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AFTER VICTORY: THE COMMANDER’S TASKS IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract
This research paper examines the nature of post-conflict operations at the operational level of war. The central thesis of the paper is that post-conflict operations are a critical phase of a conflict, are unique and separate from other seemingly similar applications of military force, and the tasks of the commander are not addressed in a clear and integrated manner in current doctrine. Specifically, this paper looks at current doctrine and literature, in an attempt to arrive at a working definition of post-conflict operations. The paper will examine two historical case studies: OPERATION JUST CAUSE/ PROMOTE LIBERTY, in Panama, and OPERATION STABILISE in East Timor in order to identify the unique challenges and characteristics of Post-conflict operations. This paper contends that the start of transition to follow-on control is in fact the military end state. It will demonstrate that in the post-conflict phase of a conflict, the commanders mission can be refined into three essential tasks: (1) provide security and stability, (2) support the legitimacy of the follow-on authority, and (3) plan and execute a transition to follow-on control. Military operations that occur after this point in support of nation building are distinct from post-conflict operations, even if the forces and missions remain essentially unchanged.
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INTRODUCTION

The role of police officer or constable is a difficult one for an unbridled warrior fresh from the fight to assume. High-strung and chomping at the bit, we would soon be forced to suppress our aggression and adopt a more civil approach to dealing with our surroundings.¹

At the end of World War II, General Douglas Macarthur became the ultimate political entity in defeated and occupied Japan. Acting as proconsul, his role evolved from military conqueror to civil administrator and statesman until the end of occupation in 1951. Macarthur’s responsibility for and authority over the political and economic reconstruction of Japan was near total, and the results were in many ways a direct result of his specific vision and leadership style.²

Today, the concept of military government has become archaic. The international landscape has changed dramatically since 1945, and an “occupying army” model seems ill fitting in a multi-regional, post-colonial world. While not ruling out unilateral action, future U.S. military endeavors are likely to be as part of an international coalition, along a continuum from humanitarian and peace operations to a major regional conflict (MRC). Authority is typically derived not just from the National Command Authority (NCA), but also from consensus expressed through an international body such as the United Nations (UN) or a regional alliance (e.g., NATO). Admittedly, as the sole super-power, lead nation and greatest contributor of forces, the U.S. often exists as primus inter pares. The nature and character of force, however, and all aspects of a military operation—objective, composition of forces, rules of engagement, termination, and desired end state—will be constrained by
coalition consensus. End state governing mechanisms are likely to be political/diplomatic, reflect an international and interagency organizational environment based on coordination rather than command, and be aimed not at occupation, but at producing a viable government.

One effect of this evolving international environment has been to blur the line between post-conflict operations and peace operations. In recent years, U.S. military forces have been used in humanitarian crises, multinational peace operations, a growing variety of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and outright conflict, often transforming from one to the next—and back again—as circumstances change. Doctrine and the operational lexicon have attempted to keep pace, with mixed success. The operational-level commander’s responsibilities in these disparate areas are distinct in theory, but often subtle in practice, when viewed across the continuum of military operations. The result has been to make ambiguous the purpose and nature of post-conflict operations.

In fighting future wars, commanders need to recognize where their war ends. In the post-conflict phase of a conflict, the commander’s mission can be refined into three essential tasks: (1) provide security and stability, (2) support the legitimacy of the follow-on authority, and (3) plan and execute a transition to follow-on control. This paper contends that the start of transition to follow-on control is in fact the military end state. Military operations that occur after this point in support of nation building are distinct from post-conflict operations, even if the forces and missions remain essentially unchanged. Post-conflict operations are a critical phase of a conflict, and are unique and separate from other—seemingly similar—applications of military force. These unique aspects are not adequately addressed in operational-level joint doctrine.
DEFINING POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

“Posthostilities period: that period subsequent to the date of ratification by political authorities of agreements to terminate hostilities.”

“A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last U.S. servicemember. A variety of MOOTW occur during this period.

“Peace building . . . [P]ost-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or the training of defense forces.”

