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PEARL HARBOR:
FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE?

by

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Preface

The success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor represents an excellent case study on national preparedness that has influenced each generation of American military leaders since December 7, 1941. Despite the efforts of no less than nine in-depth investigations, however, the circumstances surrounding the attack remain controversial. References continue to surface in official and public writings that do not accurately address the underlying causes for the defeat, ranging from new interpretations of the existing data to revisionist conspiracy theories. One of the most prevalent assertions is that Pearl Harbor resulted from a “failure of intelligence.” As a career intelligence officer, these claims always interested and annoyed me. I undertook this study to determine for professional and personal reasons if the attack on Pearl Harbor truly was the result of an intelligence failure. I felt the need to be aware of the lessons of Pearl Harbor to ensure that I would not make the same mistakes during my Air Force career. I also wanted to lay to rest in my own mind the questions I had concerning the culpability of the intelligence community in the disaster of December 7.

I sincerely thank Dr. Malcolm Muir and the staff of the Muir S. Fairchild Library at Air University for their invaluable assistance in this effort. Dr. Muir’s expert advice and guidance focused my research in examining the voluminous data available on the Pearl Harbor attack. He also provided patient understanding and insight into condensing and organizing this material. In addition, I truly appreciate the assistance rendered by the men

and women of the Air University Library staff. Their knowledge of research materials was essential for locating the many sources of information required.

Abstract

Many scholars and writers state that the surprise the Japanese achieved in their attack on Pearl Harbor resulted from a failure of the U.S. intelligence community to provide adequate, accurate information to government and military decision-makers. These historians presume the intelligence community possessed critical information that was misinterpreted or not appropriately disseminated prior to the attack. Some revisionist historians also subscribe to conspiracy theories and believe that key members of the U.S. government purposely withheld this critical information from the military command in an effort to bring the U.S. into World War II against the Axis powers. Both groups cite existing studies and formerly classified information released since 1978 as evidence for their assertions.

A review of the evidence available from official, public, and private sources, however, indicates these viewpoints are inaccurate. At best they reflect a lack of understanding of the collection capabilities and information available to the U.S. intelligence community before Pearl Harbor; at worst these views are an effort to rewrite history. It is possible to disprove these allegations, however, by examining the history of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the attack; its intelligence collection capabilities; the success or failure of the collection effort; its knowledge of Japanese military preparations for offensive activity; and the utilization of that information by national and military decision-makers.

The lessons of Pearl Harbor are too valuable to be lost to misinterpretation or revisionism. They provide the basis for teaching future generations of government and military leaders the importance of national preparedness and the proper use of intelligence. Without a clear understanding, future leaders may be doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past—an error of major proportions during this time of military downsizing and decreasing power projection capabilities.

Chapter 1

Day of Infamy

Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

—President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Aircraft from the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) attacked the sleeping American naval base at Pearl Harbor and other Hawaiian Department military facilities beginning at 0750 on Sunday, December 7, 1941. For the next two hours and twenty minutes the planes executed well planned, well-rehearsed strikes against ships of the Pacific Fleet and aircraft of the Army Air Corps. Surprise was complete, and the American forces could only offer ineffectual resistance. Resulting Japanese losses were light (29 aircraft and 5 midget submarines), while over 3400 American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were killed or wounded. In addition, 188 Army, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft were damaged or destroyed, as well as 18 ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet (eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and four miscellaneous vessels).¹




Figure 1. The U.S.S. Arizona burns in the aftermath of the Japanese attack

Thus began a controversy that continues today. Why were the American forces in Hawaii so unprepared for the Japanese attack? No fewer than nine Congressional and military investigations, as well as the efforts of numerous scholars and historians, have attempted to answer this question. The official answer, according to the United States Senate and House of Representatives' *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, dated 16 July 1946, states that:

The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and material losses, of the Army and the Navy [to] institute measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese.

Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time that she did. Yet officers, both in Washington and

Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack; they realized this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a possibility; and they were adequately informed of the imminence of war.

Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed

(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle of command by mutual cooperation.

(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941.

(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence.

(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of their equipment.

(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.

(f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command, which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.

(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them.

The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty.

The War Plans Division of the War Department failed to discharge its direct responsibility to advise the commanding general he had not properly alerted the Hawaiian Department when the latter, pursuant to instructions, had reported action taken in a message that was not satisfactorily responsive to the original directive.

Notwithstanding the fact that there were officers on twenty-four hour watch, the Committee believes that under all of the evidence the War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and 7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war.²

Despite the overwhelming amount of evidence supporting these conclusions, they are often disbelieved or ignored. Some scholars and historians, to include a textbook used at the Air War College, continue to assert that the disaster at Pearl Harbor was really a “major failure of American intelligence.”³ They incorrectly assert that: the American intelligence community had the capability and sufficient information to determine Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor; and subsequently failed to evaluate, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in a timely manner to the national command authorities, the War and Navy Departments, and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short in Hawaii.

There is no question that the intelligence community shared part of the blame for Pearl Harbor. The United States Senate and House of Representatives’ *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, dated 16 July 1946, correctly stated that:

The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments failed:

(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and November 20 (the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet’s base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other information available to them, in making their estimate of the situation.

(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the “one o’clock” intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7. If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.⁴

But these shortcomings did not, and do not, represent a “major failure of American intelligence.”⁵ They are contributing factors to be certain, but not the sole or most important in the surprise achieved by the Japanese attack. Intelligence adequate to determine that Japan would probably initiate hostilities on or about December 7, 1941, was provided to American government and military leaders. In addition, key officers within the Navy Department rejected requests from the intelligence staff to forward information to the military commanders in Hawaii. The root of the problem lay with the attitude held by key national and military decision-makers concerning the utility of intelligence. A review of the history of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the attack; its intelligence collection capabilities; the success of the collection effort; what was known of Japanese military preparations for offensive activity; and how that information was utilized by national and military decision-makers shows that Pearl Harbor was not a failure of intelligence, but stemmed from flawed command relationships and inadequate leadership.

Notes

¹ United States Senate and House of Representatives, *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 16 July 1946, 71; on-line, Internet, 9 December 1996, available from <ftp://ftp.purdue.edu/pub/Liberal-Arts/pha/pearl.harbor/congress/>.

² *Ibid.*, 251-252.

³ Captain Julie A. Catt, ed., “The Grand Alliance: 1941-1945,” in *Department of Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power Reader: Volume II*, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 1996.

⁴ United States Senate and House of Representatives, *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 16 July 1946, 251; on-line, Internet, 9 December 1996, available from <ftp://ftp.purdue.edu/pub/Liberal-Arts/pha/pearl.harbor/congress/>.

⁵ Captain Julie A. Catt, ed., “The Grand Alliance: 1941-1945,” in *Department of Strategy, Doctrine, and Air Power Reader: Volume II*, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 1996.

Chapter 2

Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community

Gentlemen do not read each other's mail.

—U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson, 1929

1775-1917—The Formative Years

“Of all the major twentieth century powers, the United States has the weakest intelligence tradition.”¹ Interest in intelligence and its application by government and military decision-makers prior to Pearl Harbor primarily rose and fell in cadence with the real or perceived threat to the United States. “Because there was no serious external threat to U.S. security during the first 140 years of the nation’s history, the United States kept defense [and intelligence] preparations to a minimum.”² This posture generally resulted in a lack of appreciation for the art of intelligence within the government and military, and undermined the development of a professional intelligence community with a viable doctrine.

