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TRANSFORMATION – DON’T FORGET TRAINING DOCTRINE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH R. STRICKLAND
United States Army

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TRANSFORMATION-Don't forget Training Doctrine

by

LTC Kenneth R. Strickland
US Army

COL Ray Alexander
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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Operational effectiveness is a result of training. As THE ARMY transforms so should the capstone training doctrinal manuals. The purpose of this study is to examine the current environment to determine if the doctrine is still valid or in need of revision. In addition this study will examine the extent to which transformation impacts current training doctrine, and if now is the time to establish doctrinal training manuals that guide THE ARMY well beyond the legacy and interim period through the objective force and beyond. This will be accomplished by examining what needs to be changed and what of the doctrine is valid. The projected conclusion of this research is that part of current doctrine is still valid, but updating and inclusion of the total army-training framework must be addressed.
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PREFACE

In the late 1970's and 80's with General Vuono as the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, Major General Mallory as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, and Lieutenant Colonel Van Alstyne as the Project Officer the Army wrote the current capstone training doctrine, FM 25-100 – Training the Force. This effort could be considered as the beginning of Army transformation. As operational effectiveness is a result of training, it is appropriate that the transformation began with a revolution in training doctrine. The purpose of this study is to examine the current environment to determine if the doctrine is still valid or in need of revision. As the requirements of the Army continue to range across the full spectrum of conflict, and not focused entirely on major theater war, now may be the time for a revision and update of the current capstone training doctrine.
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TABLE 1 DOCTRINAL REVISION

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THE SPECTRUM OF TRAINING

As many types of missions arise across the full spectrum of conflict changing the environment of operations, the environment of training is also changing. The institutional knowledge of the U.S. Army is captured in its doctrine: the collective thinking of how it will train, fight, modernize, and equip itself. When FM 25-100, Training the Force hit the street over two decades ago, it started the transformation of the Army by changing the way the Army trains and prepares for warfare. This capstone doctrine articulated the principles and the model (not formally) of training for a substantial period of time. A significant portion of the current capstone training doctrine is still valid and will continue to be well into the continuing transformation process. With this solid foundation in place, the time is right for the U.S. Army's institution and all leaders to carry the transformation to end-state. The history of any army is that change in the form of evolution is the most difficult operation it conducts.

For over two decades, much has changed around the world. No longer is there a bi-polar environment focusing the national defense efforts. The Army is smaller and no longer focused on forward presence; rather, it is organized to globally project power rapidly. The reserve components have an increased role and are frequently deployed, as they are essential to the Army's ability to accomplish the missions.

Training doctrine focuses on major theater war and provides the Army with the azimuth to transform the institution. The battlefields being trained for today aim to counter sophisticated and crude asymmetrical threats. Effort, and resources are directed at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, specifically support and stability operations. The Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint Vision 2020, and numerous independent studies point to a future environment where demographics, energy, the environment, and clashes along cultural fault lines combine to make the world a potentially more dangerous place. These studies also demonstrate that America's Army will continue to be the organization chosen to meet future challenges.

As the Nation struggles with its role in globalization, the Army needs to review the assumptions upon which current training capstone doctrine was written. The underpinning strength of the Army is its doctrine. The application of this doctrine led to development of the best Army in the world and change is sure to be met with skepticism and resistance. It is imperative to remember that change is disruptive to organizations; however, organizations must meet the needs of the new environment or cease to be effective.
THE CHALLENGES

The Army exists to deter war, or if deterrence fails, to reestablish peace through victory in combat wherever US interests are challenged. To accomplish this, the Army’s forces must be able to accomplish their assigned strategic, operational, and tactical roles. For deterrence to be effective, potential enemies must perceive that the Army has the capability to mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain combat operations. Training is the process that melds human and material resources into these required capabilities. The Army has an obligation to the American people to ensure its sons and daughters go into battle with the best chance of success and survival. This is an obligation that only outstanding and realistic training, conducted to the most exacting standards, can fulfill.

In an era of complex national security requirements, the Army’s strategic responsibilities now embrace a wider range of missions. Emphasis must be on the primary function of the Army—to fight and win the wars of the nation. Implicit in that emphasis is the mounting importance of missions other than combat—missions that will require the same degree of training and readiness as combat itself. Therefore, in the context of the capstone training doctrinal manual, the emphasis on warfighting needs to subsume the full range of operational missions that the Army may be called upon to execute.

In addition to the challenge of executing operations across the full spectrum of conflict is the challenge of dealing with the exponential changes in technology and its impact on training. Some senior Army leaders believe that the changes occurring in training are a transformation process, not a revolution.¹

By definition, transformation is a consistent change in one or more of the traditional elements of a system: technology, organizational structure, people, resources and doctrine. Also, the common characteristics of revolution (scope, intensity, permanence, and paradigm shift) are inherent in this transition.² Clearly, the Army is experiencing change in each of these areas.

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY

There has been an exponential change in technology in the United States since the publishing of the training doctrine. The rate of change, although hard to quantify, is said to be doubling every 18 months.³ The Army is experiencing this rapid rate of technological change too. Information age technology is increasing the pace of operations. The flow, quantity, and accuracy of information, combined with the range and lethality of weapons, has significantly extended units of action (task forces based on capability and availability) battlespace.
Information age technology will drive greater change as emerging systems enter the force. This is the underpinning of the Transformation Campaign Plan. The Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) provides early views of the transforming Army. Increased components of equipment, much of which is automated by computers, are integrated into command and control systems as well as weapons systems and vehicles. The use of these systems demonstrates the significant advances in technology and the impact on the way we train and fight. Enhanced situational awareness; significantly increased effectiveness in air defense and anti-armor systems; development of tactics, techniques and procedures; changes to organizational designs; and the identification of advanced leader skills represent a few of the changes and challenges that technology has produced in the field.

The frequency of training required to maintain proficiency must be considered and addressed in capstone doctrine. The increasing complexity of the tools of the profession requires soldiers to train more frequently to sustain proficiency. Most of the new digital information systems have an annual software upgrade that will require training.

