The Army Chief of Staff wants to know if the United States Army has taken the appropriate actions to prepare leaders for the evolutionary change of future warfare: joint operations involving air, land, and sea forces. General Shinseki's question is rooted in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and seasoned with the multiple joint deployments, wars, peacekeeping operations, and other missions the Army has engaged in the past fifteen years.

Creation of a new system or modification of an old system is difficult. Change stresses the system and people within the system. Our system in this case is the United States Army. The initial change to the system was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols requirement for the Army to become more capable for joint operations and interoperability with the three other services. The subsequent stress on the system is the Army Chief of Staff's recent emphasis on joint duty and assessment of Army actions to prepare officers for joint warfare. Recommendations.
Preparing Army Officers for Joint Warfare Leadership

A Monograph

by

Lieutenant Colonel Dwayne K. Wagner
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 00-01

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel Dwayne K. Wagner

Title of Monograph: Preparing Army Officers for Joint Warfare Leadership

Approved by:

[Signature]
Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D.  Monograph Director

[Signature]
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.  Professor and Director Academic Affairs, School of Advanced Military Studies

[Signature]
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.  Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 15th Day of May 2001

AQM02-10-2360
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Perceptions on Joint Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changing the Army to Embrace Joint Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Policies, Systems, and Traditions Evolve to Support Joint Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army systems: Interpret, Foster, and Enforce Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Traditions: sustain and support Long-Held Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Personnel System: Selects, Develops and Promotes Joint Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insider's View of Joint Assignment Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent Promotion Data for Joint Officers (1998 and 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OPMS XXI's Impact on Joint Officer Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Perceptions on the Development of Army Officers for Joint Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical Perspective on Joint Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent Perceptive on Joint Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Preparation for Joint Warfare: Can the Army Do Better?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endnotes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, or more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new system. For, the initiator has the enmity of all that would profit by the preservation of the old institutions, and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new one. The hesitation of the latter arises in part from the fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, and in part from the general skepticism of mankind which does not really believe in an innovation until experience proves its value. So it happens that whenever his enemies have occasion to attack the innovator they do so with the passion of partisans while the others defend him sluggishly so that the innovator and his party are alike vulnerable.\(^1\) (1513)

Goldwater-Nichols (joint interoperability) is the most significant piece of military legislation since the National Defense Act of 1947 created a separate Air Force and established the Department of Defense.\(^2\) (1988)

We will develop a consistent, clearly stated strategy for the long term that embraces a commitment to joint operations.\(^3\) (1999)

Recently, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, listed six topics that he would personally oversee when he assumed office. His inclusion of preparing Army officers for joint warfare as one of the top goals in the Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army (23 June 1999)\(^4\), sent a signal to the field of the importance of joint training and capabilities. General Shinseki may suspect that the Army is not being all it can be in the preparation of leaders for joint duty.

The Army Chief of Staff wants to know if "the United States Army has taken the appropriate actions to prepare leaders for the evolutionary change of future warfare:" joint operations involving air, land, and sea forces?\(^5\) General Shinseki's question is rooted in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and seasoned with the multiple joint deployments, wars, peacekeeping operations, and other missions the Army has engaged in the past fifteen years.
Creation of a new system or modification of an old system is difficult, as Machiavelli described. Systems and people are creatures of habit. Change stresses the system and people within the system. Our system in this case is an organization, the United States Army. The initial change to the system was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols requirement for the Army to become more capable for joint operations and interoperability with the three other services. The subsequent stress on the system, and the focus of this paper, is the Army Chief of Staff’s recent emphasis on joint duty and assessment of Army actions to prepare officers for joint warfare.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: THE HISTORICAL TIE TO JOINT SERVICE EMPHASIS

Some military missions in the 1980s involving two or more services were poorly executed, causing Congress and some senior military leaders to push reform to force the services to work together more cooperatively. Senator Sam Nunn, after reviewing the Grenada invasion summaries and after action reports, remarked that “despite our victory... and performance of the individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations.”

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986), directed the Army, and other services, to train, educate, and place officers into joint assignments so the Department of Defense would be better prepared to fight future wars and support worldwide contingency missions. The act directed the services to provide joint-tailored schooling and assurance of promotion rates that equaled or surpassed the promotion rates of peer officer groups, specifically officers serving on the service headquarters staff and officers in other competitive billets. Goldwater-Nichols’ intent was twofold: create a pool of officers specialized in joint operations and provide promotion and career incentives for officers with joint experience.
Goldwater-Nichols had a much bigger role than personnel and training. The “act, under the guise of reorganizing, actually revolutionized the way the military did business. Elevating the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the senior military officer responsible for providing advice to the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (empowered him).” The Army Chief of Staff no longer had a direct line to the President. Army issues and operations went to the Chairman of the JCS, allowing him to use his “joint bully pulpit” to persuade the services to cooperate and dissipate the services selfish rice bowl mentality.

Senator Sam Nunn, one of the legislation’s most ardent supporters, testified in Congress that reorganizing the Department of Defense was the “most important undertaking” regarding America’s security. Senator Barry Goldwater, during the same session believed it (the legislation) “may be the most important thing that Congress does in my lifetime.” Directing change is relatively easy. Influencing change first involves working through negative perceptions.

**ARMY PERCEPTIONS ON JOINT SERVICE**

Congress mandated change to improve service interoperability in combat operations. Joint service was not popular among Army officers. General Shinseki should be glad that he is not dealing with the Army officer corps of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In general, this era officer did not flock to joint duty. Historically, Army officers have avoided joint duty. A 1982 report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff explains that:

*Joint assignments are seldom sought by officers. A joint position removes them from the environment for which they have been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in which they seek advancement. It places them instead in a wholly new environment involving unfamiliar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports are often trusted to officers of other services with little in common by way of professional background. Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work on the joint Staff is unproductive, and that too much effort is wasted on tedious negotiation of issues until they have been debased and reduced to the lowest common level of assent.*
Other Army leaders who have served in joint assignments believe that our Army must and can do a better job preparing leaders and staff officers for joint duty. Interviews with several officers revealed that some assumed joint jobs without the prerequisite knowledge and skills required for success.11 Either the system failed to train the officers or they were uncomfortable being out of their cozy and familiar Army environments. Regardless of perceptions, the historical evolution of warfare combined with technology means the Army officers must embrace joint service and the Army must develop officers through joint training, education and assignments.

JOINT WARFARE HISTORICAL VIEW

Historically, an Army fought wars, campaigns, and battles with some support, but little coordination with the Air Force, Navy, or Marines. Likewise, the other services prosecuted their campaigns with little regard to the Army’s role. Previously, the nature of war—its isolation, relative slow pace, and antiquated communications—allowed land forces the autonomy to conduct operations in a separate theater, unencumbered by the activity of naval or air forces in other theaters. In wars dawn, Napoleon synchronized multiple battles and commanded hundreds of thousands foot soldiers while ruling France from a forward deployed command post. Napoleon would be overwhelmed today. A contemporary Commander-in –Chief (CINC) must conduct an orchestra of armored forces, air alliances, and naval armada’s with the aid of a large staff composed of commanders and staff officers from four different services.

The future battlefield will require Army leaders who can visualize, plan for, and integrate naval and air assets and forces. This is change in the greatest magnitude. War’s landscape and environ have changed greatly due to the synergy of technology—gun-powder, warp-speed communications, and globalization. The ancient battles between Sparta and Athens provide
example: "since Athens fought Sparta, technological advances have greatly reduced the time available for military decision making. In the age of sail, governments had months to decide how to coordinate land and sea responses to military threat. With modern weapons and communications, the luxury of time had virtually disappeared. The pace of events requires rapid and more effective decision-making." The ancient leader's command of the art and science of war was much less complicated than the Army leader of the future who must integrate the combat capabilities of four services.

The past decade included several military operations where the Army worked with the other services in both conventional combat and unconventional or Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Several examples highlight the inability of the four services to work together, justifying, in some minds, the need for reform to improve service interoperability. Examples include the, "...1980 terrorist truck bomb that killed 241 Marines in Beirut (who were) concentrated...in one building. An investigation revealed that a cumbersome chain-of-command, unclear objectives, and inconsistent guidance" were byproducts of the four services' interoperability woes. The later "failure to rescue American hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran (was) hampered by a lack of joint training and inadequate command and control." Last, the "operational mishaps in Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY...established the clearest need for reform in (joint operations)...Although the joint task force accomplished its mission, things went wrong. Troops had to use tourist maps, Army and Marine operations were poorly coordinated, and lack of radio interoperability led to casualties among the civilian population and friendly fires." Military missions will fail and observers will always second-guess why. In these cases, After Action Reviews reflected poor coordination across service lines and the inability for the Army's various systems to tie into other service systems.
These new Army missions required closer coordination, in a faster-moving operational environment. Traditional Army missions performed in the past was closer to the "war" axis on the continuum of conflict scale, where force-focused Army units engaged like forces. These newer missions are closer to the peacekeeping and stability support axis. The old is clashing with the new and the ability to conduct joint operations may be the bridge between the two.

