MAKING A U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WORK

by

Brian P. Goldschmidt

December 2001

Thesis Advisor: Peter R. Lavoy
Second Reader: Surinder Rana

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# Making A U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Work

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## Author(s)
Goldschmidt, Brian

## Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)
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Making a U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Work

Brian P Goldschmidt, LT, USNR

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA  93943-5000

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This thesis examines the prospects for an enduring U.S.-India strategic partnership. It analyzes the history of U.S.-India relations, and describes the conditions that impeded the development of strong relations between the two countries. It describes the negative impact of Pakistan and Kashmir on U.S.-India relations. It demonstrates that a new reality, based upon capability and cooperation, has replaced the Cold War reality of power and bloc alignment, and why that bodes well for the future of U.S.-India relations. And it recommends that: the U.S.-India Defense Planning Group and its subsidiaries are revived; the Memorandum of Understanding be reviewed and simplified; and the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism is enhanced.

India, United States, US-India Relations, Foreign Relations, Military-Military Cooperation, Strategic Partnership, U.S.-India Strategic Partnership, South Asia

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MAKING A U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WORK

Brian P. Goldschmidt
Lieutenant, United States Naval Reserve
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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from the

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December 2001

Author: Brian P. Goldschmidt

Approved by: Peter R. Lavoy, Thesis Advisor

Surinder Rana, Second Reader

James Wirtz, Chairman
National Security Affairs Department
ABSTRACT

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Both countries are now courting each other. The United States wants a strategic partner that is capable of assisting the United States to achieving its international and regional objectives. It seeks a regional partner that can help the U.S. armed forces protect and preserve peace and security by providing bases, logistical support and, when required, combat support. India wants to be acknowledged as a regional power, as a nuclear power, and to more actively participate in global affairs, without sacrificing sovereignty. The two countries have pursued a strategic partnership before but the results have been failure and heightened resentment. Will this time be any different?

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1  
   A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1  
   B. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 2  
      1. Why India is a Strong Candidate for Strategic Partnership .................... 2  
      2. Brief History of U.S.-India Relations ......................................................... 4  
   C. PURPOSE OF THESIS ....................................................................................... 6  
   D. ORGANIZATION ................................................................................................. 7  

II. COMPLICATIONS IN U.S-INDIA RELATIONS .......................................................... 9  
   A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 9  
   B. U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA: DURING THE COLD WAR ......................... 9  
      1. Truman Administration (1945-1953) ........................................................ 9  
      2. Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961) ............................................... 11  
   C. U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR ......................... 19  
      2. Clinton Administration (1993-2001) .......................................................... 20  
   D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ............................................................................... 21  

III. CHANGES AFFECTING U.S.-INDIA COOPERATION ............................................. 25  
   A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 25  
   B. U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR ..................................... 25  
      1. Balance of Power Arrangements Replaced by Mutual Gains ................. 25  
      2. Indian Idealism Replaced by Pragmatism .................................................. 26  
   C. THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ............................................................... 27  
      1. Global Problems Require Global Partners .............................................. 27  
      2. Information Technology Revolution ......................................................... 28  
   D. NEW CHALLENGES IN THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD ......................... 28  
      1. Radical Influences ....................................................................................... 28  
      2. New Approaches to the Proliferation Problem ....................................... 28  
   E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ............................................................................... 30  

IV. INDIAN OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS ............................................................... 31  
   A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 31  
   B. INDIAN MOTIVATIONS FOR A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES ................................................................. 31  
      1. Terrorism ...................................................................................................... 31  
      2. Missile Programs ......................................................................................... 33
3. Space Programs ................................................................. 35
4. Energy Security ............................................................... 36
5. Military Assistance ......................................................... 37
6. Nuclear Stability ............................................................ 39
7. Other Matters ............................................................... 39
C. INDIAN CONCERNS ............................................................ 40
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .................................................. 43

V. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS ........................................ 45
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 45
B. U.S. OBJECTIVES ............................................................... 45
  1. Global Objectives .......................................................... 45
  2. Regional Objectives ..................................................... 46
  3. National Objectives ....................................................... 47
C. WHAT THE UNITED STATES DESIRES FROM INDIA ........... 48
   1. Nonproliferation .......................................................... 48
   2. Terrorism ................................................................. 48
   3. Energy Security ......................................................... 49
   4. Regional Stability ...................................................... 49
   5. Military Cooperation ................................................ 49
   6. Other Matters .......................................................... 50
D. U.S. CONCERNS ................................................................. 51
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .................................................. 53

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................. 55
A. SUMMARY ................................................................. 55
B. FINDINGS ................................................................. 56
C. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 57

ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................... 59
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................... 67
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Indian Indigenous Missile Systems ................................................................. 34
Table 2. Summary of U.S. Desires for Military Cooperation ................................. 50
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A new strategic relationship between the United States and India is inevitable. Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Bush administration was striving to improve relations with India. After the attacks, this action has become a U.S. priority. India, too, is devoting unprecedented energy to improving relations with the United States.

Both countries are now courting each other. The United States wants a strategic partner that is capable of assisting the United States to achieving its international and regional objectives. It seeks a regional partner that can help the U.S. armed forces protect and preserve peace and security by providing bases, logistical support and, when required, combat support. India wants to be acknowledged as a regional power, as a nuclear power, and to more actively participate in global affairs, without sacrificing sovereignty. The two countries have pursued a strategic partnership before but the results have been failure and heightened resentment. Will this time be any different?

India is an emerging power. It has a strong military, diplomatic corps, and economy. India also has a strong tradition of international involvement as well as a history of leadership in the Third World. Even though there have been difficult times in Indian domestic politics, India’s commitment to democracy endures. For these reasons, India deserves serious consideration for a strategic partnership.

A historical review of U.S.-India relations reveals several conflicts of interest between the two states. The complications primarily center upon the Cold War, the United States and India had differing worldviews. The foreign policy of the United States was driven by realism; a world divided between blue and red, where the goal was to contain the red expansion. Indian foreign policy was based upon morals, Nehruvian ideals of right and wrong. Additionally, successive Indian prime ministers dominated Indian foreign policy, often personalizing it. The outcome was a mutual feeling of mistrust.

Multinational cooperative agreements and fora have replaced the old system of alliances. The old structure was power based: the major powers had the largest voice and
the smaller powers were often unheard. The new structure is capability based: states are ordered by what they offer within a specific framework. In this new structure, India, as a dominant regional power, has the potential to play a significant role in the U.S.-led global security and economic system.

India will cooperate with the United States because the benefits outweigh the costs. It seeks to continue its economic, social, and scientific development without sacrificing its ability to act independently. It seeks regional stability. India strives for a minimum deterrent capability vis-à-vis Pakistan and China as well as U.S. assurances of assistance should it be attacked. India also seeks military modernization. However, India is concerned that cooperation will interfere with its ability to act independently.

With or without India, the United States will develop its new strategic framework. It will decrease its nuclear arsenal, create a missile defense, and pursue new approaches to nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The inclusion of India will ease some of the burden on U.S. armed forces. The United States wants logistical support. It wants access to bases, airfields, ports, and repair facilities. It wants access to training facilities as well as increased training opportunities. And finally, it wants the support of the Indian Navy in protecting the commercial shipping as well as U.S. Navy ships in the event of conflict.

A strategic partnership between the United States and India can emerge: the key lies in recognizing that a new reality exists and that the difficulties of the past hold less relevance. U.S.-Pakistan relations still have the potential to disrupt U.S.-India relations. Similarly, until the Kashmir issue is resolved by India and Pakistan, U.S. policy in South Asia is susceptible to failure. The United States must strike a delicate balance in its South Asia foreign policy; it must insist that India and Pakistan continue to work towards a resolution of the Kashmir issue while insulating U.S.-India relations from Pakistan. The future should be founded upon the cooperative frameworks that already exist between the United States and India: space, defense, information technology, economic, and counterterrorism. These frameworks need to be adapted to the new reality and enhanced to develop the full potential of both countries in a new strategic partnership.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

A new U.S.-India relationship is inevitable. The Bush administration assumed office in January 2001 asserting that the opportunity existed for a new and improved relationship with India. On 6 April 2001, Jaswant Singh, serving as India’s Minister for both External Affairs and Defense, visited the United States and was received with full military honors; the first time since 1992 that such a reception had been accorded to an Indian dignitary. Mr. Singh also had an unscheduled forty-five minute discussion with President Bush in the Oval Office. Since that visit, numerous high-level official visits have occurred both in Washington, D.C. and New Delhi. Additionally, President Bush has accepted an invitation to visit India. A final signal of the impending policy shift occurred on 22 September 2001 when President Bush signed a Presidential Determination lifting the economic sanctions placed upon India and Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear tests.

India, too, is striving to improve relations with the United States. India has also supported the Bush Administration’s plan for ballistic missile defense policy. It has been receptive to enhanced military-to-military cooperation with the United States. India fully supports the war against terrorism. In support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, it has offered to share intelligence as well as the use of its bases and airfields to house fighter planes and refuel long-range bombers. This marks only the second time in history that this has occurred; the first time was for refueling U.S. military transport flights during the Gulf War.

These new developments indicate that, once again, the United States and India feel the need to cooperate. According to a senior Indian government official in Washington, “We’re now looking at each other with a view that we have an increasing

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number of things in common.”4 The two countries have been here before, on more than one occasion, and each attempt has ended in disappointment. Will this time be any different?

B. BACKGROUND

India has always possessed the components that are required to make a strong state. Indeed, from the outset, its foreign policy has stressed that fact and insisted upon the ability to maintain independence in global affairs. However, Indian foreign policy has often come into conflict with the policies and actions of the United States. This section briefly discusses the capabilities that make India a strong state, and therefore the reasons its partnership is desired. It also introduces a brief history of U.S.-India relations, focusing on the conditions that have complicated U.S.-India relations.

1. Why India is a Strong Candidate for Strategic Partnership

If the U.S. armed forces are going to continue their rapid pace of deployments and continued global presence, they will require assistance to keep from being spread too thin. India’s military is the largest in the South Asian region with a combined strength of approximately 1.2 million personnel. The army is the largest of India’s three services at nearly 1.1 million personnel. The Indian Air Force (IAF) consists of approximately 115,000 personnel, and there are roughly 55,000 members serving in the Indian Navy.5 Additionally, there are approximately 347,000 members in the paramilitary forces and an army reserve component of roughly 250,000 personnel.6 In addition to its conventional strength, India possesses nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by either aircraft or short- to medium-range missiles. India also has a robust defense research and development program that is engaged in missile, nuclear submarine, aircraft carrier, and aircraft programs. Finally, India is not content with the status quo, its military constantly seeking to modernize; in the 2000 budget, 3.32 percent of India’s GDP (US$13.6 billion) was allocated for defense, a 28 percent increase over the previous year.7

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4 Sherman, “Rumsfeld Orders Action To Restore Military Contacts,” 3.
6 Ibid.
7 South Asia Monitor, Number 20 (1 April 2000). http://www.csis.org/saprog/sam20.html
If America’s prosperity truly depends upon the prosperity of others, then India deserves serious consideration for partnership. India’s economy is fairly robust and growing at a greater rate than the other countries in the region. In 1999 India had the 13th largest GDP in the world (US$390 billion), of which industry comprised 26 percent and services accounted for 48 percent; its real growth rate for that year was 6.8 percent. The United States is India’s largest trading partner and nearly 40 percent of America’s Fortune 500 companies outsource their software needs to Indian companies.

