring behaviors." This research could serve to measure the effectiveness of the doctrine; however, completing this research in 2002 is too soon to do so. Recommend conducting this research after the one-year anniversary of the doctrine. Further recommend the survey determine how well the mentor and mentored are using the doctrine to guide their mentoring relationship.

e. Conduct Army-level mentoring research and ensure all future research employs measures to avoid the contradictions of past research. The amount of existing literature on mentorship is exhausting to explore. Contradictions exist in areas this amateur researcher would not have assumed would be the case (e.g., definition, functions of mentoring, barriers to mentoring including diversity...). The research noted contradictions with military research similar to those affecting civilian research. Most of the published Army research is the result of Professional Military Educational (PME) requirements, such as this project. The purpose of the 2000 ATLDP, the latest official research, was a comprehensive look at the Army's systems of
training and leader development. Therefore, its research was broad with mentorship addressed as a subset within a focus area of the study. Colonel Kolditz's research comes closest to a "professional" focused look at mentoring in the Army. This research was limited in scope intended to isolate specific factors that influence the protégé's chances for mentorship. The researcher is not critical of these works, but only points out that there has been no comprehensive mentorship research within the Army other than that research conducted by students while in PME.

As mentorship is such a popular topic in today's Army, students in PME and degree seeking programs will continue to approach it as a topic for research. To make research valuable to our institution, future researchers should take measures to avoid errors of the past. The Army should invest in a comprehensive look at mentorship in the Force, given the amount of organizational energy expended on the topic as individuals express their viewpoints in articles and surveys and the Army focuses on mentorship doctrine preparation and training in our institutions. This Army-level research would negate the necessity to draw inference from studies of civilian institutions that have different cultures than does the Army.

Therefore, recommend all future Army research (either active with Army data as the source or passive using civilian data) apply Belle Rose Ragins', University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, suggestions to construct the research to avoid some of the contradictions existing in mentoring research today.86 Ragins recommends that researchers define mentoring in the research tool. Because there are so many variations of the term, respondents may have a different behavior/relationship in mind when taking surveys, thus, possibly leading to invalid conclusions. Secondly, Ragins recommends including questions about multiple mentors. Depending on the focus of the researcher, a respondent with multiple mentoring relationships could complicate the results. Thirdly, she recommends including questions that address the respondent as a protégé and a mentor. This is crucial in Army research because Army leaders will perform both roles. She also recommends that researchers consider questions on the functions of the mentor, that is as the supervisor, senior in rank, senior in experience, etc. As well she recommends considering questions that address internal and external mentoring, participation in formal mentoring programs and participation in organizational mentoring. This could be extremely valuable to Army research because respondents could answer a question such as "Are you being mentored?" based on mentoring relationships outside the Army from a relative, a community program or association with a private organization. Again, this could make the results invalid. Depending on the intent of the research, questions in these areas
would allow the researcher to isolate or exclude certain populations from the findings and reach more precise conclusions.

CONCLUSION

This research set out to examine two questions. First, what does mentorship mean? Secondly, how should we use mentorship in the Army? While the 2000 ATLD confirmed dissatisfaction in the Force concerning mentoring, an assessment of the current Army leadership (including mentoring) doctrine against mentorship literature pinpointed disconnects in the Army approach to mentoring. That approach has created a dilemma:

- Army doctrine advocates mentoring for all without sponsorship, protection and the like, at the tactical and operational levels; mentoring classically defined is an exclusive practice that can include sponsorship, protection and the like; Army doctrine for strategic mentoring follows the classic definition.

- In large part, actual practice of mentoring in the Army, at all levels, is classic mentoring; many leaders have an expectation of classic mentoring because they perceive mentoring as giving opportunity and advantage to those involved.

- Exclusive practices violate the Army values of loyalty and respect that require fair and equal treatment of all soldiers; developmental practices, just as all other Army practices, must follow ALL Army values.

