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THE RENEWED UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY: IMPLICATIONS ON THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

BY

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THE RENEWED UNITED-STATES DEFENSE POLICY: 
IMPLIED ON THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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As the Bush administration took office in January 2001 in the most uncertain geopolitical environment in half a century, now is the right time to address issues related to the impacts on the cohesive Trans-Atlantic relationship of the renewed Strategic orientations of the United States. This review deals especially with the domain of the military with, among others, his Antiballistic Missile Defense Project. This essay is an attempt to begin to examine this paramount subject.
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PREFACE

In 1996, I was assigned in MONS, as a staff officer of the Strategic Planning Cell of the Combined Joint Planning Staff of Supreme Headquarter of Allied Powers in Europe. I was involved in the decision making process of the chain of command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I witnessed the efficiency of this organization and the emergence of the European will to see E.U. dealing not only with economy but also with Defense issues. During discussions with cell mates from various NATO countries, I discovered misunderstandings about what could be the renewed transatlantic relationship, given the post Cold War era.

In 2001, because of my studies at the US Army War College, I was given the opportunity to better understand the US policy as far as Europe is concerned. Therefore, I offer this SRP based on the unique perspective I have gained from service in the SHAPE, and in the US Army War College as well as the deep friendships I have established with officers I met there.

I would like to acknowledge a number of people who assisted me in developing my thoughts and provided me key resources for this SRP but first and foremost, among others, is COL Edward Murdock, my research advisor. I remain eternally grateful and indebted for his support, patience and understanding during the preparation of this paper.
THE RENEWED UNITED-STATES DEFENSE POLICY: IMPLICATIONS ON THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

To precisely define the determinants of the American Defense Policy is a tremendous challenge because the setting up of the new Administration has been a lengthy business and the new terrorist threats has forced a reorientation of previous priorities. Nevertheless, first official declarations\(^1\) and official reports, such as the QDR 2001, state an intention to change, which if applied, would have strong indisputable implications either at the national level or within the framework of the international policy of the United States especially as far as the U.S. and E.U. relationship is concerned.

The Bush administration took office in January 2001 in the most uncertain geopolitical environment in half a century\(^2\). It is now the right time to address issues related to the impacts on the cohesive Trans-Atlantic relationship\(^3\) of the renewed strategic orientations of the United States as defined in the Quadrennial Defense Review report of 2001\(^4\) and the emerging of the European Security and Defense Policy. This review deals especially with the domain of the military power with, among others, implications of new technological and geopolitical variables. This essay begins an examination of this very important subject.

President Bush presented his priorities\(^5\): reinforcement of trust and confidence with the American armed forces; improvement of the capacities required to fight terrorism; protection of space assets and information systems and development of an Antiballistic Missile Defense capability. Overall, he wants the United-States to build a military tool adapted to the challenges of the XXI century that will take into account the ongoing technological revolution and the new geopolitical environment mainly characterized by asymmetrical threats. The U.S. defense strategy will embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise. This strategy is premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home. Therefore, the new American Defense Policy will be characterized by an important technological sophistication and by a continued unilateral approach in defense policy. This will likely have important effects on the relationship of the United States with European allies.

THE U.S. DEFENSE POLICY AS DEFINED BY THE QDR 2001\(^6\)

The QDR 2001 provides strategy and direction for DOD. It has been issued prior to the definition of a National Defense Strategy on September 30, 2001. The QDR was not written in a vacuum, it reflects views of the President, the NSC and many outsiders. It expresses the interests and goals of the U.S. as a nation.
The definition of programs and budgets needed to implement this strategy is expected to follow. This strategy underlines seven key themes:

- Surprise and uncertainty - highlights the condition of planning,
- Asymmetrical threats,
- Deterrence – refashion existing concepts, adopting a multi-faceted approach. Forward deterrence based on forward force posture (deployments) plus capabilities for immediate reinforcement,
- Homeland Defense,
- Transforming defense: identified a set of operational challenges and four focused areas,
- Force sizing: paradigm shift in force planning to a capabilities approach,

The United States has entered the 21st century as the preeminent military, economic, and political power in the world. U.S. security in the 21st century is described as the result of its unique role in the world, because it is already the only superpower with a global foreign policy. Its goals remain essentially the same when compared to those described in QDR 1997; to promote peace; to sustain freedom; and to encourage prosperity. Its unique security role provides the basis for a network of alliances and friendships. The U.S. will provide stability and confidence to its allies and friends and will guarantee them against coercion and aggression.

U.S. “Interests and objectives” could be regrouped in three categories:

- Ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action:
  - U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom,
  - Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad,
  - Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure,
- Honoring international commitments:
  - Security and well-being of allies and friends,
  - Precluding hostile domination in critical areas (Europe, NEA, ME and SWA, EA littoral),
  - Peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere,
- Contributing to economic well-being:
  - Vitality and productivity of the global economy,
  - Security of International sea, space, and information LOCs,
- Access to key markets and strategic resources.
The changed security environment is described through key geopolitical and military technical trends:

**KEY GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS:**
- Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance,
- Regional security developments,  
  no peer competitor in the near future,  
  threat of regional powers,  
  Asia: susceptible to large-scale military competition,  
- Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states,  
  Diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors,  
  Developing and sustaining regional security arrangements,  
  Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict.

With the exception of the Balkans, Europe is considered largely at peace. Central European states are becoming increasingly integrated with the West, both politically and economically and therefore don’t pose a large scale conventional military threat to NATO. Europe is seen as sharing the common threat of ballistic missile attacks. This will allow a reorientation of the U.S. military global posture, in the near future, as the U.S. overseas presence remains aligned closely with its own interests and likely threats to those interests. The U.S. presence in Western Europe may decrease. The primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create a favorable balance of power in critical areas of the world. This balance of power as far as Europe is concerned, should be understood as a balance of power among European countries. The bottom line is the U.S. will not support the emergence of a strong political and military Europe as a peer competitor. A renewed relationship should lead at the very least to a partnership.

**KEY MILITARY-TECHNICAL TRENDS:**
- Rapid advancement of military technologies,  
- Increasing proliferation of CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles,  
- Emergence of new arenas of military competition: space and cyber space,  
- Increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.

The answer to problems these trends pose is the improvement of substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of military competition (e.g., power projection, space and information). It will require exploiting U.S. advantages in superior technological innovation and
increasing these advantages especially in the C4ISR. These improvements will maintain U.S. leadership even within coalition operations, but will weaken the efficiency of such a coalition force. Consequently, it will be difficult to strengthen alliances and partnerships on military bases. U.S. forces won't be able to enhance interoperability.

The motto of the Defense Strategy shifts from the trilogy “Shape-Respond-Prepare” to a new quadrilogy consisting in “Assure allies and friends-Dissuade future military competition-Deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests-if deterrence fails, decisively Defeat any adversary.”

Therefore the force sizing construct is based on four capabilities:
- Defend the United States,
- Deter Forward,
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions,
- Conduct Major Combat Operations,
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving option for decisive victory in one conflict – to include regime change,
- Conduct limited number of SSCs.


The analysis of the strong and weak points of this report make it possible to highlight the relevance of the strategic synthesis presented by QDR 2001 within the framework of the approach of U.S. foreign commitment: a fine and strong structured strategic synthesis. It presents differences from predecessors. The use of outside panels during the drafting process created expectations for radical changes. The product is mostly a strategy document without any programmatic details or guidance for resource allocation. Strategy analysts will have to wait for the other shoe to drop.