India is an important actor in the international arena. Even though it is not one of the Permanent Five (P-5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), India frequently has been a key player in both the UNSC and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). India has always been a strong voice for the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Indian culture is not only a strong influence in South Asia; it has spread to Southeast Asia, Africa, and even the Americas. Finally, India has exceptional regional influence and significant international leverage:

- Nepal and Bhutan primarily export to and import from India;
- Bangladesh is heavily dependant for water on India’s Gangetic River System;
- Pakistan’s source of river water supply originates in, or passes through, India;
- Sri Lanka and the Maldives are closer to India than any other country, and have a strong ethnic Indian presence;
- India is the most politically stable country in the region;
- India’s size, military power and international clout positions her as a regional protector, economic assistant, and service provider (medical, educational, employment).

Additional factors weigh heavily in India’s favor. They can all facilitate the building of a durable framework allowing the relationship between the United States and

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8 Department of State, Background Notes: India (March 2000). [http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/india_0003_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/india_0003_bgn.html)


India to prosper now and in the future. India is the seventh largest country in the world, in terms of landmass. At 3.3 million square kilometers, it is roughly 1/3 the size of the United States. While India occupies only 2.4 percent of the world’s landmass, with a population slightly over one billion it supports 15 percent of the total world population and is soon expected to exceed China.\textsuperscript{11}

The Indian Ocean is the major sea line of communication connecting Asia to Africa and the Middle East. It is both a lifeline and a strategic waterway and India nearly bisects it. Vast amounts of oil flow through the Indian Ocean bound for ports in Japan, Korea, China, and Southeast Asia often stopping in India along the way; every year half of the 62,000 vessels transiting the Indian Ocean visit Indian ports.\textsuperscript{12} Additionally, large reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals are being tapped in the Indian Ocean Basin. It is estimated that approximately 40 percent of the world’s offshore oil production is, or can be, derived from the Indian Ocean Basin.\textsuperscript{13}

India possesses many of the characteristics of a strong state. It has a strong military, diplomatic corps, and economy. India also has a strong tradition of international involvement, through the United Nations (UN) and the NAM and it has credibility within the Third World. And even though there have been difficult times in Indian domestic politics, India’s commitment to democracy endures. For these reasons, and many more below the geo-strategic level of analysis, India deserves serious consideration for a strategic partnership.

2. Brief History of U.S.-India Relations

A brief historical review reveals that the relationship between the United States and India has often passed through difficult phases. The two countries have routinely clashed over such issues as Third World development, economic and trade policies, and nuclear proliferation. Additionally, the United States has been assertive in achieving its

\textsuperscript{11} Dept. of State, Background Notes: India.

\textsuperscript{12} Shao Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun, “China NDU Professor Views India’s Military Power,” \textit{Beijing Guangming Ribao, Internet Version} (15 November 2000).
\url{http://cnsinfo.miis.edu/search97se...late=pnewsdoc.hts&&Collection=FBIS}

\url{http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/}
foreign policy goals, acting either unilaterally or multilaterally. India has been less inclined to take sides, preferring to maintain the ability to act independently.

First and foremost among the complicating factors has been Pakistan. The three-way relationship between the United States, India and Pakistan was, and still is, riddled with pitfalls. One example that India continues to remember was the decision of President Nixon to send the USS ENTERPRISE Battle Group, Task Force 74, into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. Secretary of State of Henry Kissinger explained the USS ENTERPRISE deployment as a move to assist Pakistan as well as China. Meanwhile, to many Indians, this was yet another example of American gunboat diplomacy, it was not only an overt threat, but a nuclear one as well.\(^{14}\)

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has also complicated U.S.-India relations. Initially, India and the United States were of different opinions; while India was signing friendly agreements based upon *Panch Sheel* with the PRC, the United States was offering full support, to include nuclear threats against Mainland China, to the Kuomintang Government on the island of Taiwan. In 1972, there was a role reversal. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger broached friendly relations with the PRC, while India was growing more concerned, having lost the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.

Nonproliferation also created foreign policy conflict between the United States and India. As the United States was struggling to deal with the repercussions of the new nuclear era, India was creating an independent nuclear program. While Indian policy remained unchanged throughout the Cold War, the various U.S. Administrations viewed proliferation issues differently, as well as varying its level of importance. Caught in the middle of all of these changing policies was India’s Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS).

In the spirit of the Atoms for Peace Program, the United States assisted India with the construction of TAPS. The conflict began once the project was completed in 1974; India originally opposed safeguards but was coerced into accepting them in return for

continued fuel supplies. As part of the original agreement, India was supposed to operate a reprocessing facility in conjunction with TAPS. However, as nonproliferation concerns gained importance the United States denied India the remaining resources required for reprocessing.

The final significant complication in U.S.-India relations during the Cold War was non-alignment. A product of Prime Minister Nehru’s ideology, non-alignment was perceived as a way in which India was seen playing both sides against each other, while maintaining the ability to act independently. However, several key United States policy makers viewed this as a ruse; Secretary of State Dean Acheson was one of the foremost critics of non-alignment, claiming India was soft on communism.

With the Cold War over, India continues to strive for achieving the status as a nuclear power, which is yet to be acknowledged. However, the latest statements emerging from the United States and other Western countries indicate a sense of accommodation for India’s nuclear status. This shift has helped in removing this major irritant from the U.S.-India relationship. Furthermore, the United States does not place the same geo-strategic importance on relations with Pakistan it once did. The end of the Cold War also has removed the stigma that was attached to non-alignment. No longer must a country choose sides in the Blue versus Red conflict of the past; there is no longer a global contest, just globalism.

C. PURPOSE OF THESIS

This thesis examines the prospects for an enduring U.S.-India strategic partnership. A strategic partnership between the United States and India can emerge: the key lies in recognizing that a new reality exists and that the difficulties of the past hold less relevance. In doing so, certain questions that arise are: Why have the United States and India been unable to create an enduring partnership before now? What conditions, if any, have changed that increase the probability of successful cooperation? How much cooperation can be expected from each country? Are there any actions or policies that should be avoided in order to prevent setbacks?
D. ORGANIZATION

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter One introduces the current environment, gives a brief background, and outlines the thesis, its questions, methodology, and organization. Chapter Two analyzes U.S.-India relations since 1947; it focuses on the conditions that have prevented the United States and India from reaching a partnership. Chapter Three reviews the recent changes that have occurred which are once again bringing the United States and India into agreement. Chapter Four outlines the reasons why India desires a strategic partnership, as well as the concerns it has over such a drastic policy shift. Chapter Five outlines the reasons why the United States wishes to engage India and the concerns that exist regarding India as a partner. Chapter Six concludes with a summary, the findings, and recommendations.
II. COMPLICATIONS IN U.S-INDIA RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States has had periods of strong interest in India as well as periods of indifference. Chapter One introduced reasons why India would be a good partner. If India is so significant to the success of U.S. foreign policy, then why has not a partnership emerged prior to this? This is a simple question that must be answered in order to break the cycle of on again-off again relations.

In order to prevent history from repeating itself, the history of U.S.-India relations must be known and understood. This chapter examines the history of U.S.-India relations. The first section covers the Cold War years, 1947-1988, while the second section covers more recent events, 1989-2000. The questions driving this analysis are: What were the significant conflicts in U.S.-India relations? And, what conditions created those conflicts?

The analysis reveals that multiple levels of interaction, global, regional, and individual, created the complications in U.S.-India relations. At the global level, the United States and India differed ideologically. At the regional level, competing interests and relations with China and Pakistan caused periods of intense displeasure. At the individual level, successive Indian prime ministers dominated Indian foreign policy during the Cold War; Nehru and Indira Gandhi were prone to personalize Indian foreign policy. Understanding these conditions, so as to prevent their repetition, is the first step to ensuring an enduring U.S.-India strategic partnership.

B. U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA: DURING THE COLD WAR

1. Truman Administration (1945-1953)

At the outset, South Asian foreign policy was low on the list of priorities. The United States was more concerned with rebuilding Europe, containing Communism and the sinking fortunes of Chang Kai-shek in China. Only when conflict erupted in 1947 in the princely state of Kashmir did the region appear on the foreign policy radar.

India was dismayed when the United States sided with Great Britain in pressing for the creation of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).
While the United States was focused upon devising a viable solution, India was upset at the failure of the United States and the UN to identify Pakistan as the aggressor. Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru labeled the reactions of the United States and the United Kingdom as, “completely wrong” and that, “The U.S.A. and the U.K. have played a dirty role.”

Despite Indian efforts to the contrary, the United States kept the issue alive in the UNSC from 1948 through 1953. The solution proffered by the United States was based largely upon the McNaughton Plan, which called for a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, and a plebiscite. According to Josef Korbel, former UNCIP chairman, India was opposed to such a measure, primarily on the grounds of ideology:

> The struggle for Kashmir is in every sense another battle in this continuing struggle and by now irrational war of ideals. In the minds of Nehru and the Congress, Kashmir is, in miniature, another Pakistan, and if this Muslim nation can be successfully governed by India, then their philosophy of secularization is vindicated.

A second source of conflict was the personal style of Prime Minister Nehru; he placed a great amount of emphasis on personal relations. Therefore, he was distressed by critical remarks from such key players as Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. Nehru also felt that Pakistan continually received a warm and gracious welcome as compared to India. According to him, “They go through the same routine whether it is Nehru or the Shah or Liaquat Ali…. It does appear that there is a concerted attempt to build up Pakistan and build down, if I may say, India.”

There were other sources of conflict that emerged during this period, which prevented improvement in U.S.-India relations. U.S. failure to follow through on food aid in 1949 and 1950 drew ire from the Indians, who turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. India and the United States also disagreed over continuing the war in Korea; India was one of two non-communist countries to oppose the resolution condemning the Chinese aggressors. Arms sales to India during this period were also unpredictable.

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16 Ibid, 67.

17 Ibid, 72.

18 Ibid, 75.
A pattern of inconsistency emerged over the course of the Harry S. Truman administration. The United States alternately demonstrated a willingness and lack of enthusiasm for economic and military assistance. Similarly, the diplomacy directed towards India alternated between friendly and adversarial. Underlying all of this was a feeling of disappointment; the United States was disappointed that India would not align itself with the West, while Indian were upset that the United States would not support another democratic country.

2. Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961)

When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the office of the President of the United State he promised a tougher stance abroad. To support his tougher and more active foreign policy, Eisenhower promoted John Foster Dulles to fill the position of Secretary of State. As Eisenhower’s primary foreign policy advisor, Dulles echoed the President’s position; fighting communism was the primary concern.

Dulles favored collective security arrangements in the fight against communism. In light of the Korean War, this concept was immediately applied to South Asia. After visiting the region in May 1953, Dulles announced the creation of the Baghdad Pact, to include Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. According to Dulles, Pakistan was chosen over India because, “…Pakistan is one country that has the moral courage to do its part resisting communism.” Furthermore, Dulles was highly skeptical of India’s policy of neutralism, going so far as to call it immoral. Upon hearing the statements from Dulles India was understandably upset, especially because he had avoided the issue in his talks with Nehru in New Delhi.

India’s official acknowledgement of the PRC was also a setback in U.S.-India relations. Having argued in favor of the PRC sitting on the UNSC during the Korean War was only the first step. Nehru followed that by allowing Premier Chou En-lai to visit New Delhi in the summer of 1954. During that visit, India and China signed a mutual agreement of non-interference and respect based upon the Five Principles, or

19 Ibid, 106.
21 Kux, Estranged Democracies, 105.
Panch Sheel. India deemed these actions critical to reduce its security concerns, to the displeasure of the United States.

