NATO's New Strategic Concept: Implications for a Transforming Army

**A MONOGRAPH
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Abstract

NATO's NEW Strategic Concept: Implications for a Transforming Army
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The evolution of the Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) blueprint for its approach to the global security environment, has undergone substantial change during the last ten years. These changes reflect the vastly different international world order precipitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States, as a member of NATO, has been equally involved with the developments of the post bi-polar world. It has begun to restructure its military in an attempt to better respond to the full-spectrum of conflict and higher tempo of contemporary operations.

The potential for complex multinational operations, coupled with the unique military and strategic dynamics found within such an environment, will ultimately demand a higher level of understanding of such operations from members of the United States Army. Using a contemporary analytical strategy to explore the development of NATO's Strategic Concept, coupled with an examination of Army service specific doctrine, this monograph will answer the problem statement of this research: Is the United States Army aware of the operational ramifications contained within NATO's new strategic concept?

The most visible evidence of alliance understanding and awareness rests within the cornerstone publications and service doctrine. This monograph concludes that there is insufficient attention paid to alliance and multinational operations within its doctrine and manuals and points to After Action Reviews from Kosovo and Bosnia to support these findings. The extensive experience accumulated by U.S. Army commanders since the signing of the Dayton peace Accords must be cultivated and ultimately integrated into future doctrine development.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

Upon signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, President Truman remarked that had the agreement been in place in 1914 or 1939, it might have prevented the hostilities that ultimately led to the outbreak of the previous two world wars.¹ The vastly different strategic environment of the two previous eras referenced by Truman is subject to considerable debate. However, his comments do have contemporary meaning at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues its search for post-Cold War relevance in the complex web of multi-polar security.

The establishment of NATO in the face of a heavily armed, expansion-minded Soviet Union served as a necessity in post-war Europe. Since the United States played such a key role during European reconstruction, the recognition of the vital link between the United States and Europe required the establishment of a formal agreement. Ultimately, the Washington Treaty, also known as the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April of 1949, served as a method of expanding the previously signed Brussels Treaty of 1948, which was limited in scope to the Western European nations. Designed as a tailored risk-sharing security mechanism between the signatory states, as well as a preserver of the vital transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, the components of the Washington Treaty remained unchanged for the following 43 years.² A key component of the treaty rests within Article 5, as it states, "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against

¹ Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, "NATO: A Commemorative Address celebrating its 50th Anniversary," remarks delivered at Mellon Auditorium, Washington, DC, 23 April 1999, www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990423d.htm, accessed 1 November 2001.

² Originally, the Alliance consisted of 12 nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany joined the Alliance in 1955 and Spain became a member of NATO in 1982. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999.

them all."³ This cornerstone verbiage serves as the most important aspect to understanding an agreement largely postured upon the notion of collective defense.

With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, debate over NATO's relevance within the new strategic setting swelled. The viable threat that had served to fuel NATO's existence since inception had suddenly crumbled. Realizing the potential for fracture, NATO responded by introducing the New Strategic Concept in 1991. This unclassified document provided the basis for reexamining the roles and missions of this historically successful organization. Recognizing the realities of the transitioning polarity of the transatlantic security environment, NATO introduced the possibility of peacekeeping operations, or what would later be know as "out-of-area" operations, and non-Article 5 operations, later included within the subsequent 1999 Strategic Concept.⁴

Believing that the core concept of collective defense had not changed, NATO reaffirmed that the purpose of the alliances' military forces, preserving the territorial integrity of the members, remained appropriate.⁵ However, the method to achieve this security shifted. In addition to broadly addressing the roles of other European security instruments such as the Western European Union and the European Union for the first time, NATO adopted language that allowed for dealing with potential threats as far forward as possible, with the complimentary possibility to station forces outside of NATO's borders to maintain security.⁶ These seeds of change formed the foundation of formalized out-of-area operations ongoing within the Balkan region today.⁷

³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 4 April 1949, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm, accessed 1 September 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the very first time.

⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliances New Strategic Concept*, 7 November 1991, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm, paragraph 41, accessed 1 September 2001. This paragraph specifically states that the "allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions." In the opinion of the author, this paragraph, although reaffirming collective defense, provided opportunities for NATO action outside its borders.

⁵ Ibid, paragraph 13.

⁶ Ibid, paragraph 41.

⁷ Chapter's 3 and 4 of this monograph describe this change.

In 1999, celebrating the 50th Anniversary of NATO, 19 heads of state and government not only resigned the North Atlantic Treaty, but approved NATO's New Strategic Concept which delineated the task, purpose, and a vastly new approach to security NATO would adopt for the new century. Expanding upon the 1991 Strategic Concept, this document articulated a collective defense posture reflective of the contemporary changes of the strategic environment.

Preliminary and Secondary Questions

This monograph will attempt to determine if the United States Army is aware of the operational ramifications contained within NATO's new Strategic Concept of 1999 and the dramatic shift from operations of a defensive nature to those that can now be considered preemptory and coercive in nature. More specifically, this monograph will provide recommendations specifically tailored to address strategic shortfalls within the Army's keystone strategic transformation documents as they relate to NATO and coalition operations.⁸

Following this brief introductory chapter, the second chapter of this monograph will examine the historical development of the Strategic Concept with emphasis on its development through 1999. Key issues addressed in this chapter include strategic concept development between 1989 and the circumstances leading to the adoption of the Strategic Concept in 1999. Chapter three will provide a conceptual overview of U.S. military involvement within NATO, with particular emphasis on the key engagements of the last 10 years. This will provide the analytic basis for attempting to forecast deployment and exercise impact on Army forces during future years. The key question addressed in this section is: How involved with NATO have we been since 1991? Chapter four will examine significant strategic Army documents to identify essential threads of continuity between the cornerstone Army publications and the strategic concept. This

⁸ JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines **coalition** as an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action or protection. An **alliance** is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

chapter will explore whether the U.S. Army transformation plan addresses the new strategic concept and if the accumulated U.S. Army alliance experience of the last ten years has been incorporated into service doctrine.

The final chapter will focus on the ramifications and implications of the United States' commitment to NATO and the projected impact it will have on the United States Army. Ultimately, this chapter should provide the necessary framework to answer the fundamental question of this monograph: Is the United States Army aware of the ramifications associated with the adoption of NATO's new Strategic Concept?

Methodology

Just as NATO deals with transformation, so too does the United States Army. As the Army attempts to tailor its force into a structure capable of responding to a full-spectrum of operational environments, NATO has simultaneously widened the potential scenarios whereas the Army could be potentially included. As previously stated, this monograph will explore the specific language of the new strategic concept and the associated ramifications it will have on the operational tempo of a continuously engaged, transforming Army. Reliant on a contemporary analytical strategy, this paper will first focus upon understanding the evolution of NATO's New Strategic Concept. It will then examine the Army transformation plan for evidence signaling the incorporation of this New Strategic Concept. Ultimately, this monograph will either demonstrate linkages between the strategic concept and Army transformation or, conversely, highlight the disparity.

Key Definitions

Before moving forward it is useful to first define NATO's Strategic Concept. Paragraph Five of this document states, "NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the

Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces."⁹

⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *The Alliances Strategic Concept*, 24 April 1999, para 5, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, accessed 1 September 2001.

CHAPTER TWO

EVOLUTION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The Strategic Concept: Charting the Way Ahead

The strategic concept is not a uniquely contemporary aspect of defining NATO strategy outside of the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. The New Strategic Concept can trace its roots back to a number of events leading to its creation. In December 1952, NATO adopted MC 14/1, titled *A Report by the Standing Group on Strategic Guidance*, which called for a three-phase plan of action for conventional forces, consisting of a delaying action in Eastern Europe, a defensive action on the Weser River, and a counter-attack to restore NATO integrity.¹⁰

In May 1957, MC 14/2, titled *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area*, echoed a U.S. strategic doctrine of integrated nuclear capability designed to provide impenetrable shields forward of defending NATO forces.¹¹ By the 1960s, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recognized the dangers of rapid nuclear force escalation and introduced the idea of "no-first use." This reformulation of nuclear policy met with somewhat heavy resistance within NATO circles. France ultimately pulled out of the integrated military structure, forcing a compromise and the adoption of flexible response contained in the updated *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area*, MC 14/3, released on 12 December 1967. The nexus of flexible response option called for a defense commiserate with the attacking force. Although it did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons, it placed less

¹⁰ Hugh Beach, "National Planning in an Alliance Context," in *Military Power in Europe*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 32-34.

