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GLOBAL MEDIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS IN A NEW ERA OF DEFENSE: THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

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**Abstract** (Maximum 200 words)
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ARTICLE ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OR POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
GLOBAL MEDIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS IN A NEW ERA OF
DEFENSE: THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM

by

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The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent conflict in Afghanistan culminated a 30-year escalation of terrorism and efforts to counter it, an undeclared war that has unfolded principally on the information battlefield. Though terrorists habitually denounce the elements of modernity and globalization, they manipulate the transnational media to commit and communicate their violence and virulent rhetoric.

This qualitative study considers the information battlefield in the war against terrorism and how the U.S. emergence as the primary economic, political and media superpower ensured its position as a terrorists’ target during the late 20th Century. This also notes that the exponential growth of the U.S. news media market paralleled the increasing brutality of terrorism directed against U.S. interests. As a result, leaders past and present have sought to engage the U.S. information dimension of national power to communicate American policies and capabilities, though in recent months that effort has been mostly directed toward the “Arab Street” of public opinion.

The post attack, U.S. national strategy includes several public affairs and diplomatic initiatives, which this thesis seeks to explore. This will include consideration of how these new developments interact on the information
battlefield, with particular attention to “weapons of mass communications,” in the context of the 30-year effort to combat terrorism.¹

It is through the technological components which furnish the information landscape that terrorists’ disseminate their propaganda and allied governments counter with true and accurate statements of fact. As much as it is a battle between combatants, the war against terrorism is equally a battle of values and ideology—U.S. democratic respect for life and freedom, versus the radical Islamicism vision of death and oppression.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this effort to my parents, and to those in my family who served in the U.S. military when our nation called for their service, to include my father, who served during World War II in the United States Navy, along with his brother and my uncle, who bravely faced hostile fire in the Pacific; my who served during the Korean conflict; my who served with the Navy Seabees in World War II—on Iwo Jima.

I want to also acknowledge the wisdom or spirit of my forebears and extended family to include Georgette and Robert Rutherford; Geraldine and Byron Whittaker; Mary Jane and Olsen Brown; Margaret O'Shea; Pelogrina and Ciacomo Tasista; Ethel and George Sanderson; and Cheri, Junior and Michael Tasista. I further dedicate this to those USAF leaders who believed in my potential and to the broader Air Force family who are serving in defense of freedom in the war against terrorism.
CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
   A. September 11, 2001 ....................................................... 1
   B. Information Dimension of National Power .......................... 4
   C. Purpose of Study ......................................................... 6
   D. Changing World Views and News Narratives ....................... 7
   E. The 30 Year War Against Radical Islamic Terrorism ............ 12
   F. Research Questions ..................................................... 14
   G. Scope of Study ............................................................ 14
   H. Data Limitations ......................................................... 15

II. MEDIA AND TERRORISM ...................................................... 16
   A. Media and Terrorism in Review ....................................... 17
   B. Terrorism Defined as Violent Propaganda ............................ 20
   C. Media-Terrorism Theory ............................................... 20
   D. U.S. Effort to Combat Terrorism ...................................... 24

III. TWO CASE STUDIES ......................................................... 27
   A. 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis .............................................. 27
      1. War of Words: The News Media and Khomeini ................. 28
      2. Changing Media Landscape during the 1970s .................... 30
      3. U.S. Government Communication Efforts to end Crisis ........ 32
      4. Mediated Diplomacy as Led by Walter Cronkite ............... 33
      5. Media Pressure on Military to Take Action .................... 34
6. The NBC Interview with Military Hostage..........................35

B. 1985 TWA Flight 847 Hostage Crisis .........................37
   1. Terrorists Used News Media to Obtain Status............. 38
   2. U.S. Government Communication Efforts................39
   3. News Media as Negotiator Between U.S. and Terrorists....40
   4. Hostage as Terrorists’ Mouthpiece—Under Duress They Speak..41
   5. Hostage Crisis as News Story..................................42
   6. Terrorists’ Media Savvy in Manipulating National Attention.....42
   7. Journalists’ Ethical Issues and Terrorism Coverage Debated......44
   8. Media Guidelines Governing Future Terrorism Coverage........47

C. In Summary........................................................................48

IV. INFORMATION BATTLEFIELD........................................51
   A. Chapter Overview......................................................52
   B. Battle of Values.........................................................53
   C. A Wartime National Agenda......................................53
   D. Projection of National Power.....................................54
   E. Allied Communication.................................................57
   F. Global Public Affairs................................................59
   G. Intercultural Communication......................................63
   H. Middle East Media Market........................................65
   I. Al Jazeera.................................................................69
   J. Emerging Islamic News Framework............................70
   K. CNN and al Jazeera...................................................72
L. Coalition Information Center ........................................... 76
M. Mainstream or Extreme Media? .................................... 77
N. Al Jazeera and CNN Ethics .......................................... 79
O. Information Operations ............................................. 82
P. Taliban Propaganda ................................................ 86
Q. Public Diplomacy ................................................... 89

V. FINDINGS .................................................................. 95
   A. Chapter Overview ................................................ 95
   B. Research Question #1 ......................................... 95
      2. The U.S. Government Communicator’s role ........ 98
      3. Information Operations and public affairs activities .... 99
   C. Research Question #2 ......................................... 102
      1. Transnational Terrorism and Media .................. 102
      2. U.S. Media Terrorism Coverage Guidelines ....... 103
      3. Terrorists’ manipulation of media .................... 104
   D. To Whom Should the U.S. Communicate and on What Channel? 105

VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................... 113
   A. Thesis Limitations ............................................ 116
   B. Recommendations for Further Study .................. 117

REFERENCES ............................................................ 119
APPENDIX

A. USAF Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.........................130
   AFTTP 3-1, Vol. 36 (3.13) (Unci)
   Public Affairs Operations in Crisis or Combat

B. Interview Agenda for Military and Media subjects................162
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For most of our history, combat has been something that has largely taken place on foreign soil. These strikes were the first on American soil since the Second World War, and the first attack on our capital by a foreign enemy since the War of 1812. These assaults have brought the battlefield home to us. – Secretary of Defense, Donald S. Rumsfeld.¹

The United States' first war of the 21st Century began Oct. 7, 2001, when U.S. and British armed forces fired precision guided missiles against an array of terrorist base camps in Afghanistan in retaliation for the "worst act of terrorism in world history"² which occurred Sept. 11, 2001, when hijackers commandeered commercial aircraft and turned them into cruise missiles against economic and government hubs in U.S. cities—events which resulted in the largest loss of life in the U.S. since the Civil War.³

A. September 11, 2001

It was just after 9 a.m. on the East Coast. Trading on Wall Street had just begun. People were settling into their workday routines. Morning meetings were underway, as in the Pentagon where United States Army Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude and others were "discussing survivor benefits for military employees."⁴ Within minutes, the heart of international commerce and the nerve center of U.S. defense


² Marcella Bombardieri, "Facing Terror/Community Impact; for Afghan Refugees, Fears Come Rumbling Back," The Boston Globe (Sept. 16, 2001), B4. It is of debate whether there is a worse act of terrorism in the history of civilization.


activity—and indeed the nation—would be under siege on live, global television. At first it seemed to be an accidental collision of a “small commuter plane” into the first World Trade Center tower in New York City, though some commentators immediately speculated otherwise. “The plane just was coming in low, and the wingtips tilted back and forth, and it flattened out,” said CNN producer Sean Murtagh.⁵ Since the World Trade Center had been the target of terrorism in 1993, Matt Lauer host of NBC’s “Today Show,” wondered, “was this purely an accident or could this have been an intentional act.”⁶ It was American Airlines flight 11. Viewers watched the scene as it was broadcast live from helicopter-level camera platforms, showing the fire and smoke arising from the 110-story tower. Speculation turned to shock as a second aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, flew directly into the twin high rise. These attacks led to a series of events for which there are no words, as employees tried—thousands unsuccessfully—to escape the burning buildings. Many people became heroes as they helped others evacuate from their offices, down the stair well, to the outside, where the towers were soon to collapse. As the networks covered the aftermath, there were reports of an explosion at the Pentagon in Washington D.C. It was American Airlines Flight 77. Soon cameras fixed on the smoke and fire as it arose from one section of the 50-year old building, home of the U.S. Department of Defense. General Maude and more than 20 associates, along with 168 other military, civil servants and civilians were killed in the attack. Pentagon

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military and civilian employees provided the first on scene rescue efforts, with several climbing through and around the wreckage to rescue people who had been injured. News reports indicated there was another hijacked aircraft, possibly bound for the nation’s capital. Passengers on United Airlines Flight 93 bravely fought and successfully stopped what was likely intended for the White House—sacrificing their own lives as they brought the plane down in a remote Pennsylvania field.

Despite the assault on its infrastructure, Department of Defense operations continued as military units from bases throughout the U.S. were immediately dispatched to patrol skies, harbors, airports and cities in addition to testing air samples for chemical and biological contamination. U.S. government public affairs teams set up 24-hour crisis response centers to provide up-to-date information through global news media outlets.\(^7\) Television networks stopped the broadcast of advertisements and normal programming, which cost the industry an estimated $482 million.\(^8\) Unprecedented coverage of spiritual events and debate included news networks non-stop broadcast of the sermons and events held on the National Day of Remembrance, in addition to clergy and other religious leaders’ comments and discussion on various news and daytime talk shows. Candlelight vigils were held worldwide, as television screens revealed images of people mourning from Chicago

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\(^8\) Col. Doug McCoy, telephone interview (Jan. 2, 2002).

to Berlin, Tokyo to Tehran, juxtaposed with visuals of embattled U.S. firefighters and other rescuers searching for life amid the rubble.\textsuperscript{10}

As people worldwide mourned the losses at the World Trade Center, where citizens from more than 80 nations were killed, a new vision of the Internet and Satellite connected global village started to emerge. It became evident that the village included a district where the transnational, radical Islamic terrorist group could surreptitiously organize, a side of the globalization process that contrasted with its oft-heralded role in the increasing democratization of nations and liberalization of economies. While responsible individuals have become more empowered from the unregulated flow of information across borders, others with ulterior intentions, from hackers to terrorists have also made use of those same resources. This has underscored the need for greater vigilance among nations, not only in the geographical sense, but also the information sphere.

\textbf{B. The Information Dimension of National Power}

Many U.S. government representatives are involved in the broad spectrum of mediated activities that constitute the projection of U.S. defense capability on the world stage, from the most visible and nationally significant figure—the President—to the soldier on the battlefield. People animate the information dimension of national power, conveying American core values and ideals representative of their service and country, images which may lead to the prevention of war, escalation of a conflict, or negotiation

for peace.\textsuperscript{11} The use of information may prevent the need for military force, ultimately saving lives. However, there are rare instances when force is absolutely necessary as was the case following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Information became a complex and critical resource with the potential to alter broader strategic spheres of influence, as indicated by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers:

Perhaps the most challenging piece of this is putting together what we call a strategic influence campaign quickly and with the right emphasis. That’s everything from psychological operations to the public affairs piece to coordinating partners in this effort with us.\textsuperscript{12}

The information dimension of national power can be considered the “delivery system” of U.S. policy, message and action abroad during conflict, particularly the war against terrorism.\textsuperscript{13} In an effort to streamline the information gathering and release process in this new era, several new U.S. government communication agencies and offices were created or expanded. The Executive branch has made permanent the White House information office, which will ensure U.S. and presidential directives are being communicated, in a direct effort to combat the wave of anti-Americanism abroad.\textsuperscript{14} This expands its mission from its tactical, counter information role shared with several Coalition Information Centers located in Islamabad, London and Kabul, during the conflict in Afghanistan. The reconstitution of this office towards longer-term objectives will compliment the U.S. Department of State’s new Office for Public Affairs and Public

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{11} United States Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures: Public Affairs Operations in Peacetime 3-1, Vol. 36, Sec. 2.13, 3.13.1, 18.
\item\textsuperscript{12} James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad; Debate over Credibility; New Office Proposes to Send News or Maybe False News to Even Friendly Lands,” The New York Times (Feb. 19, 2002), A1.
\item\textsuperscript{13} Lt. Col. Robert Williams, telephone interview (Jan 15, 2002).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Diplomacy, which is intended to implement new public diplomacy campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia. The Department of Defense contracted with an outside public relations firm, while the United States Air Force established a Communications Directorate. There will likely be continued organizational and structural changes of these and other U.S. government communication and information offices. The threat and realization of terrorism in its worst form, is what brought the agencies into being, and will likely be one of few constants in a sea of change. The other constant is the impetus for the agencies’ synergy and unity of effort, which is organized to effectively combat the globalization of terrorism and terrorists’ violent propaganda—something that is in the interest of people worldwide.

C. Purpose of Study

The media is caught in a historic dilemma: how to cover acts of war against the United States in which their role is a critical dimension.\textsuperscript{15}

--Senator Edward Feighan, 1985

The horrific “acts of war” of Sept. 11, 2001, and subsequent conflict in Afghanistan culminated a 30-year escalation of terrorism and the war against it, which has unfolded throughout its course on the information battlefield.\textsuperscript{16} The exponential growth of and competitiveness in the global news media market has ensured a stage for terrorists’ theatrics, a point which has new significance in light of the worst terrorist attacks to occur, but also in terms of the battlefield dimensions, of which information has proven to be the most effective defensive and offensive weapon. To better understand


\textsuperscript{16} The author of this thesis believes the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, can be defined as either acts of war and/or terrorism.
the evolution of this environment, it is helpful to consider the confluence of news media and terrorism and how ideological and technological components furnish the information landscape where terrorists’ propaganda and the messages of legitimate state actors engage in ideological combat.

D. Changing World Views and News Narratives

The information battlefield is shaped by ideological and technological elements, perceptions and other influences. It encapsulates the non-spatial, digital domain through which media communications occur, either through public or classified means to assert national strategy. The two or more sides of the battlefield are framed by influential news frameworks, which reflect geopolitical systems as constructed by involved state and non-state ideologies. The U.S. foreign policy news narratives have reflected U.S. strategic worldviews, with the focus on containing communism during the Cold War, interventionism during the post Cold War and anti-terrorism during the post attack era.

The Cold War

After World War II, the information battlescape was shaped by the Cold War view of two primary and competing political-economic systems. The theory of containment and nuclear deterrence, which developed in the wake of the West’s 20th Century struggles against totalitarianism and fascism, was intended to prevent another country from dominating Europe—particularly the expansionist Soviet Union.

It was another time of enormous historical consequence in which a modest, mid-western man resided in the Oval Office. President Harry S. Truman is most
often remembered for the “sweeping National Security Act” of 1947,\textsuperscript{17} which founded the modern Department of Defense, United States Air Force and National Security Council.\textsuperscript{18} While reorganizing at home, the U.S. also led efforts abroad to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations,\textsuperscript{19} as the former Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact. Most nations chose a policy of alignment or non-alignment, suggesting whether their alliance was neutral, with the U.S. or former U.S.S.R., a framework that dominated world affairs until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Despite the rise of terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, the Cold War view was not significantly impacted because the danger posed by terrorism paled in comparison to that of Soviet nuclear annihilation.

\textit{Post-Cold War Era}

The U.S. news media were also anchored to this bipolar view of world affairs, based on the shared assumption that the threat of nuclear war was the most significant national security concern for all Americans. As the east-west stalemate came to a celebratory close, public interest shifted to domestic issues, and many media organizations subsequently closed foreign operating locations to save money.\textsuperscript{20} News outlets began to engage in “parachute journalism,” which refers to the practice of sending a news crew from the states as a crisis or conflict after it was already

\textsuperscript{17}David McCullough, \textit{Truman}, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 566.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid}, 566.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid}, 735, 990.

underway. The journalist, lacking time for preparation or critical thought processes, was unable to provide in-depth analysis during these situations.

Unmoored from the Cold War frame of reference, journalists’ coverage was “reflexive,” and reactive, as they defined “the national interest” at each turn of international diplomacy and intervention without the benefit of cultural immersion. In addition, coverage of U.S. engagement abroad was also often contradictory, critical of U.S. non-involvement in one instance and location, then of later U.S. intervention in the same situation. This was usually accompanied by brief, vivid visuals of unrest, rather than more in depth analysis and narrative.

Several issues of strategic importance in the U.S. did not receive much media attention, to include the ever-increasing likelihood of large-scale terrorism. This threat was recognized and published in several government-sponsored reports, including the Hart-Rudman report “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,” released in September 1999. Former Senator Warren Rudman stated, “it was the first comprehensive rethinking of national security since Harry Truman in 1947,” which indicated that “Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.”

The report and resulting congressional debate regarding terrorism didn’t generate too much media interest, other than one televised “discussion” on CNN and


22 Entman, 20.

23 Ibid, 12.

some in depth coverage in *The Washington Post, USA Today* and *Los Angeles Times*, according to the *Columbia Journalism Review*. The CJR also notes that at least one senator, "watched in disbelief," as *The New York Times* "reporter left before the [congressional] presentation was over, saying it was not much of a story."  

**Post-Attack Era**

The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, marked the beginning of a new era of media interest in foreign affairs and policy. The new urgency in the news media coverage mirrored the U.S. government’s shift in strategic focus from non-specific interventionism to anti-terrorism and homeland defense. Fortification of America and direct national security issues came to predominate the geopolitical and media landscape, with focus on the effort "to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks."  

Greater media attention was given to the military, as it transformed from a force ready to respond to fixed, geopolitical threats to a flexible instrument capable of meeting a variety of asymmetric, mobile dangers. Leaders explained these changes would prepare "for America’s defense" in such a way "that would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise—premised on the idea that to be effective abroad America must be safe at home."  

United States Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. Jumper reiterated this:

> The threat of terrorism and our heightened security measures have made these very stressful times for all of us. Even though we may not know

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what the future holds, it is our responsibility to prepare for the full spectrum of threats and possible terrorist actions.28

This defense focus on anti-terrorism, as it reflected in the news media coverage, included quality analysis and debate. Several television networks broadcast insightful documentaries on Middle East issues, from women’s oppression, to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This in-depth coverage included correspondents’ investigative reporting on complex undercurrents shaping the region. As during the Cold War, foreign reporting proved to have a very dangerous side, as seen with the senseless kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. This sobering event reminded many of the risks journalists are undergoing to report on the war against terrorism.

This transformation from an era of uncertain threats to an era of threat realization was acknowledged as such by officials, journalists, and academics among others. This is not to suggest they agreed on every specific regarding airport security or military preparedness, but the majority recognize and agree that these and other national security issues were needed to save lives and that this global age required national vigilance and defense. This new common understanding was founded on the shared belief that terrorism is one of the most significant threats to U.S. security—a consensus that has not existed since the Cold War.

E. The 30-Year War Against Radical, Islamic Terrorism

The U.S. rise as the primary economic, political and media superpower ensured its position as a terrorists’ target during the late 20th Century. Most of the aggressive actions taken against U.S. interests have been intended in some measure

for the global television audience, with the goal of undermining alliances while appealing to base, Arab nationalism. From the time of the first attack in September, to the fall of the Taliban in December, al Qaeda terrorists and their supporters sought to use the news media, particularly the start up news organization, Al Jazeera to “divide and conquer” the forces of popular opinion in the Middle East. To accomplish this, the militants capitalized on symbolic Islamic phraseology and issues in an effort to frame the conflict as a “holy war,” though in the end, their measures arguably drew more contempt than support from some in their target audience.

This rhetoric invoked the endemic antipathy of western culture taught in some closed, Islamic societies which ascribe to the extremist viewpoint. “Radical Islamicism is a violent, extremist and radically intolerant religious-political movement that now threatens the world, including the Muslim world,” according to a letter published by 60 prominent academics from various American universities and think tanks.\(^{29}\) This destructive intolerance is part of a larger socialization process which has ensured successive generations of young, angry men willing to follow a violent cause against the U.S.

Some have observed that this movement has arisen because nations in the region have not divorced religious and political passions, comparable to 17th Century Europe,\(^{30}\) when some religious leaders brutally enforced the rule of law and wars waged among denominations. Others have noted, that this era is much different than


\(^{30}\) Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 164.
that earlier epoch, due to the combustive mix of violent fanaticism and components of modern society, to include technology, global media and free market elements. This alloy is further complicated by Arab resentment often attributed to the west’s colonial influence in the region following World War I, and its subsequent economic and political power. Many point out that there is little economic mobility and opportunity for young Arabs, who are then easily indoctrinated into negative groups that profess a cause no matter how twisted, similar in some degree to cult and gang followings in the west.\(^{31}\) Combine this with the lack of “free and independent news media,” as noted by David Hoffman of *Foreign Affairs*, and “it is no coincidence that countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq...are the very places where terrorism is bred.”\(^{32}\) Prior to the terrorist attacks committed against the Pentagon, in Washington D.C., and the World Trade Center towers, in New York City, people may have thought that regardless of belief or dispossession, it would have been wholly inconceivable that any group would commit the atrocities of Sept. 11, 2001.

It is a significant challenge, if not impossible, for U.S. communicators to bridge the divide from a place of reason and modernity, founded on the highest respect for life, to those who ascribe to an irrational, anarchic and violent order. The question then becomes, to whom in the Middle East does the U.S. seek to communicate its anti-terrorism policy and commitment to and on what channel?

To propose an answer to this question, it is helpful to consider the various global public affairs and media communications elements, which furnish the

\(^{31}\) Williams.

information battlefield in the 30-year war to include defense policy, terrorism, media and message and how they interrelate.

F. Research questions

1) What values compete when the mass media cover the United States counter-terrorism efforts?

2) What impact has the mass media's coverage of terrorism directed against the U.S. had on the U.S.'s efforts to counter such terrorism?

G. Scope of Study

In their efforts, allied communicators overcame cultural and linguistic barriers and biases to reach the broader, mainstream Arabic public, appealing to universal values while explaining military and political objectives. This will be considered in order to better understand the interrelation of mass communications, defense policy and terrorists' propaganda, and their convergence on the information battlefield in the 21st Century. To inform on this connection, applicable media-terrorism theory will be reviewed in Chapter 2. Two case studies, to include the Iran and TWA hostage crises, will be reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will consider the information battlefield, through analysis of global public affairs, media communications and other information operations conducted during the war against terrorism. Chapters 5 and 6 will present findings and draw conclusions.

H. Data Limitations

This thesis is written for the United States Air Force as an academic project and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense or any other U.S. governmental agency. It is written from a
normative, U.S. western perspective and as such will not include critical analysis from other non-western, theoretical or ideological constructs.

This study will consider terrorism involving "radical Islamicism" related to the conflict of 2001 and ancillary cases, and will not review instances of indigenous U.S. terrorism nor all instances of international terrorism. This will not include a review of media and government/military relations, a subject which has been covered by previous U.S. Air Force researchers. Nor will this study be able to provide the benefit of post-conflict abstraction, because the war had recently begun as of the drafting of this thesis.
CHAPTER 2

MEDIA AND TERRORISM

Terrorism is the new war, a species of guerilla warfare whose battlefield is the television screen and the front page. — Former CBS News President, Fred Friendly to the U.S. Congress in 1985.¹

The terrorists who planned the September 2001 attacks likely expected the television networks to broadcast the aftermath of the first plane crash into the first World Trade Center so the second attack would be broadcast live to a worldwide audience. Extremists are not dissuaded by international outrage, as infamy actually serves their purpose of gaining significant media attention for their violent personas and "causes," though their proclaimed purposes are not necessarily their true motivation for such violence. Radical Islamic terrorists "hijack" issues sensitive to Arabs in their effort to justify their crimes and appeal to their target audience.

This was particularly true of the terrorists of September 2001, who underestimated the U.S. ability to develop multiple coalitions, to become united legislatively and to reorganize militarily, and all in sufficient time to retaliate. They may have expected the government to overreact or that Americans would become angered at U.S. government policies. Perhaps they thought public support for a military engagement would quickly wane. They also underestimated the mainstream Arabic audience, which ultimately viewed the terrorists' boasts with some skepticism. In any case, the terrorists were deluded extremists, reportedly trained to manipulate the news media, and they spent years preparing for that war.

A. Media and Terrorism in Review

In the early 1980s, former U.S. Marine Terry Anderson served as the Associated Press' chief Middle East correspondent, covering a series of cataclysmic events in Lebanon, including the 1993 terrorist bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and U.S. embassy. He was enthusiastic about his position for a variety of reasons, not least among them was the professional opportunity it presented. "I was excited. It was a war, it was the world's biggest story, and I was a journalist." Although Americans were warned by the U.S. State Department to leave, Anderson decided to stay in the civil war-torn former French colony. While on his way to work one day in 1985, Anderson was captured in Beirut by Hezbollah terrorists. It would be more than seven years before he was freed.  

This was one of many terrorist crises that occurred in the waning years of the Cold War, as the U.S. emerged as a primary superpower in global politics, economics and mass communications. This development made the U.S. a target for Soviet sponsored terrorism and other transnational terrorist groups seeking to divide western alliances and pressure governments. In an effort to deter this asymmetrical threat, leaders applied considerable resources, in addition to articulating key anti-terrorism messages, often stating that the U.S. will not yield to terrorists' demands, will punish states which support terrorism and will employ "the force of law" to arrest terrorists.

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3 Ibid, 61.


5 Ibid, 131.
These messages were constructed to show national unity, will, and intent, and were projected through the U.S. news media to different audiences as will be reviewed in this chapter. In addition, applicable media-terrorism theory will be considered along with two case studies, to inform on the nexus which connects defense policy, the news media and terrorism.

Of the many high-profile international terrorist cases that affected Americans in the closing decades of the 20th Century, the Iran (1979) and TWA flight 847 (1985) hostage crises had significant impact on government and news media practices. This is the underlying similarity shared with the terrorism that occurred in 2001, which is why these crises were selected as case studies. This is not to minimize the importance of the many other international terrorist incidents, as they too deserve further study by media and government researchers. The list includes but is not limited to: the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut which killed 161 U.S. Marines;6 the mid-1980s Lebanon hostage crisis which included the captivity of more than 17 Americans; the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro Italian cruise ship in which the U.S. government commando team “succeeded with a rather difficult counter terrorist operation;”7 the mid-1980s bombings at military work and social establishments in Europe; the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, during which 244 passengers were killed;8 the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

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7 Nacos, 22.

that killed six and injured hundreds, the 1993 terrorist-linked attack on U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia which killed 18; and the mid-1990s bombings of U.S. government assets and forces in Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen which killed more than 265 people.

Many leaders employed political, military and economic dimensions of national power to combat terrorism. After the spate of terrorist attacks against Americans in Germany, former President Ronald Reagan sent a message to Libya via U.S. Air Force EF-111s which attacked key military sites, resulting in the dictator’s loss of “willingness to use terror against Americans.”

In August of 1990, the U.S. deployed more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel to the Persian Gulf to eject Saddam Hussein’s errant forces from Kuwait. Desert Storm resulted with the Iraqi dictator’s forces removed, in addition to the establishment of a no fly zone and permanent basing of U.S. forces to help provide security in the region. The conclusion of this conflict was followed by the release of several Americans held hostage in Lebanon. It seemed, at least for a brief moment, that the Islamic-militant, driven terrorist threat was on the wane. Then the World Trade Center was attacked for the first time in 1993, followed by other devastating attacks abroad, and Osama bin Laden became a notorious felon.

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10 Susan Page, “Why Clinton failed to stop bin Laden,” USA TODAY (Nov. 12, 2001), 1A.

11 Ibid.

B. Terrorism Defined as Violent Propaganda

While there are many definitions of terrorism, for the purpose of this study there are two that apply. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of—or threatened use of—force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."¹³ Many media and communication scholars have noted that terrorism can also be viewed as a form of propaganda—a violent effort of persuasion intentionally committed on the international stage by lawless actors, with the goal of gaining legitimacy, undermining the target government and its allies, creating division among influential internal and external publics and ultimately affecting national and defense policies.¹⁴ These goals are seldom obtained in the target country because the more brutal forms of terrorism engender public outrage rather than sympathy.¹⁵

C. Media-Terrorism Theory

Terrorists depend on news media coverage—because publicity is the "oxygen,"¹⁶ that ensures their violent causes exist in the public consciousness.¹⁷ They stage their actions in such a way that they will be guaranteed to be on the header of


¹⁶ Ibid, 69.

