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NAVY JFACC: ARE WE SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTERS?

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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Introduction

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated that the U.S. Armed Services reform and improve their joint warfighting capability. Further, Title X, United States Code, directed the services to be force providers, in that they organize, train, and equip their respective services for joint combat.\(^1\) These laws gave the regional combatant commanders (Commander-in-Chiefs or CINCs) the primary responsibility for warfighting in their respective theatres, and tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to promulgate joint doctrine.\(^2\) Joint doctrine provides the basis for the CINC to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) with functional component commanders (air, land, sea, and special operations).\(^3\) The "air" functional component commander is the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC).\(^4\) Under joint doctrine, the Joint Task Force Commander (JFC) assigns the JFACC responsibilities to the commander who has "the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations."\(^5\)

The Navy’s first introductions to operating within the JFACC construct was during the build-up for Operation Desert Shield. The Navy vehemently opposed it. The concept went against the tradition and tactical view as to how the Navy felt its air power should be employed and controlled. However, over time the Navy's position on JFACC has changed dramatically.

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3. Ibid.

4. Throughout this paper, I will use JFACC to denote the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) as well for consistency.

Navy policy now is that it can assume responsibility as a JFACC across the spectrum of conflict. The Navy specifically stresses its role as an "initial enabling force" for the JFC, which means that deployed naval forces will be the first forces available to project combat power at the scene of a crisis. Furthermore, the Navy's most recent white paper, "Forward...From the Sea-The Navy Operational Concept", states that it can provide on-scene command and control (C2) capabilities up to the JFC level. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has delegated this responsibility to the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) level, tasking the establishment therein of JFC and JFACC capabilities.

This paper will investigate if the Navy's position and practices are fulfilling the CINC's JFACC warfighting requirements. To answer this question, I examined the Navy's training of its designated forces, the Navy's approach to experimentation/exercises with respect to the JFACC responsibilities, and finally, the Navy's role in recent JFACC operations. Within these areas, I evaluated the application of joint doctrine, necessary manpower/expertise, adequate technology, and sufficient training. This analysis showed that the Navy has made marked improvements in its integration into the JFACC construct for current operations, and that the Navy is taking the next step toward achieving joint synchronization within the JFACC responsibilities. However, until these next steps are implemented, the Navy's disconnect from the concept of JFACC will continue, particularly with regard to its exercises, experimentation, and training.

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7 Ibid, 3-1.

8 Jay Johnson, Forward...From The Sea-An Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1997), 7.
Defining the JFACC

Current joint doctrine states that unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are the fundamental tenets for the employment of joint forces in combat. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) will normally designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations through a cohesive joint air operations plan and a responsive and integrated command and control system. When a JFACC is not designated, the JFC may plan, direct, and control joint air operations.10

“Command and Control for Joint Air Operations” (Joint Pub 3-56.1) outlines the minimum JFACC responsibilities. These include: developing a joint air operations plan (JAOP), recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, controlling execution of joint air operations, providing centralized direction for allocation and tasking of forces, coordinating joint air operations with other component commanders and forces assigned to the JFC, evaluating the results of the joint air effort, and performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA) and the area air defense commander (AADC) when assigned by the JFC.11,12 These responsibilities span the levels of war from strategic to tactical, and require detailed knowledge and insight for planning at those levels.

To fulfill these responsibilities, the JFACC must devise an air estimate of the situation and recommended courses of action for the JFC’s air effort. These are integrated into the

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9 OPNAVINST 3510.316, Enclosure 1-2.

10 Joint Pub 3-56.1, 1-2,3.

11 Ibid, II-3.

12 Joint doctrine states that the JFACC, ACA, and AADC should be assigned to the same individual because of the interrelationships of their functions. The ACA is responsible for developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures and for operating the airspace control system in the Joint Operating Area (JOA). The AADC is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort in the JOA. It is assumed throughout the paper that
JAOP to become the joint air strategy to support the JFC’\textquotesingle{}s objectives. Moreover, the JFACC must also create and continually reexamine a number of complex planning products derived from the JAOP, including the master air attack plan (MAAP), air defense plan (ADP), airspace control plan (ACP), air tasking orders (ATOs)\textsuperscript{13}, airspace control order (ACO), and special instructions (SPINS).\textsuperscript{14} Comprehensively defining and analyzing these tasks is beyond the scope of this paper; the point to be made here is that not only is the JFACC required to be schooled in the “operational art of war”, but there are significant planning and C2 demands generated upon JFACC expertise beyond the tactical issues of ATO generation and implementation.

