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ARMY ROTC'S CHALLENGE: PROVIDING LIEUTENANTS FOR THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

BY

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United States Army

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USAWC FELLOWSHIP RESEARCH PROJECT

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The 21st Century will force the Army to make perhaps the most dramatic changes to its structure, organization, and doctrine in its history. The junior leaders of this new organization, the Objective Force, will require skills, talents, and training to understand the world around them and to better see the entire battlespace from all dimensions. The changing operating environment being shaped by both traditional threats and rising non-traditional threats will present significant challenges for the leaders of this new force. If the Army is going to successfully transition to the Objective Force, Army ROTC must lead the way in recruiting, retaining, and training the right type of Gen-Xers and Gen-Yers with the necessary characteristics to become the lieutenants of the Objective Force.

Army ROTC has evolved into the largest producer of officers for the Army. ROTC officers have proven themselves in war and peace. Despite the outstanding record of producing quality officers, Cadet Command has not had the same level of success in producing lieutenants in the quantity that the Army requires. It has failed to meet its commissioning mission each of the past ten years. It is imperative to the success of the Army’s transition to the Objective Force that this trend be reversed. Cadet Command must ensure that the organization, staffing, and training of Army ROTC will attract the right type of students to ensure a highly trained and properly manned officer corps. This is the major challenge facing Cadet Command and Army ROTC. It must provide the majority of lieutenants for the Objective Force.

The purpose of this research paper is to look at challenges facing Cadet Command in successfully recruiting and training the new lieutenants with the necessary skills and attributes to assume leadership roles in the Objective Force and beyond. The paper looks at the history of Army ROTC, and the impact of changes in the market, the world, and the Army on the organization and operations of ROTC. It identifies the major challenges in personnel, recruiting, and training Cadet Command must overcome and recommendations for ensuring that Cadet Command provides the right quality and quantity of lieutenants for the Objective Force.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is the result of the author's Army War College Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Technology at The University of Texas at Austin. The author's primary interest in this topic was the result of two assignments in Cadet Command including the last assignment as the Professor of Military Science at Sam Houston State University.

The author would like to thank all the Professors of Military Science who took time out of their busy schedules to complete my survey. Their candid comments, concerns and suggestions regarding Army ROTC and Cadet Command were invaluable. Although the paper could not include every comment, summarized comments are included in such a way as to capture the essence of the input provided. The author appreciates the important job that these dedicated and professional officers are doing to ensure the success of the Objective Force by providing outstanding lieutenants and setting the foundation for the future success of the Army.
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ARMY ROTC'S CHALLENGE: PROVIDING LIEUTENANTS FOR THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) provides the best singular opportunity to increase contacts between the military and future civilian leaders.

—Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn

ROTC is a familiar brand name. It is not, however, one of those brand names which guarantee uniform ingredients in all packages bearing the brand…it varies from campus to campus.

—Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland

Throughout most of the 19th Century and the first part of the 20th Century, the primary means of producing officers for the United States Army was either the United States Military Academy at West Point or "promotion from the ranks" of selected enlisted soldiers. World War I and World War II significantly increased the requirements for lieutenants beyond the capabilities of the previous methods. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program (ROTC) and Officers' Candidate School (OCS) were established to meet the Army's increased demand for junior officers. In the period after World War II, ROTC emerged as the primary producer of lieutenants for the Army.

Cadet Command, which has the responsibility for Army ROTC, has consistently produced officers who have proven themselves in both peace and war. Although the quality has remained high, the quantity has not. Cadet Command has failed to meet its commissioning mission over the past ten years for several reasons including inadequate staffing and insufficient funding. If the Army is going to successfully transform to the Objective Force, it must have a highly trained and properly manned officer corps. Recruiting, retaining, training, and
commissioning the right type of lieutenants with the required traits and attributes are the challenges for Cadet Command.

The Objective Force will require leaders who are “taught how to think as opposed to what to think”\(^1\) if they are to be successful in an environment unlike that of previous generations of Army Officers. The ability to understand the world around them and to better see the entire battlespace from all dimensions will require new training and preparation for these leaders. Although this will be an evolving process over an officer’s entire career, the critical foundation for future learning and development must be accomplished during the initial training phase of these lieutenants while they are cadets.

Since ROTC produces the majority of the Army’s lieutenants each year, it must also make changes to its organization and manning along with the changes in training to properly meet the needs of the Army. Recruiting efforts will need to be updated to ensure that it reaches and attracts the right cadets from the “Generation X” and “Generation Y” markets. ROTC has a well-established tradition of producing good leaders for the Army, but it must ensure that it is able to adapt and change as necessary to meet both the needs of the college students that it seeks to recruit, train, and commission for the Army’s Objective Force.

Major General John Casey, Commanding General of Cadet Command, recently released his vision for Cadet Command. In “The Way Ahead,” he identifies the challenges facing Cadet Command, and his vision of how to overcome these challenges and successfully accomplishing its mission.\(^2\) This paper looks at these challenges from the operator’s level. It focuses on the key, critical areas as identified by current Professors of Military Science (PMS) who represent almost half of the current total of Senior ROTC Programs. These PMSs who will make General Casey’s vision a success for The Army and Cadet Command. In addition to identifying problem areas, this paper will provide recommended solutions for the Army and
Cadet Command to address and implement. Overcoming these impediments to success will enable Cadet Command and its 270 ROTC Battalions to provide the right quality and quantity of lieutenants for the Objective Force. Although Cadet Command’s primary mission has not changed, changes in the market, the world, and the Army will make accomplishing this mission even more important in the future.

HISTORY OF ARMY ROTC

During the 1800s and early 1900s, the Regular Army was relatively small. Its officer corps was filled primarily with graduates of West Point. Occasionally, outstanding enlisted soldiers would be commissioned in recognition of either outstanding performance or acts of valor. The senior leadership of the Army was almost exclusively West Point graduates.

Despite earlier fears of a large standing army, the leaders of the country realized that a professional army led by a professional officer corps was essential to both the protection and future of the United States. The United States Military Academy at West Point was the primary source of officers for the Army until World War I. The increased demand for officers at the beginning of World War I led to the development of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). Its primary focus was producing officers for the Reserves and National Guard. The demand for officers during World War II was more than either West Point or ROTC could produce. To meet this unfilled need, the Army created the Officers’ Candidate School (OCS). This allowed the Army to surge its officer production by giving highly, qualified enlisted soldiers the opportunity to become officers. All three commissioning programs have produced outstanding officers who have served their country well in both peace and war.

