Kto Kogo?
The Use of Peacekeeping Forces in Russian Foreign Policy:
The Cases of Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia and Kosovo

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this work to the professional military officers and troopers from all nations with whom I’ve had the pleasure to serve. As the executors of international peacekeeping, they will provide us the peace and stability we all seek in the future.
Introduction

Around noon one day in Uglevik, Bosnia, in June of 1999, the American Liaison officers to the Russian Separate Airborne Brigade (RSAB) noticed something was afoot. Captains Riley and Yates, who had by this point worked weeks with the RSAB in Bosnia, watched as the Russian officers were suddenly called to meet behind closed doors. The Russians said nothing directly to them, but the signs of a change in standard operations were everywhere. During a routine review of weapons storage site inspection schedules, one of the Russian warrant officers remarked to Captain Yates, "I don't need to worry about these inspections anymore – I'm going to Kosovo." Captain Riley later confirmed this news when he walked into the Russian brigade's operations section that evening – on the walls were maps whose graphics read 'Deployment to Slatina Airfield.' Later that evening, Colonel Nikolai I. Ignatov, the RSAB commander called Major General Byrnes, the U.S. multinational division (MND) commander to let him know that the RSAB had received orders from Moscow to "deploy an advanced party to Pristina to receive follow-on peacekeeping forces, but without an exact time.

It was 10 June 1999, and negotiations for the deployment of a Russian element in the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR) had been going on for the last few weeks between Moscow and Mons (NATO Headquarters). The major sticking point was the

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1 For example, the RSAB assistant personnel officer was checking each section – in his hand was a list of 'deployable personnel.' Author's notes, from discussions with CPT Paul Riley and CPT Renea Yates, US Army Liaison Detachment to the Russian Separate Airborne Brigade, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Winter, 1999, Winter 2002).

2 Slatina Airport is just south of Pristina, the capital of Kosovo.

3 CPT Yates had previously called the US MND (N) warning of impending RSAB operations across the border into Kosovo. Author's notes, Riley/Yates.
Russian demand for a separate peacekeeping ‘zone.’ NATO did not want to agree to this as the strain in NATO-Russian relations had reached a high point, and there was fear Moscow would try to partition Kosovo through its administration of a separate zone.\footnote{Wesley Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War}, (New York, Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 375-379.} At 9:00 PM, Colonel Ignatov called Major General Byrnes a second time—he’d received orders to send his troops out the next morning.\footnote{Col Ignatov was clear that it would only be a detachment of the RSAB, and the majority of his brigade would stay in Bosnia. Author’s notes, Riley/Yates.} This move was not only a violation of the Dayton Military Technical Agreement, but violated the ongoing talks between Moscow and Mons. When the Russian detachment left Bijelina Airfield in Bosnia, US liaison team passed on to NATO Headquarters that the Russians were en route to Serbia via the Drina River.\footnote{The Dayton MTA required a four-month warning prior to the withdrawal of any troops from Bosnia. US Army, \textit{Russian LNO Section Standard Operating Procedures}, Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2 October 1998.} Having been tipped off by Moscow, CNN was waiting for the Russians at the Drina—Russia was, as Colonel General Ivaslov put it, “taking her own train” to Kosovo.\footnote{This comment was in response to a previous comment by the US delegate during the ongoing KFOR negotiations, that the Russians had better hurry up (and agree) because ‘the train was leaving the station.’ Clark, p. 375.}

Pictures of the ‘triumphant’ Russians crossing the Drina were on CNN’s website within an hour of the event.\footnote{Author’s notes, Riley/Yates} This was met with much confusion, as the Russian Foreign Minister, Ivan Ivanov first told NATO it was a false report, and later that the Russian forces would be pulled back. By 2:00 AM on 12 June 1999, the Russian detachment was passing through Pristina, “welcomed by the Serbs as heroes.”\footnote{Clark, p. 389.} At NATO headquarters, there was long consideration over how to solve the problem with the specter of Russian and NATO soldiers confronting each other in the Balkans. The decision was finally
made to stop all aerial reinforcements from Russia by closing off routes across other European nations. According to Aleksei Arbatov, the Kosovo Crisis was as close as Moscow and NATO have ever been to actual confrontation, in the same league as the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises of the 1960s. How did it come to pass that the Russian Federation and NATO were ‘squaring off’ for the first time – after the Cold War?

Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new Russian Federation continues to find its place in a very challenging geopolitical environment. In its relations with the outside world, the Russian Federation struggles to not only define itself and its relationship with the global community of nations, but also its relationship to its former regional empire. In its relations with the West, Moscow has exhibited a progressively more conservative foreign policy – from a pro-Western policy run by the ‘liberal-internationalists’ under Andrei Kozyrev in 1992 to a multipolar policy in 1999 as subscribed to by Yevgenii Primakov and the ‘derzhavniks.’ During this time, Russian foreign policy has been shown to be reactive for the most part, to both domestic pressure and foreign influence and events. One indicator of this evolution is the haphazard development of Russian peacekeeping policy.

In this thesis I will argue that Russian peacekeeping policy in the 1990s can be ascribed to two variables – geography and target audience – which reflect the evolution of Russian foreign policy as a whole. The development of this policy over time has been the result of domestic political pressure to change the Russian relationship with the

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10 NATO intelligence had picked up troop movements at airfields in Russia and had convinced NATO and PfP partners to close down their airspace.
international community, primarily the West and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This domestic political pressure developed during the complex process of determining Russian national identity and national interests, which itself was responding in part to domestic and international events.

As the initially nebulous sense of the 'Russian nation' became more defined, Moscow changed its policy in the Near Abroad, reasserting its influence and establishing this area as within its sphere of influence, providing the 'geographic' component of my argument.\(^{12}\) Russian foreign policy in the Near Abroad is generally characterized by a 'Russia first' element that allows for a more coercive and internally focused application of policy tools. Within the Near Abroad, loosely identified by the CIS, Russian peacekeeping operations follow this agenda. Not only are they oft-times used coercively, the target audience of these operations is primarily one of the regional actors in the conflict – the other component of my argument.

On the other hand, Russian peacekeeping operations in the Balkans are typically non-coercive operationally, as they fall within a multinational framework,\(^{13}\) precluding domination by any one power. Following the dictates of the United Nations Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations is a great restraint on any nation trying to develop a sphere of influence. However, this is again only half of the argument. Russian participation within the framework of UN-mandated peacekeeping operations in the Balkans has

\(^{12}\) The traditional Russian Near Abroad consists of the former Soviet Republics. With the exception of the Baltics, most of these nations have some connection with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

\(^{13}\) 'Multinational' in the traditional UN peacekeeping role means 'disinterested third party,' something Moscow cannot claim in the Near Abroad.
another focus altogether. Moscow's target audience for these operations is primarily an extra-regional actor – the Western Democracies.

Clearly the targeting of a regional actor does not preclude the simultaneous targeting of an extra-regional actor; indeed, it may be impossible to execute any policy with such a restricted effect. The intent of this argument is to identify the primary target of Russian effort. Additionally, these two issues do not ‘stand alone’ and in fact are not only intertwined, but also complimentary. It would be difficult to argue one without the other, given the evolution of Russian foreign and peacekeeping policy in the 1990s.

I will use the following outline for the thesis. In Chapter I, an analysis will be conducted of the relevant literature on the development of peacekeeping operations and their relation to Russian foreign policy since 1992. In Chapter II, I will establish a foundation for the discussion by briefly reviewing international peacekeeping policy. Then, published Russian national security and defense doctrine will be examined to determine its relevance to the discussion of peacekeeping operations. In the conclusion of Chapter II, I will review the evolution of Russian foreign policy during the decade to determine its impact on the development of these operations. Chapter III is devoted to case studies of the events leading up to and the deployment of peacekeeping forces in four regions: Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Finally, Chapter IV will summarize my argument, citing its most salient points.
Chapter I
Literature Review of Russian Peacekeeping Policy

_We [in Russia] are inclined to think that today the sources of danger are not of a military nature, so we should shift our focus toward peacemaking operations, law and order enforcement issues, social and humanitarian problems, including refugees and the least fortunate levels of our society._

- General Valeri Cheban
January 2002

How does the assertion that there are two distinct variants of Russian peacekeeping operations fit within the current framework of scholarship? If one accepts the notion that Russian peacekeeping operations within the CIS are conducted differently from those conducted outside of this area, it could be assumed that there is a body of research to document the events and theorize and or explain why this happens. In this chapter I will review some of the available research on the theory of Russian foreign policy in order to show that no current explanation of Russia and its foreign policy adequately explains this dichotomy in peacekeeping operations.

**General**

Overall, the scholarship falls within three general schools of thought. Among Western scholars and others interested in Russia, the community remains divided between those who see the glass half full and those who see it as half empty. Those in the former group, the _liberal-democratic school_, view Russia as an emerging liberal democracy, successfully crossing over the divide from command to free-market economy. They likewise ascribe to Russian policy makers those tendencies of western

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policy makers. Their basic argument is, in time, Russia will act like any Western liberal democracy and should be treated as one.

The latter group, the neo-imperialist school, has a much darker assessment of post Communist Russia. They see the fall of the Soviet Union as having little effect on Russia's imperialist aspirations; the Soviet Union was only the most recent in a series of Russian Empires. Their basic argument is that Russia has known uninterrupted expansion for over a century and a half and remains expansionistic and therefore to be treated warily and with suspicion.

Although there are those within the Russian academic and political communities who fall within both of these groups, a third, or defensive realist, viewpoint is also reflected amongst Russian scholars – an argument that Russia's unique geographic location and history ties it to the Eurasian landmass. From this distinctive relationship with Eurasia Russia derives its special responsibility for security and stability in the region. The basic defensive realist argument is that Russia is a great power in a multipolar world with a distinctive sphere of influence.

The Liberal-Democratic View

One of the foundational pillars of the liberal-democratic view of international relations is that democracies don't go to war with each other – they are driven by a different dynamic than balance-of-power politics. In a justification for the Clinton

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Administration’s Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement – an official policy manifestation of the liberal-democratic view of the world – Strobe Talbott wrote:

In and increasingly interdependent world Americans have a growing stake in how other countries govern, or misgovern, themselves. The larger and more close-knit the community of nations that choose democratic forms of government, the safer and more prosperous Americans will be, since democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war on each other.16

Another leading proponent of the liberal-democrat school of thought, Michael McFaul, explains it thus: “When states are organized in similar ways (that is, with the same set of political and economic institutions) cooperation is more likely while the cost of conflict is greater.”17 This theory remains consistent in the post-Soviet world as argued by McFaul, with the world “loosely divided” on this principle of political and economic organization – the “core” and the “periphery.” The “core” is composed of liberal democracies with free-market economies as contrasted with the “periphery,” which is “highly heterogeneous and conflictual.”18 The periphery is typified by authoritarian regimes or failed regimes, which don’t share the set of norms and institutions of the “core” states.

Where does Russia fit within this theoretical framework? Liberal-democrats would argue that Russia is making the transition from “periphery” to “core.” Celeste

Wallander posits that Russia is “democratizing,” and McFaul has consistently argued, “the Soviet dictatorship has been replaced by an emerging (albeit weak, unstable and unconsolidated) Russian democracy.”19 In this transitional period, they warn, developing democracies are particularly susceptible to setbacks. In fact, the ideological rationale for the Clinton Administration Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement intended that “the United States, in collaboration with its democratic allies, must work hard helping nascent democracies through their phase of greatest fragility.”20

However, when using the template of “liberal-democracy,” even “nascent liberal-democracy,” to explain Russian foreign policy generally and peacekeeping in particular certain inconsistencies arise. When reviewing the conduct of Russian peacekeeping operations, we find that the liberal-democrat view only sufficiently explains Russian peacekeeping operations that are conducted outside of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia is generally cooperating with NATO-run but UN-authorized peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. These PKOs are both designed to help bring stability to the “periphery” and foster nascent democracies in the Balkan region. By providing its first-ever peacekeeping force to the former Yugoslavia in April 1992, Russia allied itself with liberal-democracies advancing this agenda.21

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21 Vladimir I. Krysenko, “Military Aspects of Peacekeeping and the Participation of Russian Armed Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations and in Areas of Conflict on the Territory of the CIS and Russia: Logistics Support of Peacekeeping Operations,” unpublished paper presented at a United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Peacekeeping Conference (Ft Leavenworth KS, December 1993), p. 2. Peacekeeping forces are distinct from observers, in that they are charged with keeping – and sometimes enforcing – the peace, as negotiated by the UN, or some other organization in the UN’s stead. Russia/Soviet Union has
However, when reviewing the conduct of Russian peacekeeping within the CIS, the *liberal-democrat* view is inconsistent with Russian actions. In fact, the UN has yet to agree to assume stewardship or funding of Russian peacekeeping operations in the CIS in general and has only sent observers to Georgia. Dov Lynch explains the difference between the conduct of UN-sponsored and Russian-sponsored peacekeeping in this way:

More fundamentally, the policy context for these [Russian] operations distinguishes them from international practice. ‘Peacekeeping’ forces were deployed when Russian troops were already engaged in the conflict zones. ... the Russian operations differ from international practices in that they do not necessarily reflect the will of the international community to maintain peace and security — but more the unilateral will of the Russian government to assert its influence abroad.

The involvement of Russian troops in the conflicts within the CIS before the introduction of a Russian-sponsored and funded peacekeeping force, as well as the conduct of its operations, is inconsistent with UN goals. The “unilateral, coercive intervention of Russian forces” as tools of a broader Russian policy in Georgia and Moldova preceded any Russian commitment to peacekeeping. It is this willingness to use military force to coerce one of the sides in another “nascent democracy’s” internal conflict, followed by the role of “impartial umpire” in the same conflict that cannot be supported by the *liberal-democrat* theory.

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26 Eduard A. Vorob'yev, Colonel-General, “On Russia’s Conceptual Approach to Peacekeeping,” unpublished paper presented at a United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Peacekeeping Conference (Ft Leavenworth KS, December 1993), p. 2. Peacekeeping forces are distinct from observers, in that they are charged with keeping — and sometimes enforcing — the peace, as negotiated by the UN, or
The Neo-Imperialist View

Russian peacekeeping policy occurring as part of Russia’s imperialist aspirations does, however, support the neo-imperialist view, as addressed in this paper. This school of thought has its roots in the “balance of power” principle of international relations, or the “realist approach” – that is, that a change in the status of the system results in the immediate reorientation of the system until it finds balance once again.27 The demise of the bi-polar world should thus result in the rise of a multi-polar one within which the new multiple powers “jockey for position” and form shifting alliances until a new balance of power is struck. This group believes that Russia will try to reassert itself in areas where it has lost influence as part of this realignment.

An adherent to this point of view is Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argues that Russia has an “imperial impulse.”28 He points to the growing political influence of the military, especially in foreign policy, and the belief by a “roughly two-thirds of the Russian people, and even by the majority of democratic politicians” polled that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “a tragic mistake.”29 M.A. Smith notes that Russian economic and security policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States has consistently attempted, though with patchy success, to integrate the CIS into a Russian dominated confederation.30 Brzezinski argues that “Russian policy towards its CIS neighbors has

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29 Ibid, p. 70.
30 Smith, Russia and the Near Abroad, pp. 1-26.
two central prongs: it has focused on progressively stripping the newly independent states of economic autonomy and forestalling the emergence of separate armed forces.\textsuperscript{31}

This viewpoint also sees requests by Russia to increase troop concentrations in the Caucasus in response to instability in the region – but in violation of the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty of 1990 – as manipulation for advantage.\textsuperscript{32} Likewise, Russian official statements objecting to the growing closeness of Central and Eastern Europe to the West are cited as examples of Russian expansionistic intentions.\textsuperscript{33} Yeltsin’s statement that “We are of the opinion that relations between our country and NATO should be several degrees warmer than relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe,” is pointed to as proof that Russia still regards this region as within its sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{34}

How does the \textit{neo-imperialist} view support the argument that Russian peacekeeping operations (PKOs) vary between those conducted within the CIS and those outside? As discussed above, Russian PKOs within the CIS seem to support the assertion that Russia is bent on reestablishing an empire, or at least a sphere of influence in Eurasia. What is unclear is how Russian PKOs in Bosnia and Kosovo support the “imperial impulse.” It could be argued that instability in the Balkans served a Russian expansionist policy. By throwing in on the side of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian government in either the Bosnian or Kosovo crises, Russia could have effectively expanded its sphere of influence into southeastern Europe. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an

\textsuperscript{31} Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” p. 70.
\textsuperscript{33} Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” p. 70.
\textsuperscript{34} Boris Yeltsin, interview, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 December 1993.
adherent to an extreme version of this point of view (to be addressed in the next
subchapter) called for just such action during the Kosovo crisis. The neo-imperialist
argument might plausibly posit that by reining in Milosevic and his more overzealous
subordinates, Russia could have stabilized the region and negotiated settlements much
like it did in the CIS, while maintaining access to international financing and outflanking
NATO’s eastward expansion in the south. But the closest Moscow came to enacting any
such policy was when the 200 desantniki from Bosnia dashed into Kosovo in June of
1999 to seize the Pristina Airport ahead of the negotiated NATO deployment. This
desperate gambit to forestall “NATO’s attempts to exclude Russia from the Balkans” was
quickly set aside by negotiations in Helsinki to include Russia in the Kosovo
Stabilization Force. Additionally, the Russian-NATO partnership in the
Implementation/Stabilization Force mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina displayed no such
controversy and was touted as an example of Russia’s cooperative engagement with the
West. By choosing to work “with NATO” on the Balkans problem, however
reluctantly, Russia voluntarily took a back seat and lost prestige not only in the region,
but also on the world stage. Therefore, the neo-imperialist view of Russian foreign
policy and PKOs does not adequately explain Russian cooperation with NATO in the
Balkans.

