JUDICIOUS ENGAGEMENT: THE ROAD TO ENDURING PEACE

BY

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Judicious Engagement: The Road to Enduring Peace

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War, an upsurge of intra-state conflicts have posed the greatest challenge to enduring peace the international community sought to achieve. The peace dividends nations expected were far short of reality. This paper argues that the U.S. must maintain its judicious engagement in the international community for legitimacy, stability, and democracy are key to its prosperity. Since its inception, the United Nations has conducted 54 peace operations of which 14 are ongoing. Few of these operations are seen as a success. The United States in many cases was reluctantly drawn into conflict or intervention. President Bush during his presidential campaign took an anti-interventionist stance on peace operations in various regions of the world, citing its toll on the military readiness and its links to regional security. Once in office, President George W. Bush took care to reassure U.S. allies of its resolve to regional security and his continuing support to current commitments, specifically in the Balkans. With Somalia, Northern Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo under its belt, the U.S. now faces another potential crisis in the Afghanistan war on terrorism. What lessons from the previous crises should the U.S. apply in the post-Taliban Afghanistan? Many experts now conclude that U.S. policy toward Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat did much to create the present crisis of terrorism. This paper attempts to draw some conclusions from the analysis of the Bosnia and Somalia crises and make some recommendations based on lessons learned.
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PREFACE

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JUDICIOUS ENGAGEMENT: THE ROAD TO ENDURING PEACE

Since the end of the Cold War, an upsurge of intra-state conflicts have posed the greatest challenge to enduring peace the international community sought to achieve. The peace dividends nations expected were far short of reality. Since 1989, there have been thirteen flash points around the world.¹ Since its inception, the United Nations has conducted 54 peace operations of which 14 are ongoing. The record of success of UN operations particularly in the 1990s is “decidedly mixed.”²

The United States should no longer participate in peacekeeping in the Balkans "and extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness for these kinds of global missions", stated Condoleezza Rice.³ During the 2000 presidential campaign, Ms. Rice, then the Presidential Candidate George W. Bush’s potential National Security Advisor, vexed U.S. allies and academics who supported the involvement of U.S. forces in the Balkans with the statement that seem to signal President Bush’s intention to withdraw U.S. forces from the Balkans. Should the U.S. really walk away from its current commitments and obligations? This paper argues that the U.S. must maintain its judicious engagement in the international community for legitimacy, stability, and democracy are key to its prosperity.

The United States in many cases was reluctantly drawn into conflict or intervention only to be blamed for its demise.⁴ President Bush during his presidential campaign took an anti-interventionist stance on peace operations in various regions of the world, citing its toll on the military readiness and its links to regional security. Once in office, President George W. Bush took care to reassure U.S. allies of its resolve to regional security and his continuing support to current commitments, specifically in the Balkans.

Since the end of the Cold War and as the U.S. military deployed frequently responding to regional crises, the discussion of appropriateness and utility of U.S. forces in peace operations also intensified. Those who oppose it often cite wear and tear on the U.S. military as well as a poor link to furthering of vital National interests. Those who support it argue that regional stability and our responsibility as the world’s only superpower compel us to intervene where violence and atrocities threatening security and stability of neighboring states whose governing abilities are fragile at best.⁵ Either case, peace operations have been frequent and open-ended commitments for the U.S.

In the 1990s, the U.S. participated in over two dozen peace operations with varying success.⁶ The common feature was how the U.S. became involved. In almost every case, the U.S. had been a reluctant participant and arrived at the scene only after the situation in the
region had degenerated into a freefall. The impetus for our involvement came in various forms – graphic and heart-rending reports on CNN or reports of atrocities through various media or the UN request for assistance. Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda are some of the most visible examples of how the U.S. was compelled to act.

Having dealt with Somalia, Northern Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo in the 1990s, the U.S. now faces another potential case in Afghanistan. What lessons from the previous crises should the U.S. apply in the post-Taliban Afghanistan? Many experts now conclude that U.S. policy toward Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat did much to create the present crisis of terrorism. This paper will draw some conclusions from the analysis of the Somalia and Bosnia crises and make some recommendations based on lessons learned.

The U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1990s was the first of its kind under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter. The mission’s failure did much to curb the U.S. willingness to get involved in similar future crises. The trend in policy development shows commitment to long-term, proactive, and comprehensive measures in dealing with regional crises. Somalia and Bosnia illustrate the consequences of policies that are reactive, short-sighted and implemented with less than full resolve or full public and legislative support. Finally, the democratic ideals are compatible with reality.

FUTURE TRENDS

A look into the future geopolitical environment will be helpful. It would be unnecessary to suggest that the U.S. should pursue judicious engagement when one does not expect the similar crises of the 1990s to continue for the foreseeable future. The U.S. probably will not be able to intervene in every crisis especially if we experience an upsurge of crises around the world.

What can the U.S. expect for the next ten to twenty years in the international system? According to Robert H. Dorff, “spawned by ethnic, religious, and nationalist animosities and hatreds, [intra-state conflicts and conflicts arising from ungovernability and resultant failing or failed states] will continue to be the most prevalent form of conflict.” Ungovernability is defined as the declining ability of governments worldwide to govern and to carry out the responsibilities of managing a state. These failed or failing states linger and the longer they persist, the greater potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability and international peace.

Since the end of the Cold War, many states once under the Soviet rule endeavored to establish a democratic form of government. This trend of democratization was not necessarily
good for regional stability. Unfamiliar with complex problems that accompany a free, democratic form of government, the citizens of those fledgling states tend to perceive the democratic form of government as strange and not very effective. These states are no less at risk, or potentially more prone, to failure.

With crises arising from increased ungovernability and failing/failed states, the U.S. can expect to see more man-made humanitarian disasters, intra-state wars, and disintegration of civil society. Hence, the likelihood of small-scale contingencies will increase rather than decrease for the foreseeable future.

RETRENCHMENT FOLLOWED BY RE-ENGAGEMENT

Since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, U.S. Presidents promulgated eleven National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. These documents were a window to see how each administration was to prioritize U.S. interests and how it intended to use the instruments of power to pursue its policy. In particular, the NSSs would show each administration’s policy toward peace operations.