Supporting a military that is strong and capable enough to achieve the nation’s political and economic goals without becoming a threat to civil liberties and civilian oversight has
consistently presented a dilemma to America’s traditional view of a standing Army. ROTC has evolved as the answer to achieving this delicate balance.\(^3\) Governor George Clinton of New York was the first to propose an academic alliance between civilian colleges and the military. The intent was to produce civilian-soldiers schooled in the military art who understood the needs to protect America’s freedoms. The intent was to staff the professional army with officers who were not professional soldiers.\(^4\)

Although Congress did not accept Clinton’s idea, there were some attempts by colleges to make this concept reality. The American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy (now Norwich University) became the first college to successfully include military training in its curriculum. Its founder, Capt. Alden Partridge, was a former Superintendent at West Point. His intent was to build “a balance between the militia and the Regular Army, a balance that would bring the popular support and allegiances of the militia system into harmony and discipline of an efficient army.”\(^5\) All modern ROTC institutions trace their heritage to Norwich.\(^6\)

The intent of these on-campus training programs was to produce citizen-soldier officers who counterbalanced, rather than complemented, the professional officers coming out of West Point. The prevailing thought among the educational leaders of America’s colleges and universities was that the military academies at West Point and Annapolis were “bastions of aristocracy” whose graduates were increasingly “isolated from their civilian contemporaries.” The “uneven” education of academy graduates was also criticized for being “so dogmatic that it discouraged initiative.”\(^7\)

The curriculum at Norwich University was considered more advanced and broader than that of West Point. Courses ranged from the practical to more diverse classes such as modern languages, sciences and liberal arts. To supplement the classroom instruction in military
science, Captain Partridge borrowed cannons and muskets from both federal and state
governments to add realism to his students' training.8

During the antebellum period, numerous civilian schools such as St John's (Annapolis,
Maryland), The University of Tennessee, and Indiana University, provided military instruction as
part of their curriculum. A few schools, such as Kemper and Marion Institutes, which were
private institutions, along with state-supported institutions such as Virginia Military Academy and
the Citadel, were founded to support the Southern military tradition and as a means to provide a
management education for the sons of planter aristocracy.9

At the beginning of the Civil War, the division of the available trained officers between
their loyalty to the Union and the Confederacy reduced the number of officers available to either
side. It emphasized the need for a larger pool of trained officers in times of crises than the
current systems could provide. Vermont Representative, Congressman Justin Morrill, who was
a friend and neighbor of Capt. Alden Partridge, created legislation to solve this problem. He
proposed that 30,000 acres of public land be sold in each state. The funds from these sales
would be used to create public colleges — land grant colleges.10

Although these colleges could teach any subjects that they wanted, they had to offer
agriculture, mechanical arts, and military tactics. The intent was to increase the number of
individuals with military knowledge, but who were not military professionals and could be called
on to lead other citizen soldiers in times of need. One of the first and most successful land
grant colleges was the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas (later Texas A&M
University). These land grant college graduates would be citizens first and soldiers second.11

Over the next forty years, the support from the Army for these programs was inconsistent
despite the growth of the program into forty-two colleges and universities. (For example, the
Army assigned an eighty-year old major to the North Dakota Agricultural College.12) These
programs lacked standardization in training and organization that resulted in mixed results in terms of the officers that they produced. However, America's preference for non-professional officers continued to gain acceptance among Americans.

Despite this lukewarm support, the War Department initiated a program in 1900 that awarded a Regular Army commission to one outstanding graduate from one of the ten most highly rated land-grant and military colleges — called Distinguished Institutions. One of America's most famous military heroes, George C. Marshall, received his commission from Virginia Military Institute in 1902. The build-up to World War I saw a change in the previous informal policy and the establishment of a formal arrangement between the colleges and universities providing on-campus military training for the Army. The General Staff of the Army realized that the bulk of its reserve officers would come from America's colleges and universities. To ensure the right type of officers in terms of quality, it was decided that the current informal relationship with the military training at colleges and universities needed to be standardized and a system of central control and management implemented. According to one report from the Army General Staff, "Central control is needed to insure efficiency and standardization."

The National Defense Act of 1916 established the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). Its purpose was to professionalize the Officer Corps of the Reserves and National Guard by taking responsibility for all current and future military training programs at land grant colleges and other universities. This plan was identified as the "only viable option to a greatly expanded military academy" to meet the Army's expanding need for officers. The "birth" of a formal ROTC program saw an increase in the number of programs and a movement by such schools as Princeton, Harvard, and Yale to be added to the list of schools offering ROTC on their campus. Universities saw that adding ROTC was part of their responsibility to serve the
public, and it provided numerous benefits. According to Princeton’s President Edwin Corwin, working with the Army provided university professors “self respect by giving us some useful work to do while we draw our salaries.”

It was during World War II that ROTC proved its value to the Nation by providing a ready pool of trained officers that allowed the Army to quickly mobilize into a wartime organization. Although there was some initial dissatisfaction with ROTC due to its inability to produce quality officers as fast as the Army needed them, the overall experience of citizen soldiers proved to be a pivotal event in determining America’s attitude towards the military for most of the remainder of the 20th Century. For the Army, the overall performance of ROTC officers led to an increased emphasis on ROTC after the end of World War II. ROTC surpassed West Point as the largest producer of officers for the Army during this period. As the Gray Congressional Committee in 1948 stated, “ROTC was the best available means of producing enough college-educated officers of the right type who were capable of understanding and employing increasingly sophisticated military technology to lead America’s Cold War Army.”

The 1970s and 1980s saw numerous initiatives by the Army to increase interest in ROTC that had fallen significantly after the Vietnam War. Additionally, steps were taken to improve the quality of ROTC in terms of training and cadre. The establishment of Cadet Command in 1986 was the most significant step taken by the Army to help ROTC meet its production mission. ROTC was no longer managed by a staff element of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), but was now a subordinate command with a Major General in charge. Although the establishment of this command did not immediately solve all of ROTC’s problems, it did provide new ideas, enthusiasm, and initiatives to help shake ROTC out of its post-Vietnam doldrums and move Cadet Command and ROTC in the right direction.
The ROTC and OCS officers were often considered the “second team” when compared to their West Point contemporaries — this is no longer the case. The increased quality of the officers produced by these programs have “leveled the playing field” in terms of opportunities for success and promotion, but West Point retains many advantages and is considered the “greater among equals.” While West Point continues the tradition of a professional officer-training program, and OCS provides opportunities for exceptional enlisted soldiers to become officers, ROTC remains the historical link to America’s desire for a strong influence of the citizen soldier and diversity in the leadership of the United States Army.