As the complexity of the tools of military operations increase, the frequency of training required to maintain proficiency also grows. Information age technology provides new tools for this requirement. Current doctrine addresses training in three domains: Live, Virtual, and Constructive. The relevancy of continuing to separate these domains is an on-going discussion at The Army Training Support Center (ATSC) Ft. Eustis as they are all within the Synthetic Theater of War (STE) and can no longer be separated. STE is broadly defined as an environment that is everything short of the actual event, which means all training is done within STE.

The effective use of constructive simulations, such as the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), plays a significant role in the Army’s vast improvement in battlestaff and leader proficiency at brigade, division, corps, and joint level. Simulations, such as JANUS and MPARE (Mission, Planning, Analysis, Rehearsal, and Execution), are used to enhance leader proficiency and to rehearse contingency missions at the battalion, company, and platoon level for conventional and special operations forces.

Virtual simulations play a key role in the training of infantry, armor and aviation units today, and are continuing to expand to others. Virtual simulations are being used to train individuals and crews to perform to standard in realistic and stressful situations. Virtual simulations have enabled training in hazardous situations that would be too dangerous to execute in the live training domain, and have become the preferred method. They also allow individuals and crews to train in specific environmental conditions and to experience many
different situations in a compressed time period. Additionally, units at different installations using simulation networks and close combat tactical trainers (CCTT) can train simultaneously in a common virtual environment, such as Afghanistan, prior to live training at the units common training area.

Today, live, constructive, and virtual domains are linked together in training events. Several units have successfully executed training events in which elements conducting live training in the field operated in concert with their battlestaffs training in the constructive domain and with other leaders/crews training in the virtual domain— all with a common picture of the fight. Although still evolving, multi-echelon training in multiple domains will be common in active, reserve, and joint components in the not too distant future. In sum, the simulations in the constructive and virtual domains will exponentially increase individual, leader, and collective experience and proficiency prior to live training events.⁹

ORGANIZATION

The Army’s force structure has changed dramatically since the development of the capstone doctrine. Since 1989, the U.S. Army downsized from 18 to 10 active divisions and experienced a decrease in end strength as well as a reduction in National Guard and in Army Reserve personnel.¹⁰ Simultaneously, the Army continues to deploy for operations across the spectrum at an increased rate, a significant increase in comparison to the previous forty years.¹¹

A smaller Army and the demanding operations tempo also required changes within the organization. A significant change is the increased integration of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in support of contingency missions as well as the daily operations of the active force. Simply stated, “Total Army” operations are the norm today. For example, National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers are continuing to be mobilized for operations across the spectrum of conflict ranging from domestic security to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.¹² The Reserve Components (National Guard and the Army Reserve) continue to change their structure to improve integration with the active component as well as support the Transformation Campaign Plan.

Changes in organization for contingency operations go beyond the integration of Guard and Reserve forces. We frequently deploy today with “mix and match” forces, breaking the habitual relationships within brigades. To accomplish missions today, the Army builds task forces based on capability and availability (units of action) to ensure force proficiency, then deploys the force to execute a mission. This is a significant change from the previous norm of deploying habitual task forces that are stationed together, and train, deploy, and fight as a team.
This is significant for understanding how the Army trains itself, as unit training is not a stand-alone option.\textsuperscript{13} 

The organizational structure of the Army will continue to change in fundamental ways as we transform from the Legacy Force to an Interim and then Objective Force.\textsuperscript{14} The Army Interim Force is becoming a reality. With the fielding of the IBCT, the Army's organization will change dramatically as it may potentially consist of legacy, interim, objective and special purpose forces at the same time. This means that a capstone doctrine that allows for the bedrock in training to cover all is required.

PEOPLE

The changes in the Army and in the Army's environment also change the human dimension irreversibly. Soldiers must be intelligent, highly skilled, and confident to perform in this uncertain, volatile environment while using complex systems. Today's soldiers must acquire more knowledge and greater skill proficiency during shorter training periods and then confidently employ their skills in new ways with emerging technology.

Army leaders are especially challenged by the changes taking place. Given the wide range of missions, today's Non-and Commissioned Officers are frequently confronted with difficult and ambiguous situations that require flexibility, initiative, and creative thinking. Yet, they must continue to lead by example. Leaders must learn to operate their soldiers' sophisticated systems, as well as understand the integration and synchronization of these systems across the battlefield functional areas and with sister service, allied, and coalition force systems.

Finally, leaders are responsible for planning and executing the training programs that develop and sustain individual, leader, and unit proficiency on an increasing number of tasks in a variety of challenging conditions without an increase in the most precious training resource—time. In short, what the Army requires of soldiers and leaders today, and in the future, is changing significantly.\textsuperscript{15}

RESOURCES

The way we resource training has changed. The Army experienced a decrease in buying power over the past decades.\textsuperscript{16} Such a change drives hard decisions concerning the use of funds and affects every aspect of training. Time is also a precious resource, maybe the most precious. Although time remains constant, the growing number and increasing complexity of missions coupled with the sophistication of our systems places increasing pressure on available training time. Training areas have been reduced in number and in sufficiency. The U.S. Army closed installations in the United States and abroad,\textsuperscript{17} many of which included training land and
facilities. This reduction in available training area is particularly significant for forward-deployed forces and the Army National Guard and Reserve components. Additionally, existing training areas are lacking as our units' battlespace expand and as the public presses against the boundaries of existing training areas.

Increasingly, leaders today and in the future will be concerned about the efficiency and effectiveness of their training. The elements of the training challenge: technology, organization, people, and resources all evolved since the development of the capstone training doctrine and require to be addressed as the Army transitions. The scope of the evolution is all encompassing; it involves the entire organization as every part of the Army is impacted by the changing ways to train the force. Training is the number one priority in the Army. Intensity about the way we train is part of our culture and is reflected in the field by leaders' innovative training methods and in articles in our professional journals. Most significantly, there is a distinguished paradigm shift – a change in the world-view in recognizing the training challenges in advance.\textsuperscript{18} There is a sense in the Army today that the old doctrine doesn't quite fit.