¹¹ Beach, 33.

emphasis on them during the early phases of a potential attack.¹²

An earlier unclassified document of note, which served to compliment MC 14/3, was the Harmel Report. The Harmel Report, named after the sitting Foreign Minister of Belgium, presented before the North Atlantic Council in 1967, and released two days after MC 14-3 on 14 December 1967, provides insight into the changes that would stimulate NATO transformation some 20 years later. The functions of NATO outlined within the report specified, "its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur."¹³ The report continued, "[its additional function is] to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved."¹⁴ This effectively defined the alliance as one not only concerned with collective defense, but one interested in pursuing a lessening of tensions as well through dialogue and cooperation.¹⁵ Not surprisingly, this theme of *détente* would dominate much of the NATO agenda for the decade to follow.

The continuous U.S. involvement during each stage of strategy review is impossible to ignore. In each instance, the U.S. provided stimulus for change. The 1952 strategy was largely based upon the U.S. Air Force experience in World War II, which focused on destroying vital centers of gravity.¹⁶ In 1957, the concept reflected John Foster Dulles' strategic doctrine

¹² Beach, 34. The French Government was extremely uncomfortable with the revised strategy and chose to remove themselves from the integrated military structure and develop their own strategy outside the framework of the McNamara Doctrine and traditional NATO channels. On 29 Mar 66, President De Gaulle's government confirmed France would stop participating in NATO's integrated military structure on 1 July 1966 and that all allied military headquarters and facilities must leave France by 1 April 1967. Nevertheless, France continues to remain a full voting member of NATO.

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Future Tasks of the Alliance: The Harmel Report*. 14 December 1967, sect 5, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c671213b.htm, accessed 1 November 2001.

¹⁴ *Future Tasks of the Alliance: The Harmel Report*. 14 December 1967, sect 5.

¹⁵ Lawrence Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (New York: Twain Publishers, 1994), 105.

¹⁶ Beach, 32. Under the plan called Dropshot, the strategic objective was to destroy the vital war-making capacity of the USSR by the use of 300 atomic bombs against weapons stockpiles, command and control facilities, military bases, petroleum sites, power, and steel industries. Beach contends this is a carry over of the strategic bombing ideology developed by the United States during World War II.

emphasizing instant nuclear retaliation. In 1967, the U.S concept of *graduated deterrence* dominated strategic thinking along with McNamara's *flexible response* initiative.¹⁷ In fact, the strategic concepts contained within MC 14/3 and the Harmel report would last for the next 24 years.¹⁸ The preeminent role of the United States in NATO concept development remains very much unchallenged today.

Shifting Sands of the Security Environment

In 1988, in front of the United Nations, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced he would reduce Soviet troop strength by 500,000 and pull 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe.¹⁹ Ultimately, the end of the Cold War occurred with the now famous dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the Malta conference in 1989 when Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush declared the Cold War over. As S. Nelson Drew points out in *The Future of NATO*, the extraordinary events and the inevitable implications of Soviet restructuring were numerous and reflect why the 1991 Strategic Concept remained focused on collective defense:

- The total collapse of the Warsaw Pact Countries had destroyed the political unity of the East.
- The [potential] breakup of the Soviet post war empire...[could] release long suppressed national rivalries that increase the likelihood of armed conflict.
- Internal Soviet tensions, the decline of the military, and the collapse of the Soviet political consensus increased the likelihood of domestic chaos with unpredictable results in geopolitical terms.
- The Soviet Union, even in its reduced and more isolated state, remained the largest military power on the European Continent, and one equipped with nuclear weapons.²⁰

¹⁷ Beach, 34.

¹⁸ Javier Solana, *A New NATO Within a New Security Architecture: How to Make Things Work*, talking points presented to the 11th NATO Review of Future Tasks of the Alliance, 6 March 1998, para 4, www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980306a.htm, accessed 15 January 2002. The former Secretary General addresses the longevity of the previous strategic concept adopted in 1967.

¹⁹ S. Nelson Drew and others, *The Future of NATO*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 18.

²⁰ Drew and others, 41.

Meanwhile, NATO was in the process of developing a new strategy that reflected the shifting bi-polar environment. The dramatic changes within the European landscape during the 1980s left NATO dangerously unprepared for the challenges of the next decade.²¹ As the two most powerful leaders in the world were declaring the end of an era, the NATO Military Committee was working to formulate a strategy reflective of this new strategic setting. During this period, NATO estimated that the security situation would continue to remain optimistic with events such as German reunification and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact inevitable in the near future.²² However, perestroika resulted in stringent debate regarding the potential change to the flexible response and forward defense option employed by NATO since the 1960s.

One such voice was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General John Galvin, who was opposed to an in-depth revision of NATO strategy from the top down. He felt the strategy of flexible response, adopted some 20 years earlier, was indeed flexible enough to withstand changes within the rapidly changing security environment.²³ He preferred to first examine the operational concepts and only then change the strategy. Since the original strategy of flexible response was implicitly one of options, Galvin believed the challenge lay instead in how to defend Western Europe with fewer troops.²⁴ In fact, he recognized immediately the realities of the ongoing budget debate both domestically and within Europe when he stated in a 1989 New York Times article, "[There is] a 10 percent reduction, a quiet, silent reduction that nations are taking from the support of NATO collectively."²⁵

²¹ Richard Hatfield, "NATO's New Strategic Concept," *Defense Systems Daily*, 28 January 2000, <http://defence-data.com/features/fpage35.htm>, accessed 4 January 2002.

²² Rob De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium*, (London: Brassey's, 1997), 14. De Wijk presents compelling insight into the work of COL Klaus Whittman and his paper entitled *Alliance Security Beyond the CFE*. This controversial paper discussed where NATO might fit within the new world order.

²³ De Wijk, 15.

²⁴ De Wijk, 15.

²⁵ "U.S. Commander in Europe Weighs Reductions of Armed Forces," *New York Times*, 18 October 1989, A12.

By May of 1990, the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Vigleik Eide, presented a completed memorandum outlining a review of military strategy titled *Alliance Security Post CFE* to NATO defense ministers at the Defense Planning Committee. This memorandum addressed the overall reduction of armed forces in Europe and the reduced likelihood of major conventional combat in Eastern Europe and the resultantly less predictable and diversified European security environment. Additionally, this report also provided the impetus for the NAC to move forward with a substantive review of NATO strategy that would quickly evolve into the New Strategic Concept.²⁶

During the London Summit in July of 1990, NATO unveiled a document reflective of these changing conditions faced by the Alliance. The document, titled the *London Declaration On a Transforming North Atlantic Alliance*, highlighted the importance of retaining a foundation of collective defense, while also addressing the new challenges anticipated by the emerging multi-polar dynamics articulated by General Eide. It not only furthered the debate on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, but also recognized that nuclear weapons would play a lesser role as well. Of particular note is the recognition that NATO was in the process of large-scale transformation. The London Declaration reads:

This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change.....Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.²⁷

Interestingly, the course of events beginning the following month accelerated the anticipation of the NATO renovation plan. In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein's military forces

²⁶General Vigleik Eide, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Military Dimension in the Transformed Alliance*, www.nato.int/docu/review/rev92-4.htm, para 8, accessed 15 January 2002. This article, written by the then-Chairman of the Military Committee, presents an overview of the military committee's efforts to shape the Strategic Concept introduced in 1991.