Pakistan continued to pose problems for the relationship between the United States and India. It increased its support for and alignment with the United States by allowing the United States to conduct intelligence gathering U-2 flights from the airfield at Peshawar. In return, Pakistan received significant military assistance. This aid to Pakistan was balanced with offerings to India, but the items offered were such that they could not alter the balance. Nehru was highly critical of the U.S. network of alliances, saying that the United States was unable to, “think of anything else but getting bases all over the world and using their money power to get manpower elsewhere to fight for them.”22 To many in India, the antics of the United States were akin to colonialism.

India viewed U.S. military assistance to Pakistan as an attempt to influence Indian neutralism. Nehru went so far as to publicly admonish the United States for introducing arms into the region. It was his opinion that U.S. foreign policy was bringing the Cold War to the region instead of keeping it out:

> A military pact between Pakistan and the U.S. changes the whole balance in this part of the world and affects India more especially. The U.S. must realize that the reaction in India will be that this arming of Pakistan is largely against India or might be used against India, whether the U.S. wants that or not…. They imagine that such an alliance between Pakistan and the U.S. would bring such overwhelming pressure on India as to compel her to change her policy of nonalignment. That is a rather naïve view because the effect on India will be just the opposite, that is, one of greater resentment against the U.S.23

India edged closer to the Soviet Union as a result of U.S. policy decisions relating to South Asia. India also began to seek improvement of its relations with Communist China. Meanwhile, India stepped up it rhetoric through the NAM, capitalizing upon relations with Africa and Southeast Asia. Further complicating matters was the fact that India failed to condemn Soviet actions in Hungary while it was simultaneously chastising France and Great Britain for their aggressive actions in the Suez crisis. The Kashmir issue continued to create trouble for U.S.-India relations; Eisenhower kept the issue alive in the UN and India continued to refuse outside influence.

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22 Ibid, 108.


While most of President John F. Kennedy’s term saw successes in U.S.-India relations, several detractors appeared. In India, the expectations for improved relations with the United States were high because Kennedy was a well known as an advocate of greater aid, support and attention to India. He had established this reputation while serving as a United States Senator.

However, the expectations did not match the reality. The mood of American domestic politics shifted away from foreign aid. Nehru complicated matters through his statements and actions regarding the Berlin Crisis of 1961. These, and other factors, combined to negatively affect the quality of aid directed towards India: the cost of bolstering the Indian defense establishment to meet the Chinese threat was determined to be excessive; U.S.-Pakistan agreements and understandings limited the scope of a U.S.-India relationship; U.S. pressure on India to settle the Kashmir dispute was continually met with Indian resistance.24

During the Sino-Indian border war, the Kennedy Administration sought to take advantage of the situation to improve relations with India, but Pakistan strongly objected. The result was a limited military assistance package, items primarily for mountain warfare and not sufficient enough to swing the military balance away from Pakistan.

India’s invasion of Goa adversely affected relations with the United States. India, having worked with the United States, and through the UN on recent issues, took unilateral action in the Portuguese colony. This caught the President off-guard, putting him in an awkward situation. While the military action between India and Portugal was brief and bloodless, the diplomatic encounter between the United States and India was anything but brief.25

The issue of Kashmir also added to the friction between the two countries. As it had in the previous administrations, the United States continued to push for the implementation of UN resolutions, specifically the plebiscite in the Kashmir valley.

25 Kux, Estranged Democracies, 196.
India continued to rebuff UN efforts, claiming that the issue could only be settled bilaterally.


The Lyndon B. Johnson administration did not continue Kennedy’s initiatives in South Asia. Rather, his foreign policy towards India was dominated by practicality. On the issue of arms sales to India, he deemed that the sale of supersonic F-104’s could only be harmful. A transfer of such military importance would alter the delicate balance between India and Pakistan, and could rupture the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. It was also an expensive package at a time when India was experiencing difficulty feeding its people. Even though the possibility existed that refusal would push India towards a Soviet alternative, the United States had to support its ally.

Johnson’s personal convictions also affected food aid to India. Because he was unconvinced by India’s efforts to solve its food problems he put India on a “short-tether.” At the President’s insistence the PL-480 commitments were renewed only on a yearly basis. When he personally became convinced that India was exerting an all-out effort he relented and allowed more food aid to flow. India was deeply angered by Johnson’s tough love; Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and much of the public sector felt their sovereignty was being attacked.²⁶

The second Indo-Pak war negatively impacted U.S.-India relations. As in the first Indo-Pak War, the United States favored UN efforts to bring the conflict to an end. The damage occurred when the Johnson administration ceased military aid to both countries and essentially walked away from the region; India had become dangerously frustrated and Pakistan had become dangerously overconfident.²⁷

The Johnson administration was forced to focus more closely on nonproliferation after China tested a nuclear device. The administration became determined that India would not follow China’s footsteps. For this, the United States worked closely with the Soviet Union to create the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India felt the NPT was discriminatory. It created a class of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” it ensured a

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²⁶ Cohen, *India*, 279.

monopoly, and choosing 1964 as a deadline for nuclear weapons attainment was arbitrary. Furthermore, when India attempted to secure a UN sponsored nuclear guarantee against PRC aggression, both the United States and the Soviet Union balked at the idea.28

Despite the combined efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, neither country could convince India to become a signatory. For India, the decision was straightforward; it would have to defend itself. In the instance, India’s non-alignment had left it isolated.

Unlike the previous two administrations, the Johnson administration treated India with practicality and pragmatism. All aid to India became a tool for attempting to create reform. Rather than try to seduce India, the Johnson administration was more coercive. Foreign aid flowed through a valve, which could be turned on or off as the President saw fit. India was simply one of many Third World countries demanding aid.


Opening China was Richard M. Nixon’s primary focus. This focus, and the manner in which it was carried out, alienated India. Washington’s flip-flop on China was devastating; after having aided India in its war against China, the United States was now using China as a counter-weight against the Soviet Union.29 With nowhere else to turn, India looked to the Soviet Union for increased assistance.

Nixon’s response to India’s strengthening Soviet ties was predictable. Seeing that Indira Gandhi was warming to assistance from the Soviet Union, Nixon changed his stance on Pakistan. In the fall of 1970, Nixon approved a “one-time exception” and agreed to sell arms to Pakistan. A package of $50 million was offered, which included armored personnel carriers and aircraft.30

The years during the Nixon Administration could almost be categorized as action-reaction. As India softened its stance and began to lean more towards the Soviet Union, the United States responded by aiding Pakistan. Because of U.S. assistance to Pakistan,

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28 Ibid, 263.

Antagonism and animosity seemed to replace maturity and sound decision-making. President Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger, and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi seemed to take every action as a personal affront. For example, despite U.S. objections, Indira Gandhi elevated the Consulate General in Hanoi to the level of Embassy as well as ordering the closing of the U.S. economic assistance mission and reducing the number of Peace Corps volunteers in the country.31

The most troubling development of the Nixon years was the U.S. response to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. According to U.S. sources, Task Group 74, headed by the USS ENTERPRISE, was ordered to the Bay of Bengal to assist with the possible evacuation of U.S. personnel in Dacca.32 The true intentions of the United States were widely debated and vary considerably depending upon the source. Regardless of the true motive, the result was another setback in U.S.-India relations. Throughout the rest of the Cold War, India claimed that the nuclear extortion of the United States was one of the underlying factors in their decision to acquire nuclear weapons, which was achieved on 18 May 1974.


The Gerald Ford administration continued with the previously established policy of selling arms to Pakistan. While there was a concerted effort to improve U.S.-India relations, sale of military hardware to Pakistan worked as a major irritant. Pakistan desperately wanted to purchase weapons from the United States and Secretary of State Kissinger was apt to comply.

Given the back and forth, and up and down, in U.S.-India relations, the 1974 test of India’s peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) appears to be an anomaly. What should have been a serious setback turned out to be only a bump in the road. It had been known that India was close, but for Ford and Kissinger the nuclear tests were a fact of life, readily

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32 Ibid, 305.
explainable by the concept of power politics. Accordingly, Kissinger chose to keep matters low-key; while supplies for the TAPS were briefly delayed, no sanctions or punishments were meted out. The only damage that resulted from this incident was the betrayal felt by those who had supported India for so long coupled with a downturn in public opinion.

Some experts are of the opinion that Ford’s lack of foreign policy experience prohibited him from improving relations with India. Because of his inexperience, he relied heavily upon Secretary of State Kissinger. This dependence upon a person who had previously demonstrated antagonistic tendencies tainted every attempt to improve relations. As a demonstration of her disdain for Kissinger, Indira Gandhi had a brief lunch with him and then abruptly departed for Kashmir in a calculated snub. At the end of his tenure, the situation was no better or worse than when he had assumed office.


While President Jimmy Carter significantly improved U.S.-India relations, pitfalls remained. The first difficulty struck to the core of Carter’s agenda. India was very upset with the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA) passed by the United States Congress. After serious negotiations India reluctantly agreed to safeguards on the nuclear power plants that had been built with the assistance of outsiders. This meant that the stations at Tarapur and Rajasthan would come under international safeguards, but indigenous nuclear plants were not part of the agreement.

In response to India’s obstinacy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) split on a vote to transfer fuel to India. Created by a reorganization of U.S. nuclear activities, the NRC was established as an independent body responsible for licensing nuclear technology for sale and export. Sensing that all of the positive improvements were about to unravel, Carter was forced to overturn the NRC ruling. Justifying his

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actions, Carter acknowledged that withholding the fuel would seriously undermine the
delicate nonproliferation efforts that were already in progress.36

Nonproliferation soon became the key sticking point in U.S.-India relations. The
original plans for TAPS included reprocessing. However, because India had
demonstrated a nuclear weapons capability, the issue of reprocessing became
problematic. A dilemma arose: India would not be allowed to reprocess its own spent
nuclear fuel and because they would not submit to full scope safeguards they could not
receive new fuel supplies from the United States. Matters became even more
complicated when evidence began to surface that Pakistan had embarked upon its own
nuclear weapons program.

As with every previous administration, arms to Pakistan again caused a problem
for U.S.-India relations. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the United
States revived its bilateral security commitment to Pakistan. Despite Indian complaints,
the Carter Administration pressed forward with a $400 million military assistance
package.37 However, signaling another policy shift, Carter simultaneously offered a
$300 million military aid package to India.38


Initially, India’s prospects for improved relations with the Ronald Reagan
Administration appeared gloomy. The new administration, particularly Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, a Kissinger protégé, had little sympathy for India. India’s close
relationship with the Soviet Union did not bode well. The United States approved a $2.5
billion aid package for Pakistan in an all-out effort to allay its security concerns.

Having worked hard to create a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to
improve technology transfers, its implementation tested U.S. credibility. The MOU was
conceived after the United States and India realized that there were too many
impediments to cooperative ventures. An agreement was needed that could facilitate the

36 Ibid, 358.
37 Ibid, 369.
38 Ibid, 371.
transfer of technology to India while satisfying U.S. export requirements; it took shape in the form of the MOU, which was signed by the United States and India in May 1985.\textsuperscript{39}

At issue was the sale of a sophisticated Cray XMP-24 supercomputer. India wanted the computer for use in atmospheric research. The Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Commerce (DoC) favored the sale while the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DoE), and the National Security Agency (NSA) opposed the deal because the computer could also be used for code breaking. President Reagan had a personal interest in successful completion of the deal but submitted to the concerns of the NSA and allowed for the offering of a less capable XMP-14 in its place. India expressed dismay with the decision but accepted it nonetheless.

