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ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN HAITI

BY

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ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN HAITI

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Raymond J. Duncan Jr.

TITLE: Achieving U.S. National Interests in Haiti

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper critiques U.S. policy on Haiti and recommends a national strategy to achieve long term national interests. It covers the history of Haiti from Dessalines through Duvalier to Aristide to provide an understanding of the complexities involved in addressing the Haitian dilemma. The study highlights current socioeconomic conditions, recent U.S. involvement, with a specific focus on the contributions of U.S. Support Group-Haiti, and the conditions surrounding the termination of the Support Group’s mission and withdrawal of U.S. forces in January 2000. The paper examines current U.S. strategy and interagency policy approaches. A recommendation for a revised U.S. policy is provided applying all elements of national power in conjunction with a multilateral UN, OAS, and CARICOM approach. This study proposes potential Department of Defense involvement in Haiti to strengthen the fragile political, judicial, and economic institutions, executing the current global war on terrorism, and the ongoing war on drugs.
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TABLE 1: US/UN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SINCE 1993 ......................................................... 9
ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN HAITI

The U.S. and Europe are accusing you of despotism and have frozen half a billion dollars in desperately needed aid for your basket case of a nation. George W. Bush is mailing private letters demanding your “personal commitment” to shape up. The last thing you need is your supporters chasing your opponents into hiding and threatening to “turn their skulls into inkwells.” What drives Aristide these days, however, is a fierce desire to sell himself abroad as a modernizer. Haiti certainly needs it. The country suffers 80% unemployment, and Colombian drug traffickers have begun using the island of Haiti as a transit lounge. So inside Tabarre, his heavily guarded residence, he is showing a new persona: nouveau Jean-Bertrand, a genial statesman-cum-Chamber of Commerce President. “Life is a daily dialectical movement for me,” says the ex-priest. “I pay attention to the global economy now, and I have to be realistic. Haiti needs investors.”

—Time Magazine

Conceived in blood, ostracized in its early years as an aberration and a threat to the old world order, and ranking dead last in every social index among American countries in the late twentieth century, Haiti stands out. What factors have accounted for Haiti’s decay? Can Haiti be renewed? One set of explanations is rooted in Haiti’s history, political culture, and social structure, especially in the chasms between elites and masses, between blacks and mulattos, urbanites versus country folk, and rich versus poor. The other set of explanations emphasizes external factors, especially relations between Haiti and France in the early nineteenth century and between Haiti and the United States in the twentieth. The solutions proposed vary from aggressively integrating Haiti into the global economy along neoliberal lines to a more populist approach emphasizing basic needs and self-sufficiency in food production.

—Jean-Germain Gros

We do not hear much about Haiti today, although the United States Coast Guard has intercepted 1,637 Haitian migrants at sea so far in 2001. This was an increase of more than seventeen percent over the 1,394 migrants intercepted and returned to Haiti in 2000. Another Haitian journalist, Brignol Lindor, was killed by local government supporters during political demonstrations in Port-au-Prince on 4 December 2001. Political demonstrations continue as a result of the disputed local and parliamentary legislative elections held on 21 May 2000, which “prompted other nations to suspend nearly $600 million in desperately needed international aid and loans to Haiti.”

The country remains a “basket case” that cannot be ignored. Geographic proximity and the desire to prevent Haitian refugees from washing up on our southern beaches have
influenced United States (U.S.) policy. North American businesses found cheap labor in Haiti. But there are many other more stable Latin American countries, such as the Dominican Republic and Mexico, that offer the same and provide a more secure commercial environment. After the military junta was ousted in 1994, former President Bill Clinton recognized an insignificant foreign policy success in restoring a democratically elected leader to Haiti. However, the general American attitude is that “Aristide has always been the Third World leader the U.S. thinks it ought to like but can’t.”

Given the current global war on terrorism and our national war on drugs, Haiti’s position as a neighbor in our front yard dictates the development of U.S. policy that applies all elements of national power to improve the political, social, economic, and security conditions. This would prevent it from becoming a safehaven for terrorist elements and narco-traffickers and a launching platform for increasing numbers of Haitian boat people paddling north to escape poverty and misery. Very specifically and with immediate concern, the Department of Defense (DoD) must endorse U.S. policy that establishes the conditions which enable the assigned regional combatant commander to weed out terrorist elements that may seek refuge in Haiti, and to target narco-terrorists or narco-traffickers operating within the borders of the country. There is no easy solution for improving conditions in Haiti but the U.S. can no longer consider it a black hole and look the other way given the threats that face the Americas.