In addition to providing citizen soldier leaders for the Army, ROTC also provides an important function by providing a vital link between the Army and civilians. The value of providing a positive military influence for today’s youth by establishing relationships with future civilian leaders while they are students combined with providing a tangible military presence throughout the heartland of America cannot be overstated. In today’s environment, the value of ROTC should not be measured merely on numbers produced, but on the important part it plays in bridging the growing gap between the military and civilians.

A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

If ROTC is going to continue to provide the right type of lieutenants for the Objective Force, it must focus its recruiting to attract the right cadets from both Generation X and Generation Y whose motivations and interests differ from that of the Baby Boomer Generation. It must modify its training, which has remained basically unchanged for over a generation to provide the necessary skills and traits to allow the Objective Force to fight and win in any environment. Finally, it must also prepare its cadets to understand and operate in the changing environment of the 21st Century. Although many of these changes will also be necessary at
West Point and OCS, the focus will be on Cadet Command since it is the largest producer of lieutenants.

No doubt, Capt. Alden Partridge had to deal with generational differences when he formed the first military training program on a civilian campus at Norwich that evolved into today's ROTC. The 80-year old Major at North Dakota Agricultural College and his cadets probably never completely solved their generational differences. Today's ROTC battalions must also deal with generational differences in attracting and recruiting the right students for the base requirement which Major General Casey defines as "Scholar, Athlete, Leader" or SAL. Although the differences might seem daunting, they are not insurmountable.

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Who are the groups in this current generational struggle? The Baby Boom Generation or "Boomers" are those born between 1946 and 1964. In the military, they are the current mid-level and senior leadership of the Army — Major thru General. They grew up in the post-war economic growth period. They lived in two-parent households where the mother typically stayed home with shows like, "Father Knows Best" and "Leave It To Beaver" serving as examples of the typical American Family. They learned to be team players and work with others. Their work ethic is based on hard work and waiting their turn for promotion. Their World War II-era parents and key influencers like coaches and teachers who served during the Cold War-era Army influenced their ideas about the military and military service.

The Generation X or "Gen-Xers" were born from 1965 until 1976. In the military, they represent the lower-level management of the Army — Lieutenants and Captains. They will be the future mid-level and senior level leadership in the Objective Force. The last part of this generation also represents a potential market for ROTC, especially those who leave active duty
after serving an initial enlistment and return to college. Many in this generation grew up in single parent families caused by the increasing divorce rate among their Baby Boomer parents or two-career households. They grew up in changing economic times highlighted by “downsizing” within industry and frequent job changes by their parents that resulted in more moving around during their youth than the preceding generations. Their example of a typical, dysfunctional American family came from the “Simpsons” and similar anti-establishment programs.

This generation saw the dawn of the Information Age fueled by the rapid growth of computers. The Vietnam War, Watergate, and the “sex, drugs, and rock and roll” philosophy of the mid 1960s to early 1970s influenced their parents. The changing values and liberated ideas were often passed on to the Gen-Xers. They represent a generation of “latch key” kids that increased their independence due to a lack of parental involvement, and they were molded by the influence of television. This independence and a desire to be in control combined with their ability to operate comfortably in a hi-tech environment and take advantage of technology form the basis of their work ethic. Their need for immediate gratification and rewards makes them less patient for promotion than Baby Boomers.¹⁹

Few, if any of their key influencers, had any first-hand military experience to share with them. Although their parents saw the importance of the military, they did not want their children to serve in the military. Xers generally have a disregard for politics and government as evidenced by less than 20% participation in national elections.²⁰ They normally view it as not a factor in their daily lives. They represent the most educated generation in American history. Prevailing attitudes and a robust economy with numerous opportunities have decreased the propensity to participate in ROTC and serve in the military among members of Generation X.
Lawrence Bradford and Claire Raines analyzed Generation X members to assess their values and beliefs in their book, *Twenty-Something: Managing and Motivating Today's New Work Force*. Table 1 below gives an insight into the key values for Gen-Xers. Although no extensive research on the next generation, Generation Y, has been done. Initial research and data shows large similarities between both generations.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA OF INTEREST</th>
<th>BELIEF/VIEW</th>
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<tr>
<td>Self vs. Others</td>
<td>A self-orientation of “what's in it for me?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism/Pessimism</td>
<td>A cynical belief that the best years are already past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td>They are materialists who expect high paying jobs, and the accompanying possessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing Up</td>
<td>They feel they have been rushed through childhood by &quot;absentee, workaholic parents.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason For Working</td>
<td>They see jobs as a means to gain a high quality of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>They are slow to commit to people and jobs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Authority</td>
<td>They exhibit an attitude of indifference towards authority.</td>
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**TABLE 1. GENERATION X VALUES**

The newest generation, and the most important generation to produce officers for the Objective Force, is Generation Y or “Millennials” — those children born from 1977 until today. In the military, these members of Generation Y are the newly commissioned lieutenants, current cadets, and the market from which lieutenants for the Objective Force will be recruited. They represent the future of Army ROTC and the Army Officer Corps. The ability to attract and recruit these Millennials will determine if “The Way Ahead” will be successful.
Generation Y is the most Internet savvy generation ever. This makes the use of the Internet a key ingredient in any marketing effort designed to attract Millennials. They could become the largest generation and the most ethnically diverse generation in history. Since they are generally children of Baby Boomers, they share many of the values, influences, and concerns of their Generation X near-contemporaries. These individuals are also more interested in the present than the future, and they share the same desire for immediate gratification with Gen-Xers. 

Since the Millennials are often missing supportive and mentoring relationships from their families, this is an area that ROTC battalions can focus on in trying to reach potential cadets. Of the recent ROTC graduates, 80% came from a military family background. This lack of a broader background of ROTC participants is another big challenge for providing lieutenants for the Objective Force. The failure to expand this pool of prospects outside the extended military family for cadets could lead to a form of “military elitism” that will threaten the legacy of citizen soldiers from all segments of the population forming the officer corps.

A CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Not only has the “market” that provides the future lieutenants changed, the world that these officers will face has also changed. The end of the Cold War upset the “balance of power” that had kept the post World War II period divided along an “East-West” axis. The “good” guys (U.S. and its allies) and “bad” guys (USSR and its allies) were clearly defined and identified. Local disputes based on ethnic and religious differences were kept in check by this arrangement. U.S. Army doctrine and organization were designed to contain and defeat Soviet forces primarily on the battlefields of Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall not only changed the map of Europe, but also started a change in the balance of power in the world. The United States emerged as the sole “super power” and the world became full of uncertainty.
The changing threat has forced the Army from merely focusing on its warfighting mission to preparing to successfully execute missions across the entire spectrum of war. In the changing, demanding operational environment of the 21st Century, the size of the units deployed without the usual heavy command and control structure means that junior leaders will be expected to make immediate decisions and take independent action. Instead of merely being the "pointed end of the spear" that a senior commander moves against the threat, tactical decisions made by lieutenants in such places as Kosovo, Afghanistan, and other yet-to-be determined locations around the world can have strategic consequences with lasting impact on national policy. Magnify the effect of these decisions by the impact of almost instant notification of the world by CNN and other Cable News Networks, and the pressure on young leaders in today's operating environment is almost as great as that faced by senior officers during the Cold War.

Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the threat to the United States and its military was focused primarily on "rogue" countries such as Iraq and North Korea threatening U.S. interests abroad. After 11 September, protecting the United States became a critical task for the first time since World War II. Instead of focusing only on containing and defeating threats to the United States overseas, the Army had to readjust its mission focus to include Homeland Security. The declaration of an "Axis of Evil" which included Iraq, Iran, and North Korea by President Bush during his recent State of the Union Address clearly defined our major traditional threat. The "mugs, thugs, and wackos" like Osama bin Laden will continue to be a threat not only to the U.S., but also to the entire world. The known threats and those threats yet to be identified remain as other non-traditional threats whose potential ruthlessness and brazenness will impact the environment in which the Objective Force will operate.
A NEW FORCE

The continuing spread of ethnic and religious conflicts, regional conflicts, religious extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), continuing world-wide economic challenges which increases the disparity between the "haves and have-nots" and the growing dislike of the United States among many countries pose significant threats for the Army in the 21st Century and will far exceed those faced in its first 226 years.

The intent of the Objective Force is to develop an Army that is more deployable with greater battlefield mobility that is both survivable and lethal. This will allow the deployment of forces into a theater to influence the crisis before it moves along the spectrum of war and becomes a conflict or even war. As the Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest said, "get there the firstest with the mostest." The Objective Force will achieve its lethality by leveraging dynamic advancements in weapons technology and information dominance through unprecedented situational awareness. Leaders will have the ability to see and communicate to the entire battlespace in a manner unlike any previous generation of officers. The ability to quickly deploy forces into any theater will place units into developing situations where the cultural sensitivity and understanding combined with diplomacy skills may be as critical to preventing the escalation of the crisis as the vast array of weapons at the leader's disposal. This requires leaders who can think faster, deeper, and broader than the previous lieutenants from the Baby Boomer Generation and even the current lieutenants from Generation X.

In 1999, Cadet Command conducted a study to determine what the "future lieutenant" would need to be successful. They developed a list of eight skills and seven attributes necessary for a junior officer to be successful in the 21st Century. A meeting with Major General George A. Higgins, Deputy Corps Commander of III Corps, and several of his senior leaders on November 28, 2001, identified many of these same skills and attributes.
### TABLE 2. FUTURE LIEUTENANTS SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SKILLS</th>
<th>ATTRIBUTES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Mental Agility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetical</td>
<td>Physical Hardness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>Emotional Hardness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oral &amp; Written Communications</td>
<td>Followship</td>
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<td>Information filtering</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
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<td>Research</td>
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The current transformation of the Army represents the most dramatic changes in the Army since World War II. While the changes to doctrine and organization and the other aspects of force modification will be significant, the changes to how leaders are expected to operate within this new force will be equally dramatic. To successfully transform the Army, it will require new skills and attributes for its leaders, and a new training program to teach these skills and develop these attributes. Additionally, Cadet Command must recruit and train the Generation Y students with the “right stuff” to succeed in the challenging environment of the 21st Century.

**CHALLENGES FOR CADET COMMAND**

Major General Casey has developed a plan for reversing the decade long slump in terms of not meeting its commissioning mission by Cadet Command. The “The Way Ahead” has
become the road map for success for Army ROTC. There are several issues that will have to be addressed to ensure that this road map leads to success. Figure 1 below shows Cadet Command's production performance since 1992.

![Lieutenant Production Chart](image)

**Figure 1. Cadet Command Production Performance**

Although ROTC graduates may have overcome their "second team" status, ROTC in general, still has not been able to overcome some long-held stereotypes by the Army. An assignment to ROTC has long been considered either a "field grade" graveyard, or the professional "kiss of death" for a captain who had hopes of a successful military career. Recent selection rates have proven these two axioms to be true. It may be the result of Assignment Officers sending less than stellar performers to ROTC assignments that provides a "self-fulfilling" prophecy and the negative perception towards ROTC by the Army at large. Regardless of the actual cause, the results have been the same. It has hampered the success of Cadet Command, and has reinforced the "stay away" warning for many good officers who would bring some of the needed enthusiasm and initiative to ROTC. Table 3 on the next page shows how Cadet Command officers have done in comparison with their contemporaries at
West Point and Recruiting Command (USAREC) in terms of selection for promotion and school attendance when compared to the Army average.

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TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF PROMOTION AND SELECTION RATES³¹

To get the perspectives of these individuals at the “pointy tip of the spear” for Cadet Command, a letter was sent to 160 of the current PMSs. The letter gave an explanation of the research, and a request for assistance by completing a survey. The survey consisted of twelve questions that were designed to get their personal evaluation of the current state of Army ROTC in terms of personnel, recruiting, and training. Additionally, they were asked to make recommendations on how to improve these areas in terms of producing lieutenants for the Objective Force. The PMSs selected represented colleges and universities from all around the country and the “top through bottom” in terms of their ranking within Cadet Command. The response rate was 75%. The answers were grouped into the four critical areas: Cadet Command, personnel, recruiting and training. To maintain the academic non-attribution of this paper, most of the responses are kept anonymous.
CADET COMMAND

Cadet Command is a neglected asset of the Army in terms of resources. As LTC Neil C. Reinwald, the Professor of Military Science at The University of Alabama stated, “The Army ROTC program is the Army’s cheap way of getting officers. I’m still convinced that a little more funding and resourcing would greatly increase the ability of the command to make mission.”