²⁷North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, 6 July 1990, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm, accessed 7 November 2001, Sections 2 and 23.

invaded Kuwait as NATO stood somewhat powerless on the sidelines, while the United States, under United Nations Security Council endorsement, led an ad hoc coalition of nations in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although not formally asked to commit forces by the United States, the circumstances "were almost ideal from the point of view of...NATO play[ing] a military role beyond the established Treaty area."²⁸ In addition to the U.S., the coalition included the NATO members of France, Great Britain, and Italy. Although large amounts of combat power flowed from U.S. bases within Germany, each of these nations acted as individual nations, within a temporary coalition, and not as collective members of NATO. In fact, Germany questioned whether it would even honor potential Article 5 infringement of Turkey.²⁹

Recognizing Change: The Strategic Concept of 1991

Ultimately, the perceived coalition victory and the inability to act due to geographic limitations provided NATO with further motivation to continue the progress proclaimed at the London Summit the previous year.³⁰ Throughout 1991, NATO continued to refine many of the concepts contained within the London Proclamation. The metamorphosis was nearly complete. In November 1991, the Alliance presented a New Strategic Concept at the Rome Summit reflecting the significant changes during the preceded two years. Incidentally, the recognition of the 1967 Harmel Report provides a linkage to the strategic concepts of the past:

The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfillment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive, and potentially immediate threat which was a principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared.³¹

²⁸Douglas T. Stuart, *Can NATO Transcend Its European Borders: NATO Out-of-Area Disputes* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 1992), 11. Although not formally voted upon in the North Atlantic Council, Stuart highlights NATO's self-imposed geographic limitations on potential action during Operation Desert Storm.

²⁹Kaplan, 105. Germany eventually deployed Air Force and Patriot units to Turkey.

³⁰Stuart, 13.

³¹North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991*, part 1, para 6.

Embracing many of the traditional elements, such as Article 4 consultation whenever territorial or political independence of any party is threatened, as well as reinforcing the *all for one* clause of Article 5, the New Strategic Concept of 1991 recognized the diminished requirement for large standing forces and shifted emphasis to rapid reaction forces and augmentation forces.³² The augmentation forces are designed to provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. It also incorporated language specifying that alliance security could be affected by other risks of a wider nature.

In short, the Alliance's adoption of a New Strategic Concept in 1991 was an important milestone in adapting NATO to the post-Cold War era. It moved beyond the Cold War strategic framework reliant on a robust forward defense and placed new importance on the development of multinational force projection expanding the capabilities for crisis management operations and flexible deterrent options.³³ In many respects, it provided the strategic blueprint for the military mission in the former Yugoslavia.

On 11 January 1994, NATO stepped further into the new world order by embracing the Brussels Declaration and agreed to endorse the concept of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which in theory, gives the European Union a military capability under the auspice of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), something the Strategic Concept of 1999 would later endorse. The shift stemmed as much from the political and budgetary realities as it did from some grand new strategy. In the U.S. for instance, the Bush administration had lost a battle with Congress to maintain the troop strength in Europe at a number above 200,000.³⁴ Within two years, the Clinton administration would lower the European troop figure to 100,000.³⁵

³² Ibid, para 47.

³³ Ibid, para 37.

³⁴ Kaplan, 163. Recognizing post Cold War budgetary constraints, the US House of Representatives, controlled by the Democratic Party, called for a reduction of troop strength in Europe from 250,000 to 100,000.

³⁵ Kaplan, 171.

The Brussels Declaration reaffirmed the Alliances' Article 10 option of admitting new members, and launched the Partnership for Peace program, which allowed a mechanism to engage those nations outside of NATO security architecture. The declaration addressed out-of-area operations with a far greater degree of emphasis than had been previously discussed in its history. Indeed, NATO had in fact been patrolling a no-fly zone in the Balkan region since the preceding summer and used the Brussels Declaration as a means of communicating its continued pursuit for regional stability, terrorism, Middle East peace, and the ongoing tensions within the Balkan region:

We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations....

...We strongly welcome the agreements recently concluded in the Middle East peace process which offer an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the area....

...As members of the Alliance, we deplore the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁶

Additionally, this declaration became the first formal recognition of a military force *separable, but not separate* from NATO by declaring the need "to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defense Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces."³⁷

Meanwhile, between 1995 and 1997, non-US NATO research and development budgets dropped from \$11.9 billion to \$8.9 billion annually.³⁸ The United States became increasingly

³⁶North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Declaration of Heads of State and Government*, 11 January 1994, para 19, para 22, para 23, www.nato.int/docu/pr/pr94.htm, accessed 1 November 2001.

³⁷North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Declaration of Heads of State and Government*, 11 January 1994, para 1.

³⁸"R & D Funding Disparity Widens Capability Gap in NATO," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 28 April 2000, para 1, www.mkogy.hu/nato/2000/00an13.htm, accessed 25 March 2002.

concerned with the perceived gap in technology and NATO interoperability, as the US research and development steadily increased to over \$30 billion.³⁹ In February 1997, the State Department presented a public report to Congress titled, *Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications*. As an important aspect of enlargement, the report addressed increased US concerns regarding the technical gap and outlined the Clinton Administration's recommendation for improvement:

[E]fforts during this period will focus on relatively low-cost, high-payoff enhancements in interoperability to rapidly improve the ability of the forces of new members to contribute effectively to their own defense....and make them [along with current members] more deployable and sustainable both for collective defense and non-Article V operations.⁴⁰

Ultimately, the decision to further update the strategic concept occurred at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. The invitation of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance dominated the events and headlines of the 2-day conference. Remarkably, it had only been six years since these three nations had been members of the Warsaw Pact.⁴¹ The summit's communiqué further identified the progress of the CJTF concept, highlighted the new cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, but more importantly to the context of this paper, contained specific language regarding the evolution of the strategic concept:

The Alliance Strategic Concept, which we adopted at our meeting in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. Recognizing that the strategic environment has changed since then, we have decided to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.⁴²

³⁹"R & D Funding Disparity Widens Capability Gap in NATO," para 4. Excluding the US, Great Britain, and France, the figure plummets to \$1.9 billion devoted to research and development. The US figure increased to \$36 billion by 1999.

⁴⁰Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, *Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications*, February 24, 1997. part 4, para 9.

⁴¹The Warsaw Pact met in Budapest on 25 February 1991 to announce the dissolution of its military structure.

⁴²North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*, 8 July 1997, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm>, accessed 5 November 2001, section 19.

This effectively provided the momentum for further change. NATO members voted to formally welcome the three new members to the Alliance and unveil an updated strategic concept in time for the 50th anniversary of the NATO Summit, to be held in Washington D.C. Recognizing that NATO policy had evolved and developed in areas that were covered in what was now seen as inadequate depth, the Clinton Administration pressured the NATO members to update the Alliance's concept. Comments by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in 1999 illustrate this position, "We, as an Alliance, must be better able to deal with the non-Article V challenges that we are more likely to face....ethnic strife, regional conflict, WMD, missile proliferation."⁴³

Embracing the Future: The New Strategic Concept of 1999

On 24 April 1999, the nineteen heads of state agreed on a new strategic concept that outlined NATO's role within the European-Atlantic security environment and focused on five key areas fulfilling the desires of transformation conceived some 10 years before. These broadly worded strategies, serving as the new template for action, were overshadowed by the ongoing challenges confronting NATO at the time. NATO was in the middle of conducting OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, and the Washington Summit largely focused on the pressing issues associated with the military and political aspects associated within it.

Summary

NATO's founding fathers might not have envisioned the dramatic evolution of the Alliance's self-defined mission and purpose over the last ten-years. Organized to confront an increasingly belligerent Soviet Union, NATO found itself at the crossroads of significance with the fall of its dominant opponent in the late 1980s. However, it has managed to find life in a manner most successful organizations are familiar. It examined itself and transformed itself into an

⁴³Strobe Talbott, "A New NATO for a New Era," lecture presented at the United Royal Services Institute, United Kingdom, 10 March 1999, para 21, <http://usa.grmbl.com/s19990310e.html>, accessed 20 February 2002.

organization comprising relevant policy goals, with increased resolve to achieve its updated ambitions.

However, let there be no mistake, the original members of the North Atlantic Council never envisioned a period when the Alliance would undertake operations that were outside of its scope, such as those termed *non-Article 5* and *out-of-area* operations. Indeed, it was Secretary General Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, who uttered the now famous words about what NATO was all about: to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. Of immediate importance to the US military, and to the US Army in particular, is that NATO has evolved from an organization bound by the geographic borders it occupies, into an Alliance willing to conduct operations outside of those same borders against a wider range of potential threats. The next chapter will explore some of the more significant NATO operations involving U.S. forces over the last ten years.