To gain an appreciation for the complexity of the Haitian situation, this paper examines the history of Haiti, current socioeconomic conditions, relations with the United States, impact of recent U.S. intervention, U.S. policy, and recommends a way ahead for developing a foreign policy to improve conditions in the country. Specifically, this paper will address recommendations for DoD involvement in Haiti to assist in the continued development of civic administration functions, execute the war on terrorism, and support the national counter-narcotics strategy.

HAITI’S FREEDOM AND AGONY – FROM DESSALINES TO ARISTIDE

They simply could not take it any longer. Half a million slaves were toiling in the coffee, indigo, and sugarcane fields of this French colony. When Boukman Dutty, a Jamaican-born voodoo priest, implored a gathering to “throw away the thoughts of the Whitegod who thirsts for our tears,” the masses listened. Armed with machetes and vengeance, black men and women revolted, torched plantations, and took white European lives by the thousands as they fought for their freedom. A self-educated former slave, Toussaint Louverture organized an army that
withstood France's attempts to regain control until 1802 when he surrendered to Napoleon's military. However, the revolt was so costly to France that Napoleon sold the Louisiana Territory to the United States in 1803 for $15 million. The sale of the Louisiana Territory ended France's extensive holdings and quest for dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Toussaint Louverture did not live to see his dream of a free Haiti but on New Year's Day, 1804, Haiti became the world's first free black republic. The ripple effects vibrated across the oceans and the news was echoed by abolitionists in America and in Europe. Would the United States be the same country today had the slaves of Haiti not revolted and the sale of the Louisiana Territory had never taken place? Are many Americans today aware of the impact that the Haitian slave rebellion had on the history of our country, such as allowing westward expansion through the newly obtained Louisiana Territory? Americans today might more favorably consider providing assistance to this nation in need when understanding that a portion of the U.S. westward expansion occurred as a secondary result of the Haitian slave rebellion.

Although recognized as an international symbol of black unity resulting from the only successful slave rebellion in the Caribbean, Haiti has failed in truly bonding its people together into an independent and unified nation. Even though "consciousness of racial identity" was the principal factor in uniting Haitians to maintain their freedom, "color has been the divisive influence leading to the erosion of effective independence."8 Racial divisiveness was reinforced through the racial prejudice exhibited by American forces in dealing with all Haitians, both black and mulatto, during the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 through 1934. This prejudice was very characteristic of our own society throughout the majority of the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that the Haitian President was not even allowed to enter the American Club in Port-au-Prince during the twenty year period of occupation by the United States Marine Corps.

The difficulties affecting the stability and well-being of Haiti over the last two-hundred years are classified as "color prejudice, the ignorance and greed of heads of state, the authoritarian tradition, and the ignorance of the masses."9 The early years of Haiti as an independent nation from 1804 to 1825 beginning under the domination by Dessalines touch upon all four factors but are highly characterized by color distinction. These racial and color differences are largely coincident with economic class distinction which become increasingly significant in the politics of Haiti.

The following period in Haiti's history until the 1860's was generally peaceful with little violence or serious crime but characterized by the "concentration of power in the hands of a small elite."10 The issue of color continued to emerge in establishing the politics of the country. Black leaders would appeal to the masses on the basis of color and highlight the mulatto group
as the enemy of the general population. The next forty years, until approximately 1910, was a period of ideological struggle between two political parties, the predominantly mulatto Liberal Party and the primarily black National Party. Politicians from all sides demonstrated their willingness to "compromise the autonomy of the country by inviting foreign intervention rather than allowing their political opponents to gain power."11 Although many Haitian writers of the period believed that their country's independence was significant for the entire black race and that it must be preserved at any cost, the pressure of foreign intervention in Haiti did not diminish and the country began to clearly swing into a sphere of foreign influence.

Acute governmental instability characterized Haiti in 1911. Foreign intervention in the internal politics of Haiti became significant during this period. In 1914, the report that the Germans controlled eighty per cent of commerce and the "determination of the United States to gain strategic control of the Caribbean" were factors that further destabilized the country.12 The American invasion in 1915 and occupation by the U.S. Marines until 1934 "resulted in the re-establishment of the mulatto elite in office."13 However, the racial prejudice demonstrated by the American occupation forces toward all Haitians of whatever color actually succeeded in uniting the country and revitalized the national spirit. Yet during the American occupation the mulatto elite continued to dominate key sectors of the economy. But a new class began to emerge from the non-elite black families as numbers of black teachers, doctors, and lawyers formed the nucleus of the new "noiriste" movement that characterized the older tradition in Haitian thought and emphasized Haiti's African roots.14 This changing class structure and class consciousness on the part of the new black middle class was an effect of American occupation. During this period between 1930 until 1946, Haiti supported United States policy in politics and foreign affairs.