A review of eight of the last eleven NSSs, from 1991 to 2000, provides evidence that the U.S. cannot afford to nor willing to disengage from the international community. The first three NSSs, from 1987 to 1990, contained no substantive views on peace operations. A review of the NSSs reveals how the U.S. strategy evolved based on administration’s perceived threats and prioritized interests. What is more interesting is the documents’ evolutionary trend. President George H.W. Bush’s cautious optimism about the aftermath of the break up of the Soviet Union and potential instability evolved to President Clinton’s attempt to refine how the U.S. conducts peace operations.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the Bush administration saw a new Europe where a continent that was “truly whole and free.” It opined that “one by one, the states of Central and Eastern Europe have begun to reclaim the European culture and political tradition” but “disputes between and among some Eastern European states and ethnic groups appear to have been merely frozen in time by decades of Cold War. Security problems could emerge in the East in the course of 1990s.” The Bush 1991 NSS did not articulate its response policy toward those security problems other than to state that it will “respond quickly and substantially to the suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters – that is, for humanitarian reasons.”

Seventeen months later, the second Bush NSS reflected a decidedly more urgent tone.
The end of the Cold War has coincided with a virtual explosion of long-dormant ethnic and aggressive nationalistic tensions around the world, many of which degenerated into international crises. . . . The United States should significantly increase its efforts to improve regional and United Nations conflict prevention efforts, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping capabilities. . . . [The U.S.] must develop multinational capabilities necessary for enforcing peace, and peace rebuilding after conflict.\textsuperscript{12}

The 1993 NSS is an acknowledgment that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its influence brought far more problems than anyone had ever predicted. Still the U.S. was reluctant to play the role of the world’s policeman. Published in the Bush’s final month in office, it appeared all but to be a record of President Bush’s accomplishment and not much use to President Clinton.\textsuperscript{13}

Candidate Clinton ran for president on the domestic agenda – “It’s the economy, stupid.” Once in office, however, President Clinton almost immediately had to deal with the crisis in Somalia. The 1994 Clinton NSS titled “Engagement and Enlargement” sought to leverage the globalism and U.S. economic power to advance the national interests. This idealistic policy received a jolt of reality in Somalia. Prior to the 1994 Clinton NSS publication, the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 had already laid out in detail how and when the U.S. will employ its power dealing with peace operations. Further discussions on the development of PDDs will follow in the next section of this paper. The 1994 NSS detailed the basic principles on the use of force. Prior to the use of force, national interests will dictate the pace and extent of our engagement – the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved. [we will] seek the help of our allies or of relevant multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{14}

The U.S. must consider several critical questions: Are non-military means considered? What type of military capabilities is appropriate? Is the use of force matched to political objectives? Is there public and Congressional support for such involvement? Are there clear measures of success and exit strategy?\textsuperscript{15} All in all the Clinton administration seemed to be committed to preparing the “forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution. The United States will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response.\textsuperscript{16} Having dealt with the Somalia and Balkan crises, the 1994 NSS seemed to call for the more judicious use of force.

The 1995 NSS was the first document to explicitly categorize the U.S. interests – vital, important and humanitarian. Despite the attempt to prioritize its interests, the policy on the use of force remained virtually identical in the NSSs from 1994 to 1996. The differences in peace operations policy in the three documents reflect the challenges the Clinton administration faced.
Whereas the 1994 NSS boldly declared that the U.S. would pay “our bills” in peace operations in full, the 1995 NSS spelled out the U.S. goal to reduce the peacekeeping payments to twenty-five percent.\textsuperscript{17}

Having been amply criticized for its abrogation of world leadership in dealing with the Balkan crises and failed to live up to its previous strategy of “engagement and enlargement”, the Clinton administration no longer eagerly sought to spread democracy.\textsuperscript{18} The 1997 NSS was titled, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century”. Gone were the words, “engagement and enlargement” while the emphasis was on how the U.S. will “remain engaged abroad and work with partners”. The first-time use of “smaller scale contingencies” (SSCs) appeared which was defined as lesser contingencies and actions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and interventions.\textsuperscript{19} The Clinton administration published the 1998 NSS that contained little changes from 1997 other than the fact that “failed states” got a separate heading of its own.

The 2000 NSS, the last NSS for the Clinton administration, clearly delineated “guiding principles of engagement” that called for protecting “our national interests – vital, important, and humanitarian and other longer-term interests.”\textsuperscript{20} Despite the trend toward judicious use of force and other instruments of power to advance the national interests, the SSC-category continued to become increasingly inclusive. By 2000, the SSC category included peacekeeping operations, enforcing embargoes and no fly-zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, neutralizing NBC weapons facilities, supporting counter-drug operations, protecting freedom of navigation in international waters, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coping with mass migration and engaging in information operations.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore the international environment of increasing instability and fracture compelled the U.S. to stay engaged, albeit reluctantly. This reluctance, however, cost the U.S. valuable credibility and countless lives particularly during the 1990s as it dealt with an unfamiliar environment. After the failure in Somalia the Clinton administration delineated strict criteria for future U.S. intervention. Over time, however; the strict criteria for intervention was found to be unrealistic and the need for proactive engagement in peace operations became apparent. Hence, this paper will now analyze the Clinton policy through a closer look at his PDDs 25, 56 and 71.

RETRENCHMENT TO NATION-BUILDING

President Clinton’s PDDs serve as a clear example of how the U.S. cannot afford to remain reactive. In May 1994, the Clinton administration promulgated Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) that addressed six major issues of “reform and improvement”: 1) making
"disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support", 2) "reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations", 3) clarifying U.S. policy regarding command and control of our forces in UN peace operations, 4) "reforming and improving the UN’s capability to manage peace operations", 5) improving our managing and funding of peace operations, and 6) improving cooperation between the Executive, and Legislative branches and the American public. PDD-25 sought to rectify the tendency for the U.S. to become embroiled in any and all kinds of crises that arose from the Clinton National Security Strategy. President Clinton’s National Security Strategy sought to “engage and enlarge” the U.S. role in the world and had humanitarian interest as one of the three categories of U.S. interests. Hence, PDD-25 prescribed that peace operations not be open-ended, but linked to concrete political solutions and specified timeframe. Over the next several years, based on the lessons learned during our participation in peace operations, PDD-25 would be the first in the series of three PDDs that the Clinton administration promulgated between 1996 and 2000 on peace operations. The other two were PDD-56 and PDD-71.

President Clinton’s PDD-56 addressed the main criticism of his administration’s practice of indefinite commitment of U.S. forces and the perception that military response became the preponderant method to conduct U.S. foreign policy. PDD-56 called for closer and “accelerated planning and implementation of the civilian aspect of the operation.” A clear recognition that the military will be unable, in the long run, to secure enduring peace in a region resulted in PDD-56. PDD-56 dictated that “the civilian component of an operation must be integrated closely with the military component” where “the political-military plan include demonstrable milestones and measures of success.”