George Washington is credited with being the first American leader to recognize the need for intelligence. He stated that “The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged...success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, & for want of it, they are generally defeated, however, well planned...”³ Washington

established a fledging intelligence service that conducted spying and deception operations against the occupying British forces, and later as president convinced Congress to set aside funds to support foreign intelligence collection operations. Despite this promising beginning, however, the practice lost emphasis during subsequent administrations and was discontinued after President Polk left office.⁴

The Civil War briefly renewed interest in intelligence operations within the United States government and military. Both the North and the South organized intelligence services to support military operations. In addition to creating and operating agent networks, both sides also began exploiting emerging technology to conduct intelligence operations. The invention of the telegraph provided commanders with the means to communicate quickly over long distances using coded messages; conversely it also necessitated the need for military intelligence personnel to engage in code-breaking operations. The development of the hot air balloon also provided commanders with the capability to conduct aerial reconnaissance operations. The North recognized the importance of coordinating these different types of intelligence collection operations and analyzing the resulting information. It established the Bureau of Military Intelligence in 1863 to perform this function, but ceased all intelligence operations with the end of the war in April 1865.⁵

Interest in intelligence operations by the American government and military lapsed in the period immediately after the Civil War. Intelligence prior to 1880 was primarily ad hoc in nature, and the military services did not show renewed interest in organized intelligence until the 1880s. Beginning in 1882 and 1885 respectively, the Navy

Department and Department of the Army each established formal organizations to collect foreign and domestic military intelligence.⁶

1917-1929—Renewed Interest in the Aftermath of World War I

America's entry into World War I created a need for extensive intelligence data by a sometimes reluctant leadership. Despite President Woodrow Wilson's policy of open diplomacy and personal distaste for intelligence operations, the "Zimmerman Telegram" incident convinced him of their value. German efforts to enlist Mexican support were derailed by decryptations of diplomatic traffic presented to President Wilson by British Intelligence.⁷ The British exposure of the Zimmerman Telegram reversed American views and spurred the development of intelligence capabilities designed to support military and government requirements. Subsequently the military formed communications intelligence (COMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) units to support the war effort.

One of the most successful intelligence units during World War I was MI-8, or the "Black Chamber." Founded by Major Herbert Yardley in 1917, it was the first professional cryptanalytic organization in American history. MI-8 was part of the Army's Military Intelligence Division and provided code-breaking and encoding services. After the war, it was transferred to the State Department where it made its greatest contribution by concentrating on foreign diplomatic communications.⁸

Beginning in 1920, "Black Chamber" personnel focused their attentions on Japanese diplomatic and military attaché codes. They successfully penetrated the diplomatic code and provided invaluable information to the American representatives at the 1920-1921

Naval Disarmament Conference in Washington, D.C. This behind the scenes data on Japanese naval capabilities, fleet strength, and size allowed the American team to successfully negotiate a settlement in the Pacific Ocean favorable to the United States.⁹

1929-1941—Isolationism, Downsizing, and Neglect

Secretary Stimson's often quoted remark "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"¹⁰ reflected the strong isolationist sentiments within the American government during the years following World War I. The Hoover administration closed MI-8 in 1929, and all personnel and files were transferred subtly to the Army Signal Corps in an effort to maintain a minimal COMINT capability. This limited the State Department's capability to formally collect, evaluate, and coordinate intelligence from a variety of sources, and it was forced to rely solely on its embassies for information to support foreign policy.¹¹

Isolationist-driven downsizing also impacted the capabilities of military intelligence. While the military services retained small formal intelligence organizations, the emphasis was on tactical, not strategic intelligence. Internally, this created de facto barriers preventing the dissemination and sharing of information between command levels in both services. Outlying headquarters intelligence personnel were responsible for providing primarily tactical and theater level intelligence in their unit's specific area of operations; headquarters intelligence personnel provided primarily strategic oriented information designed to support their service's respective staffs in Washington, D.C. This led to the inevitable disconnects within the service chains of command as to who had received or was aware of the appropriate information.¹²

The services also lacked an adequate intelligence professional development program to ensure that a core of trained officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) provided continuity and skill development. Intelligence assignments were generally luck of the draw, with officers being selected on the basis of their availability, not overall qualifications. Most viewed an intelligence assignment as a “kiss of death” in the downsized 1930s military where promotions were notoriously slow.¹³ Very few professional officers elected to remain in these assignments longer than absolutely necessary, fostering an attitude that intelligence was an area for “reservists and dilettantes.”¹⁴