¹⁷ Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated governments "Must find a way to starve the terrorists and hijackers of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend."
every news hour and front page of every newspaper. The theory is that terrorists seek to meet the newsworthiness litmus bar of "superlatives, firsts, and records," which "encourages not necessarily more but increasingly spectacular and brutal incidents."\(^{18}\)

This trend is empirically evident in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, as transnational terrorism progressively worsened from the 1980s hostage situations and small-scale bombings, to the 1990s large-scale bombings which resulted in hundreds of casualties. This course of escalating violence was paralleled by the increasingly charged rhetoric and propaganda from Middle Eastern extremists such as the Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iran hostage crisis of 1979. Khomeini was not the first Middle Eastern figure to use language intoning a "holy war" against a western country, as the primate of the Ottoman Empire Sheikh-ul-Islam issued a similar decree against the United Kingdom during World War I.\(^{19}\) Khomeini, however, was the first of the modern, Islamic extremists to rally a significant majority to that drum beat through the news media. It was a practice that would be emulated by future Middle Eastern dictators and radicals.

Terrorists' use of propaganda and violence are often intertwined with the ultimate goal of affecting national policy, debate and public opinion of a target country. Leaders combat the terrorists' vitriolic message and deeds through the media, by providing accurate and timely information, in addition to reassuring the nation when appropriate. The terrorists' destruction dominate mediated conversation among elites which inevitably "leads to discussions of the issues that led to the

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\(^{18}\) Nacos, 52.

terrorism." Maintaining control of the problem and policy domain are critical measures for leaders, when dealing with terrorism because by its nature it is a form of violent propaganda, which may incite and perpetuate further or copycat violence—an effect known as “contagion.”

Another problem posed by extensive news media coverage of terrorism, as noted by some theorists, is the hypothesis that the coverage “confers status on those who commit acts of violence and legitimizes their causes and actions.” At least one media effects study supports this theory, according to Robert Picard. The study concluded that “when audiences were not directly affected by the acts of violence and no significant preexisting attitudes were present, reports about the incidents resulted in audiences slightly improving their images of the perpetrators and giving status to the causes promoted by those engaging in violence.” There are media scholars such as Mitchell and Kelly who question the notion that media coverage grants status to terrorists. They argue that “while transnational terrorism does generate a considerable amount of press attention, the particular type of coverage it receives would appear to undermine the effectiveness of terrorism as a communications strategy.”

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20 Picard, Media Portrayals, 55.


22 Picard, Media Portrayals, 67.

23 Ibid, 68.

Concerns regarding the concepts of contagion and status conferral effects have generated debate on whether there should be greater constraint on the news media’s coverage of terrorism. Many journalists believe that any restriction would violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which delineates, “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...”\textsuperscript{25} Other media representatives have been “among the most outspoken advocates of restricting terrorism coverage,” according to Brigitte Nacos.\textsuperscript{26} She cites David Broder of \textit{The Washington Post} who argues that a national anti-terrorism strategy should prevent terrorists’ access to the news media:

The way by which this denial is achieved—whether by voluntary means of those of us in press and television, self-restraint, or by government control—is a crucial question for journalists and for all other citizens who share our belief in civil liberties.\textsuperscript{27}

There may be legal basis for government imposed restriction on the news media when there is “clear and present danger”\textsuperscript{28} to national security, according to Cherif Bassiouni. He asserts coverage of terrorism may be constrained when “terrorist attacks may be perceived as a ‘demonstrated risk of specific threats to the social order,’” particularly “when no opportunity or time exists” for officials “to respond to the information disseminated,” through the news media. He further indicates this restriction could be appropriate when “a media representative’s remarks could be

\textsuperscript{25} U.S. Constitution, amend. 1, sec. 1.

\textsuperscript{26} Nacos, 155.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
construed...as an incitement to lawless action” or in situations “where media dissemination of specific information” may endanger hostages.29

In spite of the national security threat posed by mediated terrorism, the U.S. government has continually respected and protected press freedoms, because to do otherwise would be to lose a value integral to democracy. This would also further a common terrorist objective which is to “derail the symbiotic relationship between journalists and administration officials.”30 The late publisher of The Washington Post, Katharine Graham stated, “Publicity may be the oxygen of terrorists. But I say this: News is the lifeblood of liberty. If the terrorists succeed in depriving us of freedom, their victory will be far greater than they ever hoped and far worse than we ever feared. Let it never come to pass.”31

D. U.S. Effort to Combat Terrorism

Leaders have included anti-terrorism policies as part of their overall national security strategy since the Nixon administration established the Committee to Combat Terrorism32 in response to the televised capture and murder of the Israeli Olympic team members by the Palestinian terrorist group “Black September” at the 1972 Olympic Munich games. This was the first mediated, international terrorist incident that targeted a globally “symbolic” event of western origin, and was viewed by U.S.

31 Ibid, 159.
leaders as a harbinger of future terrorist acts—though the broadcast dimension was not considered systemic to the terrorism problem until some years later. 33

The Carter administration included a public information function within its restructured anti-terrorist program based on prevention, deterrence, reaction and prediction under the auspices of "The Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council." 34 With each successive domestic and international terrorist action the government established additional anti-terrorist policies and agencies with greater recognition of the news media as an integral dimension.

This led to a groundbreaking government study in the mid-1970s by "The Federal Advisory Committee Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism," which laid the foundation for better government-media interaction during terrorist crises. Among the suggestions made by the committee to the news media industry, included "that media coverage of terrorist incidents be based on the principles of 'minimum intrusiveness' and complete, non-inflammatory coverage." 35 It further surmised "whatever principles can be prescribed must be generated by the media themselves, out of a recognition of special public responsibility." 36

This approach was important because the United States would soon face greater terrorist challenges commonly dealt with in Europe. The U.S. developed the counter-terrorist unit, the Delta Force, following the separate, albeit equally dramatic


34 Farrell, 34-5, 39.

35 Carruthers, 176.

36 Weimann and Winn, 267.
hijacking-hostage crises handled by Israel and West Germany, in which those governments deployed their respective commando units “Saiyeret” and “Border Protection Group.” While the U.S. was not directly affected by these crises, the highly classified U.S. commando team was similarly equipped and established under the command of Charles Beckwith in 1977.

Two years following, on Nov. 4, 1979, several Iranians of the “Militant Moslem Movement” seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and captured 66 Americans. With worldwide attention the militants held 52 hostages for more than 400 days. This coincided with the Soviet Union’s December invasion of Iran’s neighbor Afghanistan—two events which would have significant impact on U.S. policy relating to the Persian Gulf region and would dominate the headlines for many months.

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37 Farrell, 59-60.

38 Nacos, 85.

39 Perloff, 55.

40 Ibid.

CHAPTER 3
TWO CASE STUDIES

A. Iran Hostage Crisis-1979

The Iran hostage situation was the first satellite-transmitted “living room crisis”\(^1\) replete with live broadcasts, allowing Americans to viscerally experience a global, political drama. Many became familiar with the Persian Gulf region, though with a very narrow view of Moslems, based on figures such as Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and religious leader of the Islamic Shi’ite sect Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. “The Shah” became known for his sudden exile after 37 years of secular rule, while Khomeini emerged as the dominant figure in the drama, known for his leadership of Iran’s Islamic revolution and hatred of western culture.\(^2\) Khomeini set a precedent with his use of charged language such as “jihad,” to foment Moslems’ discontent against the United States, a practice that would be repeated in the future by other Middle Eastern extremists. Khomeini was the sole Iranian figure able to influence the militants holding the hostages and they worked in tandem to disseminate their propaganda through the news media.

While the terrorists were not prepared for the number of journalists who went to Tehran, they understood how to manipulate the press corps in an effort to disseminate their message. They orchestrated demonstrations, which turned Iranians who were “friendly and relaxed” off camera, into “a howling mob” on camera, as

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\(^2\) Ibid, 32.
they shouted negative slogans about America, burned flags and effigies.\textsuperscript{3} They staged newsworthy events which were covered by the U.S. news media, but also by Iranian television, which inflamed local opinion against the U.S.\textsuperscript{4} Many journalists recognized the duplicity involved as indicated by ABC representative Robert Siegenthaler:

The Revolutionary Council are like cheerleaders with bullhorns, and they bring out the demonstrators—truck drivers one day, ladies and self-flagellators the next—and so we try to keep using words like 'orchestrated' and 'well-organized' so that we're not being a kind of mindless mirror.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{1. War of Words: The News Media and Khomeini}

The tendency of the news media during the era was to "neglect to consider the historic, politic and religious dimensions" of the Middle East,\textsuperscript{6} while casting the various Iranian participants in a way that alienated larger Moslem audiences. This practice was noted by one ambassador from a Persian Gulf country who told \textit{The Washington Post}, "Your media is making a war. They don't say 'Iranian demonstrators' or 'Turkish rioters,' they say 'Moslem mobs' and 'militant Moslems.'"\textsuperscript{7} The news media descriptors misled less-informed viewers into believing all Moslems were in agreement or associated with Khomeini and his


\textsuperscript{5} Shales, C1.

\textsuperscript{6} Perloff, 55.

\textsuperscript{7} Karen DeYoung, "Khomeini's Holy War Wall is Troubling Moslem World; Iran's Call for 'Holy War' Troubles Other Moslems," \textit{The Washington Post} (Nov. 25, 1979), A1.
fundamentalist movement. This was a benefit to the hostage takers, who sought greater support from alienated Moslem communities.

The "war of words" intensified during the crisis, as militants asserted that the hostage detention would end when "the Shah sets foot in Tehran and his possessions are returned to Iran." Khomeini escalated the rhetoric during various speeches calling "on Moslems to 'arise, face up to the fight and become victorious.'" A Khomeini adherent stated the goal was "not just to hold the Americans hostage" but to also undermine Iranian secular leadership, in an effort to obtain "a purely revolutionary society with equality and classlessness." Another militant, Sadegh Chotbzaeh demanded, "We want the shah and his wealth. The United States wants their hostages. It's easy. They give us the shah and that's good. We give them the hostages." They further demanded the United States publicly confess of "interference in Iranian affairs for the past 25 years," and in so doing, the U.S. and U.N. delegation would be afforded a visit with Khomeini and the hostages. The delegation rejected this proposal, and Carter administration officials handling the

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8 Verdon, A1.


11 Shales, C1.


14 Weisskopf, A1.
crisis were concerned that if the news media continued to “provide a forum for Iran’s
denunciation of the Shah,” the Iranian principals would not be inclined to seriously
discuss the release of those in captivity.\textsuperscript{15}

The networks camped outside the Embassy in Tehran for more than a
year, each with three, four, and five crews at a time. There was never any
real news, although the Iranians had access to the networks when they
wanted it. Meanwhile Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the Ayatollah’s aide, made
deals. ‘Feed film to ABC, CBS, and NBC; then get it on Eurovision. If
Eurovision uses the film, Japan will pick it up.’\textsuperscript{16}

2. Changing Media Landscape During Late 1970s

Administration officials were challenged to manage the hostage crisis while
meeting the demands of the changing news environment. The news media’s ability to
satellite-transmit live coverage of events in Tehran, illustrated the technological
progress that occurred since combat journalists in Vietnam sent film via transport
aircraft back to the U.S. The critical news narrative against the government that
began during Vietnam, and culminated during Watergate, continued to frame the
coverage during the Iran crisis. The business of newsgathering had been further
transformed as journalists became active participants in the news they were reporting
from Tehran. This increased tension between the institutions during the crisis which
was a problem not fully grasped in procedure by government communicators trying to
respond to critical news reports.


\textsuperscript{16} John Corry, “TV View: Must TV be at the Mercy of Terrorists?” \textit{The New York Times}
(July 21, 1985), 1.
CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite, "the most trusted man in America," is attributed by some as having intensified the spotlight on the hostage crisis, with his trademark sign off at the end of his news program: "And that's the way it is. It is Tuesday, December 16, 1980, the 409th day of captivity for the hostages in Iran. This is Walter Cronkite at CBS News. Goodnight." The crisis was the longest running human interest story in the history of television, in living color from the other side of the world. Commercially it was a stunning success. Never had a news story so thoroughly captured the imagination of the U.S. public.

News media exhaustively covered the crisis which did not go unnoticed by the militants, according to Picard. "The captors and their supporters, quickly learned how to effectively manipulate U.S. media by holding staged demonstrations and press conferences that were scheduled to coincide with satellite time, so they could reach the United States in time for nightly newscasts," such as "The Iran Crisis: America Held Hostage," hosted by Ted Koppel on ABC—a program eventually renamed "Nightline." Nightline was the first late night news program intended to provide viewers a recap of the days' events, and was, according to one article, "one of the most significant innovations in network news since the evening newscasts were expanded to 30 minutes in 1963."

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17 Dan Rather replaced Walter Cronkite as CBS News anchor before the crisis ended.

18 Seib, 35.


20 Nacos, 157.

21 Picard, Media Portrayals, 53.

3. U.S. Government Communication Efforts to End Crisis

This maelstrom of change in the news media environment challenged the Carter administration in its efforts to meet journalists’ demands, particularly since it did not have the benefit of a solid crisis communication strategy. Some scholars note that the administration was not responsive enough to the news media with the first Presidential announcement to the nation occurring on November 12, more than a week after the crisis began.23 Others recognize the effectiveness of the administration’s strategy to keep “a powerful media spotlight on the Embassy,” so that “the hostages would not be harmed.”24 To accomplish this, President Carter reiterated that the U.S. would “not yield to international terrorism or to blackmail” and “the Iranian government and its leaders” were “fully responsible for the safety and well being of our representatives in Iran.”25 In this respect the news media helped to ensure the safety of the hostages, but other coverage complicated the situation by intensifying ongoing political communication as it “raised public expectations” and “encouraged acceleration of diplomatic initiatives that might have been more effective through calmer, quieter, and slower procedures.”26

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24 Carruthers, 174.


26 Seib, 33.
4. Mediated Diplomacy as Led by Walter Cronkite

The mediated diplomatic environment can be challenging in normal circumstances with legitimate state actors, because “diplomacy and journalism” are often at odds, due to the necessity of behind the scenes discussion.27 This process is more complicated when the challenger is a terrorist group for which there is no formal negotiation channel, as in the Iran hostage crisis. The news media became a defacto instrument of influence, through which leaders tried to maintain control of the message; though it was a challenge for them to compete with the live images of protest. Meanwhile, diplomats endeavored to maintain ground in a private sphere of influence, though it was eroded as journalists removed the “ambiguity” necessary for negotiation.28 Journalists’ direct questioning caused the militants and their leaders to become more intransigent in their positions, as reported by The Washington Post: “Diplomats hoping to find room for negotiations, fear the Iranians will be pushed into inflexible stands by journalists asking questions aimed at clarifying positions.”29 This concern was not unfounded as negotiations became even more problematic with a series of “sudden reversals and broken promises,” from the Khomeini camp. At least one official speculated, “TV interviews precipitated the Ayatollah Khomeini’s vow that hostages would be tried as spies.” Commentators resisted leaders’ suggestions to limit the mediation of terrorists’ statements as indicated by CBS news icon Walter Cronkite, “We can’t be asked to abstain from journalistic practices because a story

27 Ibid. 35.
28 Ibid.
will complicate diplomatic practices.”

Some scholars note that the effect of such “high level attention paid by the media” during international crisis, “accordingly [pressure] the government to ‘do something,’ when to do nothing - or act quietly behind the scenes—might be more efficacious.”

5. Media Pressure on Military to Take Action

The news media criticized the government for not taking a form of military action, although the U.S. had already “declared the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest,” commencing a military buildup with the deployment of Naval forces. In contradictory fashion, the administration was also warned through the news media to not take any action, as explained by Miller:

In fact, the Iranians made it quite clear to the American media, which in turn unequivocally relayed the message to the American People and their Government, that if the United States attempted military action of any sort, the hostages would be killed outright.

The confluence of events in Iran and Afghanistan led the administration to formally request that Congress “renew registration of the draft” and that it “take shackles off covert operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.” Of the military actions taken, there was one tragic mission involving an aborted rescue effort that received most of the news media attention. A team of commandos was secretly dispatched to the Persian Gulf, but the assignment was cancelled upon arrival to

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30 Terrell and Ross, 88.
31 Carruthers, 174.
33 Miller, 53.
34 Ibid.
Iran’s Dasht-e Kavir desert due to aircraft mechanical issues. Unfortunately, tragedy struck before the re-deployment when one of the helicopters clipped a refueling transport, killing eight servicemen and injuring others.\textsuperscript{35}

6. The \textit{NBC Interview With a Military Hostage}

Terrorists select military members during high profile hostage situations for visibility (or injury), as during the Iran hostage crisis when 21-year old Marine Cpl. William Gallegos was chosen by the militants to be the first hostage interviewed on U.S. television. Gallegos told NBC that he and other hostages hadn’t been “mistreated” by the militants, but that he was uncertain whether they could endure the situation much longer.\textsuperscript{36} While the militants “offered the Gallegos interview to all three TV networks” ABC and CBS declined the opportunity because they “didn’t want to become a tool” for the terrorists, according to CBS News President William Leonard.\textsuperscript{37} ABC President Roone Arledge explained that he was “surprised and disappointed” that NBC had acquiesced.\textsuperscript{38}

Some congressmen also criticized NBC, such as House member Robert Bauman who stated the network “should be nominated for the Benedict Arnold Award for broadcast journalism.”\textsuperscript{39} House speaker Thomas O’Neill agreed and “accused the network of falling into the trap of Iranian propaganda.”


\textsuperscript{38} Arlie Schardt, “TV: Held Hostage?” \textit{Newsweek} (Dec. 24, 1979), 27.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}

The NBC interview took place under the most stringent controls instilled by the militants, who insisted on five minutes of airtime for a "propaganda speech" by an adherent named "Mary." In addition, the extremists controlled all production elements, specifically the content and video equipment.

NBC News President William Small defended the network's controversial episode "Hostage! The First Television Interview" stating that the network had preserved the right to cancel the broadcast, did not turn-in questions in advance and was permitted to edit the footage. He further explained, "experts on hostages have pointed out that the worst thing you can do is have a total news blackout, because then the captors do more dramatic, more radical things to get attention."

Others at NBC disagreed with how the network handled the interview. Pentagon correspondent Ford Rowan quit his job because the affiliate did not broadcast a brief video clip of State Department spokesman Tom Reston, who had responded to the NBC interview. Reston stated the interview was a "cruel and cynical attempt" to distract from efforts to resolve the crisis. Although "anchorman John Chancellor had summed up Reston's remarks," Rowan felt it was wrong to not "include an interview with U.S.

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41 Ibid.

42 Schardt, 27.

43 Ibid.

44 Don Oberdorfer, "NBC is Criticized for Broadcast on American Hostage; NBC Draws Criticism from Hostage Broadcast," The Washington Post (Dec. 12, 1979), A1.

45 Schardt, 27.
officials giving their point of view,” and in so doing, “the network made itself a platform for Iranian propaganda.”

It was a precedent setting event, in that it showed the vulnerability of the news media in this sort of hostage situation, as future hostage takers might similarly decide to extort airtime from networks. It also provided a pattern for future terrorists who sought to manipulate the news media to affect the U.S. government, public opinion and policy. Walter Cronkite noted this caused concern among “some network news executives” as “NBC let the Iranian students get their foot into that door.”

**B. TWA flight 847 Hostage Crisis**

The fears of a similar terrorist action were realized when TWA flight 847 enroute from Athens to Rome, was hijacked by two Lebanese Shi’ites of the terrorist group “Islamic Holy War.” As it unfolded, the hijackers diverted the aircraft to Beirut where it landed, then ordered it to Algiers, a pattern which would be repeated during the 17-day saga. In the interim, the hijackers killed passenger U.S. Navy Seals diver, Petty Officer Robert Dean Stethem and brutally assaulted several others. The terrorists demanded that Israel release more than 700 Lebanese prisoners held since the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. President Ronald Reagan

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47 Ibid.

48 Carruthers, 175.

49 Lule, 182-3.

50 Ibid.

responded, "...we must not yield to the terrorist demands and invite more terrorism. We cannot reward their grisly deeds. We will not cave in."52

1. **Terrorists Used News Media to Obtain Status**

Networks raced for the "exclusive" interview, image and story during the TWA crisis despite the fact that involved terrorists hijacked a plane, killed a passenger, beat others and held many at gunpoint. Critics charged that competition led to "journalistic participation in the terrorists' theater," particularly in terms of "their accession to demands for televised interviews."53 Nacos states that the networks' treatment of the skyjacking spokesman, Nabih Berri, was equal to that usually afforded to "a political leader" such as "the President of the United States."54 Reportedly trained by U.S. journalism studies graduates, Berri became a television news media favorite during the crisis.55 While terrorists were treated as political actors, journalists assumed the role of negotiator. In one instance, CBS anchorman Dan Rather conducted a taped, telephone interview, in which Berri stated, "If they [the Israelis]...took the 700 [Shi'ites] to a neutral country...I am ready to send all the Americans here with their plane to the same country to—to make the exchange, yes. I accept that."56 Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State, was critical of this sort of practice, notes Nacos—asserting it conferred status to the terrorists. "When TV reporters interview kidnappers it...risks making international outlaws seem like


53 Carruthers, 175.

54 Nacos, 66.

55 Carruthers, 175.

56 Nacos, 62.
responsible personalities. Television should avoid being used that way. But there's so much competition involved that it's naïve to expect such a thing.  

2. **U.S. Government Communication Efforts**

The U.S. government and news media relationship seemed at odds during the crisis, which was due in part to the disproportionate amount of coverage given to the terrorists. Officials worked to engage the media, but they probably needed to be more aggressive to combat the terrorist-driven narrative. Despite the imbalance in coverage, behind-the-scenes official negotiations eventually picked up pace, with “a swirl of confidential messages involving France, Israel, Syria and the Lebanese Shi’ites,” during the crisis.  

While officials were afforded minimal airtime, the news media did support one very important government request. Journalists preserved the anonymity of several federal, high-ranking government employees aboard the aircraft. These individuals had “top security clearances” and may have been singled out for harsher treatment if their identities were known. The fact that the news media protected sensitive information in this situation as in others had the effect of building greater trust between news and government representatives. It is incumbent upon government communicators to ensure news media understand why certain data is sensitive and the risks if it were made public, as noted by Picard. “Problems appear to occur most

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when journalists do not realize the significance of specific information or its potential for harm and are left to exercise their own judgment.”\textsuperscript{60}

The news media exercised little restraint, however, in most other respects to include the arena of diplomacy, as Jack Lule noted:

As [official] negotiations stalled, reporters seemed to become arbiters between the Amal movement and U.S. officials. Nabih Berri... was given much media time and space. Often, Berri was permitted to give live, unedited statements about the negotiations.\textsuperscript{61}

3. News Media as Negotiator Between U.S. and Terrorists

ABC’s “Good Morning America” anchorman David Hartman served as a “self-appointed mediator”\textsuperscript{62} during a controversial live interview with Berri. Hartman asked if Berri had, “any final words to President Reagan,”\textsuperscript{63} to which Berri replied, “I want him to deal with this affair like a brother, not like a president...”\textsuperscript{64} Hartman also interviewed hostage Allyn Conwell who ended the segment telling viewers “to ‘stand up’ for the right of all [Lebanese] prisoners to go home.”\textsuperscript{65} As a result of this exchange and subsequent controversy, ABC ensured the morning show was “subject to the written news-policy guidelines” of regular news programming.\textsuperscript{66} Hartman later said, “To some extent, we have been used,” by the terrorists. “On the other hand, we

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{63} Nacos, 67

\textsuperscript{64} Watson, 17.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{66} Pagano, 1.
can’t turn around and say ‘No, we’re not going to report what’s going on.’”

Some print journalists criticized the networks for interviewing hostages while under duress, as in one Washington Post article, “The networks are interviewing the hostages as if they were official U.S. emissaries perfectly free to speak their minds.”

4. Hostage as Terrorists’ Mouthpiece—Under Duress They Speak

Throughout this ordeal, terrorists used the hostages to help air their grievances and demands. On several occasions, in probable fear for their lives, some hostages became “the Amal’s most effective spokesmen,” which supports the psychological theory that its “common for prisoners to agree with their captors in a subconscious effort to ensure their own survival.” One of the more documented examples of this was during a press conference with the hostages held “at their captors’ instigation, to ask Reagan not to mount a militarized rescue, and to pressure Israel to release the Shi’ite prisoners demanded by the hijackers.” In one instance, an armed captor was poised at the heels of TWA pilot, Capt. Jack Testrake, as he surmised for U.S. reporters, “we’d all be dead men” if a United States “rescue was attempted.” As Testrake spoke, the terrorist was “constantly jabbing the air with his pistol and sometimes moving his lips as if to prompt” Testrake’s response.

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68 Ibid.

69 Howard Rosenberg, “Kidnapers in Lebanon Play Host to Tragedy” Los Angeles Times (July 1, 1985), 1.

70 Carruthers, 175.

71 Times Wire Services, “Six Hostages Held by Radical Faction; ‘We’d be Dead’ in Rescue Effort, Pilot Cautions,” Los Angeles Times (June 20, 1985), 1.
5. Hostage Crisis as News Story

Hostage situations can be a slow moving news target, and like many international crises requiring complex diplomacy, they simply don’t fit the news media’s timeline and deadline schema. Subsequently hostages’ families—and families of previous hostage crises—were also drawn into the media fray. While the relatives’ circumstances presented a legitimate human-interest story, the news media’s proclivity is to lean heavily on charged emotional elements, which can needlessly create a sense of urgency and complicate an already difficult situation controlled by non-state actors. Excess news media attention on the speculative can have the adverse effect of giving the terrorists the attention they desire, while excessively dramatizing the situation. Barbara Rosen, wife of one of the hostages held by the Iranian militants in 1979, seemed to recognize this tendency of the news media when she was interviewed during the 1985 saga:

‘I told the producer ahead of time, I would not come on and talk about what it’s like to be a hostage’s wife,’ Rosen said angrily on the air to a shocked Terence Smith. ‘This isn’t a drama. This isn’t something that’s on Broadway. This is a real-life crisis.’

6. Terrorists’ Media Savvy in Manipulating National Attention

The terrorists considered television to be the best means to win the battle of public opinion and build sympathy. Berri reportedly directed that all press opportunities be given to the television media, excluding the print news media from most press venues. For their efforts, the terrorists were “rewarded” with

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72 Times Wire Services, “Rescue US and We Die,” Pilot warns from cockpit; Reporters Permitted to Talk to Crew,” Los Angeles Times (June 19, 1985), 1.

73 Shales, G1.
unprecedented coverage, which "furthered their media recognition goal." While networks were "targets of massive criticism for carrying the terrorists’ political messages at unprecedented length into American living rooms," news media representatives insisted they controlled the content and that "the terrorists were not being given any air time." This assertion conflicts with at least one documented occasion when the terrorists "seized" a video recording from a U.S. television crew and "deleted the comments of four hostages whose remarks it didn’t endorse." The terrorists’ media savvy surprised many of the news people in Beirut, as indicated by ABC news representative Ray Nunn. He was asked a rather esoteric question by an Amal member, regarding then CIA Director William Casey. "Mr. Casey owns a lot of shares in your company doesn’t he?" In another show of media understanding, after ABC failed to share some footage with other networks, the Amal group’s press secretary Shiek Hassan Masri posted the sign at the hotel where media were housed, "The Central Press Bureau of the Amal movement declares that all film taken of the hostages can be used freely by all press agencies and television networks." "When Amal understands the pool system, that blows my mind," said

74 Nacos, 50.

75 Ibid, 64.

76 Ibid, 50-51, 64.

77 Ibid, 51.


79 Picard, Media Portrayals, 53-4.

80 Shales, G1.

81 Howard Rosenberg, "Kidnappers in Lebanon Play Host to Tragedy," Los Angeles Times (July 1, 1985), 1.
Walter Mears, Associated Press. “These guys are street fighters and they are making 
ground rules for the media.”

7. Journalists’ Ethical Issues and Terrorism Coverage Debated

The networks did not resist the terrorists’ manipulation during the TWA 
controversy because of the heated competition for ratings and advertising dollars—a 
race which inevitably led to a variety of ethical dilemmas. It was a game of one-
upmanship which included providing considerable airtime to terrorists, and may have 
had the effect of encouraging other extremists with similar motives. As The 
Washington Post reported at the time, “There is a serious question now...whether 
good television is always good journalism and, more importantly in such a precarious 
situation whether it is good citizenship.” NBC anchorman Tom Brokaw was one of 
a few high profile television personalities critical of the coverage:

There was, in that hijacking coverage, too much of the kind of raw, 
unexpurgated television transmission coming from Beirut. The people 
were getting a kind of voyeurish experience. There was a real exploitation 
going on, which I don’t think we should allow.

