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ABSTRACT

THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY: PART II: THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES (SAMS) by LTC Frank L. Barth, USA, 60 pages.

As the United States Army enters the 21st Century, it is focused on transformation of the force to meet the challenges of the future. The Army is spending large amounts of resources to organize and equip the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Ft. Lewis, Washington along with its continued digitization of the III Corps at Ft. Hood, Texas. Transformation’s main effort has been centered on equipment and organizational issues. Some changes have occurred in officer leadership development, primarily in officer management and assessment with the advent of OPMS XXI in 1997. The United States Army has not given the same focus to the most essential element of combat power, leadership. Surveys indicate decline in officer morale. Record number of lieutenant colonels and colonels are getting out early or turning down command. Officers attending the Command & General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) are voicing their concerns. The Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, convened a “Blue Ribbon” panel in 2000 to investigate shortcomings in leadership and training.

This monograph asks should the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) have a leadership development program and if so, what should it look like?

This monograph concludes that SAMS does need a leadership development program. SAMS graduates are leaders within staffs and units that require effective leadership abilities. SAMS graduates can be the “seed corn” to improve leadership not only in the United States Army but other services as well. The SAMS Leadership Development Program (SLDP) is an embedded program that establishes a process to provide individual feedback to the students attending the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF). SLDP assesses, counsels (informal & formal), coaches and mentors students toward improving their leadership “blind spots” in a learning free environment.
The Challenges of Leadership Development

In the United States Army:

Part II: The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)

A Monograph

by

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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Because it focuses directly on soldiers, leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001.

Introduction

An Army in Transition

If the United States Army is to improve and prepare for the future, leaders need to be prepared to effectively lead their subordinates and organizations. The purpose of this monograph is to examine whether a leadership development program in the Army officer institutional education system can help accomplish this task, specially the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The key question of this paper is should the School of Advanced Military Studies (AMSP & AOASF) have a leadership development program and if so, what should it look like? Educational experience at SAMS is a year to develop and grow intellectually in military skills, processes and leadership.

After operational tempo, the biggest reason company grade officers leave the Army is due to their perception of poor Army leadership. Captains are leaving the service in record numbers. A survey by the Army Research Institute (ARI) in May 1999 of company grade officers showed the percentage of those officers stating they would leave the Army prior to retirement had gone up from thirty percent in 1990 to forty-four percent in 1998. Survey information from over 18,000 company and field grade officers in 2000 showed a significant decline in morale in the two years since the Army implemented some of the recent leadership programs (OPMS XXI, new leadership doctrine: Field Manual 22-100, new counseling form, new Officer Efficiency Report).

Lieutenant colonels and colonels in recent years are turning down command in higher numbers. During FY00, thirty-two lieutenant colonels and twenty-three colonels turned down command. This is a sharp increase from one lieutenant colonel and nine colonels turning down command in FY 1996. The total number of officers selected for battalion and brigade command is not known
for FY 1996 and FY 2000, it is probably similar to the 226 officers selected for brigade command and the 457 officers selected for battalion command for FY 2002. Officers are retiring prior to their mandatory retirement dates. Lieutenant colonels leaving prior to their mandatory retirement date increased from 9.9 percent in FY 1996 to 13.3 percent in FY 1999. Colonels leaving the service prior to mandatory retirement during this same period went from 13.6 percent to 20 percent.

Additionally, officers attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas are voicing concerns about the Army’s well being. Many of these complaints centered around what the students considered a failure in leadership. Complaints from CGSOC students in 2000 caused the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, to convene a “Blue Ribbon” panel to investigate shortcomings in leadership and training. The results of The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report (ATLD) was released on 25 May 2001. This study confirmed the decline of direct contact between seniors and subordinates and leaders who are focused up rather than down. As the U.S. Army tackles its current difficulties it is attempting to transform itself for the future.

In 2001 the United States Army is focused on transformation. The Army’s vision statement published in October 1999 stresses “comprehensive transformation of the Army” to meet the challenges of the future. It would seem developing leaders is a component of transformation.

We are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different. We take soldiers who enter the force and grow them into leaders for the next generation of soldiers. We will continue to develop those leaders through study in the institutional schoolhouse, through field experiences gained through in operational assignment, and through personal study and professional reading.

Two brigades at Fort Lewis are being transformed into the first Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT). Units within III Corps continue their ongoing digitization. Studies are being conducted into the organizational structure and equipment for the Interim Division (IDIV) and the Objective Force. Transformation’s main effort seems to be centered on equipment and organizational
issues. Some changes have occurred in officer leadership development, primarily in officer management and assessment with the advent of OPMS XXI in 1997. United States Army does not give the same focus in operational assignments or in the institutional schoolhouse to the most essential element of combat power, leadership.

**Military Professional Education**

Military education is considered important to the United States Army even though in 2001 the resources to support it are stretched extremely thin. Feedback from the March 2001 **Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Needs Analysis** that the U.S. Army conducted through the contractor, Cubic Applications, has damaging comments on the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). The same ILE study made positive comments concerning SAMS. The institutional schoolhouse has the potential to be a very effective change agent not only in developing officers’ intellect, tactical and technical skills but also in developing the individual officer’s leadership abilities.

**The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)**

Some of the solutions for these leadership problems may be found in the officer education system. The institutional education system allows a period of study, reflection and self-development that integrates previous experiences as officer’s prepare to return to operational assignments. Military schoolhouse can reach out through its graduates and have a fundamental impact to every part of the force. A respected educational institution is the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. SAMS motto is “Mens est clavis victoriae” which translates to “the mind is the key to victory”. SAMS, with its’ hand selected students who want to be there, quality curriculum, reputation, small seminars and proficient faculty, has the potential to be the “seed corn” in transforming leadership development in the United States Army. SAMS graduates as they enter operational assignments as an expected proficient planner can also set the standard as leaders who are continually developing themselves
and their subordinates. SAMS as seen from the ILE study is a success story for officer education. SAMS has the conditions to improve leadership development not only in SAMS but also for the entire U.S. Army.

SAMS has the mission "to educate officers at the graduate level in military art and science in order to produce leaders with the mental flexibility to solve complex problems in peace, conflict, and war." SAMS was created in 1982 with the purpose laid out by one of its founders Colonel (now Brigadier General Retired) Huba Wass de Czege:

.....to provide a broad, deep military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels that goes beyond the CGSO (Command & General Staff Officer) course in both theoretical depth and practical application to officers who have demonstrated a high degree of potential for serving as battalion and brigade commanders, as principal staff officers of divisions and corps, and as branch chiefs and deputy division chiefs on major command and Department of the Army level staffs or their equivalents. The course focus is on operational planning skills and on developing sound military judgment across the entire spectrum of present and future US Army missions in the preparation for and conduct of war.

To understand the potential for leadership development in SAMS it is important to understand the structure of the school. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), is a eleven-month, post-Command & Staff College course for majors that is divided into modules that includes the study of theory, history, doctrine, tactics, operational art, and campaign planning. Military simulation and practicum exercises are conducted to assist in the development of tactical and operational planning and leadership skills.

The Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) in SAMS is a twenty-two month equivalent Military Education Level One (MEL 1) program for lieutenant colonels and colonels that focuses on theater level planning and execution of theater campaign for war and operations other than war. The first year is an academic curriculum focusing on National Security Strategy, Military Theory, Strategic Studies, Military History and Campaign Planning. As part of their studies, the first-year fellows spend a total of six weeks throughout the year visiting the Joint
Staff and major joint headquarters in the United States, Europe and Korea. Second year fellows serve as seminar leaders for the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) or assigned other duties by the Deputy Commandant, CGSOC and the Director, SAMS.18

This paper examines the leadership development processes at three advanced military educational institutions, including the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the U.S.M.C. School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and the German National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course (NGASOC). Examining similar schools as SAW and NGASOC will give insights into leadership development at SAMS. To understand these three schools, it is necessary to review their mission, purpose, development and curriculum. Additionally, each school is analyzed by using the U.S. Army's capstone leadership manual, Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, along with personal interviews of present/former student and faculty from all three institutions. A recommendation for a SAMS Leadership Development Program will be presented that will assist in improving leaders and their ability to better develop their subordinates. The program will be based on the U.S. Army’s leadership doctrine FM 22-100 and six criteria established by the author through a research review of leadership development.
The French Revolution and Napoleon offered conclusive proof that soldiering was no longer a craft or occupation, but a profession that required continuous study. It was Scharnhorst's great achievement that he not only clearly saw this new dimension of warfare, but also attempted to develop institutions to meet the challenge of a changing art of war. The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the 'Militarische Gesellschaft' in Berlin, 1801-1805 by Charles Edward White.19

Chapter I

The School of Advanced Military Studies, The School of Advanced Warfighting and the National German General/Admiral Staff Officer Course

Advanced Military Education: Background

Advanced military education in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; from the banks of the Missouri River to the shores of the Potomac River, to the halls of Clausewitz Kaserne in Hamburg, Germany. Descendents of the Prussian heritage that bloomed in the early 19th Century continues strong today. Gerhard von Scharnhorst began the first advanced military institution, the Prussian Kriegsakademie in 1801.20 Advanced military education in the United States had its beginnings in the early 20th Century due to the great success seen in the German model and the fallout from the Spanish-American War staff planning disasters.21

American advanced military officer education exists at the command and staff colleges (majors attending after approximately eleven to fourteen years of service) and senior service colleges (lieutenant colonels & colonels after twenty to twenty-two years of service) for all four services. In the German military, the most significant military education occurs with attendance at the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course (selection normally occurs at about the eleventh year of service) for the very fortunate that are selected. Except for miscellaneous short courses, there is no further German officer education.22

Three significant one year post-command and staff college programs in the American military are the Air Force's, School of Advanced Air Studies (SAAS) located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, the Marine Corps’, School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), Quantico, Virginia and
the dean of United States post-command and staff college institutions, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. These three are significant in their general, well-respected institutional reputation and the success of their graduates. Therefore, effective techniques and procedures that are demonstrated in these courses could have an opportunity for proliferation throughout their respective services. SAAS, SAW and SAMS requires an application and interview process to be accepted as opposed to the NGASOC which selects attendance through a central board similar to the American command and staff colleges and senior service colleges. These post-command & staff college courses are the last opportunity officers have prior to serving as operational/tactical planners and battalion/squadron commanders. Finally, graduates of post-command & staff colleges have the potential to serve anywhere from six to twenty years in significant positions of responsibility that can make a major impact on their services through their personal leadership and how they develop their subordinates.

It is not the intent of this paper to examine SAAS. It is appropriate to examine SAMS and SAW based on their similarities. One of two schools that focuses on land operations is the United States Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), the newest post-command staff college program (began its first class, July 1990) at Quantico, Virginia. The other school to examine is the National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course located at the Fuehrungsakademie (Command & General Staff College) Hamburg, Germany. Examining all three institutions with a general overview in this chapter, examining the U.S. Army’s leadership doctrine in chapter II and then analyzing all three institutions using elements of the Army’s leadership doctrine will assist in determining the type of leadership development program necessary in SAMS.
This program (AMSP) selects the best and the brightest students at the Army’s Command & General Staff College and extends their studies for a second year. The second-year course, a recent addition to the Army’s officer professional development program, is a controversial one, its critics claiming it smacks of elitism, along the lines of the Prussian general-staff concept.