This attitude towards intelligence as a career was reflected in the services’ approach to intelligence training programs. During the interwar years these resembled an apprenticeship and consisted primarily of academic and language study in select foreign countries. Training was limited to small numbers of personnel, and little or no attention was paid to the application of intelligence for operational purposes. This practice created only a very limited number of intelligence experts, and the services were incapable of quickly expanding their ranks with foreign language experts, area specialists, all-source analysts, and cryptanalysts to meet the increased requirements for operational intelligence during 1940-1941.¹⁵ It resulted in the over-tasking of existing personnel (16 hour workdays, and seven day work weeks for many key personnel during the critical weeks before Pearl Harbor¹⁶) and increased the potential that significant intelligence information could be misunderstood, misinterpreted, or overlooked.¹⁷

Compounding the intelligence problems within the State Department and the military services was the lack of a centralized system to coordinate the collection, analysis, or

dissemination of information for national and military decision-makers. Despite efforts by President Roosevelt beginning in November 1938, two factors stood in the way. First, bureaucratic infighting between “the FBI, the Customs Service, the Secret Service, and the intelligence units of the State, War and Navy Departments”¹⁸ over jurisdictional issues stonewalled the issue within the government. Second, “the external opposition was perhaps an even greater consideration. It was manifested in two arguments: that the internal security threat was minimal, and that centralization would lead to establishment of a ‘secret police’ organization.”¹⁹ These problems resulted in a fragmented intelligence effort where information tended to be “stovepiped” within the parent organization, and individual initiative was often the best means of ensuring dissemination.²⁰ This situation was a contributing factor in the disaster at Pearl Harbor (as noted in the Congressional report of 1946) and would not be formally addressed until the National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency.

Summary

The U.S. intelligence community prior to Pearl Harbor was a product of America’s historical aversion to foreign entanglements. Utilization of intelligence by national and military decision-makers was primarily limited to times of war. Little effort was made to develop, support, or task intelligence for governmental or military purposes during peacetime. This resulted in an intelligence system without an established doctrine, and one that was hamstrung in providing critical indications and warning intelligence services to national and military decision-makers as the crisis in between Japan and the United States intensified in 1941.

Notes

¹ Mark M. Lowenthal, *U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 5.

² *Ibid.*, 5.

³ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, "Appendix A: The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community - An Historical Overview" in *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, 1 March 1996, 1; on-line, Internet, 15 December 1996, available from http://www.gpo.gov/su_.../epubs/int.report.html.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3

⁸ Carl Boyd, *Hitler's Japanese Confidant* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰ Ladislav Farago, *Burn Before Reading: The Espionage History of World War II* (New York, NY: Walker & Co., 1961), 187.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 187-188.

¹² Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 58-64,

¹³ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 288-289.

¹⁴ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, "And I Was There" (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985) 25.

¹⁵ William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977), 161-162.

¹⁶ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 175.

¹⁷ United States Senate and House of Representatives, *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 16 July 1946, 253; on-line, Internet, 9 December 1996, available from <ftp://ftp.purdue.edu/pub/Liberal-Arts/pha/pearl.harbor/congress/>.

¹⁸ William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977), 94.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 95.

²⁰ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 385.

Chapter 3

Overview of the U.S. Intelligence Community in 1941

The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge. Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation

—Sun Tzu,
The Art of War

Overview

America's attitude and naiveté towards the art of intelligence within government and military circles directly impacted the functioning of the intelligence community—the Customs Service, the Secret Service, the FBI, and the intelligence units of the State, War and Navy Departments.¹ The Customs Service and Secret Service, however, were not engaged in the collection, evaluation, or dissemination of foreign intelligence as it pertained to the military security of the United States. Only the FBI, the State Department, and the service intelligence organizations played a direct role in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Understanding their basic organizational history during the interwar years is essential in order to assess each's capability and performance in supporting national and military decision-makers prior to December 7.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The mission of the FBI was primarily one of counterespionage despite J. Edgar Hoover's desire to "control the intelligence community."² Specifically, the FBI was charged by the Attorney General's office with taking "charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations."³ Agents were assigned to perform these tasks in the continental United States, its possessions (including Hawaii and the Philippines), and in foreign countries of the Western Hemisphere.⁴