This concern was one of several aired by a variety of political and media 
commentators in the post-crisis analysis of the news coverage. Chief among other 
issues discussed was the news media’s unprecedented high “visibility,” as journalists 
became part of the story in terms of active involvement, rather than serving strictly as 
detached professionals. “…the media became participants, affecting and even


83 Shales, G1.

84 Nacos, 157.
shaping the course of events rather than merely reporting them,”\textsuperscript{86} according to Paletz and Schmid. They note the agreement of analyst Michael O’Neill, who stated, “reporters were no longer just reporters, journalism no longer just journalism but a unique bonding of news making and news reporting, dictated by television’s special nature and lying beyond the traditional definitions of news.”\textsuperscript{87}

The news media’s pack-mentality led to coverage, which was criticized as “sensationalized, excessive and sometimes even tasteless.”\textsuperscript{88} It allowed the terrorists to accomplish their media strategy of press conferences, photo opportunities, talking points and visits on news talk shows. \textsuperscript{89} While the terrorists obtained maximum publicity through spokesmen and the exploitation of hostages, government officials were provided minimal airtime.\textsuperscript{90} The cumulative effect of the coverage complicated U.S. negotiation efforts to secure hostages’ release, as acknowledged by ABC’s anchorman Peter Jennings:

Speculating on ABC about why the Amal seemed reluctant to give up the hostages on the final weekend, Peter Jennings said, “They were at the center of the universe—these hostage holders—Why should they give it up?” This may have been the most provocative thing anyone who regularly appeared on television said about television and what it was doing.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{85} Pagano, 1.

\textsuperscript{86} Paletz and Schmid, 121.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{88} Pagano, 1.

\textsuperscript{89} Nacos, 50.


\textsuperscript{91} Corry, 1.
In the end, many of the hostages were extremely dissatisfied with the news media’s conduct in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{92} If the press corps would have performed with greater restraint, not only would it have ensured the hostages safety with less interference in diplomatic efforts, but it would have also protected the hostages from having to speak against their will or saying something that would anger their captors.

Another ethical issue pertains to the rumors that some news organizations purchased time with the hostages, as Newsweek was offered—but declined—an aircraft tour for $1,000 or interviews with hostages for $12,500.\textsuperscript{93} If news media paid for such access they would have in effect been subsidizing the terrorists and terrorism, posing a significant national security problem. Allegations of purchasing such coverage were never fully substantiated against any particular media outlet, but much coverage and interviews were obtained of the reported venues for sale. In a separate but equally questionable situation, ABC came under some scrutiny as it reportedly co-hosted the terrorists’ going away banquet for the hostages. It also obtained exclusive rights to cover the event, shutting out all other television news media.\textsuperscript{94}

An extraordinary ‘last supper’ for the hostages was laid on for their last, but one night in captivity at the luxurious Summerland Hotel, where ABC had its headquarters. One ABC journalist made a speech of welcome and a cake iced with the words ‘Wish you all a happy trip home’ was produced for the hostages to eat exclusively for the network’s cameras. One hostage muttered cynically, ‘maybe ABC had us hijacked to improve their ratings.’\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Cockerell, 1.

\textsuperscript{93} Alter, 21.

\textsuperscript{94} Cockerell.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
8. Media Guidelines Governing Future Terrorism Coverage

The news media showed more restraint during the Iran hostage crisis than the TWA contingency. During the Iran controversy, two networks' didn't broadcast the Gallegos interview based on principle, while all the networks extensively covered the terrorists and hostages during the TWA crisis. This reflected the changing news media practices and greater emphasis on bottom line issues, and less regard for potential impact on the hostages and diplomatic processes underway. These issues were roundly criticized in various circles of influence, to include Congress, academia and news media. Edwin Meese, Attorney General during the Reagan administration, suggested "the U.S. might ask news organizations to adopt a code of restraint and that broadcasters might be asked to agree to 'some principles reduced to writing.'"  

Senator Edward Feighan further captured the essence of the problem. "The media is caught in a historic dilemma: how to cover acts of war against the United States in which their role is a critical dimension."  

To stave off this and other public criticism several news outlets established guidelines to "avoid providing an excessive platform for terrorists," to prevent "live coverage of terrorism," and to ensure "coverage would not sensationalize a story beyond the fact of its being sensational."  

The actual implementation of these guidelines in practice has been mixed at best, as revealed in the news media terrorism coverage during the 1980s, 1990s and 2001.

96 Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter, Terrorism & the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists & the Public (New York: Brassey's, 1990), 43.

97 Pagano, 1.

98 Alexander and Latter, 43.
C. In Summary

Terrorism existed long before there were networks to broadcast it, as in the 11th Century when “the Islamic Assassins” attacked “prominent victims” in central locations of government, religion and commerce “usually on holy days when many witnesses would be present.”99

In the 20th Century, significant media attention on terrorism invariably includes discussion on terrorists’ purported causes. In the early 1970s, the Palestinian issue became the “cause de celebre” of many extremists, which was punctuated with the tragic assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, by al Qaeda terrorist Muhallad Omar.100 Sadat had been the first of many Arabic leaders to establish dialogue with the West and Israel, while severing ties with the former Soviet Union. This followed his country’s defeat in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and was energized by his desire to improve Egypt’s international influence and profile.101 To this end, he entered into a process of détente with the U.S., and peace negotiations with Prime Minister Menachem Benkin. The leaders began their dialogue through the news media, with Walter Cronkite and Barbara Walters acting as mediators. This process reached its apex with the signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords, a construct which was entitled “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East.”102

The U.S. has long been visibly involved in the negotiation of peace in the Middle East, to include the tenuous situation between the Israelis and Palestinians, a

99 Nacos, 49.

100 Microsoft Encarta Reference Library, 2002 ed “Camp David Accords.”

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.
cause which has often been “hijacked” by terrorists as an excuse to commit unconscionable acts of violence against Americans and American interests. Each successive incident proved to be more devastating than the previous, while the accompanying anti-American and anti-west rhetoric increasingly became more severe.

While the hostage crises of 1979 and 1985 were not the most violent acts of terrorism to occur, they brought to the fore more fundamental questions regarding news media coverage and its effect on the government’s response to terrorism. As anti-terrorism policy evolved, it included provisions which recognized the news media’s role in terrorism, as journalists became more aware of their vulnerability in terrorists’ efforts to gain publicity. This increase in awareness was reflected in theoretical constructs such as the contagion and status conferral theories, which have been the more widely debated among media and government representatives. The debate and criticism regarding the news media’s interrelation with terrorism provided impetus for the development of guidelines in the coverage of terrorism. In practice, the guidelines have seldom been employed by the television news media.

In a few short years, the balance of power would be positively changed in the Middle East to include a large U.S. military presence in the region as a result of the Gulf War. This conflict altered the way Americans view the application of military power in response to Middle East based aggression and terrorism. This military action had the effect of containing rogue dictators in the region, introducing global media elements to formerly closed markets, quelling some
forms of terrorism, while providing an excuse for wealthy warlords to bring a new brand of terrorism to America.
CHAPTER 4

INFORMATION BATTLEFIELD

Information is the delivery system while the dimensions of economy, diplomacy and military are the warheads.

—Lt. Col. Robert C. Williams

With the unprecedented terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the spatial dimensions of the 30-year war against terrorism and its respective battlefield changed. Transnational terrorism was no longer limited to smaller-scale, less coordinated hijacking and bombing scenarios abroad. It had evolved into a network with decentralized “sleeper” cells of extremists pre-positioned in multiple countries, interconnected through the surreptitious utilization of disperse, internet-based communication and financial systems. To stop the al Qaeda network, geopolitical options were narrowed if not closed, such as borders between nations limiting the directions to which terrorists could run. Likewise, western media and market personalities became self aware, at once recognizing their vulnerabilities in the schemes of terrorism, but also in exercising their own institutional influence, closing the gaps where terrorists could find digital refuge, by preventing unobstructed access to the airwaves and commerce. While these changes in practices did not happen instantaneously, they happened as quickly as anyone could hope, considering the multiple bureaucracies and industries involved. This massive paradigm shift was required, from pre-attack business and public service methodologies focused on free market elements and prosperity, to post-attack emphasis on homeland security and anti-terrorism.

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1 Williams.
A. Chapter Overview

During wartime leaders interact with the elements of the information dimension to accomplish the national end. The mediated environment provides a forum for building a national wartime agenda informing the American public and other heads of state of U.S. strategic objectives. It also allows for the participation in open dialogue with other prominent figures to address public concerns. International media elements and non-western news narratives also furnish this space, adding to its complexity. Perhaps the most distinguishing aspect of the information battlefield during conflict is the "operationalization" of information to combat an adversary's propaganda.

While the information battlefield requires the synchronization of many elements and concepts, to include intelligence information, command and control, communication technologies, it is the part of the battlefield that deals with the public information processes, news media and communicators that are of concern in this chapter.\(^2\) This area of the battlefield is not limited to these components, however. It also includes the framework or lens through which the country, the military and mission, are judged in the mediated landscape as described by Williams:

I also believe that the way in which we’re looked at, our reputation, our service and our country is also part of that battle space, and the elements that frame that, either understanding or misunderstanding of who we are and what we do, comprise a lot of different ingredients, political, diplomatic, along with standard mass communication channels.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.
B. Battle of Values

The information battle that occurs in the public sphere is ultimately a battle of values, ideas and beliefs. During the war against terrorism, U.S. and Taliban values were contrasted in the global media environment. The Taliban oppressed the women of Afghanistan, while the U.S. campaigned for their freedom. The terrorists called on Moslems to attack Americans, as the U.S. called for tolerance among all groups. The terrorists demonstrated their value of life with the heinous attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, while the U.S. proved through its protection and humanitarian assistance to innocent Afghans that it respects life.

C. A Wartime National Agenda

The United States' anti-terrorism national agenda shaped the post-attack news narrative. The commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, in addition to the passage of homeland defense legislation and law enforcement measures, provided a new security arrangement through which journalists and citizens could interpret world affairs. The daily news agenda was referenced to this new defense posture, with focus on leaders' schedules, diplomatic engagements, security meetings, trips and related civic events. This included the President's signing of an executive order which authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to use all means to destroy the Osama bin Laden network.4 In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation published a "Most Wanted list" of terrorist suspects, in the American West tradition of capturing criminals.5 "They must be found.


They will be stopped and they will be punished," said President Bush. These initiatives were reported by the transnational news media sending a uniquely American message around the world that this was a new era, a new war and would involve bringing the best of American moral, cultural, military and political values to the fight against terrorism.

**D. Projection of National Power**

There is probably no more critical time for a nation than when it is attacked or preparing for war. There are many elements which constitute the nation's posture and how its projected to different audiences during such times of crises, with leaders' commentaries being the most important. During the war against terrorism, national will and intent was projected to both allies and adversaries by the President and echoed through the chain of command. President George W. Bush described the military involvement, "The name of [this] military operation is Operation Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear."  

The Department of Defense was at the helm of the overall war effort, which reflected in hundreds of media conferences and interviews in the weeks following the attacks. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was in front of the cameras at least once a day describing the military dimension of the war. In one conference soon after the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan, he discussed the objectives and commitment of the United States:

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We have to wage a war, and it has to be taken to them, where they are. And it will be a broadly based sustained effort, not in a matter of days and weeks but over years. People think of the wars we have seen lately, the kind of antiseptic wars where a cruise missile is fired off, shown on television landing in some smoke and so forth. That is not what this is about. \(^8\)

Thematicallly this statement covers considerable ground. It refers to the moral responsibility the U.S. must fulfill in response to the unjust attacks that killed more than 3, 500 innocent people. It will be fought in the caves and in the shadows by Special Operations forces and others who cannot be named or photographed. There won’t be familiar visuals of military maneuvers, tanks rolling in the desert, daylight aircraft formations, airborne tomahawk missiles or forces storming the beach. It will be a “marathon rather than a sprint,” because this isn’t about “news cycles or short attention spans.” It is about justice.

Another recurring theme, reminded people that this was not an engagement that the United States would have entered into without having been attacked in the first place. General John P. Jumper stated, “This is a fight we did not ask for, but one we accept in defense of freedom-loving people everywhere. We have fought and defeated the forces of evil many times throughout our existence.”\(^9\)

While many messages were crafted to inform and reassure the public others were intended to project U.S. power—with the ultimate goal of deterring further terrorist actions. This occurred when the President told the U.S. Congress, “Our war on terror

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begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.\textsuperscript{10}

Congress sent a clear signal to multiple audiences within a week after the attack, passing a resolution 98 to 0 to retaliate against the terrorist network, while the House of Representatives passed the same measure, 420 to 1.\textsuperscript{11} This legislative measure supported the words by President George W. Bush, who declared a "national emergency" and addressed a special Joint Session of Congress, pledging, "We will direct every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war — to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network."\textsuperscript{12}

Military leaders, such as General Thomas Franks, commander of forces in Southwest and Central Asia, further communicated this during a trip to the Persian Gulf after the start of the air war.\textsuperscript{13} In an interview with NBC's Anne Curry, he stated, "This is not going to be a war as we've seen in World War II and it's not going to be a war as we've seen in Vietnam. This is going to be a war on our terms — at points and times of our choosing."\textsuperscript{14} The message was clear—the U.S. is in control of the battlefield and through a measured campaign, is committed to defeating the al Qaeda terrorist network.


\textsuperscript{14} Gen. Thomas Franks, NBC interview (Nov. 1, 2001).
E. Allied Communication

The sum of all U.S. leadership and public affairs communications serve to project national power on the global information battlefield. Strategic objectives are further strengthened by international, allied and intercultural exchange, which may include a diplomatic meeting, coalition aircraft taxiing together or a multi-national press conference. World leaders reinforce allied commitment with messages of support through the news media, deterring adversaries while informing global audiences. The net effect of these mediated activities is the alteration or continuation of the perceived international balance of power, which ultimately influences the decisions of state and non-state actors worldwide.

The confluence of these elements bolstered U.S. efforts internationally, particularly with the show de force of the unanimous support obtained from NATO and the U.N. NATO invoked, for the first time in its 52-year history, Article V of its charter “which declares the attack on America to be an attack on the alliance as a whole.”15 This was reinforced with the deployment of NATO’s E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., in support of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) mission.16 Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair said, “It was not a crime against the west, but against humanity.”17 This


16 A North American (U.S. and Canada) organization which provides aerospace warning and control for the continent. This includes surveillance of airspace, tracking objects in space, and the warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles <available at www.peterson.af.mil/norad/>.

commitment from an allied nation is a departure from previous years when Presidents Carter and Reagan “tried to enlist support for collective responses to terrorism,” according to Nacos. “In both instances the friends and allies of the United States were slow to support even modest proposals for concerted actions.”

Stated commitment of nations, whether they are traditional or non-traditional allies, is reinforced with operational images and messages that project unity to broad, global audiences, who may otherwise be wary of one nation’s unilateral effort. Among the non-NATO nations which supported the U.S. led coalition in the war against terrorism, included several in the Persian Gulf region. While this show of support was crucial, it didn’t necessarily simplify the larger challenges faced by allied communicators in their effort to inform on the multi-dimensional objectives involved.

Regardless of host nation sensitivities, in many cases reporters were on the ground in Pakistan and later Afghanistan, covering some U.S. military forces and events, ultimately providing information on the war’s progress. Many people saw the photo of the Special Forces soldiers on horseback, which showed the austerity of the war torn country within which they were tasked to engage in combat. The media also transmitted images of the humanitarian relief efforts provided to the beleaguered Afghans.

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18 Nacos, 11.
F. Global Public Affairs

This is an information environment with 24-hour media reporting and instant analysis of events. The effect is that, at any moment, real-time information can instantaneously influence domestic and international decision makers.\(^{19}\)

The military public affairs representative is at the front line of maintaining the public perception of America’s reach and defense by “telling the story” of the Armed Forces in specific and unclassified operations. The televised images of F-15s taxiing for take off, or a Navy carrier cruising to the Persian Gulf, sends a message to different audiences worldwide, while fostering national will—which is considered to be an operational center of gravity.\(^{20}\) It deters potential adversaries and terrorists from aggression, it reassures friends and allies, and most importantly, it gives the American people proof of and confidence in the strength of U.S. forces, according to Col. Doug McCoy, Deputy Director for Air Force Public Affairs:

It lets the world know of our capabilities and that we are preparing to go use them if we need to, but it also creates public awareness right here in America of our capabilities and our willingness to use them if it will help the President achieve the national end.\(^{21}\)

With a delicate multi-national coalition in the balance, the U.S. endeavored to carefully leverage global influence and deterrence by projecting U.S. military resolve. Public affairs ensured “a virtual force projection” in the U.S. led effort, by facilitating media coverage of military preparations at U.S. installations worldwide. The


\(^{21}\) McCoy.
collective of these missions contributes to the projection of American national power, as each individual military base represents one single part of the defense whole.

At Charleston Air Force Base, national and local media interest focused on the 437 Airlift Wing and the C-17’s role in the humanitarian dimension of Operation Enduring Freedom, according to Capt. Krista Carlos. She described the importance of being able to communicate the wing’s role in support of this mission:

We’re all about the business of information, passing out information. So you really get to see the effects of everything, when you’re watching the interview or the project you put together on the nightly news, or when you hear a sound bite on the radio...You’re not maintaining aircraft out there or dropping the bombs, but you’re helping the people back here understand what’s going on.22

Air Force humanitarian airdrops of food into Afghanistan commenced with the war effort, showing to the world the U.S. commitment to aid Afghans. The use of the innovative Tri-Wall Air Delivery (TRIAD) deployment system in the back of specially equipped C-17s and C-130s,23 ensured that the drops would not endanger anyone on the ground. More than two million “culturally neutral” humanitarian rations were delivered during the first two months of the conflict.24 Lt. Col. Anne Morris, Chief of the Air Force’s Strategic Communication Division, further explained the Air Force’s role in this mission:

The public and media were stuck on the fact that what the Air Force does is drop bombs. An event like this presents an opportunity to shine a light that we knew was there all along. What the Air Force does is deliver

22 Capt. Krista Carlos, telephone interview (Jan. 29, 2002).


24 Tom Bowman and Ellen Gamerman, “Aid Distribution in Afghanistan Deteriorates; General Lawlessness Makes Task harder than it was Under Taliban,” The Baltimore Sun (Dec. 5, 2001), 6A.
effects...we don’t necessarily have to put a physical bomb on a target we
can drop food and have a desired effect.25

The Air Force’s humanitarian mission was covered in the national media such as
CNN and The New York Times. The Times article by reporter James Dao described a C-
17 airdrop mission in which it and two other aircraft released 51,000 rations overland in
Afghanistan:

Crouching before the door, his oxygen mask pressing hard against his
face, a staff sergeant named Paul signaled that the plane was one minute
from its target. Suddenly, with a rush like a powerful freight train
gathering speed, 42 boxes flew out the door, opening in midair and raining
their contents—bright yellow packets of food—on the country-side
below.26

While the U.S. military’s role in the humanitarian dimension of the war
received considerable attention, those missions directly related to combat naturally
received the predominant coverage. While intense news media interest in military
operations during wartime is per usual, coverage of organizational changes and
military hardware can vary. Since Sept. 11, 2001, mainstream media coverage of
esoteric military issues has dramatically increased, according to Morris:

The events have caused certain functions and missions to be spotlighted...
if you did a word search prior to September 11, you might find
information here and there in the [Quadrennial Review] literature, but now
you’re seeing it in all the day to day reporting...Long range bombing was
not a very popular subject...[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] are of course
new and being covered, which before it was just an aerospace industry
kind of topic.27

(Oct. 20, 2001), B4.
27 Morris.
Another public affairs asset on the information battlefield is the well-informed retired military officer employed as a paid network commentator. He or she is able to add to the depth and quality of the national debate, providing insight on military weapons, systems, law, procedures and culture. In an interview with *The New York Times*, retired Air Force General Donald Peck, explained that these analysts raise the awareness level beyond the mainstream, and if there weren’t military analysts, the news media would rely “on some kid from Brookings who has never served a day of his life.”

Morris further notes that retired military “commentators and analysts provide perspective and they counteract what is novel and bad...they help the networks to achieve that balance.”

There is also the tendency of some military analysts, long removed from the service, to speculate on areas and forces outside of their area of expertise. As stated by Peck, “When you seen an Army general explaining today’s B-52 bombers, he is on the feathered edge.” Retired Army General Wesley Clark, renown for his leadership during NATO’s Kosovo campaign of 1999 and now a paid military analyst for CNN stated, “I would never publicly remonstrate or second guess our commanders in Washington or on the ground. I learned during Kosovo that people on the outside don’t know enough. Even if you think you know, you don’t know.”

Insight provided by analysts raises the public awareness level beyond what can be

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29 Morris.

30 Stanley, B3.

obtained from three-minute television news headlines, which are usually based on various televised images.

G. Intercultural Communication

Government public affairs teams are increasingly challenged to reach non-English speaking audiences during international crisis. Depending on the geopolitical and ideological constructs of the involved regions, this can be a difficult process, as observed during the war against terrorism. Western communicators sought to connect with Arabic audiences through the Middle East news media to present the U.S. position, while responding to the Taliban and al Qeada propaganda. This required a composite of public affairs and diplomatic initiatives, with direct engagement by U.S. officials through interviews among politically diverse news outlets. Despite this effort, there were diffuse complications for leaders who were interviewed by the region’s extreme news media as noted by The New York Times Magazine contributor, Professor Fouad Ajami:

An American leader being interviewed on Al Jazeera will hardly be able to grasp the insinuations, the hidden meanings, suggested by its hostile reporters. No matter how hard we try, we cannot beat Al Jazeera at its own game.32

Since the communicator and journalist are operating from two different sets of cultural and linguistic assumptions there is a risk of misinterpretation which will be reduced with the interviewee’s effort to look beyond the western construct of the immediate situation, with broader appeal to universal values. Invoking principles which transcend cultural barriers, such as the respect for life, importance of family and sovereignty, while avoiding historical, social and religious sensitivities, will build

bridges and reduce gaps. The journalist, audience and communicator will be able to “draw upon matching semantic assumptions,” which is essential to effective communication, as noted by Raymond Cohen, author of *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*.33

In order to communicate effectively to a target international audience, familiarity with global and regional media market forces is fundamental, according to McCoy. Public affairs professionals who are attentive to media trends, coverage patterns, the range of attitudes and opinions will be able to “predict what is going to happen” in different markets during crisis and peacetime, and be able to advise leaders accordingly.34 This will also help leaders to stay apprised on the host nation’s receptivity, whether there are problems and which outreach methods would be most effective, as noted by Capt. Ron Watrous:

> By keeping a watchful eye on the political realm, we’re able to advise commanders as to the tone in [a particular] country, and whether or not it’s a good idea for us to engage with the media or to emphasize our presence or de-emphasize the fact that we’re in that country, according to the agreements we have with the host nation.35

The challenge in communicating the U.S. military objectives to the Middle Eastern audience, was that the U.S. wasn’t “the relevant voice,” in the region, according to Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy,

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34 McCoy.

35 Maj. Ron Watrous, telephone interview (Feb. 6, 2001).
Charlotte Beers.\textsuperscript{36} The Middle East news media, which is naturally and firmly grounded in the religious and political forces shaping its society, was not readily open to allied communicators efforts to explain U.S. intentions. Beers explained that while the U.S. presented "reasoned and rational" policies, the competing view was "intensely emotional" and came "from a very different place than ration and reason."\textsuperscript{37} To further understand the Middle East media component of the information battlefield, it is helpful to take a brief look at the development of that region's news media.

\textbf{H. Middle East Media Market}

The Ottoman Chroniclers, who did not normally have much to say about what was going on in the lands of the infidels, reported the invention of printing and even devoted a few lines to Gutenberg...\textsuperscript{38}

Governmental control of information—and the press—has long been indicative of social and political processes of several Persian Gulf countries. Maintaining a reign on the spread of political ideas and movements ensured relative stability if not inspiration. By severely limiting interchange between the public and private spheres of influence, without transparency of action, some leaders have been relatively unchallenged politically.

This practice has historical roots in the 17\textsuperscript{th} Century, when the Ottoman Empire was a dominant world power. At least one Middle Eastern elite, familiar with


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Bernard Lewis, \textit{The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 years} (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 9.
the press in Europe, recognized and noted the implications and “dangers” of the newspaper in which “sensational lies” could be reported.\textsuperscript{39} Free flowing political thought would have been counter to the monarchial system of government which linked dispersed provinces ranging from the Mediterranean, Caspian and Black Seas to the Persian Gulf.

The French published the first known newspaper in the region around 1795 called the \textit{Gazette Francaise de Constantinople},\textsuperscript{40} a milestone which was soon followed by a few government news letters published by Egyptian and Turkish rulers which featured “laws and decrees” in long, formal text.\textsuperscript{41}

In 1840, an English expatriate published the first known commercial newspaper, \textit{The Journal of Events}, which was the first to be telegraphed to a broader Middle Eastern audience during the Crimean War (1853-1856).\textsuperscript{42}

The next milestone was the establishment of the Ottoman Empire’s first daily paper in 1860, which included “news from inside and outside the Empire,” written in concise prose suitable for journalism.\textsuperscript{43} During this era, the press was relatively free because elites didn’t view it as a political threat. This changed in the early 1950s when governments began to actively control news content.\textsuperscript{44} Leaders used state-controlled radio and television to reach larger audiences in their effort to instill

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Albert Hourani, \textit{A History of the Arab Peoples} (New York: MJF Books, 1991), 304.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Lewis, 11.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid}, 12.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Hourani, 393.
\end{itemize}
nationalistic values and mores. This practice was also employed by extremists of the late 20th Century who had media access, such as the Ayatollah Khomeini who advocated Islamic fundamentalism and espoused anti-western dogma.

The media industry within the region was closed until the arrival of U.S. troops and CNN in 1990. At the same time the Egyptian Radio-Television Union (ERTU) had “just negotiated a deal with ARABSAT” for a regional satellite network “Spacenet” which began operations “at the start of the Gulf War.”45 While CNN was making headlines for being the first network to provide live, global television, the Egyptian network was countering Iraqi propaganda on the Arab Street. It probably had greater impact on the opinions of the external Arabic audience since few in the region had satellite dishes. Nevertheless, it was another voice in addition to the state controlled networks providing the Arabic-speaking audience war-related information.46

The arrival of CNN precipitated the rush towards privatization and the creation of new Arabic media venues.47 Following in the path tread by ERTU more than 20 Middle Eastern, commercial satellites were launched, increasing competition among channels including,48 Kuwait’s *Orbit*, the London-based *Middle East Broadcasting Corp*, Lebanon’s *LBC*, Qatar’s *Al Jazeera*49 and Saudi Arabia’s *Arab

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46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid, 71.

49 Ibid.
Radio and Television. Despite the proliferation of networks, the direct impact of satellite television is less certain since a small number—an estimated 10 percent—of the viewing public has the necessary satellite equipment. More information is shared among groups via "word of mouth," by the few who have satellites. This will likely remain constant as satellite broadcasting is still a relatively new phenomenon, and has yet to replace the preferred local and national television milieu to which an approximate 80 percent of Arabs "have access."

Arabs typically watch their own national TV networks. But when they are in doubt about the accuracy of the reporting, they turn to one of several trusted state-subsidized radio services, and America should do the same to get its message across. These include, most notably, the BBC World Service, the French government's Radio Monte Carlo and Egyptian Radio.

Of all the Arabic satellite television media available, Al Jazeera received more attention than the others during the war against terrorism due to its unique proximity to the Taliban, in addition to its public relations efforts. While it is the first 24-hour Arabic news channel and has attracted a following with its controversial fare, it is not the only around-the-clock satellite network broadcasting with some autonomy in the

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51 Ibid.

52 Mike Adams, "Seeking an Arab view of news: Alternatives: Many Arab-Americans and Muslims who don't trust U.S. press organizations go to Web sites and other news outlets to get a different perspective," The Baltimore Sun (Dec. 27, 2001), 2A.


54 Brooks, 185.

55 Fandy, B2.
region. Nor is it necessarily the most popular Arabic network among the mainstream Arab audience, according to Mamoun Fandy, Egyptian-born Professor of Near East-South Asian studies at the National Defense University. He indicates that the broader Arabic public actually prefers MBC and Orbit. “Relatively few in the region watch Al Jazeera…and those who do, don’t necessarily trust it,” he states. It is “a channel that many in the region consider to be controlled by Islamic fundamentalists and Arab nationalist demagogues.”