The ATO is, however, the largest focus of the JFACC effort. It is produced in conjunction with the SPINs and the ACO, and provides the JFACC’\textquotesingle;s daily guidance to generate joint air operations in support of the JFC’s objectives. An effective ATO is the result of a continuous process of JFACC-to-component coordination, target development, weaponeering/allocation, multi-service planning, force execution, and combat results assessment.\textsuperscript{15}

The JFACC’\textquotesingle;s operations center is called the joint air operations center (JAOC).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} The ATO is a formatted message disseminated only through the Theatre Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) network. The ATO contains every scheduled and alert sortie within the JOA. It includes information like flight composition, ordnance loadout, mission, route, target assignment, in-flight refueling assignment, and other information as required such as TLAM missions and UAV missions. There are normally three ATOs in existence: today’\textquotesingle;s, tomorrow’\textquotesingle;s, and the day after tomorrow’\textquotesingle;s. The timeliness of a joint ATO is critical. The cycle time to produce a joint ATO is 30-72 hours and an ATO normally covers operations for a 24 hour period.

\textsuperscript{14} Joint Pub 3-56.1, III-1.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, IV-4,5.

\textsuperscript{16} Throughout this paper, I will use JAOC to denote the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) as well for consistency.
Every JAOC will have at least two organizations: Combat Plans and Combat Operations.\textsuperscript{17} Combat Plans produces future ATOs, while Combat Operations executes the current ATO. Each JAOC must be staffed to meet all the JFACC’s responsibilities. This staff must have strong liaison officers and staff members who represent all relevant elements of subordinate units.\textsuperscript{18}

The subsequent version of Joint Pub 3-56.1 (Joint Pub 3-30 draft) expands the required organizations of the JAOC to include a Strategy Division and an Air Mobility Division. This draft document also further expands the JFACC’s ATO development responsibilities to include plans for Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs) and the redirection of assets as necessary to attack emerging TSTs in accordance with the JFC’s guidance. Both these initiatives significantly increase the manpower, training, and technology required for the JFACC.\textsuperscript{19} In particular, the mentioned TST responsibilities require great amounts of high speed data and video transfer and the added personnel and equipment to facilitate its incorporation and execution.

The JFACC’s responsibilities, then, can be seen as encompassing a spectrum of theatre strategic and operational planning requirements in the employment and control of joint airpower. These requirements stem from the U.S. Air Force concepts for the strategic application of airpower and the need for centralized control and planning of the air effort. These are deeply embedded in U.S. Air Force doctrine.

\textbf{The Navy’s Perspective}

\textsuperscript{17} Joint Pub 3-56.1, viii.


The Navy’s warfighting construct is deeply rooted in employing its air, surface, and sub-surface assets in the Composite Warfare Concept (CWC). This concept provides the structure for the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to wage offensive and defensive combat operations against air, surface, undersea, and land-based threats. Thus, airpower is just one of the Navy’s many force components the Numbered Fleet Commander or Battle Group Commander uses to carry out his tactical mission.  

20 This emphasis on the integrated employment of naval firepower by the Battle Group has created great friction with regard to the Navy’s integration and acceptance of the JFACC concept of “centralized control” 21 of the joint air effort. While the assimilation of the JFACC construct was slow in the Navy, several doctrine and procedures documents do contain reference to the Navy’s approach to the JFACC. The Navy perspective is codified succinctly in three documents that the Navy uses to guide its JFACC operations.