The focal point of FBI operations regarding Pearl Harbor took place in Honolulu and Washington, D.C., respectively. Agents in both locations were tasked to surveil and report on activities by personnel assigned to the Honolulu Consulate and the Japanese Embassy staff. Methods employed consisted of observation and, in the case of the Honolulu Consulate, wiretaps on official and unofficial telephone lines.⁵ Of primary concern to the FBI was the operation of Japanese agent networks attempting to obtain information on U.S. defense plants, military installations, and military order of battle.⁶

The Honolulu office played the FBI's most prominent role in providing information to the intelligence community concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Under Agent Robert Shivers, it "shared concurrent authority and responsibility with the Navy District Intelligence Office (DIO)" for the activities of Japanese personnel assigned to the Honolulu consulate.⁷ He also maintained contact with the Army's Hawaiian Department G-2 section, and relationships between all three offices were cordial.⁸

The capacity of the FBI to provide intelligence for national and military decision-makers concerning Japanese intentions prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor is best

described as peripheral. By virtue of its mission and information collection capabilities, the organization was not in a position to provide intelligence that directly foretold of the Japanese attack. FBI observations and telephone intercepts, however, were a useful source of additional information for the military services concerning Japanese espionage activities on Oahu.

State Department

The State Department terminated its formal intelligence capability in 1929 with the transfer of MI-8 to the Army.⁹ Its main source of information collection and reporting became U.S. ambassadors and their embassy staffs. The U.S. embassy in Tokyo headed by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, however, was limited in its capabilities to provide in-depth information concerning Japanese intentions and activities.

Ambassador Grew was an excellent diplomat with extensive experience in Japan. His primary focus, though, was on political and economic reporting. While these provided valuable insights into conditions within Japan, they were incapable of determining Japanese military intentions concerning Pearl Harbor. Ambassador Grew did include observations from military attaches assigned to the embassy, but their reports were described by Army G-2 as “very indefinite and general information about Japanese military and naval movements.”¹⁰

Given the constraints of operating within Japan, the State Department and Ambassador Grew had a very limited capability to provide intelligence to national and military decision-makers. Grew’s staff worked under very difficult conditions when trying to obtain information concerning Japanese governmental and military activity.

Japan implemented stringent security practices within the country, particularly after Herbert Yardley of MI-8 fame published *The American Black Chamber*, in 1931 and thereby revealed the success of U.S. COMINT operations against Japan.¹¹ This heightened the traditional Japanese distrust of foreigners and created a national “mania for spies.”¹² Travel by foreigners within Japan was limited, and all were kept under close surveillance by the Kempetai (army secret police) or the Tokkoka (special political branch of the Tokyo police).¹³ These efforts limited access by embassy personnel, both diplomatic and military, to Japanese military activity and made collecting useful information almost impossible. As a result, the State Department was not in a position to provide intelligence that could have averted the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

Military Intelligence Organizations

The War Department and Navy Department maintained separate intelligence organizations. Each collected information from a variety of sources and provided its parent service with intelligence to support mission requirements. Together, they supplied the bulk of the intelligence available to national and military decision-makers prior to Pearl Harbor.

The War Department emerged from World War I with “most of the functions of a modern intelligence organization.”¹⁴ The G2, a.k.a. the Military Intelligence Division, was established as one of the Army’s four principal general staff divisions in August 1918. During two years of war it had developed excellent capabilities in current intelligence; in military, economic, political, and psychological estimates; in collection; cryptanalysis; communications intelligence; topography; and operations security.

Members of the G2 even accompanied and supported President Wilson during the peace conference at Versailles.¹⁵ The size, prestige, role of G2, and sources of information available, however, declined significantly within the War Department after World War I.