The Army must continue to train the way it intends to fight because historical experiences clearly show the direct correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield. Today's leaders must learn the lessons of history in planning training for tomorrow's battles.\textsuperscript{19} The Army's battle-focused training paid off. The Army trained and won.\textsuperscript{20}

The key to winning any place across the spectrum of conflict is the understanding of "how we fight" at every level and the demonstrated confidence, competence, and initiative of soldiers and leaders. Training provides the means to achieve the tactical and technical proficiency that soldiers, leaders, and units must have to enable them to accomplish the mission. Training focuses on fighting and winning battles. While warfighting is the central and principle training focus, other missions exist as well. The proficiency derived from this training is the same for many stability and support operations (SASO) tasks. Primarily, the ability to defeat any foe tactically gives our Army great credibility and respect that enhances our ability to accomplish all missions to include SASO. Therefore, training must: practice the techniques and procedures of integrated command and control, enable units to apply joint and multinational doctrine and tactics, exercise all support systems required to sustain combat operations. Responsibility for the Army's success across the spectrum of conflict rests on the shoulders of all components of the Army.\textsuperscript{21}

The current capstone training doctrine construct is an excellent vehicle for evaluating whether change of the doctrine is necessary. By using this construct and then evaluating it
against the strategic objectives of training, it will determine whether it is still valid or needs to be changed. This can be structured into a usable methodology for providing a feasible analysis.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
- Publish a doctrine that provides a vehicle to reenergize and clarify how the Army trains itself.
- Create a training capstone doctrine for current and future operating environments that will endure into the objective force.
- Provide the Army's (AC/RC) capstone training doctrine to support the continuing transformation.

Bottomline, the doctrine must be enduring. It must serve through transformation and into the objective force as a vehicle to energize training.\textsuperscript{22}

The current capstone training doctrine is found to be fundamentally valid against this evaluation criteria but does need to be updated and refined through clarification as well be expanded in several areas. Just as there are strengths, there are areas that need to be improved within the current doctrine. Proposed changes to doctrine are found in Table 1. These changes are addressed in this study.

### Doctrine

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Update and rewrite the manual as the capstone training doctrine of "How the Army Trains the Army"

### TABLE 1 DOCTRINAL REVISION

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Weaved throughout all the doctrine, an increased emphasis must be placed on creating improved training doctrine for current and future operating environments. This doctrine must support the legacy, interim, and objective force training challenges and ensure training remains the commander’s responsibility and emphasizes standards based training.

HOW THE ARMY TRAINS

A critical component of the capstone training doctrine is the exclusion of a demonstration of how the pieces fit together. An understanding of how “The Army trains- the Army” is necessary for all levels of leadership in order to have situational awareness on how to plan and execute training. This is not a component of current doctrine. By including this into the doctrine, the foundation of training will be stabilized and will provide necessary staying power to support the transformation campaign plan. The broad based understanding of the majority of the Army’s leadership is that there is institutional training and there is unit training. Level of knowledge doesn’t demonstrate understanding of the strategic approach to training. Not understanding the strategic plan often leads to the waste of critical training resources. A formalized description of how the Army trains itself should be a part of the capstone doctrinal manual. An attempt at this linkage follows and is derived from the ongoing Institutional Transformation Plan that is being developed in conjunction with the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan.

Every soldier, NCO, warrant officer, and officer has one primary focus--to be trained and ready to fight and win the nation’s wars. Success in battle does not happen by accident, it is a direct result of tough, realistic, and challenging training. Training is a team effort and the entire Army, the institutional training base, units, the combat training centers (CTC), and each individual soldier, has a role that contributes to force readiness (see figure 1). The training base (Institutional Army) trains soldiers and leaders to take their place in units in the Army. Units train to standard on their wartime missions. CTC’s provide realistic and stressful training and operational experience to enhance unit readiness and produce bold, innovative leaders. Simultaneously, individual soldiers, NCOs, warrant officers, and officers are responsible for training themselves through personal self-development study.

Training is a continuous, lifelong endeavor that produces competent, confident, and adaptive soldiers and leaders with the warrior ethos in our Army. Commanders have the ultimate responsibility to train soldiers and develop leaders that accept change and are confident they can use new situations, technology and developments to their advantage, derived from an understanding of the challenge of full spectrum operations. The result of this
Army-wide team effort is a training system that is unrivaled in the world. Effective training produces the force, soldiers, and units that are unbeatable in battle.

THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTION

The institution is the foundation for career-long learning and is a key enabler for unit readiness. It develops competent, confident, and adaptive leaders and soldiers and establishes the framework for the development of future leadership characteristics that result in critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, mental agility and who are comfortable with ambiguity. Institutional training and education enhances military knowledge, individual potential, initiative, and competence in warfighting skills. It infuses an ethos of service to the Nation and the Army and provides the educational and experiential foundation for success on the battlefield. The institution teaches Army doctrine and provides the experiences that train leaders and soldiers. It trains them to be adaptable to uncertainty and be creative and innovative problem solvers throughout their careers and to serve as effective members of lethal units and battle staffs that synchronize combined arms, joint, and multinational operations, and sort out essential elements of information in an information-rich environment. Institutions provide training on common tasks and a selected portion of occupation related critical tasks.
THE ROLE OF TRAINING IN THE UNIT

The unit commander is the primary trainer of the organization and is responsible for ensuring that all training is conducted to the Army standard. This is the commander's number one priority. The commander analyzes the unit's wartime mission and develops the unit's mission essential task list (METL). The commander plans training and briefs the training plan to the senior commander. The senior commander is responsible to protect training from interference and ensure stability and predictability.

The goal of unit training is to develop and sustain the capability to deploy rapidly, and to fight and win as part of a combined arms team in a variety of operational environments. Training in both the institution and the unit contributes to achieving this goal.

Institutions provide the foundational training and education soldiers and leaders need in their next assignment, as well as a reach-back capability for functional and duty position-related training or reference materials. Unit commanders, through subordinate leaders, build on that foundation to continue developing the skills and knowledge required for mission success. Unit commanders are responsible for sustaining individual soldier skills to support the unit's mission. A great strength of the Army is its professional NCO Corps, which takes pride in being responsible for the individual training of soldiers.

Unit training combines the individual training associated with specified duties and tasks with the collective training that produces cohesive teams and units. Commanders conduct unit training to prepare soldiers and leaders for unit missions, including the leader and battle staff training essential for synchronizing the effects of Battlefield Functional Area (BFA's) in joint, combined arms, and multinational operations. The commander sustains individual and team capability by establishing a climate of innovation through leader team training.