Even Pentagon officials who were deeply involved in the drafting of the previous QDR report recognize that there are many good things in this 2001 document as far as the defense of U.S. specific interests is concerned.

First, the document does not disregard the past. Pentagon officials should not have conceived it this way, but they rather regard it as a new stage in adapting the strategy of defense to the post Cold War era rather than a new strategic rupture. The most positive aspect of this document resides in the emphasis it places on asymmetrical threats. Before September 11, asymmetrical threats were already an important consideration. It was a known topic but still a future concern. But today, these are a reality and thus credible. Americans confront with
asymmetric warfare can believe in it after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush Administration has understood perfectly the criticality of these threats as a key factor in determining the strategic thought.

In the same way, these threats place at its right level the defense of the territory. Already, before September 11, the defense of U.S. territory was articulated as a major mission of the active and reserve armed forces, and the National Guard. Today this focus on Homeland Defense is so important it becomes a significant criterion for designing and organizing forces.

Another positive element of QDR 2001, is the preservation of the transformation of forces in priorities of the Pentagon: U.S. forces need to transform to take up the challenges of the 21st century. The CJCS Assessment has a cautionary tone and balances transformation with near and mid-term commitments. It is interesting to note on this subject that collaborators of Mr. Rumsfeld are already preparing a follow-on step by defining a half dozen operational goals to provide Pentagon officials with directives to select and define programs needed to implement the defense strategy. Those will guide efforts for transformation. They should direct projects of development and experimentation.

This report has also the merit of widening the major force sizing criterion of U.S. forces, namely the capacity to conduct almost simultaneously two major conflicts (Major Theater of War or MTW). Force sizing is based on a capabilities-based approach. The capacity to commit and to overcome on 2 MTW was the double criterion to design U.S. conventional forces (with the exception of naval forces which already integrated the need of a presence on all seas). In theory, it is a powerful criterion. But the illustrative nature of scenarios which U.S. forces used, namely a war against Iraq and Korea, had been forgotten. Pentagon officials had then passed from the preparation to two generic scenarios to the preparation of forces to two specific cases. And in a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous, or VUCA world, that was particularly dangerous.

Thus, it was necessary that U.S. officials re-examine their criterion of force sizing and their ways to commit such forces. It was significant to generalize this kind of scenario used to plan architecture of forces, while trying to limit uncertainty. It was necessary to study performances of forces vis-à-vis a broader variety of scenarios or combinations of scenarios to develop a real capacity vis-à-vis a large spectrum of possible scenarios. The new Administration took this problem into account.

Crises of low intensity (Small Scale Contingencies or SSC) could be conducted simultaneously. The initial desire of the Bush Administration was to set aside these missions and, for example, even considered the withdrawal of American troops from the Balkans. But in
the months which followed, the new U.S. authorities realized that this was easier to say than to do. And perhaps the former Administration had good reasons to commit U.S. forces in these operations, and that those SSCs could not and should not to be regarded as secondary. Thus, they were retained and mentioned in QDR 2001. Finally, QDR 2001 proposes a definition of a force sizing matrix which really tries to encompass the full spectrum of possible scenarios, that is to say the requirement that U.S. forces might have to satisfy relentlessly and on short notice.

It is necessary to underline another strength of QDR 2001. It answers the question of risk analysis. The Department of Defense had not yet adopted any transparent, rigorous, consistent and revised methodology to measure and evaluate the risks in its decision-making process. One of the things that the events of September 11 highlighted, was the need to develop a method to analyze risks and to use it rigorously during the decision-making process. QDR 2001 demonstrates a clear recognition of this need and offers a credible attempt to fulfill this requirement.

But QDR 2001 sheds the light on some real weaknesses. First, as indicated previously, the problem of the absence of National Security Strategy or NSS, backing this document with an adequate and broad-spectrum context.

The second weakness is the absence of detailed implementation programming. It is a weakness in the sense that nothing in the report describes what the new strategic synthesis will imply in term of programs for its implementation.

The third weakness is the absence of transparency concerning analysis that precedes the conclusion. In the two previous reports, QDR 93 and 97, the drafters were able to reveal the essence of their analysis, even in these unclassified documents. In QDR 2001, we do not know details of the analysis. It is a weakness because it will be more difficult to defend this document before the Congress. If there is one thing in which members of commissions of Congress excel, it is in the scrupulous examination of reasons why decisions were taken by the Department of Defense. It would be less difficult to obtain approval of a project by anticipating this attitude rather than to react step by step in answering each one of their questions in public hearings.

Moreover, the report doesn't answer the legislative requirements. Because of the absence of the NSS, the Bush Administration lost an opportunity to complete the process correctly. As far as force structure is concerned, it will be necessary to complete a “ground-up” look at requirements.

But the major weakness of this report is in the absence of an accurate vision of the implications of globalization on the U.S. Defense Strategy. The trend towards globalization is accelerating and will likely continue throughout the next century. The United States has played a
prominent role in fostering economic, technological, cultural and political integration among disparate regions of the world. Globalization has served to bring citizens from all continents closer together, allowing them to share ideas and information in an instant.

The prominent role of the U.S. in creating the security environment we enjoy is in large part the result of U.S. commitment to shaping the strategic environment while retaining the ability to respond to a full range of crises. The prominent U.S. role in globalization and in creating this environment, however, has come at a heavy cost. It will be a tricky problem for the U.S. to continue along this course because it might dissipate its strength and find itself in a reduced readiness level if the Defense budget doesn't stay constant.

It is clear that the U.S. should spread the international defense burden more equitably, continuing to create more stable conditions in which the U.S. economy and national well-being can flourish. Instead of a costly unilateral approach, Americans should work toward an international cooperative security regime. The U.S. would retain an important role in this regime, but should relinquish its absolute primacy for a truly international character to emerge.

The unique U.S. leadership role should be best played by advancing the shared interests and values of the international community through more effective multilateral alliances, coalitions and institutions, and especially through the U.N. But this might require that the use of U.S. military forces be governed not only by U.S. national interests, but also by U.S. values concerning freedom, peace, and justice for all humanity.

The unilateral approach does not strengthen the international community and may encourage an anti-U.S. backlash from nations believing that U.S. leadership portends global hegemony. Because of asymmetric threats, as the September 11 attacks demonstrated, U.S. authorities will have to prepare to be surprised everywhere, at any time. Further QDR 2001 only makes references to international organizations in the context of how they can be used to support U.S. defense policy.

However it may be, this document provides a very useful framework of reference for the Bush Administration and in particular for Mr. Rumsfeld and his collaborators at the Pentagon to analyze and react properly after the terrorist attacks and to guide them in their thoughts and assessments as events unfold. Those should lead them to benefit from the temporary disappearance of the budgetary constraint and the window of opportunity generated by the antiterrorist war, to surmount some barriers of Congress and to implement the solutions to problems revealed by the attacks of September 11. It will initially consist of a re-examination of the operations of the U.S. intelligence system and seeking a better answer to the threat of bioterrorism.
Lastly, the events of September 11 offer the opportunity of a reevaluation of certain aspects of the foreign policy of the United States, especially in the Middle East, but also in Europe. The United States, considering itself as the global defender of Democracy, will have to re-evaluate its support to certain non democratic states (for example in the Gulf region), or potentially failed states. Because of this gap between the ideal and the implementation, the resentment of some oppressed people focuses on the United States.