U.S. ARMY INVOLVEMENT WITHIN NATO OPERATIONS

Introduction

As previously discussed, the 1991 Strategic Concept made no direct reference to peacekeeping operations, however, the establishment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia following the adoption of the Dayton Peace Accords changed all this. The end of the Cold War meant that NATO needed to find a new capability to insure its long-term relevance.⁴⁴ The realities of the destabilized European situation, primarily in the Balkan region, meant that NATO might act in response to an increasingly ominous circumstance. As has been previously discussed, NATO was largely a defensive security alliance for its first 40 years, but the Balkans provided the setting to test potential peacekeeping and peacemaking functions of a post-Cold War NATO.

Although disagreements emerged regarding the nature of NATO defensive *theories*, such as forward defense, massive retaliation, and flexible response, no true test as to the viability of these varied premises ever took place. Stepping into the trappings of actual operations meant that NATO would be *acting* collectively in an offensive manner for the first time. This chapter will explore the operational side of the Alliance development during the 1990s with emphasis on the events within the Balkan region. Although the participation of NATO forces as part of the training missions associated with the post-Desert Storm Operation SOUTHERN GUARD serve as important aspects of NATO military employment, the large-scale operations within the Balkan region provide the defining experience of NATO during the 1990s and will be the focus of this chapter.

⁴⁴ Ted Carpenter, "Introduction: The Post-Cold War NATO Debate," in *The Future of NATO*, ed. Ted Carpenter (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 1.

Crisis in the Balkans

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, democratic movements began to sweep through much of Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia. The election of non-communist governments in four of Yugoslavia's six republics resulted in a fractured Yugoslavian Federation and the reemergence of ethnic tension.⁴⁵ Slovenia and Croatia, members of the Yugoslav Federation, declared independence in June of 1991. In July, fighting erupted between Croatian forces and Serb militiamen. Simultaneously, Slovenia attempt to establish its own borders, resulted in a fighting with the Yugoslav army.⁴⁶ While Montenegro sided with Serbia to remain in the federation, the two remaining republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, voted in favor of independence.⁴⁷ In 1992, as international attention began to focus on the same region responsible for the outbreak of World War I as the regional instability continued to rise, NATO responded by issuing a statement passionately asking all parties to respect United Nation's cease-fire arrangements and respecting the authority of United Nations' peacekeepers.⁴⁸

Responding to the crisis, the United States launched Operation PROVIDE PROMISE in July 1992, which was designed as a Joint Task Force charged with humanitarian relief support and medical assistance to the ongoing United Nations' peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, JTF PROVIDE PROMISE's missions included: the command of all U.S. forces operating within the Balkan Region; detecting, monitoring, and reporting activities along the border of Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); and conducting reconnaissance using

⁴⁵Cable News Network, *Roots of the Balkan Troubles: A History of Ethnic Skirmishes 1995*, (no other date listed), para 4-6, www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/history/index.html, accessed 25 March 2002.

⁴⁶*Ibid*, para 7.

⁴⁷*Ibid*, para 7.

⁴⁸The ceasefire was established by the UN between the Croatia and the Yugoslav Army on 2 January 1992. UNPROFOR was established by the United Nations on 15 February 1992 with a one year mandate. For a detailed overview see United Nations, *Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR*, September 1995, para 1-6, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm, accessed 25 March 2002. NATO issued the communiqué of support for the operation on 5 June 1992. NATO, *Statement Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council*, 5 June 1992, para 5, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920605a.htm, accessed 25 March 2002.

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in support of U.N., NATO and U.S. operations.⁴⁹ This particular mission would last until 15 March 1996.

As tensions continued to escalate, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, GEN John Shalikashvili, directed Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), to conduct patrolling operations in international waters off the coast of Montenegro, in what would eventually become Operation SHARP GUARD on 15 June 1993. Under the command of Combined Task Force 440, consisting of both U.S. and Allied vessels, this operation was designed to prevent all unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and all arms from entering the former Yugoslavia, as well as monitor and enforce compliance with standing UN sanctions.⁵⁰

When the United Nations approved UN Security Resolution 816 on 31 March 1993, which established the ban on military flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO agreed to provide air space monitoring by enlarging the role of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Aircraft that had been supporting the naval monitoring mission of Operation SHARP GUARD.⁵¹ Nicknamed Operation SKY MONITOR, this mission consisted of E-3A surveillance aircraft flown by multinational crews provided by eleven NATO nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United States.⁵²

The monitoring and enforcement aspects had little effect on the increasingly violent situation on the ground. On 12 April 1993, as a result of the passage of UN Resolution 816, which authorized member states to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the airspace ban over Yugoslavia, NATO established Operation DENY FLIGHT to actively enforce the no-fly

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Task Force Provide Promise Deactivates*, 1 February 1996, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1996/b020196_bt055-96.html, accessed 23 January 2002.

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO: Operation Sharp Guard*, 2 October 1996, <http://www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm>, accessed 1 February 2002.

⁵¹ Allied Forces Southern Europe, *NATO: Operation Sky Monitor*, 11 April 1993, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/OperationSkyMonitor.htm>, para 2, accessed 2 February 2002.

⁵² Allied Forces Southern Europe, *NATO: Operation Sky Monitor*, para 3.

ban over the Balkan Region. This operation involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, from various Alliance nations, including the United States, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic.⁵³

On 2 August 1993, the North Atlantic Council elected to adopt even harsher responses to quell the violence, including the use of air strikes. A statement released that day by NATO highlighted the increasing resolve to the growing violence within Balkan region:

The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues, including wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance, stronger measures including air strikes against those responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁴

On 9 February 1994, the NAC followed this statement with a strict ultimatum: remove heavy weapons from a twenty-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo or be subjected to air strikes.⁵⁵ Subsequent air enforcement came in response to violations of these designated heavy-weapon exclusionary zones during the summer and fall of 1995.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, on 28 February, NATO fighters shot down four fixed winged aircraft violating the UN sanctioned no-fly zone, representing the first combat experience of the Alliance.⁵⁷

On 14 December 1995, the historic signing Dayton Peace Accords were followed the next day with a UN Security Council mandate authorizing a multinational implementation force (IFOR), under the command and control of NATO. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, composed of nearly 60,000 troops came under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council and the military

⁵³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliances Operational Role in Peacekeeping: The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia*, 8 October 2001, para 7, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb050102.htm>, accessed 2 February 2002.

⁵⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Press Statement by the Secretary General*, 2 August 1993, para 3, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/1993/9308e.htm>, accessed 23 January 2002.

⁵⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliances Operational Role in Peacekeeping: The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia*, 8 October 2001, para 14.

⁵⁶ Notable air strikes began on 5 August 1994, Bosnian Serb Army elements seized a number of weapons from the Sarajevo Exclusionary Zone and were attacked with NATO aircraft, and lasted until 14 September 1995.

⁵⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliances Operational Role in Peacekeeping: The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia*, para 14.

command and control of the SACEUR, GEN George Joulwan.⁵⁸ Specifically, the IFOR mission was to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and conduct the following military tasks:

- ensure [IFOR] self defense and freedom of movement
- supervise selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the parties
- monitor and -- if needed -- enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, and the establishment of Zones of Separation
- assume control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes
- establish Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to the Peace Agreement
- to assist with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR.⁵⁹

To accomplish these tasks, NATO divided the operational area of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three sectors, under French, American, and British command and control.⁶⁰ Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, Task Force Eagle, comprised of 20,000 soldiers, largely from the United States' 1st Armored Division and designated as part of NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, was ordered to Bosnia-Herzegovina, constituting the American portion of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.⁶¹

Following one year of execution, IFOR and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR gave way to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Operation JOINT GUARD in December 1996, representing a 50 percent reduction in NATO forces.⁶² As the name shift implies, the IFOR mission was focused

⁵⁸ De Wijk, 113.

⁵⁹ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, *Implementation Force Backgrounder*, no date listed, para 18, www.shape.nato.int/IMPFORC1.HTM#2, accessed 2 February 2002.

⁶⁰ De Wijk, 113.

⁶¹ US Army, *Task Force Eagle: A History of SFOR*, no date listed, <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/>, accessed 9 February 2002.