PDD-71 declared that in peace operations, U.S. armed forces must “confront civil disorder, violence, and crime” since “effective indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are necessary for a society to achieve and maintain durable peace.” And it concluded that military forces are best suited to accomplish constabulary tasks such as regulating movements, intervening to stop civil violence, stopping and deterring widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots, or other mob-type action, and dispersing unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances. Contradictorily, PDD 71 also declared that military forces do not normally have inherent law enforcement authority overseas as it sends inappropriate signals, places U.S. forces in situations for which they have not been thoroughly trained, and detracts from other purposes. Even so, PDD 71 sought to bolster the role and participation of civil-police in strengthening criminal justice systems to secure enduring peace.
Thus PDDs 25, 56, and 71 illustrate the Clinton administration’s realization that the U.S. must play an active role in nation-building which it was not willing to do in Somalia or in Bosnia.

The policy on peace operations that the Clinton administration pursued, therefore, was congruent with its own National Security Strategy, a concept of globalization which described the dynamics of integration and empowerment on the global scale. And further militarization of U.S. foreign policy by the Clinton administration saw a “spectacular outburst of military activism.” By “rejecting the [Clausewitz’s] dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means, [the U.S.] advanced the proposition that force is indistinguishable from politics.” Given the sticky experience, the Bush administration at the outset sought to minimize U.S. involvement in peace operations.

We should not promise what we ought not, lest we be called upon to perform what we cannot. - Lincoln

**BUSH’S POLICY - 2001**

Since taking office, President Bush has used various forums to make it clear to our allies that the U.S. is firmly committed to honor its current obligations. When he visited the U.S. troops in the Balkans in July, 2001, he articulated a clear policy on peace operations:

There remains considerable work in securing peace before [you] can come home. Each and everyday, your work is important to people of this region and for peace that NATO is committed to building here. . . . We understand that America’s contribution is essential, both militarily and politically. We will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or unilaterally. . . . Civil institutions must be put in place and made stronger. Organized crime must be brought under control. War criminals must face justice. Kosovo must not be a safe haven for insurrections elsewhere.

Absent in his speeches, however, is what the administration’s future intentions are should other situations arise that seem to call for U.S. forces in peace operations. The gradual downsizing of U.S. forces in the Balkans was already underway prior to 2001. President Clinton’s PDDs 25 and 56 addressed the issue of the financial or readiness cost of peace operations. Thus our stated intentions of honoring our ongoing commitment are inadequate at best.

The Bush administration has not yet produced a Congressionally mandated National Security Strategy. But the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) recently released Quadrennial Defense Review might shed light on the current policy since the document should be nested with yet to be promulgated National Security Strategy.

In the National Security lexicon, operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement are grouped into a category called small-scale
contingencies. In the newly published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), small-scale contingencies are viewed as furthering national interests.

America's security is linked directly to that of other nations. ...While the Western Hemisphere remains largely at peace, the danger exists that crises or insurgencies, particularly within the Andean region, might spread across borders, destabilize neighboring states, and place U.S. economic and political interests at risk.  

Furthermore, failed or failing states allow non-state actors to fill the vacuum or take advantage of rampant violence and the utter absence of social stability. The QDR concludes that U.S. armed forces must be prepared to respond to these smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) virtually anywhere in the world.  

As the experience in the 1990s shows, the U.S. had not fared well in dealing with SSCs. Additionally, the U.S. intervened in these SSCs haphazardly without forethought.  What remained consistent, however, is the evolution in policy development that points to the fact that the U.S. cannot shy away from future crises that threaten security and freedom of the international community. Clearly, Somalia and Bosnia highlight the nature of modern conflict and dynamic forces at play in the world since the end of the Cold War. The review of the Somalia and Bosnia crises will show the imperative lessons that are helpful to the situation the U.S. will face in Afghanistan.

POLICY OPTIONS ON SMALLER SCALE CONTINGENCIES

Several alternatives are available to the U.S. in dealing with small-scale contingencies. But the major three are: Do nothing, develop more robust, full-spectrum military capabilities, or adopt a strategy based on a "legitimate governance theory of engagement."  

First, the U.S. can decide that small-scale contingencies are not of vital national interests. This neo-isolationist approach is problematic since what gets to be a vital interest depends on who defines it as such. In cases of horrific humanitarian disasters, any attempt by the Bush administration to not intervene would be severely criticized as it runs counter to U.S. National values.  In the case of Kosovo, "the record of Slobodan Milosevic provides a compelling case that here are a personality and a policy of the kind the just-war ethic was designed to confront."
If the U.S. chooses to develop more robust, full-spectrum military capabilities along with improving its mechanisms for identifying such crises early on, it would certainly improve U.S. capability to deal with such contingencies. Critics point out that:

for more than a decade now, the U.S. has been trailing behind the spread of war in the Balkans. It is time to get ahead, to make events instead of being led by them, and a larger Balkans security framework is essential to that end.37

Yet, it may not garner consensus as to whether such build-up and effort are warranted or affordable. Currently, public support for involvement in small-scale contingencies is shallow at best.38

A strategy based on a “legitimate governance theory of engagement” is the third option. Legitimate governance is “governance that derives its just powers from the governed and generates a viable political competence that can and will manage, coordinate, and sustain security, and political, economic, and social development.”39 This theory of engagement is based on Edward N. Luttwak’s contention that war serves a purpose of resolving political conflicts and ultimately leads to peace. Luttwak’s point is that the cessation of violence and the peace that follows are possible when one side of the conflict is either victorious, exhausted or ceases to act as an entity. “Too many wars, . . . become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention.”40

Small-scale contingencies, Luttwak further contends, ought to be allowed to run their course without outside intervention. The U.S. ought to get involved only when legitimate governance exists which would provide any hope of enduring peace. The problem of such approach is that it runs counter to American values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as it would ignore horrific atrocities such as in Kosovo or Rwanda. With this approach, the U.S. will no longer be able to claim the moral high ground as its vital interests take priority over its espoused values.

The values that make the U.S. what it is are just as important as its national interests. John Lewis Gaddis posited,

the way the cold war ended, therefore, was directly related to how it had begun. [President] Harry Truman had it right after all: the struggle was, ultimately, about two ways of life, one that abandoned freedom in its effort to rationalize politics, and one that was content to leave politics as the messy business that it normally is, and therefore to preserve freedom.41

Hence, a policy that only seeks to advance national interests runs contrary to the values that the U.S. holds. How then should the U.S. proceed in Afghanistan?
BUSH ADMINISTRATION: WAY AHEAD

Based on official statements from President Bush and Secretary Colin Powell, the resolve of the U.S. in the Balkans and other regions had not waned. Presently, the level of force commitment in support of small-scale contingencies is low. Most experts and world leaders agree that U.S. involvement however small is critical in maintaining peace by its "sheer intimidating, physical presence" in the Balkans and other regions.42

The real issue is not whether the U.S. can afford to participate in small-scale contingencies in the future. The issue is whether the policy the U.S. chooses to pursue will represent core American values and advance regional stability. As of 2000, U.S. troops make up less than twenty percent of total force in the Balkans. European nation members contributed ninety percent of Kosovo cost. U.S. forces make up less than one percent of 37,350 United Nations peacekeeping operations.43 As the U.S. considers the increasing likelihood of small-scale contingencies, the policy it adopts must address both facets of U.S. foreign policy goal.