Three traditions of political thought, noirisme, Marxism and mulatto liberalism, highlighted the development of political ideas and influenced events until 1957. Francois Duvalier began to emerge during this period as a noiriste leader and spokesman for improving the overall well-being of the exploited masses. The philosophy of the noiristes espoused leveling the economic disparity between the classes and addressing the overwhelming poverty of the people. Noirisme helped elect Duvalier as president in 1957. Upon assuming office, Duvalier was genuinely concerned to act in the interest of the masses that elected him president. However, Duvalier recognized the mistakes of his predecessors in failing "to deal with centers of opposition in a sufficiently vigorous and ruthless way" and this pattern was reinforced by the new president having to invest all of his energies in the "urgent task of staying alive and of retaining office."15 The effect of this life and death struggle between Duvalier and
the group around him is that they "developed a vested interest in keeping things more or less as they were" to maintain their control. Duvalier's strength was that he understood the widespread and deeply rooted beliefs of the masses and effectively communicated those messages. This allowed him to retain authority and the support of the people. The period of Duvalier's fourteen year rule until 1971 brought few fundamental improvements in the economic and social structure of Haiti. Duvalier died in that same year after having appointed his son, Jean-Claude, as successor. Although Jean-Claude's government did little to improve the life of the average Haitian, his rule did not interfere with the routine life of the peasant, and this was all or simply the best that they could hope for from their government. Total corruption, worsening economic hardship and the alienation of middle-class blacks resulted in the overthrow and flight of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986.

A national association of democratic movements was formed in Haiti in 1987 and, although inclined to resist centralization of power in the capital, finally supported Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who took office in 1991. Aristide maintained enormous popularity but due to reforms that threatened the military, push for regional government, and steps to create a separate police force was ousted by military coup after only eight months in office. The migration of thousands of Haitians to the United States and the Congressional Black Caucus pressured President Clinton to reinstall Aristide to power by military action in 1994.

Aristide enhanced his political awareness throughout his period of exile, which resulted in a slowing of his neoliberal reform upon return to office in order to obtain U.S. and other international support. The Haitian elite adapted well to the new government since they "actually benefited from a much stronger economic position" without having to support and fund a Duvalier-type regime. Since 1994, Haiti's leaders appear to have submitted to the dictates of the international system and have been accepted by the small elite class without the lower classes enjoying the benefits of a fair and formal democracy. Again, the recurring problem for Haiti is that the "political and economic elites have tended to behave as classes for themselves, more as protection rackets than as custodians of the public good." Aristide seemed to have turned into the almost U.S. approved candidate that he previously warned the Haitian people to avoid, never thinking that those "prophetic words might come back to haunt him." Most Haitians are still hopeful that President Aristide will carry through on his promise to reform the nation but will he be able to deliver?

Surprisingly, it appears this promise may be coming to fruition in minor but significant ways. Throughout 2001, positive improvements began to surface in multiple areas of Port-au-Prince to the benefit of both the masses and the commercial sector; it seems the light may be
beginning to shine a bit brighter for Haiti. However, the attempted coup on 17 December 2001 indicates that segments of the population still vehemently oppose the current government. President Aristide has additionally taken steps to correct the electoral inconsistencies of May 2000 and seven of the legislators elected under questionable Provisional Electoral Council methodology have resigned as indicated in a formal letter from Aristide to the Organization of the American States (OAS). The OAS interpretation and recommended response of Aristide’s letter follows:

Luigi Einaudi, assistant secretary general of the OAS, described Aristide’s letter as “rather remarkable” because it is “so concrete in setting out a path for Haiti,” adding: “What we do with that path – whether we try to redirect or support part of it – depends on what the OAS assembly says.” Aristide said it is his “sincere belief that as an integral part of this solution,” the OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) “should undertake to help normalize relations between Haiti and international financial institutions.” He asserted that “the release of much-needed international financial assistance would permit Haiti’s economic development, which will in turn strengthen the democratic process.” In his assessment of Aristide’s suggested reform package, Einaudi said Haiti “needs the support” of the international community, and declared: “I think Haiti is ready to receive that support.”

—Eric Green, Department of State

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS

A senior military officer visiting Haiti in December 1999 for the very first time after spending his first few days in Port-au-Prince commented that “Haiti truly is hell on earth.” The misery and poverty of the general population surrounds the first time visitor. Daily life is a struggle for survival for an estimated 75 percent of the population living in absolute poverty. The problems facing the international community and all agencies desiring to support the country are the depleted resources and near total collapse of the infrastructure. There is little to build from and no strong institutions to competently manage foreign aid. A previous Army War College publication provided: “Haiti’s human and material resources are either in such short supply or have been so degraded by poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, violence, corruption, overpopulation, rapid urbanization, deforestation, and soil erosion as to raise serious questions about its continued survival as a society and an independent nation-state.”