Figure 2. War Department Organization as of December 7, 1941

G2 remained on the Army general staff during the interwar years, but it was not accorded the importance of other War Department divisions. Budgetary restrictions associated with the Great Depression and the general Isolationist mood of the country undermined the requirement to maintain a sizable peacetime intelligence organization. The G2 staff at the War Department was downsized accordingly, and consisted of only 168 personnel divided between five branches (Administrative, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Plans and Training, and Information Control) in October 1941 (Figure 2).¹⁶ Not included in the G2, but also collecting intelligence, were personnel of the Signal Intelligence Service. Although assigned to the Chief Signal Officer's staff, these individuals provided an invaluable intelligence service by intercepting, decrypting, and translating foreign diplomatic and military communications. Led by William F. Friedman, they played a critical role in breaking the Japanese diplomatic code known as

Purple. These individuals provided much of the intelligence under the code name “Magic” that was available to national and military decision-makers concerning Japanese intentions. Given its importance, however, SIS was a relatively small organization. It consisted of only “44 officers and 180 soldiers and civilians in Washington, and 150 personnel in the field at monitoring stations. By contrast, at the end of the war, SIS had 666 officers and a total of 10,000 individuals in Washington alone.”¹⁷

The prestige of G2 within the War Department and Army dropped along with its size. “Regular Army Officers discovered that intelligence was not a viable career field” and sought to avoid G2 assignments.¹⁸ Some even attributed the Military Intelligence Division as a “‘dumping ground’ for incompetents.”¹⁹ This had the effect of limiting the number of qualified intelligence personnel within the War Department, something that hindered expansion during times of increased defense requirements.

The role of G2 also underwent changes within the War Department and Army during the interwar years. Isolationism and the espionage scare of the 1930s changed its primary focus from concentrating on foreign intelligence to subversion.²⁰ Existing Army Regulations of 1940 also further diluted G2’s focus on foreign affairs. They generally specified that the G2 perform “those duties...which relate to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.”²¹ This was interpreted by the G2 staff to pertain to operational intelligence, not strategic intelligence. The only specific direction concerning intelligence found in Army Regulations stated that:

The MID is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning—

1. Military topographical surveys and maps, including their acquisition, reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).
2. The custody of the War Department map collection.
3. Military attaches, observers and foreign-language students
4. Intelligence personnel of all units.
5. Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.
6. Codes and ciphers.
7. Translations.
8. [crossed out]
9. Censorship in time of war.
10. Safeguarding of military information.²²

Its impact was to divert limited personnel and intelligence resources to what was deemed “most important” by the Army general staff, and not on the “collection, evaluation, and dissemination” of foreign intelligence.

G2 efforts to provide adequate intelligence products were further hampered by security concerns within the War Department over access to and dissemination of MAGIC decrypts and other COMINT information. While the exact source of this is the subject of conflicting testimony during the Pearl Harbor hearings, it successfully limited G2’s effectiveness in providing valuable indications and warning materials for two primary reasons. First, only a handful of key decision-makers in the War Department (the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Director of Military of Intelligence) and General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific were authorized to see MAGIC decrypts.²³ This placed raw, unevaluated information in the hands of personnel without the experience or background to determine its intelligence value. They were also unable to correlate it with other information, something that might have presented a more complete picture of Japanese intentions in the Pacific. In addition, key Army commanders and their staffs in the Pacific, particularly Lieutenant General Short in Hawaii, were unaware

of the information and could not incorporate it into their estimate of the situation. Second, staff G2s and intelligence analysts outside the SIS generally did not have access to MAGIC and were forced to rely principally on attaches and observers in overseas locations for information. Attaches assigned to America's Far Eastern embassies provided information of limited intelligence value as a result of excellent Japanese security measures. "The observers in the Far East were few (three in Singapore, one in Hong Kong); they were underpaid; and, as might be expected, their information was worth about what was paid for it."²⁴ In addition, the Army did not provide funding for the establishment of human intelligence (HUMINT) networks in the Far East, further hindering information collection.²⁵ Overall, security concerns forced G2 to provide field commanders with largely static information, not the type of dynamic indications and warning materials that might have helped avert the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

