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EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS: MAKING THEM WORK TOGETHER

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERTO D’ALESSANDRO
Italian Army

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EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS: MAKING THEM WORK TOGETHER

by

Lieutenant Colonel Roberto D'Alessandro
Italian Army

Colonel Harry Tomlin
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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Despite a general consensus, different views still exist on how the NATO Alliance and the European Union military organizations should interact. The “3D” American approach to an evolving European Security and Defense Identity (supportive as long as it avoids decoupling, duplication and discrimination) seems to be at odds with a European desire for greater “autonomy” in defense policy. This paper looks at how the European Union is dealing with the problem of coexistence with(in) NATO and provides possible alternative ideas.
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EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS: MAKING THEM WORK TOGETHER

"The US would support the concept so long as it doesn’t undermine NATO, so long as the notion of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is one that is added value to NATO."
— George Bush

The policy that US President Bush has pronounced confirms American skepticism of the European position of an “autonomous” Security and Defense Policy. The “yes, but” US position supports the European Union (EU) project as long as it avoids “duplication, decoupling and discrimination” between NATO and EU.

In short, a major issue is the confrontation between ESDP and the Allied European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The European decision to develop a Common Security and Defense Policy arose at the end of the Cold War. For almost forty years of European construction, the expression “Common Foreign Policy” found no place in the Treaties. From October 1970 the Member States of European Community cooperated and endeavored to consult one another on major international policy problems. The change came at Maastricht where, for the first time, Member States incorporated in the Treaty the objective of a “Common Foreign and Security Policy”. The objectives of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy were established in the Treaty of EU, approved in Maastricht in December 1991.

On the other hand, in 1996, recalling a concept already arose in 1991, NATO agreed to reinforce its European pillar through the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. The agreement was seen by all members of NATO to contribute to Alliance security. An essential part of the development of ESDI is the improvement of European military capabilities. To this end, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was launched in 1999 to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges.

The Alliance considers the evolving European initiative an urgent need to create a more balanced Alliance by reinforcing NATO’s European pillar according to Lord Robertson’s “3Is” principle (improvement in European defense capabilities, inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies and indivisibility of Trans-Atlantic security) expressed during a meeting in Berlin on 14 November 2000. On the other hand, EU Secretary General, Dr. Solana, pointed out that ESDP has nothing to do with collective defense nor the idea of building a European Army. The EU is not in competition with NATO. Conversely, he said, ESDP is aimed at strengthening
Transatlantic ties. The EU approach, similar to NATO Secretary General’s position at first
glance, seems to entail the idea of an organization "tied to" but not "within NATO".

The establishment of four EU-NATO ad-hoc working groups to discuss issues of security,
capabilities, modalities for EU access to Alliance resources, and the definition of permanent
agreements\textsuperscript{6} together with the settlement of political and military bodies (Political and Security
Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff) seems to imply that political intentions and
practical accomplishment of the project follow different tracks.

The creation of the EU Satellite Center and the Security Studies Institute\textsuperscript{7}, essentially
taken from former Western European Union (WEU) structures, to support the decision making
process in the context of a European Security and Foreign Policy and the reduction of the WEU
functions\textsuperscript{8} reinforce the impression of the European Union desire to create "something from
within Europe for Europe" not tied to NATO.

Some argue about the utility of establishing an ESDP to solve problems that NATO or
other organizations could address. A different approach would avoid duplication of effort. In
principle, a EU without a Security and Defense Policy would be inconceivable. Common
economic interests require shared foreign policy views. Now, how could it be possible to share
the same foreign policy without a common defense policy? Thus, being vital to the growth of
EU, ESDP is not aimed at duplicating NATO structure but at supporting EU as a whole. In
addition, if well managed, it could reinforce NATO.

In this context, the most likely outcome appears to be the coexistence of EU and NATO
organizations in the international arena. There are still many political problems to solve, such
as the influence of EU’s ambition for a defense role on the future of NATO in the management
of European security, the question of the relationship of non-EU NATO countries to the EU
initiative, the different views of individual EU countries about the right approach towards NATO,
and so forth. These issues aside, the above mentioned coexistence of the two organizations
raises many questions about the effectiveness of the military solutions proposed for the
European Union military project to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

Would NATO and EU military organizations be employed at the same time? Is a
separation of labor (NATO for Article V and EU for Petersberg missions\textsuperscript{9}) feasible? Is it
possible without duplication of effort? Will there be a lead organization for the (force and
operational) planning processes? Do the EU countries have enough resources to carry out their
project of a ERRF? How can EU address the problem of Command and Control? And, again,
are there other forces available out of the Alliance? Is the "separable but not separated"\textsuperscript{10}
criterion the only possible solution?
Without answering the above questions, a crisis would require a “case by case” situation assessment among the organizations and countries involved to deconflict scarce resources.

The purpose of this research paper is to address the problems related to the coexistence of the EU and NATO military organizations in the case of EU-led operations. By comparing different points of view, assessing possible solutions and managing the available resources, this paper will propose ideas focused on the military issues (command and control, forces, etc.) aimed at making NATO and EU military organizations work together effectively and with limited duplication. At the same time, the envisioned solutions will reinforce NATO in the long term.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Before starting a detailed assessment of possible solutions for the different issue, it is helpful to recall the main goals achieved so far with respect to the growth of EU and its relation with NATO.

Without revisiting all the past attempts to build a credible common security and defense policy (e.g. the idea of a European Defense Community was first launched by the French Minister Pleven in 1950), the most significant recent event which has affected development of the ESDP is a change of British policy. The new British policy supporting a more active role of the EU in the area of defense was declared in 1998 at St. Malo’ during a British-French Conference. The inability of Europe to manage the Balkan struggles of Bosnia and Kosovo without US support\textsuperscript{11} reinforced the need to speed up the process, started at St. Malo’, to bolster European military posture. The leaps taken from the British-French Conference in 1998 to the Nice European Council meeting in 2000 represent more progress in 3 years than in the previous half century.\textsuperscript{12}

The “Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration”\textsuperscript{13} issued at Brussels, on 20 November 2000, is another milestone in the process of developing an autonomous European capability. For the purposes of this paper, it is noteworthy to review what the Brussels Declaration included. In the document, EU nations:

- confirmed the European interest, already cited in the “Helsinki Headline Goals”;\textsuperscript{14} to focus on missions defined in the Treaty of the EU known as “Petersberg missions” (humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and combat tasks in crisis management);
- highlighted the general trend toward developing more effective military capabilities without unnecessary duplication, and avoiding, at the same time, the establishment of a European Army. To this end, EU Defense Ministers made national commitments\textsuperscript{15} to fulfill the military requirements identified in the “Helsinki Headline Goals”. To date, a “pool” of forces of
about 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 40 vessels has been set up to establish, by 2003, a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 persons available for deployment within 60 days for a one-year mission at least;

- stressed the need to develop strategic capabilities such as strategic mobility (to deploy forces to a Theater of Operation), command and control, and associated communication and intelligence capabilities;

- expressed the intention to fulfill the main shortfalls (improvement of availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces) to accomplish the mentioned “Petersberg missions” while specifying the need to produce more efforts in some areas such as military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, support services, medical services, prevention of operational risk and protection of forces;

- pointed out the necessities of a resolution of the talks with NATO to reach agreements on access to Allied capabilities and assets. Within this context, general criteria have been established to develop a series of standing procedures for mutual consultation and relations with NATO and non-EU European NATO members;

- encouraged the development of European capabilities in Defense Industry to bolster ongoing international programs (such as Future Large Aircraft, sea transport vessels, Troop Transport Helicopter, etc.);

- defined an “evaluation and follow up” mechanism based on the consultation of Member States to keep track of the process of pursuing its goals. To avoid unnecessary duplications, it would rely on data emanating from the existing NATO mechanism such as Defense Planning Process and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of NATO Partnership for Peace Program;

- stressed the need to ensure (a) compatibility of the EU commitment towards force goals and the framework of NATO force planning and (b) mutual reinforcement of the EU’s goals and those of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) within NATO.