Therefore, the QDR 2001, which presents differences from predecessors, is an important strategic document to understand the revised post Cold War U.S. Defense Policy. It does not disregard the past, points out asymmetrical warfare, and focuses on Homeland Defense. The transformation of forces stays a priority of the Department of Defense because of the necessity to implement changes in the military regarding the new challenges forces will have to encompass in a VUCA world. Absence of NSS, lack of transparency concerning analysis and the inaccurate vision of implications of globalization will weaken this strategy.

**IMPLICATIONS OF KEY MILITARY-TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS**

As defined by QDR 2001, in order to advance U.S. transformation efforts, the new defense strategy identifies key operational goals for deterring conflict and conducting military operations. To improve the linkage between strategy and investments, six operational goals have been assigned to DoD’s investment resources. One of them is the capacity to protect bases of operation at home and abroad and defeat the threat of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and highly enhanced Explosive or CBNRE weapons. To counter this threat, the U.S. is developing the Missile Defense Project, or MDP as a matter of priority. DoD has refocused and revitalized the missile defense program, shifting from a single-site national missile defense approach to a broad based research, development and testing effort aimed at deployment of layered missile defenses. Moreover, American authorities just have renamed the program MD, without any further reference to the N of National. These changes in the missile defense program will permit the exploration of many previously untested technologies and approaches. Therefore, the new American Defense Policy will be characterized by important technological sophistication.

Across the Atlantic, it is considered that this MDP could be deployed within the Euro-Atlantic zone and in Asia (particularly in the Sea of Japan, East and South China Seas, Yellow Sea). This project, particularly in its more ambitious future development could modify the current balance of power and endanger the classical deterrence concept. Russia still maintains its opposition to the implementation of Antibalistic Missile shields. China (whose growing
military strength worries the Americans\textsuperscript{12}) could find a new reason to justify the development of a new arms race (Russia and China just have signed a new military cooperation treaty). Since the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks, the U.S. and Russia are seeking to find a compromise about the compatibility of testing antballistic missiles with the ABM treaty. But this issue will remain when MD weaponry is deployed.

More broadly speaking, the project the Americans propose to their allies\textsuperscript{13} seems to be part of deeper strategic critical thinking about the means of deterrence and puts in question the ABM Treaty\textsuperscript{14}. This project would be the approach to improve the strategic flexibility of the scope of U.S. authorities decision making and "would spread the American peace while improving the technology" as Mr. Bush affirmed.

The corollary of this policy would be the emergence of a new balance of power as far as nuclear deterrence is concerned\textsuperscript{15}. Therefore a renewed strategic framework should be shaped. This project could be accompanied by an effort to ensure U.S. supremacy in space capabilities and could lead to the acquisition of a monopoly in this domain. This is another threat in the balance of power in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Lastly, the "American Missile Shield\textsuperscript{16}" proposal is already a tremendous rhetoric device to check the loyalty of the European allies.

REVOLUTION IN THE MILITARY?

This Antballistic Missile Defense Project should be considered as a part of a wide transformation and modernization of the U.S. military. It could have repercussions on other major U.S. military programs. While keeping the transformation as a priority, QDR 2001 does not answer the questions of the programs needed to put into practice the new military strategy. Since September 11, the defense budget has notably increased because of the need to implement Homeland Defense and antiterrorist warfare. But is this a spike or a new sustainable level? Whichever it may be, using this period of distinct U.S. military advantage, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Marshall would like to impose\textsuperscript{17} a technologic "generation jump" in certain domains and therefore envisage terminations of some programs qualified as too traditional or considered as duplication of means. President Bush has initiated an appraisal of the U.S. defense posture that could lead to a tremendous reduction in force structure, especially abroad (projection and pre-deployed forces)\textsuperscript{18}.

QDR 2001 assesses the necessity to reorient the U.S. military global posture taking into account anti-access and area-denial threats. The concept of "force multiplier"\textsuperscript{19} could allow a further downsizing of U.S. forward-stationed forces in Europe with the introduction of an Interim Brigade Combat Team by 2007\textsuperscript{20}. Such evolution could increase the use of long range
weaponry fired from the homeland and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustained homeland based forces. The U.S. strategic concept will focus and rely mainly on power projection from the U.S. to decisively defeat an adversary. Significant differences between American and allied strategies and military doctrines will come up. Consequently, capability and technology gaps would grow among them. A significant amount of interoperability problems could arise especially as far as C4ISR is concerned. Thus, the environment will be fit for “specialization” of each sphere. This specialization of C4ISR risks creating an operational disconnect between the United States and Europe.

FORCES APPRAISAL

The events of the last months have clarified the new balance of power among Bush Administration Heads. The role played by Mr. Rumsfeld has been indisputably determinant\textsuperscript{21}. He is well-armed to energize and direct significant changes in the U.S. military. He describes it through five essential milestones\textsuperscript{22}: to reformulate a deterrence policy driving the new context of the National Security Framework, especially Weapon of Mass Destruction Threats; to preserve the high level of capability and readiness of forces; to modernize military capabilities, especially as far as C4ISR is concerned; to deeply transform the military tool (new arm systems); to reform the Department of Defense (structures, procedures, and organization). However medium term budget constraints could make this ambitious program hard up to complete.

The cost of both transformation and modernization as defined by Mr. Rumsfeld, should result in reducing the strength of U.S. forces abroad\textsuperscript{23} and to partially decrease American leadership during this post Cold War strategic pause in Europe. This shall be balanced by the assurance of reaching in a medium or even long term time frame a total military supremacy. However, in the present international situation asymmetric threats have essentially eliminated such a strategic pause. In addition, it is uncertain that reliable allies, even in Europe\textsuperscript{24}, want to support the monitoring of a VUCA post Cold War world while the Americans shape a new one\textsuperscript{25} consistent with their own National Interests. Whatever the aftermath of the terrorist attacks could be, the United States should open an intense transatlantic dialogue\textsuperscript{26} about these important issues.

IMPLICATIONS OF KEY GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS

As a paradox, this sophisticated technology race emphasizes the need for the U.S. to rely on its allies all the more. For example, the U.S. will increasingly delegate the monitoring of low intensity conflicts (Smaller Scale Contingencies scenarios) to its allies. Actually, within such a
framework, the United States would need the support of its "reliable allies". These nations, under a regional lead nation command, could conduct OOTWs (Operations Other Than War), releasing the United States from that burden. U.S. forces would still preserve the concept of "overwhelming forces in fighting" (Powell doctrine) while minimizing the risks and setting oneself as the "ultimate guarantor".

If this logic prevails, the new U.S. regional policy for Europe would make sense and would be relevant. The emergence of Asia as a region susceptible to large scale military competition, the improvement of the unique UK-USA relationship, the claim of the Alliance primacy, the ongoing thoughts in the Pentagon about the pertinence of Americans deployment in the Balkans, and more specifically the effectiveness (strength and means) of U.S. forces within the KFOR and SFOR, are evidence of the will of U.S. authorities to both simultaneously trim the commitment of forces and to sustain an optimal influence on the European Security Affairs.

This approach explains the specific attention Americans must pay to the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, or ESDP and Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP. These projects, not yet finely shaped, are conditionally backed by the Americans, and ought to reinforce the Alliance.