When you consider that the United States Military Academy produces fewer lieutenants annually at one location with a larger annual budget than Cadet Command, which produces almost 4,000 lieutenants at 270 locations, the disparity becomes obvious.

Although the argument is not purely economics and it is not meant to question the value of West Point, the importance of Cadet Command to the Army would seem to justify a larger allocation of resources. The lack of adequate allocation of resources to Cadet Command is similar to the under funding of base operations and infrastructure improvements for Army installations in the 1980s and 1990s to fund other priorities such as force modernization and training. The bill eventually comes due, and it is often higher than if it had been taken care of adequately along the way.

The attitude towards Cadet Command reflects to the prevailing feeling towards military education. It is time too for the Army to place a higher value on the education and its officers who are educators such as those assigned to staff and war colleges and ROTC units. A frequent proponent of the military education system, Congressman Ike Skelton, frequently uses the example that 31 out of the 34 corps commanders who led the American Army to victory in World War II had taught in the Army school system. Lt Gen (Ret) Richard G. Trefry further defined this attitude towards the Army education system when he said, “My generation of officers did everything we could to get into military schools while your generation of officers does everything it can to stay out of military schools!”
Cadet Command has undergone several changes since its inception in 1986. During this time it reduced its command and control from four to three regional headquarters. Each region controlled four or five brigades and it also downgraded the commander of each region from a brigadier general to a senior colonel. Each of the 13 brigades controls 20-25 ROTC Battalions. Figure 2 shows the current geographical breakout of Cadet Command.

The subsequent realignment of personnel among the regions and their subordinate brigades resulted in neither the staff at region or brigade headquarters being properly staffed to provide the right amount of command and control. This expanded span of control violates all traditional Army thinking and severely hampers the ability of either the regions or brigades to effectively provide necessary command and control of their subordinate battalions. Additionally, the roles and functions of each level of command also remain unclear. Although the command and control remained at Region and Brigade, most of the resources had migrated to Cadet Command or completely out of the command. Layers of bureaucracy were added without really adding any value while increasing confusion and reducing efficiency. As one PMS said, "I am
forced to bypass Region and Brigade Headquarters and go directly to Cadet Command on numerous actions which eliminates accuracy and critical guidance along the way."

All of the PMSs were asked why they had chosen to become a Professor of Military Science. While the Army might think that these officers decided to become a PMS for purely personal reasons, such as preparing for retirement or looking for an easy assignment, the surveys paint a completely different picture. As LTC David Guzman, PMS at San Diego State University said in speaking for his fellow PMSs and himself, "You are the fruit of knowledge for your cadets. A little bit of your values, thoughts, philosophy, and humor will live on with these cadets long after you have hung up your boots." The chart below reflects the most common reasons given for becoming a PMS.

| 1. Train and mentor the next generation of Amy officers. |
| 2. Pass on their legacy to the next generation. |
| 3. Give back to the Army. |
| 4. Previously served as a PMS. |
| 5. 2nd best job if you can't be a Battalion Commander |

TABLE 4. TOP REASONS FOR BECOMING A PMS

These officers clearly recognized the importance of their job. One PMS said it best, "An officer will encounter many individuals during his/her career, but they will always remember their PMS. They take his example of leadership and their first impression of the Army is based on that individual."

Although most of the officers surveyed were non-select for Battalion Command, and they realized that they were probably not going to be promoted to colonel, their attitude was not one
of being angry with the Army. They were excited about the opportunities that being a PMS gave them. They saw this assignment as a great opportunity to make a difference in the Army. They enjoyed being in charge and being able to be around cadets. They fed off of the enthusiasm and youth of their cadets. They were dedicated to their cadets and their programs. Several officers have extended their tours at their schools beyond the normal three-year tour, and a few PMSs even declined Battalion Command because they felt so strongly about the importance of being a PMS.

CADRE

For the most part, the PMSs were generally satisfied with their cadre. The PMSs all agreed that qualified cadre was one of their most important tools of success. As one PMS said, "The officers and NCOs that make up our cadre are the first Army professionals that the cadets meet. We should have our best and brightest as ROTC cadre." The table below reflects the major concerns that PMS had reference their cadre.

| 1. Getting the right type of cadre.             |
| 2. Elimination of the School of Cadet Command was a bad idea. |
| 3. Lack of instructor training.                |
| 4. Lack of Cadre stability creates too many distracters. |
| 5. Getting entire cadre involved in recruiting. |

TABLE 5. TOP CADRE CONCERNS
Just as a ROTC assignment for a senior field grade officer is considered a "dead end job" for those who are about to retire, an Assistant Professor of Military Science (APMS) assignment for a branch-qualified captain is considered detrimental to his/her career. As one PMS explained, "In many cases, the officers who should come to ROTC won't, and the officers who shouldn't come are sent anyway."

Another problem is cadre shortages, especially NCOs. It takes too long to replace departing cadre. If the officer or NCO leaves early for a school assignment or decides to retire before the end of the assignment, the delay in providing replacements is even longer. Several schools have vacancies of a semester or longer. Given the small number of cadre at most schools, the personnel turbulence and increased work load on the remaining cadre makes an extremely difficult job that much more difficult. As we have discovered in the Army before, you can only "do more with less" for a short time without impacting mission effectiveness and morale.

One of the largest complaints was the lack of instructor training for incoming cadre. Most officers and NCOs are good trainers, but they are not necessarily good teachers. One PMS described it this way, "These guys know how to train. However, it is much different teaching in a university setting with students than training soldiers in the Charlie Company Dayroom."

PMSs continually requested that The School of Cadet Command at Fort Monroe be started again to provide the necessary instructor training along with recruiting training, and an immersion into the Cadet Command philosophy and ethos. The current on-line version is inadequate to meet the needs of the incoming cadre. It pushes too much burden back on the PMS who is working hard enough to recruit and train cadets, and he doesn't need any more distractions to these critical missions. Cadet Command is doing an outstanding job of training
new PMSs and Recruiting Operations Officers (ROOs), but the remainder of the staff needs this same level of preparation. LTC Dave Kneafsey, PMS at Syracuse University, explained the need for quality cadre best this way, “Our true value as cadre lies in instilling a warrior ethos, in mentoring, in teaching, and in coaching our cadets. In terms of people, quality cadre in equates to quality lieutenants out.”

Cadet Command must develop two populations — cadets and cadre simultaneously and invest in both to ensure success.