35 Andrei P. Tsiganov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign
Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia,” Mershon International Studies Review, no. 41 (Ohio State
36 Stephen Blank, Military Threats and Threat Assessment in Russia’s new Defense Doctrine and Security
37 The entire IFOR/SFOR partnership experience between the US and Russia was the subject of exhaustive
joint studies by the RF Ministry of Defense and the United States Army. See Department of the Army,
Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined
Army Lessons Learned, United States Army Combined Arms Center,
The Defensive Realist View

The *defensive realist* viewpoint as addressed in this paper is the only one found predominantly among Russian scholars. Also based on the notion of “great power status” and the Western realist belief in the “balance of power,” it has many similarities to the *neo-imperialist* view, but is self-limiting. A broader spectrum of political beliefs has impacted Russian scholarship on the conduct of Russian foreign policy in the past decade than is true of its western counterpart. Andrei Tsyganov initially identified four schools of thought that influence Russian foreign policy: *international institutionalism, aggressive realism, defensive realism, and revolutionary expansionism.* According to Sergio Mikoyan, “the current struggle for foreign-policy dominance is between the *defensive and aggressive realists,*” Only one of these views – *defensive realism* – will be addressed as a distinct school of thought in this paper. This is because two of the four loosely fit with the *liberal-democratic* and *neo-imperialist* schools of thought, as explained above: the third is an extreme case of the *neo-imperialist* school.

*International institutionalism* closely followed Gorbachaev’s “New Thinking” (*glasnost*), and is the closest of the four to the *liberal-democratic* view expressed in this paper. It was the basis of Yeltsin’s early foreign policy, as conducted by Kozyrev. *Revolutionary expansionism* is rooted in Soviet and pre-Soviet foreign policy and considers radical external expansion as Russia’s best means to secure itself. In this way, it parallels the *neo-imperialist* view expressed in this paper, but to an extreme degree – *revolutionary expansionists* are “influenced by the most radical doctrines of foreign

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38 For further discussion, see Tsyganov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism,” pp. 247-268.
policy expansion... This influence can be traced back to the Lenin-Trotsky call for world revolution."40 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, as noted above, is a revolutionary expansionist according to Sergio Mikoyan.41 Closer to the neo-imperialist view expressed here is the aggressive realism school of thought, according to Tsyganov. Aggressive realists share with their defensive counterparts the belief that security is the strongest motivation of states. However, aggressive realists "feel nostalgia for the doctrine of deterrence" vis-à-vis the U.S. and "favor Russia's moderate expansion beyond the current borders."42 Konstantin Zatulin, former head of the CIS Parliamentary Committee, as well as some high-ranking generals and diplomats fall within this group.43

According to Mikoyan, defensive realists, including Yevgenii Primakov, have dominated the foreign policy debate in Russia since 1994.44 Much like western realists and their more aggressive counterparts above, defensive realists assume that "individual states work hard to increase their military and economic capabilities in order to gain the capacity to deter potential aggressors and provide themselves with security."45 They argue that the bi-polar strategic system has been replaced by a multi-polar system, within which Russia will take its place "if it manages to halt its internal disintegration and correctly define[s] its place in the new system."46 As a result of the collapse of the bi-polar system, though, Russia must remain a great power in order to fulfill its geopolitical

40 Tsyganov, p. 252.
41 Mikoyan, p.115.
42 Tsyganov, pp. 252-253.
43 Mikoyan, p.115.
44 Ibid.
45 Tsyganov, p. 251.
responsibility of organizing and stabilizing the Eurasian region. Unlike the aggressive realists, defensive realists argue that the reestablishment of a Russian sphere of influence should be accomplished through diplomatic means. They advocate that Russia maintain peace and stability by directing a combination of deterrent and cooperative policies toward the Near Abroad and Far Abroad countries and retaining the status of a post-imperial state. They also contend that Russia’s leadership or influence is necessary to stabilize southern Eurasia.

Does the defensive realist view sufficiently answer why Russian peacekeeping policy differs between the Near Abroad and Far Abroad? Although it seems to strike a balance between the liberal-democratic and neo-imperialist/aggressive realist views, there are still striking incongruities between defensive realist theory and foreign policy and peacekeeping reality. Peacekeeping operations within the CIS and the Far Abroad are both supported by the defensive realist concept of maintaining stability through diplomatic means. However, the initial use of military forces in the Transdneistr, Ossetia and Kosovo all run contrary to the use of ‘cooperative policy’ as advocated by this school of thought. Andrei Arbatov when elaborating on the defensive realist point of view wrote that military forces should not be used to “restore the USSR or the Russian Empire.” It is on this point primarily that defensive realists differ with their neo-imperialist/aggressive realist counterparts.

48 Oleg Kovalev, “Russian “Realism”: Theory and Policy Preferences,” an unpublished manuscript, University of Delaware, as cited in Tsyganov, p. 255. The “Near Abroad” in this context refers to ex-Soviet Republics; the “Far Abroad” constituting those nations outside of the former Soviet Union’s borders.
49 Mikoyan, p.115.
Summary

In this chapter I have tried to show how different schools of thought relate to the conduct of Russian foreign policy and peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. If one accepts the notion that Russian peacekeeping operations within the Near Abroad are conducted differently from those conducted in the Far Abroad, I argued that there should be a body of research to document the events and theorize and or explain why this happens. However, after reviewing the three general schools of thought on foreign policy and peacekeeping operations, I found that no current theory of Russia and its foreign and peacekeeping policies adequately explains this dichotomy in peacekeeping operations.

The liberal democrat school of thought could explain Russian peacekeeping operations outside of the CIS, in which Russia allied itself with liberal democracies to bring stability to a region on the “periphery.” This school of thought was however unable to justify Russia’s use of military force to coerce one of the sides in an internal civil conflict prior to the commitment of “impartial” Russian peacekeeping forces.

The neo-imperialists, on the other hand, could explain the Russian use of coercive force within a sovereign nation that fell within the Russian sphere of influence as part of an expansionistic imperial policy. This point of view was found wanting when trying to explain Russian integration and cooperation with the NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, also within Russia’s Eurasian sphere of influence.

Finally, the defensive realist viewpoint could in the final analysis justify Russian peacekeeping activities in both the Near and Far Abroad as diplomatic, cooperative measures as part of Russia’s special responsibility for security and stability in the region.
Yet, again the Russia use of aggressive, coercive force, specifically in the areas of the Transdneistr, Ossetia and Kosovo found no support within this school of thought.

This thesis will establish that Russian foreign policy, especially as it pertains to peacekeeping operations and their use in support of Russian security policy in the 1990s is the result of a hybrid realist policy that evolves throughout the decade and incorporates elements of all three above schools of thought. The core argument of this thesis is that the audience, which the peacekeeping operation is targeted at, depends on whether the operation is within the Near or Far Abroad. Russian peacekeeping operations within the CIS, as part of a general policy to stabilize the region, are primarily conducted to persuade/dissuade a regional actor. Those conducted outside of the Near Abroad are primarily conducted to maintain influence in world affairs, and are thus targeted at global or supranational actors.
Chapter II
Russian Policy Development and Peacekeeping Operations

After undergoing complicated transformations, Russia is vitally interested in preserving stability in the world. When armed conflicts arise, whether between nations or inside their borders, and particularly if these conflicts are near Russia's borders, they run directly counter to Russia's national interests and cause significant harm. Utilizing armed forces in support of international peace in accordance with the norms of international law has great significance for Russia, as do the trends in the development of these norms.

- O.N. Khlestov and A.I. Nikitin
  June 1996

Peacekeeping in general is a fairly new development historically, and has become a prominent issue in international relations in the 1990s. Since the end of the Second World War, there have been numerous peacekeeping operations conducted internationally, most of them under the auspices of the United Nations. Fifteen of 54 United Nations peacekeeping operations were still being conducted as of 15 January 2002. The longest running – the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine – has run continuously since 1948. UN Peacekeeping has fallen into two broad categories:

- military observer missions that are composed of relatively small numbers of unarmed officers, charged with such tasks as monitoring ceasefires verifying troop withdrawals, or patrolling borders and militarized zones; and
- peacekeeping forces that are composed of national contingents of troops, deployed to carry out tasks similar to those of military observers and, often, to act as a buffer between hostile parties.

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Although Moscow has contributed observers to many UN-led peacekeeping operations as part of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, Russia’s real experience with this new policy tool, that is, the deployment of military units to conduct peacekeeping operations, is limited to the last decade of the 20th Century.\textsuperscript{54}

Since the United Nations provides the “generic template” of peacekeeping operations, Russian peacekeeping policy must be understood within the wider context of this international peacekeeping. This chapter will deal with a more in depth review of the evolution of international norms of peacekeeping, the general development of official Russian security and defense policy in the 1990s and their influence on the conduct of Russian peacekeeping operations worldwide.

**International Peacekeeping Development**

Peacekeeping developed after the end of World War II as a means for the newly established United Nations to settle conflicts before they became global. Rarely has peacekeeping received so much support as in the 1990s, yet it is in that decade that it faced its most notable setbacks. This is a reflection of the evolution of peacekeeping from its initial ideal to current, more coercive operations. Traditional peacekeeping operated within certain parameters that required the acquiescence of both parties to the conflict. The strength of the traditional operations was its “hostage effect.”\textsuperscript{55} This effect


\textsuperscript{55} Dow Lynch, *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000), p. 20
was created by "...placing a soldier from an international force between two opposing armies as a hostage to their good behavior."\(^{56}\)

Traditional peacekeeping therefore relied on a set of agreed upon guidelines in order to work. Marrack Goulding asserted that,

thirteen operations, established during the Cold War, fostered the general evolution of a body of principles, procedures and principles for peacekeeping [and] came to represent a corpus of case law or customary practice which was by and large accepted by all concerned.\(^{57}\)

This basic foundation of traditional peacekeeping has historically been guided by six general principles:

- operations required a UN mandate under the command and control of the Secretary General and paid for collectively;
- operations required the consent of all involved;
- forces were required to act impartially;
- troops for the forces were provided voluntarily by UN member-states, usually small and medium nations to exclude superpower rivalry;
- "peacekeepers" were limited in the use of force – self defense, only; and
- the peacekeeping force was deployed only after a ceasefire had been negotiated.\(^{58}\)

Traditional peacekeeping operations' success depended upon their impartiality and a minimum use of force. If seen by all as the legitimate expression of will of the international community, a peacekeeping operation’s success was all but guaranteed.

Specific events and broad trends at the beginning of the 1990s significantly changed the role of international peacekeeping operations. The first of these is the involvement of the UN in mediating conflicts in areas previously considered superpower


\(^{58}\) Lynch, p.20.
"reserved domains." Secondly, the unofficial consensus achieved by the Permanent
Five members of the UN Security Council between 1990 and 1993, essentially suspended
their own veto rights over UN resolutions during that time period. Generally, this
"consensus" was extremely difficult to achieve during the Cold War. Two of the few
times it was achieved were the UN intervention in Korea in 1950 and the UN
endeavor had to pass the scrutiny of both the Western and Soviet Blocs – no mean feat.
The virtual end of superpower rivalry in 1990 also goes a long way toward explaining
UN operations in former spheres of influence, as stated in the first point.

This unofficial consensus among the permanent five members of the UN Security
Council in the early 1990s led to the expanded use of the UN in solving international
problems. In addition, the end of the Cold War saw the blossoming of international
optimism regarding a "new world order" of international peace and security. Finally,
there was an increasing acceptance internationally of the concept of "humanitarian
intervention." Two UN Secretary Generals – Javier Perez de Cuellar and Boutros-
Boutros Gali – formalized this trend in official pronouncements and later in actual UN

61 The consensus in both cases was achieved by the abstention or absence of one or more of the permanent
five members of the UN Security Council. In the case of Korea, it was the absence of the Soviet
representative and the abstention of the Chinese representative: in the case of the Congo, China, France and
the UK abstained, with the US and Soviet Union voting for the resolution. United Nations, Security
Council Resolutions 84 and 85 (1950), [http://www.un.org/documents/scres/1950/s50r82e.pdf]; and
62 For a broader discussion on the topic of “humanitarian intervention” see Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian
Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long, “Humanitarian Intervention: A New Role for the UN?” International
Peacekeeping (Summer 1995), pp. 140-156.
resolutions. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1991, which led to Operation Provide Comfort in support of the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, was justified in terms of threats this situation posed to peace and security.64

These global trends have affected international peacekeeping in two ways. The UN’s expanded involvement in internal conflicts has radically changed the operational environment. Examples of this new type of operation include Somalia and Yugoslavia, and in these situations, the parties are “...less unitary, and more difficult to control, and ceasefire agreements are more difficult to implement in such circumstances.”65 Second, the UN has taken on additional tasks beyond traditional peacekeeping, ranging from preventative deployments and the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid deliveries to the demobilization of former fighters and the training of civilian police.66 Unfortunately, this rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping operations was not followed by a reassessment of its capabilities to support them.

Setbacks and problems in both Yugoslavia and Somalia in the early 1990s had a “sobering effect” on attitudes toward peacekeeping operations in general. In Yugoslavia, the result of three years of negotiations finally led to the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, but not until thousands had been killed on all sides, despite the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992. UNPROFOR was sent into the region in order

65 Lynch, p. 21.
to separate the warring sides and deliver humanitarian aid, but according to some analysts lacked the “requisite information to navigate its way out of a paper bag, let alone a Balkan War.” The UN Mission to Somalia had many of the same problems, which led to the eventual withdrawal of all UN forces by 1993. These disasters have forced the United Nations to reassess peacekeeping and according to Dov Lynch, “…since 1993, the UN has reaffirmed the principles that characterized traditional peacekeeping.”

However, this has not meant that the UN has divorced itself from more complex operations. A new division of labor has surfaced within which the UN “sub-contracts” peacekeeping operations to regional organizations, providing a small element to provide oversight. The NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (whose mission superceded UNPROFOR’s in 1996) is one example of this type of operation. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter provides for “regional arrangements to resolve disputes and maintain peace” without giving a precise definition on the specifics of the arrangements. Starting with the United Nations Observer Mission in Libya (UNOMIL) in 1993, this new direction in peacekeeping has been used several times, most notably in Africa, former Yugoslavia and Georgia. In 1995, UN Secretary General Boutros-Gali wrote that this system

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68 Lynch, p. 21.


heralds a new division of labor between the UN and regional organizations, under which the regional organization carries the main burden, but a small UN operation supports it and verifies that it is functioning in a manner consistent with the positions adopted by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{71}

The Russian Federation has been a “forceful advocate” of this point of view since 1993, especially as it relates to the CIS.\textsuperscript{72} Moscow has not, however, been universally successful in getting the United Nations to underwrite its peacekeeping operations in the Near Abroad.\textsuperscript{73}

**Russian National Security and Defense Policy**

One might expect that the foundation for Russian peacekeeping policy can be found in the various military doctrines and national security policy documents passed by the Russian Federation since the fall of the Soviet Union. There have been three primary security policy documents published since the end of the Soviet era that one may use to trace the evolution of a “national peacekeeping policy.” That is not to say that official policy was strictly followed, or even that it was followed at all. However, by reviewing the general trend of national foreign policy, one may attempt to discern a pattern in the evolution of Russian defense doctrine and security policy, especially as it relates to threats and the uses of military force in peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping was first elevated to the level of national security in the 1993 Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine (Military Doctrine (1993)). As

\textsuperscript{71} Boutros-Gali, Supplement, para. 86, p. 16.
approved by the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Military Doctrine (1993) states:

Russia will assist in the efforts of the World Community and the various organs of collective security for the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, peacekeeping and peace restoration, and for this purpose, considers it essential to maintain armed and other forces for conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with the UN Security Council or in keeping with international circumstances.74

Few further details of the use of peacekeeping troops are listed in this document, perhaps as a function of their uniqueness, perhaps to keep their use unrestricted. This initial defense and security posture found its roots in the liberal, integrationist foreign policy initially championed by Mikhail Gorbachev, later to be adopted by Boris Yeltsin and aggressively pursued by his Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev. The greatest threats to the Russian Federation were deemed to be economic, political and social, and for the first time since 1948, NATO was not considered a threat to Moscow.75 The hands-off policy toward the Near Abroad, as initially advocated by Kozyrev, dominated foreign policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Military Doctrine (1993).76

However, by the end of 1993, this policy was already running afoul of a rapid succession of regional setbacks, including burgeoning civil wars along the Russian periphery in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan.77

The Russian National Security Council adopted the next document on security and defense policy, the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (National

