MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS’ ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING FOR ENLISTED INFANTRYMEN:
THE MARGINALIZATION OF BASIC WARRIORS

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AUTHOR: Major Antonio B. Smith

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Mentor: Dr. Kamal Beyoghlow
Approved: ______________
Date: _________________

Mentor: Lieutenant Colonel Scott Trout
Approved: ______________
Date: _________________
Abstract
Over the past 10 years, the Marine Corps has made significant changes to entry-level training. These changes were prompted by high non-expiration of active service attrition by First-Term Marines. Although the changes were instituted to improve the quality of all Marines entering the Marine Corps, in Hindsight, the aggregate of the changes impacted negatively upon the quality of enlisted infantrymen entering the Operational Forces. In order for the Marine Corps to correct the training deficiencies, more emphasis will have to be placed on Basic Warrior Training in the Entry-Level training process.

Subject Terms
**Title:** United States Marine Corps' Entry-Level Training for Enlisted Infantrymen: The Marginalization of Basic Warriors

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Over the past 10 years, the Marine Corps has made significant changes to entry-level training. These changes were prompted by high non-expiration of active service attrition by first-term Marines. Although the changes were instituted to improve the quality of all Marines entering the Marine Corps, in hindsight, the aggregate of the changes impacted negatively upon the quality of enlisted infantrymen entering the operational forces. In order for the Marine Corps to correct the training deficiencies, more emphasis will have to be placed on basic warrior training in the entry-level training process.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS’ ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING FOR INFANTRYMEN: THE MARGINALIZATION OF BASIC WARRIORS

Author: Major Antonio B. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps

Thesis: This essay examines Marine Corps’ entry-level training (recruit training and basic infantry training) of infantrymen in order to discern whether or not the training is sufficient.

Discussion: Over the past ten years, the Marine Corps has made significant changes to the Recruit Training Regiments’ (RTR’s) and Infantry Training Battalions’ (ITB’s) curricula due to institutional changes prompted by high non-expiration of active service attrition. A few of the changes included implementing a corps-wide values program, transferring combat related individual training standards from the RTR’s to the ITB’s, and decreasing the training time at the ITB’s. The aggregate of these changes has diminished the quality of the enlisted infantrymen entering the operational forces.

What was known as "Basic Warrior Training" at the recruit depots in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s was removed by late 1996. The responsibility for basic warrior training was transferred to the Infantry Training Battalions, but no additional time was allocated to the ITB’s for the additional training requirements. In fact, training time was removed from the ITB’s in 1998. In order for the Marine Corps to develop basic warriors that are “second to none,” these issues have to be examined. After researching the issues, below are recommendations to resolve the problems.

Conclusion:

1. The Marine Corps needs to maximize combat training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depots by returning basic warrior training.
2. The Marine Corps needs to develop a single overarching Marine Corps Order for the Marine Corps Recruit Depots and Schools of Infantry. This order will provide the guidance necessary to ensure the two commands are in concert with higher headquarters and that the efforts of both commands are complimentary.
3. The training time at the Infantry Training Battalions needs to be increased to improve the quality of training.
METHODOLOGY

This essay reviews United States Marine Corps entry-level training for infantrymen to determine whether or not the training is sufficient. Chapter one is the introduction and background information. The second chapter identifies the institutional changes that affected entry-level training for infantrymen. Also, contained in this chapter are comparisons in vital skill sets (i.e., land navigation, marksmanship, radio communications…) between US Marine Corps entry-level training for enlisted infantrymen and that of the U.S. Army and British Royal Marines Commandos. The third chapter identifies and analyzes the impact of the changes to training. The fourth chapter explains the importance of a single overarching Marine Corps Order for the Marine Corps Recruit Depots and Schools of Infantry that outlines the mission, objectives, and other guidance by higher headquarters. The fifth chapter identifies “cost,” in terms funding and resources, if changes are mandated. Chapter six describes the correlation between entry-level training for infantrymen and national interests and readiness. The conclusion focuses on recommendations to improve the inadequacies.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions.

Nor ought we believe that there is much difference between man and man, But to think that superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school.

-- Archidamus
Spartan King

This essay will argue that, over the past ten years, the U.S. Marine Corps has marginalized entry-level training for enlisted infantrymen to the point that the combat preparedness of infantrymen entering the Operational Forces is in jeopardy of being insufficient. This paper will develop the preceding argument by showing (1) how institutional changes in the mid-1990’s affected training; (2) the impact of the institutional changes; (3) the “costs” to resolve modifications to training in terms of funding, structure, and training time; (4) that entry-level training has a direct correlation to national interests and readiness. This essay will conclude that in order to maximize entry-level training for enlisted infantrymen, more combat related skills need to be formally taught in recruit training.

Perhaps entry-level training for enlisted infantrymen is not developing basic infantrymen with the necessary skills needed to survive in combat (for example, land navigation). Arguably, graduates of Infantry Training Battalion still need a considerable amount of training in the operational forces before they possess the skills to operate in

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combat conditions. Is it incumbent upon the ITB’s to graduate combat ready infantrymen?

The British Royal Marines, who train for missions similar to U.S. Marines, advocate that a graduate of their infantry training is “ready to go wherever his orders take him – and, if necessary, ready to fight the instant he gets there.”\(^2\) This was proven recently in Sierra Leon. The Commander of the British Royal Marines, in his after action report, praised the actions of young Royal Marines who had recently graduated from the Royal Marines recruit training.\(^3\) British Royal Marines Commandos undergo thirty weeks of entry-level training, whereas infantrymen in the U.S. Marine Corps undergo approximately twenty weeks of entry-level training.

**BACKGROUND**

Entry-level training for infantrymen in the U.S. Marine Corps is comprised of recruit training and military occupational training. Recruit training is conducted at Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRD’s) Parris Island, South Carolina and San Diego, California. The mission of recruit training is to develop basically trained Marines who can succeed in combat and be productive individuals in society. The objectives of recruit training are to instill discipline, military bearing, and esprit de corps; to teach general military subjects, individual combat basic tasks, or individual training standards (ITS’s); and to build character and increase physical fitness. The graduation requirements are to pass the physical fitness test, qualify combat water survival 4 (CWS 4) level or higher, qualify with the service rifle, pass the Battalion Commander's inspection, pass the general military subjects’ examinations, and complete the Crucible.

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U.S. Marine Corps’ recruit training is twelve weeks (84 days) in duration. There are 64 training days (t-days) interspersed in this three-month period. The remaining days are not categorized as t-days, but they are equally as important in the process of transforming a civilian to a Marine. This time is important because it encompasses Team Week (formerly known as Mess and Maintenance Week), free time on Sundays to attend religious services, and administrative time. Each recruit depot trains approximately 18,000 male recruits per year. MCRD Parris Island (PI), the only recruit depot that trains female recruits, trains approximately 2,000 female recruits each year.