By a 1998 estimate, Haiti’s population was roughly seven million and rates as the most densely populated country in the Western Hemisphere. The life expectancy average of 51 years is the lowest in the Hemisphere. The infant mortality rate is 99 per 1000 live births with a total fertility rate of nearly five children born per woman. Twenty-five percent of all registered
deaths in 1998 occurred among infants less than one year old and half of all deaths occurred among children under five. The majority of these deaths resulted from infectious diseases, primarily diarrheal illnesses. Acute respiratory infections and malnutrition are also listed as significant problems for children. For adults, malaria remains as one of the most serious problems with 85 percent of the population residing in malarial areas. Tuberculosis and parasitic infections continue to represent serious health hazards. Random sampling for the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus throughout Port-au-Prince by Support Group Medical Teams in 1999 reported a 30 per cent infection rate for most metropolitan areas with a 70 percent rate for Cité Soleil, the worst slum area. Public health is completely inadequate. The country has approximately one doctor and one nurse for every 10,000 people. Most Haitians meet their health care requirements through traditional remedies with wide use of herbal medicines. Only forty percent of the population has access to safe drinking water and only twenty-five percent has access to sanitary sewage systems.22

Although education is compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 13, access to education is limited by school location, the cost of school supplies, and teacher availability. Estimates are that only half of the eligible 1.5 million children actually attend school. The overall literacy rate is 45 percent for those age 15 and above who can read and write. The country’s most important institution of higher education is the University of Haiti in Port-au-Prince. But enrollment remains low at approximately 1500 students; many university-level students attend foreign universities. In general, education institutions suffer severe shortages of instructors, books, and other materials.23

Haiti’s economy has been declining over the past two decades while the population has continued to grow. The per capita income is less than $250 and places Haiti among the world’s poorest nations. Agriculture employs nearly 70 percent all Haitians with manufacturing and services being the next largest employers. The agriculture sector consists primarily of small-subsistence farming but there are simply too many people working far too little land. The significant problems of deforestation, soil erosion, and overworked land are physically destroying the country at a rate of about 1 percent of arable land per year with roughly 10 percent of Haiti’s land currently evaluated as arable. Haiti’s energy consumption per capita rates only one-third that of the world’s poorest nations but other than privately operated generators, a single hydro electric plant is the only source of commercial energy. The majority of Haitians use firewood and charcoal for home energy needs and the excessive use of these fuel sources simply exacerbate the deforestation and erosion problems. Previous country
studies provide that the country risks mass starvation in the early part of this century and may well be on the way to becoming a desert.²⁴

The issue for Haiti is that international aid in the form of money alone will not solve this country’s problems. Very close supervision and strict management by international presence are required to rebuild the infrastructure, restore social services to an acceptable level, and assure effective management by government offices and agencies executing reforms. The majority of international aid should continue to be provided through non-governmental agencies and private volunteer organizations to more effectively achieve success. Without close scrutiny and significant international involvement, any amount of foreign aid will be wasted.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN HAITI

There is a general understanding by most Haitians “that nothing of major significance happens in Haiti without the consent of the United States.”²⁵ This linkage colored Haiti throughout the twentieth century, beginning with the twenty years of occupation by the U.S. Marines and continuing through until the withdrawal of the U.S. Support Group Joint Task Force in January 2000. Alex Dupuy’s writings “make a forceful case for linking the Haitian problem to outside (particularly U.S.) forces” and he contends “that the U.S.-led United Nations (UN) invasion in 1994 was undertaken to achieve democratic stability and implement neoliberalism in Haiti.”²⁶

In making the decision to intervene in Haiti, the Clinton Administration was looking to stop the flow of Haitian boat people and rafters into South Florida and to accomplish the military mission without the loss of life characteristic of the similar 1993 involvement in Somalia. The U.S. military role in Haiti from 1994 until 1995 was essential to achieve stability until the security mission could be transferred to other military forces. From early 1995, the U.S. military’s role subsided as the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established to provide security.²⁷

On 30 April 1995 with the detachment of U.S. forces from the UN Mission, U.S. Support Group-Haiti was established as a Joint Task Force to conduct civil-military operations.²⁸ The Support Group additionally provided command and control of units deployed to improve joint training readiness through conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance operations.²⁹ The departure of the final elements of the Support Group on 30 January 2000, marked the end of the continuous presence of U.S. Forces in the country since 1994 when the U.S.-led UN-sanctioned Multinational Force restored democratically elected government to Haiti.³⁰
CHRONOLOGY OF UN AND US INVOLVEMENT IN HAITI SINCE 1993