The following European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000, confirmed the agreements reached in the above Brussels Declaration and approved detailed mechanisms for the relations between EU and NATO and third countries (non-EU European NATO countries and candidates for joining EU).

In Nice, additional decisions included:

- the establishment of EU politico-diplomatic and military bodies (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff) to manage an “autonomous” decision making process for crisis management;
- the reduced functions of the WEU after the hand over its crisis management responsibility to the EU;\textsuperscript{18}
- the specific role of DSACEUR - as a link between NATO and EU for a EU-led operation commanded by a European NATO Commander – (as well as an adapted Combined Joint Task Force concept)\textsuperscript{19}, logical steps of the Allied commitment for an effective ESDI, transferred to EU as a consequence of his new responsibility in the crisis management environment.

FOCUSBING ON THE MAIN ISSUES

THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

Having reviewed the recent evolution and current status of EU’s security portfolio and EU’s relations with NATO offers sufficient background to transition to the key questions mentioned in the introduction. This section is aimed at deepening the discussion of general issues such as the geographical Area of Operations of NATO and EU, the possibility of applying the “role specialization” concept and the role of WEU.

Assuming that any structure should be mission oriented, the first step is to compare NATO and EU conceptual frameworks and determine any drawbacks related to coexistence of the two military organizations.

A few questions immediately arise. What is the role of each organization within the international security environment? What security tasks can/does/should each carry out? Are there overlapping areas of interest/influence/decision? And, in the latter, how can we account for it and avoid duplication?

The latest published Alliance’s Strategic Concept,\textsuperscript{20} while strengthening the deterrence and collective defense functions of NATO (Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty), fosters its increasing role in the “out of area” crisis management spectrum along with other fundamental tasks in the field of security, conflict prevention, consultation and partnership. Simply, according to NATO, the Alliance cannot be considered only as a “collective defense tool” any more but must be seen as a means to solve security problems in a much broader perspective.

On the other hand, although a EU detailed global crisis management strategy - similar to NATO doctrine - has yet to be drawn\textsuperscript{21}, a “Food for Thought” Paper - agreed during the EU Defense Ministers in Sintra\textsuperscript{22} at the end of February 2000 – suggests the steps the EU should follow to establish a military capability. The mentioned “Food for Thought” Paper summarized the well known military aspects of the EU Rapid Reaction Corps (about 50,000-60,000 persons
to be deployed within 60 days for one year, area of intervention “in and around Europe”, etc.) and confirmed the European vocation to accomplish the “Petersberg missions”. Different points of view still exist on the extent the EU force should or could accomplish the above missions. No clear reference to actual crisis operations has emerged so far. In any case, it seems that the strength of the ERRF would allow it to conduct limited contingency operations in the transition phase (to stability operations) once more robust forces had completed the combat operations phase.

At a first glance, the area of “crisis management” seems to be “common ground” of the two organizations that should be “deconflicted” to avoid redundancy. Is there any way to let the EU play a “complementary” role without downgrading its importance? Can a geographical area of intervention define a line of demarcation between NATO and EU? Can we envisage a “division of labor” (NATO for Article V and EU for Petersberg missions)? Would the WEU have a useful role in this process?

That said, and taking into account that Americans and most European countries (only France seems to have a slightly different view) agree on the Alliance’s primary role in European security and the Alliance’s right to decide first whether to be involved in a crisis, there seems to be no question on the “subordinate” position of the EU. From a political perspective, a separation of labor seems to be unlikely since it would relegate the Alliance to collective defense only and marginalize its role and those of non-EU NATO countries.

Similarly, use of other defining parameters do not help resolve the organizational overlap. Given the commonality of resources shared by the two organizations, a “role specialization” of the respective assets cannot be pursued. A geographical delineation is not helpful. An “in and around Europe” area of intervention does not clearly demarcate a suitable area of influence/interest. Different views still exist on this point but, for the time being, Europe's military strategic planning will continue to focus on regional concerns. A global scope is hardly likely in the near term given the current trend of European nations’ expenditures on defense.

Important is the impact of the uncovering “collective defense contract”, which is uncovered as a result of the EU Security and Defense Policy. In the case of separation of labor and in anticipation of the (possible) suppression of WEU, some of the EU members would remain without “collective defense insurance” considering that only WEU (and NATO) provide it. This issue – while requiring an “ad hoc” solution - reinforces the need to identify the future role of WEU. To this end, some propose to include the collective defense in a sort of declaration annexed to the Treaty of EU without it being imposed on the other members of the
EU (in this case, the WEU would gradually be merged with EU). Others suggest using the expertise of the WEU to help establish a “European Defense and Security Assembly” to monitor the EU security bodies from the perspective of national parliaments, giving the EU a more representative parliamentary dimension.

A viable solution for the near term could be to renew the WEU by it “joining” the EU and by giving it the responsibilities not included in the Treaty of EU. In the medium term, as NATO and EU enlarge, the “former WEU” could be integrated within EU. As a matter of fact, it doesn’t seem to make any sense maintaining WEU to accomplish a small number of “limited” functions (i.e. armament cooperation).

At this stage a few observations should be made. Given the above mentioned political realities, in the near term, a change in the “ambiguous relationship” between NATO and EU seems unlikely. The envisioned “division of labor” between the two organizations seems to be politically, legally and practically unacceptable. A “case by case” decision is the most likely approach the organizations would use to determine the military options in the event of a crisis. Could NATO and EU be employed simultaneously? Considering increasing operational needs, the US internal discussion on a reduction of overseas presence and the desire of both the US and EU to reinforce the “NATO European pillar”, simultaneous employment may be a reality.

Thus, if a simultaneous employment is possible and, taking into account the EU desire for autonomy in the decision making process, duplication of some structures seems to be unavoidable. Identifying (and minimizing) the redundancies and harmonizing the two structures will be addressed next.

THE FORCE PLANNING PROCESS

If duplication is unavoidable (at least in the field of military structures), there must be a system to limit it to a minimum level. It can only be done within the force planning process. This leads to the question of leadership between the two organizations and the issue of the level of autonomy that could reasonable given to EU.

The two approaches envisioned by British Minister of Defense (“separable but not separated”, “fully coordinated, compatible and transparent with NATO”) on one hand and the conclusions of Nice report on the other show that different views still exist on the degree of EU autonomy desires. Regardless of political positions, the lack of resources is an incontestable reason that will force the two organizations to plan together and apply the principle of close cooperation for coherent and compatible defense planning. As NATO Secretary General said “the countries have only one set of forces and only one defense budget”. That said, the logical
consequence is that one of the two organizations must have priority. This idea is reinforced by Lord Robertson when he says that “its [ESDP’s] development must naturally be consistent with NATO’s existing defense planning arrangements”.