The recruit depots’ training curricula are standardized; however, the training schedules are not. The following is an overview of the training schedule at each recruit depot:

**San Diego**

Weeks 1-4 Close Order Drill, Customs & Courtesies, Marine Corps History, Core Values, Close Combat, and Physical Training

Week 5 Team Week (Formerly Mess & Maintenance)

Week 6 Swim Week

Week 7 Final Events Week

Week 8 Rifle Marksmanship (Grass Week/Snapping-in)

Week 9 Rifle Qualification (Firing Week)

Week 10 Field Week

Week 11 Battalion Commanders Inspection/ Crucible

Week 12 Transition Week/ Graduation
## Parris Island

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Weeks 1-4</th>
<th>Close Order Drill, Customs &amp; Courtesies, Marine Corps History, Core Values, Close Combat, and Physical Training</th>
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<td>Week 5</td>
<td>Swim Week</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 6</td>
<td>Field Week</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 7</td>
<td>Rifle Marksmanship (Grass Week/Snapping-In)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 8</td>
<td>Rifle Marksmanship (Firing Week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 9</td>
<td>Team Week (Formerly Mess &amp; Maintenance)</td>
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<td>Week 10</td>
<td>Field Week</td>
</tr>
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<td>Crucible/Administrative Time</td>
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<td>Week 12</td>
<td>Transition Week/Battalion Commanders Inspection/Graduation</td>
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The Crucible was added to recruit training in 1996. The initial intent of the Crucible as described in ALMAR 160/97 states, “It is a 54 hour field training exercise that presents continuous physical and mental challenges. Designed to emphasize the importance of teamwork in overcoming adversity, it is truly the defining moment in recruit training.” In a nutshell, the Crucible tests the intestinal fortitude of every recruit by requiring the recruits to negotiate numerous obstacles as a team, while being deprived of food and sleep. There is also a considerable amount of time spent discussing lessons learned and general values (i.e., respect, courage, honesty, etc…). The recruits receive approximately 8 hours of sleep and 2 meals ready-to-eat during the 54 hour training period. Throughout the event, there is a continual emphasis on teamwork in overcoming adversity and adaptive problem solving.
The Crucible is designed around six major field events and augmented with eleven “Warrior Stations.” A final 9-mile forced march concludes with a Morning Colors Ceremony, followed by the Marine Corps Emblem Ceremony, where the Drill Instructors present the Marine Corps Emblem to their new Marines. Upon receiving the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor (Marine Corps emblem), the faces of the new Marines glow with pride and a sense of accomplishment. The parents, friends, educators, Marines, and other guests in attendance also seem to be overwhelmed with pride and joy. On occasion, at MCRD San Diego, an F/A-18 does a fly-by to congratulate the new Marines. The motion of the plane, coupled with the roar of the engines, is quite motivating and spectacular. The Marines then hike to the last ceremony associated with the Crucible, the Warriors Breakfast, where they receive steak, eggs, and juice.

Prior to the incorporation of the Crucible event, recruits earned the title of Marine during the graduation ceremony. A recruit now earns the title of Marine one-week prior to graduation, at the Marine Cops Emblem Ceremony. The last week of recruit training is “Transition Week” and graduation is held on Friday. After graduation, the Marines are allowed to take 10 days of leave before reporting to one of the Schools of Infantry (SOI’s).

All Marines, regardless of military occupational specialty, report to one of the two Schools of Infantry. One school is located on the East Coast at Camp Lejeune, NC and the other school is located on the West Coast at Camp Pendleton, CA. Depending on military occupational specialty, the SOI’s then assign the Marines to Marine Combat

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4 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Message to All Marines 160/97. Subject: “Entry Level Training Changes.” 130900Z May 1997
Training Battalion (MCT Bn) or Infantry Training Battalion (ITB). Marine Combat Training Battalion trains all non-infantry Marines in basic infantry skills. Training lasts 17 calendar days and is built around a likely expeditionary scenario. Graduates of MCT Bn are considered riflemen, capable of augmenting an infantry fire team or squad. After graduating from MCT Bn, Marines proceed to their military occupational schools.

Infantry Training Battalion (ITB) is the military occupational school for infantrymen. ITB trains basic infantrymen (03XX’s) in the skills required to integrate into an infantry unit. The different MOS’s in the enlisted infantry field are Rifleman (0311), Machinegunner (0331), Mortarman (0341), Assaultman (0351) and Anti-tank Gunner (0352). The training for infantrymen is divided into two major courses, Rifleman’s Course and Weapons Course. The Rifleman’s Course lasts 36 calendar days and all infantrymen are required to attend. After graduation, Riflemen proceed to their designated operational units. All of the other infantry students remain for another 17 calendar days for their respective weapons courses.

The ITB’s training curricula are standardized and the training schedules are very similar.

**ITB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Training</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Week 1</td>
<td>M16A2, M249, M203, Grenades, and AT-4 training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 2</td>
<td>Land Navigation, Military Operations in Urban Terrain, and Field Skill Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 3</td>
<td>Patrolling and Ambush Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 4</td>
<td>Defense and Offense Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week 5</td>
<td>Field Exercise/Out-Processing</td>
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Weapons Courses

Week 1  Gunnery/Offense/Defense
Week 2  Live Fire/ Performance Evaluations

The Weapons Courses are multi-tracked (separate and parallel courses) to train each Marine in his particular MOS. Upon graduation; machinegunners, assaultmen, mortarmen, and anti-tank gunners depart ITB and report to their designated operational units. The combined time in recruit training (12 weeks) and infantry MOS training is 19 to 20 weeks. In the mid-1990’s, changes were made in the Marine Corps’ entry level training of enlisted infantrymen that affected the quality of the basic infantryman, and the next chapter will explore these changes.
Chapter 2

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Is the current entry-level training of infantrymen inadequate because of the training changes that occurred in the mid-1990’s? Entry-level training for infantrymen regressed in the mid-1990’s due to a number of institutional changes that in their aggregate impacted negatively on developing infantrymen. These institutional changes were prompted by high non-Expiration of Active Service (EAS) attrition among all first-term Marines.\(^5\) One of the changes that occurred was that a considerable number of Individual Training Standards (ITS’s), normally taught at the recruit depots, were transferred to the Infantry Training Battalions.\(^6\) It was believed that the Infantry Training Battalions could do a better job teaching Basic Warrior Training (BWT) than the recruit depots.\(^7\) Also, in early 1998, Infantry Training Battalions’ training days were reduced. It was believed at the time by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) that training at the ITB’s could be made more efficient in a condensed period of time, even after additional ITS’s were added to the curriculum. This would be made possible by increasing the size of the staffs to compensate for loss time.\(^8\) Finally, more values training was implemented Corps-wide to address the perceived lack of morals amongst Generation X.\(^9\)