Effective training of leader teams results in leaders that act both as an individual and as a member of a team possessing a common understanding of the commander's intent. Repetitive team training builds mutual trust and confidence in the collective ability of the entire team. Commanders must establish a command climate of mutual trust and understanding, allowing subordinates to exercise initiative within the common understanding of the commander's intent across the full spectrum of operations.

Commanders, leaders, and soldiers will use the Synthetic Training Environment (STE) training domains—Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) — to enhance battle focused training.

Live training is executed in field conditions using tactical equipment and enhanced by training aids, devices, simulators, simulations (TADSS), and tactical engagement simulation of combat conditions. Virtual training uses computer-generated battlefields in simulators with
approximate characteristics of tactical weapons systems and vehicles. Virtual tactical engagement simulation training permits units to maneuver over much larger areas. Constructive training uses computer models and simulations to exercise the command and staff functions of units from platoon through echelons above corps.

These domains provide a set of tools for the commander to train soldiers, staffs, leaders, units, and themselves. Further, more appropriate discussion of the training domains must be provided in the planning and execution phases of the training management system. The commander selects the tools that will result in the unit receiving the best training based on available resources. Although each domain offers an advantage, collectively, they maximize Army training potential within resource limitations.

The intent is to achieve qualification to standard, integrate and coordinate multiple tasks, and rehearse. It is the commander's responsibility to be familiar with all three domains and to select the most applicable environment. The commander, when planning training, must determine the appropriate mix that meets the unit training objectives. Units may potentially conduct training with elements from these tools simultaneously.

Commander presence and involvement is key to effective unit training. Commanders are responsible for resourcing, preparing, and executing unit training to standard. To accomplish this, units build on the basics with a goal of an annual external evaluation (EXEVAL). Leaders must emphasize meeting mission training plan (MTP) standards during all EXEVALs. If a squad, platoon, or company fails to meet established standards for identified critical METL tasks, it must retrain and then be re-evaluated. Training to standard of critical METL tasks is more important than completion of the EXEVAL. Train to standard, not to time. Focus on sustaining METL tasks in the Band of Excellence (Figure 2)\textsuperscript{26}--this is the critical factor in developing lethal small units. The purpose of training is to be ready to fight and win our nation's battles. This means executing METL tasks to standard.
THE ROLE OF COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

Realistic training environments enhance combat readiness. The CTC Program, consisting of the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), provides highly realistic and stressful joint and combined arms training based on Army and joint doctrine. CTC training is designed to increase unit collective proficiency on the most realistic and challenging training battlefield available. They do not stand by themselves; they are the culminating point of a progressive training system that begins at much lower levels and builds to the CTC’s. Commanders will fight the equipment they would expect to take to war during their command tenure arrayed against a freethinking, opportunity based Opposing Force (OPFOR) with an equal chance to win. Consequences of tactical decisions are fully played out in scenarios where the outcome is not assured, and doctrinally based After Action Reviews (AAR) guide leaders to accept responsibility. This combat training environment maximizes operational experience, as well as benefits training for the entire unit. The battlefield is replicated and enhanced by a variety of state-of-the-art simulations. They portray possible conditions expected in the unit’s operational mission area. The CTC Program is the Army's training and leader development experience.27

THE ROLE OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT

Learning is a life-long process. Institutional, unit, and CTC training alone cannot provide the insight, imagination, and judgment needed for combat. The gravity of our profession requires comprehensive self-study and training. In no other profession is the cost of un-
preparedness so high. Soldiers and leaders at all levels continually study our profession in preparation to fight and win the nation's wars. This requires commanders at all levels to create an environment that encourages subordinates to develop personal and professional goals. Further refinement of those interests should occur through personal mentoring by commanders and leaders. Application of battle-focused Officer Professional Development and NCO Professional Development programs are essential to leader development. Exploiting reach-back, distance learning, and continuing education technologies support these programs.

Self-development is continuous and should be emphasized in both institutional and operational assignments. Successful self-development requires a team effort. Self-development starts with an assessment of individual strengths, weaknesses, potential, and developmental needs. Commanders and leaders provide feedback to assist subordinates in determining causes for these strengths and weaknesses, and courses of action to improve performance. Together, they prioritize self-development goals.\textsuperscript{28}

ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING

The Army consists of active and reserve components--Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. Each has unique characteristics, but all share the same doctrine, training process, and training support system (TSS). All components train to the same standard; however, the number of tasks trained may differ as a result of the training time available. Senior Army leaders need to understand the differences between active and reserve component training opportunities and be prepared to provide or receive units from all components.

HOW COMMANDERS TRAIN THEIR UNITS

Army training has one purpose: to produce competent, confident, adaptive soldiers, and leaders to build lethal units and battle command teams (Figure 3).\textsuperscript{29} They must possess shared competence and shared visions of what will happen, why it will happen, and to adapt to make the commanders vision a reality. These units and soldiers must be trained and ready to fight and win our nation's battles. The Army training system integrates institutional, unit, CTC, and individual self-development into a system of systems approach to training. The commander is responsible for unit training and integrates the training resources of the institution, unit, CTC, as well as individual self-development to train combat ready units. They are trained to the Army standard and never compromise it. Battle-focused training dictates that units train as they fight.
PROVEN CONCEPTS

FIRM FOUNDATIONS AND A PROVEN RECORD

Interviews with 39 of the Army’s brigade commanders confirmed that a large portion of current doctrine is as valid today as it was at publication. What did become apparent is that not until these commanders were in their current positions did they become aware of the quality of the doctrine. It had not been taught or demonstrated by the majority of their senior leaders.30

The Army’s record of success on the battlefield since the publication of the current doctrinal manual provides validity of the doctrine in the past. Success is ironically a challenge to change.31

AFTER ACTION REVIEW PROCESS

No other army does it as well. No other organization, of any type, has institutionalized the After Action Review (AAR) to such a degree. If there are improvements to be made, they are largely a matter of style and of quality control.32
TRAIN AS A COMBINED ARMS AND SERVICES TEAM

The combined arms approach to training was widely viewed as valid and enduring by the senior leaders interviewed. Combined arms proficiency develops when teams train together. The full integration of the combined arms team is attained through training management. While viewed as a concept that is valid and enduring, there appears to be wide disparity as to understanding of the capabilities of various formations, particularly between heavy and light units and as legacy/interim forces materialize. A significant addition to the combined arms approach is required for the future. As the Reserve Component, which comprises the majority of the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support structure, deploys as a part of operational requirements, our training programs must be better at integrating Active and Reserve units.