Since 1995, the Navy has defined the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) as the principle element of its combat arm, and specified its capabilities in Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 3510.316. The CVBG is designed to provide the CINC with robust and balanced forces that are able to deal with a variety of threats and respond to fast breaking crises with credible combat power. The Navy’s C2 framework for application of this combat power is the CWC. The CNO’s mandated tasks for the CVBG define the roles that the warfare commanders will execute and are very tactically oriented. The CNO, in this instruction, also mandates that the Battle Group will be capable of functioning as a JFC and a JFACC if so

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21 Joint Pub 3-30 (Draft), viii. Furthermore, the JFACC concept has created great friction from all four services. Some workarounds have been made to ease the application such as the Omnibus agreement for the Marines and the added terminology of direct support, common use, and excess sorties for the Navy. However, for the purposes
designated, having strategic and operational implications with regard to the command and control of joint forces and, specifically, air power.

The Navy’s latest strategic concept, “Forward...From the Sea: an Operational Concept,” also states that the CVBG is the essential foundation of naval combat operations. Furthermore, it defines how these Battle Groups will contribute to joint operations. Specifically, it states that the Navy not only provides forward forces to respond quickly and shape the battlespace, but great emphasis is also placed on the “operational primacy” the CINC can achieve with naval on-scene command and control capabilities for joint operations. It also emphasizes the ability of both carriers and command and control ships as fully equipped command centers for the JFC or JFACC. The Navy stresses these roles in the initial or enabling phases of an operation, but also suggests the capability to sustain these capabilities as the crisis escalates across the spectrum of conflict.

Finally, in late 2000, the Navy updated its doctrinal approach to coordinating joint air operations, including the conceptual foundations for a Navy JFACC. This doctrine attempts to modify the CVBG air operational infrastructure to closely parallel the combat plans and combat operations divisions of a JFACC. This document provides guidance for the establishment of a sea-based JFACC in accordance with joint doctrine, and further codifies tactics, techniques and procedures to be utilized for the conduct of operations while remaining within joint doctrine boundaries. In addition, appendix (E) of “Naval Air Operations Center,“ NWP 3-56.1 (Revision A), spells out the required JFACC/staff training courses for naval personnel from the Numbered Fleet staffs down to the squadron level.

However, the aforementioned documents are only paper unless executed. The supposed
growing adherence of the Navy to the JFACC process must also be examined for validity in the practices of the Navy in training, experimentation/exercises, and in combat operations.

Training the Fleet

The majority of JFACC operational training occurs during the CVBG’s Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) and remains the sole focus of the Navy’s training efforts. JTFEXs’ principal focus is to conduct joint operations to achieve interoperability among service component commanders at the tactical level of war. To gain an understanding of this JFACC training, the examination must be focused on naval training on each coast of the U.S. individually. This is because the Numbered Fleets on the east and west coasts, whose task it is to prepare CVBGs for deployment, take markedly different approaches to addressing the JFACC issue.

Commander 2nd Fleet (C2F) on the east coast has assigned the JFACC mission to a reserve unit within his command designated the C2F Naval Reserve JFACC. This unit provides the core element of trained and ready to deploy staff members to support any JFACC requirement, the East Coast fly-away unit.\textsuperscript{22} Also, they are tasked with providing the core personnel to perform the JFACC duties supporting a USAF/NATO JFACC during a CVBG’s JTFEX.\textsuperscript{23}

The approach for training east coast CVBGs is to “ensure that our deploying Naval forces are at least competent to execute missions within a JFACC operational environment, not

\textsuperscript{22} Dave Anderson, Commanding Officer, Second Fleet Naval Reserve JFACC, interview by author, 5 December 2001, authors notes, Newport, RI.

\textsuperscript{23} Steve Snyder, <steve.snyder@exult.net>, “RE: Doc’s JFACC Paper...,” [E-mail to Ryan Scholl <schollr@nwc.navy.mil>], 10 January 2002.
actually run a JFACC.” The reasons for this are twofold. First, the opportunity to train to the complex processes of JFACC responsibilities is limited to inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) formal courses and a scant 10 day JTFEX. Due to the relatively short timeframe of JTFEX and the limited JFACC training objective, the JFACC responsibilities of creating a JAOP, strategy development and air apportionment are not conducted by exercise JFACC staff. The scope of the JFACC product execution in JTFEX places heavy emphasis on ATO production and implementation, and only introduces the strategy and apportionment processes for conceptual training. Second, JFACC training objectives are competing with a number of other CVBG and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) integration training requirements. To this extent, the main focus of the JFACC staff is supporting the deploying units by producing an effective ATO for their execution. Moreover, the exercise JFACC staff has routinely had to turn to the system expertise of contractors and USAF officers to ensure timely dissemination of the ATO.