The old Army primarily focused on land-based operations. American Army officers in the Revolutionary War, War of 1812 and Civil War moved men and animals through the forests or across expansive battlefields. There was no Air Force, unless we consider reconnaissance balloons. The Navy operated independently, in most cases, except for Vicksburg. World War I and World War II brought the beginning of one service coordinating with another. The services just happened to occupy the same theater of war. The Korean Conflict and Vietnam War moved the Army closer to joint operations, as the Army needed the long range bombing capability of the Army Air Corps and later the Air Force. The American experience in Vietnam “brought questions on the effectiveness of joint operations. After retiring, General David Jones, United States Air Force, who was Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff from 1978-1982, described Vietnam as our worst example of confused objectives and unclear responsibilities in Washington and the field. Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself.”

The past twenty years have been most significant regarding joint warfare. The Army asks the Air Force for close air support on the battlefield and competes for airspace in the sky. Meanwhile the Army bickers with the Navy and Marine Corps regarding the type and number of jets each service will buy.
The past ten years saw the “new” Army go to war and to peacetime operations with the other services, many times under the command and control of a Joint Task Force commanded by a Marine, Sailor, or Airman. Unfortunately, problems in concepts, roles, equipment, and communication capability hampered mission accomplishment. The lack of interoperability between the services contributed to mission difficulties in Grenada, Beirut, Southwest Asia, Panama, and Haiti. The changing nature of warfare demands that the Army and its leaders work capably with the other services.

Focusing on joint operations as opposed to land-based operations is a giant paradigm shift for Army leaders, based on tradition and a persuasive view that joint duty is not good for one’s career. General Shinseki wants Army officers trained for joint duty because service with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as evidenced by the past decade, is the wave of the future.

CHANGING THE ARMY TO EMBRACE JOINT SERVICE

Establishing the mindset for change and programs to facilitate change is a slow process. Machiavelli’s maxim regarding systemic change is so appropriate because many senior Army leaders thought the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation was too much change for the good of the Army. Therefore, the directive to coordinate with the other services, send the best Army officers to joint assignments, and promote them in commensurate percentages as compared to Army staff officers was met with skepticism in many quarters.

General Shinseki’s intent is to “develop a consistent, clearly stated strategy for the long term that embraces a commitment to joint operations. (He sees the Army) as the leader in joint mission readiness…(and plans to) select senior leaders based on their joint warfighting abilities.”

The Army Chief of Staff is right to be concerned about the Army’s ability to develop officers for
joint duty. He knows that joint-trained Army leaders will be the battlefield commanders of the future as they lead Joint Task Forces (JTF) or serve on the Joint staff.

METHODODOLOGY

A longitudinal study of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and its impact on the Army with a review of current policies, Army school joint instruction, and officer assignment patterns will help answer the research question. A review of historical policy documents, promotion board results, and school curriculum, and the interview of senior leaders in Army policy, personnel, and academic billets was conducted in gathering data. The two central aspects of the problem are determining if officers embraced joint duty and assessing the viability of joint professional development programs.

The Army had to have taken a two-pronged approach to prepare for future joint warfare: First, ensure Army leaders understand the importance of the Army being part of the Department of Defense’s “joint team.” Second, establish a program that educates, trains, and places the best Army officers in the joint schools, headquarters, and task forces.

These two tasks are daunting. The Army continues to grapple with how much time, money, and leaders should be devoted to joint programs as they weigh the cost to Army programs. The Army Chief of Staff will deal with an Army culture that eschews joint duty assignments and experience. General Shinseki may deal with an undertow of resistance as he continues to push the U.S. Army and its leaders toward supporting joint service,

The Goldwater-Nichols Act and General Shinseki’s question focus on initiating system change to assure interoperability between the four services. Army compliance with Goldwater-Nichols' personnel directives will indicate that: (1) the Army instituted change in reaction to Goldwater-Nichols; (2) personnel programs were developed to foster the development and
promotion of joint officers, and (3) officers perceive joint duty positively. Likewise, General Shinseki’s question is answered by assessing the institutional reaction to Goldwater-Nichols and the status of joint-oriented personnel systems, programs, and perceptions.

An Army that develops officers for joint warfare and complies with Goldwater-Nichols will have taken positive steps to revise policies, systems, and traditions that support joint training, education, and duty. Their personnel programs will facilitate the development and promotion of joint experienced and qualified officers. Their leaders favorably perceive joint duty as beneficial and career enhancing to the nation, the Army, and themselves.

If the Army that does not comply with Goldwater-Nichols will poorly develops officers for joint warfare by ultimately failing to train, educate or reward joint experience.

CONCLUSIONS

General Shinseki must win over those who see no need for the Army relying too much on the other services. These traditionalists know Goldwater-Nichols’ intent and are lukewarm supporters until they see the benefits of joint service and interoperability. There must be inter-service compatibility and cooperation. Single-service operations will be few, and far between. Army leaders must adapt for joint warfare. The Goldwater-Nichols’ Act and General Shinseki’s both seek to create and maintain a cadre of Army (and other service officers) with the knowledge, skills, and experience to fight and sustain support on a joint team.

Has the United States Army taken the appropriate actions to prepare leaders for the evolutionary change of future warfare: joint operations involving land, air, and sea forces?
Other Army leaders who have served in joint assignments believe that our Army must and can do a better job preparing leaders and staff officers for joint duty. Interviews with selected officers revealed the Army placed them into joint jobs without the prerequisite knowledge and skills required for success.

The following chapters summarize the efforts the Army has made toward embracing joint service and developing Army officers for joint duty. Chapter 2 reviews how selected Army policies, systems, and traditions have evolved to comply with Goldwater-Nichols and support the Army Chief of Staff's professional development goals for Army officers. Policies, in most cases are the result of Goldwater-Nichols legislative mandates. Various Army systems must support the end goal of interoperability and joint development. A cursory review of Army systems—personnel, education, and logistics, among others—should reflect programs that support joint development and service interoperability. Chapter 3 provides a summary of personnel programs and selection and promotions rates of joint officers to determine if serving in joint assignments leads to promotion. Goldwater-Nichols mandates the promotion and success of joint service officers as an enticement for the best and brightest. General Shinseki will not be able to develop officers unless there is a success track tied to joint duty. Chapter 4 chronicles historic and current views about joint duty. Perceptions are key. Senior leaders who believe joint service is not important or professional beneficial will steer younger officers to another career track. Officers with a negative view about joint duty will continue to avoid the experience. The Army's best officers must be attracted and interested in joint duty if the Army is to develop them for joint service. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the final summary, recommendations and conclusions on the Army's efforts to prepare leaders for joint warfare.

CHAPTER TWO
Policies, Systems, and Traditions Evolve to Support Joint Warfare

"...a study revealed that fewer than 2% of officers in joint billets had previous joint service. (1987)."19

“Our policy is for 75% of former Battalion Commanders (the Army’s future senior leadership) to have had joint service experience (2000).”20

Note the significant emphasis increase on placing Army officer’s in joint assignment from 1987 as compared to 2000. Army officers assigned to joint billets in the 1980s were “by and large officers ... (who were) not the best and brightest. Nor were they prepared as they should be for joint assignments. They were not competitive for promotion as officers who remained close to (the Army).” 21 This chapter reviews how selected Army policies, systems, and traditions have evolved to partially comply with the Goldwater-Nichols Act and support the Army Chief of Staff’s joint-oriented professional development goals. Policies, in most cases, are the result of Goldwater-Nichols legislative mandates. Various Army systems or programs support the end goals of interoperability and joint development. Army traditions are more difficult to change because they evolve over time, and have now become oriented toward joint education and service. A review of Army policy, systems, and traditions show that the Army changed as an institution to prepare Army officers to work on joint staffs and in joint commands.

Army Policies: How the Army Publishes Standards

Army policy is written to govern the who, what, why, where, but, mostly how the Army handles an issue. The Goldwater-Nichols Act influenced and the Army Chief of Staff influences development of Army officer for joint duty policy.