Operation Just Cause-The Storming of Panama by Donnelly, Roth & Baker.\textsuperscript{21}

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), United States Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) consists of two major educational groups. One is the yearlong “Majors Course”, Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), a follow-on course for selected members of the resident Command & General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth plus a small group of officers who arrive for the second year from reserve component units, sister service school and other locations. Student population for AMSP expanded from fifty-nine to sixty-eight in 2001 to add additional officers from the reserve components (National Guard & Army Reserve).\textsuperscript{24}

The second educational group is the two-year Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) consisting of senior lieutenant colonels and colonels attending this Senior Service College. All of these officers are former battalion level commanders. Officers who attended the 2000-2001 AOASF course consisted of seven Army officers, plus one officer each from the Air Force and the German Army (Bundeswehr) and a Jordanian Brigadier.\textsuperscript{25}

Another important aspect of SAMS had been responsibility for the Army’s capstone operational doctrine, Field Manual 3-0, Operations. When the Army was undergoing a re-write of this manual, the SAMS Director, along with other members of the school, were engaged in this effort at the expense of spending time with the AMSP and AOASF educational programs.\textsuperscript{26}

Involvement with FM 3-0 reduced the time available for the SAMS Director had to assess, develop, coach and counsel military and civilians in SAMS. An improvement for the Director in the summer of 2001 was responsibility for FM 3-0 being withdrawn from SAMS but the Director still has many other responsibilities that pulls him away from SAMS on numerous occasions.\textsuperscript{27}
A two-year staff course is not new at Fort Leavenworth. The Command & General Staff
College conducted two-year courses from 1903-1922 and 1928-1936. The 1903-1922 version
allowed the best students of the first year course to stay for a second year of study. The course
was reduced for all officers to one year after the First World War due to budget shortages. Leavenworth returned to the two-year course in 1928 in order to cover the large amount of
material believed necessary for the officers to master as planners and commanders. All officers
attended the two-year course during the 1928-1936 version that was stopped as the Army
prepared for war and wanted to increase the number of planners.

Incentive to return back to the two-year course occurred in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s. Three
studies on military education, Review of Education & Training of Officers (RETO) Study (1979),
the Strategic Studies Institute Study (1982), and the Meloy Report (1982), identified weaknesses
in the military education of CGSOC students. All these studies concluded that a) the Army
needed “to obtain a higher quality output from CGSC”; b) the Army had an austere approach to
staff training officer education when compared with other first-rate armies; c) RETO study
identified the need for a smaller, more highly select student body should undergo a more
demanding course of instruction; and d) SSI and the Meloy studies reported that the curriculum
lacked rigor. Academic change was occurring simultaneous to the Army’s move away from
the doctrine of the “Active Defense” to the offensive Airland Battle doctrine. Additionally, as
doctrine changed so did changes in technology with the introduction of the Abrams tank, the
Bradley fighting vehicle and the Apache attack helicopter. Doctrinal and technical advancements
added fuel to educational reforms with the birth of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School
(CAS) in 1981 for captains and the beginnings of SAMS in the early 1980’s.

The idea for SAMS began during a sightseeing trip on the Chinese Yangtze River in June
1981. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) Commander, Lieutenant General William R.
Richardson, the head of the U.S. Military Delegation, was visiting Chinese education and training
centers. LTG Richardson was concerned that the CGSOC curriculum was not up to the demands of the new Airland Warfare in particular with developing planners. Another member of the delegation, then Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, proposed to LTG Richardson that the college develop a second year program. LTC Wass de Czege was selected as the feasibility study director for a second year course while at the same time he was administratively a student at the Army War College.\textsuperscript{36} On 10 September 1982, a formal proposal for a second year course was sent forward to the new CAC Commander, Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt.\textsuperscript{37} On 28 December 1982, General Glenn K. Otis, the Commander of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) granted permission to conduct a pilot program with 12 students commencing in the summer of 1983.\textsuperscript{38} The first class of 14 students began on 20 June 1983.\textsuperscript{39}

AMSP has grown from 14 students in 1983 to 2001 with the highest number of students ever with an increase to five seminars and sixty-eight students. Graduates such as Brigadier General, David Huntoon, in 2001, Deputy Commandant of the Command & General Staff College are moving into senior-level leadership positions. Officers attending AMSP today represent all four U.S. services and three different allied nations.

The intent of AMSP is to "provide graduate level military education programs which prepares officers to serve as planners and leaders of military operations."\textsuperscript{40} AMSP is specially focused on preparing officers for command and staff positions at the Division and Corps level. The AMSP course starts the end of June and runs until the end of May the following year. Courses are divided into seven modules spread throughout the year.\textsuperscript{41} Simulations and practicum exercises are a significant portion of the course throughout the year of study. Additionally, students starting AY 2001-2002 will have only one forty-page monograph to write instead of two. This change came as a result of the realization of a heavier course load due to an increase of simulation and practicum exercises.\textsuperscript{42}
A significant problem for the AMSP was to identify qualified instructors. Officer educational institutions such as Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS) and CGSOC have traditionally been affected by the shortage of qualified instructors. In March 1983, General Merritt initiated a proposal to the Department of the Army outlining a program called “The U.S. Army War College Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship Program.” Using the Wass de Czege model, officers would receive their War College experience through conducting independent research and serving as adjunct faculty members for SAMS. This idea came to fruition when the first fellowship of five officers began their academic year in 1983-84. The first group of officers conducted independent research on such topics as light force employment, preparing first drafts on documents such as FM 100-5 (Operations) or FM 22-103 (Senior Leadership). The Fellowship, during the early years of its creation, migrated from a focus on independent research to an instructor feeder system for AMSP and a war college level AMSP. Academic year 1986-87 was the first year that second year fellows served as seminar leaders for AMSP. Many of the Army’s educational institutions continually struggle with getting qualified faculty. SAMS has been fortunate in having its own farm system to bring in new qualified instructors through the AOASF program. These SAMS seminar leaders bring recent experiences in developing, coaching and teaching officers. Additionally, SAMS has been fortunate to have long-term serving civilian faculty who have maintained academic and intellectual continuity through the years. Institutional continuity in SAMS without a formal assessment process that captures lessons learned will make it more difficult especially when long-serving professors retire.

There is no formal assessment process conducted in SAMS internally or by its higher headquarters, the Command & General Staff College to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the course. A partial assessment of SAMS took place in 2000 mainly due to the efforts of
the SAMS Director of Academic Affairs, Dr. Robert H. Berlin. It is difficult to improve, sustain or implement change in an organization without first assessing its performance.

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) has had a positive impact on the United States Army. In less than twenty years, SAMS has established the reputation for academic excellence and its’ graduates have gone on to be very successful in all their military services. SAMS is fortunate to have a proficient military and civilian faculty. Long-serving civilian faculty members offer a critical continuity but the future has to be prepared for their departure. A part of this is a formal assessment program to build upon successes and improve upon shortcomings and strengths. Assessment programs additionally documents the important information before it disappears of ever in the trash or erased off of computer disks. SAMS has the potential to further improve not only itself but the United States Army and other services as well.

*The School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), United States Marines Corps, Quantico, Virginia*

Another post-command & staff college but seven years younger than SAMS is the United States Marine Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) at Quantico, Virginia. SAW similar to SAMS is design to educate officers who will plan and lead land operations. The United States Marine Corps sent their first two students to SAMS during academic year, 1988-1989. The Marine Corps, along with the other services, received a black eye by the 1988 commission on Professional Military Education (PME) led by Missouri United States House of Representative Ike Skelton. One of the deficiencies noted was the Marine’s not having a school designated to prepare officers for operational level thinking, planning and decision-making. The first SAW class of fourteen officers started on 10 July 1990. According to its current Director, Lieutenant Colonel John Bacon, the initial guidance for SAW was focused in producing officers “who could effectively deal with issues at the operational level and above – officers who would find themselves working on more programmatic (PBBS, budgets, service-level) issues as they became
more senior.” SAW was structured around the notion of the “Enlightened Soldier” by Charles Edward White and the Scharnhorst/Kriegsakademie model. The students conducted intense study of selected historical case studies focusing on specific recurring themes on operational art and problem solving. According to LTC Bacon, the Program of Instruction (POI) has evolved slowly since 1990 with the dropping of the programmatic subject matter, keeping the military history case studies and adding more material on planning and future war concepts. Students are required to write two fifteen-page papers during the year. In the fall, students do one paper on historical research followed by a future concept paper in the spring.

The eleven-month school's intent “is to concentrate—for selected field grade officers—in decision-making and complex problem-solving experience at the operational level, using historical and contemporary issues as a framework and building blocks.” SAW, unlike SAMS, does not run simulations or execute its’ plans. The SAW Director does not conduct simulations due to an office staff of one Lance Corporal, a tight academic schedule and his personal experience with simulations. Whereas SAMS focuses a great deal of resources toward simulation exercises SAW has determined to focus their energies in other ways. Simulations and practicums allow an opportunity above and beyond seminar discussions for students to apply what they have learned. Exercises create an environment to provide leadership feedback from other students and faculty members.

The curriculum in SAW has three interrelated areas of study: Foundations of Operational Art, Operational Planning and Future War. Foundation of the Operational Art studies campaigns, military innovations and contemporary institutions that have evolved through primarily American military since the colonial period. Operational Planning is conducted through a series of planning exercises focusing on the Marine Corps Planning Process (similar to the U.S. Army’s Military Decision-Making Process: MDMP). As part of their educational experience, SAW students serve as planning team leaders instructing students attending the nearby Marine Corps
Command and Staff College students. *Future Warfighting* studies agencies and institutions and their ability to anticipate, prepare and manage future change. Additionally, students are required to write a paper on the consequences of change for the future. SAW students, in their studies of operational issues, conduct a Civil War staff ride of the Overland campaign in Virginia and a three-week staff ride of European battlefields.

SAW consists of two seminars with usually twenty-four officers total. Similar to SAMS, SAW selects students through an interview process selecting the best officers available. SAW, during the admissions process, examines a student’s reason for attending SAW, his/her career pattern, operational background, academic potential and proven verbal/written communication skills. The breakdown of the group for academic year, 2001-2002, consists of sixteen Marine officers, one U.S. Navy officer, two U.S. Army, two U.S. Air Force, and two international officers, one from the United Kingdom and the other, Australia. During AY 1999-2000, SAW had a government civilian attend the course, an intelligence analyst from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The current faculty consists of the military Director and two history professors with Ph.D’s. The summer of 2001, SAW was due to receive another military faculty member, a U.S.M.C. lieutenant colonel, who is a SAW graduate, post-battalion command and National War College graduate.