74 As cited in Vorob'ev, p. 3
Security Concept (1997)), on 7 May 1997.\textsuperscript{78} This document was intended to define “strategies to counter international military-political, and economic threats to Russian Security.”\textsuperscript{79} Assembled with input from Yeltsin’s new Foreign Minister, Yevgenii Primakov, it had a more pragmatic approach to international relations, recognizing the external threat was most likely to appear from Russia’s southern neighbors. Yet, the analysis of the dangers to Russian security in the National Security Concept (1997) again focused on internal rather than external factors – “domestic, political, economic, social, environmental, information and spiritual spheres.”\textsuperscript{80} This is consistent with the defensive realist school of thought, which doesn’t see the West as a direct threat, but having its own agenda.\textsuperscript{81} Again, peacekeeping is mentioned in a broad context and with few additional comments. The external threats remained unspecified and “limited national resources would be focused on preparing to counter those regional conflicts that pose the most serious conflict to national interests.”\textsuperscript{82} The National Security Concept (1997) was also criticized as “too vague” and even as “failing to reflect Russia’s social and philosophical roots.”\textsuperscript{83} By the time this concept became policy, Russia was not only conducting its own peacekeeping operations in the Near Abroad, but had already spent over three years involved in a cooperative effort with NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ivan Rybkin, \textit{Nezavisimaya Gazeta}, 29 April 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{80} “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” \textit{Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Moscow)}, 26 December 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Tsyganov, pp. 251-252, 261-262.
\end{itemize}
The latest of national policy documents elaborating Moscow’s security policy and military doctrine as they pertain to peacekeeping operations came out over the winter of 1999/2000. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Military Doctrine (2000)) was a radical departure from the two previous documents in its description of the outside world and the role the Russian Federation would play in it. Most pronounced of the changes was a “re-analysis” of external threats. External threats were downplayed in earlier versions of the national security doctrine; not only were there specific external threats listed in the beginning of the Military Doctrine (2000), many of the threats listed were political in nature. This may have indicated the rise in influence of adherents to the neo-imperialist/aggressive realist viewpoint in the drafting of this document and a move away from the use of international political structures to solve external security problems. This version also gives a somewhat more detailed account of the use of Russian Armed Forces in a peacekeeping role. The Military Doctrine (2000) dictates the use of military forces “in peacekeeping and peace-restoration operations – to disengage the warring factions, to stabilize the situation and to ensure the conditions for a just peace settlement.” This may also be an indication of the increased role of the Russian General Staff – generally considered to be in the neo-imperialist/aggressive realist camp – in the drafting of the document. It further cites that in addition to their regular duties, Russian

84 S. J. Main, Dr., Russia’s Military Doctrine, Conflict Studies Research Center, Occasional Brief 77, (Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy, 2000), p. 1.
87 Blank, pp. 4-11.
Federation armed forces "must ensure the implementation of peacekeeping activities by
the Russian Federation both independently and as part of international organizations." 88

Clearly, the role of military forces in peacekeeping operations has become much
better defined in this latest iteration of official Russian policy. The Military Doctrine
(2000) foreshadows the use of peacekeeping or peace-restoration forces "close to the
Russian Federation's state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining
their territories." 89 For purposes of peacekeeping policy development, this doctrine also
comes too late. For, by the winter of 1999/2000, all Russian peacekeeping operations, in
both the Near and Far Abroad, were already underway. In fact, the Military Doctrine
(2000) reads like a justification of ongoing Russian peacekeeping operations, as even
some of the more questionable activities can be explained by it. Moldova, Georgia and
Tajikistan can all be explained by several of the external threats listed, to include
suppression of Russian diasporas, seats of armed conflict close to Russian borders,
actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability and attacks on Russian
installations in other countries. 90 Likewise, both of the UN-led Balkans peacekeeping
operations that Russia participates in can be explained by some of the listed threats. 91

Therefore, published national defense and security policies turn out to have
played little to no part in the development of Russian peacekeeping policy. What is
important when reviewing the successive official national security/military doctrines is
the evolution of the theoretical basis for these documents, and what this may indicate as

88 BBC, "Military Doctrine," p. 19...
89 Ibid, p. 3.
90 Ibid, pp. 3-5.
91 Kosovo and Bosnia could be justified seats of armed conflict close to the borders of a Russian ally
(Serbia), actions aimed at undermining global/regional stability, or the creation of armed formations for
later operations on Russian territory (Chechnya). Ibid, pp. 3-5.
to the influence of rival schools of thought in Moscow’s foreign policy debate over time. As briefly revisited above, the initial Military Doctrine (1993) was based on the general belief that Russia’s future lay with the West, the Near Abroad was treated like any other group of foreign nations (with respect to internal affairs), and the efforts of the fledgling Russian Federation were best spent on improving the economy and focusing on domestic infrastructure.\(^{92}\) Unrealistic expectations of the West and the growing troubles with the Russian diasporas in the Near Abroad helped to undermine this policy, leading to the eventual resignation of Andrei Kozyrev and the ascendance of Yevgenii Primakov in the Russian foreign policy establishment.\(^{93}\)

Primakov was the consummate defensive realist, and reflected the second evolution of security policy at the national level. His concept of a “multi-polar system” of states at the end of the Cold War was the classic synopsis of defensive realism and the foundation on which the National Security Concept (1997) was laid. Unlike in the previous document, although cooperation with the West was seen as acceptable, it was not the primary focus of foreign policy as elaborated in this concept. Additionally, the West was still not seen as a military threat. Ivan Rybkin, in discussing the National Security Concept’s (1997) threat analysis, stated limited national resources would be focused to counter the most serious regional conflicts; he also assessed the possibility of a “global threat” as remote.\(^{94}\) This is a clear reference to the only remaining superpower, the United States. This policy, too, would be superseded due in this case to


\(^{94}\) RFE/RL, “Rybkin calls,” p. 4. Italics are the authors’.
problems mostly outside of the Near Abroad and the growing distance between the
Russian Federation and the United States.

As early as 1996, the debate to change the Military Doctrine (1993) had begun
within Russian defense and security communities. The expansion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) into Central Europe in 1997 was one cause for Russian
concern. NATO’s new strategic concept allowing the Alliance to deploy forces out if
theater and outside the confines of Article 5 (self-defense) was another. The NATO air
campaign in Kosovo seemed to be the watershed in Russian threat analysis. Moscow’s
seeming inability to stop these events strengthened the hand of adherents to the *neo-
imperialistic/aggressive realism* school of thought within the foreign policy debate.

Celeste Wallander argued:

NATO’s changes, combined with its determination to use force against
non-members threatens Russia because political turmoil in the former
Soviet Union increases the likelihood of NATO involvement near and
perhaps even in Russia. Moscow has long feared that the expansion of the
Alliance could radicalize or destabilize neighboring countries, sparking
internal splits or civil wars that could drag in Russia – a role it neither
wants nor can afford.  

Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel-General Valery L. Manilov admitted that the Kosovo
crisis led to revisions of the draft doctrine. The Military Doctrine (2000) appears to be
verging on a *neo-imperialistic/aggressive realism* view of foreign relations as described
by Tsyganov.

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95 Blank, p. 8.
96 Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian Views on Kosovo: Synopsis of May 6 Panel Discussion,” Program on
New Approaches to Russian Security, (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, April 1999), pp. 3-4.
97 The draft of the Military Doctrine (2000) was released in the Russian press in October 1999. *Nezavisimoe
Voennoe Obozrenie*, 29 October 1999, pp. 1,4, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS Daily
98 Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Russia, the U.S. and Regional Conflict in Asia,” *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 3,
Even if it represents only a "hardening" of the defensive realism viewpoint, the trend in Russian foreign and security policy during the 1990s is toward the neo-imperialistic/aggressive realism school of thought and away from the liberal-democratic view. However, as noted above, there appears to be little connecting Russian official national security and defense doctrine with peacekeeping policy, except hindsight. In the next section, this paper will trace the development of Russian foreign policy and its effect on peacekeeping policy.

The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy and Peacekeeping

Russian foreign policy in the 1990s was the result of an ever-changing set of domestic and foreign inputs, much as in any other country. Add to this the wholesale changeover of the central government, the collapse of much of the domestic economic infrastructure, the loss of perhaps 30% of its population, and the process of establishing from scratch an entirely foreign economic system and one can imagine the stress under which the government operated. Yet it is here we will see the development of peacekeeping policy.

Foreign policy decision-making during the Yeltsin era was characterized by competing government elites and the struggle for influence between government bureaucracies.99 Because of this, Russia found it difficult to pursue a clear and consistent foreign policy. The chaos in Russian foreign policy as perceived from the outside is understandable, as the majority influence in policy making moved from one ministry,

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committee, or bureaucracy to the next, relative to several factors. These factors include instability in Russian politics and society, a weak and inefficient foreign and security policy decision-making apparatus, and bureaucratic rivalry.100

Operating in the absence of western-type government organs, the “re-flagged” Russian power ministries spent most of the 1990s jockeying for a position of primacy in the Yeltsin government. One Russian analyst noted that,

In democratic Russia each branch of power considers itself a Politburo and thinks it has the right to pursue its own diplomacy. Moreover, several Politburos of this kind have appeared within the executive branch. They do not allow the Foreign Ministry to conduct a clear and consistent policy in world affairs.101

Some analysts have also attributed much of this bureaucratic infighting to Boris Yeltsin’s foreign policy “style,” citing his failure to establish a “...smooth-running and effective decision-making system to coordinate and integrate foreign and security policy.”102

Under the Russian Constitution of 1993, the President is charged with the responsibility for foreign policy. However, legal authority does not necessarily equate to the effective exercise of that right. Sergei Karaganov, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe and one time member of Yeltsin’s Presidential Council, opined, “Foreign Policy is called ‘presidential,’ but neither the President nor anyone else has the bureaucratic possibilities of systematically shaping and directing it.”103 According to Dov Lynch, President Yeltsin

100 Larrabee and Karasik, pp. 2-3.
102 Larrabee and Karasik, pp. 2-3.
sought to remain above the fray on foreign policy unless absolutely necessary and/or a consensus has emerged on an issue. At key points, interventions by President Boris Yeltsin have been determining on the broader direction of foreign policy. In ‘peacekeeping,’ Yeltsin has also maintained a neutral stance, allowing government ministries to squabble over the direction of those operations. Again, however, Yeltsin’s episodic interventions in specific operations have been determining.\textsuperscript{104}

Despite its overall inconsistency, a review of the evolution of Russian foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin should provide insight into the duality of Russian peacekeeping policy, as exercised by Moscow in the Near and Far Abroad.

Early in 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under Andrei Kozyrev was the dominant actor in the formulation of foreign and security policy. A member of the \textit{liberal-democratic} school of thought, Kozyrev pursued a foreign policy that prioritized relations with the West, relegating contacts with the Near Abroad to a lesser status.\textsuperscript{105} Part of this “Westernized” foreign policy meant the rejection of the re-creation of the Soviet Union and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy – Russian interests were to be pursued through bilateral and international negotiations.\textsuperscript{106} The MFA view held sway, not primarily because it was within their authority to establish foreign policy, but because the military and security ministries were in disarray following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.\textsuperscript{107} Critics to this \textit{liberal-democratic} policy fell into three broad groups, as described in Chapter 1 – the \textit{revolutionary expansionism} school of thought, primarily the ‘red-brown’ \textit{gosudarstvenniki} of the Liberal Democratic and Communist Parties – and the \textit{defensive} and \textit{aggressive realism} schools of thought, as

\textsuperscript{104} The “key point” Lynch is referring to Yeltsin’s criticism of the MFA in October 1992. Lynch, p. 38. \textsuperscript{105} Larrabee and Karasik, pp. 5-7. \textsuperscript{106} Lynch, p. 43. \textsuperscript{107} For a thorough discussion about the decline of the Russian military, including its restructuring under the auspices of the CIS, see William E. Odom (1998), \textit{The Collapse of the Soviet Military}. (Yale University Press: New Haven, CN, 1998).
represented by the Civic Union and the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP).\textsuperscript{108} The \textit{defensive} and \textit{aggressive realist} schools disagree primarily on the use of force in reestablishing the Russian sphere of influence in Eurasia, with defensive realists preferring the use of diplomatic means.\textsuperscript{109} These two opinion groupings were represented well in the military and security spheres and reflect more conservative philosophies on Russian foreign policy, which would also come to play in policy formulation during the decade.

The middle of 1992 became the watershed in Russian peacekeeping policy as the Moldova-Dnestr conflict forced a shift in Russian foreign policy toward the CIS. The initial MFA ‘hands-off’ approach to the CIS was under considerable pressure in 1992 from the Duma and other ministries who disagreed with this approach.\textsuperscript{110} Yevgenii Ambartsumov launched scathing attacks on Kozyrev and the MFA for the alleged disregard of Russia’s national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{111} The restructuring of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in May 1992 and the ongoing problems in Moldova-Dnestr region dealt a severe blow to Kozyrev’s \textit{liberal-democratic} policy of benign complacency in the CIS.\textsuperscript{112} The military leadership accepted the utility of force as an instrument of policy and military

\textsuperscript{108} Dov Lynch elaborates fairly extensively on these 3 views and the parties that support each. He goes on to state that the only thing they all agree on is “…that Russia is and will be a Great Power.” Lynch, pp. 42-62.
\textsuperscript{110} In 1992, the parliament pressed for Kozyrev’s resignation, and in July, Ruslan Khasbulatov (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet) announced that a separate CIS foreign ministry was to be created. This initiative came to naught, but had the effect of applying additional pressure to Kozyrev. See Suzanne Crow, “Ambartsumov’s Influence on Russian Foreign Policy,” \textit{RFE/RL Research Report}, 7 May 1993, pp. 21.
\textsuperscript{111} Crow, pp. 36-41.
\textsuperscript{112} Lynch, pp. 43-49.
commentators openly called for a more assertive policy to counter threats from the Near Abroad. On 1 July 1992, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev openly challenged the MFA on its policy toward the former Soviet Union when he stated “in conditions of civil chaos, clashes and reprisals, only the army can save thousands of lives, preserve morsels of good and defend what is sacred.” This was followed by Kozyrev’s endorsement of the use of force in his new ‘policy of peace’ in early July 1992 and deployment of Russian peacekeepers later that month. The development of peacekeeping as a Russian foreign policy tool begins in Moldova – peacekeeping forces are sent in to persuade the Moldovan Government to stay within the Russian orbit.

Some analysts argue that this shift in influence away from the MFA toward the MoD would last until Yeltsin replaced Kozyrev with Primakov in 1996; some would argue it lasted even after Primakov’s appointment. As stated previously, it was the result of the continuous struggle between the ministries and throughout the government bureaucracy as to what was in the nation’s best interest. The shift in 1992 from the ‘pro-western’ approach, which left a vacuum in Russian foreign policy toward the CIS, to the ‘Russia first’ approach showed the increasing influence of the defensive and aggressive realism schools of thought in policy debates in Moscow. Instability in the region was a central concern and reflected Russian perceptions of insecurity. Vladimir Lukin wrote about a “zone of constant uncertainty and instability” that threatened Russia with

113 Colonel S. Pechorov and Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Tegin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 April 1992, p. 3.
114 Itar-Tass, Moscow, 1 July 1992, as cited in Lynch, p. 62.
115 *The original proposal was for Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Russian and Moldovan troops. This was changed however when other CIS states didn’t want to participate; the new Russian proposal called for the introduction of combined “interested” peacekeeping forces (5 Russian, 3 Moldovan, 2 Trans Dniester battalions). Finch, p. 7.
116 Larrabee and Karasik, pp. 5-11.
117 Lynch, pp. 49-54.
conflicts and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{118} Aggressive reengagement with the Near Abroad as a Russian sphere of interest was the answer according to several ‘centrist-nationalist’ groups. Peacekeeping emerged as an important tool of that reengagement. Boris Yeltsin, in an appeal on regional security to the other CIS heads of state, also placed special emphasis on peacekeeping:

While laying no claim to the leading role in it, we realize our responsibility for ensuring that we cooperate closely and on an equal basis with all of the independent states in the interests of economic and social recovery, in order to secure stability and security in our common geopolitical space.... First and foremost there is a need for realistic instruments to eliminate “trouble spots” and prevent the outbreak of fresh hotbeds of tension.\textsuperscript{119}

The shift in policy also reflected the reality on the ground – the Russian MoD was involved in \textit{de facto} policy-making in the CIS, as it had over 250,000 troops still forward deployed in the region.\textsuperscript{120} As early as 1992, Minister of Defense Grachev presented ‘peacekeeping’ as a main peacetime task for the armed forces.\textsuperscript{121} In 1992, Moscow had peacekeepers in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan;\textsuperscript{122} by the end of 1993, the total number of Russian soldiers involved in peacekeeping operations in Russia and the former Soviet Union at any given time was approximately 15,000.\textsuperscript{123} In each case, Russian or Russian-dominated peacekeeping forces acted in accordance with a primarily \textit{aggressive realist} policy of reestablishing ties amongst the members of the CIS.