THE EMERGING CFSP/ESDP

The requirements of the Cold War and the domination of the United States anchored the defense of Western Europe in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, April 1949, and backed up by a powerful permanent structure under American command: the Supreme Headquarter for Allies Powers in Europe or SHAPE. The Western Europe Union, or W.E.U successor of the European Community of Defense (ECD) instituted in 1952, was, at that time, a weak competitor. Not having actual operational structure, it was only a forum for political consultation. European forces not subjected to the integrated command of NATO (except the French Armies since the decision of General de Gaulle to withdraw itself, in 1966) were created, in the 1990s, in the form of multinational units, known as "responsible forces before the W.E.U.", including French participation in each:
- Eurocorps (with Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg);
- Eurofor, fast force of intervention, and
- Euromar, air and sea maritime force, each one with Spain, Italy and Portugal.
- In addition, in 1992, the WEU created a cell of planning and, in 1993, a satellite center in Torrejon (Spain) to exploit images shot from satellites of observation.
Two extreme positions historically clashed as regards European defense, which return to two contradictory designs of Community construction. On a side, the successive French governments defended with constancy "Europe power" - or "European Europe", to repeat the "de Gaulle" terminology -, which is defined by strong common policies and independence with regard to the United States. In this meaning, the WEU had responsibility to become the "military arm" of the E.U. for its Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP, independent of NATO. On the other side, traditionally the British position, Europe is reduced to its free-trader dimension, and the United States is de facto a member. The E.U. is not seen as a community but as a large market connected by a transatlantic economic partnership, and being fully satisfied by its subordinate statute within NATO. A CFSP does not mean a European defense and a European defense does not imply necessarily a European army.

The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam reflect these two approaches by ambiguous formulations endeavoring to say one thing and its opposite, to propose the WEU but proclaiming, each time as necessary, its compatibility with NATO: "the foreign and common security policies include the broad spectrum of questions relating to the security of the European Union, including the definition, in the long term, of a policy of common defense, which could lead, at the proper time, to a common defense" (Article J 4-1 of E.U. Treaty). In fact, except France and, to a certain extent, Spain – (Germany now being tempted to play its national card independently of the Union) -, no country, among the Fifteen, wanted a "Europe Power", not even as a pillar of NATO.

Because of divergence of position between E.U. members, with the exception of the ALBA operation in Albania (Italian-led operation under the Authority of WEU in 1997) the European military interventions of these last years (Gulf war, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo), were executed either under national, U.N. or NATO command. Franco-German attempts to elaborate a European defense system within NATO failed.

The agreement concluded in Berlin on June 3 and 4, 1996 clearly stated the principle of a European system of defense within NATO, and had indeed envisaged Multinational Task Forces (MTF) under European command, which could be attached to the WEU and act without U.S. participation. But the foreseen use of those WTF would depend on prior agreement with NATO authorities, that means in practice with the agreement of the United States, and that is to say without any autonomy of E.U. decision making.

MTFs would have relied on the infrastructure and the logistics of NATO and would have consequently depended on the assistance NATO would agree to give them. The Command and Control of operations would have been linked to existing levels of command of NATO. In short,
these "European" forces would have acted only if the United States wanted it and whenever the 
U.S. would not have wished to engage its own forces.

Based on a Franco-German common defense security concept, the declaration adopted in 
Nuremberg on December 9, 1996, by President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
reinforced the overlap of the future European system of defense within its Atlantic framework, as 
far as its inspiration, its doctrines and its instructions are concerned. Thus, such considerable 
steps towards an integration of France in the Atlantic organization, at the same time theoretical 
and practical, logically led to decisions and actions: the return of France to the Council of 
Ministers of Defense of the countries of the Alliance and to the committee of the military plans; 
the official request for the designation of a European commander - successively a French, an 
Italian and a Spaniard – to the southern command of NATO.

This proposal was motivated by ongoing discussions started on the renewed task 
organization of NATO staffs and the command of SOUTHCOM, the command of the southern 
region of NATO. The American answer was without any ambiguity: this command would never 
be given to a European because of the importance the area represents for U.S. interests, and 
because the American Sixth Fleet is attached to it. In Bergen, in December 1996, this point of 
view was clearly expressed during NATO Defense Ministers informal meeting. The war in 
Kosovo in spring 1999 seemed to refute French and German inclinations for autonomous 
European defense, existing with and under "NATO cover".

But since the Cologne European Council, a renewed priority of the E.U. has been to 
develop and introduce the civil and military resources and capabilities required to enable the 
E.U. to take and implement decisions on the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-
management missions defined in the Treaty on E.U. ("Petersberg tasks"). The E.U. has, in 
this respect, highlighted its determination to develop an autonomous capability to decide on and 
where NATO as such is not involved, to launch and conduct E.U.-led military operations in 
response to international crises. For that purpose, Member States have decided to develop 
more effective military capabilities. This process, without unnecessary duplication, does not 
involve the establishment of a European army. These developments are an integral part of 
strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Union will, thus, be able to make a 
greater contribution to international security in keeping with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the OSCE Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. The E.U. recognizes the primary 
responsibility of the United Nations Security Council with regard to international peace-keeping 
and security.
At the Helsinki European Council, the Member States set themselves headline goals in the field of military capabilities, which will complement the other instruments available to the E.U. The intent is to be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces which could range up to corps level (60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support units and, if required, air and naval elements. In Helsinki, the Member States also decided to develop collective capability goals, particularly in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. At the Feira European Council, the E.U. also encouraged countries which have applied for membership of the E.U. and the non-E.U. European members of NATO to contribute to improving Europe's capabilities.

The work conducted since the Feira European Council has enabled the E.U. to define the variety of measures needed to carry out successfully the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding among these. It has made it possible to specify the E.U.'s needs in terms of the military capability and forces required to attain the headline goal. The needs identified are outlined in a capability catalogue. As agreed at the Feira European Council, NATO's military expertise has helped in drawing up this catalogue.

On 20 November, 2000, in Brussels, the Member States took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. The conference also made it possible to identify a number of areas in which efforts will be made in upgrading existing assets, investment, development and coordination so as to gradually acquire or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous E.U. action. The Member States announced their initial commitments in this respect.

This conference constitutes the first stage of a demanding process of reinforcing military capabilities for crisis management by the E.U. with the purpose being to achieve the overall goal set by 2003, but continuing beyond that date in order to achieve the collective capability goals. At the Helsinki European Council the Member States had also decided to identify the collective capability goals in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, and had welcomed decisions of that nature already announced by certain Member States: – to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means; – to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States; – to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; – to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command; – to increase the number of readily deployable troops; – and to enhance strategic sea lift capacity. This effort will continue. It remains essential to the
credibility and effectiveness of the European security and defense policy that the E.U.'s military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the E.U. is in a position to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets.

At the Capabilities Commitment Conference\textsuperscript{31}, in accordance with the decisions taken at the Helsinki and Feira European Councils, the Member States committed themselves, on a voluntary basis, to making national contributions corresponding to the rapid reaction capabilities identified to attain the headline goal. These commitments have been set out in a catalogue known as the "Force Catalogue". Analysis of this catalogue confirms that by 2003, in keeping with the headline goal established in Helsinki, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks, but that certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms in order to maximize the capabilities available to the Union. In this respect, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment fully to achieve the goals identified at the Helsinki European Council. To that end, they will aim to identify as soon as possible the complementary initiatives which they may implement, either on a national basis or in cooperation with partners, to respond to the needs identified. These efforts will be in addition to the contributions already identified. For the countries concerned, these efforts and those deployed as part of the initiative on NATO defense capabilities are mutually reinforcing.