In terms of cadre, there are 220 out of the 270 schools who have 330-contractor cadre members assigned to their Battalions. Most of these contractors are retired, recently separated, and reserve component officers. Additionally, there are almost 30 Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) who are in enlisted cadre positions. Communications Technologies, Inc. (COMTek) — formerly Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) employs these contractors. These COMTek contractors serve as an Assistant Professor of Military Science (APMS) and as Recruiting Operations Officer (ROO). The NCOs serve as Enlisted Instructors, Admin NCOs, or Supply Sergeants.

Using COMTek cadre members is a response to the elimination of several hundred company grade officer positions primarily from FORSCOM to fill the Captain vacancies in divisions. RAND conducted a test program in 1997-1998 to verify the feasibility of using contractors to replace active soldiers in ROTC Battalions. Since the Captains were leaving Cadet Command anyway, this plan was accepted as an alternative to prevent severe personnel shortages at the various colleges and universities or closing of units.

The success of the program has been mixed. Many PMSs are satisfied with their COMTek cadre members, but many PMSs have gone through several unsatisfactory individuals before getting ones that could do the job. The best “fit” for a COMTek cadre member appears to be as the ROO, but there is not complete agreement among the PMSs on this. The maturity,
experience, and stability that the contractor brings to the position were frequently mentioned as benefits. As an APMS, the results are mixed. A common observation by PMSs is, “There is no substitute for a hard-charging branch qualified captain to train and motivate cadets!” Another one said, “There doesn’t need to be more than one ‘gray beard’ around here and that’s the PMS.” This is in response to the fact that many of the COMTek personnel are retired lieutenant colonels over 40 years old.

As the Army goes “full speed ahead” into Transformation, officers without current active duty experience will lose much of their relevancy and subsequently their value to ROTC. The benefit package offered by COMTek doesn’t always attract the “best and brightest” among the pool of potential applicants. This is another example of Cadet Command not being resourced commensurate with the level of importance of its mission. The use of COMTek is hopefully going to be a temporary fix and not a permanent solution. This is another example of a mixed signal and clearly a wrong signal that we send to potential cadets and university administrators about the importance of ROTC.

RECRUITING

The priority of action for ROTC battalions has shifted from training to recruiting. Despite the right intentions by all concerned, ROTC battalions are still being sent into the fight without the proper training and resources in terms of recruiting, and they are still required to “fight and win” this battle. PMSs who expressed almost universal concerns about the same challenges reference their ability to successfully meet their recruiting mission regardless of the size or location of their battalion. This was the one area of the survey where the responses varied little.

The PMSs feel the pressure, and it has affected the command climate. PMSs are told that they are each on a “one year contract” from Cadet Command. The implication is that if you fail to make your mission, you can be fired. If you make your commissioning mission, you are a
“hero,” which is a fleeting status since the next year you could lose your status if you don’t make your mission. When a PMS arrives on his campus, the contract mission (Military Science III cadets who are under contract to the Army) is pretty much already determined by the efforts or lack of effort by the outgoing PMS. This will determine his ability to meet his commissioning mission the next year.

The incoming PMS has basically no ability to impact on the commissioning mission (MS IV cadets who will be commissioned during that FY). The best he can do is to ensure that he doesn’t lose anyone. So before he even puts the pictures on the wall of his new office, he is in the Cadet Command “dog house” for not making mission! It is like being called out before you ever get up to bat. If he inherits a strong program, he enjoys the “fruits” of his predecessor’s efforts, and he is a hero with Cadet Command. Initial success or failure for a new PMS can often be the “luck of the draw” in regards to which ROTC battalion they are assigned.

Among the PMSs surveyed, the common perception was there is no credit given for making progress or rebuilding a broken program unless you make the mission. Although this does not appear to be the philosophy of Major General Case, his philosophy has not “filtered down” to the battalion level. In Cadet Command, there are “no points for second place” when it comes to making mission. Since the Command has not made its commissioning mission in ten years, it would seem to be unreasonable to expect battalions to achieve miracles overnight. The lack of any positive feedback or encouragement for making forward progress has created a feeling of having an impossible mission by many PMSs. The PMSs are not quitting, but they aren’t given the tools necessary to succeed.

The major complaint was the lack of a National Recruiting effort for ROTC for being an officer. USAREC was having similar mission problems until a large influx of money and a major advertising campaign put them back into the “black” again. “Does any of those 212 ways to be
a soldier in the ‘Army of One’ campaign include joining ROTC?’ one PMS asked. There is a serious lack of understanding or appreciation by the general public about ROTC and being an Army officer. The only national effort in regards to marketing has been primarily directed at minorities. While this is a good idea, Cadet Command needs to ensure that the entire market understands the product before focusing all its efforts on only one segment of the market. This is another product of the declining propensity to serve in the military by Baby Boomers, Gen-Xers, and the new kids on the block – Generation Y. The table below identifies the major issues regarding recruiting that PMSs expressed the most concern about.

| 1. No National Recruiting Program for ROTC or officership to develop a national image. |
| 2. Lack of understanding of ROTC and officership within the target market. |
| 3. Lack of proper recruiting training for cadre. |
| 4. Declining propensity to serve in the military among Generation Y. |
| 5. No flexibility on marketing funds at the battalion level. |
| 6. Finding SALs. |

**TABLE 6. CHALLENGES TO RECRUITING**

Although there was much agreement on the success of the training program for ROOs, the remainder of the cadre and the PMS do not yet have the proper training to be successful. Since recruiting has become a team sport in Cadet Command, it is critical that everyone on the team knows how to play the game. The PMSs were concerned about their lack of discretionary recruiting funds at their level to take advantage of opportunities or tailor their efforts to meet the needs of the market. For example, many complained about being forced to spend money on
print media in an area where the print media doesn’t even reach the market is a waste of valuable resources.

The focus on the “Soldier, Scholar, Athlete - SAL” student that Major General Casey has given Cadet Command is enthusiastically supported by all PMSs. The overall quality of the cadets in their program is rising. One PMS said, “Looking at the cadets when I arrived, I think my predecessor must have hung around bus stations a lot! The quality is improving as we get in more SALs in our program.” Although everyone agreed that the SALs were the right target market, the competition for these individuals has become keener on campus. Since the market that Cadet Command is going after has become sophisticated, it must ensure that its approach and techniques match this level of sophistication in order to be successful.