Goldwater-Nichols influenced Army policy by issuing several legislatively mandated edicts to the Department of Defense. First, it strengthened the role of the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff by making him the primary military advisor to the President and the National Security Council.

11
Second, the act made four-star combatant Commander-in-Chiefs fully responsible for missions within their area of responsibility, making service chiefs less powerful for operational missions. Third, Goldwater-Nichols mandated consolidation of resources to elicit efficiencies and cost avoidance, Department of Defense-wide. Fourth, Department of Defense streamlined its' operations to improve command and control. Last, the act provided carefully worded promotion opportunity guidance to improve officer management policies for joint officers.

Other changes include:

...definitions to provide a standard joint terminology and concepts regarding operations and education; a special career field for Joint Specialty Officers; improved standards and rigors of intermediate level schools for joint training; and, a new five-day course to teach Army Brigadier Generals how to work with the other services.22

The Army Chief of Staff influences policy by telling his leaders that the development of Army officers for joint warfare is important. His personal involvement influences his senior operational and personnel leaders to react. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations has established a working group in the Training and Readiness Division to review the way the Army trains and educates joint officers.23 The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has placed renewed emphasis on the assignment of high quality officers to joint commands.24 But, more important, every officer who has read the "Intent of the Chief of Staff (2 June 1999) knows that the Army's senior general expects his leaders to be proficient in joint operations. Policy born as a result of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 will continue to grow and mature. Joint operations are woven into the fabric of the Army because of the Chief of Staff's interest and personal involvement.

Reaction to Goldwater Nichols was significant and Army policies today continue to support the intent of the 1986 legislation. Four policies provide example. First, the Army
ordered the Director of the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) the Army's senior Assignment Officer, to personally review the nomination of each officer to a joint billet. Second, selection to brigadier general would favor colonels who had served in previous joint assignments. Third, only officers competitive for promotion would be sent to the Phase II of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) course. Last, the date of the colonel selection board was moved so Army Senior Service College (SSC) graduates would be in joint assignment before the board met, allowing the Army to show good faith in sending quality officers to joint commands.

**ARMY SYSTEMS: INTERPRET, FOSTER, AND ENFORCE ARMY POLICY**

Policies have no teeth unless there is a system established to carryout the policy's stated and implied goals. The Army is a system with several major subsystems: organizations, personnel, intelligence, training and education, operations, resources, and logistics. The best results come from applying the policy change to all parts of the system. A check of several sub-systems should show modifications that facilitate professional development of Army officers for joint warfare. The army should work with the other services and the Department of Defense to assure that the systems that feed, train, heal, fuel, fix, and move the Army force are compatible with the sister services and joint headquarters. It does not make sense to train Army officers for joint duty if another sub-system is still only Army-oriented. A cursory review of personnel, education and training, and logistics interoperability show the Army took steps to push the whole system toward joint development.

The Personnel system is obviously the most important sub-system to influence. Leaders are the human resource to support all the Army sub-systems. Both Goldwater-Nichols and the Army Chief of Staff proactively influenced or influence, respectively, the personnel rules for
assignments, career development, and board (school, command, and promotion). The 1986 legislation invoked strict rules for promotion of joint officers. The Army Chief of Staff helps to write the letter that provides guidance to school, command, and promotion boards. Boards can be guided to place more credence on joint experience.

The bread and butter of an officer's career is his assignment pattern or history of duty positions. The Army system promotes and selects (school or command) officers who perform the tough or preferred duty well. Conversely, the Army system does not select or promote officers who have not had the right jobs, performed poorly, or both. The backers of Goldwater-Nichols realized this and directed that officers who served in joint assignment be promoted at a rate equal to or higher than all other officers. In other words, joint duty became a preferred duty because promotions and selections followed.

Promotion and selection boards previously selected officers based on the overall quality of the file—photograph, assignment summary, and officer efficiency reports. Now, the board had to consider joint duty as extremely important as they voted the files. Selection of officers with joint experience and a good file became the norm. Or, the board had to explain why the right percentage of joint officers were not selected to the Secretary of the Army, who had to report to the Secretary of Defense.

Boards do not always select joint officers to the next grade. Sometimes the joint experienced officer has failed to meet another qualifying standard. The Army Colonel's board in 1992 failed to promote joint qualified officers to colonel because they had served as Battalion Command. Conversely, successful battalion commanders, who were not joint qualified, were selected to colonel. The Department of Defense directed the board to reconvene and review the joint numbers of selections and non-selections. The board refused to change the selections. The
author argues for promoting specialists (Foreign Area Officers, Comptrollers, System Automation Officers, and Operational Research Engineers) that the Army needs at the colonel-level. In 1996, the Army, based on a recommendation by the Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study Group, changed the officer management and promotions system. In 2001, the Army will start selecting officers to colonel who are specialists in selected fields, but did not command as a Lieutenant Colonel. ²⁹ This is a revolutionary change for the Army and will help other non-traditionalists, including officers who spend a career in joint billets, be accepted by the Army.

The right assignments lead to promotion, which lead to the right assignment, which lead to another promotion: a successful career track. A successful career pattern previously did not include joint assignments, before the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Now, joint duty is an almost must for officers who seek to serve as Colonels. Post Goldwater-Nichols' officers who hope to make general officer must seek joint assignments since joint duty is a prerequisite for a star, unless the experienced is waived. This is especially true for Combat Arms officers—Infantry, Artillery, and Armor.

Personnel assignments many times require prerequisite education and training. The development of joint doctrine supports classroom education. Schools for leaders provide the foundation in joint matters and exercises at training centers allow officers to test the skills they have learned in the classroom.

Joint doctrine has been in a constant state of flux as the services try to integrate their procedures into joint operations. Some leaders believe that joint doctrine is merely a rehash of service doctrine. Words are changed to imply joint, as opposed to the right procedures developed to insure interoperability: One author comments: "we created the joint doctrine formulation process in part to overcome service parochialism. Institutions like the Joint doctrine Center in
Norfolk, VA, and elements of the Joint Staff have produced literally tons of publications that sketch, and sometimes offer exquisite details for, what is termed joint doctrine. Yet, this growing body of literature is not so much joint doctrine as simply a (collection) of service doctrines.\textsuperscript{30}

Army schools teach some aspect of joint knowledge or operations, or both at each level of leader schooling. The levels include: the Officer Basic Course (OBC) for Lieutenants; Officer Advanced Course (OAC) for Captains; Combined Arms Service Staff School (CAS3) for Captains; the Command and Staff College (CSC) for Majors; Senior Service College (SSC) for Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels; and General Officer (GO) orientation for newly pinned-on general officers. Of course, more joint doctrine and operations are taught in the higher level courses.

During pre-commissioning training, cadets are introduced to the joint world with an overview, purpose, and some historical examples of joint operations. Company grade officers, Lieutenants and Captains, are made aware of joint operations at the Officer Basic and Officer Advanced courses. Today, most of these officers have already served on several deployments with Joint Task Forces. CAS3, the Army's six week staff school, provides an indoctrination and conducts exercises in a joint environment to further the development—joint organizations and inter-service relations are discussed. Majors who attend a command and staff college learn about defense planning systems; joint command, control, communications, and intelligence; organizational and command relationships; and the operational level of war. Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels selected for Senior Service College study national military capabilities, joint doctrine and planning, campaign planning, and combined warfare in a theater. Brigadier Generals in the one week Capstone course study theater-level joint and combined operations, synthesis of national military strategy, and synthesis of national security strategy and policymaking.\textsuperscript{31}
One innovative idea comes from “various study groups and commissions that propose changes in joint education (by) expanding exchange programs. Military academy cadets and naval academy midshipmen would be allowed to (attend) other service academies (so) joint education is introduced” \(^{32}\) earlier in an officers’ career. An earlier introduction of joint concepts may help inhibit the service parochialism that seems to entrench Army officers.

This parochialism may account for the performance of some Army officers in joint exercises. The test bed for education and training are joint training exercises. However, the cooperation learned in the classroom, is not always exhibited in the field. Army training centers “test approved joint operations plans…and (joint) tactical concepts. (Army leaders) fail to learn from previous joint exercises. (Specifically, the Army) could not effectively utilize (naval) carrier air assets…and the Army and Navy reflected the ongoing conflict between them over coastal defenses and aviation-related issues.\(^{33}\)

This is not unusual, as “the military services have a long history of interoperability problems during joint operations. For example, the success of the Persian Gulf War in 1991—a major joint military operation—was hampered by a lack of basic interoperability.\(^{34}\) Specific logistics’ problems included “service components (that) used their service unique stove piped systems to requisition, receive, store, and issue massive amounts of material that were shipped from the continental United States. Unfortunately, there was no system in place to provide centralized visibility of theater-wide requirements, assets on-hand, and assets in-transit from external sources, thereby precluding optimal resource management.”\(^{35}\) Once again, the Army’s trained joint officer cannot be effective in an environment where the sub-systems are not meshed.