Non-EAS attrition for females was over fifty percent and for males it was over thirty-three percent. It seemed commonplace during this period that Marines were

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6 Lt.Col Leon Pappa, USMC (ret.), Former Head of Training Programs Section, Ground Training Branch, TECOM. Interviewed by author on 22 December 2000.
7 SgtMaj Lee, 2.
8 John P. Isakson, GS-12, Education Specialist, School of Infantry (W). Interviewed by author, 3 January 2001.
9 SgtMaj. Lee, 2.
becoming more and more involved in heinous acts of violence -- from participation in a
rape of a 12 year old school girl in Okinawa to Marines killing a Marine outside of a bar
near Camp Lejeune. The emphasis in values training did not only occur at the recruit
depots, but Corps-wide. It was not a bad idea to enhance values training, since the
Corps’ image as a well disciplined force was at stake. Theodore Roosevelt once said,
“To educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society.”

In late 1996, the Marine Corps’ Values Program was implemented. It provided
commanders with the resources necessary to address values, leadership, and related
issues. Also, tools were put into place to sustain the program in the operational forces,
for example, the publication of the Marine Corps Values and Leadership User’s Guide for
Discussion Leaders. This publication was designed so that the average Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) or Officer could conduct a guided discussion on subjects
ranging from fraternization to race relations. Other actions were taken, such as the
issuing of Marines Value Cards. An “All Marines” message directed that “every Marine
should have the Marine values card in his or her possession at all times, just as they carry
their identification cards and wear their identification tags. The card is a daily reminder
that they joined a Corps of dedicated professionals for whom honor, courage, and
commitment are a way of life.” The Marine Corps also began the Unit Cohesion
Program, which sought to keep Marines together at the squad sized level or below from
the Crucible event to assignment in the same squad in the operational forces.

Recruit training was expanded from eleven to twelve weeks on October 1, 1996.
Over 50 hours of Drill Instructors’ time was added for additional time to teach, mold, and

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10 Karen Bohlin, Kevin Ryan and Center for the Advancement of Character and Ethics at Boston
mentor the recruits, instilling in each the self discipline and selflessness the future battlefield would demand. Other initiatives, like the Crucible event, were implemented.

During 1997 efforts began to reduce training days at the Infantry Training Battalions. During February 1998, the Infantry Training Battalions’ course lengths were reduced from 46 calendar days to 36 calendar days. This change, coupled with the transfer of ITS’s during the previous two years from the recruit depots to the ITB’s, overwhelmed the ITB’s, especially since the larger staffs and supporting elements were never put in place by HQMC. Below are the modifications to training days, individual training standards (ITS’s), academic hours, and skill sets (see Appendix A, detailed list of ITS’s) that were adjusted as outlined in the Recruit Training Regiments’ and Infantry Training Battalions’ Programs of Instruction (POI’s).

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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITS’s</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Academic Hours</td>
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Infantry Training Battalions

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<tr>
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<th>1993</th>
<th>1996</th>
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<tr>
<td>Training Days</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITS’s</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Hours</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>523</td>
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</table>

Basic Warrior Training Skill Sets Transferred From Recruit Training

1. Land Navigation
2. Prepare and operate the AN/PRC-77 radio
3. Employ a live fragmentation grenade
4. Install and fire or recover the M18A1 claymore mine.
5. Move through a minefield.
6. How to operate the AT-4
7. How to operate the M 249 SAW
8. How to operate the M 203
9. Fire Team Formations
10. State the mission of the Marine Rifle Squad.
11. Select field firing positions
12. Perform local security as an LP/OP
13. Emplane and deplane from a helicopter
14. Embark and debark from an amphibious assault vehicle
15. Receive a five-paragraph order

As one can see, the number of ITS’s taught during recruit training declined by half over this period, while the number of ITS’s taught at the Schools of Infantry doubled. Also, the Infantry Training Battalions lost a considerable amount of training time. Once all of the dust had settled at the Infantry Training Battalions in 1999, the average hours per training day skyrocketed to 17.4 hours, from approximately 10 hours in 1996.

Combat skill sets are vital in the development of infantrymen. The “Basic Warrior Training” that was incorporated into recruit training in the late 1980’s was intended to make sure basic combat skills were taught where the Marine was created. By the mid-1990’s, most of the “Basic Warrior Training” had been removed from recruit training. If a recruit leaves basic training and does not have some familiarity with land navigation, fire team formations, weapons organic to the fire team, and operating a radio, then it is reasonable to think the Marine has failed to be basically trained. To further explore whether or not a recruit needs basic skills, a comparison between the Marine Corps and the U.S. Army/British Royal Commandos will indicate where other services stress the importance of basic combat skills to sufficiently prepare trainees for combat. Arguably, the Marine Corps has transferred vital skills that should be taught during recruit training from recruit training to the Infantry Training Battalions.

The U.S. Army’s objectives of basic training are to train each basic trainee to successfully qualify with the M16A2 service rifle, pass the physical fitness test, complete the 5 mile “Eagle Run” in under 45 minutes, complete all tactical foot marches (4, 8, 10, 12, 16, 20, and 25 km foot marches), successfully throw 2 live hand grenades, negotiate the confidence course and obstacle courses, complete combative training to include rifle
bayonet, pugil training and hand-to-hand combat training, demonstrate knowledge of the seven Army values, completion of the field training exercise, and receive training to standard in all mandatory subjects. The duration of basic training is nine weeks. The Army has One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for infantrymen. This means that infantrymen will remain at the same location for another six to seven weeks to receive advanced infantry training.

During basic training, the U.S. Army teaches and evaluates employment of hand grenades (including live-fire), how to send a radio message, and how to construct individual fighting positions. The Army also trains and evaluates to refresher level, land navigation, fire team movement, and basic emplacement and removal of mines. The Army’s recruit training cycle is nine-weeks in duration as compared to the Marine Corps 12-week recruit training cycle. Soldiers with an infantry MOS will undergo six to seven more weeks of advanced training. Since time is spent during basic training teaching vital combat skills, it is likely that when the soldiers with infantry MOS’s undergo advanced infantry training, they are better prepared. The aforementioned data shows that the U.S. Army formally teaches more vital combat tasks than the Marine Corps in a shorter period of time. Like the U.S. Army, The Royal Marines also teach a significant number of combat skills by the twelfth week (length of USMC basic training) of a thirty week training cycle.

