NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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EXPEDITIONARY PORT SECURITY: TACTICAL FOCUS PREVENTS COMPLETE OPERATIONAL PROTECTION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________________

4 February 2002

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Professor Donald Chisholm
Professor, JMO Department
“...efforts must go beyond enhancing our protection of the force through defensive measures. We need to turn things around as quickly as we can, in every respect-antiterrorism doctrine, procedures, training and technology. It is doable, but we must change our mindset. Force protection is not an adjunct to our real mission. It must be in the forefront of our minds every step of the way, from planning through mission completion.”

Gen. John M. Shalikashvili

Abstract of

Expeditionary Port Security: Tactical Focus Prevents Complete Operational Protection

The mission of expeditionary port security and harbor defense is presently interpreted as tactical force protection and anti-terrorism. This view incorrectly identifies the major threat to strategic mobility assets at the endpoints of sea lines of communication and within ports of debarkation. Operational commanders must focus on more than individual vessels and facilities to achieve a layered defense. The Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) community is designated to plan and execute operations to protect harbors, ports, and vessels that enter these areas. The planning process must properly structure NCW forces to achieve FP/AT measures at the tactical level, unity of effort at the operational level, and full dimensional protection at the theater-strategic level.
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<td>ANT</td>
<td>Aids to Navigation Team (USCG)</td>
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<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>Army Prepositioning Force</td>
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<td>Anti-terrorism</td>
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<td>BOS</td>
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<td>FAST</td>
<td>Fleet Augmentation Security Team</td>
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<td>FP</td>
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<td>HAD</td>
<td>Harbor Approach Defense</td>
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<td>HDC</td>
<td>Harbor Defense Commander</td>
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<td>HDCU</td>
<td>Harbor Defense Command Unit</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>High Value Asset</td>
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<td>IBU</td>
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<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>Joint Force Land Component Commander</td>
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<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>Joint Force Maritime Component Commander</td>
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<td>JLOTS</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore</td>
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<td>JRAC</td>
<td>Joint Rear Area Commander</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>JV</td>
<td>Joint Vision</td>
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<td>LEDET</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Detachment (USCG)</td>
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<td>MIUWU</td>
<td>Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Unit</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Maritime Prepositioning Force</td>
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<td>Maritime Prepositioning Squadron</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
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<td>Military Transportation Management Command</td>
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<td>NCAPS</td>
<td>Naval Control and Protection of Shipping</td>
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<td>NCSO</td>
<td>Naval Control of Shipping Officer</td>
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<td>NCW</td>
<td>Naval Coastal Warfare</td>
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<td>NCWC</td>
<td>Naval Coastal Warfare Commander</td>
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<td>Naval Warfare Publication</td>
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<td>PSHD</td>
<td>Port Security/Harbor Defense</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Port Security Unit (USCG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Line of Communication</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Single Port Manager</td>
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<td>SPOD</td>
<td>Seaport of Debarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>Turbo Intermodal Surge</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques, Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPB</td>
<td>Small Patrol Boat (USCG)</td>
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<td>WTC</td>
<td>World Trade Center</td>
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**Problem Statement:**

During the last decade, force protection and anti-terrorism became the primary mission for US joint forces conducting military operations. Incidents like the USS COLE bombing reinforced this trend. Concurrently, the Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) community shifted its emphasis toward the tactical defense of individual vessels and structures rather than operational protection of ports and harbors. The future shape of this problem directly affects two of Joint Vision 2020’s supporting columns; focused logistics and full dimensional protection.

Geographic combatant commanders (CINCs) and joint task force (JTF) staffs cannot neglect operational protection in port security and harbor defense operations (PSHD). Their ability to safeguard ports of embarkation, sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) will determine if our logistics tail becomes a critical strength, weakness, or vulnerability.

The coastal warfare community goes well beyond the handful of units historically considered part of the team. The new debate must examine how we intend to operate in the future, the results of which will drive the coastal warfare community's identity and organizational structure.¹

**Thesis:**

This paper examines the thorny problem of expeditionary port security and harbor defense and its solution as a role for the NCW community.² PSHD force structure and mission focus must be clarified at the operational level to achieve unity of effort, and provide doctrine for tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that the US Navy and US Coast Guard can employ in a joint or combined environment.
**Introduction:**

Joint Vision 2020 outlines a future that shapes our military forces to effectively accomplish all military objectives in support of the National Security Strategy. The foundation of that vision resides in information superiority and innovation. The future spearhead is full spectrum dominance, or:

...the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.³

Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection make-up the four pillars that support this spearhead. In other words, joint forces will take the fight to the enemy. Last year, the destructive September 11, 2001 attacks on our homeland caused an opposite reaction. In a break from ‘Forward...From the Sea’ major USN combatants patrolled the US coastline. Meanwhile, the USCG virtually abandoned all other missions in order to focus on domestic port security. Strikingly, Joint Vision 2020 provides an alternative direction.