SAW conducts a post instruction survey with its’ graduates six-eight months after their graduation. Recent graduates and their bosses are surveyed to see if SAW instruction is focused in the proper areas. According to Lieutenant Colonel John Bacon, SAW Director, the feedback from graduates and units in the field has been favorable on the structure of the course. Bacon states the feedback on the strength of the course is in student’s development of thinking and problem solving instead of learning the mechanics of the planning process.
German National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course (NGASOC) at the Fuehrungskademie-Leadership Academy, Hamburg, Germany

The dean of advance military education is located at Clausewitz Kaserne, Federal Republic of Germany. The German National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course is located at the German Command and Staff College (Fuehrungskademie). The twenty-four month course consists of four seminars of Army officers, two Air Force seminars and one Navy seminar.\(^{58}\) Whereas in the United States Army, 50 percent of a year group are selected for the resident course of the Command & General Staff College, selection to the NGASOC for a year group is about 12.5 percent.\(^{69}\) The course has an overarching joint training focus. This is assisted in having all the services advanced military education programs located at Clausewitz Kaserne in close proximity that allows for social and military interaction.\(^{70}\)

After eleven years of total service (this includes three years of mandatory enlisted service, officers are captain/lieutenant and about 30 years old) all German officers are considered for attendance to the NGASOC by a Ministry of Defense selection board with emphasis placed on an officer’s performance at the fourteen-week Field Grade Officer Qualification Course.\(^{71}\) Additionally, an officer’s last three evaluation reports (evaluations are conducted biannually) are reviewed. 12.5 percent of officers will be selected for attendance at the NGASOC, 2.5 percent for the yearlong International General/Admiral Staff Officer Course and the remaining 85 percent will attend the ten-week Armed Force Command Course and the three-week Higher Headquarters Staff Course.\(^{72}\) Each year sixty officers attend the course. This number includes forty-two German officers and eighteen allied officers.\(^{73}\) Unlike SAMS or SAW, officers will attend a three-month language course at the Federal Language Institute at Hurth, Germany prior to attending the NGASOC.\(^{74}\) Language training assists these future staff officers and commanders working on NATO and other combined staffs.

The course follows the strong staff officer tradition of Frederick the Great in establishing schools for officers to study their profession. Prussian advanced military education started with
the appointment in 1801 of Gerhard von Scharnhorst as the director of the Militärakademie. The school evolved into the nine-month Allgemeine Kriegsschule (General War Academy) in 1810 which had undergone significant changes due to the Prussian defeats at the Battle of Jena in October 1806. After the fall of Napoleon, the course was extended to three years with a third of the course consisting of tactics. The Kriegsakademie was considered in an exalted status by the society as a whole. The victories over Denmark, Austria and France added to the Prussian reputation as not only as professional training but also as a military university of higher learning and education. Another key factor for the Kriegsakademie's great success was the reputation of its' faculty and how they were considered future stars and not considered "has been" military educators.

The training objectives of the courses taught at the Führungsakademie are to develop officers General Staff officers who can effectively operate during peacetime, crisis or various forms of other conflict. Additionally, these officers must be able to perform within or outside their own service, at national/international levels especially with a focus toward NATO and at all levels of command. Bundeswehr (German Army) wants to develop field-grade officers who can effectively work with others, self-confident and military experts.

The NGASOC consists of courses in Security Policy & Strategy, Leadership & Management, Social Sciences, Service Doctrine and Joint/Combined Operations training. The Leadership and Management Department have fifteen instructors with a colonel as the department director. Leadership & management instruction is broken down into four blocks of one and a half weeks over the two-year course. The curriculum in the leadership department is focused on such areas as planning & management procedures for national & international staffs and communication training (interviews with the press, media). Depending on the subject matter the students will have different instructors.
Course curriculum has a heavy emphasis on joint/combined operations as the students conduct five simulation exercises during the course from contingency operations, wartime joint operations, interagency crisis management, peace support operations to humanitarian aid mission. The course starts at the battalion task force level and moves on to brigade/division operations the first year. Year two is focused on corps level and campaign planning working as a NATO staff. Additionally, the course has an extensive travel program to assist in staff, joint and NATO training that includes visits to all the German branch schools, NATO headquarters and a sixteen day trip to the United States. The travel schedule allows for students to have an opportunity to be updated on current programs and issues.

The role between instructors and students is critical in the NGASOC educational process. "Faithful to Clausewitz’s dictum that war is a matter of character above all, the evaluators looked for such untranslatable attributes as Anstaendigkeit (uprightness, decency, and reliability), Verantwortungsfreude (joy in responsibility), Seelenkraft (spiritual and mental force), and the ability to work long hours under pressure without sacrificing quality." The seminar leaders all arrive with recent battalion command experience and stay with the fifteen students the entire two years of the course. Colonel Helmut H. Muhl, graduate of the NGASOC, a former seminar leader and a former faculty director, stated he was closer to and knew the officers in the seminar he led better than he knew his company commanders during battalion command. This statement demonstrates the ability within an military institutional schoolhouse environment to be able to effectively observe/assess students and then to use that to develop through coaching, counseling and mentoring.

At the completion of the course, students fill-out a survey on their overall experiences at the school. At the completion of the graduate’s first assignment, a validation survey is conducted with the graduate and his commanders.
Summary

SAMS, SAW and the NGASOC provide advance educational opportunities for selected members of their services. One institution traces its beginnings two hundred years ago while another began its classes barely over ten years ago. They all were created to develop, train and educate key officers. All three are focused on developing planners and leaders. The techniques and procedures they use differ.

All three focus on land operations with a heavy emphasis working with other services and allies. NGASOC has the benefit of having Army, Air Force and Navy seminars at the same location. Clausewitz Kaserne offers an easier opportunity to conduct joint simulation exercises, interact professionally and socially among all three services. SAW unlike SAMS and NGASOC does not conduct simulation exercises. All three have travel programs. SAMS conducts a four-day staff ride of Vicksburg, SAW a three-week staff ride of European battlefields and the NGASOC to German military bases and a sixteen-day trip to the United States. SAW and SAMS selects their students through an internal selection process whereas the NGASOC conducts a centralized board to select their students. SAMS unlike SAW and the NGASOC has a prep year for future seminar leaders during the first-year of the AOASF program. SAW and the NGASOC requires military faculty to "hit the ground" running. SAW and the NGASOC have systems to assess their programs, SAMS does not.

In chapter III, the differences in the three courses will be examined based on elements of the U.S. Army's leadership doctrine, FM 22-100. To help understand leadership development at these three schools, it is important to understand FM 22-100. The next chapter examines Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, and the United States Army leadership model. This manual, which has already been mentioned, provides a leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under all conditions, establishes a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders and provides a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the Army.92
As the capstone leadership manual for America’s Army, FM 22-100 establishes the Army’s leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish the mission and take care of their people.

Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, June 1999.94

Chapter II

United States Army’s Leadership Theory: Field Manual 22-100

Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership

Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership is the United States Army’s keystone document for leadership. The field manual was published in June 1999 and is:

- To provide leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under all conditions.
- To establish a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders: military and civilian, active and reserve, officer and enlisted.
- To provide a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the Army of the 21st century.94

FM 22-100 “serves as the basis for future leadership and leader development initiatives associated with the three pillars (operational assignments, institutional training & education and self-development) of the Army’s leader development model (DA Pamphlet 350-58). Specifically, FM 22-100 serves as-

- The basis for leadership assessment.
- The basis for developmental counseling and leader development.
- The basis for leadership evaluation.
- A reference for leadership development in operational assignments.
- A guide for institutional instruction at proponent schools.
- A resource for individual leaders’ self-development goals and initiatives.”95

Another document is Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001, U.S. Army’s “principal tool for professional education in the art and science of war.”96 FM 3-0 provides operational guidance for leaders at all levels and is supposed to be the foundation for curriculum throughout the Army’s education system.97 The Army states that leader development is one of the essential
elements of DTLOMS (Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Material, Soldiers) to successfully execute the Army’s mission essential task lists.\textsuperscript{98} Leadership described in FM 3-0 is the most essential dynamic of combat power.\textsuperscript{99} The actions of leaders will be the difference between success and failure.

The main problem with FM 22-100 has been its lack of use since it was first published in the summer of 1999. The author was a battalion commander during the release of FM 22-100. There was no chain teaching or dissemination of the Army’s capstone leadership manual throughout United States Army, Alaska during his command tour. This seems to be another indication that even though leadership is thought to be important in the Army it’s not always exhibited effectively by institutional actions. Students attending CGSOC during the AY 1999-2000 state there was limited use of FM 22-100 even during the thirty hours of the leadership course, C700.\textsuperscript{100} Leadership doctrine that is not available or integrated effectively is also reflected in the schoolhouses method of leadership instruction.

Leadership courses of instructions are not well integrated in the Army’s officer educational experience. Instead, leadership is “stove-piped” as a stand alone course of instruction that many times is not well received either through the subject matter content or instructor inexperience.\textsuperscript{101} For example, the required leadership course at CGSOC consists of sixty-four instructor-student contact hours. Thirty-hours are devoted to “leadership” with the other thirty-four hours consisting of seventeen hours of training management, fourteen hours of military law and three hours of public affairs. Out of thirty hours of dedicated leadership instruction only three hours are devoted to individual leadership development. The focus in C700 is diluted as it attempts to cover a wide range of what is considered leadership.\textsuperscript{102}

The leadership model in FM 22-100 is Be, Know and Do. The U.S. Army defines “Leadership is influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”\textsuperscript{103}
THE LEADER
of character and competence acts to achieve excellence
FIELD MANUAL 22-100, June 1999, 1-3

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Figure 1

FM 22-100 (Values, Attributes, Skills and Actions)

Values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal/Moral Courage

Values and Attributes are integrated parts of character ("Be") within the Army leadership framework. Edgar F. Puryear Jr. states in his book, American Generalship, "the greatest of all is character, which is everything in leadership. It permeates throughout the qualities essential for leadership success." Values are the foundation that everything else is built upon. All values are important and one is not considered more important than the others. Failure of character in a military organization may mean the difference between life and death. Character is the rudder in how one leads others and how one acts in his/her daily life.
Army Values

Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the United States Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.

Duty: Fulfill your obligation.

Respect: Treat people as they should be treated.

Selfless Service: Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

Honor: Live up to all the Army values.

Integrity: Do what’s right—legally and morally.

Personal Courage: Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).  

Attributes: Mental, Physical and Emotional

Attributes are the other part of “Be” for the leader. Attributes are basic qualities and characteristics of an individual. Many of these qualities are innate but successful leaders are constantly building upon their natural talents. The Army defines mental attributes as will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence and cultural awareness.

Physical attributes include health fitness, physical fitness and military bearing. Military duty requires physical stresses that are much greater than most civilian occupations. Again, most of these qualities can be developed to significant strengths. Emotional attributes are self-control, balance and stability. Leaders who are emotionally mature will be more receptive to self-improvement and will be more willing to listen and give effective feedback to subordinates.

Leaders who lack emotional maturity will deny that there is anything wrong with their leadership skills and actions. Self-control normally demonstrates confidence in subordinates and encourages feedback up and down the chain of command. Subordinates will be less adept at telling the boss what’s really going on if the leader is perceived as a screamer who lacks self-control. Effective leaders have a sense of balance in how they demonstrate their attitudes. Effective balance is using the wide range of attitudes with the right people at the right time.

Every soldier enters the military with values and attributes developed through his/her earlier years through their family, teachers, coaches, friends and others. Each individual has his/her own physical make-up that sets the foundation for the development of one’s attributes. Self-
knowledge and the effective coaching and counseling given by others can improve values and attributes.

**Skills: Interpersonal, Conceptual, Technical and Tactical**

Character serves as the basis for competence (skills, "Know") which in turn allows the leader to "Do" (Actions). Skills can be developed through education and training. The Army's four skills in FM 22-100 are interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical.\(^\text{109}\)

A leader's interpersonal skills include understanding and knowing his/her soldiers. A part of this is coaching, teaching, mentoring and counseling subordinates. It is very difficult to be effective in interpersonal skills without the ability to effectively communicate and listen. Leaders have to know what's going on in their organization and talk to their people in order to effectively develop their subordinates. Sergeant Major Randolph S. Hollingsworth states that "Nothing will ever replace one person looking another in the eyes and telling the soldier his strengths and weaknesses. (Counseling) charts a path to success and diverts soldiers from heading down the wrong road."\(^\text{110}\)

Conceptual skills involve dealing with concepts, thoughts and ideas. Critical reasoning and creative thinking challenges one to think deeper and become more imaginative in solving problems. Another part of conceptual skills is reflective thinking, taking feedback from others and inputting it back to fix deficiencies or sustain strengths.