The factors discussed in the preceding paragraphs directly impacted the Hawaiian Department's intelligence function. The Department G2 was a member of the commanding general's staff, but had a limited role in all intelligence activities except subversion. General Short had little understanding of intelligence, and did not stress its application to his staff. He also did not require intelligence briefings at staff meetings, and appointed an officer without an intelligence background (Lt Col Kendall J. Fielder) as his G2. The basis for the appointment was one of friendship, not competence. Short knew Fielder from a previous assignment and selected him over an experienced reservist (Lt Col George W. Bicknell).²⁶ This lack of emphasis resulted in a situation where the Department G2 did not aggressively conduct intelligence operations. Limited effort was devoted to collecting information on enemy capabilities; determining its validity;

evaluating and determining intent; coordinating analyses with higher headquarters and sister services; and assessing its ultimate impact on Hawaiian Department's mission or the defense of Hawaii. Had Lt Col Fielder or Lt Col Bicknell known of MAGIC and other COMINT materials, however, they might have provided Lieutenant General Short with intelligence that clearly indicated to him the seriousness of the situation in the Pacific.

The external factors largely beyond the control of the G2s in Washington and Hawaii (reduction in size; the loss of prestige; the change in the roles from foreign intelligence to subversion; and the lack of collection assets) hindered their performance; not incompetence or negligence. The downsized force was unable to rapidly expand and meet the increased national and military intelligence requirements generated by World War II in Europe and rising tensions in the Pacific. Despite plans to triple the size of the Washington G2 staff by December 1941, too few trained, professional personnel were available to significantly increase intelligence capabilities prior to Pearl Harbor.²⁷ The emphasis on combating subversion also diverted resources that could have been used to support traditional military, economic, and political intelligence requirements. This was particularly true in Hawaii where the G2 function concerned itself primarily with installation security and the reliability of the local Japanese population. Overall, the lack of emphasis on intelligence within the War Department during the interwar years created a situation where the structure of G2 was inadequate to support decision-makers in Washington, D.C., as well as those in Hawaii, during the critical months before Pearl Harbor.

Navy Department—U.S. Navy

The Navy Department had the longest tradition of organized intelligence within the military. It formally established an intelligence function, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), during the 1880s as the worldwide naval arms race began. ONI’s focus was worldwide, and its mission was “to collect intelligence on foreign navies in peacetime and in war.”²⁸




Figure 3. Navy Department Organization as of December 7, 1941

ONI was a division on the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and divided into three main branches (Administrative, Domestic, Foreign) staff at the time of Pearl Harbor (Figure 3). The Domestic and Foreign branch provided the CNO and Navy Department staff with substantive intelligence products. The Domestic Branch concentrated on espionage and counterintelligence issues, while the Foreign Branch collected information on foreign naval forces.²⁹ The Navy also maintained a COMINT capability, although not part of the ONI. The Security Section of the Communications Division provided an invaluable intelligence service by intercepting, decrypting, and translating foreign

diplomatic and military communications. Led by Commander Laurence F. Safford, it played a major role in providing Navy operational decision-makers with information concerning foreign ship locations and fleet readiness. The section also assisted the Army's Signal Intelligence Service in intercepting, decrypting, and translating the Japanese diplomatic code known as Purple.

Like the Army's G2, ONI was adversely affected by external factors beyond its control during the interwar years. These included: the nation's isolationist sentiments and associated budget reductions that inhibited intelligence manning and daily operations; the intelligence profession's lack of prestige within the Navy hierarchy; the forceful insertion of the War Plans Division into the intelligence evaluation and dissemination process; and the stringent security practices limiting the availability of important COMINT to operational commanders. All of them combined to impede ONI's capability to support Navy and national decision-makers as tensions increased in Europe and the Pacific in 1941.