In the above view, an important requirement (at least from an American perspective) is the “linkage” to the ESDP offered by the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Within this context, the DCI, designed to fill the European nations’ capability gaps within the Alliance, represents a way to increase the quality of European NATO armies and, thus strengthen the European pillar of NATO. There is a symmetry between the DCI and the Headline Goals. At the same time, there is no need for EU to duplicate the NATO planning process. No question that, waiting for the establishment of a EU planning process, the existing WEU defense planning mechanism (the Forces Available for WEU database, so called FAWEU database) is insufficient to give substance to EU Headline Goals, let alone to harmonize different planning processes. Moreover, the WEU system of force management seems to be oriented to coordinate national force plannings more than to build a multinational force planning system.

The complex EU/NATO parallel planning and evaluation process envisioned in the report of the Nice Council, based on the work carried out by the Headline Task Force/Headline Task Force Plus (HTF/HTFP), is a step forward. However, this process does not seem to address some important issues such as the way to link “third” countries (EU candidate nations) to the planning process, how to harmonize the EU goals with EU countries’ national parallel processes and, finally, how to integrate NATO and EU processes. No mention is made of the priority of choices and therefore on which organization leads the process.

Based on the above considerations, and taking into account the greater planning expertise/capabilities of NATO, it seems more effective to rely on the NATO planning process as the “leading” process. To avoid duplication and inconsistency, the EU, within the whole planning process, should limit itself to strategic planning and generic requirements. The EU non-NATO Nations should establish a link between the national and future NATO process to limit complex procedures by following “common” recommendations issued by the NATO process.

The EU Military Staff (EUMS), under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC), should perform the strategic planning function, including generic Petersberg mission planning. This would allow the EUMS to develop headline and capabilities goals into detailed “force goals” by using NATO standards and terminology (readiness, availability, sustainability, etc.). Once
defined, the EU force goals would be brought into the NATO process where individual nations’ defense efforts could be harmonized.\textsuperscript{42}

In summary, such a proposal would allow a “planning division of labor”. The EU defense process would focus on strategic planning (whose inputs would be injected into force planning) and NATO process would retain emphasis on force planning, with continuous interaction between the two organizations.

To assist the EU in the development of the Headline Goals, NATO should contribute to the EU the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). By doing so, there would be a common view on force planning and therefore a harmonization of the EU and NATO processes. Moreover, resources would be certainly saved. Complementarity could also be advanced through an exchange of personnel. The Alliance could send planners from the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) to the EU to assist in harmonization of the Headline Goals with the NATO’s DCI.

This would probably require some change to NATO planning\textsuperscript{43} to help integrate EU process into NATO’s. Additionally, the EU needs a process aimed at seeking convergence in the field of defense and reviewing member states’ armed forces and their conformity with the EU’s objectives\textsuperscript{44}. To this end it would be sufficient to create a Council of Defense Ministers responsible for defense cooperation (military and industrial) within the EU.

Summing up, an achievable level of EU autonomy is limited because of a lack of:
- expertise and resources shared with the Alliance. The “struggle” of the EU proposed mechanism to access Allied assets\textsuperscript{45} and the “participation” of third countries in the decision making process\textsuperscript{46} makes the issues harder to solve;
- a strategic concept that must be the starting point to develop coherent force planning. Many “gray areas” (role of EU within the security environment and width of the “in and around Europe” concept, e.g.) still exist that need to be clarified to draw up a strategic vision.

With EU’s limited autonomy in mind, there is no need to have redundant structures between NATO and EU. For force planning purposes, EU politico-military bodies should solely verify the coherence of the results of national force planning with the Headline Goals. To this end, EU politico-military organizations should be kept at a minimum size by adopting “ad hoc” solutions (dual-hatted national representatives within the parallel bodies, for instance) and relying on existing NATO procedures and structures as much as possible. The consultation and cooperation procedures set up to deal with NATO bodies during peace time appear to be adequate. As the French Plan\textsuperscript{47} suggests, while the PSC would be different from the Allied
North Atlantic Council to provide a minimum of political autonomy, the EUMC could be "double hatted" for interested nations.

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

Shifting to operational planning, since the duplication of the planning capabilities of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Power in Europe (SHAPE) seems to be out of the question,⁴⁸ EU operational planning essentially relies on Allied resources both in case of operations conducted with or without NATO support.⁴⁹ One alternative option in the case of EU-led operations without the support of NATO is the multinationalization of existing EU HQs by applying the "framework nation" principle and the increased presence of other countries’ representatives. There could be no pre-established chain of command. In time of crisis, EU would decide on a case by case basis to use a multinational or national HQs from NATO or EU member states⁵⁰.

Command and control arguments aside, a weak point of the EU political strategy is its dependence upon NATO⁵¹ or upon a "framework nation" to provide a HQ for operations. The effectiveness of "ad hoc" multinational HQs relies heavily on the level of participation of the "leading" country. The desired EU autonomy would be seriously hampered. In principle, to reach and maintain a certain degree of "freedom" a strategic multinational "ad hoc" EU HQ for "EU-led operations" should be established within the medium term. As a matter of fact, differences between the European and US strategic/operational or political approaches⁵² to a particular crisis could exist. And these differences would affect the whole approach to the military solution of the crisis.

Having said that, a quick overview of the (proposed) EU procedures for operational planning is helpful to identify possible coherent and effective solutions. In normal circumstances, EU military bodies are devoted to monitoring the situation through the information gathered at the Situation Center⁵³. In time of crisis they start a process⁵⁴ to approve the Concept of Operations and Operation Plan drafted by the Operation Commander (procedures are similar to those of the Alliance)⁵⁵.

Considering the two options of EU-led operations (with or without Allied support), some questions arise. If there is no EU intention to duplicate the Allied strategic and operational planning capabilities and NATO always has the right to a final say or "first refusal"⁵⁶, an Allied "strategic assessment" would occur within NATO politico-military bodies. Is it possible for the EU to start its planning process based on an Allied assessment? And, if not, what kinds of assessment can the EUMS provide, if the Situation Center picture lacks a basic planning capability to draw strategic options⁵⁷? If an agreement on the "intelligence sharing" issue has
yet to be developed with the Alliance, which organization/country will send information to the Situation Center? Will the situational awareness be sufficient to draft an Initiating Directive and strategic military options? Why not start the EU planning process after evaluating the results of Allied political and military “advanced planning” (shaped by well rooted structures and procedures)?

The above proposal that relies on NATO structure and procedures could be militarily acceptable in spite of the likely ineffective solution proposed by the EU of establishing “on call” Crisis Action Teams to design a strategic assessment. Political objections may arise for reasons of limited autonomy. The proposal would avoid duplication of effort in the EU Situation Center by concentrating the military assessment of the situation in the NATO Situation Center. Doing so would avoid duplication of planning effort (on the same forces) and complex coordinating procedures and would preserve the EU autonomy at political level (PSC).