The emphasis to ensure interoperability in a JFACC environment instead of training the CVBG to have the capability to be a JFACC can be attributed to the CINC’s perspective wherein an east coast CVBG will likely deploy. While European Command (EUCOM) planners are enticed by the idea of an afloat JFACC capability, informal sources say the concentration of EUCOM efforts is on a land-based JFACC working in a combined NATO effort. Furthermore, even Commander 6th Fleet (C6F), in charge of naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), has produced documents

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Jeff Haupt, <jeff.haupt@eucom.mil>, “RE: Request for info...,” [E-mail to Ryan Scholl <docsolo@aol.com>], 18 January 2002.
requesting the Navy de-emphasize our afloat JFACC efforts in exercises in his theatre.  

Commander 3rd Fleet (C3F) on the west coast has assigned the JFACC mission to a reserve unit within his command designated the C3F Naval Reserve JFACC. The training model developed by the C3F Naval Reserve JFACC aligns closely to the CNO’s instruction and vision. The focus of the C3F effort is to train the deploying CVBG to function as an “enabling JFACC,” the first force in theatre available to project combat power and execute C2 functions.

This approach tasks the JTFEX Battle Group staff to plan and execute courses of action as an on-scene JFACC in the emerging stages of a crisis. Simultaneous with the start of the JTFEX hostilities phase, C3F establishes a JFACC using a USAF General officer (not always available) with C3F staff to provide JFACC expertise. Under-instruction (UI) within the C3F created JFACC staff is the next-in-line (the Battle Group who will be evaluated in the next JTFEX) Battle Group staff, so they will gain insight into the joint air command and control process. However, there are recurring problems in the west coast model as well.

First, as with the east coast, the relatively short timeframe of JTFEX limit the opportunity to realistically train to the complex processes of JFACC responsibilities. Although, there is a great deal more formalized instruction prior to JTFEX commencing. Second, the demands of competing training objectives further limit the overall learning experience.

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28 Stu Hinrichs, Commanding Officer, Third Fleet Naval Reserve JFACC, interview by author, 5 December 2001, authors notes, Newport, RI.

29 Ibid.
Moreover, the relative inexperience of the tasked Battle Group staffs leads to “learn as you go” execution, causing frustration and discontent in the JFACC process. Third, there is relatively no USAF participation on the naval JFACC staff. Fourth, there is a lack of expertise for TBMCS. Unlike the east coast, however, USAF experts are not available and ATO delays are sometimes created because of the lack of system experts. Finally, the cumulative effect of inexperience and an all naval staff created instances of exercise workarounds contrary to joint doctrine. For instance, where ambiguities existed in the Joint Target List (JTL), naval planners assigned arbitrary targets optimized for naval air forces. More egregiously, the exercise JFACC had used limitless notional USAF assets to sustain 24 hour air operations executing 80 percent of the ATO, contradicting the underlying framework that the naval forces were the predominant combat power available.

**Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs)**

FBEs are a CNO-driven series of experiments designed “to operationalize development and co-evolution of new doctrines, organizations, technologies, and systems for employment by Naval Commanders in the context of Joint Forces participation.” The purpose of these experiments is to examine initiatives and innovative concepts in realistic battle scenarios,

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which could lead to improved warfighting capabilities of the fleet.

The development of the Navy JFACC concept has not been a primary initiative in many of the last FBEs, as defined by the Navy Warfare Development Command. However, there has been significant interaction between NWDC’s stated initiatives and JFACC responsibilities and process throughout the last four experiments; FBEs F-I. An examination of these four reveals several shortfalls in the Navy’s approach to JFACC concept development. The most significant are the lack of joint participation or consultation, followed shortly thereafter by the lack of adherence to joint air C2 doctrine.