Train to challenge. Tough, realistic, and intellectually and physically challenging training both excites and motivates soldiers and leaders. It builds competence and confidence by developing and honing skills. The requirement for solid, cohesive teams in the future force is even greater than in the past due to the changed nature of the battlefield.

Train to maintain. Maintenance is a vital part of every training program. Maintenance training, designed to keep equipment in the fight is of equal importance to soldiers being expert in its use.

Multi-echelon approach. To use available time and resources most effectively, commanders must simultaneously train individuals, leaders, and units at each echelon in the organization during training events. While viewed by senior leaders as an enduring principle contained in the capstone training doctrine, there is an acknowledged disparity in the understanding and execution of this concept in the field. If applied properly, training at each level - individual through collective - and in all type-units in the combat team is integrated to achieve quality training for all. Further, the process is designed to make the most efficient use of the resources available. This requires extensive preparatory work by the commander and the staff. Multi-echelon training in the future must include provisions for pre-mission training with the Reserve Component, non-governmental and private organizations, and with allies and coalition partners (Figure 4).
FIGURE 4 MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING EVENT

Train as you fight and Combat Training Centers. The goal of combat-level training is to achieve combat-level standards. Every effort must be made to attain this difficult goal. Within the confines of safety and common sense, leaders must be willing to accept less than perfect results initially and demand realism in training. They must seize every opportunity to move soldiers out of the classroom into the field, fire weapons, [and] maneuver as a combined arms team.\(^{35}\)

The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) combination is extraordinarily powerful: doctrinally correct battlefield missions; a demanding opposition force, fighting to win; and credible instrumentation, and mentors (observer-controllers), in a tough, fair training and evaluation war-fighting environment. No other army in the world approaches this demand in rigor of training, size of physical plant, or willingness to expose the chain of command to such uncontrolled risk in front of subordinates. The CTCs should continue to be resourced fully and scheduled bi-annually for every battalion-level unit. The focus of the CTCs should remain on the battalion as part of a brigade combat team. Further, CTCs should serve to improve the quality of home station training and not be viewed as an “end point” in the life cycle of a unit.\(^{39}\)
Commanders are the key. Effective training is the number one priority of senior leaders in peacetime. In wartime, training continues with a priority second only to combat or to the support of combat operations.\textsuperscript{40} The placement of training as the Army's number one priority sent a significant message to the field by identifying the importance of training to the core function of the force - to fight and win - placing training at the top of the hierarchy of things that the commander was responsible for.\textsuperscript{41} In the future, "training as you fight" will likely be a combination of fully resourced live domain training, preceded by constructive and virtual individual, leader, and collective training. In this way, the most benefit will be gained from expending the resources necessary to conduct quality live domain training as the individuals and leaders will arrive at the training event at a higher level of proficiency. Further, emerging virtual systems will allow the individual soldier, leader, or unit to react to situations that would be too dangerous or too expensive to execute in the live domain. In this way, leaders have the opportunity to add to their experience base through rigorous, repetitive iterations of tactical problems.

Competence based Training. The concept of the systems approach to training was the "competence-basing" of the Army. Individual leaders and soldiers are now assessed on a continuous basis according to objective criteria. Units are no longer able to "go through the motions" of a training task and declare the event completed. With the incorporation of the systems approach to training, commanders have a tool to train each task in conditions that mirror those expected in combat, according to common standards established in advance.\textsuperscript{42}

Soldiers and leaders at all levels are better today as a result of current doctrine. The institutional honesty of the Army was enhanced by a criterion-referenced training doctrine allowing commanders to identify and declare poor training for what it is.\textsuperscript{43}

**BATTLE FOCUS**

Battle focus guides the planning, execution, and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure members train as they are going to fight. Battle focus is recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraints.\textsuperscript{44} Battle focus may be the single most important concept contained in the training doctrine.
DOCTRINAL ADDITIONS

EXTERNAL DIRECTIVES

The doctrinal tenet that training plans are based on an assessment of current proficiency is known throughout the force. However, a number of other documents exist in the field that require periodic training on tasks regardless of current proficiency. It is not unusual for some of the Army/Corps/Division Regulation 350-1 series and field directives to list numerous collective tasks and associated training minimums. In some cases, these requirements in total exceed the annual available training days.

Training requirements based on time rather than proficiency is not in accordance with doctrine. Emphasis must be made to discuss this issue and caution commanders about this challenge within the updated doctrine. External training requirements should be concise, general in nature and aligned with doctrine. Additionally, advantage must be taken of technology to hypertext and link from the capstone training document to field manuals and training circulars to describe training programs and training minimums that commanders may use in their training assessment and the development of their training plans. This can be developed in the future to include connection to present and developing reach back capabilities.45

PERSONNEL SYSTEM

The personnel system is a vital component that has an enormous impact on the unit training. In the future, units will be faced with higher complexity, higher lethality, more dispersion between units and more information than ever. Dealing with a difficult environment will require having more cohesive units and more capable leaders.

At the same time the demands on units and leaders will increase, there will continue to be factors that make it difficult to achieve increases in unit training level, cohesion, and leader capability. Turnover continues in most units at traditional or increasing levels, per capita leader time in developing positions continues to decrease, personnel shortages and rapidly changing technology present major challenges to achieving unit capability and cohesion. Additionally, the training challenge in units has increased over time as institutions have trained fewer tasks as a result of being undermanned which increases the number of tasks that must be trained in units.46

If the continuing transformation in training is to enable a transformation in military affairs, we may need a corresponding transformation in personnel affairs. Training doctrine should direct personnel affairs and without innovative solutions to "battle focus" the personnel system, a battle focused training system will be less effective.
IMPACT ON TRAINING AREAS AND FACILITIES

There are impacts of the training transformation on training areas and facilities, especially when considering the reserve components of the Army. First, installations have become increasingly important to training the force. There is no longer a clear distinction between training and installation resources. Installations provide things such as simulation centers, electrical power for training devices, communications infrastructure, environmental remediation of live training areas, training device maintenance and management, digital ranges and many other "installation" resources that are inextricably tied to unit training. This linkage makes separation of training money from installation money increasingly difficult, as installation funding is now centralized.