…given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.⁴

Four months later, military units in Afghanistan search out remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda members. Other units have deployed to the Philippines in support of internal defense operations or are preparing for future missions. The nation’s sea services are adjusting to what USCG Commandant Admiral James M. Loy calls the "new normalcy." Deployments and patrols have resumed on an accelerated cycle as the USN and USCG determine how to operate in a new environment.
Strategic Mobility and Focused Logistics:

US ability to project and sustain power abroad directly affects the success of ongoing and future contingency operations. Historical data shows that 90-95 percent of all military cargo enters an operations area via SPODs.\textsuperscript{5} For example, during the Vietnam War 97.5 percent of the war material was transported by sea into that theater.\textsuperscript{6}

The range of military operations from humanitarian missions to regional conflict is captured by this data. At the lower end, sealift to support Operation 'Restore Hope' in Somalia included 11 ships, 365,000 measurement tons, 1,192 containers, and 14 million gallons of fuel.\textsuperscript{7} At the other end of the spectrum, Operation ‘Desert Shield’ demonstrated the demands of regional conflict on the logistical system.

Sealift moved 2.4 million tons of cargo during the first six months of DESERT SHIELD. By comparison, that is more than four times the cargo carried across the English Channel to Normandy during the D-Day invasion and more than 6.5 times that of the peak force build-up during the Vietnam War during a similar period.\textsuperscript{8}

This effort expanded to encompass 220 Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled vessels that transported approximately 84 million pounds of cargo per day into three primary SPODs. In comparison, during 37 months of hostilities in Korea, 57 million pounds arrived daily. Furthermore, only 33 million pounds of daily cargo supported the entire Pacific Theater in World War II.\textsuperscript{9}

The volume of material needed to support military operations has risen dramatically since 1945. In addition, the loss of forward stockpiled material after forward bases were closed during the last decade further impacts on the equation. A changing strategic environment led to these reductions at the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{10} Correspondingly, an
increase in vessel size and the need for port infrastructure to handle whole squadrons of prepositioned ships make developed SPODs beneficial to strategic mobility.

In order to get material to the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, Joint Vision 2020 suggests a seamless connection with the commercial sector. Military use of commercial transportation will leverage better business practices resulting in increased speed, capacity, and efficiency.\(^{11}\) As a start, US Transportation Command developed a concept named Turbo Intermodal Surge (TIS). TIS transports cargo door-to-door utilizing existing commercial container shipments in place of military owned transportation.\(^{12}\) History indicates that higher consumption rates, loss of forward based supplies, and commercialized transportation modes will maintain sealift via SPODS as a critical component of focused logistics well into the future.

**Threat Environment:**

Strategic mobility requires a benign, or nearly benign, environment at the endpoints of the lines of communication to be successful. Presently, NCW forces are designated to protect strategic assets and SPODs. Threats encountered in SPODS can be categorized as subversive, covert, or direct action.

Subversive acts may include: demonstrations, protests, theft, purposeful mishandling of material, or use of improper procedures. For example, one memorandum reported thefts of approximately $300 million in cargo from a Vietnamese port in 1966.\(^{13}\) Another scenario might consist of an opposition group within a host nation (HN) impeding the transit of a MSC vessel by blocking a channel with small craft.

Covert operations take the form of sabotage, clandestine delivery of explosives, and other asymmetric methods. Underwater swimmers were the preferred method of
attaching explosives to vessels during the Vietnam War. However, infiltration can also occur using small boats, like in the bombing of USS COLE, or personnel approaching from the pier.

Direct or overt action is indicative of a conventional enemy attack. Waterborne, man portable, or crew served weapons, offensive mining operations, or air and missile attacks fit in this category. Classic port disruptions during the Vietnam War included heavy weapons and mortar attacks from outside the controlled perimeter. In the Gulf War, Iraqi SCUD missiles were repeatedly launched at Bahrain and Dhahran, both containing port facilities and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) areas. A successful strike in those areas would have delayed the mobility timeline and produced tremendous operational, and perhaps strategic consequences.