There is no easy short-term fix until the services integrate their systems. A Joint Task Force commander is hamstrung because each component commander may have a “…logistics
staff officer who is responsible for the joint war fighting plan (but) the detailed planning is done by
the services. This is tremendously challenging due to the fact that each service component uses a
unique logistics automation systems, which is unable to talk (to the other services’ systems).36

A discussion of personnel and training as they relate to the Army preparing officers for
joint warfare is key in gauging how well the Army is preparing its officers. But, a systemic
approach in gauging Army change must assess other sub-systems within the Army. Armies must
change the sub-components of the whole to make sure the effect takes place throughout the
whole system. An Army cannot develop an officer for joint service without modifying the other
parts of the army: personnel, training, and logistics, for example.

The Army’s preparation of officers for the future joint battlefield must encompass more
than selection of officers and their training. A systemic approach must also include insuring that
the major logistical systems used by the four services are compatible and interchangeable.
Moreover, Army officers must understand how to fit Army systems into the joint world and vice
versa. This topic is a separate monograph in itself and this body of research cannot fully examine.
However, a cursory review of Army efforts toward joint interoperability from a logistics
perspective, is another indicator of Army actions to prepare officers for joint duty. An Army
serious about joint interoperability will work with the other services to field similar logistics
systems, weapons, and vehicles and will train its officers to work with these systems.

Preparing officers for joint duty is one challenge. Changing the Army to be truly
interoperable with the other three services is a greater challenge. The Army can do a great job of
preparing, training, and educating officers and do a poor job of changing it sub-systems to work
seamlessly with the other services. Unfortunately, that is where the Army is today. The Army’s
leaders are adequately prepared for joint warfare based on selection, training, schooling,
assignments, and experience. The Army’s subsystems are not inter-operational and do not properly tie into the other services, or operational Joint Task Forces in time of war and contingencies.

There are many examples in joint operations when U.S. Army trained leaders could not accomplish the mission because of the failure of logistics interoperability. One example “is in 1962, the Army could not put tanks on a Navy roll-on roll-off ship. The ship lacked sufficient clearance to accommodate M48 tanks unless the commander’s cupolas were removed.

Unfortunately this same problem, on the same ship, had arisen during the 1958 deployment to Lebanon.”

There are some ongoing peacetime efforts to help synchronize logistics and make improvements within the Department of Defense. However, even the program set-up to certify interoperability casts aspersions on the Services efforts to work together. The acquisition and logistic processes are the first steps in curing the Services problem with radio communication and the more technical and sophisticated command and control systems.

Unfortunately, the Department of Defense does not have an effective process for “certifying existing, newly developed, and modified command and control systems. As a result, many systems have not been certified for interoperability and, in fact, the (certifiers) do not know how many systems require certification. Improvements to the certification process are needed to provide the Department of Defense better assurance that command and control systems critical to effective joint operations are tested for interoperability.”

Not knowing what systems need certification is significant. “In June 1996, the Military Communications Electronic Board reviewed existing command and control systems submitted by the services and determined that 42 were crucial to the needs of the military commanders. As of
October 1997, 223 had not been tested or certified.” According to Test Command officials, the twenty-three systems were not certified because either the command did not know the systems existed, the system was not submitted for testing.39

Failure of the acquisition and logistics systems to test and certify command and control hardware, software, and procedures may result in another friendly fire mishap. Civilian, Army and Air Force radar systems and aircraft cannot always see and recognize each other. (This) leads to “failure (of the system) to accept changes in mislabeled data identifying friendly aircraft as a hostile aircraft, thereby causing the simulated downing of an aircraft. Improper tracking identification, creates the potential for either a hostile system to penetrate defenses or a friendly system to be accidentally destroyed.”40

The most blatant weakness in the system is that “test command officials ... do not generally advise services system program managers on interoperability problems identified in exercises. While not required to do so, the Test Command is in the best position to advise the service chiefs.”41 Failure to provide warning of interoperability problems is the height of bureaucracy and tantamount to negligence.

Army strategists, operational planners, and planners at joint headquarters, Joint Task Force headquarters, Army components, Corps, and Division may be trained in joint doctrine, but it does them no good if the sub-systems that support interoperability are not meshed together. A line of reasoning could conclude that knowing that systems are not interoperable eases planning.
However, the problem will not get fixed as long as "each service component has its own service-unique procedures, terminology, and symbiology."\textsuperscript{42}

**ARMY TRADITIONS: SUSTAIN AND SUPPORT LONG-HELD POLICIES**

Policies establish the measures the Army will take to prepare officers for joint warfare. Systems and sub-systems exist to support and facilitate the policy. The failure of logistics interoperability creates difficult circumstances when the educated joint officer arrives to the field to perform. A long-term Army policy may evolve into an Army tradition. It may become a habit. The Army may be at the cusp of embracing joint warfare, after initially fighting the concept.

Tradition is the last bastion of an Army to change since "service visions about how to fight are based on service cultures, themselves derived from the defining experiences of World War II. That conflict—the greatest in history—created doctrinal and organizational foundations that ran broad and deep in services, giving them institutional visions of warfare that decisively shaped how they looked at war."\textsuperscript{43} An Army long steeped in defining officer success as time with soldiers or work on the Army staff was forced to make time with the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy as equally rewarding. This type of change is slow to come.

Work experience with the other services is good for the military in whole. Joint duty builds a cadre of leaders who can serve on Joint Headquarters, Joint Task Forces, and be groomed to be the CINCs for the next decade or two. There is a downside. These same officers could lose touch with their Army and not become the master tactician or strategist the Army needs to serve as an Assistant Division Commander or Corps Commander. A balancing of joint needs vice Army needs is required to make sure the Army joint qualified officer remains the ground fighting expert the Army needs. There are some winds of discontent regarding the
Army's push to embrace joint warfare. As we peer into the future, "when the system retooled by Goldwater-Nichols produces its first Chairman and set of Joint Chiefs, will they know as much about the capabilities of their service as those who preceded them? Will the opinions they give under the most demanding circumstances to a President who has no military experience be as operationally informed as the advice of a general officer such as Norman Schwarzkopf who, until he became a CINC, had a only served one tour on a joint staff?" \(^{44}\)

The Army tradition of fighting land combat battles requires experts in infantry, artillery, tank warfare, and all the other combat, combat support, and service support specialties. The Army may drop or lose its identity as it embraces joint concepts. "Goldwater-Nichols...(causes)...the services to adjust traditions, particularly the convention that officers did not serve outside their...tight-knit career specialty lest they fall behind their contemporaries who remained in the (Army's) mainstream." \(^{45}\)

Traditions die hard in each service because of the tie to the historical way the service fought wars. The Marines conduct amphibious assaults of beachheads. The Air Force conducts long-range bombing and strafing missions. The navy can strategically respond to a worldwide contingency in days by simply moving a carrier battle group to show the United States resolve. The Army fights major land battles, responds with unconventional forces to insurgencies, and can provide close air support for units moving to contact. Joint warfare forces the Army to rethink its' historical role by allowing a combatant Commander-in-Chief to give traditional Army missions to other services.

Senior Army leaders must let loose of their traditional ties to the Army embrace joint warfare as an Army culture and tradition. If not, subordinate officers will struggle with the reasons the Goldwater-Nichols Act established joint education or why General Shinseki places
joint officer preparation at the top of his list. Maybe the "Gulf War afforded a glimpse of things to come (when)...naval and air forces joined with ground forces to fight a large armored opponent on land."  

In summary, the Army established several policies that facilitated the development of officers for joint warfare. The requirements for training, schooling, and participation in worldwide deployments have created a bench of Army officers who are knowledgeable of joint doctrine and operations. Components of the Army have responded well by creating systems to facilitate the selection and promotion of joint qualified officers with potential. Unfortunately, several sub-systems have failed in assuring interoperability with the other services. The failure of the Army's acquisition, logistics, certification, and command and control sub-systems makes full interoperability difficult to accomplish. The Army tradition will continue to evolve toward a joint tradition as leaders and solders continue to deploy in Joint Task Forces and learn the ways of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Army's personnel policies and system will be continue to select joint qualified officer as Army leaders, causing the tradition of joint service to get stronger and stronger.