Thus the U.S. cannot "do nothing" so long as it seeks to maintain the leadership role in the world. Nor is there sufficient domestic support or consensus on effective preventive measures in securing long-term peace in small-scale contingencies. The most viable alternative is a response that includes a clear understanding of root causes of crises, timely response, and a threshold of humanitarian concerns.

Although North Africa as a region or southeast Europe was not the top priority in U.S. foreign policy nor of vital national interest, the Somalia crisis had influenced the U.S. policy toward the Balkans. This paper will now examine why the U.S. intervened and what lessons the U.S. learned.

SOMALIA – THE ROAD TO WAR

The Somali Republic of 1960, born out of a merger of the former British and Italian Somalilands, possessed a solid foundation for political stability – all within its boundary spoke the same language, practiced Islam, and followed similar cultural traditions. Despite the apparent homogeneity, Somalia suffered from political instability owing to its social structure that divided the society by social-occupational stratification and differences between urban and rural populations. In October 1969, President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated. General Mohamed Siad Barre staged a coup and, by the mid-1970s, had created a single-party state. The authoritarian nature of Siad Barre's government, exacerbated by the narrowing
political base and a disastrous war with neighboring Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, eventually led to Siad Barre’s fall from power in January 1991.\textsuperscript{44}

The Barre regime sustained its power through manipulation of domestic politics, suppressing critics, detaining opponents, playing on clan interests and rivalries, and buying out opposition with cash. Barre controlled the country by harsh political rule, undemocratic and centralized one-party system where the civil service was emasculated while the army was politicized.\textsuperscript{45} During the Cold War, Somalia served the interest of the two superpowers as it provided a strategic location for either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. The transfer of enormous quantities of weapons from the superpowers left the country heavily armed and ripe for armed conflict as the Somali clans carved out its own area of influence. The ensuing civil war left the country devoid of the most basic services for its population.

One of the world’s 10 poorest nations, Somalia possessed little arable land. One quarter of the population were farmers while half the population were itinerant herders. Although Somalia has always had a “structural food deficit”, it was war that pushed it into famine. An estimated 1.7 million people were displaced as the result of the civil war preceding and following the fall of Siad Barre. The massive displacement of its people disrupted food production on a catastrophic scale.\textsuperscript{46}

When the Marines landed on the beaches of Somalia in December 1992, there was no army, no police force, no civil service, no banking system, no schools or hospitals that functioned.\textsuperscript{47} Somalia was less of a country than a geographical region occupied by 14 clans and factions, albeit homogeneous in demography and little natural resources.

The substantial strategic interest in Somalia in the 1980s as the U.S. competed for influence and strategic advantage turned to an attitude approaching indifference by 1991.\textsuperscript{48} This attitude prevailed in the face of reports from neighboring posts and private volunteer organizations(PVOs) and non-governmental organizations(NGOs) in Somalia that the country most likely will face a catastrophe if no help is provided. The grim reports did prompt the State Department to begin providing assistance. For the next year and a half, the State Department funneled money and food through several organizations such as the Children Fund, CARE, and UNICEF in its attempt to contain the impending Somali crisis.\textsuperscript{49} By March 1992, despite the fact that it was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance, the U.S. was still looking to enhance diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. While the agreements reached at the Adis Abbaba helped to put a ceasefire in effect, security in the countryside was deteriorating where banditry and fighting were rampant.\textsuperscript{50}
In April 1992, the UN finally passed a resolution that authorized establishment of United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM). For its part, the U.S. authorized 24,000 tons of emergency food in July. The situation in Somalia slowly received substantial attention as several Congressional hearings and analyses by the Defense Department, National Security Council and intelligence communities by July. On 27 July, the U.S. released a public statement in favor of deploying UN armed security elements to Somalia. According to Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State, it was the first U.S. "pro-security statement since the crisis began."\textsuperscript{51}

Finally on 13 August 1992, after weighing all the options, President Bush announced that the U.S. would offer to transport UN security forces to Somalia (the 500-man Pakistani contingent), ordered to begin an immediate emergency food airlift to Somalia and to refugee camps in Kenya, would ask the UN to convene a donors' conference, and an additional 145,000 tons of food would be made available.\textsuperscript{52} Between August 1992 and February 1993, Operation Provide Relief logged 2,500 missions and transported 28,000 tons of relief supplies to some of the hardest hit areas in Somalia. Still, the death rate did not decline, security continued to worsened, and the Pakistani contingent was unable to leave the airport they initially occupied.\textsuperscript{53}

SOMALIA—LESSONS LEARNED

While Operation Provide Relief was ongoing, extensive analysis in the Defense Department (specifically, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff), interagency and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) drew several conclusions.

- the expanded humanitarian effort was failing due to deteriorating security
- the UN emergency intervention essentially failed
- an effective short-term solution can be mounted only by the U.S.
- assuming the U.S. must act, two options were considered—"2-division plus" with huge logistics support requirements in Mogadishu, open ports and roads, or smaller, flexible force to open smaller ports away from Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{54}

The Bush administration concluded that the only way to end the Somali crisis was to take the lead and thus taking overall responsibility for the humanitarian intervention. On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 794 authorizing a large-scale coalition to relieve the humanitarian crisis.\textsuperscript{55}

The U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) sought to achieve five goals. First, seize Mogadishu airport, its port and its surrounding area. Second, be prepared for a major logistical
throughput. Third, establish regional hubs with security elements in the hunger zone. Fourth, open necessary roads for transport. Finally, provide adequate security for humanitarian operations. The UNITAF was not expected to be engaged in rebuilding infrastructure, general disarmament, organize local security forces, intervene in local politics, public administration or justice system. In fact, the U.S. put great effort in to maintaining its initial mandate for concern over “mission creep”. Within 90 days, the UNITAF succeeded in what it set out to accomplish. The famine was brought under control. A measure of tranquillity was restored to Somalia. First steps taken on the process of reconciliation. Given the narrow scope of the UNITAF’s mandate, the operation was clearly a success.