Global economies have potentially produced a fourth threat category specifically within developed commercial ports. USCG Commander Steve Flynn labeled one such threat the 'weapon-in-a-container' scenario. His in-depth research into domestic port security revealed that a terrorist could ship illegal material or an explosive device into the US with relative ease. "In 2000, 5.8 million 40-foot maritime containers and 211,000 commercial vessels entered US ports." This system runs two ways. A terrorist, or an opposition force, could target any number of critical foreign ports required by JTF contingency operations using this method. Pusan Korea, Bahrain, Jubail, and many European ports are among notable examples where military and commercial cargo facilities coexist. TIS shipment of military cargo provides a dedicated opponent an additional infiltration opportunity. The potential for tampering with a military TIS
shipment or inserting a 'dirty' weapon into a commercial container bound for a critical port is well documented by experts such as Commander Flynn.

**Force Structure - Mission Mismatch:**

The geographic combatant commanders and subordinate JTF commanders exercise their responsibility for PSHD within their respective areas through the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). Sub-area commanders for coastal sea control, harbor defense, and other supporting functional commanders may be designated.19

**NOTIONAL NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE THE US**

![Diagram of Naval Coastal Warfare Organization](image)

*Composite figure Joint Pub 3-10 Fig A-2 & NWP 3-10 rev. A Fig. 1-3.*

**Figure 1.**

NCW forces are tasked with harbor approach defense, harbor defense, and port security to "eliminate or prevent hostile threats, terrorist actions, and safety deficiencies that would be a threat to support and resupply operations."20 NCW customers include Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF), Army Prepositioning Forces (APF), MSC, and other naval vessels that operate in the littoral zone. NCW protects port operations, logistics-over-the-shore, and other naval missions from seaward threats.21
In support of NCW and USCG Title 14 requirements, reserve USCG Port Security Units (PSU) were originally commissioned after the Vietnam War to provide pier security and safety supervision during the handling of dangerous cargoes such as fuel and ammunition. During the Gulf War, PSUs worked in conjunction with USN reserve units to protect critical ports. A CNO letter described PSHD in Operation 'Desert Shield' as follows,

Physical security against water-borne attack for three major ports in the Gulf region was a significant concern. LOGSUPFOR was responsible for coordinating the Port Security Harbor Defense (PSHD) force. Three PSHD groups-- each consisting of a Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit that operates radar and sonar from the pier, a Coast Guard small boat security team and a Navy EOD diver unit --operated 24-hours a day from the beginning of the build-up. They protected the key ports of Bahrain, along with Jubail and Dhahran in Saudi Arabia...

Unstated are the interoperability issues that plagued the forces at the tactical level. The PSUs had never deployed nor trained with the Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Unit (MIUWU) organization. Moreover, the PSUs were prepared for their traditional port security mission of preventing intentional damage by subversion or subversive acts. Unfortunately this mission was not defined by the operating guidance in affect at the time. The net result was that the units were never successfully integrated and by default the PSUs were forced into a much broader harbor defense role.

A member of MEU Service Support Group 11 deployed with the USS BOXER (LHD-4) ARG illustrates a second example of force structure - mission mismatch.

If a boat comes toward the ship and poses a threat, we'll engage it, Corporal Joshua D. Kissler stated. I did port security in United Arab Emirates during my last deployment. We did it the same way. [Emphasis added.]
In this case, the Marines provided perimeter shore-side security without benefit of dedicated waterborne assets like USN Inshore Boat Units (IBU) or USCG PSUs. Interestingly, *engage* has a different connotation for Marines or IBU personnel, as compared to members of a PSU. PSU personnel are familiar with the USCG 'use of force' continuum and provide the ability to differentiate between malevolent contacts, contacts where hostile intent has not been overtly exhibited, and the amiable. In contrast, IBUs primarily operate under 'rules of engagement' and seek to exclude contacts from a security zone using overwhelming force.\(^{27}\) In many cases HN agreements may preclude this type of response.

Today, interoperability and 'mission creep' among NCW forces remain primary concerns. Training cycles and budgets rarely allow USN and USCG tactical units to interact with each other except during major exercises and in real world operations. In many cases, training opportunities are relegated to one type of unit. Similar to Operation 'Desert Shield', in training a unit will portray a role it was not specifically created to accomplish, creating confusion in specifying mission statements and capabilities.