The above proposal could also be adopted in the case of EU operations without NATO support. In this case, the strategic and operational planning would occur at a EU HQs. The latter would require minor organizational adjustments within the EU HQs. As a minimum, in time of peace EU strategic HQs should share information and situation assessments with NATO HQs. There should be a constant exchange of information (transparency) between the two organizations. An absence of close coordination would lead to different planning processes in different HQs which would complicate and slow down coordination in time of crisis.

Simple standard procedures should also be developed between EU and non EU NATO countries for the pre-operational phase (prior to the approval of a Concept of Operations) and for the following “force generation process” as well as for daily interaction during the execution phase. Although, coordination between EU and non EU countries is primarily a political issue to resolve, a few observations are appropriate. If the EU is “separable, but not separated” from NATO, then voluntary participation of non-EU NATO countries should be the norm and not a possibility as envisioned so far. The participation of non EU countries should be viewed as a benefit for the EU rather than a burden. These countries have means and experience to bring to the table. Moreover, they have an obligation under NATO’s Article V to defend 11 of the 15 EU members if a crisis proves less manageable than originally foreseen. Finally, avoiding duplication of structures should remain a constraint. In this view, the proposed Committee of Contributors (the Committee, composed of representatives of all troop contributing nations, is aimed at monitoring the operation’s progress on a daily basis) seems to duplicate duties of the EUMS and of the Operation Command HQ. As a matter of fact, the Committee responds to concurrent political demands (participation of non EU nations) rather than operational needs.
and would make the operational process more complex. A single structure for consultation should be defined with few limitations. The different possibilities envisioned for the consultation process (15 EU countries + 6 non-EU European NATO members, 19 NATO Nations + 4 non NATO members or 15 EU countries + 15 EU candidates and non EU NATO members)\(^62\) are all likely to complicate timely consensus building the planning phase. A different formula should be identified. The French propose two different bodies, 15 + 6 and 15 + 15. Even if the French proposal seems to be at odds with the criteria of operational efficiency, there is no question that the "rivalries" among countries and organizations and different positions will require time to settle. In the near term, the French proposal may be the best solution. The consultation process between EU and non EU countries entails many political considerations related with EU and NATO enlargement, whose evaluation is outside the confines of this research paper.

With regard to the strategic/military issues, a key role seems to be assigned to the DSACEUR, as Commander\(^63\) of European forces for all operations and as strategic coordinator for the use of NATO assets by the EU. Although both NATO and EU recognize the DSACEUR position as a key link between the two organizations, there are several facts to consider.

The first is that NATO forces are already heavily committed in Peace Support Operations (PSO) in the Balkans. Secondly, the majority of the armed forces of NATO members are formally assigned to NATO. There is, therefore, both a practical and a legal requirement of NATO members to coordinate with NATO before reassigning those forces to EU operations. The same practical considerations apply to NATO Partner nations who have committed forces to ongoing NATO operations.

DSACEUR is an integral part of the operational planning structure at SHAPE. His duties already include that of the principal coordinator of contingency planning, including force generation. Given the practical and legal requirements mentioned above, it follows that the DSACEUR needs to be continuously apprised of the availability of all forces committed to NATO and to carry out his ESDI strategic coordinator job to ensure efficient and effective employment and accounting of EU forces involved in both NATO and potential EU operations.

Practical and legal considerations should be evaluated with regard to their impact on the EU/NATO force planning and operational planning processes without regard to ongoing operations. Given the "separable but not separated" concept of ESDP, adjustments to the force planning and operational planning processes are required.

With regard to the force planning, one option is to label European assets both as "NATO assigned" and "EU earmarked" (in case of EU operations). This option, while confirming the need for joint force planning between NATO and EU and the need for establishment of mutual
agreements, it would also call for a “common” legal basis for use of forces. For operational planning, the feasibility of shifting assets from NATO to EU would require a case by case decision based on current or future NATO operations.

Some doubts whether the DSACEUR can be a strategic coordinator and, simultaneously, a Commander of a EU-led Operation. In the case of EU operations supported by NATO, the DSACEUR double role would probably work. Problems arise in the case of EU-led operations without NATO support. In the latter case, it would be reasonable to assume that controlling HQ is a EU HQ dislocated from SHAPE HQ. How could the DSACEUR carry out his dual role from two locations? And, is the role of Operation Commander compatible with other DSACEUR duties? If it is not, who would temporarily replace the DSACEUR as a strategic coordinator?

Theoretically EU led operations would last one year. Overlapping DSACEUR duties would probably cause minor problems to NATO HQ due to its well rooted standard operating procedures. It might require the DSACEUR to be temporarily replaced. It seems unlikely one person could satisfactorily accomplish both demanding roles at the same time. The effectiveness of an Operation Command, however, relies heavily on the personal relationship and daily interaction of the Commander with the HQ. A part time Commander or frequently changing Commander would affect the effectiveness of the HQ.

That said, a reasonable solution would be to keep DSACEUR as the strategic coordinator between NATO and EU while assigning the Operation Command to a different officer.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The availability of command and control structures is another important area to explore for the purpose of this paper. For an EU-led operation the chain of command would consist of three levels of military headquarters:

- operation command HQs (strategic level located in a EU country);
- force command HQs (joint service headquarters deployed in the Theater of Operations);
- component air, land and sea HQs.

A distinction has to be drawn between cases in which the European Union has recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and cases in which EU conducts operations on its own. In the first case, NATO and EU are still working on automatic access to Allied assets (an operation HQ and force HQ Combined Joint Task Force type)⁶⁴. In the other case (without recourse to NATO assets), the “framework nation” concept would apply to a European country HQs made available
to the EU (France and Great Britain have already offered their national commands). The European Council would choose the appropriate HQs and agreements would be drawn up in peacetime to make it multinational through the presence of other countries representatives.

A concern is that in the second case the “separable but not separated” principle may not apply. A European multinational HQ established, for instance, on a French national command is not within NATO. The HQ chosen should be within the Alliance or, at least, available also for NATO operations. There are two possible options for creation of a core HQ for EU led operations.

The first option has two cases: EU HQs within the Alliance or EU HQs available for Allied operations. The first case would require a change of French policy to rejoin the NATO military structure. The latter solution could be achieved through specific arrangements to “dual label” the HQs within NATO and EU force planning. For example, the EUROCORPS HQ, a dedicated WEU asset, can also be employed by NATO, as occurred in Kosovo. Both solutions would ensure strategic ties between the EU and NATO and limit the expensive duplication of structures. Both solutions would also resolve the DSACEUR double role problem as the Commander of the EU HQ would automatically become the Operation Commander. Any EU HQs should have a broad multinational staff in peacetime in order to avoid, as much as possible, a large number of augmentees disrupting the HQ’s efficiency in time of crisis.

If we cannot make a EU HQ “Allied”, then, the other option is to make an existing NATO HQ “European”. This goal could be achieved by applying the “nation framework” concept (referred to all EU countries) to one of the European NATO commands (e.g. Regional Command South, designed to generate a CJTF HQ). This is, more or less, similar to the old French proposal for a European to fill the position of Commander AFSOUTH. In this case, besides the Commander (designated EU commander in case of EU led operations) even the core of the staff and the support units should be assigned to European NATO countries. The EU non-NATO nations would participate with Liaison Officers in a first stage until security and organizational agreements between NATO and EU had been established. Later, EU non NATO countries could provide augmentees to the staff. To offset the loss of positions from non EU NATO countries, the Allied countries balance of officers could be adjusted in other NATO HQs. Of course, this would require the establishment of mechanisms aimed at avoiding marginalization of Allied non-EU countries and a strong political support.