\textsuperscript{118} Vladimir Lukin, \textit{Foreign Policy} (Fall 1992), PP. 58-71.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Itar-Tass}, Moscow, 17 Mar 1993.
\textsuperscript{120} The failure of the CIS Armed Forces left the previously Soviet Army in the lap of the new Russian MoD. Odom, pp. 385-387
\textsuperscript{122} Finch, pp. 5-9.
\textsuperscript{123} This \textit{does not include} the 201\textsuperscript{st} Motorized Rifle Division on station in Tajikistan, another approximately 10,000 troops. Krysenko, p. 4.
Additionally, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the UN intervention there resulted in the first deployment of Russian peacekeepers outside the CIS, another MoD initiative coordinated with the help of the United States. Although it had a 20-year history of sending military observers in support of UN missions, this was the first time Moscow had sent peacekeepers. In April 1992 a 900-man Russian contingent was sent to Klissa, Croatia, of UN Security Council Resolution No. 743.\textsuperscript{124} Ministry of Defense initiatives in international relations were so numerous, that some analysts assert Grachev was conducting a quasi-independent foreign policy.\textsuperscript{125} Kozyrev himself publicly noted on several occasions that Grachev was conducting foreign policy without consulting with the MFA.\textsuperscript{126} Besides the previously discussed heavy-handed military involvement early on in the peacekeeping missions within the Near Abroad, it was Grachev who went to Brussels to negotiate the Russian commitment to the peacekeeping force after the Dayton Peace Accords were negotiated in 1995.\textsuperscript{127} Some analysts explain this as part of the bureaucratic infighting Yeltsin fostered within his administration, while others suggest that this, as well as the objection to NATO expansion, was part of an overall plan to distance Yeltsin from Kozyrev and prepare the way for Kozyrev’s dismissal in 1996.\textsuperscript{128} This Russian contingent to the Implementation Force (IFOR) “evolved” from the unit

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{126} Interfax, 24 November 1995; Interfax, 1 December 1995; Interfax, 5 December 1995.
\textsuperscript{127} Larrabee and Karasik, pp. 14.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, pp. 2-3; Aleksandr Belkin, analyst for the CFDP, as cited in Lynch, p. 58.
already in Croatia, which further "evolved" into the Russian element of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.\footnote{129}

The pendulum of influence swung back somewhat toward the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996, when Yeltsin replaced Kozyrev with Yevgenii Primakov. Primakov was a much more successful Foreign Minister because, not only was he vested within one of the dominant realism schools of thought policy circles in Moscow (defensive realism), he had ties to the security services and military, which generally supported the other predominant school (aggressive realism).\footnote{130} Another factor in the MFA’s assent to foreign policy primacy was that Pavel Grachev had lost favor with Yeltsin as early as 1995 due to the debacle in Chechnya. According to Vladimir Shumeiko, Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin and Shumeiko voted in the Russian Security Council in favor of Grachev’s resignation in July 1995: Yeltsin kept him on because they were in the minority.\footnote{131}

Although Primakov’s accession to the MFA didn’t conceptually change Russian foreign policy toward the Near Abroad, he did begin to reassert the ministry’s dominance over foreign policy in general. The major policy shifts were the “multipolar world” concept within which Russia would actively pursue policies with the Middle East and China to counterbalance its ties with the West, and to reassert the CIS relationship as the primary one in Russian foreign policy.\footnote{132} Both of these policies are classic defensive realism – cooperate with the West without making it the centerpiece of foreign policy,
and using the CIS, that is, diplomatic means, to strengthen the Russian sphere of influence. Primakov engineered important shifts in Russian policy towards post-Soviet conflicts, restoring the balance between political and military tools. Under Primakov, the MFA successfully concluded peace treaties in the Tajik Civil War and the conflict in Moldova.\textsuperscript{133} In May 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act normalized relations between the former adversaries; it was the culmination of several months of meetings between the NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov.\textsuperscript{134}

Primakov’s appointment as Prime Minister following the August 1998 economic crisis powerfully reinforced the position of the MFA in Russian foreign policy-making, and in peacekeeping policy in particular.\textsuperscript{135} Although there was no advance made in negotiations in Georgia, Tajikistan remained stable and efforts with the UN-NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia were a continuing success. However, growing tensions due to the theoretical and physical expansion of NATO, and the escalating crisis in Kosovo put Moscow opposite its peacekeeping partners. A growing consensus among the increasingly neo-imperialist/aggressive realist policy elite in Russia became concerned that NATO was becoming too aggressive and planning for operations outside the scope of UN-authorized actions.\textsuperscript{136} The change in NATO’s strategic concept allowing the alliance to act against non-members (theoretical), and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe (physical), as well as public statements by the NATO Secretary General Solana on NATO’s interests in the Balkans and the Caucasus seemed to confirm Moscow’s

\begin{footnotes}
\item[133] Lynch, p. 60.
\item[135] Lynch, p. 61.
\item[136] Blank, pp. 8-10; see also Wallander, “Russian Views on Kosovo.”
\end{footnotes}
worst fears. The NATO air campaign in Kosovo became the turning point in the NATO-Russian relationship.

On his way to a meeting with the US Administration on 24 March 1999, Russian Prime Minister Primakov turned his plane around when he was told by Vice President Al Gore of the start of the NATO air campaign in Kosovo. Many within Russia considered the campaign a “serious military threat to Russia’s military-political interests.” This was further exacerbated by Russian claims that NATO tried to keep Moscow out of discussions on the fate of Kosovar Albanians during the height of the crisis. It was only after the Western governments had gone to “considerable lengths to bring the Russians back” that Yeltsin sent Chernomyrdin to negotiate as his personal representative. In the end, it was with Russia’s assistance that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was convinced to pull out of Kosovo and allow a peacekeeping presence.

The difficult task remained – who would provide the force? The US wanted a NATO-led force, like the one conducting operations in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian position was they would only commit troops if they weren’t under NATO command. Only after long and intense negotiations with both the

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137 Charles J. Dick, Russia’s 1999 Draft Military Doctrine, Conflict Studies Research Center, Occasional Brief 72, (Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy, 1999), pp. 4-5.
138 NY Times, “A Phone Call From Gore and a U-Turn to Moscow,” 24 March 1999
139 Blank, p. 10.
141 This is an instance of Yeltsin’s direct intervention in foreign policy. Chernomyrdin negotiated with both Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and UN representative and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. See Zolotov, Andrei, Jr., “Talks on in Serbia Despite Bombings,” Moscow Times, 28 May 1999; The Economist, “Leaders” pp. 16-17.
142 For an in-depth discussion on the running negotiations, see Clark, Waging Modern War.
UN and NATO would Moscow agree to send peacekeepers to Kosovo. The unsettled acrimonious debate on a separate Russian zone within the peacekeeping operation foreshadowed the lightning-strike seizure of the Pristina Airport by Russian *desantniki* (paratroopers) on 12 June 1999.\(^{144}\) As reported from the US multi-national division in Bosnia, the Russians had sent a 200-man detachment with orders to “occupy Pristina Airfield and receive reinforcements.”\(^{145}\) Their arrival in Kosovo ahead of the NATO forces provided Moscow with an additional bargaining chip in the deployment discussion.

As to who sent the Russian peacekeepers to seize the airport in Pristina, Kosovo – initial speculation on whether it was a rogue military operation spread like wildfire in both Moscow and the western capitals. Although initially silent on this action, Boris Yeltsin later promoted Lieutenant-General Viktor Zavarzin, the man who led the 200 paratroopers into Kosovo.\(^{146}\) According to a senior defense ministry official when asked about the mission, “There was no self-initiative. Everything went strictly down the chain of command.”\(^{147}\) He also stated that Russia will continue pressing for its own peacekeeping zone in Kosovo, which NATO opposes, using its small contingent of paratroopers that maintain control of the key airport as a bargaining tool in talks with NATO.\(^{148}\) The use by Moscow of Russian peacekeepers from Bosnia to seize and airfield to “receive follow-on forces” may reflect an increased tendency toward a neo-imperialist/aggressive realist posture in its dealings with the West. Conversely, it may

\(^{144}\) Clark, pp. 369-374.
\(^{145}\) Clark, p. 376.
\(^{147}\) Ibid.
\(^{148}\) Ibid. Italics are the author's.
reflect another struggle between the MoD and MFA for dominance over this aspect of Russian foreign policy. The fact that Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov was left out of the decision-making process— as reflected by his promises to US Secretary of State Madeline Albright that no Russian units were moving into Kosovo— much like his colleague Kozyrev in the early 1990s, supports this theory.149 Ultimately, the general composition and disposition of multi-national peacekeeping forces in Kosovo was similar to that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulting in similar Russian influence in the two operations.150

Summary

This chapter has done several things. It first briefly reviewed the basis for and evolution of international peacekeeping. It then determined that Russian peacekeeping policy did not exist as part of a well-defined national level defense or security policy, except in hindsight. Thirdly, it followed the development of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, identifying key events in relation to the development of the two types of Russian peacekeeping operations.

Overall, this chapter determined that Russian peacekeeping policy was not the result of a well thought-out national level security concept or military doctrine. Rather, that Russian peacekeeping policy developed as a result of ever-changing relationships between domestic elites in Moscow and foreign policy events abroad. The continual struggle between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, as well as independent policies conducted by separate units on the ground, forced Moscow’s hand

149 Ibid.
on several occasions. Most notable of these were the 14th Army’s actions in Moldova in 1992, and the Russian Separate Airborne Brigade’s seizure of Pristina Airport in 1999.

Overall, a general picture can be assembled showing that Russian peacekeeping operations within the Commonwealth of Independent States are coercive tools of foreign policy; that is, their presence in the Near Abroad supports the stated goal of closer integration of the former Soviet region into a Russian sphere of influence. Thus, the focus of this policy is regional, and the primary target audience of the peacekeeping operation is one of the two sides in the conflict.

On the other hand, when reviewing the record of Russian peacekeeping operations that are part of a UN-sponsored, NATO-led peacekeeping mission, the Russian emphasis appears to be on the coordination of the operation and their work with other non-regional nations. Instability in the area of the peacekeeping operation, although tragic, does not have a direct impact on day-to-day life in Moscow. Additionally, there is no significant Russian diaspora in the Balkans. Finally, Serbia provides no real strategic advantage to a Russia trying to integrate into Europe. If any of these were true, likely there would have been Russian peacekeepers in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, just as there were in the CIS nations. Therefore what Russia gains by cooperating with NATO in these operations is prestige. Being seen as a great power contributing to world peace. Therefore, the focus of this policy is extra-regional, that is, the primary target audience in these operations is not a local antagonist, but a third party.
Chapter III
Historical Development of Russian Peacekeeping Operations – Case Studies

In certain “hot spots” Russia has been and remains the only power capable of separating the hostile sides and bringing them to a negotiating table. Real world experience confirms that no international organization or group of states will take the place of our peacekeeping efforts on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

- Colonel-General E.A Vorob’yev\textsuperscript{151}

December 1993

Russian peacekeeping operations (PKO) began in 1992 with deployments to the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States happening very close together. However, because the CIS is physically closer and considered by most within Russia to be within Moscow’s sphere of interest, it therefore makes sense to begin our review there. Russian peacekeeping operations in the CIS are first and foremost a policy tool to ensure stability in the Near Abroad. Although some of them started out as adventurist schemes in support of Russian diasporas, all have evolved over time to resemble traditional international peacekeeping operations. For Russian foreign policy, Moldova also marks the beginning of the shift in influence from the liberal-democratic school of thought to one closer to the defensive realism school of thought. Events in Georgia have reinforced this trend toward a more confrontational policy stance. The goal of these peacekeeping operations is to influence one side or the other to act in a way Moscow prefers – that is, the policy is regionally focused on one of the local antagonists. This chapter will first briefly review the cases of Moldova and Georgia for their roles in the development of Russian peacekeeping policy.

Outside of the CIS, Russian participation in international peacekeeping operations is also a means of ensuring its interests are protected, albeit globally. In this instance, the primary focus of the policy is not to influence regional actors, but a third party. Presumably, if the policy were meant to influence one of the regional actors in the Balkans, Moscow would have acted unilaterally, as it did within the CIS. Reasons Moscow has cooperated in the Implementation/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996 range from Boris Yeltsin’s attempt to maintain a liberal-democratic policy of cooperation with the West, to traditional Russian cultural and diplomatic ties in the Balkans, to the need to “be seen acting in concert with other Great Powers,” as is consistent with the defensive realism school of thought.\textsuperscript{152} Russian foreign policy with respect to IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping operations remains consistent with an increasingly aggressive Russian foreign policy, as Moscow is now acting outside of the CIS. But the next significant shift in Russian foreign policy, as seen through peacekeeping operations, occurred during the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999. Though the strained relationship between Russia and the West was exhibited as early as the first UN decision to use NATO air strikes in Bosnia, this shift in Russian policy became most apparent during the effort to halt the conflict in Kosovo – especially during the coordination for and establishment of the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR) peacekeeping operation. Therefore it is also useful to review the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo when charting the evolution of Russian peacekeeping operations and policy.

The Moldova-Dnestr Conflict

*I cannot rule out the possibility that some of the officers and generals [of the 14th Army] might take the side of those wronged and humiliated people.*

- Colonel-General Yevgenii Shaposhnikov\(^{153}\)
  May 1992

In many ways, the Russian strategy towards Moldova laid the foundation for the evolution of Russian foreign policy toward the CIS generally, and peacekeeping operations in particular. Prime Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s initial assertions in 1992 that rejected “any unnatural military responsibilities [for Russia] beyond its borders” signaled a new era in Russian foreign policy: there would be no pretensions of empire in the former Soviet Union or the former Warsaw Pact nations.\(^{154}\) The outbreak of conflict in Moldova in 1992 would change all of that. Both domestic Russian political struggles and domestic Moldovan military clashes would have the effect of undermining the MFA and forcing its policy to the right. It was the key setback for Kozyrev’s nascent ‘hands-off’ foreign policy toward the Near Abroad. It is in the Moldovan-Dnestr conflict that the use of peacekeeping troops as a lever of foreign policy is first developed. In addition, the organizational template used by Russia to create the peacekeeping forces in most of the CIS peacekeeping operations – that of combining units from the two warring sides with a larger Russian element, all under Russian command – occurred almost simultaneously in Moldova and South Ossetia.\(^{155}\)

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\(^{155}\) Technically, the first use of a peacekeeping force with soldiers from the warring sides occurred in Southern Ossetia, where a 1500 man Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian PKF was established in mid-July 1992 – about a week before the PKF in Moldova went in place. This force was also predominantly Russian (60%) and it was “clear from the beginning that the Russians were in charge.” Raymond C. Finch, III,
The split between Moldova and Dnestr region can be traced back to 1940, when the Dnestr region was transferred from Ukraine to Moldova after the USSR gained Moldova under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.\textsuperscript{156} The Dnestr region was the industrial heartland of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, but had a highly Russified population that had close ties to Moscow. The division between the Dnestr and Moldova later manifested in the rise of the Moldovan Popular Front, which began a push to reunify with Romania starting in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{157} Twice the Dnestr region declared itself independent of Moldova; once as the Dnestr Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990, and again after Moldova declared its independence from Moscow in August 1991. Both times the Moldovan government found the Transdniestrian declarations illegal.\textsuperscript{158} Late in 1991, the Dnestr militias turned a hitherto political and economic standoff into a military one when they took over the left bank districts.\textsuperscript{159}

Initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to ignore the conflict in Moldova. The defensive and aggressive realist elements in Moscow's foreign policy circles were thus able to seize the political initiative in this debate. These centrist and radical groups turned the conflict into a test case of Russian resolve in the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{160} Bureaucratic infighting and substantive differences between Kozyrev's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and most of the rest of the Yeltsin government and the Duma, typified the

\textsuperscript{157} Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. 111.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Lynch, p. 115.
initial struggle over policy toward Moldova. Some analysts argue that these internal conflicts amongst the policy elites in Moscow had the effect of single-handedly undermining Kozyrev’s liberal-democratic policy toward the Near Abroad generally and Moldova in particular.¹⁶¹ However, it seems unlikely that developments on the ground in Moldova would not have had some impact. In light of the initial inaction of the MFA toward the developing crisis in the Dnestr, it would seem that events in both Moldova and Moscow exerted a significant amount of influence on the resultant foreign policy.¹⁶² Indeed, the unofficial involvement of Russian forces in the conflict was a powerful lever to get Moscow involved.

The Russian government assumed control of the 14ᵗʰ Army in early 1992 after the Moldovan government announced plans to “form armed forces on the basis of former Soviet units.”¹⁶³ Officially, Moscow neither planned nor sanctioned military operations in support of either side. However, official statements by parliament members as well as the Ministry of Defense created a permissive atmosphere within which the commander of the 14ᵗʰ Army had great latitude to act. The Russian parliament intervened in policy toward the Dnestr conflict on numerous occasions, berating the government for its “weak defense of the Russian diaspora” and calling for a 14ᵗʰ Army intervention “in a peacekeeping role.”¹⁶⁴ Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, visiting the Dnestr region in April 1992, pledged Russian support “so that the people of the PMR can gain

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¹⁶³ Ibid, pp. 112-113.
¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 115.
independence and defend it." During the first half of 1992 the Russian 14th Army was providing support to the Dnestr Guard in the form of training, equipment and combat support. Although some analysts argue the 14th Army was fractured early in 1992 with elements supporting both sides, most argue that the available evidence shows its support went to the breakaway Dnestr region.