Technical and tactical skills, the third and fourth skills, are areas where the United States Army has usually shown strength. The Army's framework for tasks, conditions and standards has quantified many technical and tactical tasks. Technical skills are normally the job-related tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Tactical skills are the art and science through employing units in the field that requires a combination of all the competency skills.

Effective leadership integrates all four skills. A technical and tactical wizard also must be able to communicate and listen to others.
**Actions: Influencing, Operating and Improving**

To be successful, leaders have to make things happen ("Do"). Successful leaders accomplish the mission. A leader is judged more by his/her actions rather than by what they he/she says. Subordinates will learn more by a leader’s action than his/her elegant words. A leader has to role model his/her talk by his/her walk. Successful leaders accomplish the mission while at the same time educating, coaching and inspiring subordinates.

**Influencing**

The Army defines leadership as the ability to influence people by providing purpose, direction and motivation. Influencing is the way to get to the ends in accomplishing the mission. Leaders communicate through their words and example. Purpose is the reason something must be done. Direction gives not only focus but also provides the structure and resources to accomplish the mission. Motivation is not compliance. Motivation is the self-inspiration to work as hard as one can without somebody having to watch to make sure the mission is accomplished. In FM 22-100, influencing breaks down into communicating, decision making and motivating.\(^{111}\)

Communicating includes oral, written and listening skills. It is not only being clear in expressing oneself but also persuading others. Communicating is knowing oneself, the purpose of the organization, environment and others in the organization.\(^{112}\) Decision-making "is knowing whether to decide to decide, then when and what to decide. It includes understanding the consequences of your decisions."\(^{113}\) Motivating individuals is created in many different ways. By providing realistic and demanding challenges, ensuring subordinates are trained properly to perform the mission, effective coaching/counseling and leaders who care to listen usually contribute to subordinates doing more than the baseline requirement. Mastery of interpersonal skills is important in motivating others.
Operating

Operating is focused on the near-term job accomplishment. Even as one is operating he/she continues to influence others. Operating consists of planning/preparing, executing and assessing. Planning and preparing involves people skills in receiving input from others in order to build upon existing trust and confidence within the organization. Planning/preparing at staff levels requires significant leadership skills on the battle staff. Coaching, counseling and mentoring are essential in effectively developing creative and thinking staffs. Executing is accomplishing the mission while at the same time taking care of soldiers. Executing requires commanders who have trust and confidence in themselves and also their subordinates to get the job done even in the confusion and friction of combat. Assessing is important in developing organizations and individuals. To properly assess requires knowing the standard. Additionally, it requires a leader knowing himself/herself and being where he/she can observe and record leadership actions. A proper assessment is the start point toward improvement.

Improving

Improving actions are focused toward building for the long-term. The three components of improving are developing, building and learning. Developing is focused on people. The Army’s three pillars of leader development are institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. “The Army school system provides formal education and training for job related and leadership skills.” Operational assignments provide the opportunity to learn by doing. Self-development is a continuous process that involves the individual and the chain of command. Another aspect of developing that is described in FM 22-100 is mentoring, teaching, counseling and coaching.

Mentoring (in America’s Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive) for everyone under a leader’s charge.
**Teaching** gives knowledge or provides skills to others, causing them to learn by example or experience.\textsuperscript{118}

**Developmental Counseling** is subordinate centered communication that produces a plan outlining actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual or organizational goals.\textsuperscript{119}

**Coaching** involves a leader’s assessing performance based on observations, helping the subordinate develop an effective plan of action to sustain strengths and overcome weaknesses, and supporting the subordinate and the plan.\textsuperscript{120}

Building is creating effective teams but also developing an ethical climate within an organization. Building teams requires again significant interpersonal skills. As teams build, leaders have to listen and effectively communicate to the soldiers in the unit. Leaders have to know their soldiers and conduct in-process reviews and after-action reviews to gauge progress. The last aspect of improving is learning. Learning is an on-going process and is most effective in a “learning enriched environment” versus a “zero defects environment”. Few people will learn effectively if mistakes are not tolerated or an environment exists that encourages negative competition between individuals and organizations. Learning is facilitated by the use of after action reviews and learning from others’ experiences.

FM 22-100, as the Army’s capstone leadership manual, articulates the leader of character and competence with the values, attributes, skills and actions to achieve excellence. The United States Army develops this leader through the institutional schoolhouse, operational assignments and continuous self-development. Chapter III examines SAMS, SAW and the NGASOC using specific elements from FM 22-100 to analyze these institutions in the development of leaders.
Its graduates (SAMS) were supposed to be the best and brightest in the Army. The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf by Gordon & Trainor.¹²¹

Chapter III

Analysis of SAMS, SAW and the German National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course

This chapter will analyze SAMS, SAW and NGASOC by interpersonal skills and operating/improving actions as defined in FM 22-100. These skills and actions will determine if SAMS needs to have a leadership development program.

School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)

Skills: Interpersonal
Actions: Operating/Improving

As mentioned earlier, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is considered by many as an institution that produces smart planners whom in many cases will become commanders at the highest levels.¹²² SAMS is more than a “planners course”. In his vision statement for SAMS, Colonel Robin Swan, Director of SAMS, 1998-2001, states that SAMS prepares officers as planners and leaders. Planners, serving as leaders on battle staffs, will have the responsibility for coaching, teaching, counseling and mentoring the officers, NCO’s and enlisted soldiers working with them.

The requirements for what is expected of leaders in the future will be more important than it has ever been. Changes in technology, doctrine, organization and structure add uncertainty and anxiety to all members of the organization. Especially during periods of great change, leaders are responsible in providing calmness and stability to organizations and people.¹²³ Leaders have to keep the human touch without getting too enamored with technology or themselves. Institutional military education will have to ensure it focuses on the human dimension, not just technical/tactical skills.
Interpersonal skills are a critical part in developing subordinates. It is about working with people. Counseling is an extremely important component of interpersonal skill and leadership action. SAMS does poorly in formal counseling. Based on interviews with nineteen AMSP students, four seminar leaders and three first year fellows, students, seminar leaders and first-year fellows in SAMS are not being formally counseled. Nineteen AMSP students stated they had not received formal counseling from their seminar leaders the entire year. Some of the comments from the AMSP students were, "No constructive feedback this year," .... "There is no system in SAMS for feedback." One AMSP student mentioned he had filled out a pre-formatted counseling form that required him only to fill-in items such as a monograph deadline. Three of the four seminar leaders admitted they had not conducted formal counseling but stated they were active in conducting informal counseling and giving students feedback.

One student talked about the exceptional informal counseling skills of her seminar leader. This seminar leader seemed to know his students and their abilities. AMSP students want more feedback not only from their seminar leaders but also from the civilian faculty who they considered to be a wealth of knowledge. According to the AMSP students, simulations and practicums could have been more effective with additional feedback from seminar leaders and faculty members.

Additionally, AMSP students state that informal counseling was weak to nonexistent. One major stated he had received great counseling from his company commander as a lieutenant but has received nothing since then. One seminar leader stated he conducted initial counseling for his entire fifteen officer seminar group in one day with each student taking about five minutes. Students had the belief many times that the main focus of counseling was toward their deadlines in completing their monographs. One AMSP student stated it was important to counsel majors at AMSP because most majors do not know how to take criticism. One major assumes that most
Senior officers do not know how to counsel and are afraid to do it. Counseling is not only weak for the majors but it is also weak for the seminar leaders and first-year fellows. All four-seminar leaders interviewed had received only cursory counseling as seminar leaders and had received nothing as first-year fellows. One seminar leader had not even seen his Academic Efficiency Report (AER) from twelve months prior. A weakness in counseling exists in the AOASF program. Officers in the first year of the fellowship only receive feedback on their writing abilities from their monograph director during the year. Counseling subordinates is important. Unfortunately, it is not happening in SAMS. What is taking place in SAMS with developmental counseling is similar to the damaging comments made by CGSOC officers to the Army Chief of Staff in March 2001.

In his 1998 Parameters article, "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another 'Bridge too Far?'" Lieutenant General Retired Walter F. Ulmer states that "The complex task of giving developmental feedback to subordinates is not taught in the Army school system. The Army War College has included some behavioral feedback in its' program in recent years, but it is unlikely that there is the essential follow-up in the students' next organization to exploit the process." SAMS has the opportunity through the normal counseling of the AMSP and AOASF student to demonstrate effective developmental counseling.

Individuals want to be encouraged and positively reinforced. Formal and informal developmental counseling needs to be a fundamental part of every organization. Students at AMSP believed informal feedback was not as productive as it could have been. Many times students were giving feedback to each other during exercises and did not receive what they believed was significant feedback from seminar leaders and faculty on their collective or individual performance. One student commented that some seminar leaders did not treat their duties as a full-time assignment and were not always around to provide feedback during exercises and practicums. The beginnings of feedback is the operating action of assessment.
Operating

An important aspect of operating actions is assessing individuals, groups and performance. Direction cannot be given if there is no assessment on how things are functioning. Leaders are unable to gauge the effectiveness of their organization if they do not realize what is going on. Besides individuals assessing people and organizations, the U.S. Army has a long-time process that involves subordinates and others which is called in-process reviews (IPRs) and after-action process reviews (AAR). Conducting the process is one thing but the most important part is fixing and sustaining what is identified during the process. Students commented it was unfortunate during the AMSP course that there were mainly AAR’s and few to none IPR’s. When reviews were conducted, at times they consisted of too many students or happened at the end of an exercise not allowing the necessary time to fix problems. Students received no feedback on their individual values, attributes, skills or actions. Exercise reviews were focused on the mechanics of the planning or the execution and there was no discussion on individual abilities either in a large or individual setting. There is currently no SAMS mid-year or end of the year review process to assess strengths and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{137}

Additionally, the procedure of assigning students to leadership roles within the planning staffs for some seminar groups was haphazard. Some seminar leaders had students sign up for staff assignment they wanted and not necessarily leadership enriching positions. Students complained that some of their peers never participated in key positions such as chief of plans or chief of staff. Even when students participated in key positions, they received little guidance or feedback from seminar leaders or faculty members.\textsuperscript{138} This lack of feedback seemed related to the absence of seminar leaders and faculty members presence during exercises. Their absence resulted in an opportunity lost in developing and improving leaders.
Improving

A part of improving actions is self-development. Self-development is an ongoing process that should take place not only during operational assignments but also during institutional training and education. During developmental counseling, leaders give guidance and direction to assist the individual in bettering themselves. Each person is different in his/her strengths and abilities requiring a different set of skill sets to focus on. It is unfortunate that written, oral feedback and peer feedback (done on a limited scale during CGSOC) is not built upon during the AMSP year. According to two seminar leaders, nothing from the AMSP student’s CGSOC year is brought forward or any of the students’ products from the SAMS interview process is forwarded to the seminar leaders.¹³⁹

Problems identified in SAMS show that formal and informal counseling is weak. Assessment of individuals either in AMSP or AOASF can be improved to identify shortcomings in counseling. The tools of IPR’s and AAR’s, with the active involvement of seminar leaders and faculty members, can be greatly enhanced. Except for writing feedback on monographs there is little individual feedback in SAMS. Seminar leaders are failing in their responsibility in counseling their subordinates. Written guidance published by the new SAMS Director, Colonel James R. Greer, on 18 June 2001 stated that “Seminar leaders counsel AMSP students on a continual basis.” Colonel Greer also stated that formal counseling would take place at mid-term and at the end of academic year.¹⁴⁰ These recent changes are improvements in developing leaders at SAMS.