Alternatively, the two options require one of the two organizations (EU and NATO) to trade off some autonomy. The EU would lose some flexibility in the first option and NATO would lose flexibility in the last option. Given the “separable but not separable” criterion and the scarcity of
resources, there is little doubt the NATO option is the best short term solution. A NATO HQ, already experienced, which would require only minor adjustments compared to other case. Moreover, recalling the potential area of intervention ("in and around Europe") earlier mentioned, the NATO Regional Command South (RCS) would be close to the potential Area of Responsibility. This would require a temporary change to the CJTF concept development within RCS (already delayed due to the ongoing operations in the Balkans). At the same time, it might help France change her mind and reintegrate her resources into NATO.

In the long term, pursuing one of the EU HQs option (such as multinationalization of a French and British national commands to make them also available for NATO operations) would be more advantageous to the Alliance than to EU. As a matter of fact, given the limited length of EU operations (one year), one Operation HQ is enough for EU needs (e.g. SHAPE has been conducting two PSOs in the Balkans for three – four years). Then, the long term option (French and British national commands for EU operations available for EU and NATO) is a solution that is more critical to NATO that would increase its command and control capability. In this view, the long term solution should be pursued by both NATO and EU. Once the French or British project would be accomplished, the CJTF concept for RCS could be restarted to generate another Force HQ capability.

The long term project would require resources from other EU countries to give the national HQs a multinational print. At a first glance, the British national command option seems to be the most preferred due to several reasons: use of English language, already within NATO, close relationship with the US regard to the intelligence sharing, multinationalization process already under development. Political reasons, however, would probably lead to a French command option. Doing so, France would be encouraged to change its mind and rejoin the Allied military structure. In fact, to some extent this would satisfy an old French desire to get the leadership of a NATO Command. All options require dedications of resources to make the structures (NATO HQ, British and French HQs) work and, concurrently, strengthen the Alliance. If the "separable, but not separated” concept is applied, for a French command within NATO an early agreement should be reached between NATO and France on overall policy direction, compatible institutions and effective structures. France will be a pivotal player in future Transatlantic relations.

Shifting to the next level of command, Force Command, the "dual hatted" principle could also apply. Apart from NATO CJTF concept capability, within the catalogue of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) some command structures for EU operational purposes already exist. The updated list of multinational Corps HQs includes European Corps.
(EUROCORPS), European (Rapid Deployment) Force\textsuperscript{74} (EUROFOR), the 1\textsuperscript{st} German-Netherlands Corps HQ\textsuperscript{75} and the British/Netherlands Amphibious Force\textsuperscript{76}. Nevertheless, with few exceptions (EUROCORPS besides the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps\textsuperscript{77}, which is a NATO Corps HQ based on a British core staff), none of the mentioned HQs have had operational experience. The EUROFOR HQ was employed for the first time as KFOR Rear HQ at Brigade level in 2001.

Among the various European commands established, only the EUROCORPS seems to have the robust structure and experience to provide a feasible command and control capability as a Component Command and, with some limitations, as a Force Command. The transformation of EUROCORPS in ERRF\textsuperscript{78} should be coordinated with NATO's ongoing process to establish nine "new" HQs\textsuperscript{79} High Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces at Lower Readiness (FLR).

The need of Force commands is related to length of the operation and the rotation policy. Assuming a four month rotation policy in Theater of Operations, two additional HQs should be identified and restructured as Force commands. Is this feasible? An answer could be given after a deeper assessment of the EU command and control capabilities. EUROFOR, as another European command, is an example of the state of art. Even if the four founding countries (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) agreed to reinforce the force capability,\textsuperscript{80} the employment of EUROFOR as a Force HQ seems unlikely given its level of command and control capability (Brigade/Light Division). Additionally, an Italian proposal, still under evaluation, is to transform EUROFOR into an EU Immediate Reaction Force (EUIRF)\textsuperscript{81}. Moreover, EUROFOR is based on the "on call" forces concept and would be slow to activate both from a practical and political point of view.

Considering the lack of non NATO EU options (the 1\textsuperscript{st} German-Netherlands Corps is also a NATO assigned HQ), the "establishment" of other EU Force HQs could only be achieved by responding to the need for a joint (NATO/EU) force planning process.

The first objective for the EU should be to make EUROCORPS HQ\textsuperscript{82} fully operational. The ambiguity of its employment within the Alliance\textsuperscript{83} should be overcome according to the already mentioned criteria (dual-label forces). Then, likewise, do the same for the other commands. Undoubtedly, a fully operational EUROCORPS, together with a more efficient ARRC,\textsuperscript{84} would cover a big part of the NATO requirements for the mentioned readjustment of the command and control structure (HRF HQs and FLR HQs). Given the lack of resources, to build up a sufficient number of HQs would require a change of policy in the multinational arena:
the bi-national and multinational HQs established to answer to political aim rather than operational needs should be gradually disbanded. Their resources should be used to fill the gaps within the Operation HQs and Force HQs to satisfy NATO and EU needs.

Given the small number of standing EU commands and the mentioned rotation requirements, below Force Command level, it is hard to imagine a EU solution without recourse to NATO or national assets for the Component Commands. The above rationalization concept applied for the Force HQ level could apply for the other HQs.

THE FORCES

Adequacy of troops available to the ERF project as established in the Headline Goal is another important issue that requires a change of direction by EU members. The whole set of forces committed by EU and non-EU countries to meet the Headline Goal has to be assessed both from a quantitative and qualitative standpoint.

Regarding the amount of forces, there are unanswered questions. It is doubtful whether numbers reported in the Helsinki decision (50,000 – 60,000 soldiers) are adequate to carry out all Petersberg missions, taking into account the numbers represent both logistic and combat units. A force of 60,000 might be able to take over the NATO operation in Kosovo for a short period of time (six-seven months), but it is questionable whether it is sufficient to sustain operations in a semi-permissive environment. For a one-year tour, the force would need about 50,000 – 60,000 soldiers rotated every four months or a total of 150,000 – 180,000 soldiers. If we consider other foreseeable losses due to illness, promotion, etc., it would take even more soldiers than three times the Headline Goal. This means that the ERF, as designed at Helsinki, could only be employed for less demanding Petersberg missions lasting for less than one year. Given the fact that EU forces are simultaneously Allied forces, other more demanding options would seriously hamper the Allied capability to respond to other contingencies and consequently would hardly be acceptable to NATO.

In terms of quality of forces, two major issues need to be considered:
- the recruitment system (conscription or volunteer) adopted by EU countries;
- the kinds of forces available.

With respect to recruitment, in 2000, only five out of fifteen EU members had all volunteer armed forces. This figure affects the availability of forces, since conscript soldiers can only be employed for collective defense. The Petersberg missions require volunteers. Unless solved, this requirement reinforces the idea of a limited engagement for the ERF.
With respect to kinds of forces, most European forces are still designed to repel a “Soviet” ground attack. There are too many tank units, few combat service support units, for instance, which aren’t the forces needed to quickly deploy for crisis situations. European forces need to be reshaped. This is clearly understandable from Lord Robertson’s argument on the difficulties Europe had in fielding 40,000 troops for operations in the Balkan despite two million people in uniform. Something has to be done to reshape the European armies and develop deployable force projection capabilities to support the Petersberg missions.