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>11 October 1993</td>
<td>USS Harlan County with US and UN peacekeepers aboard prevented from docking in Port-au-Prince harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 1993</td>
<td>UN imposed Naval blockade on Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September 1994</td>
<td>Operation Uphold Democracy; US-led UN intervention to help restore legitimate government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 February 1995</td>
<td>Multinational Force (MNF) replaced by UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April 1995</td>
<td>US component of MNF renamed as US Support Group-Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1997</td>
<td>Operational control of US Support Group-Haiti transferred from CINCUSACOM to CINCUSSOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 2000</td>
<td>US Support Group-Haiti deactivated and redeployed to CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 2001</td>
<td>UN mission departs Haiti</td>
</tr>
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TABLE 1: US/UN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT SINCE 1993

The contributions of U.S. Support Group-Haiti were both tangible and intangible. With a focus on humanitarian assistance through civil military programs, the Support Group and attached for training units provided medical care to over one-hundred fifty thousand Haitian patients, drilled and repaired nearly two-hundred fifty wells (each providing water to neighborhoods ranging from two-thousand to six-thousand people), constructed forty-nine classrooms, supporting dormitories, twenty-one kilometers of road, and delivered over two-hundred fifty tons of donated humanitarian assistance supplies. The average personnel strength of the Support Group was approximately 850 personnel. Half of this number were local national employees working side-by-side with American military, civilian, and contractor personnel who operated throughout Port-au-Prince and ran support operations at two installations, Camp Kinzer and Camp Fairwinds, at the international airport and at the primary seaport.

The impact of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines was easy to identify. Key community leaders and representatives of the local population routinely communicated that trust and confidence in the United States. Although peacekeeping was not a Support Group mission,
the very visible presence of American military forces throughout the Port-au-Prince area did provide a sense of security to the local population which was reinforced by statements of key industry leaders and the Directors of the Airport and Seaport Authorities to members of the U.S. Country Team. U.S. forces developed working relationships and cooperation with the various government and non-government institutions. Significant bonds of trust and friendship strengthened U.S.-Haitian relations.

However, as highlighted in the 23 May 2001 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on Haiti, Congress, with concerns over force protection and cost, prohibited DoD funding to maintain a continuous U.S. military presence in Haiti. Congressional visits to the U.S. Embassy in 1999 by Senators DeWine (R-Ohio), Graham (D-Florida), and Mack (R-Florida), surfaced that the decision to redeploy the Support Group by 31 January 2000 was contentious. The Senators all felt the accomplishment of national policy objectives would be hindered by the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence. Since the ongoing UN mission was dependent on the medical support provided by the United States, the DoS and U.S. Embassy goal was to retain the Support Group presence to maintain the military hospital at Camp Kinzer. The Department of State did accept the transfer of the physical hospital and associated medical material from DoD in January 2000 so continued medical support could be provided to UN personnel until termination of the UN mission.

During a staff visit in March 2001, a little more than a year after the redeployment of the Support Group, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Director of Operations, BG Keith Huber, and selected staff met with Ambassador Brian Curran, Ken Duncan, his Deputy Chief of Mission, and the U.S. Country Team to listen to their assessment of current conditions. The SOUTHCOM team was not surprised to hear that "civil institutions were again floundering, crime and violence was again on the increase, the Haitian National Police (HNP), still an immature force, were demoralized and unmotivated, drug trafficking was increasing, and finally that Haiti had not fulfilled many of the expectations associated with the restoration of democratically elected government." This assessment validated the concerns voiced by the visiting Congressional and DoS officials in late 1999 who believed the withdrawal of the Support Group from Haiti was premature.

This deplorable status provides an appropriate segue to examine our national policy towards Haiti. It appears that continued employment of U.S. Forces or other security forces in the Port-au-Prince area in addition to the renewed application of other elements of national power would once more prove timely to assist Haiti.
CURRENT POLICY

Peter F. Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Relations - Western Hemisphere Affairs, provided the current U.S. policy toward Haiti in a statement before House Committee on 5 April 2000. He stated:

Our objectives have been to help Haitians strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights; alleviate crushing poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition; stem illegal migration; deter drug trafficking; and promote stability throughout the Caribbean region. Pursuing these objectives has been a huge challenge, and the record has been decidedly mixed. Haiti is struggling to overcome political, economic, and social legacies of nearly two centuries of ruthless, authoritarian regimes. It must overcome the most severe poverty in the Western Hemisphere. Democratic institutions are fragile at best. Unemployment, crime, illiteracy, corruption, drug trafficking, and poverty pose constant threats to stability.37

The testimony revealed that the police and judiciary remain understaffed and unresourced, illegal migration remains relatively low, and little progress has been made to end the misery, poverty and suffering of the general Haitian population.38 Our stated U.S. national objective, concepts and the current policy remain sound and, if operationalized, would carry our strategic plan for Haiti out through 2010.39 However, as a result of little change and minimal to no progress by the Government of Haiti (GOH) to make expected reforms, our nation has not provided additional resources.40 President Aristide feels that failure on the part of the international community to help him take positive action “to raise the masses from misery and poverty to dignity” will cause them to pursue drastic outlets.41 The exodus of Haitian boat people in increasing numbers and the continuing violent demonstrations throughout 2001 substantiate Aristide’s fears.