CHAPTER THREE

PERSONNEL SYSTEM: SELECTS, DEVELOPS, AND PROMOTES JOINT OFFICERS

*To effect change in the services, Goldwater-Nichols needed to define the nature of joint officer development and create institutional incentives sufficient to promote its ultimate legitimacy. (This occurred) by linking assignments, education, and later promotion potential. In subsequent years, the effectiveness of joint combat operations has been even more powerful in persuading officers that joint duty is both personally fulfilling and career enhancing.*

23
These are great words with a noble intent. However, "from 1991-1996 the Army failed to meet joint officer promotion expectations on nine occasions." 48 Changing the Army to embrace joint duty means that leaders must see a professional benefit to opt for the career track and the Army must develop officer well enough so they are promoted. With over 14 years of history and numerous joint-focused deployments, the Army has slowly embraced joint duty as an Army tradition. Officers will watch the results of command, school, and promotion boards to make sure that the joint service does not become a career ender. Officers seeking the highest level of rank and responsibility should know that "no officer is to be promoted to General Officer or Admiral unless he has served successfully in a position on the joint staff. Before that he must be educated in a service or other school that stresses a national rather than service outlook." 49 In 1986 Goldwater-Nichols broadened the horizon for Army officers.

This chapter discusses how the personnel system and OPMS XXI impact the development of joint officers, followed by a review of current promotion statistics of officers to lieutenant colonel and colonel, the best barometer for judging success. Remember that General Shinseki also said "...the selection of senior leaders will be based on their joint warfighting abilities, leadership, and capacity for innovation and change."50

The inner workings of joint staff work at the at the Pentagon and personnel development and assignments at PERSCOM will be the backdrop for describing how well the army is meeting the intent of Goldwater-Nichols and General Shinseki.

The author has an insider's view of officer professional development based on five years assigned to two Army headquarters from 1991-1996. From 1991-1993 on the the Army staff in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations working joint and Army prison issues with officers from the other services to coordinate correctional personnel and
prisoner issues. Later, a three-year assignment at the Army’s personnel command, located in Alexandria, Virginia, two years as an Assignments Officer, Field Grade officers and one year as the Branch Chief, Functional Area Assignments. These three years allowed for the assessment of how well the Army selected, developed, assigned, and rewarded Army officers who served in joint billets. 51

Many army staff officers work routine staff actions that require some coordination at the joint staff level with army counterparts serving in joint billets. Most of these officers are Majors or Lieutenant Colonels serving in operational, personnel, or logistical positions. The overwhelming majority are in their first joint assignment. The vast majority are resident graduates of a Command and Staff College, Phase I of the Army’s JPME. Most had attended the joint staff course (Phase II. JPME) at Norfolk, VA or were waiting for a school slot and would attend later. The officers waiting to attend the Phase II course were less confident about working staff actions at the joint level and voiced this dissatisfaction. Most of their discomfort stemmed from not being familiar with the joint staff’s organization, processes, and acronyms. Officers who had attended the course, in general, believed they were better prepared to assume their duties.

The author’s Assignment Officer duties included, professional development, assignments, slating and assigning majors and lieutenant colonels to Army and Joint billets. The Pentagon experience with Army officers who had not attended JPME Phase II made for sensitivity in trying to get these officers to training before they assumed their joint duties.

The Army’s goal of educating all officers at the Phase II course could not be accomplished for several reasons. First, the school had limited seats based on staffing levels. Second, Army did not allocated enough TDY funds to pay for all officers eligible for the
training. Third, some officers were deferred from training due to operational reasons from the losing or gaining command. For example, the losing command could not afford to lose the officer two months early because a replacement was not available. Or, the gaining command, the joint headquarters, demanded the officer immediately with the promise of releasing the officer for schooling later. This is the systemic answer of why basic branch Army officers were not joint trained before arrival to the joint billet.

The Branch Chief, Functional Area Assignments job entails supervision of nine Lieutenant Colonels and senior Majors who assign basic branch officers officers to Army and Joint functional area jobs—Foreign Area Officer, Comptroller, Systems Automation, Operational Research, Nuclear Operations, Permanent Army Professors, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs. Functional Area career fields, historically known as an officer’s secondary area of expertise were openly viewed with disdain by basic branch officers. Most officers went kicking and screaming to functional area assignments because they were viewed as dead-end jobs.

Promotions were largely based on how well one did in the operational basic branch Army, even though the Army and the Department for Defense desperately needed Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels who were subject matter experts in the various functional areas.

The Army made a valiant effort to put the best officers in joint assignments. Many times Assignment Officers pulled high quality officers out of field units, after branch qualification, and placed them in a joint position. Most officers understood why they were needed for joint duty—professional development and needs of the service. Some were so self-serving that they believed
that not getting more troop time would hurt them for later promotion. Most calmed down after learning the promotion rules for joint officers. In most cases, after six months to a year the officer accepted the posting and saw the professional benefit.

A review of officer perceptions regarding joint duty before Goldwater-Nichols as compared to the most recent years indicates that acceptance has arrived. The emphasis from senior leaders, including, the Chief of Staff, and the most recent promotion board results may be two reasons why. Note the selection rates for due course (on time) officers from Major to Lieutenant Colonel for basic branch officers in 1998 and 1999:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>JT SPECIALTY OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ARMY 67%</td>
<td>JOINT STAFF 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMY STAFF 74%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ARMY 69%</td>
<td>JOINT STAFF 92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMY STAFF 77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COL</th>
<th>JT SPECIALTY OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ARMY 42%</td>
<td>JOINT STAFF 69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMY STAFF 52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ARMY 50%</td>
<td>JOINT STAFF 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMY STAFF 62%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics are from Army Promotion lists from 1998 and 1999. The Army category is the average of all Army officers. The Army staff only includes officers serving on the Army staff in Washington D.C. The Joint Staff only includes officers on the Joint Staff. JSOs are officers who have served in joint before, have attended PMJE Phase Two and have the Joint Specialty additional skill identifier.

Note how well officers with joint experienced fared. These promotion rates are not a coincidence. They are the result of the last 8-10 years of assigning the highest quality officers to the joint community and then sending them back as field grade officers. The traditional career path for the successful Army officer has been altered by the congressionally mandated requirement to send Army officers to joint duty.

Today, Army officers, especially combat arms’ colonels who seek a star, strive to become a Joint Service Officer (JSO) or serve in a joint assignment, to be eligible for promotion to Brigadier General. A review of promotion statistics to Brigadier General for the last 10 years
reflects a rising trend in the percent of officers with joint experience and a three-year trend of fewer Colonels needing waivers for selection to Brigadier General.\textsuperscript{32}

The traditional route to the top has been command, command, and command. Not any more. The Officer Personnel Management System Study (OPMS) XXI will change how current field grade officers are tracked, developed, and considered for promotion. For the first time in our history, a significant number of officers will be able to serve in non-line or operational jobs and still be competitive for promotion to the most senior ranks, specifically colonel.

OPMS XXI is a review and adjustment in the way Army officers are managed, assigned, and selected for promotion, schooling, and command. Historically, officers of the combat arms, combat support arms, and combat service support arms generally followed the same career path from Second Lieutenant through Colonel. Lieutenants were Platoon Leaders. Captains were Company Commanders or battalion staff officers. Majors were Executive Officers or Operations Officers in battalions or brigades. Lieutenant Colonels commanded battalions. Colonels commanded brigades. Troop time and command equated to promotion.

The only way to be promoted from one rank to the next was by following this very traditional career path. Exceptions were few. Sometimes a Foreign Area Officer, an expert in a specific region, culture and language, or an Operational Research Systems Analyst, an officer skilled in problem-solving through quantifiable means, were selected without serving in one of the key positions. These officers and situations were rare. The Army selected officers to Colonel because they were great Battalion Commanders, but the Army also needed colonels, who were subject matter experts to serve as Foreign Area Officers, Comptrollers, Operational Research System Analyst, Automation System Analyst, and in other
non-operational billets. Unfortunately, the Army failed to grow these specialists to Colonel. The promotion system would not select them past LTC. The vast majority of colonel promotions went to for the Lieutenant Colonels who had successfully commanded battalions, but could not serve at the 06 level in functional area jobs requiring expertise. The Army’s fix to this problem was to create career fields that catered to both types of officers.