In the almost overly precise semantics of military terminology, “post-conflict operations” is a relatively vague expression. Interchangeably worded as “post-conflict,” “post-war,” or “post-hostilities,” the phrase is normally employed to describe the period of time or set of conditions that exist at the end of an armed struggle—though it is not specifically defined in any joint or service publication. When searching for a concrete definition, two specific problems are encountered. First, “post-conflict” is used to describe both the environment created at the end of a military campaign, and the extant conditions that may be encountered at the start of MOOTW such as Peace Operations. Second, the beginning and end of post-conflict operations—despite the precise definition offered above—are rarely distinct, and can lead to open-ended assumptions about military roles.

In the first objection, when describing “post-conflict,” the implied question “whose conflict?” is important. Military operations are properly seen as ongoing sequels to the larger confrontation when “post-conflict” is used to describe a situation where the forces in question have, until recently, been active participants in the conflict. Their purpose is to carry forward the objectives of the larger operation. The goals of “post-conflict”
operations in this instance must be to solidify war gains into the overriding end state goals. They are the ultimate phase of a campaign, and represent “true” post-conflict operations. Therefore they are inherently military endeavors, regardless of their specific force composition.

We should discount military operations begun in an existing “post-conflict” environment that are most accurately seen as components of a larger civil mission, such as Peace Operations. For example, Kosovo Forces (KFOR) are the military adjunct to the United Nations Mission Kosovo (UNMIK), authorized under United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 1244: they serve as a security presence component in support of a larger mission to provide stability and foster recovery to a region under an international mandate.  

In peace operations, military forces exist primarily to restore order, protect non-combatants and act as a buffer between belligerent forces during negotiations for or implementation of a long-term settlement. In fact, such forces do not have to operate “post-conflict” per se; they may be called upon to intervene among all number and severity of international (or intra-national) disputes.

The second objection to the term “post-conflict” is the misleading nature of the prefix post: when does “post-conflict” begin, and most importantly, when can it be said to be complete? As alluded to earlier, the JP 1-02 definition of the post-hostilities period is seldom encountered in practice. Doctrinal descriptions of the post-conflict period depict a shift of control from the fighting force to a follow-on organization, with the military thereafter assuming a supporting role. Clearly, a distinction is required: tasks that may support potentially long-term nation building and security assistance missions after conflict termination should be separated from post-conflict operations. If a sustained period of
essentially civil-political peace operations and nation building follow a conflict, and if there is a military component to that endeavor, does that mean that post-conflict operations continue indefinitely as long as there is a military presence? Can post-conflict operations be said to be complete after military goals are met?

Conversely, “post-conflict” operations may start well before the actual end of a conflict, as incremental gains are made en route to victory. Even after armistice, individual units may continue to fight, and if the defeated force fails to concede, the advancing victors are likely to find a varied condition where combat continues within the larger post-conflict environment. Such an environment is analogous to General Krulak’s “Three Block War,” where humanitarian, peacekeeping and combat operations are occurring simultaneously within a constrained area and involving the same forces.\(^\text{10}\)

The boundaries on either side of the post-conflict period may not be well defined: they are objective-driven, rather than time-driven, and require constant reassessment. However, the commander should confine his post-conflict tasks to those that directly support his operational objective. It is during this time that combat gains must be capitalized to achieve end state goals, and can be dissipated by poor post-conflict planning. The problem is defining end state. The strategic end state is a political vision of the future from which the commander derives his own military end state, campaign objectives and, working backward, the essential tasks he must complete.\(^\text{11}\) Military planners desire explicit and unambiguous end state guidance from civilian leadership. They rarely get it: public declarations of end state criteria are inherently constraining to political leaders. This is especially true within the hodgepodge of a coalition that may only share very rudimentary ideas of what they’re hoping to achieve. At best, end states defined at the start of an operation will express the reasoned
hopes of civil leadership against the uncertainties and the vicissitudes of conflict and politics. It is irrelevant to debate which method is better: the tension exists, and must be resolved in a dynamic fashion between civilian and military leadership. An operational commander must re-express end state, in military terms, back up the chain of command. He should anticipate that this “back-brief” would be an iterative process, and subject to modification as the situation proceeds. Recognizing that this is the case, nevertheless, a commander’s responsibility is to constantly seek a closer definition of end state.