Senior leadership from both services further confused this issue. As illustration, Admiral Riker, senior reserve officer for the USCG Atlantic Area, stated the PSU mission was "to enter the port, open the port and maintain the port."\(^{28}\) The scope implicit in that statement is a great deal larger than the capabilities a PSU routinely maintains. When the USN and USCG units operate together valuable time is lost identifying basic mission capabilities and force structure to alleviate wrangling over turf battles.\(^{29}\) In addition, the growing tactical emphasis on force protection and anti-
terrorism (FP/AT) measures and a lack of TTP to support the layered defense outlined in Naval Coastal Warfare, NWP 3-10 (rev. A) are problematic to resolving this conflict.

**Force Protection and Anti-Terrorism:**

A 1997 article by Daniel Ward states, "Force protection (FP) is one of the most misused terms in planning for and employing military forces today."\(^{30}\) This assertion has become even more germane to the current debate after bombings of two additional US embassies and USS COLE, and the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City. The result has been a reactionary and tactical response from the Secretary of Defense right down to individual unit commanders when dealing with FP/AT measures.\(^{31}\)

For example, immediately after the USS COLE bombing, Port Security Units received Presidential Selective Recall orders to provide increased security and force protection onboard individual naval units operating in Southwest Asia.\(^{32}\) Likewise, Lieutenant John Fritz, Commanding Officer of one IBU, concurred that FP/AT is his primary port security mission. "The threats involved with point defense for high value assets in port facilities are synonymous with those in force protection and anti-terrorism."\(^{33}\)

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this view is the merger of operational level force protection with tactical FP/AT. Force protection at the operational level is employed to preserve the fighting ability of the joint force by impeding the enemy's ability to reduce physical capabilities and morale.\(^{34}\) This is not an injunction against FP/AT awareness. Tactical measures continue to be highly desirable at the unit level as the inner workings of a layered defense. However, outstanding FP/AT efforts on one vessel provide minimal return for an entire port complex.
Although no further attacks have occurred against deployed military units, it is debatable that tactical efforts alone would make a difference in the face of a determined and well-planned effort against an entire port complex. Successful swimmer and sapper attacks repeatedly penetrated harbor defenses in Vietnam because tactical protection was not integrated within the framework of operational protection.35

A November 2000 article in *US News & World Report* described lax 'port security' as one of the top concerns contained in a joint Navy-Marine deficiency list. "[The] FP/AT protection program leaves us exposed to waterside threats especially at medium to low threat bases."36 The report stated that policy disconnects among the various commanders responsible for port security were a major problem.

A correctly defined PSHD mission relies on highly developed knowledge of NCW capabilities tied together with unity of effort measures to address operational force protection. Numerous working groups were created to address the problem but they have been "largely mute on the responsibilities of the staff in assisting the commander with force protection."37 Daniel Schuster, writing on force protection, concludes:

> As beneficial as all these initiatives are, to date they have tended to focus primarily on the individual components of force protection and not on the way these components fit together into a protective barrier.38

**Unity of Effort:**

New threats and challenges lie ahead to develop a layered and seamless organization utilizing NCW forces for PSHD. The ability of a combatant commander or JTF staff to properly synchronize the efforts of all the participants in this mission will be the key to success. This is an extraordinary task when the NCW organization chart reads like the alphabet and the scope of the PSHD mission is subject to interpretation. Moreover, the
addition of coalition forces and their assets will likely prevent unity of command in situations where a HN's ports are in use.

A critique of Operation 'Restore Hope' revealed confusion over who was in charge of port operations in Somalia. The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) declared Mogadishu a 'common user port' but their Single Port Manager (SPM) failed to arrive prior to the MPF and APF squadrons. Individual service components created a free-for-all environment by establishing their own sealift requirements without regard to other service priorities. Later exercises exhibit similar results in command and control.

During the employment there was no one agency or individual in the JTF staff specifically responsible for protection as a whole. The prosecution of protection matters with the JTF was delegated to the components. And,

Command and control of APODs and SPODs was an issue that remained unresolved throughout the employment phase. While it was clear the lead nations would handle movement of cargo within the ports, there was confusion over who had ultimate responsibility for such things as port security, administrative support of transient personnel, and storage of equipment that may be moved forward.