The UN, the OAS, CARICOM, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with formally developed and similarly focused long term objectives for Haiti, have criticized the country’s “failure to reform, citing a long history of political instability, corruption, misuse of public funds, and the lack of governance” as key factors leading to conditions of extreme poverty.42 Here again, our collective intent is clear but Haiti’s inability to reform has brought the country to stalemate. Haiti remains the poorest country in the Hemisphere and the per capita income is much less than one-tenth of the Latin American average.43 How do we join together in this Hemisphere, or internationally, to bridge the gap? Can the international community alter the disorganization, corruption, complacency, and incompetence which have been characteristic of the Government of Haiti?
INTERAGENCY SUPPORT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

During the early to mid-nineties, two competing U.S. policies were being conducted at the same time by various departments and branches of our government. After the Governors Island Accord was signed in 1993 and the White House openly supported the return of President Aristide to office, both the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted a separate conflicting policy because “they considered Aristide to be ideologically out-of-bounds.” A unified U.S. policy position did not surface until the DoD led UN effort came to the aid of Haiti with the arrival of Operation Restore Democracy in 1994. The CIA and DoD examples of the contradictions in interagency policy have continued to simultaneously paint Haitian leadership both positively and negatively on peripheral issues, which resulted in undermining the provision of resources to promote national interests. The withdrawal of the Support Group over the objections of DoS and members of Congress similarly sent mixed signals of our policy intentions for Haiti. However, with the disarming of Haiti’s army as a result of UN intervention and with basic security for the Haitian people still in question, peacekeepers and a stabilizing international presence, whether from the UN, OAS, or CARICOM, are needed as much now as ever before to assist the Government of Haiti in maintaining law and order.

Even though the US-led UN intervention used military force to reinstate a democratically elected leader, the same contradictions which simultaneously highlight the inconsistencies of Haiti to make reforms have caused the UN, the IMF, the OAS, CARICOM, and the U.S. to withdraw support and nearly $600 million in funding desperately needed by Haiti to execute the strategic plan crafted by the international community. Now is the time for all agencies to push and pull in the same direction to promote our shared strategic interests in Haiti. Steady international aid in terms of dollars for economic growth, coalition (UN, OAS, and CARICOM) assistance for peacekeepers to establish a secure growth environment, and UN advisors to continue training, guidance, and mentorship for police and judiciary elements is needed now, not later, to enable the Haitian government to lead reform efforts.

PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN KEY AREAS

Given the state of commerce in the Caribbean Basin today, the neoliberal approach needs to be applied by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the international community to improve Haiti’s economy. As highlighted in a recent edition of The Economist, drugs and a handful of tourists are the only commodities moving in the
Caribbean region given the security threats associated with the events of the 11 September terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{46} The indefinite crawl of the Caribbean economy alone substantiates the need for Haiti to focus on development of agriculture. However, President Aristide is very effectively wearing his "statesman-cum-chamber of commerce president" hat and recently signed a $40 million contract with Caribbean Hotel Ventures to build a Hilton-operated 290 room hotel in Port-au-Prince.\textsuperscript{47} This meaningful first step endorses continuance of the neoliberal approach to tie Haiti into the global economy. Progress should be pursued on multiple fronts to enhance commerce and the agricultural market of Haiti.

Haiti's public service institutions are making progressive improvements to enhance the traffic control and flow through the main metropolitan area to connect key transportation hubs for people and cargo movements. Although civic improvements are normally emergency based and not routine for Haiti, it is considered significant that for the first time in a decade that the main highway that transits from the American Embassy to the primary seaport through Port-au-Prince to the national industrial park, the air cargo terminal, and the international airport is now paved for traffic in both directions, with routine traffic police in place.\textsuperscript{48} In the spring of 2000, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration recognized Haiti's progress and awarded the national airport authority with a much improved rating for overall operations, security, and facilities, and in doing so, authorized continued use of the airport by American flag carrier airlines. The maintenance of the airfield and terminal is noticeably improved with efficient and effective security controls in place.\textsuperscript{49} Haiti's primary seaport in Port-au-Prince is also undergoing major construction to increase the size and physical security of paved staging areas and the overall general maintenance, appearance, and access controls of the seaport are far improved for the first time in ten years.\textsuperscript{50}