Most significantly, in nearly all these experiments, there was no fully functioning JFACC for interaction and joint interoperability, and very limited participation from other services. FBE-F is cited as the worst offender in this regard. This exercise, conducted in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) under Commander Fifth Fleet (C5F), lacked any JFACC staff or structure at all. Furthermore, the exercise had to be halted in mid-stream to facilitate creating minimal functional component commands to finish the exercise. In FBE-G, the scenario was conducted in EUCOM AOR under C6F, and called for a USAF land-based JFACC, but no provisions were set up to include one and no USAF personnel were involved. Instead, Navy exercise staff created a working JFACC unit “with minimum personnel and capability necessary to keep the experiment moving.” While this did enhance the exercise’s initiatives of flattening the C2 architecture, it was noted that friction

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34 NWDC is the CNO’s agent for planning and implementing FBEs in partnership with the Numbered Fleets.


36 Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, 26.
points were avoided and the procedures utilized were not in accordance with joint doctrine.\footnote{“Command and Control,” Lessons Learned No. LL6F0-07748, 13 April 2000. Unclassified. Navy Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB). Available on Navy Lessons Learned (NLL) CD-ROM Series. Newport, RI: Naval Warfare Development Command, November 2001, UNCLASSIFIED.} Furthermore, FBE-I also lacked a fully functional JFACC. FBE-I was conducted in the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR under C3F. The lack of a complete JFACC, omission of a Joint Targeting Board (JTB), and an all naval contingent created inconsistencies in the targeting process and raised concern with the success of FBE-I TST initiatives. On a positive note, from this exercise comes the first realization that FBE initiatives require realistic functional component C2 interaction, operations within the boundaries of joint doctrine, and real, not notional, command structures which tend to bypass formal processes.\footnote{“KERNEL BLITZ-01: Lack of a Full JFACC and Targeting Board,” Lessons Learned No. LLWE0-08614, 01 April 2001. Unclassified. Navy Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB). Available on Navy Lessons Learned (NLL) CD-ROM Series. Newport, RI: Naval Warfare Development Command, November 2001, UNCLASSIFIED.}

\textbf{Combat Operations}

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the first true modern test of joint air warfare and the JTF/JFACC concept. Within the JTF was the JFACC, headed by Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Horner. Naval leadership vehemently opposed the Air Force JFACC system from the start, proposing a service oriented control of air assets.\footnote{Jeffrey Stambaugh, “JFACC: Key to Organizing your Air Assets for Victory,” Parameters, (Summer 1994): 98.} Eventually, though, naval leaders realized that acceptance and integration into the system would be required. The Navy responded by sending personnel to augment the JFACC staff as liaisons.

However, several problems existed at this apparent acceptance of the JFACC. First, the Navy’s senior leader at the JFACC was the Naval Component Commander’s representative, a one-star surface warfare officer who was chosen only because he was the junior Battle Group
Commander. Second, the senior Navy leader in theatre deployed afloat, thus negating three-star representation. Third, the Navy liaisons sent to the JFACC had, for all intents and purposes, no knowledge of JFACC responsibilities and procedures, and thus found it difficult to affect JFACC decisions. Finally, incompatibility of Air Force and Navy technology prevented the electronic transfer of the ATO to naval units. These problems significantly detracted from the joint air command and control effort for the CINC.

To monitor Iraqi aggression following Operation DESERT STORM, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) was established. The evolution of Navy integration into this JFACC encompasses lessons learned from DESERT STORM and 12 years of continuous operation in the JTF, the Navy maintains the position of Deputy JFACC and deputy J-3, has integrated within the JFACC staff through naval personnel augmentation, assigns naval liaison officers to JTF-SWA from naval units, and has true electronic as well as telephone connectivity to the JFACC. Naval forces and personnel remain integrated, to this day, into the planning and execution processes of the JFACC in JTF-SWA. This success has built cohesion and joint understanding, thereby enhancing the CINC’s efforts.

The Navy again experienced many of the problems it faced in DESERT STORM with respect to the JFACC function in Vincenza, Italy for Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE. Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was executed to halt Serbian attacks in UN safe areas in Bosnia. The JFACC for DELIBERATE FORCE was Air Force Lieutenant General Mike Ryan. Even though a Navy four-star was in charge of all forces,

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42 Authors observations working closely with CVW-17 LNOs assigned to JTF-SWA during two deployments.
Navy JFACC staff representation included only liaison personnel from the carriers participating in the operations. And secondly, the Navy again experienced problems receiving and distributing the ATO on the carrier due to incompatible Contingency Theatre Automated Planning System (CTAPS) software configurations and limited operator proficiency.\textsuperscript{43}

Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) was the combined military operations conducted against Kosovo, and also utilized the JAOC in Vincenza, Italy for its air command and control headquarters. During OAF, the Navy had approximately 50 personnel filling a variety of roles in the JFACC.\textsuperscript{44} While that number does include members of the C2F Naval Reserve JFACC unit, many of the other personnel had little to no experience in JFACC procedures. And again, the Navy lacked flag officer representation on the OAF JFACC staff.