There are a number of reasons why the operational-level commander’s focus should therefore be on the immediate post-conflict environment, with a lesser emphasis on the long-term. First, the near post-conflict environment is fraught with hazards of conflict termination: radically changing Rules of Engagement (ROE); the return of non-combatants; widely varying security requirements; the withdrawal, collapse and/or reemergence of enemy forces; and occasional tactical engagements of recalcitrant opposition. Second, the commander can expect that—for logistical and security reasons—the interagency apparatus so critical to long-term success (non-governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, national and international agencies, etc.) will have a minor presence and little effectiveness in the near-term, until such a time as members can establish coordinated operations. His combat forces will be required to undertake a variety of non-combat civil affairs missions in addition to their normal warfighting responsibilities. Finally, it can be seen that success in achieving ultimate end state objectives is fundamentally dependent upon foundations established in the near-term post-conflict environment.

It is not the individual tasks that differentiate post-conflict operations from other military operations. For example, constabulary activities conducted as a part of peace
operations may function in a way essentially identical to those in the post-conflict phase. The distinction is in their purpose: post-conflict activities are conducted for the purpose of exploiting war gains and supporting the conflict’s larger objectives.

The following definition of “post-conflict operations” is therefore proposed:

Post-Conflict Operations: those (i) military tasks (ii) conducted in the immediate post-conflict environment, (iii) as the ultimate phase or sequel of a campaign or operation, (iv) in direct support of military objectives and desired end state.

The conditions that exist in the post-conflict phase of any conflict are unique, but the operational tasks are effectively threefold. In the next section, an examination of two very different military operations—OPERATION JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, and OPERATION STABILISE—will serve to demonstrate that in order to achieve successful end state criteria, the commander should focus his plan on the following post-conflict tasks:

(1) Provide security and stability,

(2) Support the legitimacy of the follow-on authority, and

(3) Plan and execute a transition to follow-on control.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY: PANAMA, 1989

For the time being, we inherited the chore of maintaining the peace, searching out PDF [Panamanian Defense Force] and Dignity Battalion members, arresting drunkards, stopping looters, and settling domestic disputes. The collapse of the PDF had created a power vacuum that deprived the country of its most stabilizing force and internal security mechanism. The result was widespread anarchy and lawlessness.¹³

Operation JUST CAUSE, and the follow-on post-conflict operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, are notable and distinct in several ways worthy of examination. First, JUST
CAUSE is the most recent truly unilateral military intervention taken by the U.S.. As such, it goes against the prevailing “multinational coalition” model of future conflicts and the interagency cooperation model of post-conflict operations—but is for that reason worth examining. Second, it is a true interstate conflict, where U.S. forces were set in opposition to an enemy, as opposed to a peace operation where they would act as a moderating presence. Third, it is an archetype of a focused war plan decoupled from an inadequate post-conflict plan, and the resultant chaos that followed.

When directing the intervention in Panama, President Bush identified four objectives: protect American lives; ensure implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties; bring General Noriega to justice; and restore Panamanian democracy. The December 1989 invasion produced an unanticipated and near immediate collapse of the defending PDF forces, although fighting continued—at the tactical level—for several days afterward. A direct result was the breakdown of civic order and a state of chaos, increasing through the next several days, and manifested in ubiquitous looting, vigilantism, lawlessness and intermittent fighting not just between U.S. forces and PDF remnants, but also vigilantes, criminals, and Dignity Battalion members. To these phenomena—the breakdown in order and a nascent (and superficially developed) post-conflict plan—was added the ineffectual Government of Panama (GOP) infrastructure, which could in no way provide national leadership.