Unity of effort is difficult to achieve because joint doctrine does not specify the exact relationships between the NCW Commander (NCWC), Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC), and MTMC SPM. Doctrine directs NCW Commanders to coordinate directly with the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) for shoreline defense, and with the JFMCC for the green water-blue water interface. Integration and support is also required for overlapping operations between HN and coalition security or law enforcement forces in a combined structure.

The seam between maritime and land forces requires the greatest coordination to achieve unity of effort. Exercise 'Dynamic Mix 98' established that coordination between
a MIUWU, Fleet Augmentation Security Team (FAST) and MPF were satisfactorily maintained using a 'seaward security officer.' On the other hand, relationships with the 'landward security officer' were inconsistent due to separate command organizations.\textsuperscript{42}

Commander Gordon Broz, Commanding Officer of an MIUWU, believes the coordination and liaison provided by a HDC, when established, will overcome the obstacles created in the absence of unity of command. In his experience, the PSHD role ends when cargo reaches the beach and the landward security organization under the JFLCC gains responsibility.\textsuperscript{43} This view may be correct at the MIUWU level but coordination is required to insure proper security is maintained until material leaves the RSOI area while the entire port complex remains secure.

Operationally, the biggest concern may be the hand-off from harbor defense to harbor approach defense (HAD). According to CDR Broz, neither the active duty USCG components nor the Naval Control and Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) organization have been active in exercise and drill scenarios. Outside of PSU elements little interaction between USCG and NCW command levels exists. Moreover, NCAPS equipment is non-existent and the personnel were dispersed to augment various staff offices.\textsuperscript{44} Integration problems similar to the issues faced by PSUs in the Gulf War will likely hamper operations at the outer seam when HAD operations are required. Poor understanding of the NCW mission by active duty forces, an increased operations tempo, and a lack of training opportunities prevent unity of effort among these forces in the short term.
Full Dimensional Protection (Operational Protection):  

Planning for operational protection correctly adapts the mission and force structure of available assets to conditions found across the entire range of military operations.

PSHD is a mission that requires a layered defense comprised of tactical measures, unity of effort, operational focus, and theater-strategic concerns. A high level of FP/AT measures is required onboard individual units or facilities. This capability should be provided by organic forces, augmented as necessary with units or detachments specifically trained in the FP/AT mission, not an ad hoc arrangement using PSUs or IBUs outside the scope of their true mission. The restructured USN Master at Arms force and FAST should concentrate on this level. FAST should also undertake the essential role of training individual units and forces that deploy in the FP/AT mission.

Unity of effort must be addressed prior to commencing sealift operations. First, a clear chain of command should be established where possible. Instead of separate seaward and landward security organizations, the port area or harbor area should be clearly described and placed under the responsibility of one commander. This arrangement mirrors the amphibious operations area (AOA) described in joint doctrine and prevents a possible seam at the shoreline.

Second, forces should be used in roles appropriate to their structure and mission. For example, The HDC maintains host nation and interagency liaison, organic intelligence analysis (N2), and coordination capabilities to support overall defense responsibilities. The MIUWU provides the tactical picture and maintains tactical control of response units. Ideally, a PSU detachment properly coordinated with an IBU provides the complimentary capabilities to engage a broad range of contacts and better maintain HN
agreements. In large or multiple port scenarios, a NCW Group is established to perform coordination functions while the HDC concentrates on local arrangements in one sector.

At the operational level, PSHD and force protection should not be relegated to a collateral duty. The commander must continue to emphasize that FP/AT measures are important at the tactical level. In addition, stronger guidance for operational protection is required so that the staff delineates between the two concepts. Appendix A contains a task list for coastal and port security operations that the CINCs planning staff should review before commencing deliberate or contingency planning. Additionally, factors of space, time, and force must be addressed prior to the execution of a particular operation. The size of the area, development and commercialization of the port, traffic density, HN support, surrounding population, force protection level, and time available to deploy forces impact the level of detail required. A force protection coordination center should be established to ensure unity of effort exists between the components assigned to the PSHD role. Stovepipes must be eliminated in intelligence (N2/J2), HN support functions, and between landward or seaward security forces.

Theater-strategic concerns must be addressed to complete the package. Current logistics analysis during the planning cycle emphasizes quantity and platforms over command and control or security. The SPM and designated security force structure should be in place prior to the arrival of strategic assets. Finally, NCW cannot protect strategic mobility assets from the threats generated by a global commercial transportation network. Ports that have dual use capability must be scrutinized to insure that commercial operations do not pose a threat to military sectors. Arrangements with the HN should include observation and periodic sweeps of commercial facilities and
shipping. Commercial companies conducting TIS shipments must have established positive control measures in order to track containers from door-to-door.