The senior Navy officer was an aviator Captain from the C2F Naval Reserve JFACC unit. His role was liaison officer representing all Naval Forces assigned to the JFACC, as well as being responsible for the 50 naval personnel working in the JAOC. However, no Navy officer stood the JFACC flag watch stations or the Battle Staff Director watch station, simply because of rank.\textsuperscript{45} Absence from the highest level did not diminish, though, the integration realized, proficiency achieved, and effective contribution of Navy personnel to the overall effort in OAF because of the joint understanding and trust in the process the naval personnel and leaders learned.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is the U.S.-led combined effort against Al Quaida


\textsuperscript{44} Anderson.

\textsuperscript{45} Robert Paladeau, \textit{After Action Report for Duty at the CAOC During the Kosovo Campaign} (1999), 20.
terrorists and the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The air power command and control portion of this military operation will be an interesting study once the official data is published. Informal reporting shows that the Navy has the preponderance of assets in this operation, although there isn’t a Navy JFACC. Is this in line with joint C2 procedures? The answer can be found in current joint doctrine. Seeking unity of effort, speed of response and assessing individual service capabilities, CENTCOM opted to conduct JFACC operations out of the JTF-SWA JFACC.\textsuperscript{46} First, the JTF-SWA JAOC has a robust, established communications capability to reach back to the U.S. Second, as shown above, it had a proven, efficient operational record to include incorporating augmentees and liaisons from many of the forces that are executing missions in Afghanistan.

\textbf{Conclusions}

Overcoming the traditional naval approach to the command and control of airpower has been a difficult path for the Navy. Placing organic air assets under the centralized control of a JFACC goes against the Navy’s CWC construct by supposedly reducing the CVBG’s tactical capability. The JFACC concept also requires thinking beyond tactical boundaries and solidifying plans and courses of action that are both operational and strategic in nature. There is clear evidence indicating the Navy’s lack of understanding and emphasis with respect to JFACC application in FBEs and exercises. However, the evolution of the Navy’s approach to the JFACC in combat operations has been converging toward joint doctrine and recent initiatives yet to be enacted also lend credence to this observation. Moreover, the promulgation of Navy doctrine and the stimulus to operate in accordance with the JAOC structure will greatly increase naval understanding, and hopefully, acceptance of the processes and

\textsuperscript{46} Hathaway.
procedures of the JFACC, enhancing the CVBG’s integration into joint air forces.

The Navy’s ability to integrate at all levels within the JFACC staff is inadequate. While the Navy maintains a credible and capable fly-away JFACC augmentation staff on each coast, the deployment of this force would bring the joint air training of deploying CVBGs to a halt, because they are the expertise during JTFEXs. These JTFEXs on both coasts provide only limited exposure to the inner workings of a JFACC. Furthermore, flag level training for the execution of JFACC duties has only recently been mandated and is delegated to the Battle Group Commander level, usually a one star flag officer. All U.S. combat operations to date have involved a three star Air Force general officer as the JFACC. On the three star flag officer level, future Numbered Fleet commanders will have been schooled on the JFACC construct. The negatives are that the Navy presently lacks senior level working knowledge and expertise regarding JFACC concepts and responsibilities. In addition, the Navy also lacks robust staff level expertise. Indeed, the Naval Reserve is the core of JFACC expertise in our service. The momentum caused by evolving doctrine and the CNO’s JFACC action group will, I believe, create the emphasis that will raise the performance standards for naval forces and the impetus that communicates naval commitment to our junior sailors that we are finally on-board.