Officers who wanted continued troop duty would stay in the Operational Career Field. Officers who had specialty training or experience and opted to be assigned in three other career fields—Operational Support, Information Operations, and Institutional Support—would continue to be competitive for schooling and promotion to colonel. OPMS XXI does not increase the overall total number of colonels selected in the basic branches in the future. OPMS XXI simply moves about 30% of the promotion selections from former battalion commanders and distributes them in the career fields for officers who have not commanded, but are experts in their functional areas.

This paradigm shift will change the Army culture, but is necessary based on future Army requirements. Whereas historically, command, command, and more command led to selection for schools and promotion, skills and knowledge will be given higher priority in selecting future senior leaders. OPMS XXI has supporters at the highest Army echelons. Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Louis Caldera, a West Point graduate and former Army officer, believes OPMS XXI is good for the Army and “rather than emphasize a single formula for upward career mobility, this new system expands opportunity to a much wider range of career paths…the 21st Century Army will require senior officers who possess a wide range of skills and
experiences... OPMS XXI will ensure that officers who have specialized... will have a reasonable opportunity for promotion to the rank of colonel."

Does OPMS XXI go far enough? How does OPMS XXI affect the development of joint officers? As of April 2000, OPMS XXI does not modify how Army officers are developed for joint duty. Nor does OPMS XXI improve or enhance the status of Army officers with joint experience. The OPMS Study Group acknowledged that there had been some discussion in creating a separate career field for joint officers. However, a separate track was not created.

CHAPTER FOUR

PERCEPTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMY OFFICERS FOR JT DUTY

This chapter chronicles historic and current perspectives about joint duty and the Army’s efforts at developing joint officers. Perceptions are key. They reflect what the Army is doing and failing to do regarding developing officers for joint warfare. Army leader perceptions serve as a barometer for current actions. The perceptions should come from a wide range (both joint qualified and no-joint officers) to provide the most valid indicators and measure the impact of policy throughout the Army.
Senior leaders who believe joint service is important and professionally beneficial will steer younger officers to joint duty. These proponents will push these officers forward and will lobby for them on selection and promotion boards. They are more prone to lobby proactively for joint development programs. Officers with a negative view about joint duty may do the opposite. These non-proponents will avoid the experience.

Evaluation of both historical and current perspectives is key to develop trends on officer development. Historical perspectives garnered from a review of literature indicate perceptions, and how they possibly influenced development efforts. Current perceptions, gathered via written survey and interviews of officers in essential leadership, personnel, and academic positions, highlight the status of development. Neither provides 100% reliability and validity. However, both provide qualitative measure in answering the Chief of Staff's question.

The Army has an adequate program to develop officers for joint warfare. A review of the evolution of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; Army policy response and systemic change; and the officer professional development model shows joint education and training at every level of leader schooling. Of course, there can be improvements and recommendations are offered in the last chapter.

The historical perspective is clear: Joint duty was not popular and the development of officers for joint duty was lacking before Goldwater-Nichols legislation took effect. Officers avoided joint duty. Training and education were not rigorous enough to prepare an officer for joint warfare.

The general "perception among officers (was) that a joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact, within one service it (was) believed to be the kiss of death as far as a continued military career is concerned. In contrast, service assignments (were) widely perceived as offering
much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishments and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers (opted) for service assignments rather than risk a joint duty assignment."

LTG (RET) Leonard Holder, former Commandant at the Command and General Staff College, talks about the decline of professional military education. He claims of weak “staff and war colleges that varied in quality, most with no academic focus...a Marine (attending the Army War College) was quoted as saying 'since you studied law when you went to law school, and medicine when you went to medical school, I believed that I would get to study war at the Army War College, boy I was wrong.'"

In 1989, a review of military education (officially called the Joint Professional Military Education Panel), including standards for training officers for joint duty, was a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Representative Ike Skelton, Missouri chaired the panel. The study revealed that “some military colleges (Intermediate Service Schools or Command and Staff College)...were better places to lower your golf handicap than raise an officer's intellect...The goal (should be) to create joint specialty officers fully versed in the intricacies of joint operations.”

Over time, the educational systems have improved by focusing more on joint operations. Representative Skelton’s panel was influential in establishing stringent joint-focused education requirements at both the Professional Military Joint Education (PMJE) Phase I course or intermediate level, the Command and Staff Colleges and at the Phase II course, the 12 week Joint Officer Staff course in Norfolk, Virginia that prepares officers headed to joint assignments.

Let us look at perceptions today. A combination survey and interview of current key leaders and officers revealed that most believe the Army is doing the best it can to prepare officers for joint. The 30 participants were a cross representation of the Army-- Colonels, Lieutenant
Colonels, Majors, and Captains—serving in operational, policy, academic, and personnel positions. Some are joint qualified and others are not.

The Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels are either in important policymaking positions that influence joint development or operations, or have worked a joint assignment. Based on age and years of service, the Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels joined the Army before joint was vogue (1974-1980) and lived through Goldwater-Nichols. The senior of these officers grew up during the last vestiges of the “cold war.” These officers should have the most balanced appraisal of how well we prepare officers for joint warfare, since they are in policy, personnel, and academic positions that conduct this mission. The Army has trained this cohort joint warfare. Attendance to Command and Staff College and Senior Service College and their operational experiences as Operations Officers, Executive Officers, Battalion Commanders, and Brigade Commanders supporting Joint Task Forces engaged in missions, prepared them for joint warfare.

The majors entered the Army between 1985-1989 and were relatively young company grade officers during the joint evolution. They “grew-up” knowing that joint warfare was the wave of the future. The Army trained these mid-grade officers with their attendance at the Command and General Staff College and participation in joint operational assignments.

The captains were commissioned within the past five years and their focus has been at Platoon and Company level. Many have participated in deployments in support Joint Task Forces. The Army system will train the Captains.

The survey focused on three questions. First: has the Goldwater-Nichols Act better prepared Army officers for joint duty? Second: How well is the Army preparing officers to lead in a joint environment? Three: How can the Army better prepare officers for joint duty.

SELECTED COLONELS ‘VIEWS ON JOINT PREPARATION
The six colonels all agreed that Goldwater-Nichols has better prepared Army officers for joint warfare. Each is a Senior Service College graduate and a former Battalion Commander. Five of the six have or will command at the Colonel-level.

Colonel Thomas Keller, Chief of Colonels Division, OPMD, U.S. Army PERSCOM, has responsibility for assigning Colonels to positions worldwide, including all joint positions. He has five months experience in a Joint Task Force and is a former Brigade Commander. Colonel Keller says that officers do seek joint assignments to increase their promotion potential, but worries that “joint duty is sought as a promotion advancement and normally not for warfighting reasons. This mentality cannot be beneficial” for our Army in the long run.58

Colonel Steve Andraschko, is a Senior Military Assistant for an Assistant Secretary of the Army. In this capacity, he works with many senior officials on the Army staff and in the joint arena. He takes Brigade Command in June 2000. Colonel Andraschko has 44 months of joint service and believes “the system of training and follow-on assignments to joint duty has improved our ability to operate in a joint environment.”59 He also says the Army is doing as well as it can in preparing officers for joint duty, especially with the multiple competing demands that the system faces in meeting personnel and development requirements.

Colonel Karl Knoblauch is the Chief of Officer Division, the Military Personnel Management Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He writes and interprets officer personnel policies—accession, development, education, promotion, retirement, including impact of joint requirements. Colonel Knoblauch is a specialist in officer management development and policy. His background also includes time as an Assignment Officer at U.S. Army PERSCOM in the early 1980s and as Chief of Officer Assignments for U.S. Army Europe in the mid 1990s. Colonel Knoblauch, a Senior Service College Graduate has seven months of
operational Joint Task Force experience under his belt, but has never been assigned to a joint billet. Colonel Knoblauch says the Army is having a tough time meeting all its competing requirements and that joint development makes it much tougher for an officer to do everything necessary to hit the fright gates for development and promotion. He believes the Army is dong an “average to good” job in preparing officers to lead in a joint environment and that “(it is) more prevalent for combat arms officers” to seek a joint job because “it is necessary gate.”

Colonel Timothy Lamb is a Brigade Command designee who is currently in an operational joint position. He has 22 months of joint experience and an additional 8 months of field experience by supporting a Joint Task Force. Colonel Lamb is a graduate of Phase II, PMJE. Although he believes the Army is making an effort to prepare officers for joint warfare, he is less optimistic than his peers, and thinks more can be done. Colonel Lamb says officers should attend “JPME prior to the assignment” and joint duty should be better emphasized in the “Army’s institutional training program.”