In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member States\textsuperscript{32} make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in Helsinki (60,000 troops available for deployment within 60 days for a mission of at least a year). These contributions, set out in the "Force Catalogue", constitute a pool of more than 100,000 soldiers and approximately 400 combat aircrafts and 100 ships, making it possible to satisfy fully the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis-management missions within the headline goal.

By 2003, once the appropriate European Union political and military bodies are in a position to ensure political control and strategic management of E.U.-led operations, under the authority of the Council, the Union will gradually be able to undertake Petersberg tasks\textsuperscript{33} in line with its increasing military capabilities. The need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has however been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied. Efforts also need to be made in specific areas such as military equipment, including weapons and munitions, support services, including medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of forces.

As regards command, control and communications, the Member States offered a satisfactory number of national or multinational military staff at strategic and operational levels\textsuperscript{34}, and in terms of forces and components. These offers will have to be evaluated further in
qualitative terms so that the E.U. can, over and above possible recourse to NATO capabilities, have the best possible command and control resources at its disposal. The Union pointed out the importance it attaches to the speedy conclusion of ongoing talks on access to NATO capabilities and resources. The European Union Military Staff, which has acquired an initial operational capability in the course of 2001, will bolster the European Union's collective early warning capability and will provide it with a pre-decisional situation assessment and strategic planning capability.

As far as intelligence is concerned, apart from the image interpretation capabilities of the Torrejon Satellite Center, Member States offered a number of resources which can contribute to the analysis and situation monitoring capability of the European Union. Nevertheless, they noted that serious efforts would be necessary in this area in order for the Union to have more strategic intelligence at its disposal in the future.

With regard to the strategic air and naval transport capabilities available to the European Union, improvements are necessary to guarantee that the Union is able to respond, in any scenario, to the requirements of a demanding operation at the top of the Petersberg range, as defined in Helsinki.

In accordance with the decisions of the Helsinki and Feira European Councils on collective capability goals, the Member States also committed themselves to medium and long-term efforts in order to improve both their operational and their strategic capabilities still further. The Member States committed themselves, particularly in the framework of the reforms being implemented in their armed forces, to continue taking steps to strengthen their own capabilities and carrying out existing or planned projects implementing multilateral solutions, including in the field of pooling resources.

The restructuring of the European defense industries taking place in certain Member States was a positive factor in this. It encouraged the development of European capabilities. By way of example, the Member States concerned cited the work they are engaged in on a number of vital projects which would contribute to bolstering the capabilities at the Union's disposal: Future Large Aircraft (Airbus A 400M), sea transport vessels, Troop Transport Helicopters (NH 90). Some Member States also announced their intention to continue their efforts to acquire equipment to improve the safety and effectiveness of military action (for example counter battery radars). Some undertook to improve the Union's guaranteed access to satellite imaging, thanks in particular to the development of new optical and radar satellite equipment (Helios II, SAR Lupe and Cosmos Skymed).
In order to ensure the durability of European action to strengthen capabilities, the Member States agreed on the importance of laying down an evaluation mechanism enabling follow-up to be made and progress to be facilitated toward the realization of the commitments made with a view to achieving the headline goal, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

The purpose of this mechanism, the broad outline of which was approved at the Nice European Council\(^36\), was to provide the Union with an assessment and follow-up capability for its goals (based on the HTF – Headline Goal Task Force) relying on a consultation method between the Member States. In order to avoid needless duplication, it could, for the Member States concerned, rely on technical data emanating from existing NATO mechanisms such as Defense Planning and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Recourse to these sources would be coordinated ahead at time, with the help of the E.U. Military Staff (EUMS), via consultations between experts in a working group set up on the same model as that which operated for the drawing up of the capabilities catalogue (HTF plus). In addition, exchange of information and transparency would be appropriately ensured between the E.U. and NATO by the Working Group on Capability set up between the two organizations, which would take steps to ensure the well-knit development of E.U. and NATO capabilities where they overlap (in particular that arising from the goals set out at the Helsinki European Council and from the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative).

This process will be based on the following principles\(^37\):

(a) preservation of the E.U.'s autonomy in decision making, in particular in the setting out, evaluation, monitoring and follow-up of capability goals;

(b) recognition of the political and voluntary nature of the commitments made, which implies that the Member States are responsible for any adjustment of the commitments in the light of the evaluation made;

(c) transparency, simplicity and clarity, in order among other things to enable comparisons to be made between the commitments of the various Member States;

(d) continuity and regularity of evaluation of progress made, on the basis of reports enabling ministers to take the appropriate decisions;

(e) the flexibility necessary to adapt the commitments to newly identified needs.

Regarding relations with NATO, the arrangements concerning transparency, cooperation and dialogue between the E.U. and NATO should be set out in the document on permanent arrangements between the E.U. and NATO. The evaluation mechanism would take account of the following additional principles:
(f) the need, for the countries concerned, to ensure the compatibility of the commitments taken on in the E.U. framework with the forces objectives accepted in the framework of NATO planning;

(g) the need for mutual reinforcement of the E.U.'s capability goals and those arising, for the countries concerned;

(h) the need to avoid needless duplication of procedures and of information requested.

(i) Concerning relations with third countries the mechanism would ensure that the contributions of European States which are members of NATO but not part of the E.U., and of the applicant countries, are taken into account, in order to enable an evaluation to be made of their complementary commitments which contribute to improving European capabilities, and to facilitate their possible participation in E.U.-led operations in accordance with the Helsinki and Feira decisions.

The examination of the work carried out within the E.U. will benefit from the support of E.U. Member States, or EUMS, in the framework of its mandate, and will be the subject of reports to the Council.

The Member States welcomed the offers expressed by aspirant countries to E.U. and the European Member States of NATO in reply to the invitation made to them at the Feira European Ministerial Council (21 November 2001) to make their contribution, in the form of complementary commitments, to improving European capabilities.

Contributions received at the ministerial meetings on 21 November would extend the range of capabilities available for E.U.-led operations, thus enhancing the E.U.'s intervention capability in a wide range of possible scenarios. They would be welcomed as contributions adding value to the capabilities offered by the Member States. In this context, the Member States signaled their agreement for those contributions to be evaluated, in liaison with the states concerned, according to the same criteria as those applied to the Member States.

THE RENEWED U.S. DEFENSE POLICY VIS À VIS ESDP

The idea of a new Trans-Atlantic Partnership described in 2000, by Former Secretary of State Albright, appears less relevant because of the neo-realist approach of the new administration. Mrs. Rice, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Cheney, Mr. Wolfowitz, General Powell have known the previous Bush Presidency and, thus, they seem to favor a "reinforced partnership". That means, in fact, a constrained improvement of the European military capabilities in order to allow a sharing of the burden.
The U.S. approach is still ambiguous and even seems suspicious because the Bush Administration wants to avoid the United States facing a peer competitor in a long term future. Europe is already a peer economic competitor for the U.S. and the competition will increase in a near future due to the capitalization of European industrial companies. Stanley Loan issued an excellent study\textsuperscript{3}, in which he demonstrated that a politically and military strong Europe is seen as a challenge. Turkey, frustrated by E.U. accession process is resisting pressure from U.S officials to accept the Berlin Principles which allow E.U access to NATO planning resources. These principles issued at the Washington NATO summit on April 1999, define automatic decision-making processes addressing Alliance support to an E.U.-led operation. Intransigence and threats of veto by Turkey, if the E.U. might ask for NATO means and capabilities, could lead some NATO members to favor a complete autonomy of European defense policy.