⁶² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *History of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina*, 16 November 2000, <http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>, accessed 9 February 2002.

on implementing peace while the SFOR mission focused on stabilizing the peace.⁶³ In June 1998, Operation JOINT GUARD official became operation JOINT FORGE. According to NATO, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) has and will continue:

To deter hostilities, stabilize the peace, and contribute to a 'safe and secure environment', by providing a continued military presence in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). SFOR will also target and coordinate its support to key areas and primary civil implementation organizations, as well as progressing towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The SFOR mandate has not changed and the force continues to do everything necessary to help maintain a 'safe and secure environment', as laid out in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).⁶⁴

In spite of the dramatic turn of events following 11 September 2001 and the corresponding demand for troops elsewhere in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States seems unwilling to continue a commitment started over seven years ago. As the US European Command fact sheet regarding the ongoing SFOR operation in Bosnia states, "no timeline for Operation JOINT FORGE has been established. The mission will be assessed periodically and the force commitment will be adjusted as needed."⁶⁵ This ongoing US support for the mission continues to have an impact on the US military, particularly the US Army.⁶⁶

Kosovo

As with other provinces in the region, Kosovo enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy until 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic, as part of his Serbian nationalist movement, placed it under direct Serbian control and simultaneously removed many of the autonomous authorities it had

⁶³The SFOR Mission continues as of 1 April 2002.

⁶⁴North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *SFOR Fact Sheet: SFOR Restructuring*, November 2001, <http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/restruct/t001116g.htm>, para 2, accessed 2 February 2002.

⁶⁵US European Command, *Operation Joint Forge, Task Force Eagle*, no date listed, www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/operations/main.htm&2, para 2, accessed 9 February 2002.

⁶⁶Over 6,000 US soldiers remain in support of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Currently, the US portion of the operation is commanded by the National Guard's 29th Infantry Division. See US European Command, *Operation Joint Forge, Task Force Eagle*.

benefit from.⁶⁷ As NATO continued to deal with the instability within Bosnia, the situation in neighboring Kosovo began to quickly destabilize. Kosovar resistance to Belgrade rule intensified with the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and began attacking Serbian security forces. In spring and summer of 1998, fighting between the Serbian military (VJ) and police forces (MUP) and Kosovar Albanians resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovars and forced over 400,000 people from their homes.⁶⁸ As a result, the rapidly escalating humanitarian crisis stemming from the increased violence caught the immediate attention of the Alliance.

In September 1998, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1199, which demanded that all parties in Kosovo end hostilities and maintain a cease-fire.⁶⁹ In response, the North Atlantic Council adopted an activation order that would serve as the impetus of Operation DETERMINED FORCE, an air operation designed to: support ongoing diplomatic efforts; Yugoslavian withdraw of military forces from Kosovo; cooperation in bringing an end to the violence; and unimpeded return of refugees to their homes.⁷⁰ In a separate and complimentary agreement, NATO set force limits on Serbian forces occupying Kosovo in a deal brokered by SACEUR, GEN Wesley Clark, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee GEN Klaus Naumann, and Serbian authorities.⁷¹ However, despite early indications of cooperation, Milosovic's potential for misleading signals and false intentions were already well established, thereby providing NATO with sufficient justification to maintain the ability to launch the activation order if necessary.

Complimenting the continued intelligence and surveillance efforts required to monitor Serbian military activity, NATO commenced Operation EAGLE EYE as the official means of

⁶⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Background to Conflict*, no date listed, www.nato.int/kfor/resources/intro.htm, para 1-2, accessed 10 February 2002. The Kosovo Provincial Assembly and Government were dissolved and Kosovar Albanians were removed from important state positions.

⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Background to Conflict*, para 2.

⁶⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Resolution 1199 (1998)*, 23 September 1998, www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980923a.htm, accessed 10 February 2002.

⁷⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo*, www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm, accessed 24 February 2002.

⁷¹ *NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo*, para 10.

verifying compliance with the internationally mandate of cease-fire contained in UN Resolution 1199. Specifically, EAGLE EYE established a NATO mechanism of air verification comprised of NATO reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles specified within the Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement, signed in Belgrade on October 15th 1998.⁷² The air surveillance mission, under NATO authority, complimented the 1400-member ground verification mission, also known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), under the authority of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Kosovo Verification Coordination Center (KVCC), under the authority of NATO and the command of British BG David Montgomery and located in Kumanovo, Macedonia, conducted liaison, planning, coordination and exchange of information with the OSCE verifiers.⁷³ Operation DETERMINED GUARANTOR served as the mechanism to extract KVM verifiers if necessary and assure the safety of those deployed within Kosovo.⁷⁴ This 2400 member mission fell under command of French BG Marcel M. Valentin.

Allied Force and Beyond

Following the failed negotiations of the Rambouillet Peace Talks, NATO Secretary General Solana directed SACEUR, GEN Wesley Clark to commence Operation ALLIED FORCE, representing the largest and highest intensity combat ever conducted by the Alliance. As articulated by the North Atlantic Council statement released 12 April 1999, the operation was designed to compel Milosevic to:

- Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression
- Ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces
- Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence

⁷²Allied Forces Southern Europe, *Operation Eagle Eye*, no date listed, www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/deteagle/Eagle.htm, para 2, accessed 24 February 2002. The activation order dated October 30th, 1998 marked the official launch of this high-tech verification mission.

⁷³*Operation Eagle Eye*, part 3, para 3. Participating ground and air liaison came from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Norway, and Germany.

⁷⁴Allied Forces Southern Europe, *Operation Determined Guarantor*, no date listed, www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/detguarantor/Guarantor.htm, para 5, accessed 24 February 2002.

- Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations
- Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.⁷⁵

When Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, NATO had yet to endorse a ground force option, instead reluctantly embracing the Limited Air Options prepared by SHAPE headquarters.⁷⁶ Alliance members remained committed to the decision they had reached the previous October, when they decided that any campaign against Yugoslavia would only involve air power.⁷⁷ To accomplish the previously described tasks, the United States deployed more than 700 aircraft of the total 1055 allied effort to ALLIED FORCE with the majority came from the US Air Force. The 214 fighter-aircraft, 18 bombers, 25 ISR aircraft, 38 Special Operations aircraft, and 43 intra-theater aircraft flew more than 29,000 sorties.⁷⁸

Despite the lack of Allied support for a ground option, NATO's focus on this line of operation persisted.⁷⁹ As the air campaign progressed, NATO's military staff continued to develop operational plans for the remote possibility of a ground invasion, as GEN Clark appointed a secret planning team within his headquarters to prepare potential ground options by the middle of May.⁸⁰ These plans would ultimately prove unnecessary within the next three weeks. On 9 June 1999,

⁷⁵ US Department of Defense, *Operation Allied Force*, 21 June 1999, www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo, para 2, accessed 26 February 2002.

⁷⁶ Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, (New York, Public Affairs, 2001). Chapter five and six presents the limited air options presented to the Alliance for consideration, modified for NATO approval. General Clark expresses the hesitation NATO had in using force on page 125.

⁷⁷ RAND Corporation, *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*, March 2001, www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1391, page 41, accessed 24 February 2002. This study also refers to congressional testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by the CJCS, GEN Hugh Shelton, on 15 April 1999, who states that GEN Clark was ordered not to conduct ground action. Additionally Greece's populations was overwhelmingly against ground force.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 23.

⁷⁹ Cable News Network, "Cohen: Casualties Likely in NATO Campaign," 15 April 1999, www.cnn.com/US/9904/15/us.kosovo.military.02, accessed 25 March 1999. Mr. Cohen reiterated in his congressional testimony that Washington was against the use of ground forces in Kosovo except in a permissive environment.

⁸⁰ RAND Corporation, 47.

Yugoslav military authorities agreed to full withdrawal from Kosovo by signing the Military Technical Agreement, following a seventy-seven day air campaign. The following day, Secretary General Solana announced that he had instructed General Clark to suspend NATO's air operations against Yugoslavia after Clark had confirmed the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was, in fact, underway.⁸¹

With the conclusion of combat operations, the United Nations issued Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, authorizing the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo.⁸² The security force, called the Kosovo Force (KFOR), formed the core of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN and was specifically charged to:

- Establish a security presence in Kosovo, as authorized by the United Nations Security Council 1244 and further defined in the MTA signed by military authorities from the Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO
- Verify and enforce the terms of the MTA
- Establish a secure environment in which the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established and humanitarian aid can be delivered.
- Establish a secure environment in which the international civil presence can operate.
- Achieve a self-sustaining secure environment which will allow public security responsibilities to be transferred to appropriate civil organizations.⁸³

When KFOR deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, it established its headquarters in Pristina and divided Kosovo into five subordinate sectors of responsibility. The United States contribution consisted of approximately 7,000 ground personnel, tasked to help maintain a capable military force in Kosovo and to ensure the safe return of Kosovar refugees.⁸⁴ Additionally, the US

⁸¹ NATO, *NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo*, Section 2, para 15.