School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW)

SAW is focused on developing decision-makers. The course concentrates primarily on historical study with 1148 total hours (preparation and class time) on history lessons and 546 hours on operational planning and 114 hours on future warfighting.¹⁴¹
LTC Bacon, SAW Director, states that all of the counseling at the school is done informally.\textsuperscript{142}

The major counseling is done between the faculty and the students through the writing requirements required during the year. One writing requirement is due in the fall (fifteen page historical research paper) and one (fifteen page future concept paper) in the spring. Faculty members are paired with students and "provide feedback on their thinking and writing style through two drafts and their final paper."\textsuperscript{143}

The smallness of SAW allows plenty of interaction between the faculty and the students. Students in the seminars are changed every two months to allow them different perspectives and to get out of their comfort zone.\textsuperscript{144}

SAW does cover some leadership issues based on historical case studies such as Field Marshall Slim’s experience as a field commander in Burma as depicted in Slim’s book, \textit{Defeat Into Victory}. Four hours of seminar time is dedicated to this book.\textsuperscript{145} Additionally, each student is placed in a leadership role as an Operational Planning Team Leader during a weeklong exercise during the year. The school does not conduct simulation exercises due to the small class size, and the school director’s experience with them.

Prior to graduation, the School Director reviews with the students their personal mission statement the students developed during their first week of school. They determine how the school met the expectations of the student. Additionally, each lesson required six students to provide written feedback directly to the SAW Director.\textsuperscript{146} The school (faculty and peers) at graduation awards the Clifton B. Cates award to two SAW graduates who deserve recognition based on being a superlative student, colleague, leader and contributor. Six to eight months after the students graduate, SAW sends the recent graduates and leaders a program of instruction validation survey to assess if the course of instruction is teaching the right things to its’ students.

SAW offers the advantage of a small group environment for the educational experience. Smallness can also be a disadvantage in not having the resources in faculty or administrative staff
to support some programs. One military faculty member limits feedback from active-duty military officers. SAW does not execute their plans through simulation exercises. The lack of execution would seem to negatively impact on observing important leadership actions.

According to the SAW Director, "most of the formal counseling comes from the faculty mentoring students through two major writing requirements". LTC Bacon states that leadership development is indirect and is not a stated part of the program of instruction. SAW, like SAMS, does not have a directed leadership development program. It does have a system for feedback from students during and after the course plus feedback from the "users", commanders in the field.

**German National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course**

The course of instruction at the German National General/Admiral Staff Officer Course (NGASOC) is double the course length of SAMS and SAW. The officer at NGASOC has about three to four years less commissioned service time than the same student at SAMS and SAW. The two years of interaction between the students in the seminar group and having the same seminar leader could be beneficial with a very cohesive and qualified group or it could be a miserable two years with the wrong group dynamics. The prestige of being selected for the German staff officer course is extremely high. Upon completion of the course, an officer is designated as a General Staff officer (GS). The prestige in being designated a German Staff officer sets one apart from the pack and makes them competitive for future advancements, senior level positions and usually means the officer will attain at least the rank of colonel prior to retirement.

Leadership and Management are part of the curriculum. Part of this curriculum involves administrative actions such as writing memorandums to the Ministry of Defense or working policies and actions on a NATO staff. Another part of this leadership & management curriculum deals with leadership vignettes. A student is given thirty-minutes to solve a difficult task that
requires help from other students. The student is given feedback on his/her leadership skills and abilities based on the observation during the exercises.\textsuperscript{151}

Additionally, students are evaluated in leadership roles during the five simulation exercises that take place during the year. Students in key positions are given individual feedback from a faculty member on their leadership performance. Furthermore, planning groups are given feedback not only on their planning process but also on the group’s leadership abilities. A difficulty during the course is the competing requirements of the seminar leaders in their involvement in developing/executing the simulation exercises while at the same time working with their students on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{152}

Students are individually counseled formally by their seminar leader three times during the two-year course. Two times are conducted during the course and the third time is conducted at the end of the course. The final report developed on the student is discussed and reviewed prior to its’ final approval.\textsuperscript{153} NGASOC has developed a more formal counseling system for subordinates than either SAMS or SAW.

*Should the School of Advanced Military Studies (AMSP & AOASF) have a leadership development process, and if so, what should it look like?* SAMS should have a leadership development program. According to the SAMS curriculum guidance, students in AMSP & AOASF should be provided a military education to serve as planners and leaders. Planners and field grade officers are leaders on planning staffs responsible for the development of themselves, other officers, NCO’s and enlisted soldiers. Historically, SAMS has done very well having their graduates selected for battalion level command.\textsuperscript{154} AMSP and AOASF graduates have a significant impact on their services. However, areas of improvement need to take place in order to maximize the impact these graduates can have. All military officers have leadership blind spots they do not recognize. The institutional schoolhouse offers a “learning environment” to improve upon weaknesses and sustain strengths. NGASOC offers effective techniques in
providing leadership feedback during daily activities and simulations. SAW has techniques of assessing their program with current students and receiving feedback from the field that are worthy of merit. Additionally, SAW’s use of history to study leadership appears to be a good technique.

After an extensive research review, the author has developed the following criteria for a leadership development program for SAMS.

- Program must be to prepare officers as leaders on battle staffs and command positions.
- Program must be developmental and not an evaluation.
- Program must have aspects of formal and informal development.
- Program must be holistic throughout the SAMS curriculum and not a stand-alone leadership course.
- Program must be simple to execute.
- Program must involve leadership development for both AOASF and AMSP students.

Based on the analysis of SAMS, SAW and the NGASOC and meeting the criteria stated above, a leadership development program for the School of Advanced Military Studies will be described in chapter IV. This program will build upon and supplement what already is occurring in SAMS. Leadership development in SAMS will assist in the “seeding” process that will impact not only on improving the SAMS graduate but even more importantly improve their subordinates.
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)

Founding Purpose: "Seed the Army with a number of officers annually who will produce a leavening influence on the Army by their competence and impact on other officers. The course therefore is not to train individuals to do certain jobs better, but to create a multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence as these officers teach others." SAMS Slide Presentation to CGSOC: 20 September 2000

Chapter IV

SAMS Leadership Development Program (SLDP)

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) leadership program would build upon the current AMSP and AOASF experience making it better. It would be developmental, formal/informal, holistic, simple and include both AMSP and AOASF. SAMS Leadership Development Program (SLDP) would improve the graduate and have the potential to set a standard of leadership development for the entire United States Army to replicate.

Challenges of the future, increased uncertainty, technology changes will make it even more important for leaders to understand themselves and how to deal effectively with others. Military leaders must balance between short-term task success with long-term individual development.

Major General John Faith, retired, states that

unquestionably intelligent, dedicated, effective and productive officers, (senior officers) they are also nevertheless flawed, as we all are. They have been recognized and promoted over the years because of their success in producing, for the most part, short-term, measurable results. They are characterized by a strong sense of mission and can-do attitudes, but too many of them tend to be less effective in self-knowledge, flexibility and willingness to learn.

Preparing Leaders

SAMS has a mission to develop leaders based on specific guidance found in the SAMS Director curriculum stating officers are being prepared “to serve as planners and leaders of military operations.” It is an implied task in the SAMS Director’s vision statement concerning SAMS graduates developing battle staffs. Colonel Robin Swan, SAMS Director, 1998-2001, prior to his departure strongly encouraged developing an institutionalized counseling/mentoring
program in SAMS. Additionally, it is expected that all leaders in the U.S. Army are counseling and developing their subordinates individually. Finally, the mission of SAMS higher headquarters, CGSC, “is to educate leaders in the values & practice of the profession of arms, to act as the executive agent for the Army’s Leader Development Program, to develop doctrine that guides the Army, and to promote & support the advancement of military art & science.”

SAMS can meet the expectations of what the Army desires in leadership development and be an effective learning lab.

**Counseling**

Counseling is the next area, which are both an interpersonal skill and an improving action. SAMS needs to be clear and specific on a counseling program for AMSP students and AOAS Fellows. The only guidance on counseling for seminar leaders for AY 2000-2001 was a verbal statement by the SAMS Director to seminar leaders to conduct counseling on a quarterly basis. Guidance needs to be communicated through vision statements, curriculum guidance and a specific memorandum that addresses developmental counseling and areas to be addressed.

Every seminar leader should conduct formal developmental counseling as specified by the SAMS Director’s guidance of 18 June 2001 (mid-year and end of year counseling) in addition with initial counseling. It is important within the first month of the academic year for the seminar leader to sit down personally with each student to develop and discuss goals/objectives for the year. Seminar leaders should conduct formal counseling with each student three times a year along with effective informal counseling and feedback. The Developmental Counseling Form (DA Form 4856-E, JUN 99) is the current counseling tool used by the U.S. Army. One seminar leader was still using the 1985 counseling form. Appendix C of FM 22-100 covers in great detail developmental counseling. Appendix C has twenty-three pages of information on counseling. The first paragraph of Appendix C states that “subordinate leadership development is one of the most important responsibilities of every leader. Developing the leaders who will come
after you should be one of your highest priorities. Your *legacy* and the *Army's future* rests on the shoulders of those you prepare for greater responsibility." It is a mistaken assumption that all seminar leaders know how to effectively counsel AMSP majors.

All officers attending the first year of AOASF need to have a preparation period that focuses on developmental counseling not only to ready them as seminar leaders but most importantly to prepare them for their role as senior military officers. It is important to have an effective program that does not alienate the AOASF students. Some officers will consider counseling a basic skill that was learned as a lieutenant and that there is no reason a senior officer has to be bothered with such a sophomoric skill. A senior retired officer contracted by SAMS, along with the SAMS Director, would be the training team working with the AOASF students on this skill.

Additionally, contracting a recently retired senior officer with the right background (approved by the SAMS Director), personality and interest might be beneficial (due to the SAMS Director busy schedule & having more of a “non-threatening” influence) in serving as a full-time coach, mentor, teacher and counselor with the first-year fellows. Priority needs to go to the first year fellows in their educational experience and to prepare them as seminar leaders.

As a first year fellow, AY 2000-2001, the author never received leadership feedback of any type. The only feedback was on writing style/structure as part of the monograph process. Senior lieutenant colonels and colonels should still need and want developmental feedback. The SAMS Director prior to assuming his position needs to attend at least a one-week developmental feedback program with an organization such as the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) to refresh their counseling skills. The SAMS Director should be evaluated along with the seminar leaders on their performance as developers for their subordinates.

Seminar leaders are responsible for the development of AMSP students. Developmental counseling is integrated with seminar leaders who continually observe, coach, mentor and teach AMSP students. Seminar leaders have to be full-time military educators, actively involved and
full-time participants (commander, chief of staff or observer/controller) in the simulations and practicums exercises. The author, participating in the AMSP capstone exercise in April 2000, was surprised with the student's comments about the lack of feedback and guidance that they had received during the year. Planning staffs many times were only getting feedback from the other students who were serving as OC's.