I. Al Jazeera

Following the overthrow of his father’s government in 1995, Qatar’s Emir, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Thani, invested $150 million to establish the satellite television network, Al Jazeera or “The Peninsula,” with the intention of projecting a more democratic image of the peninsular, oil-producing nation.

During the “fog of war” a variety of western driven, misperceptions arose regarding the Al Jazeera, with many alluding the network was a democratic ideal. The network’s unabridged broadcast of terrorists’ statements which were intended to incite others to commit egregious crimes, counters the assertion that it is an independent media outlet, and instead confirms that it is ideologically aligned with the violent undercurrents of radical Islamism. Despite itself, it is the first of its peer competitors to offer two opposing views and has notably reported on government

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56 Fandy, B2.


58 Michael Dobbs, “Qatar TV Station a Clear Channel to the Middle East,” The Washington Post (Oct. 9, 2001), C01.
related corruption in Syria and torture in Qatar.\textsuperscript{59} This said, the network’s promise as an independent media outlet will only be realized if it becomes free of Osama bin Laden’s tyranny. Until then, it will ensure Islamic militants’ continue to have considerable firepower on the information battlefield.

\textbf{J. Emerging Islamic News Framework}

‘The Arab world is fascinated with Al Jazeera because it allows people to bypass the usual toned down, state controlled coverage,’ says Naila Nabil Hamdy, a professor at the American University in Cairo. ‘In today’s environment, that could have consequences. It could inflame people that are not used to that kind of coverage.’\textsuperscript{60}

Al Jazeera’s appeal to the broader Arab public is based on its presentation of the news from an Islamic framework and news narrative, through which it regularly provides details about the Palestinian struggle and government excesses not normally represented in the region’s state-controlled media. One example of this is the network’s focus on the “intifadeh” which refers to a phase of Palestinian resistance which aims to “weaken and discourage the occupation,” of Israel, “rather than attract attention,” a tactic common to earlier efforts.\textsuperscript{61} The network has reportedly been accused of partisanship by parties from both sides of the conflict, with its replaying of the image in which a Palestinian child is killed on one hand, while conversely playing video “of Gazans firing mortars at Israeli communities,” on the other.\textsuperscript{62} Its bias was revealed with its echo of bin Laden’s position, calling U.S. troops “the enemy,” while


\textsuperscript{60} Peter Johnson, “Al Jazeera’s Stature is Rising,” \textit{USA Today} (Oct. 9, 2001), 4D.

\textsuperscript{61} Lewis, 366.

calling various Palestinians who died in their effort to hurt Israelis “martyrs.” Its incessant coverage of the conflict has kept the issue on regional leaders’ agenda, but it has also ensured the continued boiling of the violent situation, which has made it difficult for intermediaries to proceed with peace negotiations.64

In addition to its coverage of the Palestinian conflict, the network has also reportedly broached other taboo subjects such as “the absence of democratic institutions, the persecution of political dissidents and the inequality of women.”65 This becomes a bit shallow in light of the network’s excessive coverage of the oppressive Taliban regime and al Qaeda terrorists which would deny those very democratic ideals. If the network were truly aiming for open and unfettered debate, it would not have promulgated the terrorists’ blisteringly long diatribes—without critical analysis—while skewing opposing leaders’ statements to appeal to the base of Arab nationalistic mores. Consequently the network has few western defenders. Though for different reasons, the network has negligible support among Middle Eastern governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 66 Bahrain, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Jordan, which censured Al Jazeera by variously barring reporters and closing bureaus.67

63 Fandy, B2.

64 Michael Jansen, “Arab TV wins war exclusive,” The Irish Times (Oct. 9, 2001), 8.

65 Sciolino, B6.

66 Johnson, 4D.

67 Shadid and Donnelly, A19.
K. CNN and Al Jazeera

The network, which gets a $30 million annual subsidy from the Qatar government, is quickly making its mark as the forum of choice for Islamic radicals. As such, some have dubbed it the Bin Laden Broadcasting Corp. ⁶⁸

There are many opinions of Al Jazeera, as noted by “60 Minutes” host Ed Bradley, who remarked in one instance that it is “a tiny television network with a big mouth” and said in another that it is the only Arab network in which you “hear an opposing view.” ⁶⁹ To this end, it reportedly provides a forum for wide ranging debate and “freewheeling arguments that borrow as much from an American daytime talk show as they do from CNN’s ‘Crossfire.’” ⁷⁰

Al Jazeera has often been compared to CNN, because they are both pioneers of the 24-hour news market for their respective countries. That is where the similarity ends, as CNN does not eulogize terrorists nor does it hang a glorified picture of Osama bin Laden or any other demagogue in its headquarters. ⁷¹ Al Jazeera severed its association with CNN in February 2002, when the American network broadcast an Al Jazeera recorded interview with bin Laden. During the interview, which took place in October 2001, bin Laden gratuitously admits his involvement in the terrorist attacks, and describes the twisted way of his thinking. Many believe that Al Jazeera didn’t broadcast the tape because it would have probably alienated or disgusted its intended audience.

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⁶⁸ Johnson, 4D.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Shadid and Donnelly, A19.

How do some at CNN feel about the network some have jestingly described as “the CNN of the Middle East?” Anchorman Aaron Brown said in the early weeks of the war, “The way I looked at Al Jazeera is that it’s a resource I’m glad we have.” He further explained that it is a media outlet, the first of its kind in the Middle East and it is trying to break down established barriers. “They need to be viewed in the context of the audience they’re dealing with.” He added, “They’re doing things no one else in the Arab world is doing. At least these guys are talking to Colin Powell and Condi Rice, they’re carrying the Pentagon briefings. Are they perfect in the way an American audience might expect? Perhaps not. But it is a window to the Arab world to hear the American position.”72 Fandy states that U.S. observers have viewed Al Jazeera a bit too generously:

Everything I read in the American press about al-Jazeera—that it is independent and unbiased — sounds as if it is taken word for word from a pamphlet put out by the Einstein Consulting Group, a London public relations firm hired by Qatar to promote the network. Americans have taken the bait.73

During a 1998 Al Jazeera broadcast, bin Laden called on adherents to “target all Americans.”74 This may have contributed to the anti-west fervor behind the tragic attacks on bombings of U.S. federal and military facilities in Africa, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. U.S. leadership filed complaint when the network replayed the 1998 spiel several times in the days following the September 11 attacks.75 The network’s

72 Eric Deggans, “News Tuned into Middle East,” St. Petersburg Times (Nov. 25, 2001), 1F.
73 Fandy, B2.
74 Sciolino, B6.
75 Ibid.
practice of airing bin Laden’s propaganda, sometimes unedited, ensures the inclusion of “false boasts and misinformation,” according to Eric Deggans.  

It was apparent the first videotape address by Osama bin Laden via Al Jazeera was of broadcast quality, seemingly scripted and recorded well in advance, with transmission to CNN within an hour of the first air attack. “It was put out for the purpose of giving people the impression that Osama bin Laden was speaking after the attack,” stated White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer.  

It was also distributed to shore up support among the broader Moslem audience, appealing to the Palestinian, anti-west and Islamic issues in an effort to justify his group’s violence. As noted by one reporter, this and later videos “showed the political sophistication of an organization that has hijacked the issues most sensitive to Arabs to justify its terror.”  

Al Jazeera provided airtime for Osama bin Laden’s messages, which ranged from the Palestinian issue to Islam’s jihad. Though the terrorist network had little attachment to the Palestinian situation prior to the conflict, it became its cause de celebre in its effort to excuse its violence. The first video depicts bin Laden and his “top lieutenants” trying to “tap into widespread and deep sympathy for the Palestinians throughout the Muslim world.”  

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76 Deggans, IF.  
78 Roula Khalaf, “Al-Qaeda uses Qatar satellite channel to declare holy war and tell Arab leaders that their fight against US is to liberate Palestine,” The Financial Times (London) (Oct. 8, 2001), 4.  
79 Miller, 1.
worse—as when he called on “Muslims to attack Americans,” frequented the Al Jazeera airwaves. In attempts to divide Islam’s followers from the rest of the world, bin Laden tried to claim it was a “holy war.” He said “this is a matter of religion and creed,”80 he said, which was further expressed in a faxed statement to Al Jazeera, when he beckoned for “a jihad against the U.S.”81 This is a form of polarizing propaganda that attempts to paint the opponent as everything opposite of “divine.”82 As a result of this propaganda, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell asked Qatar’s Emir to have Al Jazeera “tone down” its incendiary coverage.83

It is through the news media that Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network revealed devastation to a worldwide audience and likewise it is through the news media he admitted his involvement in and planning of the September attacks. With the discovery of a video by forces in Kanadahar, Afghanistan, the U.S. was able to counter skeptics in the proving of bin Laden’s complicity. In the tape bin Laden is heard describing his group’s calculation of the number of floors and casualties of the World Trade Center.84

81 Jansen, 8.
82 AFTTP 3-5, Vol. 36.
83 Dobbs, C01.
L. Coalition Information Center

Communicators responded to the Taliban and al Qeada propaganda. When the conflict began, the Taliban would release a statement from Islamabad, usually an unverifiable allegation, at 2 p.m. or earlier Central Asia time. It would be 5 a.m. in Washington D.C., which made it difficult for the U.S. to respond quickly, which enabled the Taliban’s words to be the lead story in news media overseas. People were “waking up on the other side of the world,” listening to the Taliban’s statements, and were unable “to get the facts from anybody in a position of responsibility,” as explained by White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer.85

In addition to the information released by the information centers, many U.S. officials from the administration were interviewed on various Middle Eastern networks to articulate the U.S. position. Among them were the Secretaries of Defense and State, National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.87 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was interviewed by Hafez al-Mirazi, Al Jazeera’s Washington D.C. bureau chief “six days after the Sept. 11 attacks, and days before he gave interviews to a number of leading American publications.”86 These leaders explained this war was waged diplomatically, economically and militarily, and was not directed against Moslems or Afghans. “Its against terrorism and terrorists and the senior people harboring terrorists,” said Rumsfeld. Ms. Rice, in an interview with Al Jazeera, also resounded U.S. goals and discussed the importance of a free media establishment:


86 Sciolino, B6.
What we do not need is to have a kind of a free rein [for bin Laden] to sit and use the airwaves to incite attacks on innocent people...If I did not have respect for Al Jazeera, I would not be doing this interview. I think it's important that there be a network that reaches broad Arab audiences, and the United States believes in freedom of the press. We believe that the press is one of the most fundamental bases for democracy.  

Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Chris Ross, who is fluent in Arabic, also made several appearances on Al Jazeera and other Arabic networks, to counter bin Laden’s assertions. The New York Times reported that he “spoke in flawless classical Arabic, using religious terms” responding to each of bin Laden’s points.” The terrorists asserted the war was “ideological,” and therefore “Muslims have to ally themselves with Muslims,” Ross countered stating, “it is not against Islam; it is against the perpetrators of these crimes. The terrorists are twisting facts and forging history. They openly call for violence and murder and insist on making this war a religious war.” He also admonished the Taliban regime “for having ‘killed thousands of Afghans who do not share their extremist ideas.’”

M. Mainstream or Extreme Arab Media?

The Associated Press reported that Al Jazeera’s broadcast of the U.S. National Security Advisor’s interview included only those “comments likely to inflame Arab passions.” Similarly, the network’s interview with the U.S. Secretary of State, “was sandwiched between anti-American propaganda and Taliban messages,” which made

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88 MacFarquhar and Rutenberg, 2.

89 Ibid.

it difficult for the U.S. message to be heard. In comparison, Egyptian TV's broadcast of an interview with the Secretary was fairly presented and resonated with the audience:

America does succeed when it reaches out to the mainstream media. For example, on Nov. 5, Powell gave an interview that was aired on all 14 Egyptian TV channels. It was well received by Egyptians for several reasons. First the journalist who conducted the interview, Mohammed Elsetouhi, does not cater to the lowest instincts of anti-American sentiment. In addition to saturating the airwaves, the interview also made headlines in almost all Arab newspapers. The translation was exceptional and honest.91

The question remains. To whom should the U.S. seek to communicate with and on what channel? In analysis, it seems less advantageous for officials to engage with extreme news media elements in an effort to reach the irrational, radical youth or their leaders. As noted by Williams, who was the United States Air Force public affairs liaison in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Operations cell:

There was discussion in the IO cell that it doesn't make sense to target Arab press, if we want to get to those young men who want to be suicide bombers...those same people who want to destroy the US and west, want overthrow the Saudi royal family, not because of human rights abuses, but for their own version of what is right. Not easily defined by flooding the world with our messages and its entirety is going to solve the problem.92

A more effective approach would be to engage the neutral and centered media outlets to explain U.S. intent to those on the fence by expressing universally accepted values. That would help ensure a more accurate representation of U.S. policy and leaders' views, without the pitfalls of trying to appeal to an inherently biased, peripheral audience. Some of the more "popular" and "mainstream" news media

91 Ibid.
92 Williams.
outlets include the *Asharq Al-Awsat* and *Al-Hayat* newspapers, in addition to the London based MBC, Abu Dhabi TV and Egyptian TV, according to Fandy. *Asharq Al-Awsat* "Arab News" is considered to be pro-American, and is one of the most widely read, balanced Arabic publications with "the most popular" website "in the Arab world."93 This knowledge of the region's media market is an invaluable asset particularly if an adversary in the region engages in propaganda and the U.S. position needs to be heard. Despite its obvious collusion with the al Qeada terrorists, Al Jazeera is not "the worst of the Arab and Muslim media outlets," according to David Hoffman of Foreign Affairs. He notes, "editorials in Egypt’s leading newspaper, *al Ahram,*" accused "the United States deliberately poisoned relief packages and dropped them in heavily mined areas of Afghanistan." He states this sensationalistic, extremism is promulgated by those outlets which, "see their role as ‘mobilizational’ vehicles for an Islamic society under siege from the forces of Western globalization, U.S. hegemony, and Israeli domination of Palestine."94 Due to the obvious bias of such news organizations, Fandy urges that the U.S. "should work with the media outlets across the region...where it has the best shot of getting a fair hearing."

**N. Al Jazeera and CNN Ethics**

The U.S. government asked networks to exercise caution prior to airing al Qeada’s unedited commentaries, following the broadcast of the first lengthy video. Officials were concerned the statements also included signals to terrorist operatives to take some form of action. All networks obliged, saying they would no longer air

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93 Ibid.

94 Hoffman, 88.
terrorists’ commentaries without reviewing and editing them first. In a report published on CNN’s website, the media giant stated its company policy is “to avoid airing any material that we believe would directly facilitate any terrorist acts...in deciding what to air, CNN will consider guidance from appropriate authorities.” In addition, a panel of senior executives will formally preview the al Qeada material to determine if there is any news value, a basis from which they will make editorial decisions.

The Society of Professional Journalists code of ethics indicates that news media should “seek the truth and report it, minimize harm, act independently and be accountable.” Whether the network is CNN or Al Jazeera, the unfiltered broadcast of bin Laden’s call for attacks on Americans, is a compromise of these ethics. In CNN’s case, it quickly instituted guidelines showing institutional accountability and responsibility. Al Jazeera is not subject to the same peer review, and of course it lacks the legal constraints and reference of what is protected speech, as that which exists in the U.S.

Its facilitation of incendiary dialogue would not be protected in the United States. While the Supreme Court has placed few legal restrictions on U.S. news media, there are certain types of prohibited speech to include that which incites others

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96 Ibid.


98 Julie F. Grimes, Interim Executive Director, Less than one percent of the SPJ membership is from other than U.S.
Americans, arguably falls into this category, transcending the parameters of a media and law enforcement, to one of national security.

[Al Jazeera's] seething dispatches from the "streets of Kabul" or the "streets of Baghdad" emphasize anti-American feeling. The channel's numerous call-in shows welcome viewers to express opinions that in the United States would be considered hate speech.99

"We are giving freedom of the media, freedom of speech. There isn't a television station out there in the Arab world that you can say is free."100 By becoming the terrorists' principal "mouthpiece," the network became a representative of their bankrupt values, their cause and their violence, which are the antithesis of democratic principles. Uncritical broadcasts have ranged from depraved bin Laden events which include that terrorist's celebration of the USS Cole destruction, to the punctuation of the Taliban's regime, such as the destruction of 2,000-year-old Buddha statues in 2001, artifacts which represented Afghanistan's Hindu culture.101

As indicated in this section, the argument that Al Jazeera is "a beacon of free speech" in the region, is suspect. The network may change and mature overtime, perhaps it will become freed from the terrorists' tyranny, but more than likely it will become ever more caught up in that militant undercurrent. While it is difficult to know of Al Jazeera's future, one thing is certain. As the lone news outlet welcomed by the Taliban, it had a very curious proximity—to the terrorist organization responsible for more than 3, 500 deaths in America and hundreds elsewhere.

99 Ajami, 48.

100 Shadid and Donnelly, A19.

101 Ibid.
O. Information Operations

A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful.\textsuperscript{102}

The information battlefield has evolved considerably since Prussian officer Karl Von Clausewitz, vanguard of modern military doctrine, wrote those words in his 19\textsuperscript{th} Century cannon \textit{On War}. He was referring to the subjectivity of human observation during combat. Of course warriors of his era didn’t have the benefit of real-time satellite imagery, aerial reconnaissance platforms, interconnected computing networks, global news networks, public affairs processes or the multitude of other human and technological activities that furnish the modern, communication battlescape. 21\textsuperscript{st} Century leaders gather, analyze and utilize information through these processes, within the framework of “Information Operations,” in the effort to attain information superiority. While there are many functional areas within this purview, it is the Public Affairs Operational role that is to be considered, from the perspective that its mission of providing timely and accurate information is critical to success on the information battlefield.

Think of this realm as a public information battlespace where your objective is to gain and maintain the initiative and achieve public understanding and support. Commanders gain and maintain the initiative by providing fast, complete, truthful information to the media fires—in order to gain advantage over the adversary.\textsuperscript{103}

Public affairs practitioners are more challenged than ever to keep pace with the forces shaping this burgeoning media environment, while meeting increased expectations among different internal and external spheres of influence. That is why the inclusion of

\textsuperscript{102} Karl Von Clausewitz, \textit{On War} (New York: Random House, 1943), 51.

\textsuperscript{103} AFTTP 3-1, Vol. 36., 3.13.4.1.3.1, 23.
public affairs into the Information Operations process is a natural development, when considered in view of the larger information landscape and the need for coordination and deconfliction of information efforts among core government information agencies. Public affairs must be part of the process to ensure channels which inform domestic and broader international publics will not be compromised by other agencies’ counter propaganda efforts, since public trust is the sole valuation and currency of the U.S. government’s credibility.

The extension of the Information Operations domain to include public affairs, hasn’t changed the public affairs mission, according to Watrous, who has worked extensively with the IO community and serves currently as the Public Affairs Chief of Plans and Readiness at Air Combat Command Headquarters, Langley AFB, VA:

> We’ve been doing the same things in PA for years now. The difference is now we’re starting to link what we do to the operational community, and that’s a vital tie. The past public affairs motto was you kept the PA officer in a glass case— and in case of emergency break glass... But folks in the operational and command channels are starting to realize in larger numbers that we can’t afford to do that in today’s environment.  

There are two general directions in which leaders employ Public Affairs Operations within the Information Operations domain. Public Affairs role in "Information in Warfare" (IiW) includes gathering and content analysis of the daily news media reports from foreign and domestic sources, while its “Information Warfare,” (IW) effort is focused on the release of true and accurate information to counter adversarial propaganda. In the public information environment, this disables the adversary’s ability to influence peoples’ attitudes and behaviors, according to Col. McCoy:

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104 Watrous.

105 AFTTP, 2.13.4.3.1, 16.
If you know that an adversary’s propaganda machine is going to come up with some untruths, and get them out into the press, especially in the foreign press, and if we know that in advance, then, in working with the media, we can get truth out there before hand.  

Unlike corporate or political public relations professionals who must worry about the stock market or election cycle, the public affairs team serving the military doesn’t engage in spin or propaganda. It is committed to preserving the trust of the American and international publics by ensuring timely and factual information and projecting an accurate picture of the U.S. military during peace and war. By providing “maximum disclosure and minimum delay” in concert with commander directives, citizens are kept informed on military readiness, use of tax dollars and the proud service of their sons and daughters in uniform. “We are in the truth projection business,” said McCoy, “and truth always wins.”

This is further addressed in the Smith and Mundt Act of 1948, which expressly “prohibits public affairs operations from using propaganda techniques to intentionally misinform the U.S. public, congress or U.S. media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence U.S. decision makers and public opinion.” The law was passed by lawmakers with recent “memories of the German propaganda machine,” known for its promulgation of Nazi rhetoric.

There are few governmental functional agencies which are permitted to distribute propaganda—and only to foreign audiences—and under specific conditions.

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106 McCoy.

107 McCoy.

108 AFTTP, 3.13.4.3.5.1, 45.

Psychological Operations is key among those organizations, and is the primary agency which gathers, analyzes and distributes such information in the overseas environment during conflict. Watrous states it is essential for public affairs officials to know what Psychological Operations teams are doing to ensure public information processes are preserved, while being able to inform the public of those efforts:

That’s why its vital that we work with psych ops and make sure that we don’t interfere with what they’re trying to do with the hearts and minds aspect of combat. At the same time [we] don’t have them trespassing on our turf and sharing air operations to the American public via Al Jazeera.110

The primary information distribution system used by Psychological Operations is its war-hardened “Commando Solo” EC-130E aircraft, affectionately called a “flying radio station.”111 During its service in Afghanistan, the specially equipped and manned platform broadcast information and dropped pamphlets in the local dialects of Pashto and Dari.112 The messages served to warn innocent Afghans of incoming strike aircraft, as well as to encourage surrender among Taliban forces. Williams further noted that the public affairs staff was allowed to “see what the program wheels looked like,” which included “news and music”—points which were communicated to interested news media.

We’d be wise in this career field to put aside the fear that many of us have about psychological operations...we have to understand that it is another weapon in the toolkit and commanders are going to use it. So it is incumbent upon us to understand that and to know what they are doing and not doing, and be able to communicate that.113

110 Watrous.


112 Ibid.

113 Williams.
With proper planning and execution of Public Affairs Operations and other information efforts, the effect is to “gain the information initiative” increasing transparency on the situation by removing any camouflage or hyperbole. Obtaining leverage on the information battlefield, is in some ways much more difficult than obtaining the upper hand in actual combat, according to Williams, as the information environment “is much more fluid and much more difficult to control.”

P. Taliban Propaganda

While Al Jazeera was the primary purveyor of bin Laden’s vitriolic speech, it was one of many outlets which transmitted statements put forward by the Taliban’s Ambassador to Pakistan. Allied coalition information centers were established to overcome the problem posed by the time difference respective of the different international news cycles in Islamabad, London and Washington D.C. In the early weeks of the conflict, Taliban claims that had been reported without the benefit of a real-time, U.S. response. No western media were actually permitted into the country, with the few news outlets being al Qaeda-dominated press forums of Al Jazeera, Afghan Islamic Press agency and the Voice of Shari’ah (Islamic Law) radio.

This ban was suddenly reversed when Taliban members invited approximately 20 western journalists to site survey an attacked village in Karam, claiming more than 160

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114 Ibid.


117 “Break Taliban with Facts,” The Omaha World Herald (Oct. 9, 2001), 6b.
people had been killed in U.S. attacks. Not a single journalist saw any evidence that substantiated the Taliban’s claims, other than what one Associated Press reporter described as the appearance of “18 freshly dug graves.” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld responded that the Taliban claim was “ridiculous.” It came to the attention of U.S. officials that the nighttime media tour “during airstrikes,” may have been a “deliberate attempt” by the Taliban to endanger the journalists, with the expectation that coalition forces would be bombing in the vicinity. The renegade regime had clearly applied the propaganda technique of claiming false atrocities with the intention of engendering some form of international or regional sympathy, but news reports from the site tour mainly reflected some measure of skepticism, notes The Boston Globe:

For news outlets, the Taliban’s sudden friendliness toward the media raised a troubling issue: how to balance the newsworthiness of a rare trip to the battlefront with its obvious propaganda value to the Taliban, who are hoping that allegations of civilian casualties will enrage the Muslim world.

Other Taliban propaganda efforts included the assertion that they had “shot down two U.S. helicopters and killed 50 U.S. troops in the process.” The Taliban broadcast via Al Jazeera, pictures of “two sets of rubber-tired wheels, a war trophy shown off to the television cameras by Taliban commanders, who claimed they were


119 Ibid.


121 Jurkowitz, A19.

the landing gear of a US helicopter...”123 Again, Taliban claims were proven false. A helicopter had crash-landed due in the Ghazni province due to bad weather. Though crew members sustained minor injuries no one was killed in the mishap.124 A second helicopter successfully rescued them and both crews were returned safely. An F-14 Tomcat destroyed what was left of the UH-47 Chinook on the ground—a standard procedure when leaving the remains of an aircraft in enemy territory.125 Taliban members found the piece and used it for propaganda purposes.

In another instance, the U.S. received intelligence information which indicated that the Taliban regime was going to poison U.S. humanitarian rations given to Afghans. The U.S., which has donated “more than 80 percent of the food used to feed” Afghan refugees since the Soviet’s invasion in the 1980s,126 launched a counter offensive to prevent the Taliban from sickening its people, explained Williams:

We got the report at eight, got declassification by ten, by one we had the [press] briefing for Admiral Stufflebeem. We didn’t want to lead with that information, [because] we didn’t want engage in propaganda. We had it held for response to query. One of the networks asked and we responded, the result was Taliban was now on the defensive...they came back and said, ‘what type of country would poison its people,’ [our answer was] well the same type of country that would kill its people. We still believe that we stopped many innocent people from getting killed or poisoned.127


125 Ibid.


127 Williams.
Another instance of Taliban propaganda occurred when they began to lose their hold in different parts of Afghanistan. They placed various pieces of artillery, including tanks and the like, in “protected spaces,” such as mosques. In one such situation, the U.S. aimed—and hit—the tank, leaving the mosque untouched.128 Similarly, the Taliban hid their people among the Afghans, so as to not be detected an act which was called “cowardly” by Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem.129

Q. Public Diplomacy

On the information battlefield public diplomacy is one of the most important elements which figure in the U.S. long-term battle for the “hearts and minds” of non-western, Arab audiences. While there are many U.S. programs, perhaps those which are broadcast are among the most prominent and successful, because they can offer news and entertainment prohibited by some authoritarian governments.

In the years immediately following World War II, several U.S. radio broadcasting initiatives were implemented in Europe, intended to inform on American democratic ideals while countering communist propaganda. The Soviet Union’s enclosure of Berlin in 1948 precipitated legislators’ interest in federally funded, international broadcasting, which was proscribed in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 with the official inception of the “Voice of America” radio network.130 VOA was plagued with controversy and set backs in its early years, not least of which was


due to the disagreement about its focus. Lawmakers disagreed whether its intent should be the promulgation of news or anti-communist information. Over time, it became chiefly focused on the broadcast of pro-democracy, anti-Communist messages into Europe and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{131}

The U.S. State Department had oversight of the network until 1960 when the U.S. Information Agency\textsuperscript{132} began managing VOA, in addition to WORLDNET, Radio and TV Marti and Film Service.\textsuperscript{133} VOA held a news standard equivalent to any commercially owned media, as its 1976 charter specifies, “VOA will serve as a reliable and authoritative source,” it will be “accurate and objective,” and “will present a balanced projection of significant American thought and institutions.”\textsuperscript{134}

Other private, non-profit broadcast agencies of Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia also received funds from the U.S. government, and had Congressional oversight, but were independently controlled.\textsuperscript{135} VOA and “Radio Free Europe” have been credited with the inculcation of democratic ideas, and subsequent democratic transitions of countries which formerly composed the “East Block.”