Currently, training areas are thought of in terms of real estate, but the training area of the future will most likely be very different. Several factors are driving a change in the thinking of training areas. The direct cost of live training is rising rapidly, in terms of fuel, repair parts and other tangibles, and indirect costs such as environmental or infrastructure repair necessitated by training heavy forces. Also, the increased coverage of units in the future, based on increasingly lethal and more mobile systems, will cause current training areas to be adequate for only relatively smaller units. This, coupled with the likelihood that it will not be possible to significantly expand training areas or obtain new, larger ones, makes it necessary to expand the view of what training areas really are, and include the areas from the other domains of training.

The current training environment is the Synthetic Training Environment (STE) and the training area of the future will continue to include all three domains of STE live, constructive and virtual. These domains are now so interconnected that very few training events are stove piped. Embedded training technology links the virtual, constructive and live worlds into a common picture that is transmitted to training participants through their operational C3I systems.

Training areas of the future synthetic training environment will continue to be a combination of the domains, as we know them today: live, constructive and virtual. Constructive simulation could be embedded into the C4ISR systems that are fielded to units. This process would gain some training efficiencies (personnel will not have to train on their "real" system and a simulation system as well, as in today's environment) and reduce the requirement for additional simulators and simulation equipment. Personnel participating in training will only have to be expert in one system - their tactical system. This is unlike today's situation where they have to be proficient in their functional C4ISR system, but also Computer Battlefield Simulations or some other constructive simulation. The tactical system will also be the training system.47
The new training area will be distributed, with participants in different geographical locations participating in the same training exercises. Training could be integrated into deployments as each mission rehearsal can occur in a realistic virtual world. This new training area will allow rapid force tailoring, task organization, and partnership between units and institutions in a way that gains efficiencies and markedly improves training effectiveness. Training exercises in this conceptual training area will have some of the characteristics of experiments but units will still participate in live simulation and in the local training area on their installation. This could have significant payoffs for the reserve components as well as mature into a Joint, combined, multi-national and inter-agency capability.

Units in this training environment will be able to draw on institutional training support packages. Some observer controllers (OCs) could join the unit and accompany them during the exercise. In addition, many OCs, and the supporting analysts to prepare after action reviews (AARs), could operate remotely. These could be institutional subject matter experts who have specific talents or unique experience related to the training. The OPFOR (except for a relatively small element in the live training area) could be remotely located as well.

The training transformation allows us to change the way to think about training areas. While live simulation will be limited to some degree by current and future environment, changing thinking about training areas will allow for being both effective and efficient while conducting realistic training in the STE.

**Synthetic Training Environment – proper mix of the domains.**

Since the current training doctrine was written, significant changes have occurred in training techniques. The amazing speeds at which the constructive and virtual domains have developed have changed the way to train in ways not anticipated. These domains will continue to rapidly develop in the foreseeable future.

There is a lack of understanding around the Army about the proper mix of the domains as well as what they are. There are questions as to whether there is a progressive order in which to use the domains. It is very appealing to emphasize the less expensive domains by some resource conscious constituencies while others discard the non-live domains out of cultural bias. This is a very emotional issue because of the expense involved in live training and current resource levels. Adding to the controversy is the absence of discussion in current training doctrine. Updating the doctrine to address this challenge will enhance supporting the transformation process.
It is clear each domain of the STE also has significant advantages over the others as well. The advantages of realism and friction while operating in the live domain in the field, under adverse conditions and with organic equipment, are obvious. However, the virtual domain also has distinct advantages. Situations too dangerous for soldiers in the live domain may be simulated in the virtual world. System failures can be induced during training in a flight simulator that could never be induced during a live training exercise. Unit equipment under development that does not exist yet can be provided so that fielding may be conducted with units that have a high degree of proficiency before they have drawn their actual equipment. The constructive domain allows much larger units to train than current training areas or fiscal constraints allow. Both the constructive and virtual domains, through remote networking, allow geographically dispersed units to conduct training using distributed joint or combined exercises.

Understanding both the capabilities and limitations of the three domains is important to trying to determine the right mix. When the domains are understood, it becomes apparent that a quality-training program needs a mix of all three domains. While each commander will determine the correct mix for his unit based on a detailed assessment and circumstance, some general principles are obvious.

Training Environments

(Figure 5)\textsuperscript{48} illustrates the conceptual mix of the three domains in a training program based on the level of the unit involved. Generally, lower level units require a significant amount of live training, as well as substantial virtual training, while constructive training does not offer significant advantages and may not be very beneficial. Higher level units, such as battalions
can gain significant advantages from all domains so their training programs will be more balanced between all three. Live training is still an essential component, but virtual and constructive domains are important parts of the program as well.

At higher levels, such as Divisions and Corps, the constructive domain is most applicable, while virtual and live domains are of less importance. In fact, through the use of the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) concept, the live and virtual aspects may even be woven to the primarily constructive training events of these units. The virtual and constructive training domains are essential elements of any Army training program. The description of the domains, discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each and guidelines on the proper mix need to be in the Army’s capstone training doctrine.

Training Relationship - unit, institutional and individual

Except for a brief remark in the leader development section, the institutional relationship in unit training is not recognized in current training doctrine. It has developed significantly since the current doctrine was written. Innovations enabled by technology such as distance learning, video teleconferencing, and others have made training the force a task requiring the close integration and cooperation of units, institutions, and individuals.

Institutions increasingly support unit training programs and in the future this trend will continue if not increase. Combat Training Centers, which includes the Battle Command Training Program, are the most visible institutional support of unit training programs, however there are other less visible programs as well. For instance, there are unit rotations to the Virtual Training Program at Fort Knox to conduct collective training with OC packages provided by the institution. New Equipment Training Teams and Mobile Training Teams from the institutions deploy to unit locations world wide to assist units with training programs. Training doctrine, fighting doctrine, and Mission Training Plans (MTPs) are developed and published by the institutions and require a constant exchange of ideas and information. Off the shelf training support packages have been developed to decrease the overhead for units in their training preparation. In general, institutional support, enabled by technology, will improve the quality of unit training and decrease unit training preparation time.