This calls for a very important decision by EU nations. The choice is between heavy main defense forces and lighter, more mobile forces. The lack of resources to support both and the absence of a coordinating effort would result in an ineffective “pool” of forces designed to satisfy national concerns rather than EU/NATO operational requirements. Each Nation would have a little bit of everything, but not enough to accomplish any mission. It is unaffordable for every European country to have armed forces with the whole range of military capabilities. A more efficient way to approach the problem would entail multinational acquisition, co-financing and pooling of forces. A sort of “role specialization” concept should be applied, where each country specializes or group of countries specialize in accomplishing one or more different military tasks. Within NATO and among EU countries some scarce resources are already shared and bi-multilateral agreements are in place. The EU leadership should pursue the “role specialization” criterion more proactively rather than leaving single nations to decide whether or not to join other country programs. Although EU Secretary General, Dr. Solana, has announced that addressing major shortfalls is a EU priority, the effectiveness of the bridging process is totally dependent on coordination among the EU nations.

The idea of ERRF has nothing to do with the “European Army” as a standing force, opposed both by NATO and EU, but is the only way to avoid unnecessary duplication within the EU. Additionally, it is the only way to pursue constructive duplication where redundancy is desired, i.e. for the critical areas such as command and control (Operation HQs and Force HQs), strategic transport, etc..

If the criterion of the constructive duplication were accepted, a joint NATO-EU plan should be drawn up to avoid unnecessary duplication, strengthen the Alliance and, then, pursue limited autonomy for EU within NATO. Considering the need to update DCI to US aggressive transformation strategy to pursue advanced technology and operational concept, a joint NATO-EU plan would entail investments:
- to increase the interoperability of NATO forces, updating European countries’ armies with the US technologies and operational capabilities;
- to meet operational requirements not sufficiently provided for within the Alliance as a whole (strategic airlift, deployability, etc.);
- to meet the Helsinki Headline Goals.

Then, both NATO and EU could decide:
- to increase the investments to enhance the cost-effectiveness of EU defense expenditure, through common requirements, preference given to the acquisition of common systems, etc.;
- to ensure the operational viability and capability of deployable European Corps, as established at Helsinki (deployable Corps, with C3I systems, etc.);
- to allow the EU to make well informed decisions on crisis management operations (strategic planning capabilities, satellite-based intelligence, etc.).

CONCLUSION

An “autonomous” EU military capability is feasible only within the NATO Alliance due to the lack of sufficient resources to conduct contemporary operations by the two organizations. The basic requirement is a common force planning process. As far as the force planning process is concerned, there is no doubt that the well-rooted NATO force planning process should be the basis of a common process. With regard to the content of the process, the updated DCI should be the starting point to strengthen NATO forces and, in the long term, to provide a limited “autonomy” to the EU.

To preserve NATO freedom of action while giving the EU the chance to operate autonomously, a strategic “bottom-up” realistic review is necessary. What can NATO and EU do with their available resources? What kind of missions/tasks can effectively be accomplished with the EU Headline Goals capability? How does this EU capability impact on the NATO strategic concept in case of contemporary employment? Can either organization accept the resulting limitations? Should NATO revise the Allied Strategic Concept?

To this end, a NATO-EU Strategic Concept should be drawn up taking into account the following principles:
- a “division of labor” (NATO for collective defense and EU for Petersberg missions) is not possible for both political and operational reasons. The marginalization of the Alliance to collective defense is not politically acceptable and the lack of resources would not allow either organization to devote forces to a single set of operation;
- “role specialization” should be applied to European forces as a whole. First, role specialization should be pursued to fill capability gaps within the Alliance (updated DCI) and then to guarantee “limited” autonomy to the EU.
Unnecessary duplications can be avoided by maintaining EU autonomy at the political level. Simple procedures should be identified for the consultation process and planning process among NATO, EU and “third” countries. Political considerations aside, a single structure (with all concerned countries represented) offers the best solution.

As far as Command and Control is concerned, there is no question that both NATO and the EU cannot afford further development without French involvement. The strong French support to NATO-led ongoing operations in the Balkans confirms this assumption. At the same time, the French position to pursue a EU force separated from the Alliance seems unsupportable due to resource constraints and the widespread political intent of other EU nations to remain within NATO. Finally, the “European” Allied HQ solution would reinforce NATO command and control structure by giving France the desired leadership of an Allied HQ. Therefore, the “European” Allied HQ seems the most effective solution in the near term both for operational and political reasons. At the same time, a EU Operation Command based on French or British national command is a feasible long term solution, provided that the HQ would be expanded in peacetime to include multinational officers.

Within the command and control framework, the dual role of DSACEUR is only feasible for EU operations led by a NATO strategic command. In the case of EU operations led by a EU command, it would be better to split the strategic coordinator and the operation commander roles by assigning the commanding role to the designated EU Operation Command.

To what extent are the above conclusions feasible? Are the actual different positions (US “3D” and NATO and EU positions) compatible? Theoretically, it appears that the solutions envisioned in this paper could work. Some of them have already been identified by others and could be effectively adopted. What seems to slow the process is a widespread feeling of mutual mistrust. It should be clear every organization needs support from others to effectively address a crisis. Therefore, mutual support among different structures is a basic requirement. This leads to the assumption that mutual political support between the two organizations is vital to avoid their disruption. This concept should also be stressed within EU. Some of the ideas proposed in this paper, such as the “role specialization” concept for the European nations’ armies as well as the need to disband ineffective C2 structures, call for a strong change of EU members’ mindset. At the same time, by supporting EU tentative to increase military capabilities, NATO would benefit in the long run.

In conclusion, the only feasible way to achieve EU autonomy is within the Alliance. Any hypothesis based on a separated approach would lead to a waste of resources and to
ineffective solutions. Only in the long term, and with greater resources, a different perspective of the EU “autonomy” issue is possible.

WORD COUNT = 8,724
ENDNOTES


3 The objectives of the CFSP are laid down in Article J.1 (2) of the Maastricht Treaty: a) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of Union; b) to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; c) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; d) to promote international cooperation; e) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. ESDP, available from <http://www.ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2001.


6 Ibid.


Rutten, 158.

Ibid, 168.

Ibid, 41 and 82.


Rutten, 20.


Rutten, 94.


Schmidt, 12.

While London coined the sentence "in and around Europe", Dr. Solana is already talking about an EU which might be want to act in Africa as well as in East Timor, and German Cancellor has argued that "the Europe of the future must be able to defend its interests and values effectively worldwide". The European Commission’s Strategic Objectives report of
February 2000 also argues that the EU should aim at a "Europe which can show genuine leadership on the world stage. Peter van Ham, "Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US and Russia", George Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Paper No. 1, 30 April 2000, 23.

27 During a meeting in Berlin on June 29 2001, Dr. Solana clearly called for a bigger commitment of resources to support the effort to fill the gaps identified. European Information Service, "Defense: Solana still seeking to defuse concerns on EU policy", European Report of 4 July 2001, sec. n. 2606 (461 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 8 September 2001.