This perspective, which could undermine U.S. leadership, explains some of the Bush Administration concerns. Europe security is not currently threatened and the U.S. Congress carefully considers its support for new commitments of U.S. troops in Peace Support Operations (PSO) because of their costs and consequences on troop operational tempo. Therefore, U.S. concerns about NATO could be seen as based on its own national interests and the effective influence on European defense policy NATO organization provides.

The Three D (no Decoupling, no Duplication, no Discrimination) used a short while ago by Mrs. Albright were perceived as the three Nos by some European officials. It is another example of the conservative approach some U.S. officials use to monitor the development of the E.U defense policy and to keep it as one of the pillars of the NATO temple. Lord Robertson substituted the three Is (Inclusiveness, Improvement, Indivisibility) for the three Ds as a more politically correct way to express the same statement.

The E.U. bloc in NATO exists today. Some members suggest that the same motivation inspired the proposal that 6 non-E.U. members of NATO become favored interlocutors since they would not be involved in the decision-making process of an E.U.-led operation. They will only participate in crisis situation analysis, and their involvement in military management will depend on their significant commitment of forces.

Another attitude of mistrust consists in repeatedly asserting that the E.U. should only deal with OOTWs, Smaller Scale Contingencies of the Petersberg Declaration. This contradicts the Cologne and Helsinki resolutions. Moreover the U.K-French Saint Malo summit decisions will require a tremendous change of approach of either the U.S. Administration or some NATO members. A framework that considers European countries as "vassals"\textsuperscript{39} will be a key issue of
the U.S. and E.U. relationship. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks could provide an opportunity for such a required change.

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS**

The devastating attacks against the United States have forced a major foreign policy shift by the Bush Administration, from a go-it-alone approach based on narrow U.S. interests to the pursuit of a global coalition against terrorism. The shift has been welcomed in European capitals. But even as the world’s governments line up to pledge support for the United States, some worry that George W. Bush may not prove as adroit as his father was in forging an international coalition in 1990, after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. There is fear that President Bush may overreact militarily, striking back so hard against elusive terrorist targets that the Arab world becomes radicalized and spawns more terrorism.

Almost from the day he entered the White House, President Bush drew criticism from some U.S. allies for his rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and his vow to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to construct a missile defense system - moves that were regarded abroad as signifying an American retreat into a fortress mentality.

Have the Americans become multilateralists since the attacks of September 11? There is no evidence to support this. The U.S. Senate always had very firm positions against any new engagement of the United States in a multilateral system which undermines U.S. sovereignty. That did not change.

But the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, and the anthrax bio-terrorism shattered any illusions that the United States could transform itself into an invulnerable haven. As former President George H.W. Bush observed in a speech in Boston on September 13, the surprise attacks should "erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism, or in anything else for that matter."

European capitals felt quiet satisfaction at the recognition by the world's only superpower that it still requires the support of friends and former foes in the battle against terrorism and to achieve other foreign policy goals. Some officials say the Bush administration, fearing isolation on global warming and other issues, was already moving toward a more cooperative attitude, and the trauma of September 11 destroyed any lingering sense of self-sufficiency.

"It was only a matter of time," said a senior adviser to French President Jacques Chirac. "America's power in the world may be unrivaled in military, political and economic areas, but in the era of globalization even a superpower cannot disregard the need for allies". Just like
president Clinton, President Bush would have come to that conclusion, but the terrorist attacks and the recent economic problems in the U.S. accelerated the process."

Many European analysts say Bush's declaration of war against global terrorism starts with some key advantages, notably a strong degree of support in almost every corner of the globe. The United States won a powerful endorsement when NATO's 19 members made the unprecedented decision under Article 5 of their charter to declare the terror strikes an attack against all members, opening the way for a collective military response. The United States also gained support with a resolution passed unanimously by the U.N. Security Council, including Russia and China, which in the past have been hostile to the use of American military might.

"The U.N. resolution provides a clear legal framework and gives a green light for the United States to employ military force at a time and place of its choosing," said Philippe Sands, a British scholar and expert in international law. Washington also enjoys a degree of sympathy following the attacks that it did not possess when it organized the Persian Gulf War coalition. As the origins of the terrorist plot were traced, as many experts stated, to the clandestine network of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, the United States encountered little political opposition in Europe to attacking Afghan territory. Bin Laden was truly believed to be hiding in Afghanistan under the protection of its Taliban rulers.

Russia, while reluctant to offer military support, was one of the first countries to endorse the U.S. anti-terrorism drive. In September 2001, India and Pakistan set aside their bitter regional rivalry and allowed the use of their airspace and other facilities for retaliatory operations. Even Iran, which has long castigated the United States as "the Great Satan," made what senior U.S. officials call "a very positive statement" based on its virulent hostility toward the Taliban.

But in other respects, Bush faces a trickier challenge in assembling and maintaining a worldwide anti-terrorism alliance. In the Gulf War, the brutal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the dangers it posed to the safety of world oil supplies left few doubts that such aggression could not be tolerated.

Terrorists, however, operate in the shadows and may elude retaliatory strikes. Experts say the bin Laden network, for example, operates in at least 34 countries and regions, making it more difficult to eradicate than a conventional force. And if the United States were to pursue a broader military campaign in countries other than Afghanistan, it could arouse opposition from Arab and European governments already troubled by U.S. double standard approach in the Palestinian-Israel struggle.
In Europe, where citizens in 43 countries observed three minutes of silence on September 14 in honor of the U.S. terror victims, there are signs that the strong transatlantic loyalty could dissipate if U.S. retaliation proves too clumsy. "There are concerns across Europe that the United States could overreact because the president is facing such enormous public pressure to hit back hard," said Frank Umbach, a security specialist for Germany's Council on Foreign Relations. "The feeling in Germany and in other European countries is that international terrorism can only be fought by dealing with the underlying political and economic causes."

As demands for vengeance have grown among the American public, foreign leaders have counseled caution. "The United States must avoid any course of action which will be as unpopular as that of the terrorists," said Nelson Mandela, South Africa's former president and a Nobel Peace Prize winner. "It must not be allowed now to raise, to intensify hatred against the Arab nations and the Muslims."

French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine warned against igniting a "clash of civilizations" between the Western and Islamic worlds, which he claimed "may be among the demented calculations of those who instigated the attacks" in New York and Washington. He suggested that measures designed to sabotage the financial and logistical networks that nourish terrorism could be much more effective than massive bombing raids that endanger innocent civilians.

In Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair has joined Bush in calling for a global campaign "to find all of the perpetrators of the suicide attacks and destroy their machinery of terror," the government has appealed for the United States to deliberate before launching a retaliatory attack and dragging its allies into war. "Article 5 does not mean a blank check," said a Blair spokesman.

NATO diplomats said that despite the show of solidarity, the United States was likely to act alone or lead a core "coalition of the willing" when the time comes for a military response. But there was little doubt that the NATO alliance, just like the United States, has been dramatically affected by the bombings.

"The whole world has changed, and that means we will have to attach much greater importance to the problem of terrorism," said NATO Secretary General George Robertson. "This time we saw airliners used like flying bombs, inflicting the kind of damage that would require many cruise missiles. Next time it could be biological or chemical weapons, delivered in a ballistic missile or a suitcase."
TOWARD A REVIEWED TRANS-ATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIP?