USIA was disbanded in 1998 by President Bill Clinton’s signing and Congress’ passage of “the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.” This move discontinued several U.S. public diplomacy initiatives overseas, though VOA


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
survived. It was absorbed by the "independent federal entity" called the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors and today it transmits in 53 languages worldwide, has several television channels and offers several Internet-based news sites.\textsuperscript{136}

Interest in VOA and other public diplomacy initiatives waned with the Cold War's end. In the months following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, interest was renewed, and the agency was authorized to increase its broadcasts into many Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia countries. During this period, it also drew negative attention from some lawmakers "for interviewing people not sympathetic to the US."\textsuperscript{137} In one less controversial instance, it broadcast in "dozens of languages" portions bin Laden's admission of his involvement in the terrorist attacks, which was accompanied by "President Bush's response."\textsuperscript{138}

The network was an important part of the counter information calculus because it transmits in Arabic to more than 20 countries, in addition to other regional dialects, such as Pashto and Dari into Afghanistan and Farsi into Iran. According to a survey conducted by the network, its audience in Afghanistan views the network favorably:

Listeners surveyed indicated high regard for the relevance and credibility of the station's programming—94 percent agreed programs were 'relevant


to my interests,' and 72 percent agreed that [VOA] ‘gives you the facts and lets you form your own opinions.’\textsuperscript{139}

A related, federally funded broadcast program “Radio Free Afghanistan,” which was discontinued with the Soviet’s exit from that country in the late 1980s, has recently been revived by Congress. Legislators passed a $317 billion defense funding bill in January 2001, which “includes $19.2 million for one year,” of RFA broadcasting.\textsuperscript{140} Representative Henry Hyde explained the radio program is necessary to “represent the case of freedom and truth’ to otherwise inaccessible young people.” He added the program will help “marginalized youth who live without hope and without opportunity grow up into hate filled men and women who choose to bring death and destruction to themselves and to those around them.”\textsuperscript{141}

On other fronts, the U.S. State Department has implemented several programs during the war against terrorism, with the overall purpose of communicating U.S. policies and values to the broader, Arabic public. The Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers said, “We have, of course, as our ongoing fundamental communications platform simply to communicate the policies of the United States clearly, credibly and make them available everywhere.”\textsuperscript{142} To communicate these policies, Beers noted that it was important to

\textsuperscript{139} Voice of America homepage available at \texttt{<http://www.ibb.gov/pubaff/ arabic_farsi_coverage.html>}


\textsuperscript{142} U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, available at \texttt{<http://www.usinfo.state.gov>} (Nov. 9, 2001).
invoke U.S. values and principles. "Our policies are born of...words like 'freedom' and 'tolerance' and diversity of human beings.'"

Some of these policies are described through Internet-based depictions of American way of life in several languages, including Arabic.\textsuperscript{143} One link focused on American-Moslems' views in response to the terrorism of September 11. Another highlighted moderate Islam, in the multimedia and print product "Muslim Life in America," showing how it is consistent with freedom and individual rights, as opposed to the more radical Islamism.\textsuperscript{144}

The websites have also proven to be a tool for the state department to reach foreign journalists, academics, government officials and others in positions of influencing the opinions of people in their countries. Some journalists questioned the reliance of the U.S. on the Internet in delivering its message, when so few people in the poorer countries actually have access to it.\textsuperscript{145} U.S. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher responded:

Yes, we know that most people in sub-Saharan Africa don't have an Internet connection in their home, but we also know that broadcasters do, the professors do, the universities do, the governments do, the newspapers do, and that our embassies are actually very active in helping people with Internet access. Throughout Africa we have programs that establish public Internet access points.\textsuperscript{146}

The information made available through the Internet is complimented by other efforts to "open dialogue" with closed Moslem audiences, according to Beers. "I

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
think one of the ways we’ve started doing that is we’ve put together a council, an advisory group, which we’re calling ‘Dialogue with Islam.’ This group met “on a regular basis” with state department public affairs to provide help in the development of specific communication strategies and to also assist in locating potential spokespersons to help relay certain themes in other languages and countries. In a related program, there are exchanges of journalists and others to the region, according to Boucher.

Another initiative included the production of several pamphlets and internet multimedia programs. One program, translated into 14 languages, depicted the events of September 11; the Taliban’s treatment of Afghans; bin Laden admissions and comments; astonished responses from bin Laden’s “own peer class;” Afghans’ suffering; and the multi-lateral, multi-national condemnation of the attacks. Another initiative, “Rewards for Justice” encourages people to turn in terrorist suspects for a monetary reward, while another “Can a woman stop terrorism?” was based on precedents of females turning in suspicious people. One of the more publicized initiatives is the proposed creation of advertising spots to be broadcast through Middle Eastern and Central Asian news media.

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147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS

A. Chapter Overview

For someone who scorned modernity and globalization and who took refuge in an Islamic state that banned television, bin Laden proved remarkably adept at public diplomacy. — David Hoffman¹

The purpose of this study was to consider the mass communications dimension in the war against terrorism, with attention to the convergence of terrorism, news media and U.S. defense policy on the information battlefield. This review of global public affairs and media communications revealed the information dimension of national power has become equal to the other instruments of economy, diplomacy and military. Information has become a valuable resource and commodity, as it can at once serve as a force multiplier through “virtual projection” of capability through the media, while countering the misinformation disseminated by an adversary.

Research Question #1: What values compete on the information battlefield when the mass media cover the United States’ counter terrorism efforts?

As noted throughout this study, several technological and ideological elements comprise the information battlefield in the war against terror, to include the public affairs and information processes, the news media, various government related information operations, in addition to the political and social value systems which shape media perspectives. During the war against terrorism, leaders interacted with the elements of the information dimension to build the national wartime agenda in an effort to accomplish the national end. This served to inform the American public and international audiences regarding U.S. strategic wartime objectives. Terrorists,

¹ Hoffman, 87.
conversely, promulgated their anti-west message through sympathetic Middle Eastern media outlets.

**Finding 1. A post-attack U.S. worldview and news framework has emerged, replacing the post Cold War era perspective.**

Perhaps the most significant impact of mass communications on the information battlefield was its role in shaping the new U.S. post-attack worldview. This framework included a new set of assumptions from which U.S. officials, media and other public figures found agreement on national priorities, values and ideals. This does not suggest the U.S. news media gave up their "watchdog" role in their coverage of government issues, but it does imply journalists shared in the humanity of the "9-11" experience. Pentagon NBC producer Tammy Kupperman noted this sensitivity, "The bottom line is that America was attacked and we’re Americans. That does come into some of the reporting."² Government public affairs representatives such as Col. Doug McCoy described the news media’s professional acumen in telling the post-attack news story:

> I deal with the national press corps everyday. And every day I am impressed with the quality of work being done, their professionalism, each and every reporter that I’ve worked with, and I’ve been impressed with the humaneness, and their understanding on a very personal level of what’s at stake here in this country.³

The news media are often faced with ethical considerations when covering wartime events, as they must weigh their patriotic feelings with the demands of their profession, as noted by CNN’s Pentagon correspondent Jamie McIntyre. He

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² Tammy Kupperman, telephone interview (Feb. 8, 2002).

³ McCoy.
described how the unprecedented crisis had caused him “to change his thinking” regarding “traditional journalistic impulses and public’s right to know.”

Yes...its made you think about all kinds of things, about patriotism, about your role as an American, a human being, the very real loss that was suffered here at the Pentagon, people I knew and friends died here in this building, your own safety...In the end you still have a job to do and its still the same responsible decision that you have to make, anytime about how you inform the public, but not compromise operations—or put any lives in jeopardy.4

While reporters sought to keep Americans informed, they also went to extraordinary lengths to protect national security interests, noted Kupperman:

There was an internal memo that went out [within the news media] entitled “loose lips sink ships.” So there was a very rigid self censorship that went on, in addition to whatever the pentagon wouldn’t tell us about things...Even when we did find information, it didn’t always make it on the air because of concerns of jeopardizing the way the US military was going to conduct the conflict.5

While U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan faced danger in combat with Taliban combatants, journalists in the region were also at risk, as at least eight were killed during the conflict.6 Outside of the battle zone, news media were also vulnerable to acts of terrorism, as was the case with the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal’s South Asia bureau chief, reporter Daniel Pearl. He was in Pakistan researching the background on the “shoe bomber” suspect and went to meet with some members linked to al Qaeda when he was abducted. One month later a videotape surfaced in which his tragic fate was clear. One editorial, “A Tough Day

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5 Kupperman.

for Journalism,” noted that “Pearl’s death reminds us of what even many in the news biz take for granted: the extraordinary courage of those who put themselves in dangerous situations for the sake of the story.”

Finding 2. The U.S. government communicator’s role has expanded with greater focus on reaching international audiences.

While the global information battlefield became more complicated for U.S. communicators to navigate with emergence of competing ideologies and channels during the war against terrorism, there were also more opportunities to reach broader audiences. Satellite television networks, in addition to the Internet news media in the Middle East, offered previously unavailable means to reach that public. To more effectively engage those media, the U.S. established some new public information processes and organizations.

The changing communication capabilities of the government to reach multifold audiences abroad were varied, similar to the issues facing the larger defense establishment undergoing a significant transformation in the weeks following the attacks. The Quadrennial Defense Review, published Sept. 30, 2001, outlined measures to make the military and defense more flexible and able to meet the demands of this new era. Similarly, U.S. government communication and public diplomacy agencies were created, altered or reviewed. Most of the programs, such as the expansion of the State Department’s Public Diplomacy office, were permanent changes. The Department of Defense instituted several changes, to include the

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contracting of "a strategic communications firm." The United States Air Force instituted several information related initiatives at the headquarters level, to include the establishment of the Communications Directorate office, in addition to standing up a 24-hour public affairs operations center. Morris described changes as felt at the Pentagon:

[Air Force Public Affairs Director] General Rand is trying to get us to think in terms of 24-hour news environment...he's activated reservists, about a dozen, setting up a PA operations cell that is 24 hours. In the past we'd go and man the battle staff. He would like us to be 24 hour operations all the time. This has given impetus to this vision. We are in experimenting stage to see how this works.

24-hour operations were also crucial for the allied communication effort. The Coalition Information Centers in Islamabad, Kabul, Washington D.C. and London ensured that news media working in all time zones had accurate information in minimal amount of time. Consistency among agencies was critical, since messages were perceived by news media and other nations as a direct reflection of U.S. policy. A theme expressed in a mediated forum would therefore be fairly judged, assimilated, interpreted by journalists in their coverage of the conflict. This news fed back into the highly visible, international discourse among leaders with ripple effects where intercultural communication and other linguistic barriers remained.

**Finding 3. Information Operations includes traditional public affairs activities—the release of true and accurate information, to inform global audiences.**

Information Operations, which encompasses gathering, analyzing and releasing information, is the mechanism through which leaders counter terrorists’

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8 Hoffman, 84.
rhetoric. This construct has an increased importance in this new era of anti-terrorism defense, because it serves as a deterrent and counters propaganda. Information Operations practitioners work to neutralize terrorism and terrorists’ propaganda through various classified and unclassified methods, with one public measure being the projection of truth and capability through the international news media.

There was some media concern that public affairs would become compromised by the psychological operations function in the Information Operations domain. Public affairs representatives interviewed for this study indicated it is important for public affairs members to be involved in the Information Operations process, so they may know what the psychological operations team is doing, whether dropping leaflets or broadcasting, in order to be able to communicate unclassified portions of those operations to the American public. This coordination will also ensure there isn’t an inadvertent compromise of the U.S. and international public information processes by counter information operations.

There is room for debate regarding the perception of public affairs and psychological operations working closely together. The intents and purposes of that working relationship must be made transparent and should be communicated to interested news media, with assurances that there is strict adherence to the Smith and Mundt Act of 1948, which “prohibits public affairs operations from using propaganda techniques” to influence U.S. audiences.9 There has been considerable discussion as to whether the Smith-Mundt Act should include international, mainstream media,

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9 AFTTP, 3.13.4.3.5.1, 45.
which arguably informs U.S. audiences as well,\textsuperscript{10} as mentioned by Correspondent Barbara Starr, from “CNN Live Today:”

Well, you know, it's all part of this whole 21st century new world that we live in. Federal law actually doesn't allow the Pentagon to engage in propaganda or deception against U.S. media. It's a little bit more of a question about foreign media, but of course in today's world, what is really the foreign media? With the Internet and everything, the boundaries are simply disappearing, so that's something that they have to deal with.\textsuperscript{11}

Public affairs representatives associated with the military defense establishment, do not “spin” or propagate, as they do not have a concern for election cycles or stock market fluctuations. They do, however, emphasize the strengths of the military, as noted in this study, not only to inform taxpayers but also to deter potential adversaries. So in this context, there may be occasion where a non public affairs agency proposes a particular message, that is fact based, which can be communicated by the media relations team. Telling various publics of U.S. Armed Forces capability serves the bottom line of military related public affairs, which is to ensure the integrity and honor of the nation’s uniformed services, while leveraging global influence and deterrence.

\textsuperscript{10} AFTTP, 3.13.4.3.5.1, 45.

\textsuperscript{11} Bill Hemmer, Barbara Starr, “Pentagon Establishing Office of Strategic Influence,” CNN Live Today,” available at <need trans location>(Feb. 19, 2002).
Research Question 2: What impact has the mass media’s coverage of terrorism directed against the U.S. had on the U.S.’s efforts to counter such terrorism?

Finding 1. Transnational radical Islamism has escalated relative to the growth of the U.S. media industry.

Islam’s ‘cultural schizophrenia’—the struggle between tradition and Western secular modernity, between fundamentalism and globalization—haunts the souls of many Muslims and sometimes erupts in factional violence, as in Algeria or in the Palestinian territories.\(^\text{12}\)

The 30-year rise of “radical Islamism” and its associated terrorism has paralleled the exponential growth of the global media and information environment. As the U.S. emerged as the dominant economic, political and media superpower, it became the terrorists’ preferred target.

The terrorist incidents of 1979, 1985 and 2001 shared similarity in that they significantly impacted the defense and media landscape of their respective eras. The events of the earlier decades, however, did not transform the U.S. Cold War view of the world. The far more devastating terrorism of 2001 led to the complete transformation and shift in focus of post the Cold War national defense. The high-visibility, Middle East based terrorism of the earlier era was more often conducted on a limited scale, intended to cause target governments embarrassment rather than mass injury of innocent non-combatants. The terrorist group of this new century is more organized and equipped, and is trained to accomplish far more serious and deadly incidents in support of an extreme vision of Islamic society.

Terrorists manipulate sympathetic news media by committing the “first or worst” act of its intended sort of violence, to ensure that it will receive maximum

\(^{12}\text{Hoffman, 89.}\)
attention. This has the secondary effect of conferring status, often making the implicated terrorist a “martyr” in those communities to which it appeals. This also can lead to the contagion effect, as observed in the months following the terrorist attacks of September 11, when an independent, “Unabomber” figure sent anthrax-laden letters through the U.S. mail to various media and government offices. The kidnap and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was another example of contagion.

Finding 2. The U.S. news media have, at times, practiced self-censorship and adopted terrorism coverage guidelines (though they have unevenly adhered to those precepts) during the 30-year war against terrorism.

While the hostage crises of 1979 and 1985 were not the most violent acts of terrorism to occur, they brought to the fore more fundamental questions regarding news media coverage of terrorism. Despite overwhelming security threats posed by terrorism, the U.S. government has advised, but has never attempted to outright censor the press. Coverage of terrorism is justifiable because of the reaching national security and public implications. The act of prohibiting that coverage would deny the freedom terrorists seek to erode.

There is room for discussion regarding to what extent terrorism should be covered, however. The mediated environment is the primary front where the terrorism of Sept. 11, 2001, unfolded. The attacks were broadcast live to the global audience, then replayed for several days with considerable analysis and speculation. While coverage of the initial terrorist act was understood and is the duty of a free
press, repeated replay of that footage or the terrorists’ mantra is not be in the best interest of the U.S. or its people, due to the contagion and status conferral effects.

It is a finding of this study that the U.S. news media should proactively review its process and values in its coverage of terrorism. Through various consortiums over the years the news media industry has attempted to do this, usually in the aftermath of a terrorist situation. News organizations have established guidelines, with the most comprehensive list published following the 1985 TWA hostage crisis, though in practice those guidelines were seldom followed. While news media executives are more aware of the journalist’s role in the terrorists’ violent schemes, they should become even more circumspect and careful in consideration during this new era.

Finding 3. **Terrorists in the 1970s and 1980s manipulated the western news media, while the terrorists of the 1990s used the Middle East news media to promulgate their message.**

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, bin Laden turned to Al Jazeera to reach the two audiences that were essential to his plans—the Western news media and the Arab masses.\(^\text{13}\)

As reviewed during this study, terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s manipulated the western news media to play to international, non-Arab opinion. Terrorists of this new era seek to gain support among Arabic publics for their violence, by appropriating causes sensitive to Moslem audiences through the Middle Eastern news outlets. They also seek to influence the western press, however. Through the western news media, they can reach broader Arabic audiences, while intimidating targeted countries.

\(^{13}\) *Ibid*, 87.
Al Jazeera’s service as a spokes piece for the most extreme element of Islamic society represents what happens when extremist groups and an unmoored media outlet ideologically unite. While it promotes itself as independent news organization, Al Jazeera does not assume the responsibility that freedom demands, particularly with regard to the prohibition of hate speech.

Through Al Jazeera, bin Laden sought to capitalize on symbolic Islamic phraseology to frame the post September 11 conflict as a “holy war.” He and his cohorts also referenced the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, U.S. military presence in the Middle East, among other sensitive Arab issues to obtain support on the “Arab Street” of public opinion. The terrorists’ appropriation of these “causes” and usage of “jihad” rhetoric was challenged by allied communicators who argued that the war was not against Islam or Moslems, but against those responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and their sponsors.

Finding 4. To whom should the U.S. communicate in the Middle East and on what channel?

Despite the horrific nature of the September 11 attacks, communicating the moral impetus for the U.S. military response to audiences in the Middle East was a challenge. Although allied communication efforts were generally successful in countering propaganda, impact on longer-term attitudes in the region is less certain. It is challenging for western leaders to convince Middle Eastern audiences of the peril in supporting fanatics such as Osama bin Laden. This was apparent when the U.S. State Department’s “anti-terrorist” advertising campaign received mixed reviews in
Jordan, as noted by Hoffman. He stated “the majority of respondents were simply puzzled, protesting, ‘But bin Laden is a holy man.’”\textsuperscript{14}

A January 2002 Gallup poll released by CNN indicated that 61 percent of Moslem residents in nine different Persian Gulf countries “did not believe that Arab groups carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks,”\textsuperscript{15} while 53 percent “had unfavorable opinions of the United States.”\textsuperscript{16} Though these poll results reveal strong anti-American sentiment, the Al Jazeera-promulgated radicalism was eclipsed, at least for the short term by U.S. military successes in Afghanistan.

“Nothing wins like victory itself” is an often quoted phrase which best explains that no matter how many accurate, counter information efforts are waged in the Middle East, they will not be as successful in transforming negative attitudes as in the defeat of the terrorist element on the real battlefield. 

_Time_ columnist Charles Krauthammer notes the impact of this on public opinion:

The Arab street is deathly quiet. The mobs, exultant on Sept. 11 and braying for American blood, have gone home. There are no recruits headed to Afghanistan to fight the infidel. The old recruits, battered and beaten and terrified, are desperately trying to sneak their way out of Afghanistan. The reason is simple. We won.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite U.S. success in Afghanistan, the war against terrorism is not finished. It is expected to last for months if not years, due to the challenge of rooting out the

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}“Poll: Muslims call U.S. ‘ruthless, arrogant,’” \textit{CNN.Com}, available at <cnn.usnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/printThis?clickMap=printThis&fb=Y&url=h> (Feb. 26, 2002).

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17}Charles Krauthammer, “Only in Their Dreams,” Why is the Arab street silent? Because a radical Muslim fantasy has met reality,” \textit{Time Magazine} (Dec. 24, 2001), 60.
terrorist network. Throughout this effort, U.S. diplomatic and public affairs communication initiatives directed toward the global audience will continue, which brings forward the remaining question: To whom should the U.S. seek to communicate among Moslem audiences and on what channel?

The primary measure U.S. communicators undertook to reach the Arabic audience was through the moderate and extreme Middle Eastern news media. Their well-intentioned efforts to explain U.S. policy through the Taliban-affected Al Jazeera would have been better directed elsewhere. Al Jazeera edited and skewed U.S. officials’ comments in an effort to increase anti-western sentiment, while the more mainstream news media were more balanced in their broadcasts of western communicators.

Targeting the neutral and mainstream audience would be more effective, while the more extreme channels should be avoided. This will not overcome the larger problem of anti-western teachings, however. While media engagement may help to build short term rapport in the region, it will be far more difficult to solve the long term problem of anti-western sentiment, which will require public diplomacy initiatives intended to influence the “hearts and minds.”

To further the long term objectives of public diplomacy, and to shine a light on darkened corners of the Middle East where terrorism germinates, Hoffman argues “Washington should take on the more important job of supporting indigenous open media, democracy and civil society in the Muslim world.” 18 The debate regarding what extent should the U.S. become involved in the establishment of a free press, and

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18 Hoffman, 84.
democratic ideals in the Middle East and Central Asia, has strong views on both sides of the equation. The U.S., according to Hoffman, should “make use of the greatest weapon it has in its arsenal: the values enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”

It is where there is no light, freedom or information that angry young men become more susceptible to extremist ideas. They are completely swept into a political system that is consumed in its effort to maintain internal security, by blaming the outside world and the colonial past for the failures of its own policies, as noted by Hoffman. He states the U.S. should pressure for media liberation and laws governing that freedom, and do so by placing “strong diplomatic pressure including perhaps the threat of making future aid conditioned on compliance.”

The other side of this equation questions whether it is responsible for the U.S. to demand news media liberation when there is no infrastructure to support it. It would probably be seen by some elites as further evidence of “U.S. hegemony.” The pragmatic, albeit short term, view of the argument recognizes the U.S. could exert minimal influence in changing media laws and policies in the Middle East countries. The U.S. has finite resources and alliances in which it can tap into to motivate change, and should therefore direct most of its energies to those which are immediately necessary in the difficult, asymmetrical war against terrorism.

The geopolitical ramifications of quick and total media liberation in the Middle East could bring waves of violence due to the decades of social and political oppression. This should bring pause in an era of nuclear proliferation.

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19 Ibid. 85.

20 Ibid.
and “all or nothing” terrorism—threats which have profound security concerns for the U.S.

Is it in the interest of U.S. national security if the Middle East press were granted sudden freedoms, giving rise to scores of extremist news media such as Al Jazeera? Perhaps the U.S. should first encourage the establishment of judicial and legal processes compatible for an early stage of democratization, to ensure a responsible press corps. Hoffman does note the establishment of such a “foundation” is important. However, privatization of formerly state controlled media does not always lead to true liberation, as seen in Indonesia where former ruling families often buy up the media companies.

Since there is no legal foundation for a free media in the Middle East and there are no laws to prevent hate speech or other commentary which could bring harm to others, it is in the realm of the possible that other terrorists may seize ideological control of fledgling, unprotected outlets upon liberation. Although Al Jazeera is a satellite network, its actual reach within the region is limited, as few can actually afford it. “Press freedoms” in the region, would probably lead to more radicalized Islamic media at the local and state level, which would likely prove more effective in recruiting disenfranchised men into becoming “martyrs,” in a “jihad” against the west.

Hoffman cites the media liberation in Indonesia and Central Asia as examples for which the Middle East could follow. He supports this by noting many positives such that “a free press can also become the advance guard for democracy by facilitating multiparty elections, improved human rights and better
treatment for women."21 While this is well stated and he notes several successes, there is another side that he does not fully acknowledge. He does not note that former communist states and Moslem nations are far different in terms of their ideology and motivation, with the former being secular the latter theological in nature.

There are many unsuccessful democratic transitions and scores of reversals which litter the post Cold War geopolitical global landscape because the process did not begin with the establishment of sound democratic institutions. While he describes some “setbacks” he does not fully delineate some of those reversals, and how they may differ in a region where fundamental Islam and its non-secular dogma is the fabric of every day life. 22

In several of the former Soviet states in Central Asia, media outlets that were initially liberated with the end of the Cold War, were subsequently seized—and many journalists killed—by autocratic governments that overthrew the now defunct “partial democracies.”23 Democratic ideals had slowly been imbued into the hidden, private elements of communist life, whether through Radio Liberty or in the alleys, while this sort of inculcation has not occurred to the degree necessary in the Middle East. In addition, the former Soviet Union was closer in proximity and plurality to Europe, had never been colonized but was a colonizer, and shared in the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe—factors that don’t translate

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, 92.

across the Persian Gulf, where call to prayer occurs five times daily, irrespective of war, famine or news cycles.

The bottom line is that the Middle East is one of the more challenging areas to understand, in terms of its cultural complexity and subtle nuances in communication. It is a region where American straightforwardness is seen as abrasive, and where degrees of politeness and circuitous, amending language are employed in diplomacy and daily life.

The external pressure is already on many Persian Gulf autocracies and monarchies to become more democratic, but that evolution will happen on the Middle Easterner’s clock—not to meet the western demands. This is not to criticize western efforts, but just a statement of reality.

Intense pressure to change could backfire, as seen with the still ongoing Palestinian “intifada” that began in July 2000 during the U.S. sponsored, Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. This latest blood bath was arguably brought about, in part by allied leaders seeking a quick resolution to a complex situation. At the beginning of negotiations, more “concessions” were offered to Yasser Arafat than ever before. Arafat, recognizing he had the upper hand of all, declined the offer. He chose instead to escalate tensions to gain more concessions, and nearly two years later the conflict continues. With his headquarters bombed by Israeli fighters, Arafat probably realizes the chaos he started was more than he had bargained for. His post-September 11 calls to fellow Palestinians to curb the violence have gone unheeded, and subsequently, several world leaders have questioned his viability in managing the Palestinian territory.
This conflict can be viewed as a micro version of what may happen with the application of intensive, western pressure to reform larger, Middle Eastern societies. Despite Middle Eastern governments' efforts to the contrary, subtle democratization is already underway and information is more available to the people—and the people are starving for "fact-based information." This journey towards a better civil society has been and will continue to be a slow and painstaking process. Perhaps, it is better to gradually release the valve of political oppression to ensure a successful transition to a freer polity, rather than risk the ascendancy of Osama bin Laden or others of his ilk to a dictator's throne.

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24 Hoffman, 86.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, changed the U.S. worldview, and equally important, U.S. national resolve. As leaders provided the framework for action, people supplied the will as witnessed in the days following the attacks, when many donated time and money, while others volunteered for military enlistment. Public opinion polls indicated this patriotic and civic fervor did not wane as “more than 90 percent” still supported the U.S. led effort against terrorism six months later.25 People understood the attacks brought a hitherto unseen national emergency and recognized that required a strong and unified political-military response.

Public acceptance of the military risk involved in the war against terrorism reflected in several combat related movies. The films “Black Hawk Down” and “We Were Soldiers,” cinematically portray, in Hollywood style, significant U.S. losses in conflict. “Black Hawk Down” told the story of what happened in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed by a faction—now believed to have been linked to Osama bin Laden. The conflict is often remembered for the televised image, in which a Somali drags a U.S. soldier’s body through the streets, an image which is widely believed to have changed the U.S. government’s policy of interventionism abroad.

The effect of global news media on U.S. foreign policy in Somalia, with the immediate removal of troops, gave rise to the term “CNN effect,” which ushered in an age of broad, minimal risk interventionism. That view changed Sept. 11, 2001. It can’t be known whether or not the Mogadishu withdrawal led bin Laden to believe

that Americans had low tolerance for a long and dangerous fight, but he certainly knows now of U.S. steadfastness, as predicted early on by *The Economist*:

Part of the terrorist’s calculation is probably that the will to fight is weak in a modern democracy; that Americans’ support for military action will buckle at the sight of the first body bags...Almost certainly, that is also the terrorists biggest mistake. In a war launched directly on Americans, on American soil, the will to fight back is going to be great and long lasting.26

Americans continue to support the conflict, and its expansion, at the time of this writing. The extension of forces beyond Central Asia has included the deployment of U.S. troops to the Philippines. While the U.S. support for this war has continued unabated, the assurance of international support is undeniably less certain.

Speculation in the news media regarding the possible effects of the war’s expansion has ranged. Some commentators have noted the expansion of war “could have the unintended consequence of disturbing regional politics to a degree unknown since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,” referring to the partitioning of the Middle East by the United Kingdom in the aftermath of World War I, while many others argue that the consequences of inaction could be worse.27 It is a delicate balance for leaders in the Middle East, and while their governments may be non-democratic and the antithesis to U.S. ideals, those regimes are certainly better than a country controlled by Osama bin Laden or any of his terrorist contemporaries, as seen in Afghanistan.


This concern is based, in part, on the fact that the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait among other U.S. allies in the region are contending with the polemical and violent forces of radical Islamicism, which could lead to political upheaval as with the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Iranian revolution brought radical Islam to the seat of power in Iran, though it has been noted by some that the movement as a government was unsuccessful.