28 WEU Members are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK. WEU Associate Members are Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Turkey. WEU Associate Partners are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Observers countries: Denmark, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. van Ham, 4.

29 Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, the collective defense clause, must be included in a declaration annexed to the Treaty on European Union without it being imposed on the other five members of the EU. However this declaration would remain open, with non-signatory Member States being allowed to subscribe to it at any time. Article V would thus retain its full legal value for the ten full members of WEU. The legal status of such a declaration would be comparable to that of the Declaration on WEU annexed to the Maastricht Treaty. Abandoning this explicit guarantee of solidarity among the signatories, as a consequence of the merger of WEU into the Union, would be a backward step. Francois Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 31.


32 Annex 7 of Nice Meeting Presidency Conclusions titled "Standing Arrangements for Consultation and Co-operation between NATO and EU" stated that "The entire chain of command must remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation after consultation between the two organization...NATO will be informed of developments" and after "when necessary...the dialogue will be supplemented by inviting NATO representative to meetings, in accordance with the provisions of TEU" (pg. 55 Standing Arrangements for consultation and Cooperation ...). Maude Francis, "Euro army fact and fantasy", The Washington Times, April 29, 2001, sec. B, pg. B4 (1198 words); [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 8 September 2001.


Within the DCI, the following areas of improvement were identified: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistic, effective engagement, survivability of forces and infrastructure, command, control and information system. Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 84.


At present, FAWEU are defined in terms of specified units. As readiness, availability and training levels units differ substantially, national commitment cannot be compared. Rather than defining them in terms of specified units, the capabilities should be defined both in qualitative and qualitative terms. Taking key factors such as readiness, availability, sustainability and training into account. Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 89.

Within WEU, force coordination and enhancement of cooperation among forces has, since 1993, dealt with primarily by the Planning Cell. And covers both national and multinational FAWEU. For effective management of multinational forces, vertical links have been established between WEU and the multinational forces, and horizontal links among the multinational forces are encouraged through the use of Standing Operational Procedures. The WEU Military Committee (composed of CHODS) gives advice on how to implement the Petersberg tasks, deal with crisis situations, manage FAWEU and handle CJTF. Ibid, 77.


The HTF is based on the EU military staff while the HTF Plus relies also on the NATO SHAPE/IMS support to reach and maintain a coherence between the Allied and EU Goals and, for the countries involved, with the DCI. Rutten, 183.

Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 89.

This would require the following measures: a) the EU Defense Ministers meeting at regulars intervals should issue specific political guidance for the European capability for autonomous action. Guidance should include further elaboration of Petersberg missions and a clear definition of headline and capability goals. This guidance should be included in NATO Ministerial Guidance and PARP political guidance; b) the EU headline goals should take NATO standards into account; c) NATO, with its extensive planning staff should also be involved in the review process. The DRR (Defense Requirements Review) and the PARP (Planning And Review Process) survey should also include section on EU-led operations. The EMS and the EMC should compare the results of the DRR and the PARP with illustrative "Petersberg
scenarios" and include the results of this investigation in the country chapters; d) the EMS should take part in NATO’s multinational examinations; e) the EMS should carry out bi-national examinations with those countries that do not take part in the NDPP (NATO Defense Planning Process) and the PARP. For those nations that do not participate in the NDPP or the PARP, assured access is required to national planning capabilities. In these cases, the EMS should communicate both European ministerial guidance and European force goals to the defense planning staff. Ibid, 90.


46 See endnote 42.

47 Rutten, 48.


49 Recourse to NATO assets and capabilities is based on a procedure deriving from implementation of the decision taken by NATO at its Washington Summit, which followed on from the "Berlin Plus" resolutions (on ESDI). At the Nice Summit, the EU put the following proposals to the Atlantic Alliance but has not yet received a response:....In the event of predetermined capabilities being unavailable, NATO should find other available planning capabilities or else, in close consultation with the EU, find a solution acceptable to both organization. Assembly of WEU – The Interim European Security and Defense Assembly, document A/1734, 19 June 2001, "Implementation of the Nice Summit decisions in the operational area of the ESDP", 12.


52 Two examples of disagreements are trade relations with Cuba and Iran: the EU has trade relations with both and the US does not. Richard J. JUNG, "The European Security and Defense Policy: a European Trojan horse". USAWC SRP, 10 April 2000, 9.

In a crisis the EU Military Committee must first, at the PSC’s request, issue an Initiating Directive to the Director General of the EU Military Staff to draw up and present strategic military options. After evaluating these options, the EUMC forwards them to the PSC together with its military advice. On the basis of the Council’s decision, it then authorizes an Initial Planning Directive for the Operation Commander. Finally, on the basis of the EUMS evaluation, it provides the PSC with opinions and recommendations on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) drawn up by the Operation Commander. During an operation the EUMC addresses the military aspects of the political control and strategic direction of the situation. It ensures the proper execution of military operations. Its members sit in the Committee of Contributors. Ibid.


In a crisis the EUMS could set up specialized Crisis Action Teams responsible for situation evaluation and for drawing up strategic options, having recourse where necessary to outside manpower for “temporary augmentation”. Ibid, 9.

Ibid, 12.

Ibid, 14.


A Committee of Contributors will be established to monitor the operation’s progress on a day-by-day basis. All members of the Committee have the same rights and obligations. The Committee will play a key role in an operation as the participant countries' “main forum for discussing all problems relating to a day-by-day management” having regard to the decisions taken by the Council or the Political and Security Committee. It will provide the latter with opinions and recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning. The EU bodies will keep it informed about the operation’s progress. The Committee of Contributors would therefore appear to be the body in which the contributing states are represented and consulted by the EU bodies responsible for an operation although they cannot exercise direct control over it. Assembly of WEU, The interim Security and Defense Assembly, document A/1734, 19 June 2001, “Implementation of the Nice Summit decisions in the operational area of the ESDP”, document No. A/1734, report, pg. 14.

To ease the relations with non-EU countries, the Feira European Council established the principle of a single structure, which has still not be designed, bringing the 15 EU member states together with all the countries concerned in order to ensure dialogue with the non-EU European members of NATO (the 15 + 6 format) and with the countries that are candidates for EU accession and do not belong to NATO the 15 + 6 + 9 format known as 15 + 15).
Furthermore, the French Presidency proposed a scheme for permanent consultation arrangements guided by "considerations of pragmatism and efficiency". During each Presidency there will be a minimum of two meetings in the EU + 15 format and two others in the EU + 6 format (the six non EU European members of NATO). On the other side, the US considers that EU/NATO meetings should be held at 23 (the 19 members of NATO plus the four countries that do not belong to NATO). Ibid, 13.

63 Ibid, 12.

64 Ibid, 10.

65 Schimdt, 12. See also Rutten, 77.


67 The experimentation is conducted by AF SOUTH HQ. SHAPE, "CJTF Concept" (NATO Restricted). Mons: Supreme Headquarters Allied Power in Europe, Summer 2001, 6.

68 For the moment, the only existing option seems to be linked to the CJTF concept endorsed at NATO Summit in Brussels in 1996 that allows DSACEUR to oversee cooperation between WEU and NATO and make plans for possible European/WEU operations that include CJTFs. In any case, this entails elaboration of European command arrangements with NATO, arrangements for identifying NATO assets and capabilities which may be available for WEU, and so forth. Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 78.