The result, of course, was that combat troops immediately became involved in civil affairs (CA) operations for which they had received at best only cursory training. The most pressing requirement, the task upon which all subsequent tasks depended, was establishing security and stability in the country. It required a fundamental reorientation of combat forces
down to the tactical level, and a requisite deftness in understanding the murky transition from war. As noted earlier, this task began during—not after—combat operations, resulting in complicated, rapidly changing and often poorly understood ROE.\(^{18}\) In support of security tasks, U.S. forces conducted neighborhood patrols, enforced curfews, guarded public buildings, searched out weapons caches and pursued the remnant PDF and Dignity Battalion units. In addition, they conducted myriad duties to reinstate some level of stability, including garbage removal, handling displaced persons, distributing food and water, and effecting infrastructure repair.\(^{19}\) It has been stated that invading a nation carries with it the obligation to restore and maintain public order. That the planners did not foresee—or, foreseeing, did not plan for—a large, sustained and well-organized security mission post-conflict is a central, well-understood lesson of JUST CAUSE/ PROMOTE LIBERTY.\(^ {20}\) Commanders of future conflicts should note that, even in a dynamic and highly organized coalition/interagency operation, combat personnel will be required to perform CA functions during the immediate post-conflict period—a trend that has continued in subsequent conflicts.\(^{21}\)

As U.S. forces developed a security presence, and additional Military Police (MP) companies gradually replaced combat troops temporarily performing law enforcement functions, their next task was to reinforce the legitimacy of the follow-on authority. Although constrained from actively training them by U.S. law, MPs conducted joint patrols with the new Panamanian National Police (PNP), advising, monitoring and serving as examples. In this manner they both increased the effectiveness of their post-intervention law enforcement duties and buttressed the legitimacy of the PNP, and that of the GOP. Later, U.S. forces would undertake PSYOP functions designed to bolster the new government in the eyes of the Panamanian people—for example, distributing posters that read:
Use of U.S. forces in this endeavor was controversial: the idea of military forces supporting the political authority of an individual seems an inappropriate mission. Tying MPs’ reputation to that of former PDF members—now reorganized as the PNP—was also a risky strategy. Still, both initiatives need to be seen within the larger context of providing some legacy of stability. Put another way, if U.S. or coalition forces are to remain as the only genuine authority in a post-conflict region, they should be prepared to accept an interminable presence requirement, or a return to anarchy upon their departure. Since, as in Panama, political pressure to redeploy forces at the soonest possible opportunity may be assumed, this task becomes time-critical. Therefore, with cautions noted, the mission of supporting (vice creating) the authority of the follow-on administration is a legitimate one for military forces.

As seen in OPERATION STABILISE, the follow-on authority is just as likely to be transitional organization (under a multinational resolution) as it is to be an individual or political entity. The ‘who’ question, in reality, is a national policy decision outside the purview of the operational commander—his responsibility is the ‘how.’ In all likelihood, ‘who’ will not be known prior to or even during the conflict. Without question, this is nation building, but because it must start immediately post-conflict, and directly affects end state and exit strategy, it clearly falls upon the commander to develop and initiate this task.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE was terminated on January 11, 1990—approximately three weeks after it was initiated. Actual redeployment of combat forces had begun seven days earlier. Less than one week later, the Military Support Group (MSG) was established under Joint Task Force-Panama, and assumed all of the functions that had previously been
performed by Joint Task Force-South and the Civil-Military Operations Task Force. The principle reason that a hand-off from war fighter to nation builder was not clear in the instance of Panama was that interagency coordination was almost completely lacking, particularly in the planning process. Sequestering the plan for reasons of operational security removed it from review by other agencies—specifically, the Department of State—which could have provided critical input. As a result, organizations tasked with the redevelopment of Panama were often working at cross-purposes. Perhaps the best that can be said about PROMOTE LIBERTY and the transition to long-term nation building in Panama was that it demonstrated a reasonably effective ad hoc response, given the existing limitations. In the larger context, however, U.S. policy in Panama suffered as the result of poor interagency coordination, and the end state that was realized in that nation after the intervention—while not a failure—is somewhat less than had been hoped. It serves to highlight the critical task of developing an informed and comprehensive plan for post-conflict operations. Fundamental to that plan is an articulation of where the commander’s principle responsibilities end, and what entity then carries those objectives forward.