As the U.S. contemplated a start of transition to UN control, two things that sealed the failure of United Nations Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) were:

- UNITAF’s refusal to take on expanded tasks, despite the urging of the Secretary General [Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali], to make UNOSOM’s follow-on job more manageable.

- UN slowness, verging on foot-dragging, in mounting [Somalia] operation and critical associated activities in the civil, police, and justice sectors.

On 26 March 1993, the UN authorized UNOSOM II with 28,000 troops, a well-armed quick reaction force and critical logistical support. As the UNITAF handed over its operations to UNOSOM II, the troubling situation in Somalia did not go unnoticed. Initially promising trends were on hold. Reconstituting political and administrative authority, general disarmament agreement and reconstituting police forces and a court system were all victims of internecine tribal and factional fighting and rampant crime. UNOSOM II determined early on that General Mohammed Aideed was a serious obstacle to further peace process. For his part, Aideed was determined to control Somalia at all cost. The inimical interests resulted in serious armed clashes as early as June 1993. The result was militarization of the UNOSOM II operation. Les Aspin, the then Secretary of Defense observed,

First, we should bring UN combined troop strength up to planned levels. The United States has recently added 400 more combat troops to its Quick Reaction Force. UNOSOM II, however, is approximately 5,000 troops short of its planned complement of 28,000. We fully expect others to do their share, as they have promised. Second, additional efforts to set up a police force should begin immediately... Third, we should continue removing heavy weapons from the militias and begin planning for implementation - in conjunction with Somali police – of a consistent weapons control policy... Fourth, the United Nations must develop a detailed plan with concrete steps that will put together its economic, political, and security activities into an overall strategy. And it must provide adequate staff and budget to make progress on its political and economic objectives in Somalia... Fifth, the United Nations should draw on the
experience of its success in Cambodia to form a core group of nations to support and speed its work in Somalia. . . . Sixth, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity should act now to bring the parties back together on the peace track. They might use the promising model of two previous conferences on Somali national reconciliation held in Addis Ababa.⁵⁰

However accurate Aspin’s viewpoint might have been, the situation in Somalia had reached a point where any policy corrections were ineffective. In 1993, the October 3 clash between the Rangers and Aideed’s clan marked the start of the end of the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Unwilling to accept anymore casualties, the U.S. started a gradual extraction of its forces. By March 1995, the UNOSOM II officially ended its ill-fated operation in Somalia where violence and chaos returned to its 1991 level.

Unlike the previous operations that the UN and the U.S. were involved, the Somalia case had unique qualities and character that come from peace enforcement situations. In a Canadian Commission of Inquiry study of Canadian employment in Somalia, the following observations clearly illustrate some unique nature of the Somalia crisis:

- UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II were conducted entirely within the territorial boundaries of Somalia.

- There was no central government to negotiate.

- Consent was subject to negotiation among many factions and subject to failures to comply with agreements. The principle of consent was increasingly abandoned by the UN, even before the creation of UNITAF under Chapter VII of the Charter.

- UN peacekeepers were operating in a hostile environment, where they were subject to obstruction, threats, invective, and armed attacks.

- UNOSOM II was a large operation, with an authorized strength of 28,000 personnel.

- UNITAF and UNOSOM II personnel were heavily armed and used high levels of force, particularly in the struggle against General Aideed. The UN became involved in a virtual shooting war in Mogadishu.

- There were uncertainties, misunderstandings and disagreements about mission mandates and tasks within the UN effort and between the UN and UNITAF.

- The UN was marginalized by the U.S.-led UNITAF operation, then had to move quickly to create a follow-on mission to UNITAF.

- The UN mission in Somalia was multifunctional, involving a wide variety of tasks, from providing security for humanitarian relief to disarmament to infrastructure repair.
• UNOSOM II had a peacebuilding or national reconstruction component.

• Media coverage played a significant role during the crisis and had a direct impact on the missions, particularly UNITAF and UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{61}

The UNITAF operation showed that the U.S. possesses the capabilities and resources to successfully intervene in humanitarian crises. "The failure in Somalia [then] was not a failure of policy, of process, of personalities, or of tactics. It was . . . mainly a failure of collective will and leadership."\textsuperscript{62} The fundamental flaws in the policy toward Somalia were the willingness of the U.S. only to restore security, not to decide a political outcome, unwillingness to "defang" the warlords and gangs, the U.S. expectation for the UN to "quickly put in place the broad institutional capabilities and resources needed to revitalize at least the minimal elements of a functioning Somali society and government."\textsuperscript{63}

What can we learn from the Somalia crisis? The Somalia crisis was poorly understood by the U.S. from the outset. Although there is no cookie-cutter approach that works for all crises, there are some useful lessons. In hindsight, the problems of Somalia were as complex as they were difficult to solve. But it was not impossible to comprehend the situation. Internal political requirements ought to have been vetted prior to any decisions on intervention. An adequate understanding of Somali tribal and clan dynamics as well as their peculiar cultural mores would have helped the U.S. to engage in preventive intervention, short of military force, to better craft an intervention plan, if needed, with realistic objectives of the operation, length of the mission and means to obtain and sustain domestic and international support.

Understanding internal political requirements was critical regardless of the ultimate decision whether or not to intervene. Because the U.S. lacked a clear understanding, it was slow to react. When compelled to act, the American response was short-sighted and its articulated reasons did more inimical to operation's success.

As Luttwak's theory of legitimate governance suggests, the U.S. also should have sought to help in strengthening the legitimacy of the Somali government. Governance is only possible when the basic functions of government exist. Those functions are possible when stability exists. Legitimate governance is possible when stability allows the governed to exercise their political will that creates legitimacy. The Siad Barre regime lost its legitimacy in more than one dimension. Barre's autocratic and corrupt governance eventually alienated the Somali people, losing his moral right to govern. The Somali government also lost its legitimacy to govern because its inability to provide the most basic services and internal security. As the U.S. sought short-term stability in the region of strategic interest, the support of regimes, such as Siad Barre's, did more to undermine the enduring stability. Hence, U.S.'s support of the Siad Barre
regime in the 1980s should have been vetted based on legitimate governance. Legitimate governance, however, is inseparable from social and political stability.