Up until June 1992, the MFA tried to construct an environment for conflict resolution to prevent an escalation of the crisis ultimately requiring the involvement of Russian troops. Prime Minister Kozyrev roundly condemned the 14th Army for its part in the conflict. In three summits between April and June, attended by representatives from Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Moldova, Kozyrev sought an answer to the conflict; the resulting agreement was a ceasefire in Moldova to be monitored by the nations participating in the summits, plus Bulgaria. However, this measure was inadequate to keep the two warring sides apart. It has been argued that this was driven not by events in Moldova, but solely by power struggles within policy elites in Moscow. A more inclusive theory suggests that the reason for this initiative’s failure rests on three intertwined issues: the Dnestr region representatives weren’t represented in the talks, so the region had no stake in them; the centrist and radical forces in Moscow wanted a plan

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165 The separatist region is known in Russian as the Pridnestrovskaya Moldovskaya Respublika, or the PMR. Rutskoi’s visit was reported by Eduard Kondraten in Izvestiya, 6 April 1992, p. 1.
169 Lynch, p. 114.
that would protect Russian interests and exclude outside interests; and the Moldovan
government determined in mid-June that it couldn’t succeed militarily.171

It was at this point when the MFA made a critical policy shift. The initial policy
was under fire “not only from the public and the Supreme Soviet, but also from within
the bureaucracy, military and security establishments, industrial groups and young private
capital.”172 On the ground in Moldova, Russian 14th Army units ensured that the Dnestr
Guard had a qualitative edge of superiority over Moldovan forces throughout the
conflict.173 This continued even after the replacement of General-Lieutenant Netkachev
by General-Lieutenant Lebed on 27 June 1992. Lebed took an even harder line toward
the Moldovans. Pressured by both intense domestic pressure, as well as independent 14th
Army actions on the ground, Kozyrev endorsed the use of force. Lebed’s policy of
“surprise, precise powerful strikes, as well as the availability of backup armored groups”
forced the Moldovans to the negotiating table.174

Suffering from a Russian economic blockade, operational inferiority on the
ground, and indifference from the West, President Mircea Snegur was forced to accept a
Russian brokered peace on 21 July 1992.175 In addition to the agreement on the
deployment of a Russian-Moldovan-Dnestr peacekeeping force, Presidents Yeltsin and
Snegur also signed an agreement on the special status of the Dnestr region in Moldova.

172 Andrei Arbatov, “Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy Transition,” unpublished paper, as cited
in Litvak, p. 226.
173 Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s 14th Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova,” RFE/RL, Regional
175 Snegur requested a CSCE peacekeeping operation on 8 July 1992; Moscow’s response was to send a
delegation to Chisinau to negotiate deployment of Russian forces. Lynch, p. 117. Also, Andranik
Migryan suggested Western passivity during the Moldovan conflict was important in the hardening of
Russian foreign policy toward Moldova and how the crisis was eventually resolved. Andranik
The peacekeeping force (PKF), which began its deployment on 29 July 1992, was made up of 5 Russian battalions (2100 men), and 3 battalions each from Moldova and the Dnestr region (1200 men each side). The PKF was monitored by the Moldovan-Dnestr-Russian (Trilateral Joint) Control Commission, made up of 6 members from each participating group. This ensured Russian dominance not only of the troops on the ground, but also through the Russian and Dnestr members on the commission.\textsuperscript{176}

The ‘independent’ peacekeeping force in Moldova, as well as the 14\textsuperscript{th} Russian Army (approximately 6000 men), continued to play a role in Russian policy.\textsuperscript{177} The main goals of Russian political pressure on Moldova in the 1990s were: end Moldovan plans for unification with Romania; pursue the ‘normalization’ of ties between Russia and Moldova; push for the integration of Moldova into the Commonwealth of Independent States; and maintain a Russian military presence in Moldova. The first goal was accomplished fairly quickly – in January 1993 Petru Luchinski became Chairman of the Moldovan Parliament, resulting in the resignation of pro-Romanian Popular Front (RPF) members. It was the RPF that blocked full Moldovan membership in the CIS in the Moldovan parliament in 1992. Beginning in 1993, the Russia-Moldovan relations have become increasingly close.\textsuperscript{178}

Negotiations between Chisinau and Moscow eventually led to economic CIS membership for Moldova by April 1994. Even though not part of the security structure, “the new parliament was certain to take Russian interests more into consideration.”\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{176} Lynch, pp. 117, 216.
\textsuperscript{177} Lynch, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{178} M.A. Smith, Russia and the Near Abroad, (London: UK Ministry of Defense Conflict Studies Research Center, 1997), pp. 11-12; Lynch, pp. 118-121.
\textsuperscript{179} Lynch, p. 120.
The remaining issue of maintaining Russian forces in the region was intimately entwined with the status of the 14th Army, and later to the peacekeeping force. Discussions on the removal of the 14th Army began in 1992. Then commander of the 14th Army, General Major Lebed, argued that without the 14th Army in Moldova Russia would lose its key position in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{180} The Russian perspective from the beginning remained consistent with its linking of the withdrawal of the 14th Army to conflict resolution. In August 1994, an agreement was struck which included a three-year withdrawal timetable for the 14th Army, to begin when ratified by the Duma. Thus the agreement in fact changed nothing.\textsuperscript{181} Despite this and the attention of both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Ukraine, approximately 2500 Russian combat (as opposed to peacekeeping) troops remained in Moldova as late as 1999.\textsuperscript{182}

The connection between this force and the Moldovan-Dniest-Russian peacekeeping force is quite ingenious. In 1995 the Russian 14th Army was reformed extensively. In April of 1995 the 14th Army staff was halved and in June an operational group (OpGp) was created using one third of the present officers and one half of the present troops.\textsuperscript{183} In late 1995, the Russian Ministry of Defense, after shifting peacekeeping responsibilities to the new OpGp, unilaterally announced the withdrawal of two Russian peacekeeping battalions from Moldova for use in other conflicts. This was conducted without the participation of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), and both the

\textsuperscript{180} As cited in Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Army in Moldova: There to Stay?” RFE/RL, Regional Report, vol. 1, no. 29, 1993, pp. 44.
\textsuperscript{182} Austin and Muraviev, p. 74.
JCC and the Moldovan authorities were notified after the fact. Therefore, Moscow justified the continuing presence of the OpGp in Moldova due to its peacekeeping duties.

Summary

The situation remained as above throughout the rest of the 1990s, with some subtle changes. In 1998, an agreement was signed reducing Moldovan and Dnestr peacekeeping contingents down to 500 each (from 1200), the rebuilding of bridges across the Dnestr and the deployment of Ukrainian observers. However, the Russian Operational Group maintained its dual role of ‘peacekeeper’ and ‘combat force’ in the region. The conflict and following peacekeeping operation in Moldova shows the evolution of Russian foreign policy from the liberal-democratic point of view to one closer to defensive realism. A review of the history shows Russian efforts, though incoherent at first, coalesced into a policy of using peacekeeping troops to strike a balance between “armed intervention and non-intervention in the affairs of other states.” This significant shift in Russia’s relations with the Near Abroad during this time period is also reflected in its relations with Georgia.

The Georgia-Southern Ossetia-Abkhaz Conflict

No matter how much we value peace, it cannot be maintained forever by the bayonets of Russian soldiers.

- Colonel-General G. Kondratyev

April 1994

Russian involvement in the Georgian conflict began at about the same time as Moldova. Georgia was much more of a strategic concern for Russia, as instability in the

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184 Lynch, p.122.
185 Lynch, p. 117.
186 Colonel-General Georgii Kondratyev, Russian Deputy Defense Minister, as cited in Viktor Litovkin, “Mir na stykakh ne mozhets derzh’t’sya beskonechno,” [Peace Cannot be Maintained Indefinitely by Force], Evestlya, 19 January 1994, p. 3.
Transcaucasus was widely considered linked to instability in the North Caucasus in Moscow policy circles. Pavel Felgenhauer summed it up this way—"Either Russia controls the Caucasus or the Caucasus will control Russia."\textsuperscript{187} However, there was little agreement on how to best accomplish the goal of stability in the region. Armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the withdrawal of Russian forces from Azerbaijan, Georgian refusal to join the CIS, and the renewed interest of Turkey and Iran in the region complicated the issue further.\textsuperscript{188}

The liberal-internationalist \textit{(liberal-democratic)} policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at its zenith in early 1992. The MFA’s regional policy of benign neglect was reflected in the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Transcaucasus and the forced ‘nationalization’ of arms in Georgia.\textsuperscript{189} The real security concern for the Russian government in Georgia was stability. However, after the pullback of forces all across the Transcaucasus in 1991-1992, there seemed to be little stomach for a military intervention in the region.\textsuperscript{190} Russian would find itself in two distinct peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Georgia. The first, in Southern Ossetia, was strictly to ensure the stability of the region and Russian involvement was strictly after the fact and by invitation. This was likely due to the fact that the initial eruption of violence took Moscow somewhat by surprise. Having been ‘warned’ by the initial outbreak of hostilities, and thus sufficiently focused on the area, the second instance of Russian peacekeeping in Georgia (Abkhazia) would take on distinct attributes of the Moldovan PKO.

\textsuperscript{187} Pavel Felgenhauer, \textit{Nezavisimaya gazeta}, 7 November 1993, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{188} Lynch, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{189} Lynch, p. 132.
In the 1980s Georgian nationalism flourished, supported by a virulent Georgian press. By the end of the decade armed clashes broke out between ethnic Georgians and regional minorities.\(^{191}\) Within Georgia, two areas that had a history of autonomy – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – were becoming increasingly concerned about their survival.\(^{192}\) The election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia as president of Georgia in October of 1990 strained an already tense ethnic relationship. Gamsakhurdia adopted policies that ignored the semi-independence of the autonomous regions and alienated Georgia’s ethnic minorities.\(^{193}\) This resulted in demands by both Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia for a return to the autonomous status, or outright independence. Additionally, some political groups in Southern Ossetia were agitating for union with Northern Ossetia, a part of the Russian Federation.\(^{194}\)

In the Spring of 1991, elements of the Georgian ‘Mkhedrioni’ crossed into Southern Ossetia in order to crush the nascent independence movement.\(^{195}\) Serious fighting erupted that turned into a yearlong guerilla campaign, dragging the Georgian National Guard into the conflict. This in turn led to the siege of the Ossetian city Tskhinvali by Georgian forces, which resulted in thousands of casualties. The refugee flow went north into Northern Ossetia, dislocating Russian citizens and straining the

\(^{191}\) Most notable among these confrontations were the brutal suppression of demonstrations in Tblisi (April 1989) and the armed clash when the Georgians attempted to create a branch of Tblisi University in Sukhumi (July 1989). Lynch, p. 128.


\(^{193}\) Finch, p. 3.

\(^{194}\) Ossetia had been divided during Soviet times, with Northern Ossetia becoming part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and Southern Ossetia part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Austin and Muraviev, p. 74.

\(^{195}\) ‘Mkhedrioni,’ or ‘the Horsemen,’ were a pro-Georgian paramilitary formation of dubious legal status led by Jaba Ioseliani. Lynch, p. 129; Finch, p. 3.
already bleak housing and employment situation there. Eventually, the strain of the fighting and growing disaffection of Gamsakhurdia’s policies led the emergence of a Georgian opposition which drove Gamsakhurdia into exile in January 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze was invited to return to Georgia by the ruling council in March 1992.

Georgia was now fractured worse than ever, with South Ossetia in flames, Abkhazia moving in the same direction, a power struggle between the Georgian National Guard under Tengiz Kitovani and the Mkhedrioni under Jaba Ioseliani, and continuing support for Gamsakhurdia in western Georgia. Shevardnadze’s assumption of tenuous control over the Georgian state would result in two Russian peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Georgia. The first one, to restore order to Southern Ossetia, was agreed to during a meeting with Boris Yeltsin in June of 1992. No discussion as to the status of the region was addressed in the agreement. This peacekeeping force would also use soldiers from the conflicting sides as in Moldova including Russian, Georgian and Ossetian troops, with the Russian contingent about 60% of the force. The deployment of a 1000-1500 man combined peacekeeping force in and around Tskhinvali was accomplished beginning in mid-July 1992.

However, by agreeing to a Russian dominated PKO in Southern Ossetia, Shevardnadze opened himself to increased criticism domestically and perceptions of weakness in Abkhazia. In late July 1992, the “Republic of Abkhazia” reinstated its 1925

196 Finch, p. 3.
197 Lynch, p. 129; Finch, p.3.
198 Lynch, pp. 128-129.
199 Finch, p. 3.
200 Austin suggests it is “around 1000;” Finch states 1500. Austin and Muraviev, p. 74; Finch, p. 4.
Constitution, declaring itself independent of Georgia. Shevardnadze then dispatched Tengiz Kitovani to Abkhazia to “recover the Georgian Minister of the Interior who had been kidnapped by so-called ‘Zviadists’ ” – which Kitovani used as a cover to attack the Abkhaz Parliament on 14 August 1992, in an eerie replay of the ‘Mkhedrioni’ in Southern Ossetia. As with the ‘Mkhedrioni,’ the National Guard also failed in their attempt to quickly bring their quarry “under control and secure the railways and routes that ran through the region.” The Abkhazians fell back to Gudauta and Kitovani set up a Georgian-dominated council in Sukhumi. After this, widespread fighting broke out between Georgian and Abhaz forces.

Moscow’s fears about ‘conflict spill-over’ were almost immediately substantiated as the Northern Caucasus regions within Russia began voicing their support for Abkhazia – including the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC), to the Republics of Adygei and Cherkessia. In addition to volunteers from these groups, reports suggest Cossacks and mercenaries also supported the Abkhaz. Russia’s initial reaction to the crisis included steps to include take into consideration the views of the various regions and republics of the North Caucasus in the Georgian conflict resolution process. Outside support was also provided to the Georgians – the Ukrainian National

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202 ‘Zviadists’ were followers of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Why Kitovani was searching for ‘Zviadists’ in Abkhazia is unclear. Lynch, p. 129.
203 Lynch, p. 129.
205 Lynch cites several TV and radio programs where representatives of these organizations declared their support for the Abkhaz cause and leveled threats at Georgia and Georgians. Lynch, p. 133.
207 Russian Vice President Rutskoi held a meeting in late August with the heads of the Russian regions. See Gayaz Alimov, Izvestiya, 25 August 1992, p. 1.
Self Defense Organization (UNSO), a paramilitary group fighting against ‘Russian imperial aggression,’ sided with the Georgians.\textsuperscript{208}

By September 1992, President Yeltsin was able to broker a cease-fire between the Georgians and the Abkhaz.\textsuperscript{209} It called for the eventual deployment of Russian peacekeepers, as well as the dispatch of UN observers. Prior to this, the struggle between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense over the policy in Georgia was significant. While the MFA considered Shevardnadze as the best alternative to protect Russian interests in Georgia, the MoD under Grachev acted unilaterally in closing down the Russian border and entrenching the Abkhaz position in Gudauta in August 1992.\textsuperscript{210} Russian military assistance to Georgia, however, was consistently held hostage to the Russian military’s goals in the region – Russian basing rights. The transfer of military equipment from Russia to Georgia, started in June 1992, was interrupted in August and did not resume until late in 1993, after Shevardnadze had agreed in principle to Russian bases in Georgia.\textsuperscript{211} This is also reflected in the fact that Defense Minister Grachev linked the May 1992 agreement, transferring military bases, arms depots, and equipment to Georgia, to the resolution of the Abkhaz conflict and Georgia joining the CIS.\textsuperscript{212}

During the course of the year, from September 1992 to October 1993, no less than three separate cease-fire agreements were hammered out and each, in turn, was broken. The more aggressive drift of Russian foreign policy in Georgia is evident in these events.

Following on the heels of the crisis in Moldova, the conflict in Georgia maintained the

\textsuperscript{208} The UNSO has no official connection to or support from the Ukrainian government. Finch, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{209} Lynch, pp. 133-134.
\textsuperscript{210} The Russian 345th Airborne Regiment was sent to Gudauta in mid-August 1992 upon Shevardnadze’s request to protect vital transportation links. The Russian troops in fact dug in the Abkhaz positions for defense against Georgia attack. Lynch, p. 134.
\textsuperscript{211} Lynch, p. 138.
\textsuperscript{212} Pavel Felgenhauer, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 June 1992.
momentum toward a policy defined by defensive/aggressive realism. Whereas the MFA was willing to use the new ‘Moldova model’ for this conflict as well, the MoD sought to ensure Russian interests were secured before the introduction of peacekeeping troops. That is, Russian combat troops on the ground in Georgia would be used to fight if necessary to achieve Moscow’s goals. The Russian military intervention in Abkhazia “created opportunities for Moscow to win concessions on military bases, Georgia’s share of conventional weapon entitlements under the CFE Treaty, and other ‘integrationist’ steps.” Some analysts even argue that Russian army units during this period played a role similar to the one played by the 14th Army in Moldova the previous year.

The Abkhaz offensive of September 1993, in conjunction with the ‘Zviadist’ attack in the west, brought Georgia to the verge of collapse. Realizing the limits of his options, Shevardnadze issued a decree 23 October 1993 on Georgia entering the CIS. In December he signed the CIS initial documents, economic union agreement, Charter and Collective Security Treaty. He also made basing concessions to Russia, as well as leasing the port of Poti and the airfield at Bombara to Moscow. In return, the Russian resumed military transfers to Georgia held up from the previous year, and Russian troops were sent to secure critical lines of communication in western Georgia and to assist Georgian National Guard in its operations against the ‘Zviadists.’ Following these developments, Russo-Georgian military ties became stronger, allowing for joint and

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214 Finch argues that the Abkhaz forces used equipment in the successful September 1993 attack on Sukhumi that the Russians were supposed to have rendered useless. He further stipulates that Moscow’s silence on the outbreak of hostilities – even during the crisis in Moscow – was “deafening.” Lynch argues also that Russian forces deployed to Abkhazia played this role even earlier, starting in November 1992. Finch, pp. 5-7; Lynch, pp. 131, 134, 137.
215 Lynch, p. 139.
trilateral exercises (with Armenia), a CIS joint air defense system, and joint training with border troops.\textsuperscript{216}

Russian policy goals in Georgia evolved during this period as events brought the MFA and MoD, as well as Georgia and Russia to similar conclusions. By the end of 1993, a new coordinated strategy between MFA and MoD would endeavor to secure Russian interests in Georgia using Shevardnadze. In addition, similar to the goals Moscow had for Moldova in 1992, Russian policy would strive to completely integrate Georgia into the CIS and its security structure and deploy a Russian-led peacekeeping force in the region, preferably with a UN mandate this time.\textsuperscript{217} On the other hand, since it had secured a military basing agreement from Tblisi, Moscow would now exert pressure on Abkhazia to compromise with Georgia.