C. U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR


As Vice President, George Bush was instrumental in clearing the way for the successful completion of the U.S.-India MOU. As President, he encountered several domestic roadblocks to its successful implementation. The export review process and Congressional concerns delayed or impeded key technological transfers. India continued to be skeptical about the sincerity and reliability of U.S. assistance.

During the early 1990’s, there was renewed emphasis on the U.S. policy on nuclear nonproliferation. This increased attention to the proliferation problem adversely affected U.S.-India relations. The United States denied the export of a Combined Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System (CAVTS), which India sought to acquire for its space programs. The United States denied the sale of CAVTS to India because of the dual-technology issue; it could facilitate the development of nuclear capable missile systems. Similarly, in order to secure an export license, India had to give a commitment that the Cray XMP-22 that it requested would not be used for nuclear weapons development.

During this period, certain commercial legislation passed by the United States Congress became irritants to U.S.-India relations. Unhappy with the state of affairs of

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 401.
international commercial policies, Congress enacted Paragraph 301 of the Omnibus Trade Competitiveness Act of 1988—also referred to as Super 301. As a result, India was one of the first countries named when the first watch list was released in 1989. Three complaints were lodged against India, requiring the President to take retaliatory action: India was excluding investments from foreign companies by limiting equity participation to a maximum of 40 percent; the nationalization of the insurance industry in India denied access and adequate compensation; and the most contentious issue, India was lax in its protection of intellectual property rights, especially patents related to the pharmaceutical industry.\(^\text{40}\) The Indian government considered Super 301 another form of coercion.

2. **Clinton Administration (1993-2001)**

   In its early stages, the William J. Clinton Administration did not focus on South Asia. The economy, Iraq, Russia, China, and North Korea were among the top issues for the new administration. President Clinton’s increased stress on nonproliferation did not make friends in India. The issue of nonproliferation was one of the most charged issues between these two countries; it may even have been the first and greatest hurdle to U.S.-India cooperation.\(^\text{41}\)

   There were basic differences between the United States and India on the issue of nonproliferation. In 1995, when the NPT came up for review, the United States pushed for an indefinite extension while India continued to oppose to the NPT regime. Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was highly critical, renewing India’s claim that the NPT was a perpetuation of the efforts of a few to maintain their monopoly.\(^\text{42}\)

   Also complicating the nonproliferation agenda was the issue of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India was one of the original co-sponsors for the CTBT in 1993. However, India dismayed the world when it attempted to block the treaty when the time came to vote in 1996. Eventually, India refrained from blocking the

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\(^{40}\) Ibid, 435.


vote but refused to be a party to the CTBT unless it was linked to an agreement for global disarmament within a fixed period of time. India thus became the main impediment in the CTBT’s entry into force.

D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This historical review of U.S.-India relations reveals that complications occurred at all three levels of interaction: global, regional and individual. The majority of the conflicts were a direct result of the Cold War. For India, the largest, and most persistent source of conflict resulted from U.S.-Pakistan relations; the United States supported and armed the country that, according to India, formed its principal security threat. For the United States, the primary stumbling block was the relationship between the Soviet Union and India.

The first component of conflict in U.S.-India relations was the competing ideology at the core of each country’s foreign policy. The United States viewed the world through a prism of hard realism and power politics; countries were classified as allies in the fight against communism, or enemies sympathetic to the communist cause. In many instances, U.S. foreign policy was meant to punish or coerce; the idea was to convince the other country to alter its behavior. Conversely, Indian foreign policy was founded upon non-alignment. After suffering through colonialism, India sought freedom to maneuver; it refused to be subservient to another country. Because India remained true to neutralism, it did not need the United States and subsequently it was not susceptible to those tactics. Only when India felt trapped between a U.S.-Pakistan-China bloc did it consent to an agreement with the Soviet Union.

The second component of conflict was regional competition. During the Cold War, the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan, and the United States was a classic zero-sum complete with an unbreakable action-reaction cycle. If the United States attempted to interact with one country more than the other, the neglected country would cry wolf. Most frequently, India complained of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan because it propped up the weaker country, emboldening Pakistan to be more aggressive. In the instances when the United States attempted to treat India and Pakistan equally, both countries were disdainful.
The third component of conflict was Kashmir. The Kashmir issue makes it impossible to deal with just one country, India or Pakistan. There is a complex relationship that has established a delicate balance. However, peace cannot occur without solving the problem, and solving the problem does not ensure peace in the region. This circular logic demonstrates exactly how complicated South Asian relations are.

The final component of conflict was the personal nature that key individuals injected into foreign policy. Probably the most problematic relationship was between Indira Gandhi and the Nixon/Kissinger team; Indira once told an interviewer, “I think I had excellent relations with everybody except Mr. Nixon. And he had made up his mind beforehand.” The dynamic between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Indian Ambassador to the UN Krishna Menon is another outstanding example. Both men relished the opportunity to be the spokesperson for their country, and as such were prone to making highly provocative statements.

However, when the key players appreciated the importance of a personal touch in foreign policy, relations improved. Upon understanding the emphasis that Prime Minister Nehru placed personal relationships President Eisenhower reciprocated and relations between the two countries began to improve. Similarly, after a chance personal meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Cancun the pace and scope of U.S.-India relations improved dramatically. When word of the personal chemistry between Reagan and Indira Gandhi spread the Indo-American diplomatic atmosphere began to improve.44

The result of such a long period of conflict has been a sense of mistrust. India has viewed U.S. foreign policy as untrustworthy and its support unreliable; military and economic aid was erratic, insufficient, given to whims, and often intended to coerce. Similarly, the United States misread Indian silence and inactivity, interpreting as approval, or at least acceptance, of Soviet actions and policies. Therefore, the United States was suspicious of any assistance, particularly military, offered to India because it feared that it would make its way into Soviet hands.

43 Kux, India and the United States, 280.
44 Ibid, 387.
In order for a U.S.-India strategic partnership to endure, these complicating factors must be avoided. The United States must strike a delicate balance in its South Asia foreign policy; it must insist that India and Pakistan continue to work towards a resolution of the Kashmir issue while insulating U.S.-India relations from Pakistan. The end of the Cold War has made the task easier but only slightly. U.S. relations with Pakistan remain a highly charged issue. The only real difference is that personalities have become less of a foreign policy influence for both countries.
III. CHANGES AFFECTING U.S.-INDIACOOPERATION

A. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an apparent resurgence of pragmatism in the relationship between the United States and India. The Bush Administration is calling for a new strategic framework and India is responding in a positive fashion. It appears as if the opportunity exists once again the United States and India to emerge as strategic partners. The previous chapter revealed the conditions that have prevented this in the past. Therefore, the question arises: what has changed that could facilitate success this time?

This chapter assesses the current environment in an attempt to understand the conditions that have changed since the end of the Cold War. The first section outlines the changes in ideology of both the United States and India, and how this affects U.S.-India relations. The second section examines the influence of globalism on U.S.-India relations. The third section discusses the new challenges in the post Cold War world and how the two countries are reacting.

The end of the Cold War heralded the end of the era of global competition. The mentality of competition is subsequently being replaced by one of cooperation; us versus them is being transformed into us and them. Realism and balance of power politics eased towards the middle of the international relations spectrum and was replaced with neo-realism and relative gains. In the new world order, cooperation is the key to success; the alternative is isolation.

B. U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

1. Balance of Power Arrangements Replaced by Mutual Gains

During the Cold War period, realists dominated U.S. foreign policy. While there were periods of idealism, during the Kennedy and Carter Administrations, they did not last long enough to create a lasting bond in the U.S.-India relations. The end of the Cold War was also the end of realism. Engagement and enticements have replaced competition and coercion. Differences of opinion still exist but adversarial relationships have largely been eliminated.
The current administration, and its predecessor, has moved beyond realism and the balance of power politics it fostered. The new understanding is centered upon mutual gains and the model, especially in the George W. Bush Administration, follows that of a corporation. Just as corporations must cooperate, so must countries, no single entity holds all of the elements critical to success.

More and more, foreign relations resemble that of multinational corporations. Limited to success can be achieved on an individual basis, but true gains are achieved when working together towards a goal. With the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Cold War alliance systems have become extinct. In order to remain viable, NATO has been required to undergo a significant transition, which continues today.

Multinational cooperative agreements and forums have replaced the old system of alliances. The old structure was power based, the major powers had the largest voice and the smaller powers were often unheard. The new structure is capability based, states are ordered by what they offer within the specific framework. In this new structure, India, as a dominant regional power, has an apparent potential to play a significant role in the U.S. led global security and economic system.

2. Indian Idealism Replaced by Pragmatism

In India, pragmatism and practicality are replacing the moralism that guided foreign policy during the Cold War years. During this period, Indian foreign policy tended to be the sole domain of the Prime Minister, especially during the tenures of Pandit Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Personal influences in Indian foreign policy have also been reduced.

The current government, led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the BJP approaches foreign policy in a pragmatic manner. Prime Minister Vajpayee relies more closely upon his key advisors, such as Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh, Home Minister L. K. Advani, Defense Minister George Fernandes, and the other members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). India still attaches many of its traditional values to its foreign policy, however it realizes that the key is not to be adversarial in its relations. This approach has resulted in some recent foreign policy successes, e.g. India
successfully avoided international isolation after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Also, during the 1999 India-Pakistan conflict in Kargil, Indian diplomacy succeeded in bringing international pressure on Pakistan to withdraw.

C. THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION

1. Global Problems Require Global Partners

In the new world order, a threat to one is usually a threat to all. While this is not always the case, it is certainly true in the broader issues like economic development, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and energy security.

The proliferation of WMD is now appreciated as a global threat. In the 1980’s, several countries were alarmed by the events of the Iran-Iraq war, and the implications therein. The United States had been stressing nonproliferation but acting only in limited fashion. After the United States felt truly threatened as a result of the Gulf War, it increased its level of activity.

One of the differences from the 1980’s to the 1990’s is the end of the Cold War. Iran and Iraq were essentially allowed to fight it out because it was a limited war, confined to the two states. Because there was no threat to the U.S. or Soviet position or regional interests, there was no need to take action. With the Cold War over, the Gulf War was billed in a different manner. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a threat to energy security and thus a threat to global stability. Therefore the Iraqi possession of WMD became a global concern.

Added to this realm of global problems is terrorism. India has been a victim of terrorism since the mid-1960’s. It has worked just as long to bring the issue into international focus. The United States tended to view terrorism as domestic, bilateral, and only occasionally as rogue actions. This view was largely based on experience. Previous terrorist activities were linked to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the catholic-protestant dispute in Northern Ireland, and the targeting of minor U.S. interests by state sponsored terrorists like Libya. As a result of the enormity of the attack on 11 September 2001, the United States changed its view of terrorism from a limited threat to a global one. Currently, there is a congruence of views on the issue of terrorism between the two countries.
2. **Information Technology Revolution**

The information technology (IT) revolution is one of the key driving forces behind globalism. As such, India is a key player because it is a leader in IT research and development. This has significantly impacted U.S.-India relations.

Because of the IT revolution, the United States and India are inextricably linked; a situation that never occurred during the Cold War. As previously stated, 40 percent of U.S. Fortune 500 companies outsource their software needs to Indian companies.45

D. **NEW CHALLENGES IN THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD**

1. **Radical Influences**

The threat concept has changed. During the Cold War, threats were country specific, with a global focus, like the U.S.-USSR conflict, or a regional one, like Argentina-Brazil. Countries worried about other countries; the primary concern was war.