A relationship between legitimacy and stability is one of chicken-or-the-egg discussion. However, those two principles need not be sequential. The U.S. was able to end the famine in Somalia through the actions of UNITAF. Military forces provided adequate security that enabled the international community to achieve a measure of stability required for eventual development of institutions and infrastructure for viability of a state. But, as DOS undersecretary for political affairs observed, “the process of nation building will take time.”64 Enduring stability comes at a cost. Aside from tangible cost, the political resolve and patience are also part of the cost. The American political landscape and national character make it difficult to work “a marriage of Wilsonian ideals and realpolitik that provides a pragmatic foundation for national and international stability and well-being.”65

BOSNIA – THE ROAD TO WAR

In 1389, in a region now known as Kosovo, the rebelling forces of Serbia were soundly defeated by the Turkish armies that, in less than a month, completely occupied the land of southern Yugo-Slavs. Since 1389, 28 June is known as Vidovdan – the Day When We Shall See – and is a national symbol of Serbian struggle for independence and self-determination.66 The wounds of the past do not heal over time as the international community was reminded when the Serbians observed the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo where Slobodan Milosevic laid out his plan to resurrect the glory and predominance of the Serbs.67

Following a tumultuous period between the World Wars, in 1943, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, a second Yugoslavia is proclaimed based on federalist principles.68 Tito ruled Yugoslavia for 37 years surviving a major crisis in relations with the Soviet Union and four constitutions. Tito relied on political formula of self management, brotherhood and unity and non-alignment.69 All in all, Tito served as the glue to hold together the fractious state. However, “[t]he past was never laid to rest in the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. By contrast with the United States, where historical memory is quite short, peoples in the Balkans have long talked about events in 1389, 1459, 1921, 1941, 1948, 1966, and 1970-71 as if they were fresh.”70 However, another fact remains that Muslims, Serbs and Croats had lived in peace for most of the 500 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Intercommunal violence was an exception rather the norm in the region.71
By 1989, Yugoslavia had already ceased to exist. What emerged from the fracture were five republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina also fractured along ethnic lines (43.77 percent ethnic Muslim, 31.46 percent Serbian, 17.34 percent Croatian in 1991). True to Milosevic's threat, the Serb controlled Yugoslav army crossed the border to occupy Slovenia, first armed hostilities after the end of the Cold War. In 1990, Milosevic threatened to seek to annex Serb-inhabited portions of Croatia and Bosnia which was a nonsense because the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia were dispersed in such a way that it was practically impossible to draw a clear border dividing ethnic groups. Hence, the armed attack was a culmination of a calculated plan by Milosevic since 1987 to seek "unity" of the Serbian territory.

Milosevic also engineered what is now called "ethnic cleansing" where systematic purging of non-Serbs from the region. The results were frightenlingly effective. In Bosanska Krajina, for example, the Serb population increased from 625,000 in 1991 to 875,000 in 1994 whereas Croat and Muslim population was expurgated from 550,000 to 50,000 during the same period.

In response, the European Community(EC) "signaled its refusal to recognize Slovenian or Croatian independence and sent a delegation to pressure the combatants to find a peaceful solution." NATO on its part decided not to intervene in what it regarded as a Bosnian civil war, thereby acquiescing to Milosevic. Despite the failing Serbian economy, steady economic and materiel support from Russia, Greece, Romania, and China as well as diplomatic support from Great Britain and France sustained Milosevic who would have otherwise not seen as much success in his aggressive campaign.

Dissuaded by the Vietnam experience as well as misunderstanding of the true nature of conflict in the Balkans, the Clinton administration chose not to adopt the policy of "lift and strike", a policy of lifting an arms embargo on Bosnia and conducting air strikes against the Serbs. The failure in Somalia in 1993 also further dissuaded the Clinton administration from taking firmer action in the Balkans. Thus, "the result was a confused policy on the part of the West, fueled by illusions about Yugoslavia and Milosevic, inadequate use of the expertise available to the West policymakers, outright disinformation (as, for example, British Prime Minister John Major's conviction that the problem in Yugoslavia were of ancient vintage), a Germanophobia which predated any hint of advocacy on behalf of either Slovenia or Croatia on Bonn's part, insensitivity to human rights violations in the region, and a misunderstanding of the West's own interests in the Yugoslav area."

Even after the U.N. authorized UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in June 1992, the Clinton administration continued to pursue the policy of non-commitment. The ill-fated 1992
Vance-Owen plan that called for ten ethnic cantons only played into Milosevic's hands. In fact, the Vance-Owen plan gained the European Community's support as it rejected calls for a military response and since the European Community did not believe that its interest "extended beyond wanting to dam up the flow of refugees out of [Bosnia]." As late as May 1993, the U.S. declared that it had no vital interest at stake in Bosnia. It took more than a year after the U.S. deployed up to 500 peacekeeping troops to Macedonia to monitor activity along Macedonia's border with Serbia that the Clinton administration finally began to call for more resolute military action. Only after the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in December 1995 did the Clinton administration ordered the deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops as part of a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). In November 1996, the Clinton administration announced that the U.S. will deploy a Stabilization Force (SFOR) which would "in principle" remain in Bosnia until mid-1998. SFOR remains in Bosnia at the end of 2001. In the years 1992-1995, estimated some 215,000 were killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina of which 160,000 were Muslims, 30,000 were Croats, and 25,000 were Serbs.

Since the introduction of IFOR and SFOR to implement the Dayton Peace Accord, some progress has been made in Bosnia. Some people have returned to their homes. The economy is gradually rebuilding. War criminals had been captured and brought to justice. Progress has been made toward the stabilization of multi-ethnic institutions capable of handling administrative tasks, of an improvement in public security and confiscation and destruction of heavy weaponry. However, the Dayton Peace Accord did not address some issues that would ensure long-term stability and resultant success of peace in the region. It allowed nationalists to dominate the political spectrum in a region torn by intolerant nationalisms. No control was put in place to moderate the media elements expressing nationalist or chauvinistic views while lacking support for the non-nationalist media. Rushing to elections was counterproductive where nationalists won the first post-Dayton election on 14 September 1996. Free movement of all people was not ensured where Bosnian Serb police took to charging unauthorized tolls when crossing the delineated lines. No bar on hate speech, such as legal precedents established in other European countries, was put in place. The Accord failed to support establishment of institutions that would guarantee the unity and cohesiveness of Bosnia. In short, the Dayton Peace Accord reached for the short-term solutions that may not ensure long-term viability of Bosnia.
BOSNIA – LESSONS LEARNED

A complex problem requires something more than a simplistic solution that a President has an easier time explaining to his constituents. “There is an uncomfortable paradox. We want more to be put right, but we are prepared to sacrifice less... That could change if political leaders (in particular the U.S. President) were prepared to argue that intervention cannot be cost free – but that was not the case in the 1990s. A commitment to peace is as important as a commitment to war, but it is far more difficult to sustain.” 86

A policy of reluctance on the part of the U.S. toward the Balkans was not unusual. Within six months of taking office, President Clinton’s Bosnian policy had “evolved from tough talk to a hands-off approach and an acceptance of Bosnia’s ethnic partition and continuing bloody conflict,” which was fairly consistent with Bush’s policy. 87 The U.S. approached the Somalia crisis in the same manner. The PDD 25 also served to further dissuade the Clinton administration from energetically taking the lead in stemming the costly violence in the region. In the end, the U.S. did enter the fray with President Clinton having laid out the reasons for U.S.’s intervention. The U.S. intervention was “undertaken as part of its commitment to NATO in the interest of preserving stability in Europe. Many feared that continuing conflict in the Balkan, fueled by ethnic and religious rivalries, will spill over into neighboring countries with the arrival of refugees, and undermine the cohesion of the NATO alliance... U.S. participation is necessary to fortify NATO, by helping to maintain its credibility and its continued relevance.” 88 Unfortunately, the event that compelled the U.S. was the widely reported ethnic cleansing.