OPERATION STABILISE: EAST TIMOR, 1999

Our experience in East Timor was enlightening. We found there . . . that forces structured and equipped, ready if necessary, for war were actually very effective, probably more effective than had they been less capable. Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of violent rhetoric.25

Having stated that post-conflict operations are distinct from peace operations, why then examine a recent peace operation as a case study? OPERATION STABILISE, the multi-
national peace enforcement operation in East Timor, is instructive for a number of reasons. First, as opposed to OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY, it was a coalition effort and serves as a useful model for future conflicts. Second, it is an operation in which another nation (in this case, Australia) was acting as lead nation. Third, it involved the transfer of authority from a military force to an international nation building administration. Fourth, though technically permissive, it represented an operation toward the higher end of peace enforcement, and more like combat. If the Indonesian government had not acquiesced, it is far from clear that a military intervention—STABILISE but with guns blazing—would have been adopted by any coalition of nations. On the other hand, such a general scenario is well within international and regional coalition collective security mandates. The case can certainly be made that—humanitarian catastrophe aside—East Timor’s location made any conflict there a regional issue requiring a multinational response. In other words, by its nature OPERATION STABILISE adequately models the post-conflict environment to be faced by an international coalition of forces.

OPERATION STABILISE was brought about by the collapse of East Timorese security following a successful referendum for independence from Indonesia in September, 1999. Anti-independence militias, supported by Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), commenced an indiscriminate campaign of killing and destruction, resulting in the internal displacement of nearly 400,000 East Timorese and massive property damage. The UN Mission to East Timor (UNAMET), established to monitor the referendum, was forced to withdraw. Mounting international pressure and regional isolation coerced Indonesian Prime Minister Habibie to request assistance from the United Nations. Australia had already expressed a willingness to act as lead nation, and with the adoption of
the strongly worded UN Security Council Resolution 1264, was given the authority to lead International Force East Timor (INTERFET). The tasks specified by the resolution were: restore peace and stability to East Timor, protect and support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance.

Leading a force comprised of 22 nations, the Australian Defense Force determined the immediate task to be the security of East Timor and the deterrence of further violence. Central to the problem was a withdrawal from East Timor of approximately 15,000 TNI and police personnel, whose cooperation—at the operational and tactical level—was considered dubious. This was in addition to an unknown number of militia personnel, in many cases surreptitiously aided by TNI, who had been directly threatening INTERFET prior to its arrival. As a result, the plan encompassed a rapid and concentrated deployment of force ashore, with the immediate intent of controlling the capital of Dili, and rapidly moving into neighboring areas. Because INTERFET numbered only about 5,000 personnel, it relied on a concentrated and determined show of force from the outset. The centerpiece of the force was an Australian Light Infantry Brigade, designed to immediately dispel any notions by TNI or militia forces of directly opposing the intervention, and could have been augmented to greater combat strength without delay. In addition, a coalition naval presence secured the area of operations, demonstrated INTERFET resolve, and served to further dissuade any malicious actions. As one naval commander noted, the naval presence had a “[d]evastating impact on the resolve of the militia and Indonesian forces who on D-Day would have woken . . . to look across Dili Harbour and see a wall of grey ships.”

Dili was rapidly secured, but the task ahead was daunting. INTERFET forces had to disarm unknown numbers of militia members, coordinate a withdrawal of TNI and restore basic law and order functions. These
security measures were critical for allowing the return of nearly 400,000 displaced civilians, and to allow an international humanitarian effort to resume under UNAMET.\textsuperscript{35} Two weeks after the start of OPERATION STABILISE, TNI presence had almost entirely dissipated, although the militia would continue to be an ongoing problem.\textsuperscript{36} The INTERFET area of concern, in addition to the interior of East Timor, included the nearly 170 km border between East and West Timor, across which most displaced refugees were required to proceed back to East Timor, while under constant threat from TNI and anti-independence militia forces.\textsuperscript{37}