The Russian peacekeeping mission to Abkhazia in June 1994 was the result of an MFA brokered ceasefire agreement which provided for the disengagement of forces and the creation of a security zone within which a CIS peacekeeping force would operate.\textsuperscript{218} Despite the moniker “CIS peacekeeping force,” in actuality the entire force was composed of Russian troops.\textsuperscript{219} Of the five deployed peacekeeping battalions (2500 soldiers), two battalions were drawn from Russian forces in Abkhazia, and two more from the Russian Group of Forces in the Transcaucasus (GFTC), with the remaining battalion drawn from the specially trained 27\textsuperscript{th} Motorized Rifle Division ‘Totskoye’.\textsuperscript{220}

This again raised the ugly specter of ‘partiality’ (vice ‘impartiality’) in reference to

\textsuperscript{216} Vitaly Denisov and Pyotr Karapetyan, \textit{Krasnaya Zvezda}, 5 May 1996.
\textsuperscript{217} Lynch, p.138.
\textsuperscript{219} Sarafian, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{220} The Russian 27\textsuperscript{th} MRD ‘Totskoye’ has been trained specifically in peacekeeping tasks and has participated in several combined exercises with US military units; Sarafian, p. 2; Lynch, p. 141.
Russian peacekeeping troops – this is especially true of the forces formerly deployed in Abkhazia. Their passive, and in some cases active, support of Abkhaz separatists during the conflict undermined their credibility from the beginning.\footnote{Finch, pp. 5-7.}

This agreement also provided for UN oversight, as evidenced by the expansion of the mandate for UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The ceasefire agreement signed by the Georgians and Abkhaz in Moscow on 14 May 1994 lists several tasks for UNOMIG, the first of which is to “monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces.”\footnote{UNOMIG was created late in August 1993, during the Sochi ceasefire, with a total of 143 observers. Its mission expanded with the May 1994 ceasefire agreement, to include verification of troop/weapon withdrawal, monitoring of the Kodori Gorge, and contributing to the safe return of refugees. See also United Nations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations, Europe: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG),” [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/]. 15 January 2002; Sarafian, p. 2.} Initially, UN Secretary general Boutros Boutros-Gali had proposed to send international peacekeepers, with a smaller percentage of Russian forces.\footnote{Sarafian, p. 3.} By May 1994 due to time and resource constraints Boutros-Gali recommended that the UN “subcontract” the peacekeeping role to the CIS, with UNOMIG providing the all-important oversight. He considered this cooperation to be ‘satisfactory.’\footnote{United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,” 14 October 1994.} In practice however, the UN-CIS coordination in Georgia has been minimal. Edward Brunner, UN envoy to Georgia in July 1994 suggested “Russia will not permit any excessive control and interference in their affairs.”\footnote{From a Georgian Radio program, as cited in Lynch, p. 141.} UNOMIG observers were not allowed into all areas of the ceasefire zone. Colonel-General Kondratyev summed up the typical Russian response in the same month. He “saw no reason for our forces to be subordinated to others… This is a CIS operation
and that says it all. It must be understood that despite the ‘coordination’ between the CIS PKF and UNOMIG, Moscow was never able to attain a UN mandate. It should also be pointed out that the CIS mandate was only granted after the fact in October of 1994.

Since the establishment of the Russian Peacekeeping operations in Georgia in 1994, Russian pressure shifted to Abkhazia. Part of this shift could be attributed to Russian concerns with Chechnya in 1995 and the alleged connections between the two regions. The main object to conflict resolution in the eyes of Moscow by this time was Abkhaz inflexibility. That is not to say that relations between Moscow and Tblisi have been without problems. In the latter 1990s, Georgia increasingly looked outside of its relationship with Russia for support. As of the end of the decade, and still today, the conflict remains unresolved, and duty for personnel in the Region – both Russian and UNOMIG – remains hazardous.

Summary

The initial execution of Russian foreign policy in the Georgian conflict and following peacekeeping operations continued the trend toward aggressive realism. The use of Russian forces, both combat and peacekeeping, to gain concessions from Georgia is manifest in Russian actions in the region. Having secured regional basing rights and Georgia’s commitment to the CIS by 1994, Moscow shifted pressure on to the Abkhaz. Thus, a mix of the defensive and aggressive realism points of view typified Russian

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227 Lynch, pp. 140-141.
229 Lynch, p. 142.
231 Sarafian, pp. 4-8.
efforts in the latter 1990s, as Moscow sought a way to disentangle itself from a seemingly endless commitment. As befits both schools of realist thought, Russian policy toward the intervention of outside influence was exclusionary, assuming the region to be within the Russian sphere of influence. UNOMIG had little real power to assist in conflict resolution prior to the establishment of the CIS peacekeeping mission in 1994, and only de jure power afterward. Therefore, Russian foreign policy in Georgia can be seen not only as primarily regionally focused, in this case to secure Georgia’s position within the CIS, but also as evolving over time, toward a more confrontational ‘Russia first’ policy, as typified by aggressive realism.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict

In today's world, peacekeeping has become an integral part of the foreign policy of many nations, including that of the Russian Federation. International peacekeeping experience has persuasively shown this to be a powerful political lever and an effective tool for maintaining peace and stability in various regions.

- Colonel-General L. Shevtsov\textsuperscript{232}  
  December 1997

Clearly the banner year for Russian peacekeeping operations was 1992, as Moscow had deployed forces in Moldova, Southern Ossetia, Tajikistan, and as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia in April.\textsuperscript{233} However, the basis for the Russian deployment of forces to Yugoslavia was significantly different than the


operations Moscow was then conducting in the Near Abroad. Russian forces were operating under a UN mandate and answering to a British commander, just as the other deployed forces were. UNPROFOR was a classic peacekeeping mission established by UNSC Resolution 673 with a mission of separating the Serb and Croat forces in Krajina and Slavonia and monitoring the ceasefire.\textsuperscript{234} Russian forces were deployed to Klissa, Croatia, as part of the peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{235} The initial deployment of Russian forces can be interpreted as consistent with the role of a great power and also fits well within the liberal-democratic point of view of Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign policy in 1992 to work in conjunction with the West. It also supported the emerging and more aggressive point of view of the centrists, who espoused a more robust interaction abroad in support of Russian national interests. Russian forces would remain in Bosnia as part of a UN-authorized peacekeeping force throughout the 1990s.

Over time, however, the use of Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in the former Yugoslavia changed. This was a reflection of several concurrent trends. First, starting in 1992 and continuing until the end of the decade, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was coming under increasing domestic pressure from the centrist and radical groups whose foreign policy views were of a defensive/aggressive realism bent.\textsuperscript{236} In 1992, these groups dominated the majority of the government and military, the parliament and to a large extent, the populace.\textsuperscript{237} This pressure forced the MFA to


\textsuperscript{235} Krysenko, p.2-3.

\textsuperscript{236} See Tsyganov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism.”

reconsider its foreign policy and recast it less oriented towards the West.\textsuperscript{238} The eventual demise of Andrei Kozyrev as Prime Minister and the rise of Yevgenii Primakov first in the MFA and then as Prime Minister are two manifestations of this trend. The shift of Russian foreign policy from its initial \textit{liberal/democratic} view of unfettered cooperation with the West to one characterized by the more reserved and self-interested schools of \textit{realism} also affected Russian participation in the Balkans.

Second, Russian-NATO and Russian-US relations became increasingly strained in the 1990s, due in part to NATO’s post Cold War development. Though a distinct issue from the above, by 1994 these two trends were so intertwined as to be inseparable. The lynchpin of the NATO problem from the Russian perspective was NATO enlargement and its evolution from a strictly defensive alliance to an “expansive threat” to Russian military-political interests.\textsuperscript{239} According to Roland Dannreuther, there was a strongly held belief in Russia that NATO and the West had “made a series of promises about NATO’s future intentions, and the intended involvement of Russia, which simply have been reneged upon.”\textsuperscript{240} Foreign policy circles in Moscow traced this back to promises made by NATO not to expand during the reunification of Germany in 1990. Sergei Karaganov states this with conviction:

\textsuperscript{238} Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia, a part of Europe or apart from Europe?” \textit{International Affairs}, vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, p. 447; Margot Light, Stephen White and John Lowenhardt, “A wider Europe: the view from Moscow and Kyiv,” \textit{International Affairs}, vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, p. 79.


\textsuperscript{240} Roland Dannreuther, “Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations,” \textit{Survivor}, vol. 41, no. 4, p. 151.
In 1990, we were told quite clearly by the West that the unification of Germany would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere of the time it would have seemed indecent – like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other’s husbands.\footnote{As cited in Anatol Lieven, “Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion,” World Today, October 1995, p. 198.}

This belief was supported by the more general notion that the process of NATO enlargement was symptomatic of a broader policy that was directed at undermining Russia’s capabilities to pursue national objectives in its domestic, regional and international policies – that is, to keep Russia from fulfilling its role as a great power.\footnote{Oksana Antonenko, “Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo,” Survival, vol. 41, no.4, Winter 1999-2000, p. 127; Blank, pp. 10-14, 36-37.} The idea that NATO expansion was harmful to Russia was also reflected in the general populace. In opinion polls conducted in Russian in October 1996, 32% thought NATO expansion would be harmful to Russia; a mere five months later, among those who felt they had a reasonable understanding of the issue, that number had almost doubled (62%).\footnote{US Agency for International Development, “Opinion Analysis,” Office of Research and Media Reaction, Washington, D.C., 24 January 1997, as cited in Light et al, p. 80.}

Third, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia itself was evolving, causing changes to the mission of the peacekeeping force. The 1990s saw the outbreak of fighting in four of six republics in the former Yugoslav Federation.\footnote{Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia (Kosovo). Civil strife also occurred in a fifth republic, Macedonia, although in 2000.} The end of the conflict in one republic seemed to signal the start of the next; as was noted in one report, the end of the conflict in Croatia “created the conditions for the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”\footnote{US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, Lessons and Conclusions, Chapter 1, p. 3.} This almost continuous fighting affected UN policy toward the region, as well as the actions of individual nations involved in the UN force, Russia among them.
The UN Protection Force’s (UNPROFOR) mission became increasingly more complex, as the UN added additional duties via mandates from 1992 to 1995.²⁴⁶ Some of these missions were seemingly contradictory and, at least intuitively, appeared to be in opposition to one another.²⁴⁷

More importantly, the expanded list of mission tasks undermined UNPROFOR’s impartiality in the eyes of the conflicting sides and provided an exploitable weakness to the warring factions. The increased mission load also caused disagreement among the nations operating ‘together’ under the UN banner, oft-times resulting in ‘temporary insubordination’ by some nations within the force.²⁴⁸ In the end the massacre at Srebrenitsa in 1995, one of the worst abuses of UNPROFOR’s resulting weakness, caused a new round of diplomatic measures. This resulted in the signing of the Dayton Peace agreement in December 1995, initiating the end of the UNPROFOR mission and its replacement by the Implementation Force (IFOR). Russian forces became part of this UN-sponsored, NATO-led operation, but without falling under direct NATO command, as they had in UNPROFOR.²⁴⁹ This carefully negotiated arrangement was a reflection of the increase in the tension between NATO and Russia, as well as Moscow’s effort to

²⁴⁷ Examples of this were to limit the conflict, provide and protect safe havens, prevent ethnic cleansing, ameliorate the conditions of refugees, and embargo arms deliveries. Clearly this would not be a problem for an occupation force, but UNPROFOR was still operating by virtue of the “hostage effect” — something that was later brazenly exploited.
remain a ‘partner of and not subordinate to’ NATO. These three processes would weave together to produce Russian peacekeeping policy in the Balkans, and more broadly, help define Russian foreign policy toward the NATO and the US. A short historical review will put this in perspective.

The crisis that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 has long historical roots. For purposes of this paper, the events that led to the outbreak of fighting and the deployment of the UN Protection Force will mark the beginning of the discussion. The end of the Cold War revealed divisions within Yugoslavia that had been for the most part subdued under Tito. In 1990, all the republics of Yugoslavia conducted multi-party elections, the results of which exposed the differences of opinion on how to maintain the Yugoslav Federation. According to one report,

Slovenia and Croatia wanted a confederation of independent states. Serbia and Montenegro wanted to sustain the federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia preferred a commonwealth based on confederation but at the same time wanted to maintain a unified state. In this context the leadership of Slovenia and Croatia both opted for independence and moved to secure all attributes of sovereignty, including the formation of national military formations.

Thus began the series of ethno-national conflicts in Yugoslavia, which erupted in rapid succession starting in the summer of 1991.

Slovenia was the first case, but was settled quickly under international pressure on 18 July 1991. The pullout of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from Slovenia into

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250 It is interesting to note that in 1994 in a private conversation with LtGen Clark, ColGen V. A. Barykin, Director of the Main operations Directorate of the RF General Staff, accused the US of going into Bosnia because it was Russia’s “part of Europe,” and that Russia would do the same thing in the US’s position. This is clearly a reflection of the aggressive realism prevalent in Russian military circles at this time. Clark, pp. 57-58.
251 US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, Lessons and Conclusions, Chapter 1, p. 2.
252 Ibid.
253 JNA is phonetic contraction for the Serbian Jugoslavskaya Narodnaya Armiya.
Croatia ignited the next civil war. Serb minorities lived in both Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia; when crossing the border the JNA had committed itself to the defense of these ‘federation citizens.’ Both sides committed atrocities, with the Croatians forcing the Serbs out of Krajina and West Slavonia, and the Serbs clearing Eastern Slavonia of Croats. The efforts of the UN and the European Union brought an end to the fighting, but no political solution. On 21 February 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 743, establishing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to monitor the ceasefire between the two sides in the contested regions.254

By the beginning of 1992, the stability of the Yugoslav Federation was all but compromised. Increasingly, the events in the other republics led to the Federation’s dissolution. In November 1991, Macedonia had already declared its independence, leaving only Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of a now truncated Yugoslav state. In a February 1992, in a plebiscite on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbian population voted for incorporation into the Yugoslav Federation, with the Muslim and Croat populations voting for independence. International recognition of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina on 2 April 1992 led to the outbreak of yet another civil war. The JNA was again forced to withdraw, but not before leaving a large portion of its armaments with the newly styled “Respublika Srpska.”255

It is within this context that the UN began expanding UNPROFOR’s mandate from merely overseeing a ceasefire in Croatia to an ever-growing list of “peace-enforcement” duties – similar to the missions the Russians used their peacekeepers for in

255 US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, Lessons and Conclusions, Chapter 1, pp. 3-6.
the CIS. UNSC mandates for UNPROFOR included embargoing arms deliveries, preventing ethnic cleansing, imposing economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, taking care of refugees and civilian populations, policing the concentration of artillery around Sarajevo, and imposing a no-fly zone over Bosnia, to name a few. Unfortunately, the 20,000 multinational peacekeepers in UNPROFOR were unable to fulfill the increasingly complex role, mandated and unmandated, that was expected of it – it was never designed or supported to.\textsuperscript{256} It is because of this that NATO became a junior partner to the UN’s efforts – UNPROFOR had no air force, so NATO had the UN mandate to impose the no-fly zone in 1994.\textsuperscript{257} Some in Moscow policy circles considered this expansion of NATO force outside of the Alliance’s area the first of a series of disturbing events.\textsuperscript{258}

From 1992-1995, several attempts were made to settle the conflict.\textsuperscript{259} The German effort to mobilize the CSCE/OSCE to control and resolve the conflict received Moscow’s support, but ultimately failed in Helsinki in the spring of 1992.\textsuperscript{260} That fall Cyrus Vance and David Owen would spend months cobbling together a joint effort under EU-UN. The ‘Vance-Owen Peace Plan’ would also come to naught, some would argue because of the inability of the Americans and Europeans to agree to its viability, others that the blame lay squarely with the US.\textsuperscript{261} No other effort was made in 1993; the next


\textsuperscript{258} Blank, pp. 8-15.

\textsuperscript{259} For a broader discussion of this effort, see David Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey} (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1995); Michael Rose, General, Sir, \textit{Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994} (London, Harvill, 1998); Richard Holbrooke, \textit{To end a War} (New York, Random House, 1998); and Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War}.

\textsuperscript{260} US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, \textit{Lessons and Conclusions}, Chapter 1, p. 6.

attempt would come in the summer of 1994, the so-called ‘Contact Group.’
Events leading up to this collective effort at conflict resolution would severely strain Russian-US and Russian-NATO relations.