What can we learn from the Balkan crisis? Just as in Somalia, the Balkan problems did not lend themselves to a simple, clean solution. One lesson is that U.S. policy be flexible, “to let go old preconceived notions that involvement inevitably proceeds from one stage of escalation to another in a linear path, and that taking one step toward intervention inevitably leads to the next one if the desired results are not attained.” 89 The “all-or-nothing” approach to decision-making in foreign policy robbed the decisionmakers of flexibility they needed to achieve only limited objectives in situations such as Bosnia. The U.S. policymakers were inflexible because they lacked a clearly understanding of nature of the conflict while such crisis was considered less than a priority of vital national interest.

The conflict in Bosnia started due to the deteriorating conditions that could have been checked had the “development of democracy (particularly the habits and institutions that permit the management of disputes through dialogue and negotiation) and economic stability were sustained.” 90 The international community’s solutions combined the inviolability of borders and
minority rights. A case in point. The EC's haste in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, without fully reflecting on the consequences, may have robbed some regional players of moderate responses to Serb aggression, thereby stemming the bloodshed. One can point to the former Czechoslovak federation and its relatively peaceful dissolution to show that conflict was not inevitable.

Although many observers point to the death of Tito in 1980 as the start point of Yugoslavia's fracture, the key elements required for a stable society – political legitimacy and economic stability – began to unravel prior to 1980. Tito's 37-year rule of Yugoslavia can either be seen as a successful coexistence of historically feuding ethnic groups or as a failure for lacking political legitimacy. Regardless of one's viewpoint, it becomes clear that "the personality and behavior of national leaders has a great bearing on the likelihood of conflict." Once the powerful central figure was removed that held an intrinsically fractious state together, a political legitimacy ceased to exist. The post-Tito Yugoslavia did not possess the political infrastructure to sustain a modicum of democracy. Thus the failure of Yugoslav government to provide a political venue in a systematic manner did much to bring about the conflict.

Those who succeeded Tito fared no better, failing to provide no mechanisms for addressing disputes, further exacerbated by economic failures and ambitious players outside Bosnia such as Milosevic. The increasing nationalism among ethnic groups was only one of the factors in the Bosnian conflict. Nationalism that galvanized an ethnic group to speak with one voice did not necessarily produce legitimacy. Milosevic's rise to power in Serbia, in fact, heightened the increasing tension in Bosnia. Hence, the U.S. policymakers missed the opportunity in the 1980s to address the issue of prevention of conflict by focusing on political legitimacy as well as social and economic stability in the region.

Even as the policymakers debate the ultimate value of U.S. intervention in Bosnia, the Bosnian crisis clearly shows that judicious engagement is key to regional security. Judicious engagement also must be based on U.S.'s closer examination of how we can help to restore legitimate governance and stability.

CHOICES FOR AFGHANISTAN

Even as the U.S. continues to prosecute its war on terrorism in Afghanistan, having routed the Taliban government and al Qaeda terrorist network, the issue of intervention is not a moot point. The U.S. can easily pick up its tent pegs after the last bomb is dropped. Afghanistan can once again be a country that will not be on the priority list of American national interest. The U.S. can acquiesce to a regional organization to intervene in Afghanistan's effort to rebuild just
as it had "relinquished its role to the United Nations [since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union] whose effort since 1988 have been singularly ineffective." As the crises in Somalia and Bosnia have shown, the fundamental and clear understanding of the underpinning problem and the Afghan environment is imperative if the U.S. was to secure its long-term goals in the region.

A country that is a little smaller than Texas, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. The interior region of the country is predominantly mountainous and a large degree of temperature variance. Its population of 27 million consists of the Pashtun (38 percent), Tajiks (25 percent), Hazara (19 percent), Uzbeks (6 percent) and other ethnic groups (12 percent). In this harsh land, "nationalism is a meaningless notion; loyalty is to tribe or clan – not to a central authority." Though fractious, these ethnic groups would quickly unite to oppose a foreign invader as they had recently done in the 1980s. "Even during the rule of the strongest of Afghanistan’s kings, the reach of Kabul over the provinces was relative at best. The basic principle of Afghan politics was that the less control the government had, the better. The Soviet occupation of 1979-1989 did little to change this." The Afghan geopolitical layout also contributes to the challenge ahead.

Within Afghanistan there are eight geographical zones that extend outside Afghan political boundaries and hence, linguistic and cultural affinities exist across the political borders. "Given the acute centrifugal forces created by terrain, cultural diversity, cultural affinity across international borders, and two decades of conflict, the central government’s ability to hold all parts of Afghanistan together without regional insistence on autonomy is tenuous." So the challenge for the U.S. is to decide how best to make use of the political landscape while ensuring that Afghanistan does not become terrorists’ haven once again. As in Somalia and Bosnia, one must grapple with the major issues of legitimacy, stability, and democracy.

At no time was the issue of legitimacy more at the core of the Afghan history than since 1973. Of its broadly categorized five historical periods the contemporary Afghanistan emerged in its third period in the eighteenth century. The British exerted its imperial control throughout the nineteenth century which ended in 1919 when an independent monarchy emerged. Throughout the latter three historical periods, the issue of legitimacy never arose as governing authority managed to establish a semblance of governance more suited to the Afghan political and cultural landscape. In 1973, the monarchy gave way to a republic. "Haunting all Kabul regimes since the end of the monarchy in 1973 has been the specter of a lack of legitimacy of internal government." Victors over Soviet forces in 1992, the Mujahidins suffered from two critical weaknesses that became the basis for their failure to establish themselves as legitimate rights to form a state: 1) the agreement for power sharing between several ethnic groups who
fought the Soviets as one entity was flawed; 2) Islamist ideology could not overcome ethnic competition for political power. Thus the interim government that was cobbled together during the war on terrorism in 2001 must seek to reduce the centrifugal force that have previously splintered the multi-ethnic ruling group, thereby robbing of its legitimacy. The challenges are enormous, however.