The mission of the Royal Marines’ recruit training is "to train all students to achieve the standards set in the recruit course training plan in a safe, effective and efficient manner, in order that they can confidently take their place in 3 Commando Brigade Royal

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As mentioned previously, the British Royal Marines Commandos’ training lasts for thirty weeks. There are approximately 50 events (i.e., land navigation, forced marches, rifle qualification, military knowledge exams, etc…) that a trainee must pass. In addition, the trainees have to undergo a grueling eight-day Commando Course that is the culminating training event. The highlights of the Commando Course are the endurance course, the nine-mile speed march, the Tarzan Assault Course, and the thirty mile march in which the recruits carry their rifles and twenty plus pounds of equipment. The "Thirty Miler" has to be completed within 8 hours. In addition to the requirements to pass the aforementioned events, the trainee must also demonstrate successfully the following traits:

1. Determination
2. Courage
3. Unselfishness
4. Professional Skill
5. Cheerfulness under adversity

The Royal Marines' recruits receive land navigation, radio operating procedures, and fieldcraft prior to the twelfth week of training. Unlike, the Royal Marines, U.S. Marines do not train in these skills during recruit training. From the data it appears that the Royal Marines and U.S. Army have incorporated more combat related skills into their training curriculum earlier in the training cycle. This suggests that there is validity to a building block approach to ensure training opportunities are maximized at each level. It appears that most of the combat training has been relegated to the Infantry Training Battalions instead of dividing the effort between the RTR’s and the ITB’s in a more proportional

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manner. There is a significant negative impact on the ITB’s and Operational Forces because of this approach to training.
CHAPTER 3
IMPACT OF CHANGES

During October 1999, Training and Education Division (since renamed Training and Education Command), Marine Corps Combat Development Command hosted an Entry Level Training Continuum (ELTC) Conference to discern the merits and shortcomings of entry-level training. Entry Level Training Continuum Conferences are designed to review the entry level training process as one continuum instead of focusing only on the Recruit Training Regiments, Schools of Infantry, follow-on military occupational specialty schools or the supporting establishments. This allows Training and Education Command (TECOM) to discern whether or not training is complimentary, redundant, or useless based on the requirements expressed by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), and the Operational Forces.

The Infantry Training Battalions and Operational Forces identified deficiencies and merits in entry-level training for infantrymen. Topics of major concern for the ITB’s included the lack of time to sufficiently teach and conduct practical application of a number of individual training standards, and an overworked training staff due to long training days (17.4 hours). One of the merits identified by the Second Marine Division was the strong sense of teamwork demonstrated by new Marines entering the Operational Forces. However, the Operational Forces, to include Second Marine Division, were in

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agreement that new Marines were deficient in field firing skills, did not extend proper military courtesies, lacked mental toughness, and lacked upper body strength.\footnote{Marine Forces Reserve, First Marine Division, Second Marine Division, and Second Force Service Support Group Briefs. Briefs presented at the October 1999 Entry Level Training Continuum Conference. Quantico, Va. Photocopies.}

Briefers from the School of Infantry (East) presented a case that their ability to train infantrymen was severely hampered because of the changes in the entry level training process from 1996 – 1998. The effect of these changes seemed to be more profound at SOI (E) than SOI (W). The workday at SOI (E) averaged 17.4 hours per day, while the workday at SOI (W) averaged 13.5 hours per day. Operational tempo (Optempo) and Personnel tempo (Perstempo) were different at the two SOI’s partly because SOI (W) had better access to ranges than SOI (E). SOI (E), and SOI (W), concurred in the following areas regarding the current training schedule:

1. The current training schedule:
   - precludes skill progression beyond a minimum standard of proficiency.
   - lacks sufficient remediation opportunity for weapons military occupational skills.
   - precludes further expansion of task inventory.
2. Core tasks must often be re-taught by operating forces.
3. The current training schedule is characteristically inefficient in its use of available training time, resources, and personnel.\footnote{Infantry Training Battalion, SOI (E). “Infantry Training Brief.” Brief presented at the October 1999 Entry Level Training Continuum Conference. Quantico, Va. Slide 7, photocopy.}

The first problem identified was that the current schedule precluded skill progression beyond a minimum standard of proficiency. Although “minimum standard” carries a negative connotation, the established standard is the minimum standard mandated by the Marine Corps and is not to be confused with failing. Arguably, there is a natural
tendency for trainers to attempt to make their students as proficient as they are. One way to look at the issue regarding meeting standards is to look at the current physical fitness test (PFT). Most Marines can do more than 3 pull-ups, 50 crunches, and complete 3 miles in less than 28 minutes with a total score of 135 or more. However, some Marines would argue that if a Marine scores anything less than 200 points out of a possible 300 points that they are weak and should be assigned to participate in the unit’s remedial physical fitness program. The bottom line is that Marines cannot arbitrarily invent standards that are not in accordance with Marine Corps standards.

During the brief, SOI (E) identified that the level of proficiency of mortarmen had decreased since 1997 when the school had more time to teach mortar small deflection and elevation manipulation. In 1997, the mortar manipulation failure rate was 2-3%, and by 1999, the failure rate had increased to 10-12%.\(^\text{19}\) The scoring was not conducted arbitrarily, but in accordance with Marine Corps standards. The degradation of skills was also apparent in field firing skills.

The second point made by the ITB’s was that they lacked the time to remediate skills taught to the students in the Weapons Courses. This is a valid concern because courses should include additional time to remediate those skills that have traditionally been difficult to master (i.e., land navigation). If time is not available, then the staff has to create time on the weekends or during off-hours to remediate students. Therefore, it is likely that more training days would improve the initial passing and failure rates, and if needed, allow for limited remediation time without significantly interfering with off-hours.

\(^{19}\) Ibid, slide 9.
The third point of concern was that core tasks have to be re-taught by the Operating Forces (for example, radio procedures). Arguably, this is not a valid concern since core tasks will always have to be reinforced by the Operating Forces. It is not unusual to have to re-teach or practice certain skills in the Operating Forces. Lieutenants and Staff Sergeants are teachers. In peace and war, they teach, train, and re-teach, if necessary. It is true that once a task is taught that the same amount of time does not have to be spent reteaching the same task. However, reinforcement occurs frequently in the Operational Forces and it is the accepted norm that the Operational Forces must always build on what was taught in the entry-level training process.