Once a SAL is recruited, PMSs noted several challenges that they had to overcome to retain the student to commissioning. Mission migration was the biggest challenge. This challenge is caused by cadet’s graduation dates moving beyond the initial fiscal year in which they were scheduled to graduate. Although the average time for a college student to graduate is four and a half years and moving closer to over five years, the Cadet Command model is still based on four years to graduation. This creates administrative, retention, and morale problems between the cadre and the cadets. These cadets are not “dragging their feet” towards graduation. Added course requirements for ROTC completion and a lack of academic credit for ROTC at some schools contribute to this increased time to graduate. Additionally, more students working during school and summer school conflicting with National Advanced Leadership Camp after their junior year both combine to push the date of graduation past four years. This is not going to change, and it needs to be incorporated properly into Cadet Command’s guidance and policies to prevent being another obstacle to mission accomplishment.
Numerous PMSs listed the inability to either guarantee a branch or the delay before cadets get their branch as a negative. One PMS put it best, “What other company asks someone to sign an eight-year contract, and the job title is left blank for two years.” Branch assignments, which do not seem logical and delays in branch selection notification send mixed and sometimes negative messages to potential cadets. To some cadets, the process of getting your branch is like “going to see the wizard” in the movie, ‘Wizard of Oz,’: you can ask for what you want, and if you are lucky, the wizard grants your wish!” There also exists an inequity in the branching process among the three major commissioning sources. The same requirements do not exist, so ROTC graduates don’t always have the same opportunities as West Point and OCS graduates. This problem leads to initial dissatisfaction with the Army. The dissatisfaction then contributes to the early exodus of these officers from the Army.

The Military Service Obligation (MSO) was another challenge to overcome. The MSO is the amount of time that each cadet must serve in the Army after commissioning. The obligation can be met by active duty, reserve duty, or a combination. Since most Millennials (Generation Yers) don’t look too far out into the future and certainly don’t see themselves working 20 years at any job, the eight-years military commitment is a serious drawback and the benefits of a 20-year military career don’t excite them. Many potential cadets never get past the eight-years obligation to the explanation of how the time can be served on active duty, reserves or a combination. This is a holdover from the Cold War Army planning that certainly needs to be reevaluated to make being commissioned an opportunity to make a student’s future, as opposed to being viewed as a limit to his opportunities in the future.

All PMSs loved the use of the Gold Bar Recruiter. This program uses recently commissioned lieutenants to recruit for their ROTC Battalion prior to attending their Officer Basic course. It definitely provides a “win-win” situation for the new lieutenant and Cadet
Command. This is a program that needs to be further developed to maximize its contribution to the recruiting effort.

Many officers complained about the conditions of their operating environment. Furniture from the 1970s and inadequate or antiquated facilities contributed to presenting a less than professional image for potential cadets and their parents. Some PMSs have teamed with their host institutions to upgrade their facilities while others have used other creative means to accomplish the modernization. If Cadet Command is going to compete with Air Force, Navy ROTC, and Corporate America for the same limited number of SALs in our colleges and universities, it must put the necessary resources into ensuring the uniform quality of facilities throughout its 270 schools. There was also a lack of consistency among the battalions' web sites. Many had outdated information and expired links (including the Cadet Command web site) that made navigating difficult. The lack of consistency sends the wrong message to potential cadets. Image is often as important as the product when attracting and selling Gen-Yers on your product. Cadet Command must ensure that all aspects of its operations present a "first class" image impression.

TRAINING

Cadet Command is currently revising its training programs to update lesson plans that are over 20 years old. As one PMS said, "These are the same classes that I received as a cadet in 1980." These additions should significantly enhance the type and quality of training that cadets receive. Initiatives such as Enhanced Skills Training Program (ESTP) and BLACKBOARD, an on-line educational system, will provide increased use of computers in the overall training program. This increased use of technology should appeal to the Generation Y students more than classes dominated by stacks of overhead slides – "death by viewgraph."
The revision of the National Advanced Leadership Camp, formerly known as Advanced Camp, should address some other training concerns. The complete emphasis on evaluation over training as the basis for this camp created numerous problems on campus. The PMSs were forced to spend a tremendous amount of time preparing their cadets for Camp to ensure success for both their cadets and their program. The PMSs complained about the increased demands on student's limited time, inability to teach other subjects, and focusing on squad leaders skills as opposed to Platoon Leader skills. These all negatively impacted the overall quality of training, retention and recruiting. Balancing student time and ROTC time was the major challenge that concerned most PMSs when discussing the current Cadet Command training program. The shift to a leadership/decision making exercise versus a tactical small unit and tactics test will greatly help shift the emphasis to leadership development.

Lack of standardization among the 270 programs within Cadet Command, the lack of proper instructor training as mentioned earlier, no leadership training during first two years of ROTC, and the lack of academic credibility within their college or university were common complaints of many officers. The lack of academic credibility had the added disadvantage of impacting the amount of academic credit that cadets received for ROTC courses, which contributed to longer time to graduate as previously noted. The lack of weapons training as part of the ROTC curriculum was considered to be a disservice to cadets. One PMS said, "Weapons proficiency is one source of 'instant credibility' for a young lieutenant."

The shift in focus from training to recruiting was reflected in the less detailed and emotional responses regarding the current Cadet Command training program. It is too early to determine if the revised training program will meet the mission of preparing and providing the right type of lieutenants for the Objective Force. Major General Casey consistently received praise from the Professors of Military Science for his willingness to make the necessary
changes in how Cadet Command operates, and his determination to give commanders the necessary resources. The quantity of lieutenants produced is critical to Cadet Command's success, but the true value assessment of the job done by Cadet Command and its importance to the Army will be the quality of officers produced and their retention to becoming the senior leaders of the Objective Force.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations outlined below are an attempt to provide workable solutions to the numerous areas of concern presented by the PMSs. Cadet Command is currently implementing some of these solutions, and other solutions are in the staffing process. The ability of Cadet Command to accomplish its mission will take the successful implementation of these solutions at the individual ROTC Battalion (PMS), Cadet Command (CC), and the Army. The level responsible for implementing the solution is indicated in parentheses.