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS WITH LONG TERM RESOLVE ARE REQUIRED**

The Haitian people trust the United States, but the perception of continuing unilateral actions by the sole super power raises the need for an international or combined Americas approach to achieve our collective interests for Haiti. This approach is also cost effective. Additionally, UN, OAS, and CARICOM all have a stake in assuring modernization and efficiency in the continued development of the civil institutions in Haiti. Given the economic progress and effort Haiti has initiated as outlined above coupled with the civic enhancements to national ports, traffic control, and transportation flow which should be considered significant, President Aristide
and his administration are finally making marked improvements that the international community has not witnessed from any previous Haitian administration since the 1950's, when Haiti's tourist trade was strong. We must collectively agree to restore all aid to Haiti now as required to implement our strategic vision for the country. The Bush Administration, already focused on enhancing the wellness of our neighbors in this hemisphere, must insure the combined U.S. interagency approach to Haiti is marching in the same direction at the same time, and on the same route.\textsuperscript{51}

Given the global commitments for U.S. forces and requirements for each of our combatant commanders to engage the war on terrorism in their particular theaters, DoD cannot realistically sign up for any major mission in Haiti which might function similar to the previous U.S. Support Group with significant command and control, security, logistics, medical, engineer, and transportation services capabilities. However, given UN and DoS energy to get an international effort to assist Haiti in critical areas, DoD's contribution should be to provide military civil affairs (CA) ministerial advisory teams (MAT) to function similar to the CA MAT that assisted the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti from October 1994 through 1997 in working with the GOH to provide specialized talent in the key areas.\textsuperscript{52} These teams supported essential missions in the areas of justice, public works, public health, finance and central bank, commerce, interior (disaster and rescue), agriculture (including veterinary services), foreign affairs, and education. These teams were rotated through Haiti at intervals and this rotation of select teams at different times would eliminate the need for a significant support base for services since the teams could be supported on the Haitian economy.

CA MAT would be organized and employed to support the development of civic institutions at times and on frequencies determined appropriate by the Ambassador and U.S. Country Team assessments of the GOH specific need. Ideally, the CA MAT could be organized and deployed in conjunction with the implementation of a State Partnership Program (SPP) with Haiti.\textsuperscript{53} The SPP program is strongly endorsed by DoD and DoS and has been proven remarkably effective elsewhere in Latin America and also in Eastern Europe. Functioning programs in the Caribbean area include partnerships between Belize and Louisiana, Honduras and Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Washington D.C., Panama and Missouri, and Venezuela and Florida.\textsuperscript{54} The SPP creates an habitual relationship between the National Guard and selected key civic and business leaders of a particular state that may be selected for participation in the program with Haiti on lines of ethnicity, expertise in particular areas, similarity of geography, or similar geopolitical association. The National Guard Bureau provides:
The optimum SPP partnership is one in which: the Host Nation professes genuine interest in the Partnership; U.S. and theater engagement objectives are satisfied; the force protection risk is low; a minimum of additional resources is required to execute engagement; and National Guard core engagement competencies, particularly military support to civil authority, are heavily incorporated.\textsuperscript{55}

—National Guard Bureau

The intent is to create a relationship between the state and the Republic of Haiti that builds on trust and confidence developed over long and continued periods of cooperation and teamwork in areas desired by the affected nation. The value of the SPP is its ability to focus the attention of a small part of DoD, in effect a state national guard, on a single country in support of national policies. This program is tailor-made for Haiti.

The UN, OAS, and CARICOM elements could provide peacekeepers to train and enhance the Haitian National Police which still requires assistance and support; and, if considered appropriate, these organizations could also assist the GOH in other civic administration areas. In detailed coordination with other interagency and law enforcement efforts, DoD should additionally employ those assets allocated for use by the Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E) to execute the theater counter-narcotics effort and assist the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Haiti to support the national counter-narcotics strategy. DEA presently is increasing its’ staff in Haiti and has an effective working relationship with key officials in the HNP, Judicial Police, and other offices of the GOH, including Haiti’s executive branch as indicated below:\textsuperscript{56}

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected head of state for the second time last November (2000) has responded to U.S. concerns with a number of initiatives. In December, he agreed to an eight-point action plan with President Clinton’s special envoy, Tony Lake, that included a commitment to substantially enhance cooperation to combat drug trafficking. Since then, he has successfully pushed a Parliament to pass new anti-money laundering legislation, and to accept the proposal allowing U.S. ships and planes to patrol Haiti’s coastline and interdict any drug-carrying vessels. Aristide’s press office also calls attention to Haiti’s admission in March to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and that group’s “recognition of efforts already deployed by the Government of Haiti to combat drug trafficking and money laundering.”\textsuperscript{57}

—Charles Arthur

JIATF-E elements need to aggressively promote security enhancements of Haiti’s borders while simultaneously providing a renewed focus to directly target the flow of illicit drugs and execute national counterdrug objectives. Currently, the global war on terrorism has priority for key command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets normally
allocated within the Caribbean Basin to combat the war on drugs. Priority to the execution of a significant JIATF-E counter-narcotics effort in Haiti will have to be postponed until that time that the Joint Staff is able to release essential personnel and equipment resources committed in the U.S. Central Command area of operations back to U.S. SOUTHCOM to continue the JIATF-E mission.