**Counter-Arguments:**

This analysis of PSHD operations is based on the assumption that strategic mobility will utilize SPODs well into the future. The need to secure and maintain harbors and port infrastructure to handle large vessels in a rapid manner dominates this assertion. On the other hand, two proposed alternatives, Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) and sea basing, potentially reduce reliance on SPODs by using new technologies.

Proponents of JLOTS contend that force sustainment can be accomplished over the beach using 'in-stream' cargo handling and mobile pier structures assembled in situ. Today's MPF ships can offload cargo in conditions under sea state two. This capability was tested off the Somalian coast during Operation 'Restore Hope'. Austere port conditions in Mogadishu forced three MPF vessels to conduct offshore lightering operations. Repeated attempts failed and the vessels shifted down the coast to Kismayo where rough weather continued to prevent the offload. Two vessels waited 14 days for a weather window and then sailed back to Diego Garcia without delivering their cargo.⁴⁶

New technology and larger ships are projected to increase the operating parameters of MPF vessels so that they can work in conditions up to sea state three. Impressive as this sounds, the probability of exceeding those parameters (4-5 feet) on a routine basis is fairly high, such that the planning staff may be hamstrung by weather considerations much like those in Operation 'Overlord' in 1944. Or, as in Somalia, the flow of supplies may be significantly disrupted, complicating the operational timeline. Overall, the nature
of JLOTS inevitably remains near shore, or requires the shelter provided by a harbor environment. In other words, within the NCW community's domain.

Logically, the next step removes the logistics component from near proximity to land. Lieutenant General John E. Rhodes stated, "A port can be made unfriendly in a hurry." He envisions a sea base where very large MPF 'mother ships' capable of landing and supporting airframes including the MV-22 Osprey operate over fifty miles from the coast. Theoretically, combat troops join the prepositioned equipment at sea and launch combat operations directly from the ship. Cargo is continuously flowed via the air as additional merchant vessels resupply the mother ships to provide indefinite sustainment. A floating 5000-foot tactical runway supported on a large mobile offshore base becomes the final component.

Although the concept is billed as complementary to present amphibious forces, the conflict is clear. Special operations utilizing large deck carriers during Operation 'Uphold Democracy' and in the present Terror War prove that assets currently exist to conduct surge missions using a sea base mentality. A larger, more expensive, design and build program will compete with limited resources to replace a capability already in the inventory. In addition, the proof-of-concept phase will have to address critical issues including how many sea bases are needed beyond the surge capacity already exhibited, and how mobile is a 5000-foot floating runway. Will it be deliverable where and when it is needed?

Finally, current MPF vessel leases expire during the 2009-2011 time frame. The Navy is expected to purchase and retain this capacity at the end of the lease period until new construction is delivered. The MPF, APF, and MSC are increasing supplemental
sealift capability based on current technology that will provide strategic mobility assets well into the future. NCW must be prepared to provide PSHD during this extended timeframe.

**Conclusions: Port Security and Harbor Defense:**

In the Vietnam War, port security was the defense of assets from the shore. Meanwhile, harbor defense focused attention on threats from the sea. Today, the definition must change to acknowledge the vast increase in threat levels achievable by combining subversive, covert, and direct action elements to locate and exploit the seams in PSHD operations. The PSHD focus remains a secondary effort that must be integrated within the planning process to achieve FP/AT measures at the tactical level, unity of effort at the operational level, and full dimensional protection at the theater-strategic level to protect those seams. In addition to previously identified adjustments, the following recommendations outline broad steps that will enable this process:

1) Restructure USCG PSUs into detachments attached to NCW squadrons. This contradicts the current usage of these units but merges the standard equipment and preferred operating environments in a synergistic manner. PSU detachments should be commanded by an appropriate grade officer to better integrate within the NCW command structure and prevent turf wrangling. I propose changing the current O-5 structure to an O-3 as an alternative. Administrative control would be retained as is.

2) Adjust training cycles to incorporate USN and USCG forces under one command and control structure throughout the year. A PSU should not be a direct replacement for an IBU during an exercise. Integration of primarily USCG active
duty units assigned HAD responsibility must occur to break down barriers in communication and operating procedures.