The Army solution to this dilemma is a proposed Army Mentorship Doctrine, DA Pam 600-XX. Analysis of this proposed doctrine concludes that the doctrine makes an excellent effort, but falls short of eliminating the ambiguity and confusion concerning mentoring. The proposed doctrine makes the Army definition of mentoring more concise than the current definition and removes the distinction currently made between strategic mentoring and mentoring at lower levels. Yet the new definition remains inconsistent with the classic meaning of mentoring which maintains the confusion. As well the proposed doctrine identifies the pitfalls of mentoring (favoritism, careerism…and a lack of multicultural mentoring), yet offers no method to eliminate the individual biases that will allow these issues to influence mentorship. Thus, the researcher concludes that the doctrine may greatly aid those involved in the process of mentoring and may focus leaders on other types of mentoring, but the culture of our Army will continue to suffer from this practice that violates our values. The Army culture cannot afford continued erosion of the very fabric of which it is made. The long-term impact on the Army is a lack of institutional Loyalty; a climate lacking the Respect deserved by all soldiers; and a destruction of Selfless Service because the ARMY is not living up to the concepts it talks.
My research validates the positive elements of mentorship as important and necessary functions for a learning institution. To transform our force to the Objective Force of 2025 we must employ all available tools to maintain our learning environment. However, leadership is the hallmark of the Army. Over focusing on a traditionally exclusive concept distracts from the more critical discipline of leadership. The doctrine’s aim to make mentorship inclusive will not succeed and conflicts with Army values will remain. If Army mentorship is absent of the career enhancing actions (sponsorship,...) widely understood as possible functions of a mentoring relationship, it must be leader development that the Army wants. Mentoring should not stand independent of leader development. All of the positive aspects of mentoring to include sharing of the leader's frame of reference and sharing values can be achieved through leader development. To effectively prepare leaders as we transform our Army, we must halt the erosion to the fabric of our culture today. Our only method to provide hope to the nonmentored, especially those lacking the traditional mentoring discussed in the proposed doctrine, is to remove mentoring as an institutional instrument, and focus on leader development. This is a better approach to achieve the long-term impact on our culture and “...grow the leaders for the Objective Force”87 for the Transformation Army of 2025.

WORD COUNT = 9772
ENDNOTES


2 Donna Alberto <albertod@leavenworth.army.mil>, "Mentoring Info," electronic mail message to author <bette.washington@carlisle.army.mil>, 3 January 2002. LTC Alberto provided timelines for the noncommissioned officer, warrant officer and civilian panels.


7 Jolemore, 7.

8 Ibid., 7-9.


15 Gregg F. Martin, "Mentorship: Meaningful Leadership Concept, Confusing Cliché, or Euphemism for Favoritism (Draft)," in Course I Strategic Leadership, ed. U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 332. (With permission of Colonel Martin.)


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Martin, 335.

20 Ibid., 336.

21 U.S. Department of the Army, Excerpts from The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report (Detail) to the Army (ATLDP-E). Excerpts on mentoring results, findings and recommendations provided to the author as a member of the panel, 9 January 2002, 2-20.


23 Martin, 333.

24 ATLDP-E, no page number.

25 Jolemore, 8.

26 Colonel Diana L. Bodner, U.S. Army War College Class of 2002. Interview by author, 22 March 2002, Carlisle Barracks, PA

27 FM 22-100, 7-23.

28 Bodner.

29 Jolemore, 17.


31 ATLDP, OS-10.

32 PDOS, 8.

33 Donna Alberto <albertod@leavenworth.army.mil>, “Mentoring Info,” electronic mail message to author <bette.washington@carlisle.army.mil>, 3 January 2002. The author asked
LTC Alberto if respondents were provided a definition of mentoring. In the email she confirmed that Dr. Fallesen, C., Army Research Institute analyst team at Fort Leavenworth, indicated that no definition was provided.

35 ALTDP, OS-10.
36 ATLDP, 2-19.
38 ATLDP, 2-19.
39 Martin, 329.
40 ATLDP-E, no page number.
41 Kolditz, 1.
43 Robert A. Harvey, Development of a Formal Army Officer Mentorship Model for the Twenty-First Century, Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2000), 98-100.
45 Kristopher A. Singer, An Assessment of Mentoring Functions and Barriers to Mentoring, Thesis (U.S.-Air Force Institute of Technology, December 1999), 77-78.
46 FM 22-100, 2-2.
47 Ibid., 2-4.
48 Ibid., 2-5.
49 FM-22-100, 2-6.
51 Kram, 24; 32; 185.

53 Ibid., 10.

54 Ibid., 16.

55 Ibid., 11.

56 Based on advance information for the Army Mentorship Doctrine (DA PAM 600-XX) and Campaign Plan provided by electronic email, draft briefing slides and telephone interviews with Major Michael Grojean and LTC Deborah A Reisweber, Office of the G1, Human Resource Directorate.


58 FM 22-100, 5-16.

59 U.S. Army Office of the G1, Army Mentorship Doctrine, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-XX (Draft)," Briefing Slides (Draft), 14.

60 FM 22-100, 5-15.

61 Ibid.

62 Kolditz, 11.


64 Thomas, 104.

65 Kendrick, 9.

66 Robinson, 5.

67 Singer, 28.

68 Thomas, 105.

69 ATLDPE, 2-18.

70 Don E. Wells, Commandant, U.S. Army Quartermaster Noncommissioned Officer Academy, telephone interview by author, 6 March 2002. CSM Wells provided clarity for the information mentioned in the article by CSM Larry W. Gammon.
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