The INTERFET mandate, while forceful, was wisely circumspect with regard to INTERFET's role in rebuilding East Timor. On October 25, 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1272 directed the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET), empowered to exercise all legislative and executive functions of government.\textsuperscript{38} The resolution directed INTERFET to be replaced by a UN force of approximately equal size. Hand-over of responsibilities between INTERFET and UNTAET began in February 2000, and were completed within a month—largely because the new force of 8500 personnel inherited a bulk of the international forces already a part of INTERFET. It is illustrative of a change in mission, with only a small change in force composition. Prior to the transfer, INTERFET efforts to include UNTAET leadership in all matters relating to the security of East Timor served to legitimize the UN administration. For example, meetings held in January 2000 to resolve conflict along the border region were between TNI, INTERFET and UNTAET, and produced a Memorandum of Understanding between Indonesian and UN forces.\textsuperscript{39}

INTERFET gave way to UNTAET, where the military role was superseded and absorbed by a civilian mission. The transfer from INTERFET to UNTAET was not entirely
without difficulty, owing mostly to two very different organizational cultures. While acknowledging these challenges, the outgoing INTERFET commander advised future commanders:

Not to waste . . . energy trying to change [United Nations] bureaucracy in any material way but to understand and facilitate it both in the mission area and as appropriate in New York . . . [I]t is hard to see how the UN could reasonably be any different. There are so many firewalls and vertical structures in the UN that you would get a hemorrhage if you didn’t adapt to cope with the UN way of doing business.40

The nation building tasks ahead for UNTAET are considerably greater than those faced by INTERFET. East Timor has little infrastructure (other than that established by UNTAET) and no experience with democratic representative government. Massive humanitarian, economic and security problems remain, and it will be some time before the UN can effectively transfer sovereignty back to the Timorese with any hope of long-term success. Still, the INTERFET mission stands as a remarkable success—especially given the emergent nature of the contingency and the complications of a coalition operation—and demonstrates the commander’s tasks post-conflict.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the U.S. military may be called upon to act unilaterally in future conflicts, it is more likely to be the lead nation in a multinational coalition of forces. The use of force against a regional or international threat will be constrained by the collective political will of that coalition; particularly as the conflict approaches end state. Military victory will give way in short order to some form of civil administration, either a new national government or some form of transitional governing entity.
In that this model closely mirrors current peace operations, the line between post-conflict operations and other uses of military force has become indistinct. Post-conflict operations are properly seen as a phase or sequel to a larger conflict. Because action taken in the immediate post-conflict environment is essential to success in this endeavor, the commander should focus his planning on that critical period of time. Current doctrine contains most of the elements of post-conflict operations, but they are presented in a diffuse manner within a series of joint and service publications. Doctrine should be revised to properly focus the operational level commander’s responsibilities post-conflict. As such, there are essentially three interrelated tasks to be performed: (1) provide security and stability, (2) support the legitimacy of the follow-on authority, and (3) plan and execute a transition to follow-on control.

The first task is fundamental: once hostilities have ceased at the operational level, the commander’s primary task is to ensure that security and stability are achieved. As both case studies demonstrated, stability is critical to follow-on success. The force should posture itself in a way that establishes its own credibility and legitimacy: it should appear overwhelming and ever-present. Because the situation will be dynamic, clear and practical ROE need to be provided down to the tactical level—missteps there can have strategic impact. The commander should pay exceedingly close attention to reserve CA forces available, and resolve any ambiguity concerning their early employment. Political and logistical constraints may significantly delay even a well-organized interagency civil affairs initiative; therefore combat forces may be required to perform a variety of CA tasks in addition to their ongoing warfighting responsibilities, including massive humanitarian relief requirements.
The second task follows from the first: the controlling military force needs to assist in establishing the legitimacy of a follow-on authority. Supporting the legitimacy of a new civil or military entity is critical if the fighting force is to achieve exit criteria and avoid an interminable slide into a steady-state peacekeeping mission. This is especially difficult post-conflict: coalition agreement may break down over the appropriate post-conflict administration, and any existing intra-national political solidarity is likely to fracture within the power vacuum created. Ultimately, it is the commander’s responsibility to support legitimacy, not to decide it.