CADET COMMAND

- Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of Region and Brigade Headquarters and staff them accordingly. (Army & CC)

- Improve command climate. Reverse current "glass is half empty versus glass is half full" attitude towards the efforts of PMSs. Ensure that CG's philosophy is permeated to battalions. (CC)

- Foster attitude of "we're all in the fight together" between Cadet Command and the 270 Battalions. (CC)
• Provide more mentoring and assistance and less criticism and unnecessary taskings that take away from the business at hand for the PMS. (CC)

• Work within Senior Army Leadership to reverse negative attitudes towards ROTC and ROTC assignments. (Army & CC)

• Work to reduce MSO. 5-6 years seem to be target number. (Army & CC)

• Tailor benefits for non-scholarship and scholarship cadets in terms of MSO. Scholarship cadets have 8-years MSO with lots of benefits in terms of scholarship dollars. Non-scholarship cadets have same MSO without scholarship dollars. (CC)

• Change branching process. Allow ROTC and USMA graduates to compete on same OML. Financial incentives for low-density or less popular branches similar to bonus program that USAREC uses. Assign branches prior to semester before commissioning. (Army & CC)

• Remember there is no “cookie cutter” approach solution to all problems in Cadet Command that will be successful at all 270 schools. (CC)

PERSONNEL

PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE

• Establish Accession Functional Area within Institutional Support Field similar to FA 47 for USMA Professors. This would allow promotion of successful PMSs and provide senior leaders for Cadet Command with prior PMS experience. (Army)

• Get more former PMSs into senior leadership positions of Cadet Command and the Army. (Army)
• Include PMS position in CDL Battalion Command options as USAREC Battalions have been added. (Army)

• Promote successful PMSs to increase reputation and demand for this position. (Army)

CADRE

• Re-evaluate manning templates to ensure adequate staffing at all battalions. (CC)

• Streamline Annual Program Review process to decrease time lag to increase manning based on needs and success. (CC)

• Assign at least one branch-qualified O-3 to each ROTC Battalion. (Army)

• Send all incoming cadre including contractors to a School of Cadet Command. Include recruiting, teaching, and the dealing with and understanding of Generation Y in the curriculum. (CC)

• Increased stability of cadre assignments to reduce turmoil for the battalions. (Army)

• Improve screening process for cadre to ensure sufficient, competent, and committed cadre. (Army & CC)

• Ensure that cadre members are not penalized professionally for a ROTC assignment and make ROTC a desired assignment. (Army)

RECRUITING

• Start “grass roots” effort in local communities using organizations like Association of the United States Army (AUSA), The Retired Officer Association (TROA), and Reserve Officer Association (ROA) to spread the information about the opportunities
and advantages of being an Army Officer to high schools, civil groups, and other influencers in their community. (CC & PMS)

- Create an ROTC Alumni Association using current, former, and retired Army officers to assist the grass roots effort and actively assist Cadet Command and the 270 Battalions with their recruiting effort. (CC & PMS)

- Reorganize “Green to Gold” program to be more in-line with the Navy program to provide better financial incentives for these enlisted soldiers who want to become officers. Move responsibility from Post Reenlistment Office to Post Education Center. Include briefing as part of in-processing and out-processing. (Army)

- Develop national-level recruiting program for officership. This could include USMA and OCS. To ensure that ROTC and officership is the focus and not secondary effort, use another company other than the company managing USAREC program. (Army & CC)

- Develop recruiting awards and incentives for ROTC recruiters similar to what USAREC uses for it recruiters. (CC)

- Use “Hometown Recruiter” program for officers after graduation from OBC or CGSC before they report to next assignment. (Army & CC)

- Increase scholarship benefits to include room and board. (Army & CC)

- Don’t eliminate 4-year scholarships. Do a better job of finding the right SAL instead of just those who could not get into West Point. (CC & PMS)

- Extend the partnership with USAREC to include assigning a ROTC Recruiter to certain USAREC Battalions in the same way that USAREC Recruiters are assigned to certain ROTC Battalions. (Army & CC)
Update and provide standardization for the Battalion web site to ensure the same message and image is used throughout Cadet Command. (PMS)

Encourage each ROTC Battalion to team with the College Of Business at their university or college for assistance in identifying the market and developing a market plan. (PMS)

TRAINING

Increase National Advanced Leadership Camp pay for cadets. (Army & CC)

Increase academic credit for ROTC or ensure that a minimum level of credit is standardized for all 270 schools. (CC)

Ensure that National Advanced Leadership Camp focuses on leadership development instead of evaluation. (CC)

Encourage cadets to include classes such as philosophy, religion, economics, and politics to the curriculum as electives. Team with colleges and universities for expertise in these areas while using ROTC cadre to provide expertise in some academic classes. (PMS)

Increase emphasis on oral and written communications. (PMS)

Add classes on the media and public affairs. (PMS)

Use new teacher training and other newcomer orientation programs offered by colleges and universities for their new teachers. (PMS)

Emphasize military events such as Indian Wars, Philippine Insurrection, and Mexican Expedition that better represent possible scenarios for the Objective Force over traditional events such as Civil War and World War II. (CC & PMS)
Start using the case study approach that many business departments use. This approach provides a "holistic" approach to looking at a problem, and it encourages "out of the box" solutions. (CC & PMS)

SUMMARY

The "blood, sweat, and tears" of past and present ROTC Cadre and the service and sacrifice in war and peace of the lieutenants that they produced have clearly established Army ROTC's place in history and Army leadership with 50% of all current Generals being ROTC graduates compared with 30% for West Point and 17% for OCS. It will take even more "blood, sweat and tears" for future ROTC Cadre to recruit, train and commission the right lieutenants for the Objective Force. Understanding the needs and attributes of Generation-Yers are critical to attracting the necessary "scholars, athletes, leaders" on each campus to join ROTC. The next part of the challenge is providing a training environment that challenges, excites, and motivates these cadets to want to become Army officers because they understand the opportunities and advantages that it will provide them. The right type of ROTC cadre will be essential not only for recruiting, but also for providing these cadets with the critical skills and attributes that will be essential to their success in the ever-changing operating environment of the 21st Century. These cadre members will provide the mentoring and role models that will mold the next generation of senior leaders. It must be done right because there are "no points for second place" for something as important as this.

WORD COUNT = 9,883.
1 Major General George A. Higgins, interview by author, 27 November 2001, Fort Hood, TX.


6 Combe and Hartford, 8.


8 Lyons and Masland, 28-29.

9 Ibid., 29.

10 Neiberg, 21.

11 Ibid., 21.

12 Combe and Hartford, 11.

13 Ibid., 12.

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15 Lyons and Masland, 37.

16 Neiberg, 25.

17 Ibid., 33

18 Major General John T. D. Casey, USA, personal interview by the author on 29 October 2001, Fort Monroe, VA.


23 Major General John T. D. Casey interview.


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31 Ibid., 25.


34 Ibid., 29.


36 Casey, 15.


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