It is important that the Bush administration focus on helping the new interim government to establish legitimacy both in its leader and in government. What form the efforts would take can only be answered by continued dialogue between the Afghans and their government. However, leader's legitimacy to rule as well as government’s ability to effect legitimate governance take a long time to achieve and require a commitment from all those that signed up to support the process.

The 11-year warfare left Afghanistan completely devastated and disrupted. By 1990, the statistics were grave - one million people dead, 535,000 disabled veterans, 700,000 widows and orphans, one third of all villages destroyed, two thirds of paved roads unusable, 26 types of deadly mines strewn over the countryside, 5.9 million refugees to Pakistan, Iran and the West, of 11.7 million left in the country, twenty five percent were in cities and town (twice the pre-war figure) and 2 million internal refugees. The devastation of this magnitude requires a bit more than a military campaign to rout the Talibans.

Stability cannot exist in a state that is unable to provide even the most rudimentary governmental services. A long-term, active reconstruction program seems to be the only option to avoid recurrence of a terrorist haven or other malcontents. In 1990, Overseas Development Council recommended the following:

- Aid donors should use multilateral channels, especially the United Nations, to reduce social and political divisions.
- Increase the contributions to the reconstruction effort.
- Initial effort must be focused on resettlement of the refugees rather than long term development projects.
- Food production must be given a top priority in this primarily agricultural country.
- Mine-clearance should be stepped up.
- While most initial reconstruction efforts should be community-based, the basic infrastructure of bridges and roads should also be rebuilt and eventually extended.
- Prevent opium cultivation through various means.
- Aid should aim to promote development with equity to avoid aggravating economic disparities between contending social groups.
All of the above tasks would be difficult at best without a secure environment. This is especially true in Afghanistan as in Somalia where warlords hold sway in the countryside whose influence is inversely proportional to the degree of control exercised from Kabul. Hence, a peacekeeping force that is able to ensure unfettered movement of all resources, at least from the security standpoint, while a national army is established. These actions will go a long way to help Afghanistan return to normalcy and democracy.

The Afghan political process may not ever resemble that of an American system but it is critical to regional security as well as in the U.S. interest to assist Afghanistan to stay on the road to democracy. The Afghan worldview at the start of the twenty-first century “will be shaped by the Soviet invasion, the civil war, and the regional and international diaspora . . . [and hence] will be determined less by their centuries of history, as it had until recently with the upholding of the values of the medieval past, than by the trauma of the most recent decades and the eventual resolution of the problems created by the upheaval.” The key to their success will be whether or not the international community led by the U.S. has the will and tenacity to support the long-term political reconstruction as well.

Just as Gaddis asserted that ideas matter, the concept of freedom and democracy do matter. And a nation-state governs by such a concept cannot be a threat to American security. America’s unending political argument is about how freedom both depends on government and is threatened by it, and competes with other values. . . September 11 [terrorist attack on the World Trade Center] forcefully reminded Americans that their nation-state – not NATO, not the United Nations – is the source of their security. And they cherish the clarity of the Bush Doctrine, which is that nation-states have the great utility of locating responsibility: National regimes are responsible for terrorism that issues from their sphere of control.

Thus the difficult path the U.S. charts must achieve a delicate balance between democratic ideals and state interests.

CONCLUSION

The concluding decade of the twentieth century provided the U.S. not only the glimpse of the future environment but also the proving grounds for its foreign policy. Judicious engagement befitting of the world power ought to be the only course for the U.S. Complex and volatile, the future environment will contain crises like Somalia and Bosnia. Faced with this prospect, the U.S. can ill-afford to continue to implement policies without a firm resolve that will cost more in human lives as well as in economic and political resources in the long run. Regardless of administration, the need for leadership and action by the U.S. was not
overlooked, evidenced by the consistency of each administration from 1989 to present. A clear understanding of the nature of Somalia and Bosnia crises proved to be key. Nation building is costly both in manpower and monetarily but the alternative is even more costly. It also takes time which tries the resolve and patience of any nation but democracy is not born in a day. Clearly, the Somalia, Bosnia and Afghanistan crises were not of vital interest to the U.S. However, those crises helped the U.S. coalesce those important tenets of foreign policy critical to exercising leadership in the international community as the sole nation whose unmatched instruments of power ought to have relevance.

WORD COUNT = 9,998
ENDNOTES


5 Those such as Wane Bert, Robert Dorff, and William Shawcross argue for a realistic and sober approach to U.S. intervention while others such as Yossef Bodansky and Edward Luttwak argue for letting the war take its course.


8 Ibid., 160-161.

9 Ibid., 162-163.


11 Ibid., 17.


13 With the 1993 NSS published days before the Clinton inauguration, it was unlikely that the document would be used in any substantive way by the Clinton administration.


15 Ibid., 11.

16 Ibid., 13.

18 Innumerable newspaper articles exist written by critics such as Ivo Daalder and William Odom for American reluctance to be proactive or willing to provide full-fledged support to regional crises.


20 Ibid.


23 Ibid., 5.


25 Ibid., 3-6.


27 Ibid.


32 Ibid., 5.
33 Walter Clarke in Learning From Somalia contends that the U.S. had no grasp of the dynamics of a failed state. Most other authors who studied Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and other places have tended to find absence of long-range policy on the part of the U.S. Shawcross points to the most ill-timed presidential document, PDD-25, that kept the U.S. from intervening in the third substantiated genocide in Rwanda in the twentieth century as evidence of American failure to produce effective policy.

34 Dorff, 170-172.

35 Ibid.


38 Dorff, 170-172.

39 Ibid.


47 Makinda, 11-27.


49 Ibid.

Woods, 170.


Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 202.
73 Ibid., 58.
74 Ibid., 223.
75 Ibid., 65.
76 Ibid., 69.
78 Ramet, 71.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 223.
83 Ramet, 239.
84 Ibid., 279.
85 Ibid., 277-278.
87 Henriksen, 15.
89 Bert, 247.
91 Ibid., 35.

93 Michael Noonan, “Geography and the Centers of Taliban Gravity,” E-Notes by Foreign Policy Research Institute 5 November 2001; available at the U.S. Army War College, 1.


96 Magnus, 7.

97 Ibid., 161.

98 Ibid., 162.


100 Ibid., 31-33. This is a partial list of the set of recommendations. A comprehensive and detailed list is in After the Wars.

101 Magnus, 22.

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