⁸² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Resolution 1244*, 10 June 1999, www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm, accessed 24 February 2002.

⁸³ Allied Forces Southern Europe, *Operation Joint Guardian*, no date listed, www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/kfor/default.htm, section 2, accessed 24 February 2002.

⁸⁴ US European Command, *Operation Joint Guardian / Task Force Eagle*, www.eucm.mil/Directorates/ECPA, accessed 28 February 2002. EUCOM currently state that over 6000 troops remain in Kosovo.

provides personnel and equipment to other sectors and commands within the KFOR organization. As with the Bosnia mission, the U.S. policy states " no timeline for Operation Joint Guardian has been established. The mission will be assessed periodically and the force commitment will be adjusted as needed."⁸⁵

Summary

With the continued NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia approaching ten years, the US finds itself as both a leader of European resolve as well as a captive. The success of the Bosnia mission and the stabilization of Kosovo have become increasingly linked to long-term Alliance relevance. In fact, one could certainly question the relevance of the Alliance if ALLIED FORCE had not achieved its ultimate outcome. Although steadfastly committed to the Balkans, the US remains painfully aware that ability to achieve long-term regional stability and simultaneously reach the aforementioned desired end states for the Balkan region is somewhat questionable.⁸⁶

However, the pace of deployments and operations NATO has conducted during the last 10 years is not in question, as illustrated by this chapter. Its defensive posture was greatly altered by the prospects of a volatile Balkan region capable of directly affecting the well-being of its membership. Coupled with an impending humanitarian disaster and NATO was compelled to act regardless of whether its foundational documents such as the 1991 Strategic Concept were applicable or not.⁸⁷

Although the 1991 concept addressed the possibility of supporting peacekeeping operations, the document still fell short of addressing the width of potential threats and

⁸⁵Ibid, para 8. This web site states further, the US is committed to supporting peace in Kosovo by implementing the Military Technical Agreement and participating in the NATO-led military force

⁸⁶ Recall the "no time-table" statements maintained by US EUCOM for both the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping operations. Also, President George Bush requested a debt limit increase above the congressionally mandated \$6 Billion cap which was exceeded on 27 February 2002 for the first time in US history.

environments for which NATO be employed. While NATO addressed this shortfall, the actions in the former Yugoslavia stimulated change within the US Army, as it became heavily engaged within an strategic environment it was not appropriately structured to support. The next chapter will discuss the military aspects of NATO's strategic concept and examine the influences the Balkans had on its development, while also examining the transformation initiated by Army leadership during the middle and late 1990s.

CHAPTER FOUR

U.S ARMY TRANSFORMATION AND THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Introduction

As highlighted by the detailed developmental overview found in the second chapter of this paper, a new theory regarding NATO purpose emerged following intense debate between 1989 and 1991. Following the Cold War, the Alliance's search for a new theoretical strategic construct reached fruition when NATO adopted the new Strategic Concept in 1999 at NATO's 50th Anniversary summit in Washington, DC. Emphasizing cooperation instead of confrontation, the construct maintained the defensive importance contained within the original NATO treaty, yet presented an expanded framework to address European security obligations.

The 1991 document also provided a new milestone in Alliance security strategy vetting. Published as a public, non-classified document, the Strategic Concept was available to those not normally privy to such information, such as journalists and security specialists. Evidence is still lacking as to whether NATO's current policy allowing for such public discourse has directly influenced the debate regarding the evolution of NATO policy. However, one thing is clear, it has made an impact on raising the level of debate regarding the future purposes of the Alliance.

This chapter will examine the 1999 Strategic Concept and identify the key components relevant to Army transformation and military decision makers. Following the examination of the strategic concept, an analysis of the strategic direction of Army transformation will identify key threads of continuity and areas of strategic difference worthy of concern.

Unlocking the Door: Key Aspects of the Strategic Concept

The 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirms the Alliance's commitment to those original defensive measures contained within the original treaty of 1949, as well as embraces new activities outside the traditional collective security agreement. The concept embraces the precepts of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, reaffirming its standing openness to enlargement. It addresses the need for crisis management and enhanced partnerships throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. Reiterating the diminished likelihood of large-scale conventional war on the European continent, the concept shifts focus to the contemporary strategic challenges confronting the Euro-Atlantic Alliance such as ethnic conflict, political instability, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and effect, economic volatility, and human rights. Additionally, the 1999 concept highlights the continued support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.⁸⁸

Additionally, NATO's collective support for the so-called Petersberg Tasks, defined at the Western European Council of Ministers in Bonn in June 1992, and subsequently adopted by the EU in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam was finally reached with the adoption of the Strategic Concept in 1999.⁸⁹ These tasks consist of humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking, and certain missions where NATO itself does not want to engage.⁹⁰

The New Strategic Concept uses fairly strong language in articulating the capabilities particularly important in the accomplishment of these, as well as other missions. Maintaining a foundation of deterrence related to any potential aggression against member states, the concept echoes the 1991 concept, which calls for NATO to stop an aggressor, as far forward as possible should an attack occur, ensuring the territorial integrity of its member states. The document urges

⁸⁸ *The Alliances Strategic Concept*, 24 April 1999, para 19.

⁸⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Developing further the European Security and Defense Identity*, 9 August 2000, www.isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/cristallina, accessed 25 October 2000.

⁹⁰ *Developing further the European Security and Defense Identity*, 1. These tasks are quoted directly from this particular document. UK MOD Jeff Hoon also used this exact language in describing the Petersburg Tasks before members of parliament in 2002.

NATO planners to consider the shortfalls in deployability and mobility, survivability of forces and infrastructure, sustainability, and interoperability. Using these underpinnings of capability, NATO members have specifically charged the military to: protect peace and guarantee territorial integrity; conduct effective non-article 5 crisis response operations; conduct crisis response operations; conduct support of other international organizations; prepare to support separable, but not separate, European Union operations; and conduct military to military contacts.⁹¹ These substantially expanded roles and missions for NATO come at a time when a key component of the NATO force structure, the United States military, is undergoing substantial transformation.⁹² Recognizing the hegemonic presence of the United States, the Clinton Administration designed the initial template for change by promulgating the *Shape, Prepare, Respond* strategy during the 1990s.

As with the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the strategy recognizes the dramatic shift from the bi-polar Cold War strategic setting, to the contemporary multi-polar environment complete with emerging threats such as regional or state centered instability, transnational dangers, weapons proliferation, and environmental catastrophe.⁹³ This strategy, along with the operational realities faced by the United States Army in particular, demanded a new capability reflective of these vastly different circumstances.

Leaping Ahead: U.S. Army Transformation

Recognizing the shifting points of stress within the new strategic setting, the leadership of the U.S. Army, under the direction of the Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki, created a level of irreversible momentum with respect to its transformation process, when he, along with Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, unveiled the Army's transformation vision at the annual Association of

⁹¹ *The Alliances Strategic Concept*, 24 April 1999. Paragraphs 47-50. These tasks are outlined under the heading of *Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces* and sub-heading *Missions of the Alliances Forces*.

⁹² For the purposes of this paper, attention will be isolated on the United States Army.