Colonel Marvin Nickels is Director of the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), located at Fort Leavenworth, KS. CAS3 is the Army’s 6-week course that helps junior Captains become better thinker, writers, and briefers. Although not a JSO or graduate of the Phase II JPME course, Colonel Nickels has three years of joint experience from a joint headquarters assignment in Europe during the early 1990s. A former Brigade-level commander, he served as the Commandant of the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), which required him to work closely with the other services. Colonel Nickels emphatically believes Goldwater-Nichols was influential in improving joint preparation and believes the Army is using education and assignments well in that effort. He personally believes that he was not prepared as well as he could have been for his joint assignment, since he did not attend the Phase II JPME course at
Norfolk, Virginia. As Director of CAS3, he insures that the thousands of Captains who come through the course receive an overview on joint structure and doctrine.62

Colonel Anthony Fortune, is currently in a joint billet as the Deputy Commander, Joint Rear Area Coordinator, U.S. Central Command. He is “responsible for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities. (He) assists in providing a secure environment to facilitate logistics, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force.”63 Colonel Fortune previously served in a training doctrine capacity on the Army staff in the early 1990s and as a Colonels’ Assignment Officer at U.S. Army PERSCOM in the mid 19990s. He goes into Brigade Command this summer. Colonel Fortune knows the Army provides some type of joint training at every echelon, but believes the Army can do better in getting officers to PMJE before their joint duty. His experiences in a Colonel-level joint job have convinced him that officers need to get a joint assignment as early as possible in their career. This allows the officer to have more impact when they go back to the joint world as a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel. 64

**LIEUTENANT COLONELS’ AND MAJORS’ VIEWS ON JOINT PREPARATION**

The 12 field grade officers (10 Lieutenant Colonels and 2 Majors) generally believe that Goldwater-Nichols and the U.S. Army have prepared Army officers for joint warfare. These 12 officers represent a cross section of the Army in branch composition and types of background and current jobs. Seven of these officers have served joint tours. Six of these seven have served in deployments that supported a Joint Task Force. The remaining five have not served in a joint assignment. Following are selected comments that represent the consensus of this cohort. Of course, there is some disagreement about how well or poorly the Army is doing.
Lieutenant Colonel Herman Williams has five years of joint experience as he heads to Battalion Command this summer. A former Military Aide to the Under Secretary of the Army, he worked with the other services early in his career. Lieutenant Colonel Williams says that the Army “needs to ensure we get officers to Phase II of JPME, prior to the joint assignment.” He sees no drawback to the Army focusing on joint preparation since “Unified Commanders are charged with warfighting and the (Army) provides trained and ready forces. It is incumbent on the Army to ensure we provide the most capable soldiers available.”

Lieutenant Colonel Carl Fischer, Deputy Director, Directorate of Joint and Combined Operations, Command and General Staff College, provides oversight for the joint education CGSC students receive during their JPME Phase I. He has three years of joint experience, but never attended JPME Phase 2. He believes that the Army is making an effort to train and educate officer for joint, but could do better. He cites the fact that tactics’ instruction comprises the vast majority of the students’ education, but it is Army oriented, and devoid of a joint focus.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Garven, Branch Chief, CAS3, supervises a group of Lieutenant Colonels who teach CAS3. He spent three years in a joint billet and four years supporting various Joint Task forces as a Field Artillery Officer assigned to a battalion or Division Artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Garven believes the Army should put more joint education in the officer basic and advanced courses.

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Welch is an Infantry officer who is also a Foreign Area Officer. He spent three years in joint and has 28 months of experience supporting a Joint Task Force. A JPME Phase II graduate, he has extensive experience working with other agencies and services. Lieutenant Colonel Welch emphatically believes that Goldwater-Nichols positively influenced the services to work together. However, he says the Army is doing “poorly (and is) too service
oriented" in their efforts to prepare officers for joint duty. He recommends the Army increasing the number of "cross-service agreements, exchanges, (and) training (opportunities)." 66

Major Hollis Bush graduated from CGSC in 1999. He is currently a staff member in the Leadership Directorate of the Command and General Staff College. Major Bush has never served in a joint assignment, but has extensive experience supporting Joint Task Forces. He says "...the Army is attempting to prepare Army officers for joint duty...and I would give the Army a C (for their effort)." 67

Lieutenant Colonel (RET) Walter Kretchik is a former Infantry Officer who taught history before retirement and now is helping to write the Army’s doctrine for fighting wars and responding to contingencies. He never served in a joint assignment, but has extensive experience recording the history of units engaged in contingencies supported by joint forces. Mr. Kretchik believes the Army is doing better in their preparation of officers for joint duty, based on what he saw before Goldwater-Nichols. 68

CAPTAINS’ VIEWS ON PREPARATION FOR JOINT DUTY

Junior Captains in the Army focus on Company Command and learning their basic branch craft. They are not assigned to joint billets until after Company Command and branch qualification, normally at the 7-9 year mark. Most of the Captains who took this survey have between 3-5 years of service. However, their view are important since many have served in Separate Platoons or Companies that have deployed as part of or in support of Joint Task Forces. If the Army is preparing officers for joint warfare, the most junior leaders should be aware of the Army’s efforts.

The twelve Captains represent a cross-section of branches and experience. Their responses were much more varied than the previous two groups, and this is expected based on
their relatively limited exposure to joint education, training, and operations. Regarding Goldwater-Nichols, five believed the legislation generated better joint education and seven had never heard of the act. Seven Captains believe the Army is doing a good or adequate job of preparing officers for joint and some cited their operational experience as proof. Five Captains believed the Army could do better, mainly by starting the education process earlier in an officer’s career. Most of the affirmative and negative responses were void of experience, examples or concrete recommendations. This reflects the Captains’ limited exposure to this subject.

The more senior officers, who lived through the Goldwater-Nichols’ changes, and have served in joint assignments, or have peers who have worked in joint assignments, have very informed views on how well the Army is preparing officers for joint warfare. They provide very specific remarks on how the Army can get better. The Lieutenant Colonels and Majors, too, know that preparation for joint warfare is the wave of the future, think the Army is doing as well as they can, but offer some tips on how to get better. The Captains’ know that joint preparation is important, but their focus is on Army operations now. Admiral William Crowe said when he was the Commander-in-Chief Pacific: “I want people for my staff who are thoroughly proficient in their own services capabilities. Proficiency in ones own service is the sine qua non of jointness.” There is danger in focusing on joint education and training too early. This will produce an Army officer who knows a little about the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as opposed to knowing a lot about the Army and a little about the other services.

The review of literature and survey of selected key leaders and officers reveals that the Army is making an effort to prepare officers for joint warfare, but must do better in getting officers to education before the joint assignment. The last chapter provides some other
recommendation for the Army to consider as the Chief of Staff reviews his program in preparing officers for joint warfare.

CHAPTER FIVE

PREPARATION FOR JOINT WARFARE: CAN THE ARMY DO BETTER?

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986) and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, (1999) desired an Army that was focused on providing capable leaders for joint warfare. Moving the Army from fighting a one-dimensional land-focused war to strategically planning to support a four-dimensional war (land, air, water, and space) in concert with three other services, was a giant paradigm shift that changed the Army. Change is never easy. It was the time to “…initiate change in professional military education.” 70 This review of how the Army evolved shows that “…(the) change (was) never precipitous, but rather purposeful, directed, and thoughtful.” 71 Following summarizes the Army culture, infrastructure, and inducements that indicate the Army is preparing officers for joint warfare.
Conversely, recommendations to improve the Army’s efforts will be presented. Preparation of leaders for joint warfare does not mean the Army has prepared its various systems for the joint fight.

The Army is adequately preparing leaders for joint warfare. Army leaders know the importance of joint warfare preparation. Joint service is now attractive as long-held Army attitudes (traditions and perceptions) that joint duty led to a dead-end career are no longer prevalent. Personnel policies, programs, and systems reward joint service by promotions and selections to service schools and higher-level command.

The literature review and officer survey and interviews indicate that Army leaders today know that they will fight and support contingencies in a joint warfare environment. Officers at every rank have received education or training, or have participated in operational deployments in support of a Joint Task Force. Even as they grapple with how much joint is enough, Army schools include joint doctrine or exercises at each educational step.