Robert Kaplan, contributor to the *Atlantic Monthly*, states Iran’s “population of 66 million is [now] refreshingly pro-American, owing to real life experience with an Islamic revolution that has bankrupted the middle class.”[28] This also reflects in the political arena with regard to civil liberties and freedom of the press. According to Hoffman, “80 percent of Iranians” responded to the Iranian government’s shut down of more than 50 news outlets by electing “the reformist President Muhammad Khatami…indirectly [casting] their ballots for the freedom of expression he champions.”[29] Leaders from other Middle Eastern countries are beginning to recognize the inevitably of information availability, and its positive effect on governing. Hoffman notes one Saudi Arabian Prince’s comment: “If people speak more freely and get involved more in the political process, you can really contain them and make them part of the process.”[30]

Despite the failure of radical Islamicism as a viable government, there could be much turmoil similar to that in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict before its politicized, violent incarnation is assuredly in the past. As outlined in the

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Hoffman, 89.
movement’s “Strategy of Conflict With the West, the terrorists of September 11, “...were bent on more than just ushering the Americans from the Arabian Peninsula or destroying the state of Israel...they aimed at no less than the worldwide defeat of the West and the triumph of radical Islam.”

The war against terrorism is ultimately a battle of values—democratic freedom versus radical oppression, as was evident following the military success in Afghanistan, when the global news media broadcast images of unveiled women enjoying their freedom for the first time in five years. They were once again able to leave their homes unescorted, able to attend school and work, and otherwise resume life in the beleaguered and war torn nation.

A. Thesis Limitations

This thesis considered the growth of “radical Islamism” and the media environment in relation to the conflict of 2001. At the time of this study there were few scholarly works which focused on the media’s interrelation to the terrorism of 2001, and few which posited a post-attack geopolitical theory. While much of the research material has been assimilated from newspapers, magazines, interviews and journals, to a greater extent the theoretical construct and key points are the product of the author’s empirical observations. Finally, since the conflict is yet ongoing, this study cannot provide the benefit, perspective—and hindsight—of post-conflict abstraction.

31 Walter Laqueur, “A Failure of Intelligence, Gilles Kepel’s obituary for Islamicism was written before September 11,” The Atlantic Monthly (March 2002), 129.
B. Recommendations for further study

The global public affairs and media communications landscape during this war is expanding which leaves much room for further study. As this study noted, this new media environment and war presents challenges for both communicators and journalists. A researcher could determine whether the military’s rules of engagement with the news media should be revised, with regard to access permissions in the case of asymmetrical warfare, because there are more remote and classified operations involved. This could also include a review of military-media relations in this new era, what has changed and what has not.

The global Internet media and a nexus which connects many forces, is one of the primary mediums through which U.S. government communicators have sought access to broader, Arabic audiences in the war against terrorism. A researcher could study the effectiveness of this, in addition to reviewing Middle Eastern and European Internet media, and how this medium has presented more opportunities and challenges for government communicators.

Another consideration for study would be to research whether the U.S. has been involved in the development of free media institutions in other regions, and whether it should become involved in the promotion of a free and democratic press, and democratic principles in the Middle East.

Another topic for consideration is analysis of the media’s coverage of the war against terrorism in comparison with other recent conflicts. A researcher could review how has the media’s focus changed—whether it has remained hawkish and what theoretical construct best explains this perspective.
The last topic proposed here, which is worthy of study, is how information, in the global media age, has been used to prevent war and conflict, resolve a crisis or how it has led to war. There are many instances where government communicators sent a signal through the news media with the effect of bringing warring parties to the peace table.
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3.13 Public Affairs Operations During Crisis or Combat

Introduction (U)

3.13.1 (U) General. The Air Force conducts Public Affairs Operations to communicate truthful, unclassified information about USAF activities to Air Force, U.S. and international audiences. As a tool in the commander’s arsenal of Information Operations, Public Affairs Operations use timely and accurate information to help deter war, disarm adversary propaganda, halt aggression, drive a crisis back to peace, and wage war. Public Affairs provides four capabilities for the commanders during war or crisis. They are:

- (U) “Provide Trusted Counsel to Leaders.” This capability includes analyzing and interpreting the global information environment, monitoring domestic and foreign public opinion, providing lessons learned from the past, and preparing leaders to communicate with the media. In addition to supporting a commander’s offensive or defensive Public Affairs campaign, TCL contributes directly to IW concepts such as information-in-warfare, countering adversary propaganda, ensuring mission OPSEC, and information attack by helping commanders to make well-informed decisions and forecast possible results of military operations within the public information battlespace.

- (U) “Enhance Airman Morale and Readiness.” Public Affairs Operations enable airmen to understand their roles in the mission, explaining how policies, programs, and operations affect them and their families. Because military operations often receive intense media attention, airmen must fully understand that the decisions they make, what they say, and their actions can have immediate implications. Public Affairs Operations also help fight loneliness, confusion, boredom, uncertainty, fear, rumors, adversary deception efforts, and other factors that cause stress and undermine efficient operations.

- (U) “Foster Public Trust and Support.” Public Affairs Operations support a strong national defense, in effect preparing the nation for war, by building public trust and understanding for the military’s contribution to national security and its budgetary requirements. With backing from the tax-paying public and Congress, military leaders are able to effectively recruit, equip, and train airmen to perform across the full spectrum of military operations. During national crisis, this capability gives the American public the information they need to understand the importance of military action – in effect, bolstering national will.
(U) "Leverage Global Influence and Deterrence." Commanders may employ Public Affairs Operations to develop and implement communication strategies targeted toward informing national and international audiences about aerospace power’s impact on global events. Making international audiences aware of forces being positioned overseas and U.S. resolve to employ those assets through tactics such as a “virtual force projection” can enhance support from friendly countries. The same information may deter potential adversaries, driving a crisis back to peace before use of kinetic force becomes necessary. When adversaries aren’t deterred from conflict, information revealing U.S. or friendly force capabilities and resolve may still affect adversary decision-makers. Communicating military capabilities to national and international audiences can be a force multiplier for commanders.

(U) The capabilities, functions and fundamentals of Public Affairs Operations remain the same whether units are at home station or deployed. When supporting deployed operations, personnel engaged in Public Affairs Operations should be sent early into a theater in sufficient strength to begin effective operations immediately. Dramatic media coverage at the outset of a military action can rapidly influence public and political opinion and affect strategic decision making.

3.13.1.1 (U) Purpose. This section contains specifics about Public Affairs capabilities and limitations, planning responsibilities, and tactics for accomplishing the Public Affairs function during war or crises. **The tactics, techniques, and procedures presented are effective ways to employ Public Affairs Operations against Information Warfare threats.** Also, this document should serve as the baseline from which new tactics can be developed. New ideas are encouraged and should be forwarded to ACC/PA or SAF/PAR. Users of this section must be familiar with the information in AFTTP 3-1, Volume 1, General Planning and Employment Considerations; AFTTP 3-1, Volume 2, Threat Reference and Countertactics; and AFTTP 3-1, Volume 36, Information Warfare Integration.

3.13.1.2 (U) Responsibilities/Discipline. Because AFTTP 3-1 is applied to training programs, the following points are crucial:

3.13.1.2.1 (U) Training. Commanders: Commanders at every level must be media trained so they understand guidelines on the release of information and develop interview strategies and skills needed to effectively communicate in the media spotlight. See 3.13.4.2.2.7 (U) Media Training for more information. Public Affairs Operations personnel: Public Affairs Directors and Chiefs must evaluate local training programs to ensure personnel are proficient to satisfy contingency and wartime readiness requirements. Public Affairs operators and planners must be familiar with Information Operations and Information Warfare capabilities and limitations so that they can successfully integrate Public Affairs Operations.

3.13.1.2.2 (U) Leadership. The commander is responsible for Public Affairs Operations. Commanders entrust PAOs to carry out PA responsibilities. Strong
leadership, teamwork, and professional competency remain at the core of effective employment of Public Affairs' capabilities in all situations.

3.13.1.2.3 (U) Procedures and Directives. This document provides no authority or sanction to depart from established training procedures and directives.

3.13.2 Organizations involved in planning and execution.

3.13.2.1 (U) Roles and Responsibilities. As stated in Chapter 2, Public Affairs Operations are, by nature, strategic in both planning and execution. Public Affairs Operations have far-reaching consequences and must therefore be carefully tied together from the national strategic level, to the unit tactical level. Three additional organizations come into play during crisis or combat operations: the Joint Information Bureau, the Combat Information Team, and Combat Camera. For a more complete list of organizations involved in Public Affairs Operations planning and execution across the spectrum of military operations, see Section 2.13.2 and AFDD 2-5.4

3.13.2.1.1 (U) Joint Information Bureau (JIB). A JIB serves as a single point of interface between the military and news media representatives covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders and their Public Affairs staffs to discuss their units and their roles in the joint operation, while helping journalists obtain information quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex activities. The early establishment of a JIB by Combatant Command is an important step toward facilitating media operations. If non-U.S. coalition forces are assigned to a JIB, it's known as a Combined Information Bureau (CIB).

3.13.2.1.1.1 (U) Sub-JIB. Due to geography or other factors, commanders may find it necessary to establish a sub-JIB to accommodate media during a specific phase of an operation or to provide more responsive support in a particular operational area.

3.13.2.1.2 (U) Combat Information Team (CIT). AFNEWS has the capability to activate two CITs. The eight-person CIT establishes an internal information program for the air component commander or Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. The team provides command information support to military audiences both inside and outside the area of operations. CITs have the capability to obtain print and electronic material suitable for use in all aspects of Air Force internal information programs. Outlets for the material include Area of Responsibility (AOR) local Public Affairs newsletters, the AOR AFRTS network, Air Force Radio News, Air Force Television News, Airman magazine, AFRTS outlets Worldwide, and Air Force Print News. CITs can operate in base base locations as well as main operating bases.

3.13.2.1.3 (U) Combat Camera. Visual information documentation of all aspects of U.S. combat or combat support operations is important to Information Warfare activities. While most modern news organizations will not accept footage from the U.S. military, insisting that their photographers shoot their own images, combat camera can be still be valuable in a historical context to combat adversary propaganda and misinformation. It can especially be useful in countering future war crime
accusations against friendly forces or in documenting adversary actions and atrocities so responsible adversary leaders can be prosecuted.

3.13.2.1.3.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In 1945, U.S. Combat Camera documented U.S. forces liberating NAZI concentration camps throughout Eastern Europe. This documentation later proved invaluable to Allied prosecutors at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, where former NAZI leaders were held personally accountable for their wartime actions. This footage is also valuable today to counter pro-NAZI hate group propaganda claiming that the Holocaust never occurred.

3.13.3 (U) Capabilities and limitations. As stated at the beginning of this section, Public Affairs Operations provide four military capabilities in support of Air Force Information Superiority. It’s important to note that while presented separately here, these capabilities aren’t independent of one another. Successful Public Affairs Operations represent a synergy of all four.

- (U) Provide Trusted Counsel to Leaders.
- (U) Enhance Airman Morale and Readiness.
- (U) Foster Public Trust and Support.
- (U) Leverage Global Influence and Deterrence.

3.13.3.1 (U) Public Affairs Tools. Within each of the four capabilities Public Affairs Operations provide, there are four basic functions: Media Operations, Internal Information Operations, Community Relations Operations, and Security and Policy Review. For a list of major tools available to conduct Public Affairs Operations, see Table 2.13.3.1 in Chapter 2, Section 2.13.

3.13.3.2 (U) PA Doesn’t Control the Media and Shouldn’t. PAOs are trained to help commanders communicate their messages to the public and the media. However, it’s important to understand that once that message is delivered, PAOs have no control over how the final story is written or produced. This is why it’s so important to provide the media timely and accurate information. By involving the media and working with them to provide the releasable details of an operation, commanders ensure the Air Force position or messages get across. This provides the Air Force with the best chance for fair, objective news coverage.

3.13.4 (U) Public Affairs Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

3.13.4.1 (U) Public Affairs Operations Planning Considerations. Air Force Public Affairs Operations, through direct-liaison authority, support informational objectives of the National Command Authorities, the DoD, federal agencies, the Military Departments, state and civil authorities, combatant commands, joint task forces, major commands, and subordinate units. Responsibility for coordination and
deconfliction of planning and operations rests with the subordinate command Public Affairs staff.

3.13.4.1.1 (U) Fundamentals of Information. There are several principles of information that can help commanders understand the fundamental concepts of Public Affairs Operations and effectively deal with the public information battlespace. These fundamentals complement the DoD Principles of Information (See AFDD 2-5.4 Public Affairs Operations, Appendix C). For more details on each of these principles, see Chapter 2, Section 2.13.4.1.1.

☐ (U) Tell the truth: The Public Affairs Standard. PAO’s will not lie.

☐ (U) Provide timely information

☐ (U) Include the media

☐ (U) Practice security at the source

☐ (U) Provide consistent information at all levels

☐ (U) Tell the Air Force story

3.13.4.1.1.1 (U) DoD Principles of Information: Maximum Release, Minimum Delay. DoD Directive 5122.5 states that information will be made fully available to the U.S. public, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act will be complied with in both letter and spirit. For more information see AFDD 2-5.4, Public Affairs Operations, Appendix C.

3.13.4.1.2 (U) Planning for Public Affairs Operations. Planning is driven from DoD but must be conducted at all levels of command and for operations across the spectrum of conflict. Planning for Public Affairs Operations by OASD (PA) and combatant commanders guide efforts at lower echelons of command. Planning by subordinate units should be based on the assessed information needs and opportunities of their commands and should be consistent with the plans and objectives of higher commands.

3.13.4.1.2.1 (U) Planning for Public Affairs Operations is reflected in two types of documents: Communications plans (see AFDD 2-5.4, Appendix B) and operation plans (annex F of an operations plan). Commanders oversee the development of communications plans, which should exploit all activities available for carrying out Public Affairs Operations. These plans focus on strategic and tactical communication. Strategic plans provide direction for long-range communication efforts concerning the organization’s mission and objectives, while tactical plans direct communication on specific operations, events, or issues. Commanders should consider Public Affairs Operations from the very beginning of their campaign
planning. In operation plans, commanders should identify the tasks and resources required to achieve their informational and strategic communication objectives in a Public Affairs annex F. Public affairs issues and requirements should be included in all aspects of peacetime, wartime, and contingency planning.

3.13.4.1.2.2 (U) Public Affairs Operations and IW Planning Integration. It’s important that public affairs be brought in early in the planning process to help coordinate, deconflict and advise commanders and IW planners about the Public Affairs Operations aspects and considerations of the operation plan. This also allows PAO’s to be prepared and ready for high profile, public information issues that may occur as a result of combat operations. For example, media interest in collateral damage.

3.14.4.1.2.2.1 (U) EXAMPLE: During the Ulchi Focus Lens 2000 Exercise in Korea, the 7th Information Warfare Flight at Osan AB brought PA into the operations planning process early. The IWF planners shared the classified target list with PA and helped identify those targets with a high potential for collateral damage if attacked. As a result, PA was able to be prepared with responses to query and news releases in the event collateral damage occurred. This preparation would allow Public Affairs Operations to quickly respond to any targeting mistake in order to get ahead of, and disarm, adversary propaganda.

3.13.4.1.3 (U) Public Affairs Planning Considerations and the Information Environment. Many factors within the public information battlespace affect Public Affairs Operations planning. While a comprehensive list is beyond the scope of this document, here are some of the major factors Public Affairs Operations and IW planners must be aware of in order to successfully employ Public Affairs forces.

3.13.4.1.3.1 (U) Global Information Environment: The global information environment bridges the gap between the strategic and tactical levels of military operations. Audiences in the United States and throughout the world can get information and images in near real time, creating the effect of war in a glass bottle. Scenes of carnage can dramatically influence public opinion and support, leading to changes in strategic-level goals, guidance, and rules of engagement. This can result in significant modifications to operational missions, policies, and procedures, causing unexpected tactical restraint and constraints. Think of this realm as a public information “battlespace,” where your objective is to gain and maintain the initiative and achieve public understanding and support. Commanders gain and maintain the initiative by providing fast, complete, truthful information to the media first — in order to gain advantage over the adversary. The media are NOT the adversary, nor are they your friend; they are simply a critical participant in this area of operations.

3.13.4.1.3.1.1 (U) Today’s Media Operate in Real-Time. Media have the capability to quickly deploy around the world and have the technology to collect and broadcast information in real time. News networks have bureaus in every major city around the
world and reporters can appear on scene before, during, and after hostilities begin. Global competition among media outlets, including the Internet, means media coverage will be more prevalent and more challenging in future operations. E-mail and satellite communications capability mean information will quickly find its way to the news media and the public.

3.13.4.1.3.1.2 (U) EXAMPLE: E-mail and satellite telephone communications bring a new dimension to international conflict. The media can now get “live” reports from virtually anyone with typical communications equipment. In 1999, a Kosovo Albanian named Adona, sent e-mail messages from a laptop computer and satellite telephone to her pen pal, a young California man who provided them to the media. For weeks, “letters from the front” played across the international media and highlighted Serb atrocities in Kosovo as Adona fled with her family from Serb forces.

3.13.4.1.3.1.2 (U) Media Will Find Sources - With or Without DoD Input. Media will find people to talk to them. If they don’t get information from friendly forces, they’ll get it from a less knowledgeable source, or from the adversary. The ones who disclose information to the media first have a distinct advantage because they can set the context and influence the debate with their agendas fully in mind.

3.13.4.1.3.1.2.1 (U) EXAMPLE: The Falklands conflict, 1982. The British Ministry of Defense was not fully cooperating with the domestic news media on the battlefield. The BBC was finding it extremely difficult to obtain and transmit battlefield imagery from behind British lines. Because there was a void and such a high demand for images back home, the BBC turned to the adversary’s news networks for war footage. The Argentine networks cooperated with the BBC. Therefore, the British news media were forced to construct their stories with video from the Argentina point of view.

3.13.4.1.3.1.2.2 (U) EXAMPLE: The 1999 Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE illustrates another conflict where the media was forced to get most of their imagery from the opponent. The Serbs had the advantage of media “on the ground,” and the international news media was put into a position of constructing the story from images that were provided to them by the Serbs.

3.13.4.1.2.1.3 (U) It’s Nearly Impossible to Hide Troop Movements. With media coverage of a developing crisis, DoD can expect media coverage of any mobilization or increased alert status. With the availability of commercial satellite imagery, it’s virtually impossible to hide remote field deployments from the media.

3.13.4.1.2.3.1 (U) EXAMPLE: By 1997, the Russians were offering formerly “classified” satellite images on the Internet for a modest fee. Media can now purchase high-quality imagery that makes it increasingly difficult to hide major troop deployments.

3.13.4.1.2.1.4 (U) Withholding or Manipulating Information Sends the Wrong Message. We must advance our messages in every interview, without giving the
appearance of unnecessarily withholding or manipulating information. If we create the impression that we are unnecessarily withholding or manipulating information that we provide to the media, our operational capability to conduct Public Affairs Operations will be destroyed.

3.13.4.1.2.4.1 (U) EXAMPLE: Many believe that in Vietnam during the 1960s-1970s, the U.S. government and military misled the news media. This strategy of over-inflating successes and ignoring, omitting or down-playing U.S. failures initially gained public support for the war, but in the long run the Vietnam operation and ultimately the military itself lost all credibility and support as mistakes, inconsistencies and inaccuracies were exposed. In the decades following Vietnam, the military had to work very hard to re-gain credibility. The consequences of misleading the news media and losing credibility are too severe to be a viable strategy in any military operation.

3.13.4.1.2.1.5 (U) Global Communications are Instantaneous. Global communication capabilities make information simultaneously available from the strategic to the tactical levels of military operations. Often called the “CNN effect,” this phenomenon occurs when media attention and questions on an issue bring enormous pressure on political decision-makers to quickly act without full knowledge of the situation.

3.13.4.1.3.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In 1991, Iraqi troops made a hasty withdrawal from Kuwait City. They fled with luxury cars, trucks and vans filled with looted items from the city along a major roadway running from Kuwait City to Baghdad. U.S. Air Force jets intercepted the fleeing column and decimated it in an operation that came to be known as “the highway of death.” These powerful images during the last days of Operation Desert Storm gave the American public the impression that superior U.S. technology was being used to slaughter “hopeless Arabs who were just trying to get away.” This perception put enormous pressure on the U.S. government leaders to quickly end hostilities.

3.13.4.1.4 (U) EXAMPLE: In 1992, Somalia was in a severe famine that was compounded by the total collapse of its national government. Images of starving children put public pressure on U.S. leadership to do something to help stop the dying. American and UN forces intervened in an attempt to stabilize the country so that international food aid could flow. In 1993, forces loyal to Somali warlord Mohamed Aidid shot down a U.S. Army helicopter. After the crash, these forces pulled bodies from the wreckage and handed a dead pilot’s body over to the gathering crowd. Images of a dead U.S. soldier’s body being dragged through the streets put enormous pressure on U.S. leadership to withdraw.

3.13.4.1.2.1.6 (U) Seeking Out News Media Can Be an Operational Necessity. There are operational reasons to actively seek out the news media:
☐ **National support** (for funding and recruiting as well as national will and troop morale)

☐ **Adversary decision making and resolve.** Carl von Clausewitz referred to the nature of war as a “paradoxical trinity,” balanced by a combination of the populace, government leadership, and the military in a mutually supportive relationship. The more synergy and balance among the three forces, the greater the national will that can be achieved. As we recognize these centers of gravity among ourselves, our allies and our enemies, we can also expect our adversaries to recognize and attempt to influence them as well.

3.13.4.1.2.1.7 (U) Information is an Instrument of National Power. Think of information as an instrument of national power—every bit as powerful as diplomatic, economic and military instruments. Combined, they create an irresistible synergy. There are two factors that have contributed to the United States’ increasing dominance of international news. First, the U.S. more than any other country has the technology and infrastructure to harness the power of information and disseminate it globally. Second, the English language has come to dominate international journalism. These two factors give the U.S. a powerful advantage over any adversary.

3.13.4.1.2.1.8 (U) Adversaries Will Use Disinformation to Disrupt Operations. The adversary will attempt to influence our center of gravity and use propaganda and disinformation to sway public opinion against what the government wants to achieve. Technology allows our adversary to instantly communicate and transfer information to the international and American media. Furthermore, one must expect the media will attempt to present both sides of a conflict and seek out our adversary’s perspective. The less we say the more time the adversary has to get its messages across to the public, thus putting us in a defensive, reactive mode.

3.13.4.1.2.1.8.1 (U) Adversary Propaganda Techniques. Commanders should expect and anticipate an adversary’s use of propaganda to attack the U.S., Allied or coalition will to conduct military operations. While this listing is not all-inclusive, it does contain common techniques used by our adversaries in past conflicts. For a complete study of propaganda techniques, see Propaganda, The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, by Jacques Ellul (New York: Knopf, 1965) and for a comprehensive study of propaganda in crisis and conflict, see Munitions of the Mind, by Philip M. Taylor (New York: Manchester University Press, 1995).

☐ **Atrocity** – Citing atrocities as the reason action had to be taken or using stories of atrocities to justify stepping up military action or OPTEMPO. Expect the adversary to find or engineer atrocities to play up in the international news media in order to justify military or political actions. Be prepared for this propaganda and counter it by providing complete, factual information on your mistakes to the media first, before the adversary can provide the information with his “spin.”
(U) Hyperbolic inflation – The abuse of logic to twist something out of proportion. Example: Premise 1: Germany joined with Austria-Hungary to cause WW I when they interfered in the Balkans in 1914. Premise 2: Germany was responsible for WW II and in the process of the war, enslaved the Balkans in 1941. Premise 3: Today, Germany is a key member of NATO, so it is clear that the “German-led NATO aggressors” will again be attempting to rule the Balkans. This type of propaganda evaporates under careful scrutiny. Often, pointing out the facts and emphasizing your messages will dispel this quickly.

(U) Dehumanization and demonization – The adversary’s attempt at dehumanizing their opponent to their own population or to the world news media. Expect the adversary to play upon racial and ethnic stereotypes and attempt to build their opponent into something less than human in the international media. The Serbs played upon the “Germanic” nature of NATO in an attempt to equate NATO’s actions against the Slavs to those of the Nazis in World War II. A good counter would have been to emphasize the Slavic partners of the NATO alliance and emphasize their concerns for the oppressed Slavic peoples under Slobodan Milosevic’s rule.

(U) Polarization and divine sanction – Polarization is the adversary’s attempt to portray their opponents as the antithesis of what their people believe. Serbia portrayed itself as the protector of Christianity in the Balkans and defending European civilization from Muslim influences. Iran often portrays the U.S. as a godless country, or as the adversary of all Islamic peoples. **This propaganda can be countered with truthful information.** In using divine sanction, the adversary will attempt to emphasize what is being done as the will of God, the will of Allah, the will of the people, or the will of nature. Serbia used this form of propaganda very often: “Serbia for the Slavs,” the “right of our own people to control our own affairs,” the “protector of Christianity in the Balkans,” etc. Again, truthful information serves as an effective counter.

(U) Metapropaganda – Discrediting the other side’s statements totally, so as to bring everything that they say into question. Maintaining absolute credibility counters this adversary propaganda technique. **Credibility with the news media is built up over decades, yet can vanish overnight.** Continuously providing fast, truthful, credible information to the news media is operationally essential in order to defeat this adversary technique.

(U) Labeling and transfer – Selecting words or phrases because they possess a positive or negative emotional charge. The idea is to use these words frequently in public statements to “label” themselves or their opponent. This is a favorite technique to link opponents to a negative symbol or word, such as fascist, aggressor, etc. They attempt to label their opponent for the media as often as they can, hoping the label and opponent become linked in the mind of the public. They also use labels to invoke “glittering generalities” about their own operations, attempting to link or “transfer” their actions to positive words that people have deep-set ideas and feelings
about, such as Christianity, democracy, etc. PA operations tactics to counter this include providing timely, accurate facts and correcting the record wherever and whenever possible. However, careful planning and consideration should be given to making sure spokesmen don’t inadvertently lend credence or credibility to adversary claims by highlighting or repeating the information. Sometimes the best tactic is to ignore the adversary’s labels.

- **Bandwagon and plain folks** – Appeals to the desire to follow the crowd. Specifically targeted at groups already held together by common ties of nationality, race, religion, etc. The adversary will appeal to these specific groups’ pre-conceived notions in order to solicit their support. Bandwagon is often combined with a closely related technique called “plain folks,” the adversary’s attempt to portray what is being undertaken as a popular “people’s movement,” being led by “common people,” on behalf of “common people.” The Serbs used modern, Western-dressed young people at “rock concert” anti-war rallies at well-known target points (bridges, etc.) around the country. These “Western images” sharply (and very intentionally) contrasted with the “Eastern images” of the rag-tattered Kosovar Albanian refugees in Islamic attire.

- **Unwarranted extrapolations** – The adversary’s huge predictions about the future on the basis of a few small facts. A good example is the Serbian appeal to Russia to help preserve Serbia’s territorial integrity or suffer dismemberment themselves at the hands of the UN and NATO. This type of propaganda quickly evaporates under close scrutiny when the media has truthful facts that counter it.

**3.13.4.1.2.2 (U) Informational Flexible Deterrent Options.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) recognizes that information is just as important as diplomatic, military, or economic factors by establishing Informational Flexible Deterrent Options (IFDOs). IFDOs are options available to commanders as alternative Courses of Action (COAs) in accomplishing operational missions other than “bombs on target.” Twenty-one hundred years ago, Sun Tzu recognized “national unity ... to be an essential requirement of victorious war.” For the U.S. military, national unity translates to public support for the military’s actions—a strategic center of gravity. Sun Tzu also stated that “subjugating the adversary’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” Public Affairs Operations can be key to achieving this and driving a crisis back to peace. IFDOs heighten public awareness, promote national and coalition policies, aims, and objectives for the operation, as well as counter adversary propaganda and disinformation in the news. Here are some of the commander’s IFDOs:

- **Maintain an Open Dialogue with Media.** Maintaining an open dialogue with the news media communicates the leadership’s concern with the issues and allows the correct information to be placed in the public sector, without media speculation or the media going to other sources (such as the adversary) for information. This heightens public awareness and helps gain and maintain public support. Putting a spotlight on the issue helps bring regional, national and international awareness to the crisis. This increased media attention may also place
enormous pressures on foreign leaders and governments and that alone may be enough to achieve the objective.