The fourth point of concern was that the current schedule precludes any expansion or the opportunity to teach additional ITS’s. This point surfaced as a result of the Marine Corps’ intentions to implement a martial arts program that will begin in entry-level training. If the new martial arts program exceeds the current time allocated for close combat, then HQMC should allow more time for the SOI’s to conduct the martial arts training.

The fifth point of concern was that the current schedule (36-day Rifleman Course/17-day Weapons Courses) was characteristically inefficient in its use of available training time, resources, and personnel. Leading up to the June 2000 ELTC Conference, the SOI’s presented a 42-calendar days schedule to TECOM that was a more efficient schedule than the 36/17 calendar days schedules. The proposed scheduled consisted of 11 days of a common skills package attended by all students, and on the 12th day the staff would divide the students into groups based on their MOS’s. This arrangement would last until final exercises. In the 36/17-day schedules, all infantrymen underwent the entire 36-day Rifleman Course, which is not a prerequisite for the Marines reporting to
the Weapons Courses. The Marines with weapons MOS’s then attended the 17-day course to be trained in their particular weapon system. Therefore, the 42-day schedule makes more sense because students would get more training time in their particular MOS. This schedule also pays dividends for the Operational Forces because it allows more time for students to improve field firing skills, which was an expressed concern of the Operational Forces. To the novice, it might appear that training time increases with the 42-day schedule, but it actually does not (see T2P2 section.). In actuality, riflemen would report to the fleet six days later, while Marines with weapons MOS’s would report to the fleet 11 days sooner.

Although the problems were presented by SOI (E), both SOI’s agreed that they were over tasked, but still maintained some differences on what changes would remedy the problems (for example, SOI (W) resisted reducing Military Operations in Urban Terrain). Based on the need for immediate relief, changes were made to relieve pressure on the SOI’s created by high optempo/perstempo. The Infantry Training Battalions were directed to do the following:

1. Delete the following ITS’s from the Rifleman’s Course Program of Instruction:
   a. M16 AN/PAQ-4C  (0311.01.09)
   b. AN/PVS-7B (0311.17.01)
   c. AT-4 (0311.04.03)
   d. Crew Served Weapons (0311.05.01 & 0311.05.02)
   e. Make a tactical decision (0311.14.01)
   f. Communications (0311.16.01, 0311.16.02, 0311.16.03, & 0311.16.04)
   g. Terrorism Awareness (0311.13.01)
h. First Aid (0311.19.01, 0311.19.02, 0311.19.03, 0311.19.04, 0311.19.05, 0311.19.06, 0311.19.07, & 0311.19.08)

2. Administer a final PFT.

3. Reduce Military Operations In Urban Terrain (MOUT) training from 75 hours to 45 hours (Eliminating the MOUT Field Exercise). 

There was a total of 74.5 hours removed from the Infantry Training Battalions POI’s in October 1999. The removal of the ITS’s would be only temporary and, as soon as time becomes available, the classes would be taught again.

During June 2000, TECOM hosted another Entry-Level Training Continuum Conference (ELTC) to address issues germane to the entry-level training process, including long-term remedies for the problems identified in the October 1999 conference. The most significant revelation was that the Operational Forces were “not satisfied” with the development of basic infantrymen. The position of the Operational Forces solidified that corrective actions were necessary to better prepare infantrymen entering the operational forces.

The three possible courses of action (COA) to remedy the problems at the ITB’s were briefed as follows:

- COA 1 -- Status Quo (+) – Increase Rifleman’s Course to 42 calendar days schedule, with an increase in T2P2, no increase in structure.

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• COA 2 -- Split Track – Combine Rifleman’s Course and Weapons Courses, creating a 42 calendar days schedule, with no increase in T2P2 (Trainees, Transients, Patients, and Prisoners-- mandated measurement tool to account for Marines not assigned to an operational or supporting force commander, but counting against force structure.), but with limited reorganization of structure.

• COA 3 -- Split Track (+) – COA 2 combined with an undetermined amount of days. Additional days would be based on future requirements (for example, martial arts).  

The decision was made to allow SOI (E) to experiment with a 42 calendar days schedule (Course Of Action 2). The advantages of COA 2 were a fifty-percent increase in weapons MOS training days, fifteen percent increase in the Rifleman’s MOS training days, and no increase in training time or structure (manpower). The disadvantages of COA 2 were that no time was put back into the schedule to teach the ITS’s that were removed in October 1999, and the Weapon’s Company had to be reorganized. Furthermore, time was not created for additional physical training and/or martial arts training. This was another short-term fix that was necessary because no long-term resolution was foreseeable.

The initial data from this test period shows that the increase in calendar days, 36 to 42 at the Infantry Training Battalions, improved the quality of training. The data was provided by ITB (East) in March 2001.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>36-Day</th>
<th>42-day</th>
<th>Improvement %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>0331</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M240 10 meter qual (max pts)</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M240 disassembly/assembly</td>
<td>2:06</td>
<td>1:51</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
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<td>M2 (50 cal) 10 meter qual (max pts)</td>
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<td>82.7%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1:31</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<td><strong>81mm</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mount</td>
<td>58.0 sec</td>
<td>47.4 sec</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Deflection/elevation change</td>
<td>28.1 sec</td>
<td>17.3 sec</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Deflection/elevation change</td>
<td>27.9 sec</td>
<td>21.3 sec</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refer/Re-align aiming stakes</td>
<td>52.5 sec</td>
<td>49.3 sec</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lay Mortar using reciprocal lay</td>
<td>56.3 sec</td>
<td>48.8 sec</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>0351</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M47 Dragon Precision Guided Tracking System (PGTS) (% passed on 1st attempt-3 class Av)</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
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<td>Armored Fighting Vehicle Identification</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
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<td><strong>0311</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M249 10-meter qualification (% passed)</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perform M249 Maintenance</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Land Navigation</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Physical Fitness Test</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Added Advantages Gained with the 42-day Schedule:**

1. The training week was reduced from 6.5 days to 5.5 days per week.
2. Academic training hours per day were reduced from 17.4 hours to 15.1 hours.

3. The increase in training time facilitated the establishment of a battalion level instructor group. This establishment allowed standardized instruction and evaluation throughout the battalion.


5. There was added time for physical training.

6. The increase in training time allowed for remediation to be conducted on weekends vice immediate recycle to the following class.\(^\text{23}\)

The data is a snap-shot of the 42 calendar days schedule versus the 36 calendar days schedule; however, it shows that increasing the time at the ITB's significantly improved the quality of training. In order for the time to be maximized even more, there is a need for the Marine Corps to identify exactly which basic combat skills are expected to be mastered by the basic infantryman. During the June 2000 Entry Level Training Continuum Conference, the attendees recommended an overarching Marine Corps Order that mandates the mission, objectives, and other pertinent guidance necessary for the Recruit Training Depots and Schools of Infantry to operate in concert with higher headquarters' guidance.