The threat now comes from instability and uncertainty. Countries are still concerned with one another, but there are additional factors that also cause concern. Due to globalization a threat to one country is a concern for all. Terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism can cause a state to falter or possibly fail, which negatively impacts the global economy. Drug trafficking and illegal arms sales are also global threats. They are a source of funding for terrorist activities and they are a drain on national economies, as the effects must be dealt with.

2. **New Approaches to the Proliferation Problem**

The Bush Administration sees a need to reevaluate the U.S. nonproliferation policy. This is evident from two recent events: the abrogation of the ratification of the CTBT; and most recently, the withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and Russia. Additionally, key foreign policy advisors, such as Secretary of State Powell, seriously doubt the effectiveness of sanctions. Sanctions have been tried and failed, i.e. India and Pakistan. Bribery has been tried, and is also in doubt, i.e. North Korea. Other states, such as China and Russia, are strong enough that they cannot be bribed, intimidated, or coerced. President Bush’s answer is a new strategic framework that is based upon a realistic assessment and acknowledgement of regional security threats, concerted diplomatic activity, and dialogue.

In recent years, the United States has begun to reevaluate nonproliferation policy. One significant change was the launch of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI) on 7 December 1993. This was the first step in the move beyond mutually assured destruction (MAD). The DCI has three primary objectives: to prevent the further proliferation of WMD, especially chemical and biological weapons; to prevent the usage of WMD; and to protect U.S. forces from the effects of WMD ensuring they can continue to fight in the event WMD has been used. This was an important step because it implied two things. First, as demonstrated by the Gulf War, the WMD threat had expanded beyond nuclear weapons and a response was required. Secondly, it implied that nonproliferation was insufficient on its own.

The most recent change in the U.S. approach to nonproliferation is embodied in President Bush’s new strategic framework. The new framework has four components: active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses; new concepts of deterrence; missile defenses; further cuts in nuclear weapons.46 When speaking about the nonproliferation portion of the new framework, President Bush feels that the key lies in working together with like-minded nations.

This is where the potential exists for the United States and India to finally begin to cooperate on nonproliferation. India is willing to embark upon a cooperative effort. It has expressed its support for the U.S. framework because it is similar to the ideas espoused by the Indian nonproliferation community, particularly because it calls for moving beyond the concept of MAD and reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Some experts believe that a U.S.-India strategic partnership symbolizes a change to nonproliferation in another manner. By lifting sanctions and working closely with India, the United States is acknowledging that India is a de facto nuclear power. This can then be interpreted to indicate that regional security concerns are a valid reasoning for nuclear weapons.

E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Much has changed in the ten years since the Cold War ended. Many of these changes bode well for the improvement of U.S.-India relations. However, despite all that has changed, Pakistan and Kashmir continue to be highly charged issues that have the potential to disrupt U.S.-India relations.

The end of the Cold War has reduced adversarial tendencies. The United States no longer needs allies to contain a threat; it requires partners to assist with economic growth and combating international and regional threats. India no longer requires a policy of non-alignment; there are no competing power blocs. A new reality has emerged in which the goal is continued economic development and the method is cooperation. In this new reality, both the United States and India have demonstrated an appreciation for mutual gains and practicality.

The end of the Cold War allows for a focus on global issues instead of global competition. India has always pushed for resolution of the issues of non-proliferation and terrorism. During the Cold War, the United States relegated non-proliferation and terrorism to a lesser status; they were not national interests. Now global threats coincide with national interests, and United States is leading the global coalition to solve the problems.

The post Cold War world has a new ordering principle, a new understanding of what is important, and new threats. Because the United States and India share common views and interests in this new world order, the probability that they can create an enduring strategic partnership has improved significantly. Finally, the United States and India are becoming inextricably linked. The information technology revolution is currently the largest contributing factor to improved U.S.-India relations and the Indian-American community has become a driving force in U.S. South Asia policy.
IV. INDIAN OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS

A. INTRODUCTION

India is striving to improve relations with the United States. It has made several significant overtures in this respect. It has expressed support for President Bush’s new strategic framework. It is supporting the United States in the war on terrorism. And, it is working to enhance military-to-military cooperation. India obviously has an ulterior motive in all of this, therefore the question becomes: What does India want?

This chapter outlines the desires that India has of a strategic partnership as well as its concerns. The first section examines recent media reports, academic studies, and white papers to determine Indian needs and the desires it has in preparation for entering into a strategic partnership with the United States. The second section outlines the concerns that exist within sectors of the Indian government.

India has been able to achieve reasonable success without fully aligning itself with either power blocs. However, it has not been able to reach its full potential. India strongly desires to continue its economic, social, and scientific development without sacrificing its sovereignty or its ability to act independently. It is willing to accept assistance and cooperate on joint projects, but it wants to limit and closely control outside influences, especially the armed forces of foreign countries. Understanding these concerns allows the United States to formulate policies and agreements that will encourage and not alienate India, thereby ensuring an enduring U.S.-India strategic partnership.

B. INDIAN MOTIVATIONS FOR A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

1. Terrorism

India has been engaged in fighting terrorism since the mid 1960’s. The United States acknowledges India’s concern with terrorism and hopes to engage India in a two-way cooperative effort, sharing intelligence, experience, and coordinated action. In February 2000, the United States and India established a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism; an interagency group of counter-terrorism and law enforcement officials concerned with the growing menace of international terrorism, extremism, and
drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{47} India hosted the second meeting of the Joint Working Group on 25-26 September 2000 while the United States hosted the third meeting in June 2001. However, the only tangible product to date has been the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty clearing the way for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to cooperate with and operate an office in India.\textsuperscript{48} In a joint statement issued after the 5 December 2001 meeting of the U.S.-India Defense Planning Group (DPG), the two countries agreed to add a new emphasis on counter-terrorism in the area of defense cooperation.\textsuperscript{49}

While India is satisfied with bilateral assistance from the United States, it desires more. Currently, India is attempting to garner support for a proposal it has made within the UNGA, the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.\textsuperscript{50} The concern within India is that when the operations against Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban are finished, the United States and its coalition will return to business as usual; leaving India to continue its struggle against cross border terrorism in the Kashmir region. In the words of India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh the, “entire struggle (against terrorism) could not be treated as a fight against one individual or manifestation alone.”\textsuperscript{51} Along these lines, Islamic fundamentalism must be addressed because it is seen as one of the root causes for terrorism. Drug trafficking and clandestine arms sales must also be tackled because they are methods used for funding terrorist activities.

Finally, India also seeks assistance in combating chemical and biological terrorism as well as consequence management of such an attack. In light of events occurring in the United States, India, through the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), is racing to train doctors and first responders. The Indian government has been working on such issues since the Iran-Iraq war and has developed some protective and detection equipment most of which are defense related. However,

\textsuperscript{47} Dept of State, “Joint U.S.-India Statement on Counterterrorism Working Group” (8 February 2000).

\textsuperscript{48} Dept of State, “Joint U.S.-India Statement of Counterterrorism Working Group” (26 June 2001).

\textsuperscript{49} Office of International Information Programs, United States Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group” (05 December 2001). \textsuperscript{http://usinfo.state.gov}

\textsuperscript{50} Times News Network, “India Builds Support for Anti-terror Coalition,” \textit{The Times of India Online} (19 September 2001). \textsuperscript{http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=2035444571}

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
due to World Health Organization (WHO) restrictions, there are no smallpox vaccinations and only the United States is reported to have an anthrax vaccine. India is also considering creation of a crisis management group specific to counter-terrorism, modeled after the United States Office of Homeland Security.52

2. Missile Programs

The DRDO is the parent organization primarily responsible for the research and development of military hardware and systems. Within the DRDO are a wide variety of facilities that conceive, design, test, and develop indigenous projects for the Indian armed forces. It consists of over 50 laboratories and establishments and employs greater than 30,000 people; there are an estimated 6,800 scientific and technical personnel within the DRDO.53

One laboratory within the DRDO structure is the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). The DRDL is the principal missile research center, and has demonstrated considerable success along these lines. There are those within the government and scientific communities that are pleased with the progress of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP). However, there are also those who are skeptical; the programs cost too much, and no longer meet the needs by the time they are fielded.

The IGMDP consists of four core programs. One program is the nuclear capable missile delivery program. Within this program the Prithvi missile has been proven and is being fielded by the Indian Army and Air Force; naval testing is the next step. Additionally, the Agni missile and its follow-on the Agni II are now considered proven systems. These developments are crucial because they support India’s goal of maintaining a minimum credible nuclear deterrent.

The second program within IGMDP is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) program. The ongoing SAM projects are the Akash and Trishul missiles. The third program,


53 Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, 23.
surface-to-surface missile (SSM), currently consists of the *Nag* anti-tank missile project. These projects are experiencing delays due to the time taken for realization of state-of-the-art guidance and propulsion technologies.\(^{54}\) The fourth program is the air-to-air missile (AAM) program, which is beginning to engage upon a beyond visual range missile, *Astra*.\(^{55}\) In addition to the delays in all programs, there is skepticism regarding how contemporary these systems will be once they are finally fielded.\(^{56}\) Table 1 lists IGMDP projects and their status.\(^{57}\) Although it will be unrealistic for India to seek active U.S. assistance in its missile development program, India seeks the lifting of technical sanctions against components of dual-use technology from the United States.

Table 1. Indian Indigenous Missile Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Range(km)/payload(kg) *planned</th>
<th>Remarks/Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi SS-150</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>150/1,000</td>
<td>(Army version) In service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi SS-250</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>250/500</td>
<td>(IAF version) In development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni I</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>1,500/?</td>
<td>Primarily technology demonstrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni II</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>3,000*/2,200</td>
<td>Limited production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni III</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>5,000*/1,000*</td>
<td>In development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surya</td>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>12,000*</td>
<td>Status unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhanush</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>250*/500</td>
<td>In development, possible technology demonstrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akash</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>User trials, intended to replace SA-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trishul</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>User trials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astra</td>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>100*</td>
<td>Feasibility study authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nag</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Limited production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmos cruise missile</td>
<td>Anti-ship</td>
<td>300*</td>
<td>Joint US-Russia venture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagarika</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown if SLBM or SLCM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Range and status information compiled from [http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Missiles.html](http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Missiles.html)
3. Space Programs

India has a functional space program in the form of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). ISRO is primarily a civilian organization; it is not a part of DRDO. However, the two organizations work cooperatively, trading data, resources, and personnel. Much of the data for IGMDP missiles is based upon the larger satellite launch vehicles developed by ISRO.

ISRO maintains a network of ground tracking stations and satellites. Currently, the satellites are predominantly for communications and meteorology. While India has mainly utilized the satellite launch facilities of France and the United States, it has recently developed its own launch capabilities in the form of polar satellite launch vehicles (PSLV) and geosynchronous satellite launch vehicles (GSLV).

India’s PSLV is now a proven technology. It has launched two foreign satellites, KITSAT-3 of Korea and DLR TUBSAT of Germany, and is scheduled to launch two more, BIRD of Germany and PROBA of Belgium. Antrix Corporation is the commercial arm of ISRO and is responsible for coordinating such launches as well as data collection from ISRO satellites. As a commercial entity, Antrix is a moneymaker for the government of India; 75 percent of Antrix’s earnings come from foreign exchange, turning over more than Rs 30 million.