By the beginning of 1994, disagreements between UN partners to the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia became obvious. The best response to the mostly Bosnian Serb abuses of UNPROFOR – shelling of UN ‘protected’ Garadze and Bihac, taking UN peacekeepers at weapons collection sites hostage – was hotly debated. One UN official lamented, “It’s no easy task to make war and peace with the same people on the same territory at the same time.” In February of 1994, the UN had given the Bosnian Serbs an ultimatum to remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo by 21 February or face air strikes. They had the city under siege, against UN directives, and the UNPROFOR commander was considering moving in to break the siege. Serbian reluctance to follow the UN directive made NATO air strikes appear imminent.

Russian objections to NATO ‘interference’ in Bosnia came from both the administration and the parliament. However, on 18 February, President Yeltsin called on the Bosnian Serbs to pull back; simultaneously, the Russian representative to the UN presented a proposal to move Russian peacekeepers into Sarajevo as proof that Russia would protect the Serbs while they completed their withdrawal, and “not allow them to be bombed.” The redeployment of 400 Russian peacekeepers to Sarajevo covering the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb units effectively ‘de-escalated’ the crisis, but pointed out

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262 The Contact Group consisted of representatives from Russia, the US, the UK, France and Germany and was looking to end the conflict through territorial division. Clark, p. 37.
264 Tharoor, p. 60.
265 Finch, p. 1.
266 Finch, pp. 1, 11.
the looming troubles ahead. It was unclear whether the Russians fully supported the UN mission in Bosnia. Moscow, however, explained its initiative as concern that all peaceful options had not been exhausted, and that NATO air strikes would have escalated the crisis.²⁶⁷

Russian actions can be partially traced to the belief that Moscow felt its opinions were not being considered. On several occasions leading up to and immediately following this crisis, government or parliament representatives stated as much.²⁶⁸

Connected with this issue in reference to the Balkans, there was a Russian belief that Western policy had an "anti-Serb bias."²⁶⁹ In addition, apprehension of the use of NATO airpower in Bosnia was a reflection of Moscow’s concern over the increasing role of NATO in European security structures.²⁷⁰ The balance of European power as defined by the Cold War was being replaced by a security system defined by Western institutions, notably NATO. This was compounded by the fact that Moscow understood that it was not — nor would it be in the near future — part of the emerging security structure.²⁷¹

Finally, this episode pointed out that Moscow would work outside of the ‘established system’ to get the result it wanted.

By the summer of 1994, the Contact Group had emerged to find an end to the crisis. The continuing warfare in Bosnia underlined the inability of UNPROFOR to accomplish its mission. Russian-NATO and Russian-US relations became even more

²⁶⁸ On numerous occasions, both the presidential administration and parties in the Duma accuse NATO of ignoring the Russian point of view. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia Report, dates 15 February 1994 through February 1994.
²⁷⁰ Baranovsky, pp. 449-450, 452.
²⁷¹ Baranovsky, p. 452; Light, et al, p. 79.
tense in December 1994. Moscow’s unhappiness with NATO’s intent to expand without any stated limits was only partially assuaged by the ‘special relationship’ that NATO wanted to have with Russia.272 Adherents to the defensive/aggressive realism schools of thought saw NATO expansion as vindication of their beliefs, and were able to use it to undermine what little influence Kozyrev still retained. Additionally, it was clear that there were other national agendas at play in the Contact Group. However, it was this rift in the Russia-US relationship that ensured no real progress would be made toward resolving the Bosnian conflict, despite the announcement of another peace proposal on 13 May 1995.273

Although the peace process appeared to be stalled, events on the ground picked up pace until they reached a crescendo in the summer of 1995. Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo resulted in the UN’s use of NATO air power, albeit in a limited way.274 This emboldened the Bosnian Serbs to take UNPROFOR peacekeepers hostage – forcing the UN to negotiate for their release.275 With both the UN’s and UNPROFOR’s credibility in question, conflict increased. The massacre at Srebrenica, in which French peacekeepers let Bosnian Serb forces into the ‘safe haven,’ resulting to the mass slaughter of unarmed Muslims, was the high point of Serbian atrocity.276 It was also the catalyst for renewed efforts at the bargaining table. However, the fast pace of negotiations was causing considerable international tension.277 The renewed air strikes by NATO appeared to be driving all sides to the table, but Moscow still disagreed with their use. The rocket-

272 Blacker, p. 180; Baranovsky, p. 452.
273 US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, Lessons and Conclusions, Chapter 1, p. 6.
275 US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, Lessons and Conclusions, Chapter 1, p. 6.
276 Williams, p. 379, 381.
277 US Dept of the Army/RF General Staff, Lessons and Conclusions, Chapter 1, p. 7.
propelled grenade that was fired at the US Embassy in Moscow in the winter of 1995 indicated how widespread this feeling was in Russian society.\textsuperscript{278} The final peace effort in Bosnia, the Dayton accords, would finally halt the war in Bosnia on 1 December 1995. Despite misgivings in Russia, the UN "sub-contracted" the Bosnia mission to NATO. Implicit in this agreement between the UN, the US and NATO was Russia's part in the peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{279}

Russian peacekeepers were deployed as part of the NATO-led Implementation Forces (IFOR) in January 1996.\textsuperscript{280} Given the high tension between the US and Russia at the time, this controversial decision could only have been made by Yeltsin, who agreed to it over the objections of his advisors.\textsuperscript{281} When working out the details, however, the Russian contingent was "directly subordinated to Colonel-General Leontiy Shevtsov, as General Joulwan's Russian deputy [Gen. Joulwan was the NATO Commander in 1995]. In theater, the Russian Brigade was placed under the tactical control of the US-led Multinational Division (North)."\textsuperscript{282} This unique arrangement kept Russia involved in the mission, without subordinating it to NATO, a crucial detail considering NATO's bad standing in Moscow. This provided Moscow several benefits. First, Russia had some latitude on whether to actively participate in daily operations. Secondly, it gave the Russian peacekeeping force, and thus the MoD direct access to US and NATO planning. It also provided Russia a visible out from IFOR operations if they became politically

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{279} US negotiators set out specifically to engage the Russians in the peacekeeping mission, agreeing in the end to the separate Russian 'chain of command,' despite the misgivings that this would undermine unity of command on the mission. Clark, pp. 56-58.
\textsuperscript{281} According to Blacker, Yeltsin agreed to this after a personal request by President Clinton at their meeting in Hyde Park in October 1995. Blacker, p. 186.
difficult. Finally it was a subtle reminder to NATO that Russia was an equal, not a subordinate. According to one analyst, “Russian armed forces [in IFOR/SFOR] were engaged primarily to demonstrate Russia’s international power, to counter-balance NATO’s anti-Serb policies and to preserve its geopolitical position in the Balkans.”

After its one-year mandate had ended and all of its tasks accomplished, the Implementation Force (IFOR) became the Stabilization Force (SFOR), whose tasks were more developmental and required a long-term presence. There was a seamless transition of units from IFOR to SFOR, with multinational division composition largely remaining the same. Relations have been generally good, except when tensions between NATO and Russia are exceptionally tense – as when NATO reaffirmed its commitment to expand in 1996-1997. Under these circumstances, Russian SFOR limited its interaction with its US headquarters.

Summary

Russian peacekeeping operations in Bosnia would lay the groundwork for Russian peacekeeping operations in the region, much like its Moldova PKO had within the Near Abroad. Despite not having a free hand to determine policy (as was noted earlier, many nations involved from outside the conflict had their own agendas), it was in still Russia’s best interest to appear involved in the region for many reasons. Moscow’s cooperation with the West by committing forces to the UN mission in Bosnia in 1992 supported the initial liberal/democratic thrust of Kozyrev’s policy; it could also be pointed to as supporting Russia’s role as a great power, in line with the more conservative schools of

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284 Ibid.
realist thought. By 1993, however, the issue of NATO enlargement began to reinforce these more conservative elements in Moscow’s policy circles and contribute to growing distance between Russia and the West, the US in particular. This growing distrust of NATO and a generally more anti-Western trend in Moscow manifested in the more strident policy line, especially as it pertained to NATO’s aggressive involvement in the conflict. Russian operations in support of the Serbs around Sarajevo in February 1994 was meant to hold in check the Alliance, which had, from a Russian perspective, overstepped its authority. In the final peace plan for Bosnia, the UN chose NATO for the “sub-contractor” role – the same type of arrangement Moscow so actively sought for its peacekeeping operations (PKO) within the CIS. The West’s active courting of Russia to participate in the Bosnian PKO resulted in a separate ‘chain of command’ for Russian troops serving with the multinational force – they would answer directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, not NATO. General Russian-NATO relations directly affected how well Russian peacekeeping forces worked with SFOR.

Thus over the course of four years, Russian peacekeeping policy in the Balkans had begun to reflect the same trend as the PKO policy in the Near Abroad, with several notable distinctions. First, the primary target audience of Russian peacekeeping operations in Bosnia was never intended to be one of the regional antagonists. Although Russian PKO as part of UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR both contributed to peace in the region, the primary reason Russian forces were deployed had more to do with the global community. The Russian deployment to Bosnia was a reflection of Moscow’s need to counterbalance growing Western influence in the Balkans, as well as being seen as fulfilling the duties of a great power. Thus, Russian peacekeeping policy in Bosnia was
meant to influence the world in general and the West in particular. Second, although the use of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia as an aggressive tool of Russian foreign policy objectives was rare (as compared to its PKO in the Near Abroad), they did occur. Their rarity can be attributed to several reasons; arguably the most important of these were the restrictions imposed by virtue of UN or NATO command and the burden sharing of the operation with other nations. However this did not preclude Moscow from taking unilateral action when it felt its interests were being threatened or ignored. This more aggressive posture toward its Balkans foreign policy was a symptom of the deterioration of relations between Russia on the one hand and the US and NATO on the other, as well as a reflection of the increasingly assertive and confrontational drift of Russian Foreign policy as a whole. This aggressive Russian unilateralism occurred only twice in Bosnia – once in February 1994 around Sarajevo, and again in June 1999 in Kosovo.

The Kosovo Conflict

*If it [the KFOR peacekeeping operation] happens without us there, what would we be worth? A kopek!*

- Major A. I. Stolyarov²⁸⁵
  June 1999

The crisis in Kosovo was really a continuation of many incomplete timelines, trends all weaving together to produce the humanitarian tragedy that exploded in Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. It was Slobodan Milosevic’s last great effort toward a Greater Serbia – his attempt to reestablish Serbian dominance over a majority Albanian region within Yugoslavia.²⁸⁶ Kosovo was also the last (so far) of the breakaway regions

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of Yugoslavia. The fact that it was legally part of the Serbian Republic does not lessen this fact – it just complicates the ultimate resolution of the conflict. It also marked another opportunity for the United Nations to intercede in what was fast becoming its primary peacekeeping mission – *intra-state conflict*.

From the Russian perspective, the crisis in Kosovo was also a continuation of some previous trends, as well as some new and ominous ones. Russian participation in the conflict and later the UN mandated Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR) in 1999 had less to do with Kosovo, and much more to do with Moscow's relationship with the West. In many ways, Kosovo was a "worrying watershed" in Russian-NATO and Russian-US relations.\(^{287}\) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) expansion during the 1990s - conceptually, operationally and geographically - was perceived by some as a threat to the Russian Federation, which the Russian military viewed with growing apprehension.\(^{288}\) In addition, Russia was concerned about the precedent set by NATO support to the Kosovo Liberation Army, raising the specter of a new pattern of international intervention.\(^{289}\) Finally, Moscow felt compelled, however reluctantly, to support Milosevic in order to secure Russian influence in the region. It was the first time since the Cold War that Russia found itself opposite NATO in an armed conflict.\(^{290}\) Each of these issues would affect the conduct of Russian foreign policy in Kosovo, and finally be reflected in Moscow's use of peacekeepers within the region.

\(^{287}\) Antonenko, p. 124.
\(^{288}\) Blank, pp. 8-40.
\(^{289}\) Antonenko, pp. 131-133.
\(^{290}\) Moscow considered the 1998 air strikes on Iraq a US/UK affair. Levitin, pp. 134-135; Antonenko, p. 124.
Russian-NATO relations remained strained after Bosnia, due mainly to NATO’s expansion and its newly assertive security posture, as evidenced by the air strikes against the Bosnia Serbs in 1995. Although Russian concerns were somewhat alleviated by the Dayton Peace accords, NATO’s failure to consult with the Russians over its actions in Bosnia was perceived as “another instance of Western betrayal and duplicity.”

According to Aleksei Arbatov,

> the massive air attacks on the Bosnian Serbs from the summer of 1995 demonstrated that force, not patient negotiations, remained the principal instrument of diplomacy and that Moscow’s position was only taken into account so long as it did not contradict the line taken by the United States. In the eyes of the majority of Russians, the myth of the exclusively defensive nature of NATO was exploded.

Attempts to persuade Russia that NATO expansion was not a threat were mostly ineffective. NATO attempts to engage with Russia on expansion included the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program in 1994, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, both following extremely tense periods in NATO-Russian relations. From the Russian point of view, these programs did not take Russian concerns seriously and did little to solve NATO-Russian disagreements. To both Russian policy elites and the

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291 Dannreuther, p. 152.
293 Antonenko, pp. 126-130; Dannreuther, pp. 150-153.
294 The PfP initiative was put forth right after NATO began talk of expansion; the Founding Act was put forth after NATO had decided to expand, but before nominees were announced.
295 Moscow entered into the PfP program to gain leverage over NATO; it wanted to “raise the cost of enlargement by threatening to pull out of NATO.” The Permanent Joint Council established by the Founding Act was described as a “talking shop” in which disagreements could be “voiced but not resolved.” This was underlined when General Anatoly Kvaatin, as the Russian head of delegation in the PJC, warned NATO not to bomb Yugoslavia without a UN/OSCE mandate in March 1999; NATO started bombing 2 weeks later. Antonenko, pp. 129-130.
population as a whole, NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999 was only the latest in a long line of "broken NATO promises." With the initiation of air strikes in Yugoslavia, NATO "enlargement and pretensions to act beyond the territory of its members, without an explicit UN mandate" became the defining concern to Moscow. Some within the Russian government pointed to a string of developments during the 1990s through which NATO had shed its defensive status and assumed a more aggressive role in European security. This began, they argued, with the development by NATO of the 'combined joint task force' (CJTF) in 1994 as a way "for the alliance to employ forces outside the constraints of Article 5 (Self Defense)." According to this theory, the CJTF concept was then 'tested' in Bosnia after coercive air strikes in 1995 as the headquarters of the NATO-brokered peace implementation force (IFOR) in 1996. The 'New Strategic Concept' enumerated by NATO at its Washington Summit in April 1999 was seen as codifying this tool for 'out of area actions,' which made official what the IFOR had already proven to be operationally feasible. Some Russian military leaders and analysts even argued that the Kosovo operation validated their earlier beliefs and that NATO's Kosovo operation was a "template for future NATO operations against Russia or its vital interests in the near Abroad, as outlined in NATO's April 1999 strategy concept." Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov warned:

296 Dannreuther, pp. 151-152.
297 Antonenko, p. 124.
298 Wallander, Celeste A., Russian Views on Kosovo: Synopsis of May 6 Panel Discussion (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, April 1999), p. 3-4.
300 Blank, p. 10.
I don’t claim to be able to see the future, but unless we learn the
lessons from what has just happened, it could well be that the bombing of
Yugoslavia was only the beginning — the beginning of a new re-division of
the world through the use of force. If force can be used to make peace
between Serbs and Albanians, then where’s the guarantee that NATO,
acting with the noblest of intentions, won’t decide to use force to reconcile
North and South Korea, Taiwan and China, to bring democracy to Belarus,
Iraq, and Syria, or to intervene in Kashmir or Nagorny Karabakh [sic]?^301

This belief that NATO would continue to operate outside of the United Nations had a
strong following in Moscow policy circles by 1999, and helps explain Moscow’s drift
toward foreign policy rhetoric typified by aggressive realism.