Training and Education Command’s challenge, in conjunction with the entry-level training commands and Operational Forces, is to produce an overarching Entry Level Training Order (Key Initiative, ELTC Conf, June 2000) or a series of closely related documents to identify what skills are to be taught where – at the formal schools and/or within the Operational Forces. Identifying the division of labor in the grand scheme of entry-level training is critical in achieving training efficacy. Training Command, TECOM has started in the right direction in developing a series of common skills documents that identify the skills every Marine should master and when those skills should be mastered. The first of those documents, Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1510.89A, *ITS System for Marine Corps Common Skills*, was published in September of 2000. The Marine Corps Common Skills Handbooks will replace the Marine Battle Skills Training (MBST) Guidebooks. However, the MCRD’s and SOI’s still need an overarching entry-level training MCO that parallels the commons skills documents with regards to ITS’s, but a document that is more comprehensive in nature as it relates to entry-level training.

The most compelling reason for creating a single entry-level training MCO is to outline HQMC’s policies regarding entry-level training at the MCRD’s and SOI’s. There is currently an MCO (1510.C, *Recruit Training*) that governs the operations at the recruit depots and outlines the mission, objectives, graduation criteria, treatment of recruits, and other information germane to the recruit training environment. Currently, there is no
similar order that regulates the Schools of Infantry. Therefore, the Schools of Infantry have more latitude regarding the graduation requirements and other training objectives. A single overarching order should be developed that provides higher headquarters’ guidance for both commands. This will also help to strengthen the bond between the commands and clearly identify which tasks and missions should be performed by each. Also, such an order would help prevent or alleviate occasional disagreements between the commands (for example, what procedures should be followed for Marines arriving at the SOI’s without the proper gear or what procedures should be followed for Marines arriving at the SOI’s injured). If the responsibilities are officially documented in an order, it will be less likely that contentious issues will escalate to a point that the relationships between commands become unhealthy. Furthermore, the Operational Forces would have a better understanding of the mission, scope, and graduation criteria for recruits and students at the ITB’s. Currently, if someone in the Operational Forces wanted to determine the graduation criteria for the Recruit Training Regiments, Infantry Training Battalions, and Marine Combat Training Battalions, there would have to be a search for the Recruit Training Order or contact with the recruit depots to get the information regarding recruits. One would then have to contact each School of Infantry to get a list of graduation criteria. If that fails, TECOM is the only other location where the information is readily available. Compound this with the continuous cycle of change and the person inquiring in the fleet may never get an accurate list of the graduation criteria at each command.

It appears that in the 1990’s, the juggling of ITS’s from the RTR’s to the SOI’s to the Operational Forces became confusing. An overarching entry-level training order would help prevent this from reoccurring. It could also serve as a catalyst to promote
other beneficial activities for the entry-level training commands. For example, the order could stipulate that exchange visits between commands are required at least twice a year to ensure a healthy exchange of ideas or maintain standardization between commands.

As the entry-level training process is being scrutinized, one cannot forget that if changes occur in the entry-level training process, then it is likely that other costs are going to be associated with these changes. Costs in terms of resources, both manpower and material, and also in training time.
The “cost of doing business” has to be one of the critical factors in deciding to modify entry-level training for infantrymen. Does the Marine Corps pay in resources today or blood tomorrow on some distant battlefield? The impact of added time in formal schools for recruits/students and fiscal increases to cover the costs for extended training time has to be examined carefully. It has to be examined carefully because time and resources are too precious to be distributed liberally.

T2P2 (Trainees, Transients, Patients, and Prisoners) is a mandated measurement tool to account for Marines not assigned to an operational or supporting force commander, but counting against force structure. A Marine is considered in a T2P2 status if he/she is placed into one of the categories below:

1. Trainees – Entry-level accession or in a military school in excess of 20 weeks.
2. Transients – In the process of conducting a permanent change of duty station or assignment.
3. Patients – Hospitalized in excess of 30 days.
4. Prisoners – Incarcerated in excess of 30 days, but less than 6 months.

T2P2 is calculated in man-years. According to the August 2000 Troop List Manning Controls (Enlisted Force Only), T2P2 was calculated at 25,448 man-years. This means that, across the Marine Corps, 25,448 Marines were not assigned to an operational and supporting force commander, but counting against force structure. Out of the 25,448 not assigned to the enlisted force structure, 19,626 (77%) were in a trainee status. To
take it one step further, out of the 19,626 in trainee status, 19,233 (98%) were either
assigned to boot camp (40%), entry-level follow-on schools (54%), or boot leave (4%).

The decision by TECOM to proceed with the experimental 42-day schedule at
Infantry Training Battalion (East) did not increase T2P2 and did reduce the unrealistic
(approximately 17.5 hours per day) working days for the staff. This was possible because
the experimental 42-day Course is a multi-tracked course that eliminates the need to have
separate Weapons Courses. The equations below illustrate how T2P2 does not increase:

ITB (East) Current Schedule:

Rifleman’s Course: 4,000 (students) X 36 (calendar days) = 144,000

\[
\frac{144,000}{365} = 395 \text{ Man-years}
\]

Weapons Courses: 1,500 (students) X 17 (calendar days) = 25,500

\[
\frac{25,500}{365} = 70 \text{ Man-years}
\]

CURRENT SCHEDULE TOTAL MAN YEARS IS 465.

ITB (East) Experimental 42-day Schedule:

Multi-tracked Course: 4000 (students) X 42 (calendar days) = 168,000

\[
\frac{168,000}{365} = 460 \text{ Man-years}
\]

EXPERIMENTAL SCHEDULE TOTAL MAN-YEARS IS 460.

The experimental schedule does not increase T2P2, however, in order to
incorporate martial arts training and to replace ITS’s that were temporarily removed from
the Infantry Training Battalion’s curricula in October 1999, it is likely that more days
will have to be added to the 42-day schedule.

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24 J. Scott Frampton, Major, United States Marine Corps. Manpower, Plans, and Policies; Manpower and
Now the question becomes: “is it worth it to increase T2P2?” This is a difficult decision because, on the one hand, the Marine Corps is experiencing T2P2 at over 25,000 Man-years for the enlisted force. On the other hand, in order not to take time from other areas in the entry-level training process, it may be better to increase T2P2. The answer ultimately lies in identifying what is expected of infantrymen in terms of the requirements established by the Marine Corps. Again, it goes back to the need of producing a single overarching entry-level training order that directs what is to be accomplished at MCRD’s and SOI’s. T2P2 is a major concern, but equally as important are structure increases and fiscal increases.