In-Process Reviews (IPRs) and After-Action Reviews (AARs) are great tools to review planning processes/procedures and to review leadership values, attributes, skills and actions observed by the seminar leader. This is a new area for exploration. The United States Army is finally getting used to the IPR/AAR processes for training exercises. Leadership development should be incorporated into the IPR/AAR process. The battlefield operating systems (BOS) is used during IPR/AARs to determine the success of an exercise, seminar leaders could use the same technique by reviewing specific leadership values, attributes, skills and actions for the group or individuals (FM 22-100, Appendix B provides eight pages of performance indicators). Seminar leaders would have to be smart in their techniques to ensure it is kept interesting. Past practices have been to focus on the process of planning and many leadership lessons learned have been lost. Leadership feedback from simulations/practicums can be shared in a professional manner during IPRs/AARs and during the quarterly counseling times between the seminar leader and the AMSP student.

Additionally, SAMS can improve on the assessment process for lessons, modules, and the entire course. Each module should have an assessment process within the seminar and then with the entire staff and faculty. The module learning objectives and the exercise/practicum objectives would serve as the IPR/AAR criteria. A mid-year IPR should take place in the December timeframe again within the seminars and then with the faculty followed by a final AAR at the end of the year. This should be reinforced with an exit interview with selected AMSP students and each AOASF student with the SAMS Director to help assess the programs.
Informal counseling is not maximized to the extent possible. AMSP students are not being formally counseled and informal counseling is weak. An overused word in the U.S. Army but extremely important is mentoring. Mentoring is a leader's proactiveness to develop subordinates through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching and counseling. It can take place during seminar discussion, during breaks, at social events and athletic events. During the AY 2000-2001, SAMS conducted no intramural type of athletic events. Athletics, within organizations, adds to unit cohesion and assists with leadership development in an informal environment.

Assessment

Assessing is a leadership operating action that is part of developing subordinates. It is difficult for seminar leaders to mentor, coach, counsel and teach AMSP students without assessing students. Assessing takes place as previously mentioned by the seminar leader developing a base-line knowledge of the student through the collection of information on the student. Currently, there is not a system in place that passes information gathered during the SAMS interview process on to the seminar leader. CGSOC students applying for AMSP take a multiple-choice exam with two essay questions, a Nelson-Denny Reading test and participate in a personal interview. These would be helpful to the seminar leader for the following year. Additionally, none of the counseling reports, peer evaluation or performance of the CGSOC student is forwarded on to SAMS. Again, FM 22-100 and Appendix B provide a user-friendly guide of performance indicators that help a leader assess others including himself/herself.

Another aspect of assessment is the 360-Degree Feedback process that has been very effective on a limited basis in the U.S. Army and used in the private sector. It is a tool that can be utilized to a certain extent in SAMS. Assessment data for leadership development is available from many different sources including self, peers, bosses, subordinates, relatives, and many others. Assessment identifies the gaps between what the organization wants the leader to be and where the leader currently is. The assessment information is conducted in either an informal or
formal process. Quality assessment allows the individual to have a better understanding of what they need to learn, improve, sustain or change. The 360-Feedback is a structured feedback tool used to improve individuals. The 360-Feedback effectiveness is based on being a developmental tool and not an evaluation instrument.

CAS³, CGSOC and the Army War College have used different levels of leadership feedback. CAS³ and CGSOC use some limited self and peer feedback in their courses.¹⁶⁷ CGSOC students fill out a self-assessment and receive five peer reports from the other students in their seventeen-eighteen person staff group. This information is reviewed but is not used for development counseling during the CGSOC year.¹⁶⁸

Feedback-Intensive Programs (FIP) goes beyond 360-Degree Feedbacks.¹⁶⁹ FIP involves "peeling the onion" of the individual to go beyond the skills and behaviors observed to his/her underlying values. 360-Degree Feedback may explain the "what" of an individual whose FIP explains the "why". According to the research conducted at the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), the FIP is especially beneficial during a period of career transition, developing high-potential people and when an individual shows signs of career derailment.¹⁷⁰

The 360-Degree Feedback and FIP are effective programs in helping identify the gaps in an individual's leadership development. Providing feedback within SAMS, if done correctly, could be a very effective tool for increased leadership development. AOASF students prior to their arrival could have a 360-Degree Feedback conducted on themselves by receiving feedback from their senior leaders, peers and subordinates at their previous assignment (in many cases battalion command). The Army War College currently collects the same type of information for their students prior to their arrival.¹⁷¹ The AOASF 360-Degree Feedback program could expedite this program by having the input received (data collected) on an Internet web-base. Fellows, as they arrive for the year, would have the feedback data available via the computer for the SAMS Director to use as a starting point in developing those individuals' leadership development
program for the year. Additionally, to assist in the assessment process, first-year fellows would conduct verbal peer feedback sessions in September and written feedback in February. These feedback sessions would provide developmental information to assist the officer. Verbal feedback sessions would take place with the student and two classmates providing feedback facilitated by the SAMS Director. Each session would last no longer than one and half-hours. Written feedback would involve every student providing feedback on all the other students on a form developed by SAMS. It would be essential that the SAMS Director (or the hired contractor) serving as a coach, mentor and counselor to these fellows know how to provide effective feedback. It would be especially difficult in the beginning as individuals are facing different paradigms than they are used to facing.

The recommendation for majors attending AMSP is that they would go through two peer feedback sessions. The peer session would occur prior to the developmental counseling sessions with the seminar leader. Two techniques of peer feedback would be implemented, verbal and written. The first peer feedback (1 Oct.- 1 Nov.) would take place through a verbal process that has each AMSP student conducting peer feedback with four-five other seminar students along with the seminar leader. Four to five AMSP students will gather with their seminar leader in private surroundings to give peer feedback to one of the students. This verbal feedback would be kept to one hour to an hour and a half. Each student in AMSP would receive and give verbal feedback with their classmates. Seminar leaders would be skilled in the dynamics of dealing with majors receiving and giving feedback. AMSP students will learn how to give developmental feedback and receive feedback. Verbal peer feedback has been conducted at the Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC) with favorable results. The second peer feedback (1 March-1 April) would be a written feedback session. Students would provide written feedback on four-five fellow seminar students. The seminar leader would use this feedback during the last developmental counseling session with the student.
Developmental

SLDP next’s criteria are focused on development. SAMS provides a learning environment for the leadership development process. It is essential that the program be one of leadership development rather than leadership evaluation. Leadership evaluation will cause failure for an effective SLDP.

AMSP and AOASF both offer a “free year” of development. U.S. Army officers for both programs receive an Academic Efficiency Report (AER) for the year. Based on the author's twenty-one years of military experience, an AER is considered to most military officers as the most non-threatening evaluation that exists. Students can focus on development and not be afraid to make mistakes in this learning environment.

Developmental focus for leadership development is also communicated through the words and actions of the SAMS Director and seminar leaders in how they approach this process. Seminar leaders need to monitor and assign students to leadership positions based on the individual’s leadership development program. The learning and developmental climate that has to be established in SAMS for this program to succeed will be one the keys to success.

Holistic Program

Another criterion for the SLDP is ensuring it is a program embedded throughout the school and not a stand-alone lesson or course. What SAMS does not want to develop is “leadership classes”. One weakness in leadership development is the “stove-piped” approach that has been taken in much of the institutional education system. Additionally, attempting to cover everything in the wide-reach of leadership issues dilutes quality everywhere. U.S. Army has to walk before it can run in the area of leadership development. Focus area needs to be assessment and development of the individual leader. Once the U.S. Army can be successful in this specific area of leadership development, it can begin to branch out to other areas of leadership development in how it affects groups and organizations. Leadership can be leveraged throughout points of opportunities within
the SAMS courses without adding classes/courses or exercises. It is vital to build upon what already exists. Seminar leaders are role-modeling, teaching and coaching, providing developmental counseling formally/informally on a daily basis to AMSP students. AOASF students will have to go through a five-day educational/training period getting them to a common baseline on developmental assessing and counseling subordinates. AOASF, with assistance from a contractor and the SAMS Director, could work on counseling techniques, understanding/presenting 360-Degree Feedback and Feedback-Intensive Programs (FIP).

Simplicity

Simplicity is the final criteria. Simplicity applies to the holistic approach. If the program is integrated throughout, it should make it simpler to execute. About all officers have experience in assessing and developing leaders. The issue is the wide disparity of quality and quantity of their experience. SAMS leadership program, even though it is dealing with some basic leader skills, is creating a standard of excellence for the entire U.S. Army. The challenge will be getting majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels excited about this program. Everyone have his or her own ideas about leadership development. Involving the SAMS staff and faculty will assist in the development process of the program.

The program can work if the SAMS Director, faculty and seminar leaders want it to succeed. The basics are assessing, counseling (informal/formal) in developing the SAMS officer who will take those effective techniques to operational assignments. Leadership development in SAMS will only be a slight adjustment to the current program but it will better maximize the potential of the graduate. Figure 2 displays the SAMS Leadership Development Process (SLDP).
SAMS Leadership Development Program (SLDP)

- **SAMS Director’s Guidance on Leadership Development:**
  - Curriculum Guidance
  - Vision Statement
  - Annual SAMS Leadership Development Program (Issued by Director in June)

- **Quarterly Developmental Counseling: All Military & Civilian Members,** (Stress Informal Counseling) Use of Developmental Counseling Form: DA Form 4856-E, JUN 99
  - AOASF Students, Seminar Leaders, Civilian Faculty & Staff: Developmental Counseling w/SAMS Director: July-Aug./Nov.-Dec./April-May (Three times during the AY)
  - AMSP Students: Developmental Counseling w/Seminar Leaders: July/Nov.-Dec./April-May (Three times during the AY)

- **SAMS Individual/Organizational Assessment Program,**
  - AOASF Students arrive (July) with 360-Degree Feedback collected through Web-based Program. Provides start point for developmental counseling
  - AOASF Students participate in peer feedback: verbal (Sept.) & written (Feb.)
  - AOASF Students 5 day training on Counseling, 360-Degree Feedback Feedback-Intensive Programs (FIP) - July
  - AMSP Students conduct peer feedback sessions: verbal (Oct.) & written (March) Written peer feedback is collected also after simulations/practicums
  - Leadership Values, Attributes, Skills and Actions incorporated into IPR’s/AAR’s during simulations/practicums and other events.
  - Module AAR’s, AMSP students w/seminar ldrs. & Faculty/Staff. Verbal & written feedback
  - Exit interview AARs: Selected AMSP students and all AOASF students w/ Director
  - SAMS Assessment: IPR – Dec. AAR – April/May Each Seminar and then Faculty/Staff.

- Leadership/human dimension incorporated into historical lessons and other lessons as applicable.
- Contractor used for AOASF Training in July on Counseling, 360-Degree Feedback and FIP. Contractor considered as coach/mentor for first-year AOASF students.
- Greater integration of first-year Fellows with AMSP students to provide additional leadership insights and feedback.