The international-legal implications were also of concern to Moscow and given as
the reason for an increasingly ‘anti-NATO’ and ‘anti-US’ policy. Vladimir Baranovsky
opines that

NATO’s military operation against Yugoslavia was assessed as a flagrant
violation of international law, as a heavy blow against the existing UN-based
international system, as an attempt to establish a ‘new world order’
by force, allowing arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of states (on
‘humanitarian’ or other grounds).^302

The most obvious threat as reflected above is a concern that a precedent might be
established allowing the UN or other international organizations (read as ‘NATO’) to
interfere within the borders of any sovereign nation.^303 An article in a Russian journal in
1998, prior to the air strikes, suggested just that:

When analyzing the development of events in the Balkans,
parallels with the development of events in the Caucasus involuntarily
suggest themselves: Bosnia-Herzegovina is Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is
Chechnya. As soon as the West, and in particular, NATO, has rehearsed
the “divide and rule” principle in the Balkans under the cover of

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^301 ColGen Ivashev, as cited in Richard Weitz, “Managing an unpredictable Moscow,” Parameters, vol. 29,
no. 4, Winter 1999/2000, p. 79.
^302 Baranovsky, pp. 454-455.
^303 The more reluctant members of NATO, as well as those of the EU also voiced these concerns.
Dannreuther, p. 157.
peacekeeping, they should be expected to interfere in the internal affairs of the CIS countries and Russia.\textsuperscript{304}

For Russia, the connection between Chechnya and Kosovo was clear. In fact, Moscow’s interpretation of the Kosovo conflict was shaped in some ways by Russia’s Chechen experience. There were several parallels between them in Russian eyes, the most important of which was that “both movements have territorial ambitions going beyond Kosovo or Chechnya.”\textsuperscript{305}

Thus, western support to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was believed to be a factor that could encourage separatists in Russia or the CIS, causing increasing instability around Russia’s periphery. In a step further, some analysts suggested that there was widespread belief in Russia that instead of responding to a ‘humanitarian catastrophe,’ NATO instigated the instability in Kosovo by supporting the KLA in order to increase its military presence in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{306} Russian concerns that separatist groups would be emboldened by supposed NATO support of secessionist or anti-Russian movements in the CIS became a staple of Russian threat assessment and was even reflected in the April 2000 Russian National Military Doctrine.\textsuperscript{307} It is not, therefore, very hard to imagine the Russian Government siding with Milosevic during the Kosovo crisis. Russian inability to halt NATO’s expansion or its growing dominance of European security issues, either through bilateral relations with NATO or the use of other


\textsuperscript{305} Oksana Antonenko cites the following parallels in the prevailing Russian view: both represent a local Muslim majority persecuting a Slav minority; both represent a movement that emerged from the break-up of a multinational federation; both have employed terrorism and are alleged to receive financing from drug trafficking and ethnic kin abroad; both have territorial ambitions that go beyond their “homelands.” Antonenko, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{306} Antonenko, p. 131.

international organizations, continually frustrated policy elites in Moscow. Unlike NATO, Milosevic was susceptible to Russian influence, and thus appeared a better guarantor of sustained Russian influence in the Balkans. Additionally, not only was there a historic ‘Slavic’ connection to Belgrade, Russia had also worked primarily with the Serbs during the Contact Group efforts up to Dayton; it seemed natural to continue this relationship in the expanded Contact Group’s efforts during Kosovo.  

Still, Moscow’s uneasiness with this policy is reflected in how Milosevic was treated in its bilateral relations with Russia when compared to other leaders from the Balkans. Russian President Boris Yeltsin never conducted a ‘state visit’ to Belgrade, and would not accept a Yugoslav ‘state visit’ to Moscow until “the situation in Kosovo calmed down.” In the same period, both Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and former Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov were received in Moscow on official visits. This reflected two important issues: Moscow’s uneasiness with a Balkan ‘partner’ of dubious trustworthiness and value; and the continuing struggle for policy direction within senior Russian foreign policy circles – the vestiges of the previous liberal-democratic policy remained, most likely as a result of Yeltsin’s personal efforts.  

When reviewing the events leading up to the settlement of the crisis and subsequent deployment of the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR), the change in the Russian approach to conflict resolution is stark. From the Russian perspective, Western efforts in Yugoslavia appeared hegemonic. Coupled with what looked to be the eventual

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308 The ‘expanded Contact Group’ included Italy as well as the original group of the US, UK, Russia, Germany and France. Levitin, p. 134.
309 In the period up to the start of the air campaign, Moscow was also concerned that Milosevic would abuse his relationship with Russia to cause additional friction between Russia and the West. Simultaneously, it was feared Milosevic would cut a deal with the West behind Moscow’s back, seriously undermining Russia’s prestige both abroad and at home. Levitin, pp. 134-135.
310 Ibid.
success of a ‘terrorist organization’ (the KLA), Russian efforts to restrict the role of both NATO and the KLA become more understandable. This philosophical policy shift from \textit{defensive realism} to \textit{aggressive realism} is reflected in all levels of Russian interposition in the process, from diplomacy to peacekeeping. Early on in the crisis, Russia’s main concern was maintaining Kosovo within Serbia’s formal jurisdiction. Even prior to the Rambouillet Conference, Russia applied significant effort to derail the conflict resolution process. According to Marc Weller, the three elements of this ‘plan’ were:

- openly attempt to frustrate the concept of a settlement to be imposed on Yugoslavia and enforced by NATO;
- if that was unsuccessful, preserve its controlling role in the administration of the crisis, through its membership on collective bodies where it could block decisions requiring consensus (Contact Group, OSCE);
- finally, using its veto in the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{311}

An example of how this was carried out is reflected in the fact that all draft agreements produced by the ‘shuttle-diplomacy’ of American special envoy Christopher Hill in 1998 met with “a kind of slack resistance on the part of Russia.”\textsuperscript{312} What this equated to in the Contact Group was the Russian delegates’ ability to table or postpone work on these drafts. According to some accounts, the inability of the Contact Group to act in unison for most of 1998 only emboldened the Serbs.\textsuperscript{313} However, an agreement was finally hammered out in October 1998, causing a halt in hostilities.

\textsuperscript{311} France and Italy played similar ‘spoilering roles,’ and along with Russia almost caused the entire process to unravel. Marc Weller, “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,” \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 75, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{312} These efforts successfully delayed or otherwise derailed most of the suggested draft agreements, not for substantive reasons – Russian concerns were addressed in each draft – but merely to hamstring progress on conflict resolution. Levitin, p. 136.

This was effectively broken when 45 Albanians were killed in the village of Recak.\textsuperscript{314} A Contact Group Meeting in January 1999 led to the discussions between Serbs and Albanians in Rambouillet, France, in February and March. Both sides were handed a list of non-negotiable principles – points agreed to by all members of the Contact Group, which supported both sides’ demands. During the initial discussions in February, the Serbian party made opening comments and then failed to participate until the end. Drastic changes by the Serbs at the very end caused the Albanians to balk. This situation, combined with the delay in the military annex of the agreement resulted in only an arrangement to return to talks in March. The military annex was delayed because the “Contact Group itself remained divided in relation to the functions, modalities and powers of NATO implementation of the agreement.”\textsuperscript{315}

At the follow-on discussions, the Albanians had the authority to sign the previously drafted agreement – but were held off for several days. The Serbian counter-proposal a few days later sought to reopen the entire political discussion.\textsuperscript{316} This second set of discussions ended with the Serbs essentially walking out, and the Albanians signing the document from the first set of talks. In a blatant display of pro-Serb support, the Contact Group’s Russian negotiator, Ambassador Boris Mayorski, refused to witness the Albanians sign the document.\textsuperscript{317} The Serb failure to sign led to the NATO threat of air strikes, which had been a key feature of the diplomatic negotiations, along with the non-negotiable principles.

\textsuperscript{315} Weller, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{316} Weller, pp. 24-25.
\textsuperscript{317} Weller, p. 25
Milosevic refused to comply with the NATO warning, and, without a UN Security Council mandate – which would have been blocked by the Russian member on the Council – NATO began bombing Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999.\textsuperscript{318} Two days later, in a UN Security Council resolution supported by India and Belarus, Russia “called for the immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;” the resolution failed 9 votes to 3.\textsuperscript{319} Russia closed down all official relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), pulling its representatives out of NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and closing the NATO office in Moscow. The increasing tension between Russia and NATO also had an affect on the SFOR operations in Bosnia – previously cooperative Russian officers were supplanted by openly obstructive replacements sent from Moscow.\textsuperscript{320} The NATO bombing of Serbia continued unabated until the final signing of the Rambouillet-like accords by Serbia between 3 and 10 June 1999.\textsuperscript{321}

The final resolution of the conflict, however, was preceded by several months of Russian accusations of the US and NATO attempting to bypass established international systems for conflict resolution and warnings of an impending ‘American hegemony.’ Despite the increasingly threatening rhetoric from some defense and security policy circles in Moscow, President Yeltsin’s expressed policy was “not to get sucked into a big war and not to deliver arms.”\textsuperscript{322} To this extent, Yeltsin was adhering to a defensive realist posture, if not a liberal-internationalist one. In order to remain engaged in the

\textsuperscript{318} Judah, pp. 14-15
\textsuperscript{319} Roberts, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{320} Author’s notes, from discussions with CPT Paul Riley and CPT Renea Yates, US Army liaison Detachment to the Russian Separate Airborne Brigade, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Winter 1999, Winter 2002).
\textsuperscript{321} Clark, pp. 193-374.
\textsuperscript{322} Natalya Shulyakovskaya, “NATO Troops could defeat Yeltsin,” The Moscow Times, 9 April 1999.
ongoing crisis, in April 1999 Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin special envoy to the region to help broker an agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO. The establishment of the G-8 ‘general principles’ for the settlement of conflict in Kosovo in May 1999 led to intense negotiations between Chernomyrdin, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. These talks seemed to stall until at the end of May Yeltsin told Chernomyrdin to “come up with a new strategy;” some analysts suggest that the timing was driven by the 18-20 June 1999 G-8 Summit, where Yeltsin would be asking for new economic aid for Russia. Given this turn of events, Chernomyrdin was finally able to convince Milosevic of the hopelessness of his situation, leading to equally difficult negotiations reference the deployment of NATO. The simultaneous discussions NATO was holding with Moscow over the Russian part in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo also proved difficult – however, there was no ‘special envoy’ to help in this discussion.

The Pristina Airport seizure in June 1999 by the 200 Russian desantniki already discussed was the most flagrant example of a more hard line Russian foreign policy. It showed that Moscow wasn’t above the threat of force to accomplish its goals in the Balkans – this however, was the exception, not the rule. Despite the increasingly threatening rhetoric coming from Moscow, President Yeltsin was loath to discard the ties to Western institutions he had spent so long developing. It was ultimately his decision in May 1999 that reoriented Russian policy from a collision course with the US and NATO. Tensions remained high between the governments, but, in the end, Russia contributed

approximately 3500 soldiers to the KFOR – divided among three multinational brigade zones, and Pristina Airport.\textsuperscript{325}

**Summary**

Many of the themes present during the Bosnian crisis carried over directly into Russia’s confrontation with NATO over Kosovo. Despite the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council pursuant to the Russia-NATO Founding Act, Russia became increasingly frustrated with its lack of power in this ‘consultative committee.’ NATO’s expansion during the decade had a negative impact on Russian-Western relations, due to a growing Russian perception that Russia was still perceived to be the enemy by NATO.\textsuperscript{326} When viewed through this ominous prism, all of NATO’s actions had a definitively threatening aspect. Western support for what Moscow considered a terrorist organization helped reinforce this perspective – all the more so since the rebels in Chechnya and Kosovo were perceived by the average Russian as similar. The bombing of Yugoslavia, without a UN Security Council mandate, seemed to confirm for many Russians that NATO was out to ‘construct a new world order by force.’

All of these trends reinforced the already more aggressive Russian foreign policy rhetoric and to a limited extent, helped to push a more confrontational Russian foreign policy in Kosovo. The specter of a new pattern of international interventionalism, based on the Kosovo scenario became one of the threats listed in the Russian National Military Doctrine (2000).\textsuperscript{327} In the end, Moscow’s support for Milosevic did provide it the best guarantee of influence in the region – only not for the reason the Russians thought. By


\textsuperscript{326} Dannreuther, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{327} Antonenko, pp. 131-133.
being the only realistic mediator to the conflict, Russia secured its place in the negotiations. President Yeltsin’s timely intervention helped to reign in both Milosevic and the aggressive realists in his own government. While the use of desantniki to seize the airfield can be seen as part of a newly aggressive realism, in reality, Moscow’s willingness to negotiate for the rest of the peacekeeping mission parameters was indicative of its move back to defensive realism, or even toward the liberal-internationalist/liberal-democratic point of view.
Chapter IV – Summary and Comments

Summary

This thesis has been an effort to define what I perceived as two different operating systems for Russian peacekeeping operations (PKO) in the 1990s. The differences seemed to have to be associated primarily with geography and the level of cooperation required with other states. These two issues seemed inversely proportional – that is, the closer to Russia the PKO was, the less ‘international’ cooperation there seemed to be within the PKO, and vice versa. However, research proved that this was a symptom and not the ‘disease.’ In this paper I have argued that Russian Peacekeeping policy in the 1990s can be ascribed to two variables, geography and target audience. These two variables reflect the evolution of Russian foreign policy and its relationship with a Russian ‘national identity.’ The conservative bent of this foreign policy evolution can be attributed to domestic political pressure to change the Russian relationship with both the West and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This shift from a primarily pro-Western international integrationist foreign policy to a more reactive and self-centered policy as advocated by the derzhavniks influenced the establishment and conduct of PKOs.

In determining how this came about, a review of published Russian security and military doctrine proved to be of interest for two reasons. Written national policy documents were reflective of the past; for the most part they aren’t forward looking explanations of the direction of policy. Additionally, research has shown that written public policy has been a reflection of the power struggle between policy elites in
Moscow. This can be seen in the progression of the written documentation from the Military Doctrine of 1993 to the Military Doctrine of 2000. As the international situation changed, the more conservative elites exerted their influence on the writing of these documents. Therefore, official doctrine was of little use in determining why peacekeeping operations seemed to have evolved along two tracks.

It is, however, in the conduct of Russian foreign policy that the best evidence of this drift towards a more conservative *defensive/aggressive realism* is seen. The initial policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Andrei Kozyrev, and presumably in line with President Yeltsin’s beliefs, was unabashedly pro-Western. There were groups in the policy elite in Moscow who believed a harder line needed to be taken vis-à-vis the West. They also advocated a more interventionist policy toward the Near Abroad, citing historic ties, Russia’s great power status and the connections between the former Soviet nations. When the confrontation between the Moldovan government and the Dnestr separatists broke out, these more conservative elites seized the initiative to gradually force Russian foreign policy toward a more self centered, ‘Russia-first’ approach in relation to the CIS, and toward a more balance policy with the West.

This resulted in peacekeeping operations within the Near Abroad being conducted as one tool in a coercive Russian foreign policy in the region. The goals of this foreign policy in general were to strengthen security and economic ties within the region, and stabilize conflict on the Southern periphery, both with an eye toward advantage for Russia. This can be seen in Moscow’s use of peacekeepers in Moldova to ensure the viability of the Dnestr threat through direct support in 1992, and to gain concessions from
Georgia not by supporting the Abkhaz, but by not supporting Georgia militarily in 1993. This PKO policy in the Near Abroad was targeted at regional actors.

Yevgenii Primakov could be considered to primary spokesman of the more ‘centrist’ approach during the 1990s, and indeed, he replaced Kozyrev in the MFA. This policy advocated a more deliberate policy toward the West, balancing it with other Russian interests in the global community. Russian frustration with Western, primarily NATO, policy in the Balkans forced policy elites to reconsider again. Their perceptions of an ever more powerful alliance, which was absorbing former Russian allies and shifting the decision-making structures for European security west, was reinforced by NATO’s more aggressive policies, as exemplified by the NATO role in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Russian foreign policy became increasingly reactive to ‘Western’ stimuli—evolving into a more aggressive policy to limit NATO influence in the Balkans. This is most glaringly reflected in Russian intervention in Sarajevo in 1994 and Pristina in 1999. This PKO policy in the Balkans was targeted at extra-regional actors. Again, these two issues do not ‘stand alone’ and in fact, are not only intertwined, but also complementary.

Comments

When reviewing this study, several issues relating to peacekeeping operations and doctrine suggest themselves for further reflection. Of notable interest is the issue of the expanded use of ‘peacekeeping’ operations (PKO) in general, which has been the result of several simultaneous factors. The end of the Cold War has left a sort of ‘responsibility vacuum’ for global catastrophes; this has been backfilled by two groups. First, the United Nations and its role in international relations and global stability have grown
exponentially since the 1990s, helping to fill this void. Second, 'peace-making/peace-enforcement operations' conducted by regional powers and organizations, with or without UN sponsorship, has also partially filled this vacuum. The efforts of these two groups have, in effect, mechanically supplanted the roles of 'superpower intervention' and 'regional power imperialism' in terms of global stability. However, the expanding list of global catastrophes and problems these two groups now face has blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and military intervention. Where these two functions cross – increased use of PKOs and the blurred distinction between military intervention and peacekeeping – lay the probable future of international 'peacekeeping' operations.

The last decade of the Twentieth Century saw the expansion of the use of peacekeeping forces, both under the United Nations and regional powers and alliances. Part of this was the result of the United Nations becoming more intimately involved in international relations, due to the end of the Cold war and the dissolution of bipolar competition. However, the UN's expansion into former superpower domains has meant that those regional conflicts that were at one time 'tended to' by a superpower or a regional power are now in the 'global public domain.' This is reflected in the virtual explosion of UN and other 'peacekeeping operations' in the 1990s. In many cases, traditional peacekeeping operations – relying on the peacekeeping force's impartiality and the 'hostage effect' – have been inappropriate to the mission assigned. As a reflection of this, the use of the term 'peacekeeping operations' has broadened to cover not only traditional peacekeeping but also more coercive operations, involving 'peace-making' and 'peace-enforcement.'
For the United States, as well as other powers, the UN Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations provides a unique service, helping to stop conflicts before they become wars, requiring the conduct of combat operations. Unfortunately for the UN, the requisite capabilities to deal with the growing requirement for PKOs worldwide did not expand alongside new expectations of UN intervention. While the UN DPKO is generally able to conduct traditional peacekeeping operations, the more coercive peace-making/peace-enforcement operations require an expertise in combat operations that surpasses the UN’s organizational and operational capabilities. This means that the more coercive forms of international peacekeeping will still require the resources of the United States or a regional power, as well as the concurrence of the United Nations Security Council. Thus, the current ‘subcontractor-model’ will likely continue to be the UN Secretary General’s only real option when faced with the conduct of future coercive UN operations.
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