During the June 2000 ELTC Conference, one advantage to experiment with the 42 calendar days schedule was that there were no structure increases. However, the SOI’s would have to be manned at 95% under the current manning/staffing precedence. Regarding fiscal increases, and it may come as a surprise, it costs approximately $111 for each 03XX to be trained using the 42 day schedule. If the days at the ITB’s increase by 7, which is just a random number, the cost would only increase by approximately $25 per 03XX. So, the Marine Corps could expect to spend approximately an additional $200,000 to $300,000, if the schedules increased by seven days.

The data provided gives an indication of what the costs will be in terms of funding, training time, and force structure. In order for the Marine Corps to rectify deficiencies, it is likely one or a combination of the aforementioned areas will be affected.

Chapter 6

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND READINESS

The preceding chapters have focused primarily on service-level issues. This chapter will examine the correlation between entry-level training and national interests and readiness. In an era when America’s military forces are deploying often and placed in harms way, it is important to ensure that service members are properly trained. Above all, it is the right thing to do and, today’s political climate is such that the action of a single Marine could effect the way national policy is pursued. Therefore, the Marine Corps needs warriors that are not only fighters, but Marines that are cognizant that their actions may directly affect national policy.

The Marine Corps, nor any service, can afford politically to lose a large number of service members needlessly because they have not been properly trained. While Marines understand that casualties, as unfortunate as they are, do occur, the American public and political leaders seemingly advocate minimal to no losses. The American loss of life in Somalia in its entirety pales in comparison to many single missions in Vietnam. For example, when Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore’s battalion fought in the Ia Drang Valley, South Vietnam, 234 soldiers were killed. Such a tragedy today would send the country into an uproar and likely would lead to the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces. This phenomenon makes it extremely important for Marines to execute missions successfully without a high loss of life/casualties, regardless of enemy casualties, especially in peace keeping and peace enforcement missions.
In an era when the United States is the sole superpower, all Marine Corps operational units, especially infantry units, have to be able to deploy for combat on a moment’s notice. This will require that those infantrymen fresh out of the entry-level training pipeline are ready to fight and win. General Alfred M. Gray, 29th CMC, commented that “whenever you see a Marine, there is one thing of which you can be certain: he will be ready to fight, right then and there, if necessary.”

It is often said, “the world is a dangerous place.” In recent operations, Marines have had to confront a myriad of challenges. The Marine Expeditionary Units have performed well because they are probably the best trained units in the Marine Corps, but what about units that do not deploy with MEU’s, or the reservists? Recruit training is the only combat training some reservists (84 or 93 day reservists) could receive before being placed in a combat environment. Can the Marine Corps afford to put these Marines in harms way? Will these Marines make mistakes that are so significant that they will be televised world-wide and bring into question whether or not America should even be involved? In Somalia, the deaths of seventeen service members changed national policy. So, how Marines are trained or not trained may put America in a similar situation in the future. The Corps has to develop infantrymen, starting in recruit training, who understand that they are warriors first. If a situation like Somalia occurs where Marines are surrounded and outnumbered, the Marines must understand that they have to shoot their way out and evacuate fellow Marines that are either dead or alive.

Operation Joint Guardian is an example of how complex operations can evolve. Operation Joint Guardian epitomized the “three-block war” concept – humanitarian

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26 General Alfred M. Gray, USMC (Ret.), Marines Magazine (April 1998), inside cover.
relief in the morning, separating belligerents in the afternoon, and combat by nightfall, all within a very confined geographical area. Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, in a series of Gazette articles in late 1999 and early 2000, outlined the nature of the missions and lessons learned in Kosovo. Major James D. Davis, commander of one of the line companies, commented, “No amount of discussion could have fully prepared each small unit leader for the challenges they faced. During a typical day, team and squad leaders conducted vehicle and personnel searches, day and night security patrols, and the actions of a platoon, or company quick reaction force. No two patrols brought the same challenges. Patrol leaders often had to play the role of policeman, fireman, and corpsman; concurrently, they performed tasks such as those involving crisis intervention and civil affairs.”27 If the Marine Corps expects a small unit leader to be a “jack of all trades,” then it is incumbent upon the Marine Corps to develop subordinates for these “Strategic Corporals” that are well versed in basic skills.

The Marine Corps, first and foremost, must develop infantrymen that have been groomed from the time of initial entry to function in a combat environment. All other instruction should be secondary. This will produce warriors that are confident and capable of shouldering the added burden that their actions may impact national policies.

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Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

The take away from the fighting in the northern Caucasus (Chechnya) is that it is the skill of soldiers of all ranks, not the peculiar nature of the terrain they are operating on, that decides the outcome of military operations.

Vincent J. Goulding Jr.\textsuperscript{28}
Parameters

Based on the aforementioned research, entry-level training for infantrymen has been marginalized to a point that jeopardizes the combat preparedness of infantrymen entering the Operational Forces. It appears that the institutional changes in the mid-1990’s in their aggregate negatively impacted on the entry-level training and development of infantrymen. The most damaging changes were the transfer of Basic Warrior Training from the Recruit Training Regiments to the Infantry Training Battalions and the reduction of training time at the Infantry Training Battalions. By the June 2000 Entry-Level Training Conference, the Operational Forces, Recruit Training Regiments, and Schools of Infantry, and Training and Education Command reached a consensus of “not satisfied” regarding the preparedness of infantrymen entering the Operational Forces.

There are a number of possibilities to rectify the problems of preparedness of infantrymen entering the operational forces. However, the research conducted indicates that Basic Warrior Training (BWT) at the recruit depots should be re-instituted, a single overarching Entry-Level Training Marine Corps should be created, and training time at the Infantry Training Battalions should be increased.