Certainly, the Navy has embarked on the path to ensure forces have adequate technology to integrate and facilitate JFACC operations. While these systems are limited in number and communicative capability aboard a carrier, the installation of TBMCS and the other joint systems nearly revolutionized the connectivity among joint forces. The robust Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I) capability of naval command ships has been proven in training and exercise/experimentation to fulfill JFACC requirements, and is taking on greater importance as the U.S. contemplates reducing JAOCs
forward.

The training issue is the greatest obstacle that the Navy must overcome. Direction from the CNO is for deploying forces to be JFACC capable, but there are no measures or standards of training that CVBGs must achieve. The east coast training policy clearly does not fulfill the CNO’s direction, but it does produce forces that integrate quickly to JFACC operations. The west coast training policy stresses training to an “enabling” JFACC, in line with CNO policy. However, this emphasis sacrifices the CVBG’s ability to quickly integrate into a JFACC. The promotion of non-joint procedures in the west coast construct could leads to misunderstanding and distrust in actual joint operations. Furthermore, for many of the staff and forces on both coasts, the first introduction to working under JFACC control and procedure is when the carrier begins its operations during JTFEX. Promising advances in required schools and revised organizational structure will certainly help. But, as we try to reduce our operational-tempo requirements and shorten pre-deployment exercises, the petition to increase standards or require more temporary duty schooling may fall on deaf ears.

Truly, though, what must be heard at the CINC level is that the Navy is providing more capable forces for joint integration. Second, the Navy can augment JFACC staffs with capable personnel to a limited extent, and can do so to greater levels of involvement over time. Third, carriers and command ships maintain the infrastructure for JFACC operations, but the Navy presently lacks corporate knowledge to execute JFACC responsibilities. Lastly, the Navy’s published vision and direction for the JFACC is not in accordance with current or proposed joint doctrine, but Herculean efforts are underway to synchronize all Navy endeavors toward the joint air command and control.

**Recommendations**
Changing the traditions and warfighting construct of naval assets is truly another Herculean task. The direction and initiatives of the Navy JFACC concept will require a dedicated effort that will not immediately produce monumental results, but rather incrementally build and develop the capability. The Navy JFACC concept must be delineated from the top-down to jump start the system and focus the naval service, as a whole, in the same direction.

To do this, the Navy must focus training toward joint command and control of air assets. This approach should encompass educational and organizational processes to improve knowledge and experience regarding the JFACC. The educational process should include flag JFACC training, CVBG and CVW staff training, as well as unit level training of core systems used such as TBMCS.47 Within FBEs and JTFEXs, ensure the requisite number of other service personnel are staffed, and that the execution of the JFACC responsibilities is conducted in accordance with joint doctrine. The Navy must actively solicit USAF personnel involvement directly and indirectly through Joint Forces Command. Furthermore, CVBG air operations need to be restructured and standardized under the model affirmed in Navy doctrine. Their execution of JFACC responsibilities in JTFEX needs to have measurable standards of performance for evaluation with relative consistency from coast to coast.

The Navy needs to create an active duty force capable of executing JFACC responsibilities to alleviate the overburdening of the Naval Reserve JFACC units as real world contingencies continue to arise.48 These active duty units, called Naval Air Operating Centers, should be stood up at the Numbered Fleet headquarters and will be the core naval members of

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47 As outlined in NWP 3-56.1 Revision A, Appendix E.

48 This proposal was the focus of the CNO’s JFACC OAG Manning Working Group at NWDC in Newport, RI, which the author attended. The recommendation outlined herein is the same one produced by the Working Group and has since been forwarded up the chain of command.
any JFACC staff within a fleet’s AOR for exercises and combat operations. The Navy must also promote the NAOC by actively seeking participation from their sister services in joint exercises, for validation as well as for the information of the CINC. This should not relieve the reserve component from their training and evaluating responsibilities. Moreover, the active duty elements should be the subject matter experts that augment the CVBG staff in JTFEXs and the enhanced CVBG staff will get evaluated.

These changes are not simple and they are not cheap. They are, however, defendable solutions to achieving the CNO’s vision of having the JFACC capability in the CVBG. The buy-in requires more than money. It requires the fundamental shift from tactical employment of air assets in support of fleet maneuver, to the control of joint airpower to achieve the CINC’s strategic and operational objectives.
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