- (U) Articulate U.S. National (and/or Coalition) Policies, Aims, and Objectives. Explaining what we intend to achieve and why it's important helps us gain public understanding and support for our operations. This also helps the opponent understand what the U.S. and its coalition partners expect from them.

- (U) Keep the Issue in the Headlines. Heightening adversary awareness of the potential for conflict by keeping the issue in the news helps maintain national and international pressure on our opponent. This can be difficult to achieve because sometimes the media are just not interested, especially during a lull in operations. Including the media in our preparations, expanding the number of regional and hometown media involved, offering high-level spokesmen, providing strong visuals, and giving opportunities to do and see things they otherwise would not be able to, will help gain and maintain the media's interest. These efforts take careful centralized planning and a clear understanding of what the National Command Authority hopes to achieve by keeping issues in the news.

- (U) Combat Adversary Disinformation, Propaganda, and Deception Efforts. We fully expect an adversary to use the media to their own advantage by spreading disinformation and propaganda in an attempt to undermine the U.S. position and objectives. Public Affairs Operations are our first line of defense against adversary propaganda and as such, the fast, complete and credible information provided by Public Affairs Operations helps disarm adversary propaganda.

3.13.4.1.2.3 (U) Presidential Decision Directive-68 (PDD-68). Commanders today will be operating in a public information battlespace that's over-saturated with media messages, both truthful and untruthful, but all of which can affect and influence public and political opinions and decisions. Sending a consistent message and speaking with one voice is even more essential during crisis operations. The way to effectively orchestrate national strategic communication efforts is laid out in Presidential Decision Directive 68, commonly known as “PDD – 68.”

3.13.4.1.2.3.1 (U) PDD-68 Goal. The goal of this directive is to ensure all agencies of the federal government work toward a common goal in contingencies by speaking with one voice that communicates a consistent message to the international audience. It helps the U.S. coordinate its messages and “get out in front of a crisis,” rather than taking a reactive stance. The idea is to pro-actively provide information to the media, with one organized and orchestrated effort to get our messages across through all relevant U.S. Government agencies.

3.13.4.1.2.3.2 (U) International Public Information-Core Group (IPI-CG). PDD-68 establishes an International Public Information-Core Group to integrate the Public Affairs activities of all government departments into an overall strategy. It is
currently headed by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

3.13.4.1.2.3.3 (U) IPI-CG Representation. Participants in the IPI-CG include assistant secretary-level representatives from the State Department, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Agency for International Development, National Intelligence Council, National Security Council, and other offices or agencies as the situation requires.

3.13.4.1.2.3.4 (U) IPI-CG Sub-Groups. The IPI-CG establishes sub-groups to address regional issues or deal with crises as they arise.

3.13.4.1.2.3.5 (U) Public Affairs Guidance and the Dissemination of IPI-CG Information. Information from the IPI Core Group, the DoD, the Air Force, and various levels of command is disseminated through Public Affairs Guidance. This guidance is essential to ensure consistency across the entire spectrum of the global information environment. The guidance changes weekly, daily or hourly as the political and military situation changes. Commanders should strive for the release of consistent information and messages at all levels of command. One effect of the global information environment is that the public can simultaneously receive information about military operations from a variety of military units. Sources in theater and at the Pentagon are often quoted in the same media reports. Conflicting messages or information can cause skepticism and undermine public trust and support. Commanders should ensure the Air Force puts forth a consistent message through its many voices. Information and messages should be appropriately coordinated and be in compliance with official DoD, supported command, service and major command guidance before it is released to the public.

3.13.4.1.2.4 (U) Joint Public Affairs Operations Planning Considerations. Joint Public Affairs doctrine lists several planning considerations for Public Affairs Operations in a joint environment. See Joint Pub 3-61, Public Affairs in Joint Operations for in-depth details on each consideration. They are:

- News Media Access
- Security
- Media Pools
- Combat Camera
- Command Information (or Internal Information)
- Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)
- Host Nation
- Country Team

3.13.4.1.2.6 (U) Mobilization of Public Affairs Forces. Key to successful Public Affairs Operations is ensuring the right PA forces are at the right places as early in
the operation as possible. There are specific steps PA planners can take to ensure this happens:

- (U) Review PA Annexes to Operation Plans (OPLAN) and/or Concept Plans (CONPLAN); make sure plans are drawn up to include PA forces at deployment locations, as necessary.

- (U) Review PA deployment sourcing in OPLAN/CONPLAN Time-Phased Force Deployment Documents (TPFDD). Ensure PA forces are scheduled to arrive very early in the operation. Media are often at the deployed location before the military. Experience has shown over and over again that PA should be one of the first organizations on the ground.

3.13.4.1.2.7 (U) Public Release of Information and Operations Security Guidelines. Public Affairs is the only organization authorized by DoD to release information to the public. Table 3.13.4.1.2.7 outlines rules governing release of information on operational subjects. These are taken directly from AFI 35-101, Public Affairs Policies and Procedures, Chapter 6, Section C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Status. Information concerning changes of alert status, defense conditions (DEFCON), may be released only by SAF/PA after coordination with OASD/PA. In addition, public affairs offices at all levels must be notified at once by their local command post when there are changes in alert status. Local threat conditions (THREATCON) may be released to the general public if conditions affect other than base population. For example, if the base will be closed or an ID check at the gate will be instituted, release the information. However, do not release the steps taken during a THREATCON except to say that the unit is increasing its vigilance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Releasable information. Release guidance from higher headquarters usually precedes deployment. However, if it's obvious the unit has departed, confirm the obvious but notify your higher headquarters. Unless directed otherwise, the following items of information are releasable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arrival of U.S. units in the commander's area of responsibility once announced by DoD or the unified command.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Date of the unit's departure from home station.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Home station.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Approximate friendly force strength (multi-squadron, group, wing - not how many people).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Approximate number of enemy personnel detained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Non-sensitive, unclassified information regarding past and present operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In general terms, identification and location of military targets previously attacked and types of ordnance expended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Date, time, or location of previous conventional missions and their results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of combat air patrol or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in the operational area - and a characterization of whether they were &quot;land- or carrier-based.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Weather and climate conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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UNCLASSIFIED

- If appropriate, allied participation by type of units (ground units, ships, aircraft).
- Conventional operations' unclassified code names.
- Names of U.S. military personnel, unless assigned to an overseas, sensitive and routinely deployable unit. Check PA guidance.
- Deployed units and locations. Check PA guidance.
- Type of equipment, including aircraft, unless classified.
- Type of equipment, including aircraft, unless classified.
- General personal interest stories.
- General stories of training facilities, methods, etc., when not classified and when they would not indicate future operational planning.
- General scope and duration of air training performed.
- Battle damage may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

**Not releasable.** The following items of deployment information are not releasable:

- Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations.
- Name of the operation, until released by the Joint Forces Commander.
- Information placing future operations in jeopardy.
- Information which could place people’s lives at risk.
- Information that, if released, would violate host nation or allied sensitivities.
- Information that would reveal intelligence methods and sources.
- Information that would reveal intelligence targeting and battle damage assessments.
- Specific numbers of deployed troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available; unless otherwise stated in public affairs guidance from higher headquarters.
- Information that would reveal details of future plans, operations, or strikes – including postponed or canceled operations.
- Information or imagery that would reveal specific location of forces.
- Information or imagery that would reveal the level of security at deployment sites or installations.
- Datelines showing specific countries when those countries have not acknowledged their participation in the operation.
- Rules of engagement.
- Details of training of specialized units.
- Details of techniques, results, efficiency, etc., of forces involved.
- Destination – unless initially released by OASD/PA.
- Point of origin for an operational mission for an attack.
- Information on the effectiveness of weapon systems and tactics.
- Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft.
- Special operations' unique methods, equipment, tactics which, if disclosed, could harm mission accomplishment.
- Information on operational or support vulnerabilities.
- Specific methods and tactics, speeds, and formations.

**Intelligence or Reconnaissance Activities.** News releases may not be made regarding intelligence activities, except as authorized by SAF/PA.

**Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare.** Air Force public affairs material that deals with chemical, biological, or radiological warfare must be cleared by OASD/PA, through SAF/PA.

**Simulated Employment of Nuclear Weapons on Maneuvers and Training Exercises.** The fact that a particular maneuver or exercise will involve the simulated employment of nuclear weapons may be released to news media, as the maneuver commander deems necessary. However, the technique required in the use of any nuclear weapon must not be released.
Movement of Units.

CONUS to overseas. Information on the movement of Air Force units to overseas areas must be released initially by OASD/PA. SAF/PA must immediately notify all public affairs offices of commands, directly or indirectly concerned, that such a release is being made. The time and content of the release must be included in this notification. In addition, policy guidance on releasing any information subsequent to the initial release must be incorporated. This policy applies to all commands affected by the move, even if the unit is only passing through. MAJCOM public affairs offices will disseminate the guidance immediately to their affected units. Unit public affairs officers and commanders must comply strictly with the policy outlined in the notification, deviating from it only when specifically authorized by SAF/PA.

☐ Within overseas areas. Within overseas areas, movement releases are governed by instructions issued by the theater commander.

Within CONUS. For unit movements within the CONUS, the following information is releasable:

☐ Designation of unit.

☐ Name and location of new station, assembly point, training area, etc., within the US, unless the movement itself or new station are classified.

☐ Departure date, if routing for training and details of movement are not classified.

☐ General information necessary for local civic relations, such as housing, recreation, etc.

☐ On arrival at new station within the United States, resume normal public affairs activities.

Personnel Wounded in Combat. Public affairs must exercise care in releasing information and photographs of personnel wounded in action or hospitalized for other reasons. Give every consideration to the rights of the concerned individuals and to the effects publication would have on families and friends of the wounded, on the Air Force, and on public morale.

Casualties. Information on unit casualties and losses should be described in general terms only, e.g. light, moderate, heavy. The use of percentages, numbers of aircraft damaged or destroyed, buildings, facilities, vehicles, etc., will not be released without approval of the unified commander, a designated representative, or DOD.

Unit Activations, Inactivations, Phasedowns, or Movements. A significant change in unit level of operations is extremely important news for local communities. This change takes place after deliberation at appropriate levels of government. Public affairs personnel should not discuss these subjects without guidance from higher headquarters.

Weapon Systems. This category includes aircraft, missiles, munitions, support systems, subsystems, and space vehicles. Information about the existence, characteristics, potential, or capabilities of new systems, or improvements or modifications of existing ones, must be reviewed by SAF/PAS before it is released. The same is true for military applications of nuclear energy, and the following types of warfare subjects: biological, radiological, chemical, electronic, and psychological.

Contracts and Contractors' Releases. See AFI 35-101, Chap 6, Sec C, Para 6.32

Reference: AFI 35-101, Chap 6, Sec C.

3.13.4.1.2.8 (U) PAO's Must Have the Proper Security Clearance. People who plan and integrate Public Affairs Operations into Information Operations and Information Warfare must have the appropriate security clearances. Most war planning organizations require a Top Secret SCI clearance at a minimum. Therefore, it is imperative that key personnel are identified early, so that proper security clearances are awarded well in advance of hostilities.
3.13.4.1.2.9 (U) Foreign Language Requirements. Commanders and PAOs must consider foreign language requirements necessary to conduct Public Affairs Operations in deployed environments. Preparations for a translator to be assigned to a JIB or deployed PA office should be made well in advance of operations. As an already existing resource, most overseas Public Affairs offices already have host nationals assigned who are fluent in the language of that country.

3.13.4.2 (U) Public Affairs Operations Execution.

3.13.4.2.1 (U) Public Affairs Tactics.

3.13.4.2.1.1 (U) CONDUCT A VIRTUAL FORCE PROJECTION. A proven Public Affairs tactic is to use public information to create a virtual force projection. Conventional wisdom holds that release of information will be detrimental to military operations. However, commanders should consider the possible advantages of releasing certain information to demonstrate U.S. resolve, intent, or preparations. Rather than providing an advantage to an adversary, the release of information in some situations could deter military conflict. Lose the old “Cold War” paradigm that information must be hidden from the public. Seek out media opportunities and exploit public information to your advantage. It’s very important to understand, however, that Public Affairs Operations can document displays of force or training operations, but they cannot use false information to simulate force projection. If false information were ever used in Public Affairs Operations, public trust and support for the Air Force would be undermined, and the capabilities provided by Public Affairs Operations could be lost. See Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

3.13.4.2.1.1.1 (U) Demonstrate Visible Activity. Visible activity in the news media shows a heightened awareness and concern to both our enemies and to the American public. Visible activity demonstrates to the public that we are preparing to take action should force be required. Visible activity also sends the same message to our enemies. Clear messages and resolve, backed with military preparedness; help prepare the public for conflict.

3.13.4.2.1.1.2 (U) Communicate Key Messages. Messages in the international media communicate our resolve to the adversary leadership and population. This ensures no misunderstandings among the adversary leadership and population about the United States’ determination or position on an issue.

3.13.4.2.1.1.3 (U) Highlight Support from Military Participants. Visible support from military participants gives the public confidence in our ability and sends the adversary a clear message that we have the support and military competence to use force, should it become necessary.

3.13.4.2.1.1.3.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In January 1996, when military troops began deploying to southeast Europe for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, a CNN reporter
interviewed members of a deploying unit. One airman, holding a picture of family members, expressed concern about leaving them, but assured the reporter that the unit was trained, equipped, and committed to accomplishing the mission. The airman’s devotion to family and enthusiasm for the mission helped the U.S. public identify with and support the deploying forces. The airman’s articulate response to the reporter’s question was a candid statement of U.S. resolve, a factor that can have a strategic effect on the adversary’s decision making.

3.13.4.2.1.4 (U) Project Professional Images of the Military. Professional images illustrate our ability and competency to effectively carry out military operations. They can be a powerful force in the international media, and crowd out verbiage and text. Careful consideration should be given to the types of images provided to the media.

3.13.4.2.1.5 (U) Use Understandable Messages. Clear messages should be used with the images to communicate what we want the public and adversary leadership to understand about the operation. This helps our opponent understand U.S. or coalition objectives and what we’re willing to commit to the operation should military force become necessary.

3.13.4.2.1.5.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In early October 1994, Iraq dispatched 20,000 troops from its Republican Guard to join 50,000 regular army troops on the Kuwaiti border. Some diplomats thought the purpose was either to pressure the U.N. into easing economic sanctions, or to attempt another invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. reacted and sent a well-publicized combat force to re-enforce U.S. units in Kuwait. U.S. and international media coverage showed aircraft deploying to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Vigilant Warrior to meet the Iraqi challenge. National and military leaders gave interviews stating their commitment to defend Kuwait. Only 10 days after the well-publicized deployment began, Iraqi troops withdrew from their threatening positions near the Kuwaiti border.

3.13.4.2.1.5.2 (U) EXAMPLE: Virtual force projection in Haiti achieved the objective before military combat became necessary. In 1994 the U.N. authorized the use of force to remove the military dictatorship of Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras in Haiti and asked the U.S. to help restore the lawfully elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Public Affairs Operations promoted international media coverage of U.S. military preparations. A few days before the proposed invasion date, former President Jimmy Carter, then-Senator Sam Nunn, and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell traveled to Haiti in an effort to negotiate removal of the military regime. The combination of media images showing the massive invasion force and the negotiators’ skills caused Cedras to step down just hours before the arrival of the first U.S. troops. Airborne forces arrived peacefully and served as a stabilizing force during the transition, rather than having to fight the dictator’s army.

3.13.4.2.2 (U) Public Affairs Operations Techniques and Procedures. Public Affairs Operations capability is delivered through four primary functions: Media
Operations, Internal Information Operations, Community Relations Operations, and Security & Policy Review. The following section details effective Public Affairs techniques and procedures available to commanders and Public Affairs forces during crisis or contingencies. Broken down by Public Affairs function, most can be employed individually or as part of an integrated Public Affairs Operations campaign.

3.13.4.2.2.1 (U) Media Operations

3.13.4.2.2.1 (U) Use Commanders, Not Spokesmen. Commanders and airmen involved in the operations offer the most credible source of information to the public. Wherever possible, use commanders and deployers from all levels to talk to the news media.

(U) EXAMPLE: In 1999 during Kosovo operation ALLIED FORCE, senior NATO officials made the decision to strictly limit media contact with all commanders. NATO instead used civilian and military Public Affairs “spokesmen” to tell the NATO side of the air campaign. Wing commanders, component commanders, and JTF commanders were barred from speaking to the news media. As a result, the media, relying on these secondary sources, badly misunderstood key operations as they unfolded on the world stage. For example, early on the media got the impression that NATO was involved in an all-out bombing campaign when in fact the initial effort was modest. Early headlines in the U.S. and international newspapers implied a massive attack. Serbs were encouraged by this “all out” attack that they could easily withstand. The U.S. public saw it as a totally ineffective major attack that was failing to bring Serbia to the bargaining table. Retired military officers from all services appeared on news programs to fill the void and offer their analysis of the air campaign. Retired Army officers were particularly scathing with their expert analysis of the air campaign’s effectiveness. This lack of commander involvement is in stark contrast to the Persian Gulf conflict, where General Norman Schwarzkopf and his senior leaders gave daily situation updates directly to the U.S. and international publics, keeping them informed about the day to day situation. This senior commander involvement in Persian Gulf news briefings gained enormous credibility in the news media and international publics.

3.13.4.2.2.1.2 (U) Conduct News Briefings. A news briefing is the best way to release news to all media at one time. Just be sure the news warrants the news conference. Media resent a news briefing that does not produce immediate, important and useful news. If in doubt as to whether a topic should be considered for a news briefing, talk to higher headquarters Public Affairs. Since a news briefing is a major event, it often involves key installation people. Be sure the commander and staff understand the purpose of a news conference. See AFI 35-101, Chapter 6, Section F, Para 6.47 for more information.

3.13.4.2.2.1.2.1 (U) Consider a news briefing when a story or announcement is so important, sensitive or complex both the Air Force and media benefit from face-to-face presentation.
(U) A visiting dignitary has an announcement to make.

(U) Other types of releases can’t adequately convey the information.

3.13.4.2.1.3 (U) Use Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and Keep Messages Consistent. Unity of effort is central to the Public Affairs mission. The development and timely dissemination of DoD-approved PAG ensures that all information and policy are in consonance when responding to the information demands of joint operations. **This guidance must be clear in intent and it must be timely.** For details on the proper procedures to prepare PAG, see DoD Instruction 5405.3, Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG).

3.13.4.2.1.4 (U) EXAMPLE: To be effective, Public Affairs Guidance must be timely. In 1996, at the 2 BW, Barksdale AFB, La., B-52s prepared to deploy to Desert Strike. Because this operation was in the national news, the local news media asked about possible Barksdale AFB involvement. Since Public Affairs Guidance for this joint operation hadn’t yet come down from OASD (PA), the 2 BW/PA staff couldn’t comment on the deployment of B-52s. The local media kept watching the base. When reporters saw B-52s departing, they called with a query to the effect of, “We see the planes are launching, are they going to the Persian Gulf?” (They were). In the absence of Public Affairs Guidance from OASD (PA), the base refused to comment on this joint operational matter. After the planes were gone, OASD (PA) PAG came down, directing an active Public Affairs posture. The guidance directed the bases to spotlight the deployments – to do interviews, invite media to tape deployment preparations, etc. The intent of this PAG was to spotlight the deployment for its deterrent value. Because the Public Affairs Guidance hadn’t come down fast enough, some of the deterrent value of the B-52 deployment was lost.

3.13.4.2.3.1 (U) Create Consolidated PAG: During most contingency operations, field PAOs are flooded with competing PAG documents from various headquarters, including those not in the chain of command. One consolidated PAG document helps Public Affairs forces focus their efforts and the messages used in the operation. This consolidation should be done at a centralized level, such as OASD/PA, the combatant command, or the air component PA staff.

3.13.4.2.3.2 (U) EXAMPLE: In 1999, during Operation ALLIED FORCE, Public Affairs units in Europe were deluged with PAG from various levels of command. Much of the guidance conflicted and it appeared that little of it had been coordinated or synchronized. HQ USAFE/PA and 16 ASETF/PA attempted to consolidate and deconflict this PAG, and then issued consolidated PAG at several points throughout the air campaign. This consolidated PAG provided a summary of all guidance and highlighted the main points from the various competing PAG issued during the operation. The document was designed to provide at-a-glance guidance in a user-friendly format, bringing together the competing PAG issued by various headquarters -- SAF/PA, EUCOM/PA, NATO, DoD, etc.
3.13.4.2.3.3 (U) Be Consistent with Information. Commanders and Public Affairs must be consistent in providing information to the public and the media. Providing access to media one day because it suits PA objectives, but then denying access the next day because of potentially unfavorable coverage damages Air Force credibility with the public and ultimately limits Public Affairs’ ability to be effective. In addition, once a precedent is set on the release of information, any attempts to suddenly change policies or access without a credible, acceptable explanation will be viewed with suspicion by the public and the media.

3.13.4.2.2 (U) Consider Media Pools. A news pool involves having a representative from the media (or one representative from the various media, such as print, television, and radio) cover the story and then feed reports to all media taking part in the pool. Consider pooling when circumstances such as limited space or operational necessity preclude accommodating all media wanting to cover a story. Keep in mind most media dislike pool arrangements and prefer to do their own reporting. Always let media decide procedures on how representatives are selected and how stories are distributed. Always give the media access to combat operations, so that the story can be reported. Use pools only when circumstances absolutely preclude accommodating all interested media.

3.13.4.2.1 (U) EXAMPLE: Media must be given access to combat operations to ensure public support for the operation. This access should be granted, even if there are safety concerns. In 1983, the U.S. conducted an operation against Cuban forces that were attempting to gain control of the island of Grenada. After the initial denial by White House and DoD spokesmen, the operation was admitted and a media pool was formed to cover the developing story. Fifteen journalists were flown to the area of operations allowed very limited access to remote rear areas of the operation. Most of their time was spent off the island, aboard the U.S. command ship. Concerned about news reporter safety in an active combat zone, the Joint Forces Commander substituted U.S. military-supplied combat camera footage in an attempt to satisfy the media’s desire for images and information. As the operation progressed and U.S. forces swept to victory, the focus of the national news stories shifted from the success of the operation to lack of justification for the military operation. Journalists were frustrated and suspicious because they were kept away. They theorized that U.S. forces were hiding information from the public. The stunning U.S. victory was clouded by continuing media accusations of cover-up and fabrication of the threat, detracting from public support of the operation.

3.13.4.2.4 (U) Gain Country & Theater Clearances/Host Nation Approvals Early. Units must comply with the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide on country and theater clearance to avoid an international incident. If a unit wishes to escort local media to cover deploying units to a combatant command area of responsibility, they should first contact the host unit at the deployment location to see if the visit can be supported. They should research billeting and transportation requirements (i.e. how many days can they be supported, what airlift is available to take them to other locations, what are the training and equipment requirements at deployed locations to
which they plan to travel -- chemical warfare gear, Kevlar equipment, AOR training, Level 1 Antiterrorism Training, etc.

3.13.4.2.4.1 (U) EXAMPLE: At the beginning of the 1999 Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE, the first PAG was published by OASD (PA) "STANDING PLAN FOR KOSOVO-RELATED NATO-LED AIR OPS". In this plan, commanders were encouraged to embed/embark news media on U.S. aircraft. However, problems soon developed because CONUS units assumed blanket approval for country and theater had been given, which was false. Assumptions were also made that HQ USAFE/PA had the authority to give country clearance, which was also incorrect. The U.S. Embassy in cooperation with the host-nation government are the only approval authority for country clearance. USAFE functionals are authorized to give theater clearance to some European countries; however, theater clearance is contingent on country clearance. The problem proliferated when several MAJCOMS provided incorrect information to their units. Some units chose to ignore the guidance and proceed without country/theater clearance, which caused several problems for host units and countries. EUCOM/PA sent out a message in an attempt to clarify the process.

3.13.4.2.2.5 (U) Practice Security at the Source: Security Review of Media Products. The practice of security at the source (see Joint Pub 3-61, Public Affairs in Joint Operations, Appendix A, Guidelines for Discussions with the Media) is the primary protector of security and always governs discussions with news media representatives. Inclusion of the PAO in the operation planning process will help to ensure that information is properly categorized by its sensitivity. Commanders must understand that the information most available to the news media at the tactical and operational levels is also the most perishable in terms of timeliness. Decisions about information release must reflect that understanding. Ground rules allowing for the temporary delay of transmission of potentially sensitive information have proven to be acceptable to the news media and effective in addressing security concerns and media coverage requirements.

3.13.4.2.2.5.1 (U) EXAMPLE: During the Falklands conflict in 1982, the British Ministry of Defense had a long bureaucratic security review process that held up BBC news reports and images for hours, sometimes even days. Because there was a void and such a high demand for news and images back home, the BBC turned to the adversary’s news networks for fast information and war footage. The Argentine networks were happy to oblige and made it easy for the BBC to get whatever it wanted. BBC video footage provided by Argentina meant that the British news media was forced to construct the story from the Argentina point of view.

3.13.4.2.2.6 (U) Consolidate Media Flights and Overseas Deployment Requests. Instead of processing numerous individual requests for overseas travel for media covering deployments and major exercises, the sponsoring MAJCOMs may request one-time authority from OASD/PA (through SAF/PA) to approve travel aboard aircraft supporting or participating in the exercise or deployment. All media travel in conjunction with a deployment must be coordinated with the gaining unified command.
3.13.4.2.2.7 (U) Conduct Media Training. One of the most effective means of building public confidence in the military is to make military members available to the news media. Images of U.S. Air Force airmen and their families telling America and the world about the importance of their aerospace mission builds credibility and instills public trust. Public Affairs plays a very important role in making sure military members are ready to meet the media. Media training can be as simple as a 5-minute basic concepts briefing or as complex as a daylong, multi-format interview role-playing session. PAO’s must decide which format is best based on the scope of the interview request, the nature of the operation, and the amount of time available. A good training tool is *The Successful Interview, the ACC guide to engaging the media*, found at https://wwwmil.acc.af.mil/pa/Media_training.html

3.13.4.2.2.7.1 (U) EXAMPLE: Media regularly contacted RAF Lakenheath Public Affairs during the 1999 Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE, requesting to speak with spouses of airmen who had deployed to Aviano and Cervia Air Bases in Italy. The PA Office there, in coordination with the base family support center, provided a short 15-minute media training session for all spouses who agreed to participate in the interviews. The number-one concern they all had was not wanting to say something that would put their deployed spouse in jeopardy. As a result of the training, they were less nervous and were able to skillfully communicate key messages of confidence and support of the NATO operation to international publics.

3.13.4.2.2.8 (U) Develop Press Kits. Press kits are a good tool to use for handing out large quantities of information to visiting news media. They may include background information, biographies, manufacturer literature, statistics, photographs, artists’ drawings, television film clips, or anything else appropriate to the operation or subject. **Do not overload the kits with irrelevant material.** The advantage of press kits is that media members can take important background information away with them, which helps in ensuring balanced, factual, objective news reporting. However, press kits with irrelevant information, old data, or overly complicated background materials can leave reporters with a bad taste in their mouths about the Public Affairs operation and possibly the military mission they’re covering.

3.13.4.2.2.2 (U) Internal Information Operations. During any crisis or contingency, keeping Air Force members and their families informed becomes a top priority for Air Force leaders. Keeping airmen informed helps disarm adversary propaganda and disinformation. When military families are kept informed, the affected service member is able to keep focused on the mission, particularly when forward deployed. This translates directly into unit readiness, morale, and combat capability.

3.13.4.2.2.2.1 (U) Employ the Combat Information Team. The Combat Information Team is a combat news gathering team of 6-10 public affairs professionals, including specialists in print and electronic media. Headquartered at HQ AFNEWS at Kelly AFB, Texas, the CIT is available to deploy to hot spots around the world and provide news products for the internal audience and the media. Experience has shown that commands must request the CIT early in the theater
planning stages. This includes making sure the CIT is included in Operation Plan (OPLAN) Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) documents.

3.13.4.2.2.2.1 (U) EXAMPLE: During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in 1995-96, the CIT was deployed into the European theater. Their strategy was to exploit the news value of U.S. Air Force operations in Bosnia for the first 30-45 days of the mission. Their goal was to move stories very quickly through the coordination process, shotgun them out to the civilian and Air Force media, and highlight the Air Force’s airlift and hi-tech capabilities. By the end of their deployment, they’d written 40 print news stories, produced 45 Air Force Radio stories and 80 radio hometown news releases, produced 17 AF Television News spots, sent 75 digital images to world press and Air Force news outlets, and produced 1,296 35mm photographs covering the operation. As a result, they brought the Air Force story to the internal audience, educated the public on the Air Force’s mission, provided timely and accurate stories and photos to international media, assisted Air Force leaders in ‘framing the news’, and aided the media in ensuring their stories were accurate.