\textsuperscript{28}Vincent J. Goulding, Back to the Future With Asymmetric Warfare, \textit{Parameters}, (Vol. XXX, No. 4 Winter 2000-1), 21.
The first recommendation is to maximize combat training at the recruit depots. After 4-5 years of observing the negative effects of removing BWT from the recruit depots, it is time for the Marine Corps to “repair the damage” and bring a sense of balance, at least regarding ITS’s and Basic Warrior Training, back into the recruit training curricula. In order to balance the process, a number of the ITS’s that were removed from the RTR’s need to be returned from the Infantry Training Battalions. The curricula at the RTR’s are not sacrosanct, but a number of individual training standards come very close to being untouchable and should remain as the cornerstone of the recruit training curricula, for example, land navigation, fire team formations, and radio operating procedures. These skills should remain the cornerstone of combat training in the Recruit Training Regiments because they are essential to developing a Marine, particularly an infantryman. Furthermore, teaching these skills in the Recruit Training Regiments and Infantry Training Battalions would only enhance the students’ ability to learn. By not teaching these skills in recruit training, fifty percent of instruction and practical application time is lost. A number of field skills cannot be internalized based on one period of instruction and a few practical application sessions. Land navigation, for instance, was a major training event at the recruit depots prior to the changes in 1996. Recruits were taught the nomenclature of the compass, how to plot six-digit grid coordinates and how to determine a magnetic azimuth. The recruits also had to navigate to a series of points during the day and night, in which they were evaluated. In 1996, land navigation was removed from the recruit training curricula, along with other combat skills, and transferred to the Infantry Training Battalions. Teaching land navigation only at the Infantry Training Battalions neglects the benefits of a “building block” approach to ensure that students get the maximum training in skills that make-up the very foundation of an infantryman’s tactical
prowess. The U.S. Army and British Royal Commandos teach land navigation and communication skills (radio) early in training, which has to pay dividends later in training and when their trainees join operational units.

The second recommendation is to develop a Marine Corps Order (MCO) that identifies what skills are to be taught to recruits and students at the Infantry Training Battalions. The Marine Corps Recruit Depots have a MCO (1510.32C, Recruit Training) that outlines the mission of recruit training, the objectives of recruit training, what individual training standards are to be taught and, in broad terms, how recruit training is to be conducted. There is no such order that governs the Schools of Infantry, nor is there an order that establishes guidelines for common procedures or issues that routinely surface. A single entry-level training MCO could delineate the missions, objectives, and other guidance to both commands, which would ensure that both schools are operating from a common order. Arguably, the Marine Corps has not identified what are the objectives of the Infantry Training Battalions and Marine Combat Training Battalions. There is a list of ITS’s that have been standardized between the commands, but there is no document that captures the intangibles, requirements, or how the training should be conducted. This is important to ensure unity of effort.

The final recommendation is to increase training time at the ITB’s without taking training time from the Recruit Training Regiments. Headquarters Marine Corps has to be convinced that adding training time is an investment instead of a loss. The cost in training time does not appear to out weigh the benefits of developing combat ready infantrymen. The data provided shows respectable increases in the quality of training since the 42-day experimental training cycle at ITB (E). The figure below indicates the
cost in man-years, if five days (number randomly chosen) were added to the Infantry Training Battalions.

8000 (students at both ITB’s) X 5 = 40,000

\[
\frac{40,000}{365} = 110 \text{ Man Years}
\]

Some people would perhaps think any increase in training time at the Infantry Training Battalions should come from the recruit depots. The question then becomes: what should be removed from the recruit depots? The Crucible event could perhaps be modified, but what signal would that send to the other services that modeled culminating events similar to the Marine Corps? What would members of Congress think, since many of them became ardent believers of the Crucible? Maybe a few of the obstacles should be changed to more closely replicate likely combat scenarios, but for the most part the Crucible is tough and builds teamwork. Team and Transition Weeks may be optimal times to remove training time; however, removing training time from these weeks will shorten available time to build teamwork, allow recruits to work with limited supervision, recover from injuries, and allow drill instructors and company grade officers time to complete all of the tasks that are not identified on the training schedules (for example, counseling sessions). Therefore, if it is necessary to increase the training time at the ITB’s, the time should not be removed from recruit training. The right course of action should be to increase training time regardless of the impact on T2P2. The impact in man-years appears to be minimal.

The institutional changes that occurred in the mid-1990’s were not intended to degrade the quality of infantrymen entering the Operational Forces, but implemented in
the best interest of the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, in hindsight, the changes produced negative results. As the Marine Corps begins the 21st century, the leaders of the Marine Corps cannot forget the positive impact that Basic Warrior Training had on producing Marines of the highest quality, such as the Marines that fought valiantly in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. The changes that occurred have not been in practice long enough for the Corps to have suffered irreparable damage, thanks to the strong leadership of the young Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers who continue to train Marines to be warriors of the highest caliber. However, as America’s military commitments increase, it is likely that more than just Marine Expeditionary Units are going to be on the “tip of the spear.” The Marine Corps has to ensure that her ranks, reserve and active, are prepared for combat. As the old saying goes, “no one likes to participate in combat, but someone has to be able to do it.” The Marine Corps has been a profession of arms for over 225 years, and has been the most prepared when the nation was least prepared. The Marine Corps cannot afford to stray from its warrior ethos, for when that is done, the Marine Corps will cease to exist.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING STANDARDS TRANSFERRED FROM THE RECRUIT DEPOTS

1. Perform operator maintenance on a TA-312/PT, field telephone set
2. Repair (splice) field wire.
3. Install a telephone set.
4. Perform operator maintenance on the AN/PRC-77 field radio set.
5. Prepare and operate the AN/PRC-77 radio message.
6. Send and receive a radio message.
7. Take immediate action (radio set).
8. Use the lensatic compass.
9. Determine the 6-digit grid coordinate of a point.
10. Identify natural terrain features on a map.
11. Identify manmade features on a map.
12. Measure distance on a map.
14. Orient a map.
15. Navigate to a specified position using a compass.
16. Throw a live fragmentation grenade.
17. Install and fire or recover the M18A1 claymore mine.
18. Move through a minefield.
19. State the characteristics of the AT-4.
20. Demonstrate safe handling procedures for the AT-4.
22. Perform immediate action for the AT-4.
23. State the characteristics of the M249 SAW.
24. Demonstrate safe handling procedures for the 249 SAW.
25. Perform immediate action to clear a stoppage of an M249 SAW.
26. State the mission of the Marine Rifle Squad.
27. Move in fire team formation.
28. React to hand and arm signals.
29. Select field firing positions – rifleman.
30. Select field firing positions – automatic rifleman.
31. Clear fields of fire.
32. Construct individual fighting positions.
33. Camouflage a defensive position.
34. Explain the concept of interlocking fires.
35. Explain the purpose of defensive wire.
36. Perform local security as an LP/OP
37. Emplane and deplane from a helicopter.
38. Embark and debark from an amphibious assault vehicle.
39. Receive a five-paragraph order.
40. State the characteristics of the M203 grenade launcher.
41. Demonstrate safe handling procedures for the M203 grenade launcher.
42. Distinguish among the different rounds for the M203 grenade launcher.
43. Engage a target with the M203 grenade launcher.
44. Perform immediate action with the M203 grenade launcher.