3) Remove redundant or confusing documentation from joint and naval doctrine. For example the NCAPS mission should be clarified or eliminated. Create TTP based on the issues broadly identified in this paper to enable joint and combined forces to operate successfully.

4) Verify and implement procedures that improve domestic port security to increase operational protection abroad. An increased foreign port survey and assessment program, positive identification and tracking methods for commercial shipments, and standard international commercial operating procedures are warranted to mitigate the risks associated with using dual purpose ports for strategic mobility. The large amount of commercial transactions across US borders and US standing as a leading maritime nation indicate a need for continued engagement on the global level including active participation in the International Maritime Organization to establish these procedures.
Endnotes:

2 For brevity NCW is used throughout this paper. NCW may also be used in reference to Network Centric Warfare in other documents.
9 Ibid.
11 Joint Vision 2020, p. 25.
15 Note: "The defense of shore facilities from attack aircraft, guided or dropped missiles during flight is considered air defense under the cognizance of the JRAC, area air defense coordinator, or amphibious objective area equipped surface forces capable of responding to such threats." NWP 3-10 (rev. A), p. 2-1.
18 Ibid, p.74.
21 Note: "The defense of shore facilities from attack aircraft, guided or dropped missiles during flight is considered air defense under the cognizance of the JRAC, area air defense coordinator, or amphibious objective area equipped surface forces capable of responding to such threats." NWP 3-10 (rev. A), p. 2-1.
24 Stubbs, p. 17.
25 Ibid.
27 LT John Fritz, personal interview by the author [1/18/2002].
29 LT John Fritz, personal interview by the author [1/18/2002].

Note: Specifically, in the aftermath of the USS COLE bombing, then Defense Secretary William Cohen appointed a commission headed by General William W. Crouch and Admiral Harold W. Gehman who provided among others the following unclassified recommendations:

- Theater commanders will step up efforts to get HNs to improve their abilities to protect US personnel stationed in, or transiting through a country.
- Negotiate to provide US Forces their own security including armed patrols where HN support is insufficient.
- Direct the DLA and Service Components to incorporate FP/AT concerns into the entire fabric of logistics support.
- Integrate FP/AT into unit-level training and pre-deployment exercises.
- Elevate FP/AT training to the equivalent of a primary mission area and provide the same emphasis afforded combat tasks.
- Create the Maritime Ship Security Augmentation Force for fifth fleet HQ in Bahrain. Teams deploy in advance to ensure site security.


LT John Fritz, personal interview by the author [1/18/2002].


Ibid, p. 58.


Allard, p. 48.

DTIC JULLS # 20935-73617 [12/19/2001].

DTIC JULLS # 31031-99162 [12/19/2001].

DTIC Lesson Learned # LL6F0-06218 [12/19/2001].

CDR Gordon Broz, personal interview by the author [1/18/2002].

Ibid.

Tasks are listed in NWP 3-10 (rev. A), chapter 2, pp 2-2, 2-6.

Allard, p. 50.


Ibid, p. 43.

Ibid, p. 44.
Appendix A

PSHD Task List

A. Primary HDPS tasks include:

1) Inshore Surveillance,
2) Contact analysis and Reporting,
3) Command and Control,
4) Interdiction,
5) Force Protection,
6) Strategic Sealift Escort and Protection,
7) Vessel Movement Control,
8) Waterside Security,
9) Seaward/Landward Defense Coordination,
10) Environmental Defense Operations.

B. Secondary HDPS tasks include:

1) Command Control and Communications support,
2) Vessel Traffic Service,
3) Fishing Vessel Control,
4) Port Safety,
5) Host Nation Liaison,
6) Law Enforcement,
7) Aids to Navigation.

C. Additional supporting tasks include:

1) Harbor Clearance,
2) Mine Countermeasures Operations,
3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations,
4) Salvage and Safe Navigation.
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   The mission of expeditionary port security and harbor defense is presently interpreted as tactical force protection and anti-terrorism. This view incorrectly identifies the major threat to strategic mobility assets at the endpoints of sea lines of communication and within ports of debarkation. Operational commanders must focus on more than individual vessels and facilities to achieve a layered defense. The Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) community is designated to plan and execute operations to protect harbors, ports, and vessels that enter these areas. The planning process must properly structure NCW forces to achieve FP/AT measures at the tactical level, unity of effort at the operational level, and full dimensional protection at the theater-strategic level.

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