However, India lacks a GSLV capability, which is a limitation. The PSLV is only capable of putting objects into a stationary orbit near the earth’s poles; it lacks sufficient thrust to place an object in a geo-stationary orbit at a determined location. This means that India is only a candidate to launch certain types of satellites. India has been attempting to perfect its GSLV but has experienced setbacks. In April 2001, an attempted GSLV launch was aborted and the subsequent launch data issued by USSPACECOM indicates that the orbit is slightly lower than a true geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO); it is unclear whether this was intentional or whether it indicated a

slightly lower-than-nominal performance of the launch vehicle. Until GSLV technology can be perfected India is at the mercy of its foreign service providers.

Another limitation is India’s satellite capabilities. As previously stated, most of the satellites in India’s program are meant for communications or meteorology; there are a limited number of imaging satellites. The imaging satellites which India now uses are restricted to a resolution of 5.8 meters, which is sufficient for certain commercial uses but of minor military value. This lack of intelligence gathering capability was felt when India failed to detect Pakistani incursions in the Kargil region of Kashmir in the summer of 1999. Until India can refine its satellite imaging technology it must continue to buy imagery from outside sources.

The United States and India have a history of cooperation in the field of space programs. This cooperation was impacted by sanctions but can be revived and emerge as a model for other programs. The following cooperative ventures have been successfully completed between the United States and India:

- Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) was built in the 1960’s and has since launched over 3000 sounding rockets for research purposes;
- A bilateral agreement on an experimental Satellite Instrumental Television Experiment (SITE) provided television programming to 2400 Indian villages from an American ATS-6 satellite;
- The United States National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) share information with ISRO allowing for collaborative research in earth and air sciences.

4. Energy Security

As India continues to grow, its energy demands increase significantly. India is not only growing in terms of population, its industries are growing as well. Presently,

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60 Philip Clark, “India’s GSLV reaches orbit, but can it be a contender?” Jane’s Defense Weekly (20 April 2001).


India’s primary power generation is coal-based, with thermal power generating over 80 percent while nuclear power accounts for three percent of the total output. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has completed a 2020 vision document that envisions 20,000 MW as the target for nuclear power production by 2020; currently, India produces 2,720 MW from fourteen operating units. The knowledge exists within India to complete such a task in a safe and efficient manner; however, the financing is currently inadequate for such an ambitious undertaking and the resource base may be insufficient. Furthermore, the United States can ease the acquisition process by taking up India’s cause in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. There is also the potential for the construction of light-water nuclear reactors in India by international consortiums, led by the United States.

5. Military Assistance

While it is the largest of the services, and receives the biggest chunk of the defense budget (55.29 percent in 2000) the Indian Army has several significant shortfalls. The Directorate of Defence Policy and Planning (DDDP) recently released a 120-page plan outlining a rapid reaction plan for India to provide a regional defense umbrella. This plan outlined future requirements for the Indian Armed Forces. There is a dwindling stockpile of equipment, compounded by the fact that the equipment is also aging rapidly. Also reaching the end of their life cycles are Indian armor and artillery assets.

Likewise, the Indian Navy is suffering similar woes. Only one carrier remains active and the remainder of the Indian fleet is aging; in order to meet future requirements outlined in the DDDP report, two carriers are needed in addition to the INS VIRAT. While possessing sufficient forces for a conflict with Pakistan, its numbers, with the exception of its submarine force, are insufficient to be a truly “blue water” fleet capable of sea denial. It lacks air cover, especially early warning and reconnaissance aircraft, as

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64 Hoyt, “Modernizing the Indian Armed Forces,” 18.


66 Ibid.
well as anti-ship missile capabilities. Furthermore, India has expressed a desire to build its own aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine but without outside assistance these ventures are likely to exceed time and cost estimates by a significant amount.

In order to meet the rapid mobility requirements the IAF needs to acquire at least 35 long-range fast aircraft with midair refueling capabilities; three AWACS; and 200 attack helicopter. The IAF has been experiencing difficulty meeting these requirements, especially regarding AWACS; it has rejected offers to purchase the Russian A-50 and its indigenous program suffered a setback when its experimental plane crashed. There is currently a deal pending between India and Israel to fill this gap.

The IAF has other problems as well. The advanced age of Indian aircraft is being blamed for a higher-than-normal accident rate, resulting in the loss of 20-25 aircraft per year. The IAF does not possess an advanced aircraft trainer, and its indigenous Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) program has stalled forcing it to look outside the country. Furthermore the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program is over budget and overdue. The air force is also lacking a medium-lift capability. Finally, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis, in an April briefing, stated, “urgent requirements for operational and ground infrastructural upgradation,” in such areas as radar, missile, and communications systems.

In addition to the hardware requirement, the Indian armed forces seek training opportunities with the United States. Discussed at the DPG, the two countries agreed that a plan must be completed that includes, at a minimum, training for combined humanitarian airlift, combined special operations training, small unit ground and air

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69 Ibid.
70 Hoyt, “Modernizing the Indian Armed Forces,” 19.
71 While there is sufficient lift capability within the territorial boundaries of India, there is a shortfall in the ability to move forces from Indian bases and airfields to strategic locations outside of the Indian subcontinent, such as the Andaman Islands.
72 A.Y. Tipnis, Air Chief Marshal, briefing at the bi-annual Air Force Commanders’ Conference, 16 April 2001.
exercises, naval joint personnel exchanges and familiarization, and combined naval training exercises between the United States Marine Corps and its Indian counterparts.\textsuperscript{73}

6. Nuclear Stability

India seeks nuclear stability in South Asia. This requires a mixture of cautious behavior, forward thinking, and accurate and timely intelligence. Because of the triangular relationship between India, China and Pakistan there is a delicate balance that must be maintained. The Indian nuclear weapons program was initiated in response to the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964. According to Pakistani officials, their nuclear program was in response to India’s nuclear ambitions and conventional superiority. As it stands now, the three countries have seen fit to avoid an arms race, but this is not assured.

India aspires attempting to achieve regional nuclear stability by creating a minimum credible nuclear deterrent. As previously noted, the DRDO nuclear capable missile program is in direct support of this objective. Another component of this deterrence strategy is the establishment of a nuclear triad. Indian experts agree that a second strike capability is essential to support its minimum nuclear deterrent and consequently its no first use policy.

India also anticipates benefits from the Bush Administration’s plan for missile defense. India has stated that it supports the idea of missile defense because it revolves around three core concepts that are fully in tune with long-held India assumptions: rejection of mutual assured destruction, substantive reduction of nuclear arsenals, and new approaches to nonproliferation.\textsuperscript{74}

7. Other Matters

There is also the hope that a U.S.-India strategic partnership could have other benefits. There are members within the Indian government who not only desire a permanent seat on the UNSC; they view it as their rightful position. It is widely perceived in some sections of the Indian government that a partnership with the United States could be a step towards this goal.

\textsuperscript{73} Office of International Information Programs, United States Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group”

Having outlined several key reasons why India would seek a strategic partnership with the United States, the Kashmir issue remains. This is not due to a lack of omission; India does not desire third party involvement in this issue. A lingering problem since The Partition, India acknowledges that it cannot move forward without resolving this issue, but it is a matter to be settled between the affected participants. While India does not desire a third party to the negotiation process, within certain circles there is hope that the United States can exert “influence” upon Pakistan to remain positively engaged in the negotiation process.

India is on the leading edge of the information technology revolution. It has become the second largest software producer in the world, and is rapidly developing hardware manufacturing capabilities. In this area, India can only benefit from a strategic partnership with the United States. According to Stephen Cohen, an expert on South Asia, “India needs American investment and technology, which it is likely to get as it becomes a more attractive market for American businesses as well as a critical supplier of software and other computer products.”

Now that the sanctions have been lifted, many industries and companies will surely benefit. However, sixteen entities remain on a U.S. prohibitory list controlled by the DoC, which receives inputs from DoD and DoS. Those entities remaining on the list, all subsets of DRDO, DAE, and ISRO are of strategic importance to India. The problem with the entities is that they are part of the dual-use technology regime; they are deemed to pose an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of mass destruction or the missiles used to deliver those weapons. Unless a new arrangement, similar to the partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom, can be achieved, these entities may remain on the prohibitory list.

C. INDIAN CONCERNS

India has a long tradition of neutrality. Any partnership, especially one with geo-strategic implications would violate this principle. There has only been one case in which


India formally signed an agreement with a Superpower, the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. As far as India was concerned that agreement fell short of a formal alliance, but only slightly. Furthermore, some sections of the Indian political establishment feel that strategic partnership with the United States would be at the cost of their historically good relationship with Russia.

In the tradition of non-alignment and independent action, India is engaging in multiple strategic dialogues. India has completed talks with France, which were described by participants as friendly and candid. France and India have a synergy and an a pre-existing understanding; France made it clear when the European Union (EU) wanted to impose sanctions that it would support individual country sanctions but not collective sanctions. India and Australia have also completed an inaugural round of strategic dialogue that covered global, regional, and national security issues, defense policies, and arms control and disarmament.

There is also the fear that a strategic partnership with the United States would further complicate the security dilemma that it is meant to defeat. A recognized Indian security analyst, Brahma Chellaney, captures this argument in the following statement

India faces a difficult situation in Asia, one that demands deep strategic engagement with the United States. India’s largest neighbor, China, will use U.S. missile defenses as an excuse to further modernize its already expanding nuclear and missile arsenals. India’s security will be adversely affected by the increasing trans-Himalayan missile threat and Beijing’s continued nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan.

A large portion of the scientific community believes India does not need outside assistance. India’s nuclear program is a matter of pride. Depending upon the source material, India developed a nuclear bomb for one of three reasons, or a combination thereof: a security dilemma, a technological imperative, or a source of national pride in


the scientific community. India has accomplished great scientific feats on its own, in spite of many adversities.

The scientific tradition and pride is still in evidence. Speaking of ISRO’s successful launch of the Technology Experiment Satellite (TES), K. Santhanam, IDSA’s director, said that the launch was a significant step, and that such strategic technologies are a matter of do-it-yourself.81 With the launch of the TES, India now effectively has a spy satellite in its inventory. The TES has a resolution of one meter coupled with a sun-synchronous orbit, which means that it will visit the same area at the same local time repeatedly, allowing for the mapping of changes.82

DRDO accomplishments match those of the ISRO in indigenous developments. Vasudev Kalkunte Aatre outlined Indian developments in a recent review:

- The Army has inducted the Prithvi missile and the Air Force version has completed final trials. The naval tests are next.
- The Nag anti-tank missile will begin testing next year, with Trishul to follow.
- The Brahmastra supersonic cruise missile should be ready for use by 2003-2004.
- The Nishant Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has cleared flight-testing and is awaiting orders.
- The Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) should be rolled out by 2003.
- Indian naval ships have indigenous sonar systems, and submarine sonar systems are undergoing trials.
- The LCA should finish operational clearance by 2006 and induction should occur before 2010.83

Additionally, India suffered only minimal impact from the U.S. imposed sanctions. Former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), R. Chidambaram, spoke to this issue in an exclusive interview with the Bombay Times,

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82 Ibid.