Taking into account the new technological and geopolitical variables that affect Trans-Atlantic relationship as far the defense is concerned, some prudent and realistic recommendations emerge. They address the potential security challenges faced on both sides of the Atlantic. In the last decades, the Allies came out of the Cold War with great confidence. New types of crises emerged in the Gulf and the Balkans, showing some deficiencies in their security organizations, and indeed in their way of thinking about emerging threats.

Acting side by side, the U.S. and the Europeans faced and overcame these crises. The large quantities of weapons needed for the Cold War were losing their justification, hence the decline in U.S. and European defense spending, which was broadly parallel. But the U.S. kept, in comparative terms, a higher level of spending, especially on research and development, which enabled it to introduce new weapons and systems. Some European nations, France being one of them, looked to modernize but the result of this collective effort was disappointing.

Three emerging trends are now evident:

First, on both sides of the Atlantic, countries are reassessing some of their security risks and threats. These reassessments involve wide-ranging political and strategic assumptions and deserve an open public debate.

Second, some of their major existing systems need to be replaced. These large procurement programs will raise issues about the new capabilities and systems of forces which fit best into their vision of the threats, and on the level of expenditure democracies will want to devote to defense.

Third, dynamic economic sectors are competing hard for the basic resources their military establishments need, that is to say people. And above all, capable, technically competent people are in demand.

Leaders are working hard to find the best answers to these challenges, on both sides of the Atlantic. There is an additional factor to manage - the reciprocal impact of decisions to be taken on both sides of the Atlantic. This delicate period should also be one of intense dialogue and serious thought about how allies can best act in a coherent and complementary way between the U.S. and Europe.

This will not be easy because their perspectives and priorities will not necessarily be identical. The Europeans will have their own answers and priorities, just as the United States as a global power will have its answers and priorities. In reviewing the difficulties, some solutions surface.
On the European side, perception of the security challenges is influenced by the events on Europe's doorstep in the last decade. In the Balkans, there have been major tensions provoking vicious conflicts. European countries have deployed their conventional forces to restore peace and reconstruct nations. Stabilizing the Balkans is a long-term process, and they consider that the international community, including a military element, will need to remain there for a long period.

And European countries are not just concerned about their backyard. Their analysis is that many more such manifestations of instability may lie ahead. The arc of crises spans Africa, the Middle East and central Asia. Many countries in these areas are experiencing great difficulties on their road to modernity. Their numerous, unemployed and impatient young people are easy prey to religious, ethnic and nationalistic violent movements of all sorts as demonstrated with global spread terrorist networks. The roots of future crises are deep and are in place. The responses are multi-dimensional and should be defined in the context of each society and of each region.

Furthermore, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction so called Chemical Biological Radiological, and enhanced high Explosive (CBNRE) and their means of delivery is one aspect of these complex problems of societies going through difficult transitions. The U.S. and European countries should always keep in mind the local and regional context in which such proliferation emerges.

Proliferation reflects, at least in part, the temptation of states confronted with economic and social problems to compensate for domestic paralysis by shows of outward assertiveness. There is no dispute either in France40 or in the rest of Europe about the real dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. European countries welcome a real and constructive debate on the subject of proliferation and, on all the responses to it, including missile defense. They will participate actively in it.

But proliferation, while a real problem, is not high on the priority list in European public opinion. European citizens are, however, keenly aware of the human rights violations, instabilities, waves of illegal immigration, trafficking and global crime that surround them and reach them on a daily basis. They increasingly expect their governments to be able to act on those clear and present challenges.

These concerns tend to be reflected in European priorities as they have emerged in the past months. When the E.U. members determined the tools they needed to handle problems directly relevant to them, they naturally started from their Balkan experience. Their priority is the development of rapidly deployable conventional forces that could intervene to put out the fires in
their backyard or further afield. Alongside the military requirement, the E.U. is developing its civilian capabilities for nation building.

At the end of 2001, E.U. heads of state and government declared the E.U.'s operational capability which will enable the E.U. to respond to some of the lesser contingencies that may arise. It will take some more time, and the investment in the necessary projection and other key capabilities, before the E.U. will be ready to address the broader set of missions in the framework of the Petersberg tasks.

Europeans recognize the strength of some American comments: the seriousness of their intentions will be judged by the reality of new capabilities. They will have to increase European capabilities for action on the higher end of the spectrum, capabilities that are available today only to a few E.U. Member States. Experience shows that the European Headline Goal is bringing more determination for many governments to improve their defense spending both in volume and in capacity to combine national efforts; and this is going to benefit NATO capabilities as the Alliance has long demanded.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The risk that the present period of reassessment might lead to transatlantic differences was already mentioned. Does the development of a European reaction force create the very situation both sides of the Atlantic want to avoid? Does it open the way for a division of labor with the U.S. taking care of the high end of the risk and conflict spectrum, and the Europeans focusing on the fire brigade function of local peace restoration in their vicinity?

Such a division of labor, whether intended or accidental, would damage transatlantic relations and reduce our overall capacity to deter and manage new crises. A key objective for this period of review the U.S. and Europe are going through is to avoid going down separate specialized paths and to come out of this process with trans-Atlantic solidarity preserved and enhanced. How can they do this?

First, both sides of the Atlantic Alliance must maintain their commitment to deterrence. Effective missile defenses are not going to come overnight. They require a prolonged process of technological innovation, investment, adjustment in existing arms control agreements and substantial co-ordination between the U.S. and its allies.

So during the coming decade, they should continue to rely on the existing mix of conventional and nuclear offensive forces to deter any challenge by emerging countries to their vital interests. President Chirac recently made this position clear. As far as France is concerned, "if the leaders of regional powers with WMD capabilities challenged our vital interests, they run
the risk of unacceptable damage, inflicted first on their centers of political, economic and military power." France remains true to its concept of non-use. It does and will maintain the credibility of its deterrence in the face of all new threats; and it knows that Western solidarity would be crucial in the face of blackmail or pressure from a regional power.

When MD capabilities become available towards the end of the decade, these may further complicate the assessment of the risk by an adversary. However, they can never replace the fundamental importance to Trans-Atlantic security of collective political determination to use all available means of deterrence and the manifest capability to do so.

Second, the U.S. and Europe must maintain capabilities that are interoperable and complementary. The various reflections going on in Washington have a central objective: to modernize the doctrine and capabilities of U.S. armed forces in order to make them more effective against present and future threats. All allies support the modernization of U.S. forces because they feel that a capable and self-confident United States is valuable in handling the multiple crises that may emerge around the world, whether the U.S. manages the crises in a leading position or supports its allies doing so.

But it is crucial that allied forces be interoperable if they are to remain capable of acting together. When choosing the format and contents of future U.S. forces, the U.S. must bear in mind that it will participate in coalitions with forces that will not always have the same level of technology, but which will have an equal determination to prevail over common challenges. QDR 2001 addresses this issue without due consideration. Complementarity should be a key word for the U.S. and Europe partnership. Leaders must therefore build into their forces interfaces and bridges that allow them to work together effectively.

Leaders are at a key point in their decision cycles. As they consider their investment strategies about systems which are usually fielded for twenty years or more, they have to take care to avoid divergence. Leaders have to build convergence into their decisions. Technological and industrial factors must also be taken into account. They need to improve the sharing of technologies across the Atlantic, in an effective two way flow. This means:

- searching for efficiency in procurement and access to technology;
- implementing two-way confidence, while taking into account security and political concerns of both sides;
- achieving real reciprocity in access to markets and technology.