Figure 2
“We are not spending enough time talking to our folks…Counseling once a month should be the rule of thumb…People know their systems but don’t know their people…A problem in the Army is not counseling soldiers…More coaching and teaching needed…Developing folks much faster is now necessary.”
Sergeant Major of the Army Jack L. Tilley talking to AOASF Fellows, 3 May 2001, Ft. Leavenworth

Conclusion

The United States Army does many things extremely well. It is currently having the normal anxiety that occurs during change. Unfortunately, some of the statistics indicate officers are leaving the service and turning down commands in higher numbers. There are many reasons for officers leaving the service early, everything from high operational pace, stabilizing families, or displeasure with the leaders and the organization. One of the significant reasons seems to be shortcoming in leaders and their ability to effectively develop their subordinates. Soldiers have a great desire to be effectively coached, counseled and mentored. Humans have a great desire to be shown worth by quality time spent in development. Unfortunately, many leaders do not know how to effectively develop their subordinates. It is assumed that leaders know how to counsel their subordinates, the subordinates say otherwise. The famous writer on leadership, Warren Bennis, states in his book, On Becoming a Leader, “Until you truly know yourself, strengths and weaknesses, know what you want to do and why you want to do it, you cannot succeed in any but the most superficial sense of the word.”

The U.S. Army has a capstone leadership manual, FM 22-100 that would assist in developing leaders. Additionally, using an institution that has a great deal of respect, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) as the “seed corn” can demonstrate the effectiveness of a quality leadership development program. AMSP has students who want to be there and the school is small enough to allow for mid-course corrections that would be much easier than adjusting the curriculum of a 1200 member CGSOC class.

AMSP students want more feedback on their individual development. Students comment that “It is absolutely valid to have a leadership development program in SAMS.” Another AMSP
student comments "Leaders don’t know their people and leadership judgments are based on perceptions."  

Individual assessment and developmental counseling would be the foundation of the SAMS Leadership Development Program. The program would exist in a simple, developmental and learning environment, and integrated throughout the SAMS educational program in formal and informal aspects. Assessment points are out with numerous exercises, seminar discussions and information that come out of the student’s CGSOC experience. Character development needs to be an integrated part of the program. SAMS can model what should be happening in developing leaders then sending officers out into the field who can do the same in their units as senior leaders.
Endnotes


2 United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Survey on Officers Careers-2000, Career Intent Among Company Grade Officers, Report No. 2000-09 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, December 21, 2000), Table 2, page 5. Data base of 8,957 company grade officers, Most Frequently Selected Reasons for leaving the Army before retirement. Officers leaving and undecided: Away from my family too much: 20.7%, Quality of military leadership: 16.8%.


5 Timothy J. Maude, Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Briefing given at the Commander’s Conference, 19 October 2000.

6 Ibid.


8 Timothy J. Maude, LTG, Briefing given at the Commander’s Conference, 19 October 2000.

9 Comments from the CGSOC Majors were made in March 2000 in their staff group prior to the visit of the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki. The comments were e-mailed throughout the Army. The two e-mail copies the author received at different times have the same information.


11 Ibid. “There is diminishing, direct contact between senior and subordinates. This evidenced by unit leaders who are often not the primary trainers, leaders who are often not present during training, leaders who are focused up rather than down, and leaders who are unwilling to turn down excessive and late taskings. This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust.” Page OS-2.


14 Cubic Applications, INC., Intermediate Level Education Needs Analysis – Volume I, DABT65-98-D-0002 (Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 March 2001) 1-3, “Fundamentally, the current CGSOC curriculum is not a total graduate-level experience providing the necessary intellectual rigor and the practical mastery required to dominate in the full Spectrum environment.”

15 Ibid., 10-19-10-20. “As compared to the current CGSOC curriculum, the AMSP curriculum is clearly conducted at the high end of Bloom’s Taxonomy (lowest to highest: Knowledge, Comprehension, Application, Analysis, Synthesis, & Evaluation, 8-2, “More precisely, the value of Bloom’s Taxonomy is to classify “the intended behavior of students—the ways in which individuals are to act, think, or feel as the result of participating in some unit of instruction”) Some reasons for attaining this consistently higher level of learning are: quality of faculty, ability to focus field of study (not required to cover the waterfront), student schedules (time to think, reflect and write), and caliber of students. The learning experience in AMSP is richer and more productive; however, care must be taken in trying to replicate an AMSP.
experience in AOWC (new CGSoc course proposed). AMSP makes expert use of all the learning models.”


21 Ibid. 59. “When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, the U.S. armed services were swamped by operations on a scale for which they had never been designed. Mobilization, logistics, and transport to the theaters of war were characterized by a vast mess.” Page 61. “All in all, fort Leavenworth graduates are perhaps best described as pale copies of the lieutenant colonels produced by the Berlin Kriegsakademie. We may take it that they qualified to serve as medium-level military technicians, staff officers, and administrators. There was no question, however, of the one-year course producing operational experts on the German model.”

22 Helmut H. Muhl, Colonel (General Staff), German Liaison Officer, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 20 April 2001. Interview included a prepared slide brief titled, Welcome to the Fuehrungskademie der Bundeswehr. Colonel Muhl has extensive service at the Fuehrungskademie, attending the 24-month (NGASOC) course from 1982-1984, seminar leader for the 24-month course (NGASOC), 1991-1993, and most recently a three-year tour as the Director of Joint/Multinational Training, 1997-2000.


25 AOASF: 2000-20001: Brigadier AL-Dwairi Fayez, Jordan Army, LTC Frank Barth, USA, LTC (GS) Ruediger Gottzein, German Army, LTC Robert Johnson, USA, LTC William Miller, USA, COL Richard Leyden, USA, LTC David Nuenswander, USAF, LTC Richard Proietto, USA, LTC Jerry Scott, USA, LTC Marvin Williams.

26 Personal observation by the author as a first-year Fellow AY 2000-2001. Comments made by the SAMS Director, Colonel Robin Swan to author about completing FM 3-0 in order to go back to being the SAMS Director.

27 Personal observation by the author as a Seminar Leader AY 2001-2002. The new SAMS Director, Colonel James Greer, in the time period of June-August 2001 was gone half the time through briefings with TRADOC concerning the Objective Force.


29 Ibid. 15-17.

30 Ibid. 21. “In his annual report for school year 1928-29 to the War Department, Brigadier General King reported that “experience has shown that one year is too short a time for proper instruction in the subjects which are handled here. The student is unable to digest thoroughly what is given; some important matters had to be lightly touched upon, others omitted. The new two-year course eliminates most of these objections”.

31 Ibid. 26.

32 Ibid. 37.

33 Huba Wass de Czege, “Final Report: Army Staff College Level Training Study.” “All three studies (RETO, SSI, Meloy Reports) recognized the need to obtain a higher quality output from CGSoc. All studies recognized the broad nature of the CGSoc mission and recommended ways to narrow it. All three studies urged a “generalist” education at CGSoc. All three studies identified the critical need for effective teachers
in adequate quantity on the faculty. RETO especially focused on our relatively austere approach to staff training when compared to that of first rate foreign armies. All three studies identified the diverse entry level preparation of the student body as a problem. The Meloy report took particular issue with the attendance of professional officers-chaplains, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers and veterinarians. The RETO report recommended a smaller more highly select student body be offered a more rigorous course. The SSI and Meloy reports identified the problem of lack of rigor in the curriculum and apparent over-scheduling of the student's time. 15-16.

35 Richard Macak. 35-36.
36 Ibid. 36.
37 Ibid. 38.
38 Ibid. 40.
39 Ibid. 42.
40 Robin Swan, Colonel, Director SAMS, Memorandum, 12 May 2000.

General Curriculum Guidance: Broken down into numerical order.
1. Provide graduate level military education programs which prepares officers to serve as planners and leaders of military operations.
2. Advance the study of the profession of arms.
3. Encourage students to achieve both practical mastery of professional competencies and intellectual development and growth.
4. Instill students with a disciplined way of thinking and a common approach to problem solving.
5. Provide an intellectual foundation for students through the study of theory, history, doctrine, tactics, operational art, campaign planning and related subjects.
6. Conduct military exercises to develop tactical and operational planning skills.
7. Students should be able to practice the operational art and understand its link to campaign planning.
8. Assure students master relevant service and joint doctrine.
9. Prepare graduates to understand and leverage current and emerging technologies in planning and executing military operations.

41 Information taken from the AMSP monthly planner dated 18 April 2001 given to seminar leaders for 2001-2002 from Dr. Robert H. Berlin, during instructor training on 19 April 2001.

Module 1: Principles of Military Decision-making. Consists of eighteen theory lessons. This module includes a two-week decision-making practicum.
Module 2: The Napoleonic Paradigm. Four history lessons and four theory lessons. Includes a practicum at the end of the module on the 1813 Leipzig campaign.
Module 4: The Mechanization of War. Two-week computer simulation exercise (JANUS), eight history lessons and four theory lessons. The module ends with a practicum on the mechanization of war.
Module 5: Five weeks of electives in January following the Christmas holidays.
Module 6: Civil War Campaign staff ride at Vicksburg.
Module 7: Revolutionary War and Support & Stability Operations (SASO). Concludes with a practicum takes place in Kosovo.

Embedded within these modules are the simulation exercises that will take place throughout the year to teach the students the planning and command of tactical/operational operations. Selected students throughout the year will participate in exercises at field units. Additionally, students for the academic year 2001-2002 will be required to write a monograph (minimum of forty pages). AMSP students AY 2000-2001 were required to write two forty page monographs. The change was made due to the heavy load of readings and exercises that was required of the students.

42 Robert Berlin, Professor and Director of Academic Affairs, SAMS, during seminar leader training session, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 19 April 2001.
43 Barry Leslie, Lieutenant Colonel, G1, CGSC, e-mail to author, 30 January 2001
44 Richard Macak, 43.
45 Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 45-46.

Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Army, Subject: Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship (AOSF)—Action Memorandum (21 December 1984). Open-file report from the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), archives, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Paragraph 2. (b). “LTG Vuono, CDR, USAACAC, has proposed that the AOSF fellows remain at CAC for a second year (beginning AY 85-86). In the second year they would change from AOSF students to faculty for the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at Ft. Leavenworth (the post-CGSC program). In this plan the fellows would no longer be tied to AWC but would be included in the Army fellowships program (SSC Expansion and MEL-1 Fellowship) that was recently approved.” At the bottom of this action memorandum is typed “30 Dec. 84- Approved CSA with comment: ‘Good initiative. Approved W’” The “W” is for General John Wickam, CSA. According Colonel (Retired) Richard Swain, Fellow, 1985-87, 1986-87 was first year fellows were seminar leaders. It was approved by the CSA in Dec. 84 and took effect for the fellows who entered the program the next summer, 1985.


Robert Berlin, Professor & Director of Academic Affairs, SAMS, interview by author, Leavenworth, KS., 26 April 2001.

Program Overview presented by the SAMS Director, Colonel Robin Swan, in Sept. 2000, to the CGSOC class of 2001 showed a slide on SAMS selection for battalion command. SAMS Class 1989: 45 in class, 32 selected for battalion command, SAMS rate of 71.1 percent, Army wide selection rate of 9.8.

1990: 48, 24 BN CMD, 50 percent, 12.9 percent Army wide.
1991: 45, 33 BN CMD, 73.3 percent, 11.9 percent Army wide.
1992: 46, 28 BN CMD, 60.9 percent, 11.7 percent “ “
1993: 46, 35 BN CMD, 76.1 percent, 11.4 percent “ “

Richard Macak, 130.