⁹³ US President, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, December 1999, 2.

the United States Army conference in Washington, DC, in October of 1999.⁹⁴ The thesis of the vision revolved around the precept that the Army must be more responsive, survivable, and sustainable to meet the needs of the nation. GEN Shinseki favored a force capable of arriving at a conflict area quicker, with a broader range of capability than was currently achievable. He saw a gap between the time-consuming deployment of the Army's heavy force, built around the Cold War era M1 Abrams tank, and the vastly reduced firepower found within the more rapidly-deployable light-infantry division.⁹⁵

Simultaneously, Army leadership proceeded to formulate a relevant strategy within an international environment requiring a more agile force capable of dealing with the demands of a full-spectrum environment.⁹⁶ To support the new Army Vision, GEN Shinseki developed a comprehensive plan to facilitate his transformational goals, while highlighting the challenges confronting the economic, political, informational, and military elements of U.S. power. While embracing traditional threats such as those found within Southwest Asia and the Korean peninsula, Army leaders explored non-traditional strategic complicators of national security in a global rather than regional perspective. Addressing issues such as terrorism, narco-trafficking, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction, Army leadership looked to develop a force capable of dealing with a wide-spectrum of potential military operations ranging from domestic disaster relief to global war.⁹⁷

Comparing the contents of the 1994 Army Field Manual 100-1 (FM 100-1) and its replacement, Army Field Manual 1 (FM-1), provide further insight into the redefinition of the strategic environment. Titled *The Army*, each of these documents respectively serves as the

⁹⁴"Army to Develop Future Force Now," Army News Service, 13 October 1999, <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Oct1999/a19991013shinvis.html>, accessed 12 December 2001.

⁹⁵ "Army Transformation," Presented to the Association of the United States Army by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, 17 October 2000, www.army.mil/vision/transformationinfo.htm, slide 11, accessed 17 December 2001.

⁹⁶ Ibid, slide 3.

⁹⁷ Ibid, slide 3.

Army's capstone doctrinal manual, prepared under the direction of the sitting Army Chief of Staff, and supplies the strategic and operational azimuth to the future.⁹⁸

Under direction of then Army Chief of Staff GEN Gordon Sullivan, the 1994 document, built around the components of readiness and versatility, opened the door to the changes strongly articulated by Gen Shinseki some 5 years later. FM 100-1 addressed the need to *ready* the force through state of mind, training, and equipment, allowing it the *versatility* to cope with a wide range of tasks.⁹⁹ Although stopping short of using the phrase *full-spectrum operations*, it seems clear the use of the term *wide-ranging tasks* signals the necessity to embrace a wider array of potential employment scenarios, much in the same way, and at the same time, NATO was using the term *full range of tasks*.

Authored under the shadows of the Army Vision promulgated by GEN Shinseki, the 2001 document is far more forceful in its language regarding the need to execute a range of operations across the full spectrum of conflict by rapidly employing Army forces at the right place and time. Additionally, the language in FM-1 places a larger degree of emphasis on the notion of responsiveness than did FM 100-1.

However, FM-1 is clearly not without its shortfalls. Omission of substantive discussion of multinational operations is troublesome. Chapter 2 of FM-1, titled *The Strategic and Joint Operational Environment*, briefly discusses the Army's conduct in Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Operations. In the only references to alliance operations, it weakly states that the U.S. will respond "to requests from the United Nations or other treaty organizations." It subsequently defines the differences between the terms alliance and coalition without providing any additional material on where these operations fit into the future construct of the Army.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ This document delineates the Army's purpose, roles, and functions as established by the Constitution; the Congress in Title 10, USC; and the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1.

⁹⁹ Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1994), 26.

¹⁰⁰ Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), Chapter 2, para 2-5.

Although the development of U.S. Army transformation with our European partners is somewhat murky, its long-term commitment to increased responsiveness is crystal-clear. The Army transformation process clearly centers on the creation of an Objective Force. This proposed future Army force will supposedly possess strategically responsiveness and dominance at every point on the spectrum of military operations by possessing seven desirable *objective* characteristics of responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability, allowing it the capability of a rapid transition across diverse mission requirements without the loss of momentum.¹⁰¹

Army Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0), published simultaneously with FM-1 in June 2001, further categorizes the seven desirable objective characteristics as *attributes of strategically responsive army forces*. FM 3-0 states:

The Army is redesigning the force around them...structure, equipment, and training - including deployment doctrine; power projection platforms; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and joint transportation systems - establish[ing] the foundation for responsive forces.¹⁰²

This seems to reinforce the far-reaching change and corresponding urgency contained within FM-1. Indeed, recent transformation briefings provide further evidence of this deep desire for change. Reflecting continuity with the transformation presentations espoused at the AUSA conference the previous year, GEN Shinseki directed his deputy, Army Vice Chief of Staff, GEN Jack Keane, to illustrate the Army concept with further clarity to members of the Panel on Army Transformation at the annual AUSA Convention.¹⁰³ Using the Army's strategic threat assessment as a backdrop, GEN Keane again emphasized the inherent problems between the Army's heavy forces - characterized as well equipped for war, but difficult to deploy strategically, and the

¹⁰¹ Ibid, Chapter 4, para 4-2.

¹⁰² Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), para 3-1.

¹⁰³"Army Transformation," Presented to the Association of the United States Army by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, 17 October 2000, www.army.mil/vision/transformationinfo.htm, accessed 17 December 2001.

Army's light force - well suited for military operations other than war, but lacking the lethality, survivability, and staying power of the heavy force once deployed in theater. An additional focus of the briefing argued for improved near-term warfighting readiness support, an interim capability designed to increase warfighting capabilities, and an objective force prepared to meet the long-term obligations of the Army.

Similar to FM-1, the Army's Vision statement, unveiled in February 2000, also lacks substantial emphasis regarding the increased importance of multinational operations. In the only reference to alliance and coalition operations, the Army Vision statement acknowledges:

The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰⁴

The potential of multinational operations, as well as the unique challenges of operating within such an environment, deserves a higher level of prominence within the Army's foundational texts. The Army's manual dedicated to addressing matters of multinational operations is FM 100-8, titled *The Army in Multinational Operations*. It describes many of the complex challenges found within the unique setting of multinational operations, yet does so in such a generic fashion the manual's relevance is questionable.

For example, following Operation ALLIED FORCE, the U.S. Congress directed the Defense Department to produce an After Action Report (AAR) addressing such matters as geopolitical considerations, interagency planning, force development, force direction, intelligence and targeting support, logistics sustainment, personnel, and training. Within the AAR, DoD addressed specific aspects of both achievement and failure within each of the listed categories. It also addressed specific areas of improvement essential for future operations.

¹⁰⁴U.S. Army, *Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation*, February 2000, www.army.mil/vision/Chain.htm, accessed 17 December 2001.

Using the intelligence discipline as an example, which the report devoted twelve pages, the AAR provides a multitude of examples worthy of inclusion into future Army doctrine. For example, the AAR suggested that there be a requirement for a "clear implementation policy to explain when and how coalition partners can be connected to U.S. networks."¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, FM 100-8, which only devotes two pages to intelligence operations and even less on multinational architecture challenges, states "there is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations, each coalition or alliance must develop its own procedures."¹⁰⁶ In this case, the Army doctrine seems wholly out of step and most incomplete.

With the robust degree of experience U.S. Army commanders have accumulated since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, specifically the continuous deployment in the Balkan region, one should expect a healthy amount of multinational expertise useful in shoring up existing doctrine such as FM 100-8, last published in November, 1997. The absence of significant multinational comment in the U.S. Army's cornerstone publications, coupled with an outdated and incomplete FM 100-8, should concern both the U.S. Army as well as the military leadership of its NATO partners and will be addressed in further detail within the concluding chapter of this research paper.

Summary

The New Strategic Concept articulates a vastly expanded military mission in the wake of a European security setting far different than the scared geopolitical landscape visible literally and figuratively following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. With an allied vanguard oriented to confront potential Soviet invasion, the precepts on which NATO built its historic security arrangement seemed unambiguously clear. The purpose of the Alliance, as articulated in

¹⁰⁵Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo, Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000), 62.

¹⁰⁶Field Manual (FM) 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 24 November 1997), 3-2.

the original fourteen articles, centered on the collective determination to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of the peoples living within the signatory states. In this respect, NATO remains true to its original purpose, even though the threat dynamics confronting the organization had dramatically changed. Concerned with the complex non-linear security realities of the late 20th Century issues such as ethnic conflict, political instability, the spread of weapons of mass effects (WME), terrorism, international crime, and the violation of human rights forced NATO members to adapt to maintain its viability in the face of an extinct Soviet threat.