The Army tradition of today is a hue of purple-tinged green based on the past 10 years. Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors who look back on their career remember participating in joint exercises and discussing joint implications of Army operations at CAS3, CGSC, or the Army War College. The most recent joint operations, including OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, is a more of a good news story than bad news report on interoperability. Army officers no longer worry that a joint assignment will take them out of the running for promotion and success. In fact, there are indications from U.S. PERSCOM Assignment Officers that officers are seeking joint assignments. Some seek the assignment for professional development. Others, to improve promotion potential.72 Regardless, serving in joint
bodes well for producing the pool of Army officer needed when the next joint conflict arises. The tradition has evolved. Perceptions about joint are more positive than negative.

The most important changes that indicate the Army is preparing leaders for joint warfare is to look at the policies, personnel and educational systems, and assignment patterns. Army policies and systems support joint education at every step of the career ladder—OBC, OAC, CAS3, C&SC, and SSC. The personnel and promotions system assures that officers with a joint background are promoted at the same rates of other officers. Most recent trends reflect joint officers being promoted at higher rates. Assignment Officers are selecting the Army’s very best and placing them on the joint track early, and lacing some of them back into joint after Battalion Command.

The biggest problem the Army has in its developmental system is the failure to send every officer to JPME Phase II before the officer reported into the joint position. The Department of Defense controls seating allocations and funds for JPME II. The Army must work through this significant problem, as the literature review and survey results both report that officers want to be trained in joint before they get to the job.

Whereas leaders are trained to the best of the Army’s ability, some Army systems may not be ready for joint warfare. Specifically, Army logistics and command and control systems are not interoperable with the other three services. The Army has not fully-prepared for joint warfare until the major systems and sub-systems within the Army can seamlessly, and with little effort, tie into our sister services’ systems.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are recommendations to improve the preparation of Army officers for joint warfare:

First, fix the systems’ interoperability problems in personnel, logistics, command and control, among others. Army officers who are prepared doctrinally for joint warfare should not have to face multiple systems in the field that do not support or tie-in to each other.

Second, send every Army officer to JPME Phase II before reporting to the joint assignment. If seat allocations are a problem, find the funds or staff to increase the seats. Too many officers lack confidence in joint affairs by not having the training early, if they get it at all.

Third, rotate a select few Military Academy students with the other service academies. On author says “the best approach would be to rotate the classes among the academies. For example, a (Army cadet) could spend the first year at (West Point) the second year at (the Naval Academy), the third year at (the Air Force Academy) and the last year back at (West Point).”

Fourth, under OPMS XXI, create a 5th career field comprised of a select few joint officers who would only work in joint commands after their eighth year of service. These officers would come from three main fields—operations, intelligence, and logistics. These ultra-joint officers would become experts in tying the services’ systems together.

Fifth, establish joint cells within the Army that during peacetime would resolve the systems interoperability problems and during war would be assigned to a CINC’s headquarters for strategic integration of operational, intelligence, logistical, and command and control platforms.
Sixth, allow one Air Force, or Navy, or Marine Corps joint-qualified officer to sit on each Army selection board. This would send a strong signal to the importance of joint operations.

Last, establish rigor in the Senior Service College curriculums so officers graduate knowing how the services fight together in a joint or combined fight. This may involve testing or oral comprehensives to assure the officers study and learn.

Some of the recommendation may seem drastic. Nevertheless, these will be no more drastic than the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 appeared to be. General Shinseki's vision of an Army with a joint future is simply the continued evolution of Goldwater and Nichols' plan to force the individual services to train and work together. Change starts out as a revolution and becomes an evolution as the system recreates itself to prepare for its future.
Endnotes

1 Niccolo Machiavelli, 1513.
4 Similar to the President’s State of the Union Address, this document provides the Chief of Staff’s priorities.
9 Ibid. 37.
10LTG Howard Graves, “Emergence of the Joint Officer,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1996) 70.
11 Several sources. Based on a survey and interviews of 26 Army officers, ranging in rank from CPT to COL.
12 John Shalikashvili, Joint Military Operations Historical Collections,”(15 July 1997) vi.
14 Ibid. 57.
15 Ibid. 58.
16 Ibid. 57.
18 Based on several survey comments from officers who have served in joint assignments. Further discussed in Chapter 4.
20 Telephonic interview with Colonel Thomas Keller, Division Chief, Colonel’s Assignment Division, U.S. Army PERSCOM (11 May 00).
21 Terry Young, “Title IV: Joint Officer Personnel Policy: A Peace Dividend is Required,” Carlisle Barracks, PA (6 Mar 92).
23 Telephone interview with Colonel Karl Knoblauch, Division Chief, Officer Division, military Personnel Management Directorate, ODCSPER, HQDA (9 May 00).
24 Several sources: Telephonic interviews with Colonels Tom Keller, PERSCOM (11 May ) and Karl Knoblauch, (ODCSPER) (9 May 00).
25 Steven McHugh, Joint Officer Management, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1995) 56.
26 Ibid. 57.
27 Ibid. 57.
29 Several sources. Primarily, interview with Major Brad Gericke, OPMS XXI Study Group, Fort Leavenworth, KS (19 April 2000).
30 William Owens, Making the Joint Journey, Joint Forces Quarterly, (Spring 1999) 94.
32 William Owens, Making the Joint Journey, Joint Forces Quarterly, (Spring 1999) 95.
35 Claude Castaing, Joint Logistics 2010: Are We On the Right Track?: Newport, RI: Naval War College. 6.
37 Jonathon House, Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Parameters (Spring 1991).

39 Ibid. 9.

40 Ibid. 10.

41 Ibid. 10.

42 David Angle, Air Force and Army Digitization and the Joint Targeting Process for time Critical Targets, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of the Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College. (June 199) 40.


51 This is an insider’s view to the Pentagon and PERSCOM. The author is using his own experiences to chronicle the Army’s system from 1991-1996 as compared to current policies and systems.

52 Two sources. Telephonic interview with Major Sally Hall, Deputy AG, General Officer Management Office, Headquarters, Department of Army (12 May 2000) and Spread Sheet detailing selected demographic information from the past 10 years of Brigadier General boards.

53 Quote from OPMS XXI Brief provided by Major Brad Gericke, OPMS XXI Study Group, (19 April 2000).

54 Ibid. (19 April 2000).


58 Written survey comments (19 Apr 2000).

59 Ibid. (18 April 2000).

60 Ibid. (8 May 2000). Followed by subsequent telephonic questioning.

61 Ibid. (19 April 2000) Followed by personal discussion.

62 Ibid. (10 May 2000).

63 Definition of JRAC duties from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (10 June 1998). 244.

64 Personal interview at Fort Leavenworth while officer was attending the Pre Command Course. (17 April 2000).

65 Written survey comments. (17 April 2000).

66 Written survey comments. (18 April 2000).

67 Written survey comments. (9 May 2000).

68 Written survey comments. (10 May 2000)


71 Ibid. 59... 

72 Written survey, Colonel Thomas Keller, U.S. Army PERSCOM. (19 April 2000).

Bibliography

Books


Government Publications


**Interviews and Survey Data**

Andraschko, Steven., Colonel, U.S. Army, Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, HQDA, Washington, D.C. Telephonic interview and written survey, 18 April 2000.

Bush, Hollis, Major, U.S. Army, Staff Officer, Leadership Development Directorate, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written comments, 9 May 2000.

Doll, Yvonne., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Staff Officer, Leadership Development Directorate, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written survey, 18 April 2000.


Fortune, Anthony., Colonel, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander, Joint Rear Operations Center, CENTCOM, MacDill AFB, FL. Personal interview, 20 April 2000.

Garven, Robert., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Branch Chief, Combine Arms and Services Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written survey, 17 April 2000.

Gericke, Brad., Major, U.S Army, Staff Member, TRADOC Officer Personnel Management System Study Group, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Personal interview, 19 April 2000.


Ivy, Lenora., U.S. Army, Staff Officer, Leadership Development Directorate, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written comments, 17 April 2000.


Kretchik, Walter., Lieutenant Colonel (RET), Staff Member, FM 30-1 Operations Writing Team, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Written survey, 10 May 2000.

Lamb, Timothy, Colonel, Division Chief, Joint Task Force 6, Joint Forces Command, El Paso, TX. Written survey results and personal interview, 20 April 2000.


Sevcik, Mike., Lieutenant Colonel, Fellow, Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Written Survey, 18 April 2000.

Vance, Dave., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Deputy Director, Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written survey, 17 April 2000.
Welch, Ivan., Lieutenant Colonel, CAS 3 Instructor, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written survey, 17 April 2000.

Williams, Herman., Lieutenant Colonel, Fellow, Student, Pre-Command Course (Battalion), Fort Leavenworth, KS. Written Survey, 17 April 2000.

**Theses, Monographs, and Research Papers**


**Periodicals**