“The sanctions had no effect at all. In fact, during the first year of the sanctions, the capacity factor of our nuclear power plants increased by five per cent. Our nuclear programme is completely matured, with trained people.”84 Chidambaram even went on to defend the Pokhran-II blasts, saying, “They were necessary for our security. The entire attitude of the world has changed towards us. In fact, sanctions gave us the strength in our resolve to become self-reliant.”85

There is also uncertainty over the effect of a U.S.-India strategic partnership upon Indo-Pakistani relations. The United States has long been a supporter of the Pakistani government. There is some skepticism that the United States can break the old model of zero-sum relations when dealing with India and Pakistan. Newly reinstated Minister of Defence George Fernandes is highly critical of recent U.S. efforts, especially the war on terrorism:

There is yet no commitment made by the US to be part of the war that India has been fighting against this terrorism for over a decade, one should not, therefore rule out the likelihood of India having to fight its own war against terrorism on its border once the US-led alliance call off its engagement in Afghanistan, and goes back to its five-decade-old cosy relationship with Pakistan.86

India is concerned about military cooperation between China and Pakistan. Limited Sino-Pakistani cooperation has already been documented; it is widely believed that China was the crucial link that helped Pakistan complete its nuclear weapons program. If the adage holds true that, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, then China and Pakistan are sure to be alarmed by a U.S.-India strategic partnership. As a consequence, it is likely that China will increase its military assistance to Pakistan, which could cause a regional security imbalance.

D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Summarizing the Indian objectives and concerns reveals the following:

- India has a strong desire to maintain autonomy, especially with respect to


85 Ibid.

• Indigenous defense industry
• Nuclear deterrence/strategic forces
• Resolve ongoing disputes bilaterally

- India strives to preserve the integrity of its territories
  - Maintain India’s borders
  - Resolution of the Kashmir issue
  - Defeat destabilizing outside influences
    - Terrorism
    - Islamic fundamentalism
    - Drug-trafficking
    - Piracy

- India wishes to continue efforts to enhance South Asian stability
  - Reduce likelihood of nuclear conflict
  - Expand dialogue through regional forums such as SAARC

- India wishes to achieve increased international standing/recognition
  - Change to NPT regime
  - CTBT
  - Permanent member of UNSC
  - Global disarmament on a fixed timeline

- India would benefit greatly from investments in its infrastructure
  - Energy sector
  - Research and development projects

- India seeks to modernize its military forces as well as
  - Removal of remaining technology restrictions
  - C4I
  - Doctrine and training
  - Assistance with ongoing and anticipated research and development projects
V. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Bush Administration is working diligently to create a new strategic framework. Within this new framework, President Bush envisions a role for India. The United States will proceed with or without India, but the inclusion of India increases the strength and viability of the new framework. Exactly what role does the United States foresee India playing?

This chapter analyzes where the United States is going, and what it will take to get there with regard to India’s participation in the new framework. The first section outlines the objectives of the Bush Administration at the global, regional, and national level. After establishing what the objectives are, the second section delineates specific desires and expectations that the United States has for India. The third section captures a significant portion of the concerns that exist regarding a strategic partnership with India.

The role of India in the new strategic framework will be the same as that of other strategic partners: Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The United States primarily desires enhanced military-to-military cooperation, basing privileges and logistical support. Knowing this, and appreciating India’s concerns, the challenge becomes creating a relationship that India will accept, United Kingdom model, rather than one that it will most likely reject, Philippine model.

B. U.S. OBJECTIVES

1. Global Objectives

The goal of the Bush Administration is to move forward with a new strategic framework. Within this new framework, it is the methodology and not necessarily the objectives that are different. Summarizing the top U.S. geo-strategic objectives reveals the following:

- The United States aims to minimize the threat, to the United States and the world, from WMD.
- The United States desires to deter regional aggression and peer competition.
- The United States will engage in a global war on terrorism.
• The United States wishes to see a stable world, free of conflict, which allows for economic expansion.

• The United States will take appropriate actions to protect critical energy sources, as well as sea-lanes and trade routes.

However, these goals will be achieved through global and bilateral relationships that are not relationships based upon win-lose or carrots and sticks; they will be relationships of mutual understanding and mutual benefit. In the words of Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs:

We want enhanced cooperation with India to create confidence and greater transparency, enabling the U.S. to be more effective in helping reduce the risks of conflict or an arms race in the region. We believe that an overall approach of expanded engagement has the potential to achieve more than one based largely on habits of the past.87

2. Regional Objectives

Stability in South Asia has received increased concern because of the nuclear developments in the region. It is not possible to undo the recent nuclear developments in South Asia; the nuclear genie has been let out of the bottle. Now is the time to actively engage the problem and manage its consequences. In the words of Robert Blackwill, U.S. Ambassador to India, “The United States in turn has a crucial interest in minimized tensions that could otherwise lead to an outbreak of hostilities or, in a worst-case scenario, nuclear conflict.”88 South Asian specialist, Stephen Cohen, agrees and stresses that, “A heightened engagement with India and Pakistan, dealing with the causes of regional conflict and not only its symptoms, might not only reduce the risk of war but also could promote important American economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests.”89

India’s geographic location can play a critical role in the new U.S. National Military Strategy. Currently, the only location open to U.S. forces between Singapore and the Persian Gulf is Diego Garcia. Strengthening ties between the world’s two largest democracies facilitates greater military planning, joint operations, and eventual sharing of


89 Stephen Cohen, “A New Beginning in South Asia,”
weapons technology. At a minimum, a strategic partnership with India could open up ports, bases, and airfields as stop-over points, maintenance opportunities, refueling locations, or even liberty ports. It also paves the way for joint exercises, officer exchanges. ADM Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has been quoted as saying, “It would give us a wider range of flexibility in moving forward in these areas.”

3. National Objectives

Now that sanctions have been removed, improving relations with India could be considered the primary national level objective. Even though the sanctions have been lifted, much work remains to be done. Speaking in general terms, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christine Rocca has said, “We want enhanced cooperation with India to create confidence and greater transparency, enabling the U.S. to be more effective in helping reduce the risks of conflict or an arms race in the region. We believe an overall approach of expanded engagement has the potential to achieve more than one based largely on habits of the past.” Sanctions were just a minor obstacle; their removal was only the first step.

Pursuit of joint projects, particularly in the scientific and technologic arenas, is a long-standing goal. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently stated, “They are increasingly a high tech—a critical country in the high tech world—company after company in the United States is having a larger amount of their work done in India.” President Bush has also spoken on the subject, “India has got a fantastic ability to grow, because her greatest export is intelligence and brain power, as our country has learned over the last decades.” Additionally, there is a growing desire to conduct joint military operations with India.

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91 Ibid.

92 Christine Rocca, “New Directions in U.S.-India Relations.”


A tertiary objective is the sale of non-nuclear weapons technology. India is, and has been, one of the top weapons purchasing countries for the past several years. India is currently negotiating for or considering key weapons systems: 310 T-90 MBT’s from Russia; SU-30 aircraft production rights with Russia; TU-22M Backfire bombers from Russia; Russian Krasnopol laser-guided artillery rounds; Israeli Searcher-1 or Searcher-2 UAV’s; Litening pods for the Mirage-2000; Israeli Barak SAM’s; as well as the possibility of purchasing AJT’s from France or Great Britain. Although Indian defense purchases have generally depended upon Russia, albeit Soviet Union, military hardware the DRDO effort has largely been based upon acquiring Western technologies. Hence sales of weapons systems as well as research and development are another potential area for strengthened cooperation between the United States and India.

C. WHAT THE UNITED STATES DESIRES FROM INDIA

In order to achieve the objectives set forth, specific steps must be taken. Using media reports, speeches and other remarks this section delineates specific items that the United States would like India to provide as a part of a strategic partnership. In some cases, initial cooperation or a framework for cooperation exists and additional requirements are being assessed.

1. Nonproliferation

India is important to the future of nonproliferation. India will not, and cannot, be included into the NPT regime. With the exception of the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, India has demonstrated restraint. It must continue to demonstrate that it is a responsible nuclear weapons state. India also must promise to continue to refrain from further testing, in addition to its published no first-use policy.

2. Terrorism

The importance of India in the war on terrorism has already been recognized. As previously mentioned, the United States and India began to examine the issue in February 2000 through the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism. Three meetings have been held in the last eighteen months to discuss such topics as legal cooperation, tactics,

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techniques, experience, and most importantly, intelligence sharing. Indian support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a strong start along these lines.

3. **Energy Security**

   The Indian Ocean is vital to the world’s energy security, specifically the continued flow of oil from Middle East sources. The United States and its allies receive up to 50 percent of their oil while Asia receives nearly 80 percent of its oil from trade routes that pass through the Indian Ocean. India, too, is a major importer of Middle East oil, 90 percent of its imports come via the Indian Ocean. Protruding into the center of the Indian Ocean, India is a crucial link to the continued safety of vessels transiting from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, and vice versa. India must be willing to cooperate in protecting these shipping lanes and the vessels that transit them.

4. **Regional Stability**

   As China continues to emerge as the dominant Asian power, there is a growing concern both in India and the United States. This common concern is a perfect entry point for a strategic partnership between two like-minded countries. Long hostile to the United States, India is being enlisted to work with the United States to offer a strategic counterweight to China. India is ideally situated to have an impact upon future Chinese development and expansion. The Bush Administration maintains that all relations are bilateral relations; no country will be viewed through the prism of another country. While this is the official line, there is also an understanding that two like-minded democracies, with vast potential as well as significant capabilities, will cooperate against common adversaries as a matter of mutual interest.

5. **Military Cooperation**

   Military cooperation between the United States and India is the number one priority, as it supports the other objectives either directly or indirectly. As such, all services will be involved from individual units to joint operations. Table 3 provides a listing of specific U.S. interests.

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97 A significant portion of this table is based upon items in Prabhu Chawla, “War on Terror,” *India Today International* (19 November 2001): 11-15 it is also based upon assumptions derived from military cooperation with key allies such as NATO, Japan, and Australia.
Table 2. Summary of U.S. Desires for Military Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desire</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underway Replenishment</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>The USN would like support from INS tankers while operating in the IO, Bay of Bengal, and Arabian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Escorts</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>The USN would like INS ships to provide escort services through the Malacca Straits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS Task Forces</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>Support of USN combat operations in the region, either as independent Task Force or Joint USN-INS Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Facilities</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>The USN would like to use Indian naval repair facilities in order to avoid maintain forces closer to the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Facilities</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>The USN would like to make port calls in India (similar to Australian visits) for liberty as well as logistical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Services</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>The United States would like to use airfields and ports for refueling services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Facilities</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>The United States would like to use Indian training facilities as well as participate in training operations with Indian forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging facilities</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>The United States would like to be able to use Indian airfields and bases for staging forward deployed troops during combat operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States and India agree that collaboration constitutes the best strategy for preserving security, liberty, and prosperity. To facilitate this collaboration, the two countries recently revived the DPG. Created in 1995, the DPG is the framework for addressing defense cooperation between India and the United States. Subsets of the DPG include: the Executive Steering Group (ESG), the Military Cooperation Group (MCG), and the Joint Technical Group (JTG). As a result of the latest DPG meeting, an initial timeline for further sessions of all groups has been outlined through May 2002.

6. Other Matters

There are other issues that the United States requires India to address. While they are factors outside of a strategic partnership, failure to reach a resolution could significantly impact cooperative efforts. Human rights, corruption, infrastructural inefficiency, and trade practices are a few of the more important subjects. Failure to make progress in solving these problems can have one of two effects. Failure in the areas of economic reform and human rights could result in the loss of U.S. domestic support.

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98 Office of International Information Programs, United States Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group”
for continued cooperation with India. Also, failure in these areas could foster a loss of confidence in the Indian government, resulting in a new government that may not be as friendly and receptive to the United States. However, there is also a dilemma that too much assistance from or reliance upon the United States could also negatively impact the position of the Indian government.