Added to the legacy responsibilities such as arms control, disarmament, and WME non-proliferation, NATO has agreed to collectively act to pursue non-Article 5, out-of area operations if there is consensus within the membership that conducting such operations will contribute to Alliance security. Increased military to military contacts with non-member nations will serve as a method of continued engagement and communication designed to reduce and stabilize tensions with those countries potentially affecting Alliance membership. NATO has become an organization where operations within the Balkan region are no longer considered extraordinary, but instead should be considered contemporary operational normalcy reflective of an adaptive, flexible organization. An organization which is critically woven into the fabric of a peaceful, stable, and secure European environment.

Meanwhile the renovation of the U.S. Army is equally progressive in the wake of the dramatic transformation initiative introduced forcefully by Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, in October 1999. Focused on a desire to considerably increase the Army's strategic and operational responsiveness, Shinseki charted a course of irreversible momentum designed to achieve just that. As with NATO, the Army leadership recognized the shift in the global security setting and the inherent need to update the force in a manner consistent with the changes required to operate in such an environment. However, what seems missing within the transformation process is the recognition that success will demand a profound and comprehensive understanding of multinational complexity.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. ARMY

There should be little doubt regarding the necessity of continued involvement in European affairs. Strategically, the existing interrelationship between Europe and the United States is vital in both the long and short term as the evidence clearly indicates. In remarks before the university of Chicago on 4 August 1999, Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark made the following statement highlighting the importance of Europe:

U.S. trade with Europe amounts to over \$250 billion each year resulting in over three million U.S. domestic jobs. One in twelve factory workers in the U.S. is employed by one of over 4,000 different European Union (EU) companies operating within North America. Fifty percent of the world's goods are produced by EU and the U.S. Companies from the EU form the largest investment block in forty-one U.S. states. Fifty-six percent of U.S. foreign investment occurs in Europe. Even the humanitarian aspect of the relationship is demonstrated in the fact that over ninety percent of humanitarian aid dispensed throughout the world comes from the U.S. and the EU.¹⁰⁷

GEN Clark's remarks add clarity to the ongoing debate regarding the importance of a sustained relationship between the United States and Europe at the strategic level. Operationally, recent Army deployments to the Balkan region and continued participation with NATO's Partnership for Peace program reflect the importance of the ongoing relationship with Europe and the continued US focus on maintaining European security. The mechanism used to guarantee the security of Europe since 1947 has largely fallen within the purview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, as this paper has demonstrated, the Alliance has been forced to adapt to a security environment dramatically different from the bi-polar superpower struggles of the Cold War era. The reduction of military budgets as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product for many NATO nations has been a political and strategic reality for the Alliance membership.

¹⁰⁷Wesley K. Clark, "The Role of U.S. Forces in Europe," in *The Future of Military Presence in Europe*, ed. Lloyd J. Mathews (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2000), 13. These figures originated from General Clark's introductory remarks presented at the University of Chicago on 4 August 1999.

Consequently, troop reductions have created a NATO military structure far less robust than seen during the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁰⁸

This reduction in troop strength, particularly for the United States, has created the increased necessity of becoming more reliant on joint operations and alliance operations as well. Simultaneously, the introduction of the most aggressive strategic concept ever undertaken by NATO members, will continue to effect the United States Army in ways only partially understood during the 1990s. The current strategic concept, which actively embraces out-of-area operations and opens the door to involvement in forward environs with the potential to influence Euro-Atlantic stability, has evolved from a timid attempt at addressing the post-war strategic environment in 1991, to one reflecting the operational realities largely stemming from active Balkan participation over the last 10 years.

As chapter four of this monograph outlined, the Army is on a broad push to transform its force structure to compete in a security environment requiring full spectrum capability. The realities of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which increased the power of the regional CINCs, and strengthened the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has, in fact, led to lasting changes in service specific doctrine dedicated to discussion of joint operations. However, the same cannot be said regarding the development of alliance and coalition doctrine. The congressional AAR from Kosovo supports this claim, "Operation ALLIED FORCE confirmed the importance of Allied Joint Doctrine to improving the interoperability of NATO...and [it] should increase the probability of mission success while reducing the risk to forces."¹⁰⁹ Bandwidth management problems, network integration, and lack of familiarity with Standard NATO agreements (STANAGS) all require attention and update.

¹⁰⁸For instance, the US Army reduced troop strength from over 700,000 active duty soldiers and 18 combat divisions in 1989 to 480,000 troops and 10 divisions in 2000.

¹⁰⁹ Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo, Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, 27.

During Operation ALLIED FORCE, data networks were considered inadequate to support the flow of tactical, operational, and strategic data among key nodes of the NATO information grid, and no evidence exists to suggest much has changed.¹¹⁰ Shortfalls in Alliance training were also confirmed within the Kosovo AAR which states, "one of the most significant readiness lessons learned, and one which has been repeatedly revealed in the analysis conducted [after] ALLIED FORCE, is the criticality of and need for service, joint, and coalition interoperability training."¹¹¹

Final Recommendation

The military elite maintain that the United States military, and the United States Army specifically, will not operate as a single entity but instead will operate within the framework of joint, allied, and coalition partnerships. However, although addressing the complexities and necessities of operating within a joint environment, the self-described capstone documents of the U.S. Army lack the type of scene-setting language signaling an increasing reliance on multi-national operations. Certainly, one would expect that the US, and in this case the US Army, would dedicate the majority of its doctrinal focus to those issues within its purview. However, contemporary operations such as Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, have shown that there is a distinct and on-going multi-national flavor to contemporary operations. As such, the Army must address and incorporate the following issues:

- Officers should be encouraged and rewarded for participation in combined and Alliance staffs at an earlier level.
- The National Training Centers should invite Allied nations to train more frequently alongside US units.
- Incorporate instruction starting at all officer career courses highlighting the historic and ongoing commitment we have made to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 49.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 27.

- Review the original North Atlantic Treaty, investigate the Strategic Concept, and review the complexities of conducting allied and combined operations during all major steps in the Army's professional education system.
- Find innovated ways to bridge the increasing technology gap that exists between the United States and its Allies. If nothing else, explain that it does in fact exist and has a dramatic effect on military operations.¹¹²
- Develop Army doctrine addressing the unique dynamics of operating within a combined environment. Much of the framework is in place, but the details captured over the last decade need incorporation.

The U.S. Army must dedicate more attention to the complexities of operating in a multinational setting and understand that they may only play a complimentary role strategically. The recommended educational efforts would directly influence the awareness of the US Army officer corps in a manner commiserate with the future strategic and operational expectations outlined within the Strategic Concept by US and NATO policy makers. Officers within the Army must be familiar with the components of the North Atlantic Treaty and the substance of its companion documents such as the Strategic Concept. In fact, the Bosnia AAR from the US Army Peacekeeping Institute agrees by stating:

Doctrine, training, PME, and planning for peace operations tend to focus on the role of the military solely as a compellent force in response to crisis. The military role in a crisis (as well as to prevent crisis) can also be to deter, reassure, and support unilaterally or in conjunction with multinational militaries and civil organizations. Conduct multinational and multi-organizational peace operations exercises at CTCs. Add advisors to CINCs' staffs, and USAWC and CGSC faculties.¹¹³

At a minimum, the United States Army must set the framework for such awareness within its self-described capstone manuals, FM-1 and FM 3-0. Without included strong articulation addressing the importance of operating within NATO, the Army misses an opportunity to shape

¹¹² For further insight see the Department of Defense, *Lessons Learned From Kosovo: Alliance and Coalition Warfare*, 14 October 1999, para 4, <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html>, accessed 25 March 2002. Specifically, this report states disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities had the effect of impeding U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.

¹¹³ US Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review Conference Report*, 23 May 1996, para 4, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/bosrep2a.htm>, accessed 25 March 2002.

much of the doctrine emanating from it. Every reference to joint operations should also include reference to combined operations.¹¹⁴

NATO has found a way to transform itself into an organization prepared to deal with the emergent security challenges found within the contemporary strategic environment. So too has the US Army recognized the necessity of change in both structure and mission. However, the US Army only loosely understands the interdependence each organization has on the other and must take the recommended steps to bridge the gap, through the update of current doctrine and increased education, facilitating a greater understanding of the unique dynamics common within Alliance operations.

¹¹⁴ Interestingly, the *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review Conference Report* identified the lack of congruence of service, joint, and NATO peace operations doctrine, something still prevalent today.

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