Leader and soldier development are intimately tied with institutional and unit programs as well. While institutions provide considerable resident training to unit members as well as individuals processing to new assignments, the advent of distance learning and its potential will increase the intensity of this relationship with personnel in units. Special skills, especially low-density high-demand skills, will be trained more frequently in units through institutional distance
learning. Personnel while in units will increasingly conduct non-resident courses and portions of resident courses. This will affect unit-training plans both because of the potential it offers and because the unit will have to allocate time, a precious training resource, to individual training conducted using the institution.

The impact of institutions on training the force has increased and should be acknowledged in training doctrine. This can be done easily by demonstrating the linkage of “How The Army Trains The Army”. Institutional actions impact significantly on unit training programs.

DOCTRINAL CHANGES

TRAINING MANAGEMENT CYCLE

The Training Management Cycle is informally outlined in current doctrine. The cycle begins with METL development followed by preparation of a training assessment, preparation of long range plans, short range plans, near term plans, execution of training, evaluation of training, and finally unit assessment. On the inside of the cycle it shows feedback and outside shows METL development, planning, execution and assessment (Figure 6). The formalization of this model needs to occur and a discussion of how commanders can insert into the cycle for whatever additional considerations their unit uses. Procedurally, the major components to the model should be displayed at the beginning of every chapter with a highlighted and hyperlink capability to take the reader to the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP’s) manuals and reach back sites that would allow for user application at all levels of leadership. This cycle is not all inclusive of how the training management cycle works in every unit. This is okay, in fact it allows for the customizing of the capstone model to accommodate the uniqueness of the particular units.
FIGURE 6 ARMY TRAINING MANAGEMENT MODEL

This model works great for a three-maneuver brigade combat division, but also allows for inclusion of unit particular challenges like training preparation, leader training, and other essential challenges and components to training management. This would be enormous benefit to reserve component units that have challenges that differ from active components.

COMMAND TRAINING GUIDANCE

Current capstone doctrine outlines the timing of the training guidance by level and gives examples of several training guidance documents. However, there are some deficiencies that need modification. For instance, according to doctrine, divisions should issue their Command Training Guidance (CTG) in January for the period covering the following October through the two following years. Brigades are to issue their guidance in April for the year beginning the following October with their calendar through the following 18 months. Battalions issue their guidance in June for the following year beginning in October with a 12-month calendar. Corps and MACOMs, which often issue training guidance, are not addressed.

More importantly, this training cycle is at odds with some key elements of other systems on which training plans depend. For instance, the ammunition cycle in FORSCOM requires submission of annual requirements for the following fiscal year (FY) in June. However, the unit traditionally does not find out what its actual allocations are until August. This means the training plan has been distributed for seven months before the unit knows the allocation for this major resource. The budget cycle is another example of a cycle that is out of alignment with the training cycle. A look at the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System in the Army makes it clear that training planning is far ahead of budget planning. Since it is the budget
that drives training plans in today's environment, not the other way around, it seems out of balance. Other cycles such as CTC cycles, not to mention the decision cycle for unit rotations on real mission commitments, also make planning this far out for these time frames impractical. That is, it is impractical if the plans are to have either any real level of resolution or are not going to have to be continually modified.

Recognizing that precise knowledge of the future is not realistic in order to plan training, it would help to modify the time lines for those things where there is no reason not to, and to modify supporting systems under trainers control. For instance, the timing of issuing the guidance could be modified to ensure a more realistic long-range plan is developed. MACOM and Corps need to be included in the time line. Certain MACOM requirements, such as CTC rotation dates, could be included in the doctrinal guidance of what should be in their training guidance. Given information technology available today, timelines could be shortened and different levels of command could parallel plan to a much greater extent than is indicated in the doctrine.

Additionally, the examples of the training guidance contained in the doctrine could be improved by examining what units are currently issuing and developing much more complete and realistic examples. A base line format could be hyper linked to an Army format that could be modified for each commander's use. Eventually a site could be made into a repository for commanders to deposit guidance and requirements that would give real time visibility to what actions have already been committed. CTC rotations are an example. This would facilitate increased long range planning and follow along a parallel planning process by eliminating a stove piped process that is currently hampered by multiple headquarters. It is essential to include virtual and constructive simulation training in the examples to align the doctrinal examples with today's training methods. While commanders need to have maximum flexibility to tailor their guidance to their own situation and style, a more complete, realistic example would benefit all units and staffs who develop these training products. A graphic linkage of what that would look like is in (Figure 7)
DOCTRINAL CLARIFICATIONS

TRAINING EXECUTION

The training doctrine has a chapter on training execution. Pre-combat checks (or pre-execution checks) are discussed under execution considerations. It lays out training execution as a two-step method of presenting training and then executing training. Three methods of presentation are detailed: lecture, conference and demonstration. Three methods of performance, preferably hands on, are outlined: initial, refresher and sustainment.
Although most of the elements in training execution models being used in the field today are in the chapter, the reader must draw them out. The discussion of training execution needs to show the connection. These changes to the doctrine on training execution would make the concepts more understandable and would align the doctrine, responsibilities, and field practice more closely.

There were a number of doctrinal concepts that are still valid despite the changed environment but which are not clear in the current doctrine. This lack of clarity seems to degrade the effectiveness of the concept's execution in the field.

MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL) CONCEPT

The Mission Essential Task List is a tool whereby commanders "selectively identify the tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organization's wartime mission", according to FM 25-100, Training the Force. It further states, "the most critical inputs to METL development are the organization's operations and contingency plans".

In the environment in which the training doctrine was written, this was a practical method for narrowing the number of training tasks to a manageable number in order to achieve proficiency. This method acknowledges that it would be impossible, with time and resources available, to achieve proficiency on all doctrinal tasks. Therefore, it is important to have a way to pare down the number of doctrinal tasks that can be trained.