69 Even if not specifically addressed in the essay, the intelligence issue has a great impact on the whole problem of NATO/EU (and non NATO and non EU nations) relations due to the influence on the foreign policy. The debate on the development of a EU intelligence autonomous capability is focused on the different views of France – whose intention to establish a different intelligence structure from NATO's is reinforced by her reluctance to depend from the US "biased" information – and UK, strongly tied with the US intelligence agencies. On an operational ground, the different way the national intelligence organizations are structured poses a serious problem to the intelligence multinational linkage. Some argues that an autonomous EU intelligence capability should be established as in NATO while maintaining strong relations with the US. A similar confidence environment should be built with all non-NATO, non-EU and other country participating to the mission. The other consequential measures would include a greater use of commercial satellite imagery and a more demanding role (early warning, communications, etc.) for the (W)EU Center of Torrejon. Ibid, 69.


73 EUROCORPS is a multinational army Corps bringing land units from the five members countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain) whose overall strength could be about 60,000 soldiers if all four national Divisions were assigned to the Corps, whose staff also includes air and navy liaison teams to operate in a joint environment. Already employed in some PSOs (on 1998, 150 EUROCORPS staff officers reinforced the SFOR HQ in Bosnia and on April 2000 the EUROCORPS took command of KFOR III in Kosovo), the Corps has always started an organization process intended to increase its capability to act as a Joint Theatre Command. Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 74.

74 EUROFOR is composed of four Nation (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) on call forces is a rapid reaction land capability, equipped with easily deployable light forces with a level of availability adapted to the mission it is to carry out. The size of the force to be used may vary from a small formation (1000 men) to light Division (10,000 men), using a modular system depending on the mission. “Multinational Forces answerable to WEU”, WEU, available from <http://www.weu. Int/eng/info/faweu.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 September 2001.

75 In addition to its NATO roles (the Corps is part of the Main Defense Forces), the HQ may be employed by WEU for Petersberg missions. The HQ, including appropriate Command and Control support for operations, offers support in the planning and preparation for WEU operations. It comprises the 1st Mechanized Division of Netherlands and the 1st German Armored Division and the bi-national Brigade Support Group. Both Divisions have their organic combat, combat support, C2, logistic and medical troops, totaling about 40,000 men.

76 The British-Netherlands AF is a force available for WEU. The British contribution consists of the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines while the Netherlands contribute with operational units of the Marine Corps. Moreover, in 1998, Germany, Poland and Denmark decided to create a Joint Corps within NATO for collective defense and PSO. The so called Multinational North East Corps comprises the former LANDJUT (Danish Armored Infantry Jutland Division, reinforced by the Danish Reaction Brigade and 6th German Armored Division. Helsbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 76.

77 ARRC is a British framework multinational Corps is the ACE Rapid Reaction component designed, together with the IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) and the MDF (Main Defense Forces), within the NATO 1991 Strategic Concept. Assigned forces to ARRC are divided into National Divisions (the German 7th Armored Division, 1st US Armored Division and the Spanish Rapid Reaction Force), framework Divisions (1st British Armored Division which can contain a Danish Brigade, 3rd British Armored Division, which can contain the Italian Brigade "Ariete", the Italian Mechanized Division, which can contain the Portuguese Airborne Brigade. Greece and Turkey have assigned a Division) and Multinational Division (Multinational Division (Central) MND(C), airborne Division, comprising the Belgian Para Commando Brigade, the German 315th Luftlande Brigade, the Netherlands Airmobile Brigade and the 24th British Airmobile Brigade: and Multinational Division South (MND(S), which is not yet formed, will contain Brigades from Italy, Greece and Turkey). Ibid, 75.
78 Rutten, 112.


80 Rutten, 112.

81 Italian Army Staff, "Making EUROFOR the EU Immediate Reaction Force", October 2000.

82 During the KFOR mission, EUROCORPS covered only 40% of the CE (Crisis Establishment) of both (Main and Rear) Commands. Other essential capabilities (such as communications assets, air movements, etc.) were sourced by commercial sources or "borrowed" by other HQs. Juan Ortuno, "The European Corps heads up KFOR", Europe de la defense, Les Dossiers de l'Abecedaire parlementaire, second trimester 2001, No. 8, 59.


84 Kosovo operations confirmed the already revealed shortcomings which were identified in Bosnia (command and control, tactical control, interoperability and deployability of forces). Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 75.

85 Rutten, 158.

86 Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland and UK rely on volunteers. France, Spain and Portugal are abolishing conscription (by 2002/2003). Italy frozeed the conscription system in 2000. Ibid, 81.

87 van Ham, 18.

88 "If you've got a budget that is 60% of the American budget and is probably turning out 10% of the capability then that is your first big problem...You can actually spend more money quite easily and get zero increase in capability". Ibid.

89 "Command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support units...strategic transport" and "The need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Peterberg missions are to be fully satisfied. Efforts also need to be made in specific areas such as military equipment, including weapons and ammunitions, support services, including medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of forces". "Council General Affairs/Defense: military capabilities commitment declaration", Press release, Brussels 20 November 2000, No. 1342/2/00, available from <http://www.ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.cfm>; Internet; accessed 14 September 2001.
In order to reach our capabilities goals, let me mention some suggestions without trying to be too prescriptive: 1) Collective solutions, wherever possible. ...2) These savings would be greater if these collective efforts were extended to common maintenance, logistic and training. ...3) Avoiding unnecessary duplications: we should pursue arrangements to allow full use of existing collective capabilities of NATO. And we should favor investments in capabilities that are in short supply in the Alliance, thereby helping the goal to strengthen the Alliance capabilities...4) Looking further into the future; 5) Member states and the EU should respond to the restructuring efforts of the European armaments industry. Summary of the intervention by Dr. Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the EU Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2001; available from <http://www.ue.eu.int/Solana/print.asp?docID>; Internet; accessed 8 September 2001.


Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, 50.

At the moment, French leads one Division in Bosnia and one Brigade in Kosovo. The total contribution to Balkans operations is about 8,500 troops. NATO SITCEN Assessement (NATO Confidential), 26 November 2001.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE:</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF:</td>
<td>Amphibious Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSOUTH:</td>
<td>Allied Forces South Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARRC:</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE:</td>
<td>Crisis Establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP:</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJPSS:</td>
<td>Combined Joint Planning Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF:</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS:</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI:</td>
<td>Defense Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPQ:</td>
<td>Defense Planning Questionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR:</td>
<td>Defense Requirements Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSACEUR:</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADS:</td>
<td>European Aeronautic Defense and Space company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERRF:</td>
<td>EU Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDA:</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Assembly</td>
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<td>ESDI:</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP:</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU:</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUIRF:</td>
<td>European Union Immediate Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC:</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMS:</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROCORPS:</td>
<td>European Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROFOR:</td>
<td>European (Rapid Deployment) Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAWEU:</td>
<td>Forces Answerable to Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLR:</td>
<td>Forces at Lower Level of Readiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ:</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRF:</td>
<td>High Readiness Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTF:</td>
<td>Headline Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTFP:</td>
<td>Headline Task Force Plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS:</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF:</td>
<td>Immediate Reaction Forces</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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SHAPE, "CJTF Concept" (NATO Restricted), Summer 2001.