Since the war on terrorism is a defining issue for foreign policy, DoD and the combatant commander have elements in the theater capable of immediately prosecuting the war on terrorism in support of Haiti. The potential threat is that ten of thirty terrorist organizations operating worldwide are located in Latin America. A recent Strategic Forecasting journal offered:

Latin American states including even Cuba pledged to help the U.S. war on terrorism. But budget constraints and local politics will limit how much help they can provide, and more important, will leave U.S. assets in Latin America, where Muslim militants allegedly have cells, vulnerable to terrorist attacks. U.S. government anti-terrorism experts say there are Islamic extremist cells associated with militant groups Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network operating in Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador.

—Strategic Forecasting

These known terrorist cells may take advantage of the fragile democracies in Latin America to seek safe haven and expand operations elsewhere especially in those nations where law enforcement is not particularly strong. This situation places Haiti at risk where the police force is not well organized and intelligence tracking mechanisms to monitor movements of terrorist elements are not well established. The U.S. can strengthen its intelligence capabilities and assist in strengthening Haiti’s police and judiciary programs. However, the timing and targeting of Al Qaeda and other terrorist cells in Latin America will be determined and prioritized by the National Command Authority. U.S. SOUTHCOM is in a position to assist the interagency effort in collection and analysis of intelligence data from the Command’s Joint Intelligence Center to support U.S. Country Team-Haiti as required by the Ambassador to assist in the identification, targeting, tracking, and containment of known or suspected terrorists or those financial institutions or similar support structures in Haiti that support terrorism.

Now is the time for DoD to work with our interagency partners to synergize all U.S. efforts in assisting Haiti to strengthen democratic institutions, improve the economy, deter drug trafficking, prosecute the war on terrorism, and promote overall development in the country. The recommended employment of CA MAT should be tied to the related DoS USAID programs in the areas of public health, commerce, agriculture, education, and public works. The CA MAT
for justice, the police, finance and central bank should work closely with the Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury to complement their efforts into a single program for all agencies.

Given the establishment of an SPP partnership, all National Guard efforts should be coordinated through U.S. Country-Team Haiti. The coordination will insure those SPP contacts are prioritized by the Ambassador and joined with embassy programs to stabilize relations and support democratic institutions. A combined interagency approach will apply all skills simultaneously to promote democracy and assist development in Haiti while setting the right focus for regional cooperation in the Hemisphere.

CONCLUSION

A well-coordinated, combined interagency approach complements all of our national interests “to strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, alleviate crushing poverty, stem illegal migration, deter drug trafficking, and promote regional stability.” With a renewed coalition force and constant multilateral aid based on progress initiated by President Aristide and his administration, Haiti will continue to improve its capacity for reform. Given this degree of multilateral involvement and demonstrated U.S. resolve, Haiti will begin to slowly emerge as a proud product of the Americas. “The United States must adopt a flexible, understanding posture towards the demands of Haiti’s impoverished majority which are sure to be articulated in new, unpredictable ways as Haiti undergoes unprecedented modernization and change.” The current Commander, U.S. Army South, has assessed:

Our future hinges on the political, economic, and social relationships among the nations in the Western Hemisphere. The old east-west (Cold War) strategic azimuth must shift to a north-south vision within our own hemisphere to seize what is fast transforming from an American culture into a culture of the Americas. Our Army mission promotes democracy, regional prosperity in the Caribbean, Central and South America by engagement activities, drug interdiction efforts and contingency operations. No matter how you describe it, our mission is about people. We cannot rely on hope to ensure stability, prosperity and democracy, but we can lead the transformation from an American culture to a culture of the Americas by emphasizing where the methods for achieving stability lie—with the people of the Americas.

—MG Alfred A. Valenzuela
ENDNOTES


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32 U.S. Embassy-Haiti Country Team, meetings and property transfer discussions with Adler Edma, Director General, Haiti National Airport Authority, J. Julio Julien, Director General, Haiti National Port Authority, and Alix Lamarque, Director General, Haiti National Society of Industrial Parks, 26-28 November 1999.

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