An increased discussion in the doctrine on the METL concept must occur. It would also put the concept of METL into perspective in today's environment where forces are more likely to be deployed, and often on missions requiring proficiency on new or non-warfighting tasks. The current doctrine allows for this but it is concealed in external directives. The definition of external directives needs to be expanded to cover those essential requirements that are not directed by War Plans and Contingency Plans. In this particular discussion, the role of commanders at the developing and approving level is critical. First, all commanders analyze their wartime missions to identify their METL. Units with no war plans develop it from external directives that may originate from several different levels of command. The result is a task list fundamental to the unit addressing any mission it might be assigned. Units who have a wartime or contingency mission do not essentially change their process. Regardless of whether a unit has a METL derived from War Plans or from External Directives, when an execution order is received, all units analyze the situation to determine if there are other tasks they will have to do not on their current task list. They then develop their revised METL that includes the tasks they
will execute for this mission. Further discussion needs to include that this process need not be a time consuming formal process normally associated with the original METL development.

The discussion in this chapter needs to address the redeployment phase that initiates the assessment phase of METL development to determine what the new METL will be. Adaptation of this or a similar clarification would provide a doctrinal alternative to those units for whom the current METL concept does not work.

EVALUATION, ASSESSMENT AND CERTIFICATION

Two major issues are identified with the doctrinal concepts of evaluation, assessment and certification. The first concerns a lack of definition of evaluation and assessment in current capstone doctrine. Assessment is defined as "an analysis of the effectiveness of a unit, activity or force", however, evaluation is not defined in this manual.51

The practice of "certification" has caused confusion. Certification is not a concept outlined in the current capstone doctrine. This difference between doctrine and practice is disruptive to the credibility of the training doctrine. Certification for deployment to execute operations across the spectrum of conflict has always been the unit commander's responsibility and is part of the training doctrine covered in the Quarterly Training Brief that demonstrates the ability to conduct these operations. With pre-deployment certification this responsibility has been removed from commanders to staff business.52

The solution is to define the terms in training doctrine and explain the requirement for all three. The following are proposed definitions that might help clarify the terms:

- **Assessment**: An analysis of current status of training or skill using multiple sources and records; an essential part of all training planning by leaders.

- **Evaluation**: The observation of a particular training event to determine training proficiency, strengths and weaknesses to provide feedback (normally in an after action review) to the training unit. An observer not participating in the task, ideally the next senior commander or leader normally performs evaluation. However it may be by another proficient leader designated by the commander.

- **Certification**: The formal by name recording of proficiency of individuals who have met specific training requirements. Normally certification of training or licensing is required for particularly dangerous tasks before soldiers are allowed to perform them.

Clarification and consistent use of all three terms would substantially decrease the confusion and perceived dissonance between training doctrine and practice.53
ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

The role of commanders is outlined in FM 25-101, Training the Force - Battle Focused Training, and the role of senior leaders is defined in FM 25-100, Training the Force. However, neither manual describes how the terms “commanders” and “senior leaders” apply. There is no indication if there is a cut-off between a senior leader and commander at Brigade, Division or any other level, or if some senior leaders are also commanders. Senior is a relative term, so some confusion is understandable. The bottom line is the trainer just doesn’t know.

Several fundamental questions need to be answered to clarify the role of the commander. First, is there a difference between the roles of the commander at different levels? Secondly, at what level of command is one no longer a commander but a senior leader? Finally, do MACOM and Corps Commanders have a role in training? If so, is it the same as other commanders and should their levels of command be addressed in the doctrine?

The recommendation is to clearly define the roles of commanders. It is evident that there are fundamental roles all commanders have. All train their subordinates, all should visit training, and there are many other things all commanders at all levels do. However, there are also some differences in roles. Certainly the level of involvement in the development of training plans and exercises is distinctly different between the battalion commander and corps commander. The acquisition of resources is distinctly different between the MACOM commander and the company commander. It would be helpful and improve training doctrine if the term "senior leaders" was defined along the lines of FM 22-100. The current doctrine has the components of addressing senior leaders when it addresses staff METL development.54 Expanding this to demonstrate how senior leaders in various positions have a role in training is needed as some plan, resource, and execute others resource.

CONCLUSION

Significant environmental changes have taken place since the Army’s training doctrine was written. These environmental changes coupled with the great advance in information age technology have identified the need to update the Capstone Training Doctrine. Intuitively, one might believe that the doctrine required major revision to cope with such substantial change. However, this study concludes that many of the principles and concepts in FM25-100, Training the Force are relevant today and in the future.

It is a credit to the authors of FM 25-100, Training the Force that their work needs so little revision to remain current in our changing environment. It was also a privilege to sit down and question two of the authors, LTG (R) Mallory and LTG Van Alstyne, to acquire an understanding
of how much strategic thought and vision was incorporated into the document that started the transformation of the Army. However, the authors wrote with a different world-view and for an Army with a different capability. We are in the midst of great change. In order to leverage today’s capability and to ensure that America’s Army is trained and ready in the next millennium, it is essential we update the Army training doctrine.

WORD COUNT = 10,111
ENDNOTES


2 The thoughts on a transformation are acquired from several readings on transformation/revolutionary theory. John P. Kotter covers the elements of a revolution in his book Leading Change. The concept of a revolution as a paradigm shift is from Thomas S. Kuhn, author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Other readings instrumental in the development of the discussion of transformation are Alvin and Heidi Toffler’s War and Anti-War.


6 Ibid, 52-54.

7 Shortal, 32.

8 The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by the re-write team for “FM 7.0” participating in the working group (WG) meetings.

9 Ibid.


11 Shortal, 39.

12 The U.S. Army Posture Statement FY 00, 18.

13 “FM 7.0” WG.


15 “FM 7.0” WG.

16 The U.S. Army Posture Statement FY 00, 23.

17 Ibid., 19.

18 Kuhn, 92.

19 Shortal, 31

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22 Ibid.

23 Shortal, 12

24 “FM 7.0" WG.

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26 Shortal, 11

27 Ibid

28 “FM 7.0" WG.

29 Ibid.

30 Sullivan and Harper, 11.


33 FM 25-100, Training the Force, 1-3.

34 Ibid, 1-4.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 “FM 7.0" WG.

38 Ibid, 1-3.

39 The U.S. Army in Transition II, 112.

40 FM 25-100, Training the Force, 1-5.

41 The U.S. Army in Transition, 100.

42 Ibid, 100.

43 The U.S. Army in Transition II, 99-100.

45 “FM 7.0” WG.

46 Ibid.

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50 Shortal, 68.

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