3.13.4.2.2.2 (U) Clearance of CIT Products. To be effective, the CIT must have timely clearance of its products. In past missions, CIT stories were cleared by the JIB and often held so long that they ‘died on the vine,’ severely limiting this powerful capability.

3.13.4.2.2.3 (U) Technology and the CIT. Worldwide connectivity is a must for the CIT. Text and images are sent via computer during most operations, so communications support and access to phone lines is critical. In addition, CIT communications equipment should be on par with the latest Air Force and news media capabilities.

3.13.4.2.2.4 (U) CIT Theater Coverage. News isn’t limited to one location, so the CIT shouldn’t be either. Experience shows the CIT is best employed if they set up an operating center near a transportation hub and have permission to travel aboard Air Force aircraft to the mission’s various operating locations. The CIT must be configured to cover multiple locations simultaneously.

3.13.4.2.2.2 (U) Establish an Internal Information Working Group (IIWG). A technique PAO’s can use to keep base and family members updated on important information is an Internal Information Working Group. This technique requires Public Affairs to set up regularly scheduled meetings during a crisis or contingency with representatives from key base functions to identify, coordinate, and publicize important information to base personnel and their families. IIWG members could include, but aren’t limited to, a base chaplain representative, family support center representative, deployed squadron(s) first sergeant(s), base safety representative, local school representative, the wing executive officer, and anyone else who has a stake in keeping the internal audience informed. Establishing an IIWG during crisis or contingency helps deconflict information, prevents rumors, and aids in combating adversary disinformation.
3.13.4.2.2.2.3 (U) Arrange Stars & Stripes Delivery to Deployment Locations. Deployed locations can arrange for timely delivery of *Stars & Stripes* newspapers, a major morale factor for airmen deployed to remote sites. Commanders and PAOs must be aware that newspaper delivery is a Services function, along with magazines, paperback books, music CDs, and videocassettes. However, Public Affairs can help steer Services in the right direction. Information products like *Stars & Stripes* can be a powerful weapon to combat adversary propaganda and disinformation. Operational experience has shown that delivery must be established early.

3.13.4.2.2.3.1 (U) EXAMPLE: During the 1999 Operation ALLIED FORCE at Cervia Air Base, Italy, the 501st Expeditionary Operations Group commander approached Public Affairs early on in the deployment to secure *Stars & Stripes* delivery for the deployed site. Public Affairs contacted the *Stars & Stripes* circulation department, gathered necessary information, and passed the information to the deployed Services chief. Although it took some time and effort, the USAFE Library Services funded the newspaper and it was delivered to the deployed site with an approximately one-to-eight ratio (50 newspapers for 400 personnel). Since there was no Field Exchange or other means to sell the paper, they were provided free of charge in common areas, such as the Morale Tent, Maintenance Hangar, etc. Delivery of this newspaper helped keep the deployed troops informed about the operation and its support back home and in Europe. *Stars & Stripes* can be a powerful weapon in combating adversary propaganda and disinformation as well as maintaining troop morale.

3.13.4.2.2.4 (U) Arrange Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) Broadcasts at Deployed Locations. For a relatively low cost, troops can now receive AFRTS programming virtually anywhere in the world. This service is a major morale factor for airmen deployed to remote sites and is available via a satellite dish and decoder. To arrange for AFRTS, deployed PAO’s must work with Services and Contracting personnel to purchase an over-the-counter satellite dish and AFN decoder. In the European theater, these can be purchased from AAFES. In addition, a TV receiver will be needed to view the signal. Deployed communications personnel can install the dish and need to work with AFRTS to have the decoder authorized to receive the AFRTS signal. For detailed information on AFRTS and the Air Force Broadcasting Service, see AFI 35-101, Public Affairs Policies and Procedures.

3.13.4.2.2.5 (U) Conduct Town Hall/Community Meetings. When a large percentage of an Air Force base’s military population deploys forward, the ‘Air Force family’ left behind must pull together to support one another. Keeping this family informed is critical. One technique commanders can use is to conduct town hall or community meetings. Advantages include the ability to inform a large portion of the base at one time, the chance to immediately answer questions or concerns about how the deployment affects the base, and an opportunity to assess the kinds of information family members still need and their concerns. Questions that can’t be answered during the meetings should be researched and answered by the appropriate base agency. All questions and answers can then be published in the base newspaper, an
UNCLASSIFIED

excellent way to spread the information and answers even further. In addition, an unclassified mission briefing on the mission can be an extremely effective way to educate family members on the current operation.

3.13.4.2.2.3 (U) Community Relations Operations. In general, Joint Civil Affairs teams handle community relations efforts in forward-deployed areas. However, deployed Air Force Public Affairs forces may conduct community relations initiatives depending on their location and the necessity. In addition, crises and contingencies that affect stateside bases or main operating bases overseas can also have a considerable economic or social impact on the non-military publics surrounding those bases. That impact, if left unchecked, can result in loss of public or political support for military operations. Therefore, Public Affairs' community relations operations during crises or contingencies play a key role in maintaining the public trust and support necessary to sustain operations before, during, and after a military campaign or crisis.

3.13.4.2.2.3.1 (U) Activate and Energize the Speakers' Bureau. PAO's can build and maintain support for the Air Force during times of crisis or combat by projecting key Air Force themes and messages to the publics near their installation or operation via speakers. For more information on managing a Speakers' Bureau Program, see AFI 35-101, Chapter 8, Section G, Para 8.29 or Chapter 2, Section 2.13.4.2.3.5.

3.13.4.2.2.3.1.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In 1999 during Operation ALLIED FORCE, senior NATO officials made the decision to strictly limit media contact with all commanders. Wing commanders, component commanders, and JTF commanders were barred from speaking to the news media. As a result, the media, relying on these secondary sources, badly misunderstood key aerospace power operations as they unfolded on the world stage. Understanding the potential negative impact this could have on public support for the Air Force mission, Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs Media Operations Division worked with PA offices across America to send Air Force active duty and retired speakers throughout the U.S. to educate and maintain public support for aerospace power's effectiveness in military operations.

3.13.4.2.2.3.1 (U) Use Air Force Bands to Promote Key Themes and Messages. Musical programs play a vital role in raising troop morale and in generating public support for military operations (see 2.13.4.2.3.6 (U) 'Band Flight Path'). Musical programs can also be used as a "force," to enhance the effectiveness of Public Affairs Operations by inducing emotional responses favorable to meeting communications objectives within targeted international audiences. See paragraph 3.13.4.3.7.3 (U) The Use of Music in Public Affairs Operations.

3.13.4.2.2.3.2 (U) Keep Community Leadership/Opinion Leaders Informed. A technique commanders and PAO's can use to solidify and maintain support for military operations is to keep community and public opinion leaders informed of ongoing operations and the potential economic, social and political impact they'll have on the community. The information should be unclassified, releasable and provided as early as possible. Commanders and their PAO's should use these opportunities to communicate their support for the community and commit to working together
through any issues that arise during the contingency that could adversely impact community relations.

3.13.4.2.3.2.1 (U) EXAMPLE: During the 1999 Operation ALLIED FORCE, the 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath deployed two fighter squadrons to Italy. In addition, combat sorties were flown over Serbia from RAF Lakenheath by a third fighter squadron. This meant around-the-clock operations and night-flying for the base, the presence of U.S. children in local British schools whose parents had deployed, operational security concerns about the base, and a significant decrease in the number of American patrons for local businesses. Local community leaders were invited by the 48th Fighter Wing commander to receive a briefing about RAF Lakenheath’s important role in the operation. Key messages were used to convey the importance of the ongoing operation to European stability. It was also an opportunity for local community leaders to ask questions and highlight concerns brought forward by their constituents. As a result, the community leaders offered their public support for the U.S. and NATO mission and felt comfortable contacting the base to work through any potentially adverse public issues during the duration of the campaign.

3.13.4.2 Intelligence Requirements. Intelligence activities have the ability to quickly translate and help analyze adversary news broadcasts. This ability helps PAO’s quickly understand and anticipate adversary propaganda. Intelligence’s historical and cultural analysis of the adversary gives Public Affairs Operations a context from which to anticipate and get ahead of propaganda and disinformation. For more information about how intelligence activities are key to Public Affairs Operations, see 3.13.4.1.2.1.8.1 (U) Adversary Propaganda techniques.

3.13.4.2.1 EXAMPLE: During the 1999 Kosovo Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO Public Affairs officials had limited access to translations of Serb propaganda broadcasts and had no information on historic Serb propaganda regarding perceptions of outside aggression, religious defense, Slavic brotherhood or of the importance of Kosovo in Serbian history. Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO’s chief of public information, observed that this lack of integration with intelligence caused NATO major problems in dealing with Serb propaganda. Shea said that if his organization had been given access to all intelligence about the Serbs quickly, it would have helped his Public Affairs organization get ahead of the propaganda, instead of being constantly surprised by and reacting to the Serb public information campaign.

3.13.4.2.2 (U) Intelligence Products to Aid PA Planning and Analysis.

- (U) Current News Early Bird. Available at . Current News publications are daily compilations of published current news articles and commentary concerning significant defense and defense-related national security issues. The publications aim to give a balanced representation of how the public, Congress and the press see military and defense programs and issues. They are internal management tools intended to serve the informational needs of senior DoD officials in the continuing assessment of defense policies, programs and actions.
(U) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The FBIS is the primary collector of foreign open-source information for the U.S. Intelligence Community. Through its worldwide access to foreign media and other publicly available material, FBIS provides the latest political, military, economic, and technical information gleaned from foreign open sources. To do this, FBIS covers 1748 publications, 280 radio stations, 187 television stations, 95 news agencies, 501 Internet sources, and 15 databases in 149 countries and 78 languages. Translations and transliterations of this information are collectively referred to as FBIS “reporting”. FBIS is unclassified and accessible via SIPRNET at: http:\\www.fbis.cia.gov\mos2\mos2_frame_main.html.

(U) SIRO Daily Press Review. SIRO Daily Press Reviews are compiled by the National Security Agency’s National Security Operations Center (NSOC) by the Senior Information Resources Officer (SIRO). They are intended for use as background information by intelligence analysts and to serve as an indicator of significant worldwide events which may be reflected in signals intelligence. However, the information is also incredibly useful to PAO’s as a planning and analysis tool. The daily press reviews are unclassified and available on the SIPRNET at: http:\\www.nsa.smil.mil\siro\.

3.13.4.3 (U) Integration with other disciplines. At all levels of command, Public Affairs Operations should be an integral part of the IO cells. These cells are composed of expert representatives from various activities brought together to exploit the synergistic effect of unifying their efforts to collect and disseminate information, develop IW courses of action, and coordinate and deconflict information. The cells help integrate IW activities into aerospace operations plans (see AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, and Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, for detailed discussion of IO cell responsibilities).

3.13.4.3.1 (U) Importance of IW Integration. The success of a campaign plan may depend on the information superiority achieved by coordinating and integrating all IW capabilities into a seamless effort. The composition of IO cells may vary based on the over-all mission of the force, the role of IW in accomplishing the joint force commander’s objectives, and the adversary’s IW capability.

3.13.4.3.2 (U) Public Affairs Representation in the IW Team. During every phase of contingency operations, Public Affairs Operations should be represented on the IW team. The training and experience of Public Affairs professionals in dealing with the public and the media identify them as key players in achieving the commander’s objectives. Their role in coordination and deconfliction of information is vital because they are the agents for releasing official information to the public.

3.13.4.3.2.1 (U) Joint Force Commander IO Cell. Public Affairs Operations are closely interlocked with other military and information operations. All IW elements must be coordinated and deconflicted in a successful, synergistic campaign. The method to create this synergy is through the JFC IO Cell. The commander should
ensure the Public Affairs officer is an engaged part of the cell and contributes to the strategies proposed by it. **Joint doctrine (Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations)** says the purpose of the IO cell is to exchange information with the other cell members about plans in development. The IO cell should focus on integrating and deconflicting capabilities to accomplish mission objectives. According to the joint doctrine, this planning and IW coordination and deconflicting process is continuous across all phases of an operation and across the full range of military operations. The coordination of Public Affairs Operations, and other operations must be a continuous process that allows for flexible phasing.

3.13.4.3.3 (U) COLLECTION/DISSEMINATION ACTIVITIES: Public Affairs Operations collect information, analyze domestic and foreign news content and interpret the global, national, and military information environments. Public Affairs Operations also monitor domestic and foreign public opinion. This analysis helps commanders accurately forecast the ramifications of their actions and the impact their decisions have on public opinion and troop morale. It also gives commanders the awareness they need to deal with adversary propaganda. Timely and accurate information provided to the public is critical to national will, troop morale and countering adversary propaganda and disinformation.

3.13.4.3.4 (U) OPERATIONAL SECURITY: Public Affairs is the only organization authorized by DoD to release information to the public (DoD Directive 5122.5, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs). As such, it bears key responsibility for operational security. Public Affairs' security and policy review procedures protect classified, sensitive information and advanced technology. Public Affairs Operations may also exploit operational information. There is a natural tension between traditional operational security and a PAO's desire to use information to demonstrate national resolve or send a clear signal to the opponent. Operational information in the news may deter potential adversaries, driving a crisis back to peace before use of kinetic force becomes necessary. When adversaries are not deterred from conflict, information revealing U.S. or friendly force capabilities and resolve may still affect adversary decision-makers. Communicating military capabilities to national and international audiences can be a force multiplier for commanders. PAO's interface within IW in this operational security area helps the commander choose the right options to achieve the objective.

3.13.4.3.4.1 (U) EXAMPLE: Careful consideration must be given to the use of public information. Often, the release of information (traditionally withheld due to OPSEC) will directly help the commander achieve the objective. In October 1998, Air Force Public Affairs coordinated extensive media coverage of a major deployment of U.S. B-52s to Great Britain to deter conflict and to persuade Serbia to enter into peace talks. Despite their potential deterrent value, not everyone in theater supported this publicity. For example, USAFE's operations security (OPSEC) staff initially opposed publicizing the bomber deployment, claiming that media coverage would jeopardize potential operations. The well-publicized deployment had its
intended effect, as Slobodan Milosevic’s government agreed to begin Kosovo talks with U.S. and European officials in Paris.

3.13.4.3.4.2 (U) EXAMPLE: In the 1999 Operation ALLIED FORCE, the USAFE Public Affairs staff faced criticism when they established a “Kosovo homepage” on the internet in September 1998, responding to media queries about the types of forces being arrayed against Serbia. Intelligence officers soon asked Public Affairs to shut down the website, claiming it revealed sensitive information to the Serbs. Intel later rescinded its request when the deterrent value of the home page became apparent. Along with news media inquiries, the website received thousands of “hits” from Eastern Europe, including many from Serb government locations.

3.13.4.3.5 (U) COUNTER PROPAGANDA: Public Affairs Operations can be the first line of defense against adversary propaganda and disinformation in the news media. Public Affairs Operations disseminate a continuous flow of trusted, reliable, timely, and accurate information to military members, their families, the media, and the public. This capability allows Public Affairs Operations to help defeat adversary efforts to diminish national will, degrade morale, and turn world opinion against friendly operations.

3.13.4.3.5.1 (U) Combating Adversary Propaganda. Adversaries of the U.S. have used propaganda during many conflicts. Sometimes even our allies have used propaganda against us. The British used propaganda to help bring the U.S. into World War I. The Nazis used propaganda early in World War II to keep the U.S. disengaged from the war in Europe. Propaganda is psychological warfare against our leaders and population in order to “... influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly” (Joint Pub 3-53, Joint Psychological Operations). While we may anticipate propaganda being used against U.S. leaders, publics and armed forces, Public Affairs Operations may not use propaganda techniques on U.S. publics to combat adversary propaganda. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 prohibits Public Affairs Operations from using propaganda techniques to intentionally misinform the U.S. public, Congress, or U.S. media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence U.S. decision-makers and public opinion.

3.13.4.3.5.1.1 (U) Planning. The first step in countering adversary propaganda is to plan for it. Anticipate the adversary’s use of propaganda against us, then identify the technique they are using before, during and after the military operation begins. Ideally, the Public Affairs annex F to the overall ops plan should have a strategic analysis of the theater information environment and should anticipate the adversary’s propensity to use propaganda.

3.13.4.3.5.1.2 (U) The Information Initiative. Gaining and maintaining the information initiative in a conflict can also defeat propaganda. The first out with information often sets the context and frames the public debate. It is extremely important to get complete, truthful information out first—especially information
about mistakes and blunders, so that you are exposing those errors and putting them into the proper context. This will help disarm the adversary’s propaganda and defeat attempts by the adversary to use these mistakes against you.

3.13.4.3.5.1.2 (U) EXAMPLE: In April 1999 operation ALLIED FORCE F-16s mistakenly struck two civilian convoys near the Kosovo village of Djakovica. For almost a week, conflicting information had come from NATO, EUCOM and Washington. Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark initially blamed the attack on the Serbs. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon insisted that the F-16s had only hit military vehicles. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea openly questioned whether the convoy incident was a totally fabricated Serbian propaganda ploy. All the while, Serbs escorted world media to the scene to take video and photographs of the carnage. Images of the scene led evening newscasts; photographs and headlines appeared on every newspaper around the globe. Serbs used the opportunity to emphasize the unjust nature of the air campaign they insisted was indiscriminately killing innocent civilians throughout the country. After a week of conflicting stories and media headlines, NATO offered up the Aviano AB commander, Brig. Gen. Dan Lief, to brief the “ground truth” to the international media. General Lief’s highly detailed explanation set the issue to rest that day. However, Air Force officials came to believe, as General Lief did, that NATO’s slow response to the Djakovica incident could have cost NATO the war. The public will accept human errors and equipment failures during combat operations but will not accept conflicting, contradictory or evasive statements. Had NATO been able to immediately release information about the horrible mistake, putting it into the proper context for the world audience, then NATO would have denied the Serbs the enormous propaganda value they gained from the incident.

3.13.4.3.5.1.2 (U) EXAMPLE: On 10 February 1991, during Operation DESERT STORM, a USAF F-117 attacked a suspected leadership bunker in the Baghdad neighborhood of Al Fridros. Unknown to the pilot or coalition planners, the Al Fridros complex was also a civilian air raid shelter. Hundreds of civilians died in the attack and the images of the innocent dead played over and over again on the evening news. These television images had an immediate impact on the war. The U.S. initially denied that the structure was an air raid shelter, gave conflicting information and later relented and admitted the mistake when live images of the scene proved indisputable. U.S. delay and confusion allowed the Iraqis to leverage the propaganda value of the mistake. In response to the media coverage, the U.S. completely halted the bombing against Baghdad for the next 10 days. When the bombing resumed, operations were restricted. The news coverage of this mistake completely changed the nature of the bombing campaign in Baghdad.

3.13.4.3.5.1. (U) Credibility and Truth. Credibility and ground truth are key concepts to maintaining Public Affairs operational capability. The credibility and reputation of our military organization in the international news media is a strategic center of gravity for combating adversary propaganda. It is absolutely imperative that this credibility is maintained, otherwise the media and the public will lose confidence
in what our spokesmen say. If credibility is not maintained, our operational ability to use Public Affairs Operations for combating adversary propaganda, for providing informational flexible deterrent options, virtual force projection, or maintaining national will, could be permanently and irreparably damaged. Therefore, absolute credibility is the “gold standard” to counter adversary propaganda and disinformation. Credibility with the news media is earned over decades, yet can vanish overnight. Providing fast, truthful, credible information to the news media is operationally essential in order to maintain this capability.

3.13.4.3.5.1.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In late 1990, Saddam Hussein allowed Western journalists to stay in Baghdad so they could report from the besieged Iraqi capitol if and when hostilities began. Saddam hoped to use the journalists to attack the national will of the coalition countries – he had identified the domestic sensitivities of the coalition publics as a strategic center of gravity that he wanted to exploit. This apparent openness received a favorable response by journalists who praised the Iraqi leader for wanting his story told to the world. This response quickly changed. Saddam strictly controlled and orchestrated foreign media activity, from strict censorship, to supposedly “random” man-in-the-street interviews of people who spoke remarkably flawless English, to outlandish claims of bombing atrocities and massive civilian destruction and casualties. Saddam had miscalculated and had underestimated the Western media, who quickly began discounting and eventually ignoring Iraqi claims. In 1991, by the time Saddam wanted to spotlight the bombing of a “baby milk factory,” the Iraqi regime had lost all credibility in the world media, and Saddam’s claims were effectively ignored. Through the media’s perception of Iraqi attempts at manipulation, Iraq had lost the ability to effectively communicate its key messages to the world. This can be contrasted with Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf’s open and honest approach with the media. His approach built massive credibility and allowed the coalition to leverage that capability to its full advantage (see 3.13.4.3.6 (U) MILITARY DECEPTION below).

3.13.4.3.6 (U) MILITARY DECEPTION: Public Affairs Operations may play a part in deception planning via coordination and deconfliction. However, joint doctrine for military deception states that such operations will not intentionally target or mislead the U.S. public, Congress, or the news media. Deception activities potentially visible to the American public should be closely integrated with the Public Affairs Operations so as not to compromise operational considerations or diminish the credibility of Public Affairs Operations in the national media. Public Affairs Operations can document displays of force or training operations, but they cannot use false information to simulate force projection. If false information were ever used in Public Affairs Operations, public trust and support for the Air Force would be undermined, and the capabilities provided by Public Affairs Operations could be lost. See Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

3.13.4.3.6.1 (U) EXAMPLE: In late 1990, before the start of Operation Desert Storm, the media was allowed to cover U.S. amphibious training in the Persian Gulf. Public affairs officers encouraged reporters to cover the event, which highlighted
potential U.S. capabilities against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. When the amphibious landing option was later scrapped, members of the press corps accused PAOs of deceiving them. But, amphibious landings were still a military option when the press corps covered the training event. News coverage of the event put the enemy on notice that the conflict was escalating and communicated U.S. and coalition resolve.

3.13.4.3.7 (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: Public Affairs and PSYOP activities must be closely integrated and deconflicted.

3.13.4.3.7.1 (U) PSYOP Function. PSYOP provides selected information to foreign audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, their behavior (see AFDD 2-5.5, Psychological Operations).

3.13.4.3.7.2 (U) Public Affairs Function. Public Affairs Operations communicate unclassified information about Air Force activities to Air Force, domestic, and international audiences through internal communications and the national and international news media.

3.13.4.3.7.3 (U) Public Affairs Operations Bound By Truth. The two operations are separate, yet related. Many themes and messages developed by Public Affairs Operations will also be used in PSYOP, so the two must be carefully coordinated and deconflicted. Joint psychological operations doctrine states that Public Affairs Operations may be used to disseminate international information, but great care must be taken to avoid even the appearance of slanting or manipulating information provided through Public Affairs channels (see Joint Pub 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations).

3.13.4.3.7.3.1 (U) EXAMPLE: Many themes and messages developed in Public Affairs Operations will also be used in PSYOP. In 1989, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was complete, U.S. President George Bush appeared in a television address that was broadcast around the world. In his State of the Union address, watched by hundreds of millions of people worldwide, the U.S. President made a firm statement of resolve intended not only for Americans and the U.S. Congress, but also specifically targeted at Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Mr. Bush said, “Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That’s not a threat. That’s not a boast. That’s just the way it’s going to be.” His statement not only showed the American public and Congress his personal determination and resolve that the Iraqi aggression would not stand, but it also personally targeted the Iraqi dictator and his political and military leaders and intimidated them through the international media.

3.13.4.3.7.4 (U) The Use of Music in Public Affairs Operations. Public Affairs Musical Operations can enhance the effectiveness of information to targeted audiences by inducing emotional responses favorable to meeting Public Affairs Operational objectives.
3.13.4.3.7.4.1 (U) EXAMPLE: Musical operations can not only induce emotions, but these emotional responses will open the target foreign audience up to receive key themes and messages. During the Cold War, Voice of America (VOA) skillfully used musical operations to enhance the process of disseminating news and comment. The VOA musical staff supplied music to introduce or accompany a drama of American life or underscore the dramatic value of the program. Another type of VOA program was the information and entertainment show. These programs traced events through history and presented the ideals and benefits of democratic society. In these programs, music was used to induce feelings or moods favorable to the reception of those ideals, including inducing emotions of nostalgia to associate with the benefits of a democratic society.

3.13.4.3.7.4.2 (U) EXAMPLE: In 1996, a Marine jet on a training mission in Northern Italy clipped a ski-lift cable, sending a large gondola filled with Italian tourists crashing to their deaths. Locals began protesting the U.S. military presence in the region. As part of the operation to restore local faith and support in U.S. forces stationed in Northern Italy, the USAF Band was quickly dispatched to the region to reinforce U.S. themes and messages of sorrow, remorse, support and commonality of purpose between the Italian and American peoples. This Public Affairs Operation opened large audiences up to key U.S. messages during this critical time when continued military presence in the region was an issue. The protests abated and local faith and support began to be restored.

3.13.4.3.7.5 (U) PHYSICAL ATTACK: Public Affairs Operations can be used to respond to a direct physical attack. This could be especially true of an IW attack, particularly an adversary IW physical attack. For example, if an adversary IW attack “zeroed out” the bank accounts of AEF members deploying in support of operations, commanders would maintain operational capability and counter the physical attack by using Public Affairs Operations. They would do this through the mass media to inform members and their families of what happened and what the Air Force was immediately doing to take care of their needs as the deployment continued unhindered.

3.13.4.3.7.5.1 (U) EXAMPLE: During information warfare attacks, careful consideration must be given to the use of public information to counter IW physical attack. In 1998 the Air Force deployment database residing at the Standard Systems Group, Gunter Annex, Maxwell AFB Ala., came under cyber attack at a time when the U.S was publicly threatening the deployment of U.S. forces in a contingency operation. Unclassified details of the cyber attack were released to the public to demonstrate that the Air Force was unaffected by these attacks and could still deploy as planned. This careful public release of information directly countered the physical attack and allowed the publicly visible deterrent value of deployment preparations to continue.
APPENDIX B

Interview Agenda for Military Representatives

Public Affairs and new defense strategy (ref: QDR Sept. 30, 2001)

1) In what ways does AF public affairs support the new defense strategy of anti-terrorism/homeland defense?

2) What role did AF public affairs play in mediating the military response efforts in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks?

3) How has the AF public affairs career field changed or remained constant in this new era? What are some special considerations that have come to the fore?

4) Did the September attacks and subsequent war caused the news media to change their areas of interest in military news, such as focusing on aspects of the U.S. AF mission that they previously paid less attention to?

5) How is the global information environment defined from an AF public affairs perspective?

6) In what ways does public affairs participate in Information Warfare?

7) What are the most important aspects of the public affairs IW mission?

8) How do public affairs operations use timely and accurate information to help deter war, drive a crisis back to peace, or wage war as during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM?

9) Has AF public affairs participated in countering the “propaganda” disseminated by the terrorists and the Taliban?

10) Is there anything you would like to add to the discussion on AF public affairs’ role in information warfare or in this war on terrorism?

11) If you feel at east talking about it, can you describe what happened when you went to work September 11? How did things unfold and what did you think about from both professional and personal perspectives?

12) Is there anything you would like to add regarding the attack and your experience?

13) How has the global, 24 hour news media market been both a challenge and opportunity in managing media interest during this unprecedented crisis?
14) Has the relationship between public affairs officers and reporters at the pentagon (or in general, if you prefer) changed since the attacks of Sept. 11?

15) In what way has the defense strategy as outlined in the QDR—and demonstrated during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM—changed the narrative of news?

16) Is there anything you would like to add on the subjects discussed or anything else that I may be unaware of?

Interview Agenda for Media Representative

1) What was your news organization’s role in the War Against Terrorism?

2) How did the global media environment evolve with 9-11, when we heard of certain Middle East news agencies?

3) What has changed for yourself and your colleagues since the 9-11?

4) The role of public affairs in information operations—do you have opinion about this?

5) What is your view of terrorism and media relationship?

6) What was your opinion of the media’s social responsibility?

7) What is your opinion of allied Intercultural communication efforts?

8) How has the media-government relationship evolved since 9-11?

9) Is there anything you would like to add?