European countries, spurred by industry, have achieved some dramatic improvements. They have started to design a harmonized legal framework for enhancing transnational industrial activities and they have created a modern instrument for common program
management. Other initiatives will also create conditions for an enhanced and balanced transatlantic cooperation. As these processes evolve, such experiments as the Raytheon/Thales co-operation will play a major role in European assessment of what can be achieved with the U.S.

A final suggestion on how to maintain coherence at this pivotal time, is to preserve Trans-Atlantic joint determination. Europeans are ready to contribute seriously to the management of future security risks. They will not create the conditions for a decoupling in the transatlantic security relationship. At the same time, the Europeans have a new-found determination to take political responsibility for the management of crises that affect their security. This is a critical development. It has taken a long time - too long perhaps. But it is a direct response to the long-standing U.S. expectation of burden sharing and is based on a recognition of the role of effective capabilities as well as on the political responsibility of the E.U., which is a political entity in development and no longer a mere common market.

There is a lot of work to be done on both sides but some real progress has already been made. Recent changes in France offer a good example. In June 2001, the French defense minister Alain Richard spent much of his time putting together a draft law on military spending for the 2003-2008 period, trying to square all the different constraints, an exercise that has gave him some professional sympathy for the Quadrennial Defense Review which was going on in the Pentagon. This law, voted in October 2001 by the French Parliament, set out French spending priorities for the next six years. The choices that the French Government makes under the New Military Program Law reflect the specific emphasis on the operational responsibilities France is ready to assume, whether on its own or in cooperation with allies or partners.

The important point is that each side of the transatlantic partnership is capable of shouldering its part of the problems and is ready to act in close harmony with the other. This is exactly what was done in the Kosovo crisis, and what is occurring now in Macedonia. The close co-operation between the E.U. and NATO, particularly the joint efforts of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson is an example of what pragmatic, action-oriented co-operation can achieve. E.U. and U.S. joint determination in Macedonia has already had a positive effect because of the containment of the crisis. Moreover, in its way, the Macedonian crisis shows clearly the advantage of a European capability. By September 2003, E.U. is planned to take the lead of NATO operation in Macedonia. E.U. will be able to coordinate with more efficiency all aspects of a crisis using diplomacy, economy, information and military powers. This is a strong advantage because of "unity of command provided" and given NATO role limitation to defense issues. So the European Rapid Reaction Force is a practical response to a real need, for both sides of the
Atlantic. It requires, and must deliver, real improvements in European capability. It includes the welcomed contributions of European allies who are not members of the E.U. And there is no intention of creating a division between European allies by creating an exclusive E.U. capability. E.U. has done everything necessary to associate her non-E.U. colleagues with the European Rapid Reaction Force. The transatlantic partnership is being renewed. It is changing. It will enlarge further. The next NATO summit in Prague could be a good opportunity to move the process forward.

CONCLUSION

The Trans-Atlantic alliance is facing the most uncertain geopolitical environment in half a century. The examination of the impacts on this cohesive relationship of the renewed strategic orientations of the United States and the emerging of the European Security and Defense Policy may lead to a risky strategic gap. This gap may develop and widen especially with the domain of the military power with, among others, implications of new technological and geopolitical variables.

The U.S. defense policy as defined by QDR 2001, includes an intention to change, which if applied, should have strong indisputable implications either at the national level or within the framework of the international policy of the United States especially as far as the U.S. and E.U. relationship is concerned.

Preparing for the security challenges of the coming decades will require intellectual and political determination. The U.S. and Europe should help each other in analyzing all the aspects of these challenges in order to convince and mobilize democratic societies which will tend naturally to avoid multiple commitments in remote conflicts.

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ENDNOTES

1 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee; Defense Strategy Review, Thursday, June 21, 2001, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

2 Terrorist attacks on Tuesday, September, 11th, aimed against the Head of the US government, and its symbols of military and economic power, confirm the asymmetric treats US authorities have to compel with.


4 Issued on September, 30th, 2001.

5 President Bush Testimony before the NDU, May, 1st, 2001.

6 This paragraph summarizes the comments made at a panel discussion on 3 OCT 01 in Washington, DC sponsored by the Women in International Security and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Panel members included the following:

Andrew Hoehn: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and in that capacity the principal author of the 2001 QDR.

Erin Conaton: Professional Staff Member with the House Armed Services Committee, focusing on strategy and policy issues to include the QDR.

Michele Flournoy: Senior Advisor for International Security, CSIS; prior positions included project director for the NDU QDR study, and DASD for Strategy

7 QDR 2001, foreword, p111.

8 USAWC definitions of interests and objectives don’t exactly fit with QDR 2001, America’s security in the 21st century, U.S. Interests and objectives paragraph content, p2.

9 C4ISR: Control, Command, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Radar.


11 Several options are studied in the United States, with notably an encompassing magnitude and total azimuths option.

12 Chinese are supposed to be interested in spatial issues and the information technologies revolution.

14 President Bush, in his visit to Europe, in his meeting with President Putin, indicated that the ABM treaty in its present form restricts the kind of research and development that he believes is desirable and appropriate for the United States.

15 Ibid.

16 President Bush proposed this option during his European tour in July 2001.

17 Mr. Rumsfeld is the author of an ambitious report about the US spatial policy published a couple of month ago, and Mr. Marshall (office of State Assessment) is in charge of the Strategic Review. Mr. Rumsfeld has stated that the results of this review will be folded into the Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR, in turn will play a major role in shaping the administration's defense budget decisions beginning with fiscal year 2003.

18 "the Department of Defense has embarked on an ambitious transformation of U.S. military forces ...As this transformation efforts matures-and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force-DoD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces". QDR 2001, Part III, Paradigm shift in force planning, Current Forces, p23.


21 Former Gerald Ford's Defense Secretary (1974-1977), he is a skilled politician and the vice president noticeably sustains him.

22 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee; Defense Strategy Review, Thursday, June 21, 2001, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

23 About 100 000 military personnel remain permanently stationed in Europe. The majority of them are members of elements of larger units that were stationed there during the Cold War. Working Group. QDR 2001, Strategy driven choices for America's Security. Edited by Michele A. Foumoy. p237.


25 The expression "Shape the Future" was the core Motto of the US Defense Strategy.


27 Ops tempo is considered to be reduced.

The way could be open for a division of labor, with the US taking care of the high end of the risk and conflict spectrum, and the European focusing on the fire brigade function of local peace restoration in their vicinity.

The Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and evacuation missions, peacekeeping missions and combat-force missions for crisis management, including missions to restore peace (Article 17(2) TEU).


Défense Européenne: la mise en œuvre, Cahier de Chaillot, #42, Paris, September 2000

"Les institutions de l'Europe de la Défense", D.David, T. d'Arbonneau, Y. Boyer, M. Perrin de Brichambault, Revue de la Défense Nationale, November 2001, p120.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Stanley Loan, Cahier de Chaillot, number 39, April 2000.

Mr. de Charrette, Le Figaro, 13 December 2000, and Mr. Brzezinsky definition of NATO:"NATO is a set of vassals surrounding an hegemonic Center", Le grand Echiquier.


The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review is mandated by the Congress and due in December 2001. It will describe the size, structure, and posture of the U.S.'s nuclear forces and the contribution they can make to deterrence to the coming decade.
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