John Bacon, Lieutenant Colonel, Director SAW, Marine University, Quantico, Virginia, e-mail to author, 18 April 2001. “The Marine Corps, along with other services, received a black eye on the report from the 1988 commission on PME formed by Rep. Ike Skelton. Many issues were raised in the report, one of which was the fact that the Marine Corps did not have a school designed to prepare officers for operational level thinking, planning and decision-making. Possibly that Rep. Skelton saw the Army SAMS program (started in 1983) as something that each service should have. Combine the recommendation of Rep. Skelton with the visage of Commandant, Marine Corps, Al Gray and you now have the proper chemistry to spawn a new school within the Marine Corps. SAW began forming, on paper, in 1989 and started its first class in July, 1990. The initial guidance was rather macro, focusing on producing an officer who could effectively deal with issues at the operational level and above – officers who would find themselves working on more programmatic (PBBS, budgets, service-level) issues as they became more senior. The program did not borrow anything from an existing program at the time, but was designed around the notion of the “Enlightened Soldier” by Charles Edward White (required reading in SAW to this day) – the Scharnhorst/Kriegsakademie model. The focus would be on an intense study of select case histories focused on selected recurring themes stressing operational art and complex problem solving. The POI has slowly matured since 1990, dropping the programmatic material, retaining the military history case study model and adding more elements on planning future war concept and thought.”

Ibid.

Charles Edward White. Abstract, iii. “Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) was a child of the Enlightenment, educated in its techniques and imbued with its world view. He understood sooner and more clearly than others the transformation of war being wrought by the armies of the French Revolution and Napoleon. When he moved to Prussia from his native Hanover in 1801, Scharnhorst had opportunity to reform one of the great land armies of Europe. But to do so, he had to overcome the entrenched interests of the nobility that surrounded the king and insulated him from rapidly shifting military currents emanating from France.
First Scharnhorst bent to his purpose the Militarische Gesellschaft (Military Society) in Berlin, a volunteer society, which sponsored papers, lectures, essay competitions, and historical seminars. Under Scharnhorst's direction the Militarische Gesellschaft became a center of education and study in the Prussian army, and a source of intelligent, like-minded reformers. From this base, Scharnhorst proposed a system of formal military schooling and a general staff for the Prussian army. With these tools he hoped to create an educated officer corps, open to promotion by merit and capable of administrating the huge national armies unleashed by the French revolution.

Scharnhorst was blocked by the nobility until the collapse of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806. That disaster opened the way for the reformers. The result was the dramatic success of the Prussian army in 1813-15. Scharnhorst's premature death in that campaign contributed to a resurgence of noble reaction after 1815, so that the full implications of his program did not become manifest until the tenure of the elder Moltke in the second half of the nineteenth century.

This study traces this reform movement from its origins in the Enlightenment to its first victories in 1813 and 1815. The primary focus is on the Militarische Gesellschaft, where Gerhard Scharnhorst's Enlightenment notions of reform, education, and rationalism were converted into a program that revolutionized the Prussian military. Within a century most of these reforms had been adopted by all the world's military powers."

57 John Bacon, e-mail, 23 April 2001.
58 SAW, Internet; accessed on 19 April 2000.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
62 John Bacon, e-mail, 23 April 2001.
63 SAW, Internet; 19 April 2001.
64 John Bacon, e-mail, 23 April 2001.
65 John Bacon, e-mail, 18 April 2001.
66 John Bacon, e-mail, 23 April 2001. One of SAW’s permanent Ph.D’s is a retired Army Special Forces lieutenant colonel.
67 John Bacon, e-mail, 23 April 2001.
68 Helmut H. Muhl, Colonel (General Staff), German Liaison Officer, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 20 April 2001.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. Field Grade Officer Qualification Course: Weeks 1-4: Army/Air Force/Navy Doctrine, Weeks 4-5: Social Sciences, Weeks 6-12: concurrently Security Policy & Strategy and Leadership & Management, Weeks 13-14 completes the course with Social Sciences. During the follow-on ten week Armed Forces Command Course officers will conduct joint exercises.
72 Ibid. International General/Admiral Staff Officer Course (IGASOC) is focused on engagement through education and training between Germany and non-NATO countries throughout the world. In 1999 IGASOC had sixty-nine students (about the same size of the 2001-2002 SAMS AMSP class). Seventeen officers were from Germany, one-three officers are from thirty-four different countries. These countries ranged from China (PRC), Singapore, Pakistan, Egypt, South Africa, Venezuela to Switzerland to name a few.
73 Ibid. NGASOC each year will in addition to its German officers will have a strong representation from about all of the NATO allies.
74 Ibid.
75 Martin van Creveld, 22.


FM 22-100, vii.


Ibid.

Ibid. 1-3. Army Mission Essential Tasks:
1. Close with and destroy the enemy forces.
2. Shape the security environment.
3. Respond promptly to crisis.
4. Conduct forcible entry operations.
5. Conduct sustained land operations.
6. Provide support to civil authorities.
7. Mobilize the Army.


Victor Wu, Major, Executive Officer, Leadership Instruction Division (LID), e-mail to author, 5 January 2001. Teaching leadership to majors at CGSOC. LID is the office that "teaches" leadership to the CGSOC students. As of 2 February 2001, LID had thirteen out of sixteen authorized instructors. Out of these thirteen, seven are lieutenant colonels and six are majors. Additionally, six instructors are non-resident graduates and one instructor (Chaplain) is a graduate of neither. No former battalion commanders instruct leadership courses at CGSOC. Major Mark Lee, interview with author, 3 May 2001, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Major Lee, CGSOC graduate 2000, AMSP graduate 2001, stated that he was disappointed with his leadership instruction at CGSOC. Major Lee leadership instructor used getting a neighbor who is a captain to mow his grass as a case study of a leadership problem.

Department of the Army, C700: Fundament of Excellence: Character and Competence Advance Book, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS., August 2000), i.

C700 Leadership Lessons
Lesson 1: Course Overview, critical reasoning & creative thinking, leadership doctrine (4 hrs)
Lesson 2: Discussion with the Deputy Commandant on organizational leadership (2 hrs)
Lesson 3: Army values and command philosophy (3 hrs)
Lesson 4: Culture, climate, command philosophy (4 hrs)
Lesson 5: Ethical standards (2 hrs)
Lesson 6: Consideration of others, discrimination, multicultural/generational awareness (4 hrs)
Lesson 7: Leader panel, team building, cohesion, envisioning (3 hrs)
Lesson 8: Individual leadership development, developing subordinates, counseling (3 hrs)
Lesson 9: Organizational leader development programs (3 hrs)

Total: 30 hours

103 FM 22-100, 1-4.
105 FM 22-100, 2-3 to 2-9.
106 Ibid., 2-11.
107 Ibid., 2-16 to 2-17.
108 Ibid., 2-17.
109 Ibid., 2-25.
110 Ibid., 4-5.
111 Ibid., 5-2 to 5-6.
112 Ibid., 6-13 to 6-15.
113 Ibid., 5-3.
114 Ibid., 5-8.
115 Ibid., 5-14.
116 Ibid. 5-14.
117 Ibid. 5-16.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid. 5-17.
120 Ibid. 5-18.
122 Two graduates of SAMS who have performed well and are considered rising stars in the U.S. Army, Major General James Dubik, AOASF graduate and currently Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii and Brigadier General Huntoon, currently Deputy Commandant, Command & General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
123 James Dubik, Major General, Commanding General 25th Infantry Division (Light), Speech given to AMSP/AOASF students, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 1 May 2001. MG Dubik stated that leaders provide calm and stability to the organization during periods of change. Uncertainty and anxiety are normal states for organizations.
124 Nineteen AMSP students from the class of 2000-2001 and all four seminar leaders, Interviewed by author. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Four personal interviews, group discussion with seven students and oral comprehensive exams with eight students each individually took place between 26 April 2001-17 May 2001.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 CGSOC student staff group notes, March 2000. Complaints about bosses being too busy; no face to face. The first thing that falls out when time is tight is mentoring; counseling is not happening. “I’ve been in the Army fourteen years, and I’ve been counseled in writing twice—once was my ACE (Academic Counselor & Evaluator) here.” “It is believed that most officers do not practice proper counseling of
subordinates leaders, nor do they know how. It is believed that the Army does not do enough to teach how to counsel, nor does it enforce standing requirements to counsel leaders.”


136 Interviews with AMSP students and seminar leaders, 26 April 2001-17 May 2001.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 Department of the Army, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Memorandum For Dean of Academics, CGSC, Subject: AMSP Student Evaluation and Graduation Policy for Academic Year AY 2001-2002 (18 June 2001). Paragraph 5 c. “Seminar Leaders will counsel AMSP students on a continual basis. Seminar leaders should conduct scheduled mid-term and end of academic year counseling. Final counseling will be conducted in conjunction with review of the student Academic Efficiency Report (AER) prepared by the seminar leader. Students who do not satisfactorily complete AMSP course and written requirements as judged by the seminar leader are counseled and assisted as required. If student performance is marginal or a student fails a module, the student will receive written evaluation from the seminar leader and is subject to counseling by the Director SAMS.”


142 John Bacon, e-mail, 18 April 2001.

143 John Bacon, e-mail, 18 April 2001.

144 John Bacon, e-mail, 16 May 2001.

145 School of Advanced Warfighting Program of Instruction AY 2000-2001

146 Ibid.

147 John Bacon, e-mail, 18 April 2001.

148 Ibid.


150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 Walter E. Kretchik, Lieutenant Colonel, AMSP graduate, “Wither SAMS?” Army, (December 1998), 31-34. Kretchik shows data (since dated) As of 1996 151 out of 271 eligible (active duty) SAMS graduates have commanded or are in battalion command. 56% selection rate for SAMS. Army averages combat arms: 11.4 percent, combat support: 12.1 percent, combat service support: 12.2 percent.


157 Robin Swan, Curriculum Guidance.

158 Robin Swan, Colonel, SAMS Director, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., e-mail to author, 23 April 2001. “Then collectively (seminar leaders AY 2001-2002), you work a program of counseling/mentorship that makes sense. This can evolve over time, but ideally something you have considered for a discussion with Colonel Greer (incoming SAMS Director, May 2001). High time SAMS institutionalizes a more dedicated program.”


161 Ibid.

162 FM 22-100, C-1.

163 SAMS Interviews, 26 April-17 May 2001.

164 Ibid.
Ibid.

Center for Army Leadership, Leadership Research & Assessment Division (LRAD), available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/cal/LRAD/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001. Results from the 212th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division shows that over 86 percent of leaders receiving the 360 feedback had received new information about their leadership. Over 80 percent of the leaders involved believed the 360 was beneficial to their leader development, over 95 percent thought the program was valuable and over 65 percent of all participants reported leadership improvement since the 360 assessment.


Mark Lee, Major, Student, CGSOC 1999-2000 and AMSP 2000-2001, Interview by author. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 3 May 2001. Major Lee states during the C700 leadership course the class review peer feedback but was not incorporated into developmental counseling.


Ibid. 71. "1. A time of career transition, either to a new organization or to a new responsibilities in the present job. Integrating feedback from many sources can help a manager recognize that new challenges require additional skills and new behaviors. 2. In developing the careers of people identified as high-potential. Organizations often feel that full and complete assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their future leaders is a valid investment."

Herbert Barber, Professor, Director of Individual Assessment and Development Program, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., phone interview by author, 23 January 2001. Additionally, the author's personal experience completing peer feedback reports on officers headed for the Army War College.

Dale Ringler, Major, AMSP Student, 2000-2001, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 26 April 2001. Major Ringler as a Small Group Instructor (SGI) have very favorable feedback on the verbal feedback process with captains attending the course.


Center for Army Leadership, Organizational Leadership For Executives (OLE) (Ft. Leavenworth, KS.: Center for Army Leadership, April 2000), 171.

SAMS Interviews, 26 April-17 May 2001.

Ibid.
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