D. U.S. CONCERNS

India has been one of the longest and loudest critics of U.S. foreign policy. Starting with India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and continuing throughout the Cold War, India has been an opponent of U.S. foreign policy more often than a proponent. India’s failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 upset Washington, and was viewed as being hypocritical. India strongly opposed, and was very vocal about it, the war in Vietnam. India favored recognition of the PRC, a contrary view to that of the United States until President Nixon shifted the policy in 1972. India has always taken exception to U.S. assistance to Pakistan. For these and a multitude of smaller reasons, the United States should not place such importance upon a relationship with India. India must demonstrate trustworthiness before receiving such a prominent position in U.S. geo-strategic matters.

India continues to stand apart from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating that it creates a system of “nuclear haves” and “nuclear have-nots.” India has tested nuclear weapons twice, one PNE in 1974 and five tests conducted in 1998. Furthermore, India has not signed the CTBT and it continues to conduct research and development in the nuclear weapons field. It also continues to seek improvements in its delivery capabilities, having tested the AGNI II missile in January 2001.

India has not complied with the established norms of the nonproliferation regime, and as such is not deserving of a strategic partnership. There are those who fear that such positive actions will undermine U.S. efforts to prevent other nations from developing nuclear weapons. It could open the door for future cases of nuclear blackmail. Furthermore, according to nonproliferation specialists within the DoS, it sends the wrong signal to the Ukraine, South Africa and other countries that have given up nuclear

weapons under the belief that the NPT would keep the number of nuclear weapons states at five.\footnote{Ibid.}

A strategic partnership with India runs the risk of upsetting the already delicate balance in South Asia. The United States is involved in trying to bring Pakistan back from the verge of becoming a failed state. Additionally, the United States is attempting to rein in the Pakistani nuclear program. A U.S. policy that openly favors India could upset the relationship with Pakistan. Should the United States enter into an important geo-strategic partnership with India, Pakistan will most likely turn to other countries, most likely China and North Korea, to help meet its security concerns.

Chinese reaction to a U.S.-India strategic partnership is unknown, yet displeasure with such cooperation is a near certainty. China is also distressed by the U.S. plans for a missile defense program. China has also expressed displeasure with Indian military advancements. Along these lines, the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea have witnessed limited naval competition between the two countries. A significant amount of cooperation between the United States and India could, at a minimum, increase Chinese refusal to negotiate in key disagreements and, at worst, create an aggressive response from the PRC. China has also, on occasion, used its military and nuclear assistance to Pakistan as a counterweight to the U.S. assistance of Taiwan. A strategic partnership between the United States and India is likely to result in enhanced China-Pakistan military assistance thereby causing further regional competition and instability.

India is not ready to play a major role in U.S. foreign policy; it must first overcome several key obstacles. These key factors, external and internal, all serve to distract India from a global focus and thereby prevent India from being the key influential state in the region.

External obstacles include:

- India’s unsettled boundary issues prevent it from positive regional relations with Bangladesh and China;
- The Kashmir issue plagues Indo-Pakistani relations preventing the two countries from moving forward.
Internal obstacles include:

- India needs to translate its technological successes to the domestic sector, there is widespread poverty outside of the technical enclaves of Hyderabad, New Delhi, and Mumbai;

- India needs to overcome fraud, corruption, and inefficiency within its basic state infrastructure;

- India’s nationalism is incomplete, ethnic tensions continue to impede the maturation of the democratic system;

- Large sectors of India’s leftist political parties are opposed to U.S.-India strategic partnership, which could pose problems in the event of coalition governments.

While India is a democracy, the government is based on power-sharing arrangements that are highly susceptible to the destabilizing effects of corruption, bribery, and other political scandals. The result is uncertainty whether future governments will honor deals struck by the present government.

E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

As the Chief Executive, President Bush has established the objective. The foreign policy team within the Bush Cabinet has responded by charting the path and choosing the tools. Secretary of State Powell and several of his key State Department officials have visited South Asia to lay the groundwork. These visits have been supported by visits from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton. Within the first ten months of this administration, India has received more official attention than it has in the past ten years.

Also in support of the new strategic shift, the DoD conducted a top-down military strategy review as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process. The threat-based, two major theater war strategy, has been replaced with a capability-based strategy. Because of the shift to a capability-based model, the United States military requires a stronger network of allies and friends. The new strategy will be premised on efforts to strengthen America’s alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of security cooperation. Furthermore, These mutually reinforcing security relationships underpin the political stability on which the prosperity of civilized nations is built. And these
arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is willing and able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad.\textsuperscript{101}

A U.S.-India strategic partnership creates a synergy of efforts in many crucial areas. Nonproliferation, terrorism, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean are big-ticket items with broad appeal. There will also be many small term benefits from such a partnership; enhanced military training as well as increased opportunities, intelligence sharing, basing privileges, space and missile technology, communications, computer hardware and software development, and energy are just a few of the outcomes. Furthermore, there appears to be no significant downside to a strategic partnership with India.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

The United States and India are experiencing a convergence of interests on many fronts. At the top of the list of common issues of concern are terrorism, trafficking of illegal drugs and weapons, Islamic fundamentalism, freedom and safety of navigation, and the stability of Persian Gulf oil. India and the United States also share similar views on regional security, economic development, and concerns over Chinese military modernization. Furthermore, the two countries desire to achieve peace and stability in South Asia, effective control of nuclear and missile proliferation, and the development of a stable and democratic Pakistan, even though they believe in different approaches to these problems.

The question is whether the level of interest is sufficient enough to override past difficulties in order to forge a new relationship. This thesis has analyzed the history of U.S.-India relations and uncovered the conditions that created the rocky relationship. Understanding the past complications is the first step.

The second step of the process is to understand what has changed between the old and the new environment. In this regard, this thesis has demonstrated that both countries have altered their thinking on many issues in the post Cold War world. This ideological shift increases the probability that the United States and India can embark upon an enduring strategic partnership.

The third step is uncovering what each side wants, expects, and is concerned about. This thesis has uncovered the desires and concerns of each country, some general and some specific. The previous steps are the foundation; this step is the ground floor.

At the end of the day, whether or not a strategic partnership emerges depends entirely upon India. The United States will move forward with its plans for a new strategic framework. While India could be a crucial element of future U.S. foreign policy, especially in South Asia, how crucial the role India can play is a matter of conjecture.
B. FINDINGS

There historically has been a personal element to U.S.-India relations that determined its success or failure. Indian leadership tends to respond positively to cordial relations, especially when accompanied by a personal touch. Conversely, threats, unwarranted criticism, or attempts to coerce receive a negative response and jeopardize the relationship. While the new Indian government, led by the BJP has largely eliminated personal interest from its foreign policy, friendly gestures still go a long way.

Both countries have valid reasons to be skeptical of real progress in improving U.S.-India relations. The history of relations between the United States and India is replete with disagreements and disappointments. They are also right to proceed with caution. The United States is concerned that technology transferred to India will not be closely controlled, allowing for proliferation of sensitive technologies. Likewise, India is cautious about U.S. motivations.

India recognizes the dilemma it faces. It does not want to become a pawn in a larger chess game but it could benefit greatly from U.S. assistance. In a recently published issue of *India Today International*, Prabhu Chawla captures the Indian perspective, there is mixed appeal, “the fear of the devastating social consequences of a large US troops presence,” reminiscent of South Vietnam coupled with, “large strategic and colossal commercial spinoffs.”102 India must balance its strong desire for autonomy with its desire to develop militarily, technologically, and economically.

Much has changed in the ten years since the Cold War ended and these changes bode well for the improvement of U.S.-India relations. Adversarial tendencies are being replaced with serious efforts at global cooperation. Because the United States and India share common views and interests in this new world order, the probability that they can create an enduring strategic partnership has improved significantly.

The strategic partnership must be founded upon global and regional concerns and not country specific. Along these lines, India must be a full-fledged partner as opposed to an assistant or associate. The process should be a gradual one. India will not

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102 Chawla, “War on Terror,” 15.
immediately offer its armed forces to a joint command; the two countries must start with limited objectives while expanding training opportunities and other military interactions.

The strategic partnership must be simple, to facilitate successful negotiations, but multi-faceted so that all sectors may benefit. Agreements between the United States should be separate entities that support a larger framework. Both countries need the ability to “buy in” or “opt out” without damaging the overall effort. Past efforts at cooperation failed because they were all-or-nothing arrangements. In several areas, frameworks exist that must be revived and/or simplified.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Agreements between the United States and India should not be based on a quid pro quo arrangement. As much as possible, arrangements should be placed into a global or regional context. The emphasis should be placed on cooperation: intelligence sharing, to possibly include shared early-warning; and joint patrols in the Indian Ocean Basin and surrounding waters to protect commercial shipping from piracy are two possible entry points.

Agreements should start with a small focus and work towards complexity over time. An example of this concept in action would be in the realm of training. Start with individuals by increasing the amount of International Military Education and Training (IMET). Continue offering Indian units the use of specialized U.S. training environments or schools, and vice-versa. As the two militaries become more familiar with one other begin to work in joint and then combined training exercises.

The United States must demonstrate reliability and consistency in its agreements and policies. India has an institutional memory; failed agreements from the past are not forgotten. The successful implementation of several agreements with a small focus will be more effective at convincing Indian domestic opposition of U.S. trustworthiness than one large agreement that takes time to implement.

The United States must attempt to understand and appreciate domestic Indian opposition when negotiating agreements. As when dealing with any democracy, the government of India is at the mercy of its constituents. Because India is a parliamentary
government, the United States must be aware of the opposition’s stance in order to avoid destabilizing the ruling party.

The DPG, ESG, MCG, and JTG are the ideal forums for mapping out the future of a U.S.-India strategic partnership in detail. These groups should be emulated in other areas of interest. While the process of working through the various groups and levels may seem cumbersome, it ensures that all parties concerned have a voice and thus are more likely to participate.

Finally, the most controversial recommendation is that India and Pakistan are not equals and should not be treated as such. Aid to India should not be balanced with aid to Pakistan. Each country has specific concerns that must be addressed individually. The United States must avoid the appearance of favoring one country over the other. In that regard, the United States should continue to refrain from anything other than keeping the two countries engaged in solving the Kashmir dispute.
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbr</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Air-to-Air missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Indian Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJT</td>
<td>Advanced Jet Trainer</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVTS</td>
<td>Combined Acceleration Vibration Climatic Test System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Indian Cabinet Committee on Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAE</td>
<td>Indian Department of Atomic Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Counterproliferation Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDDP</td>
<td>Indian Directorate of Defence Policy and Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoC</td>
<td>United States Department of Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoE</td>
<td>United States Department of Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>U.S.-India Defense Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRDL</td>
<td>Indian Defence Research and Development Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRDO</td>
<td>Indian Defence Research and Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESG</td>
<td>U.S.-India Executive Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSLV</td>
<td>Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTO</td>
<td>Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Indian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGMDP</td>
<td>Integrated Guided Missile Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Indian Naval Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISRO</td>
<td>Indian Space Research Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTG</td>
<td>U.S.-India Joint Technical Group</td>
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<td>LCA</td>
<td>Light Combat Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCG</td>
<td>U.S.-India Military Cooperation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>United States National Aeronautical and Space Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNPA</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-proliferation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>United States National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Supplier’s Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSLV</td>
<td>Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITE</td>
<td>Satellite Instrumental Television Experiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>SSM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Surface Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPS</td>
<td>Tarapur Atomic Power Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERLS</td>
<td>Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TES</td>
<td>Technology Experiment Satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCIP</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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