Finally, the commander must plan for and execute a transition to follow-on authority. Critical to this effort is a well thought out interagency organization that is established and moving forward with unity of effort prior to conflict termination. Ideally, the transition will draw success from long-term interagency working relationships that existed prior to the conflict. Post-conflict military actions should promote long-term end state goals after a largely civil mission has supplanted the military one.

Ultimately, military tasks post-conflict must support overarching policy objectives. Their purpose is to translate military gains into conditions that will foster the long-term success of the endeavor and support the desired end state. Failing to understand and plan for a dynamic post-conflict environment risks squandering costly gains made in combat, and may jeopardize the very goals that required action at the start.
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**PANAMA**


**EAST TIMOR**


The article is a reprint of Mr. Bolton’s statement before the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives on October 11, 2000.


END NOTES


2 Detailed guidance to SCAP was issued by the JCS in November 1945, reflecting the will of the President, Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff via their planning mechanism for Japan, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). However, his authority predates this document and was inherent to the surrender document signed in August 1945: “The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government shall be subject to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers.” Department of State, U.S.A., Publication 2671, Far Eastern Series 17, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp 4-13. See also Wolfe, p. 45-47, 88-91.


6 FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001), p. 6-21. *Operations* states: “As a sequel to decisive major operations, Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign. These operations ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and that the conditions that generated the conflict do not recur. Postconflict stability operations and support operations—conducted by Army forces—transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.”


9 Joint Pub 3-07, p. IV-12.

11 Joint Pub 1-02, p. 149.


13 Briggs, pp. 96-97.

14 Gray, Anthony and Maxwell Manwaring. Panama: Operation Just Cause. Chapter 2 of Policing the New World Order, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg. [Online] http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/policing/cont.html. Whether all of the objectives, particularly the last, were legitimate military goals is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth noting that objectives are often presented to the commander that are vague and open to interpretation, and he is required to obtain clarification if their intent is in doubt.


17 Shultz, pp. 27-31.


19 Metz, p. 16.

20 Fishel, p. 29. Mr. Fishel argues that planners should have foreseen the collapse of public order as a direct result of the invasion: “[A]nyone who would argue that the breakdown in law and order . . . came as a surprise is either being disingenuous or confessing to having made a gross error in judgment . . .” Whichever the case, the overriding lesson is that security is a primary task in post-conflict operations requiring detailed assessment and planning.

21 Walczak, Alexander M., Conflict Termination—Transitioning from Warrior to Constable: A Primer (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 28. Colonel Walczak provides as further example Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, but his conclusion is applicable to every post-conflict operation.
Briggs, p. 108. 1LT Briggs does not say if the poster campaign was considered successful.

Shultz, pp. 57-61. A bulk of the operations directed at supporting the GOP occurred after the Military Support Group (MSG) had been transferred under the control of USARSO. Conflicting visions of their mandate between military and embassy personnel resulted in PSYOP forces being among the first to redeploy from Panama.

Shultz, pp 63-64. See also, Fishel, pp. 65-66.


Dickens, David, “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 2 (August 2001), p. 216. Mr. Dickens notes that the “Indonesian invitation was the precondition that Australia wanted satisfied before it would agree to lead any involvement.”


Dickens, pp. 213-232.


Dickens, p. 221.

Dickens, p. 220.

Mack, p. 23.

Dickens, p. 222. See also Ryan, pp. 67-76. Mr. Ryan notes that, in particular, the presence immediately offshore of the USS Belleau Wood and embarked 31st MEU—and its implications of U.S. support of OPERATION STABILISE “enabled INTERFET to ‘box above its weight.’”

Dickens, p. 224. Mr. Dickens is quoting Commodore Brian Robertson RAN, Maritime Component Commander for Operation Stabilise.
Mack, p. 24. Mr. Mack notes that one week after the start of OPERATION STABILISE, four NGOs had established a presence in East Timor: International Committee of the Red Cross, Medicins de Monde, Medicines sans Frontiere and World Vision.

Dickens, p. 225.


Ryan, p. 112. Mr. Ryan is quoting Lieutenant General P. J. Cosgrove in a speech delivered at Georgetown University, April 4, 2000.