Naval Intelligence consisted of approximately 2000 personnel in the beginning of December 1941: 705 personnel in Washington, D.C. (230 officers, 175 enlisted, 300 civilians) tasked to support the CNO staff; 1000 personnel assigned to naval districts located within the United States and its possessions; 133 officers and 200 enlisted personnel assigned to embassies or foreign ports around the world as attaches and observers.³⁰ While these figures sound impressive, the Navy's worldwide mission prior to Pearl Harbor required a diversified intelligence effort. The 1000 intelligence personnel assigned to the naval districts primarily had an espionage, counterintelligence, and current intelligence function at the numerous ports and naval installations within their

jurisdiction; they provided little intelligence on foreign naval activity. The war in Europe also consumed significant intelligence resources. Although officially neutral, the United States was actively engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic as it convoyed supplies to Britain. As a result, only one percent of all Navy intelligence personnel were assigned to collect information on Japan: the Far Eastern Section of the ONI staff consisting of three officers and four civilians; 17 observers assigned to Far Eastern ports;³¹ and two attaches working in the Tokyo embassy.³² Supporting this effort were only two officers, two yeomen, and six translators (three of who were in training) assigned to the all important translation section of the Communications Security unit that provided MAGIC decrypts.³³ These factors created a situation similar to that experienced by the G2—too few trained personnel to adequately address increasing and competing requirements for intelligence by military and national decision-makers.

Concurrent with increasing intelligence requirements was a lack of prestige within the Navy for personnel serving in ONI. Like their Army counterparts, regular officers avoided an assignment to intelligence if at all possible. Intelligence was considered a dumping ground and detrimental to an officer's career progression. "Pre-war intelligence people, especially cryptanalysts, were generally regarded as more or less screwballs by the service at large, and their importance was very much underrated."³⁴ This attitude hampered the training and retention of qualified personnel, something that hurt efforts to increase the capabilities of ONI to support national and military intelligence requirements. More importantly, it created a lack of appreciation for intelligence within the Navy hierarchy and negatively impacted the role of ONI's Foreign Intelligence

Branch in collecting, evaluating, and disseminating pertinent intelligence to national decision-makers and operational commanders.

This attitude is especially evident in the role assigned to intelligence by the CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark., at the request of the Chief of the War Plans Division, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner. Turner believed that ONI should not be responsible for determining enemy intentions in formal Estimates. Despite the objections of the Chief of Intelligence, Captain Alan G. Kirk, Turner convinced Admiral Stark in April 1941 that ONI was “solely a collection agency and a distributing agency, and was not charged with sending out any information which would initiate any operations on the part of the fleet, or fleets, anywhere.”³⁵ This directly contradicted Navy regulations in effect at the time of Pearl Harbor which established the mission of the ONI Foreign Intelligence Branch as:

- 1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters with particular attention to strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.

- 2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.³⁶

More importantly, Stark’ decision placed the responsibility for evaluating information in the hands on Rear Admiral Turner, not the ONI. This created a situation that would have “serious consequences” in the coming months according to Roberta Wohlstetter. “When the job of collecting information is separated from the job of assessing its meaning, the fundamental motive or incentive for collecting information disappears.”³⁷ ONI was turned into little more than an information collection agency, with little or no responsibility for evaluating, producing, or disseminating finished intelligence to operational commanders and decision-makers. Turner, who lacked the training, experience, and time for analysis, became the intelligence broker for national and naval

decision-makers. It was he who had the final say concerning the content of intelligence estimates that were disseminated. This created an additional filter in the intelligence process, one leading Admiral Kimmel and his fleet intelligence officer, Commander Edwin Layton, to complain bitterly that Washington withheld critical information from them.³⁸

Like the Army, stringent security regulations concerning MAGIC and limited alternate sources of collection hampered ONI's capabilities to support national and military decision-makers. Access to MAGIC Purple Code decrypts and translations within the Department of the Navy was limited only to the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, the Chief of the War Plans Division, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Far Eastern Desk of ONI, and the Translation Section of the Communications Division.³⁹ This turned key Navy decision-makers into quasi intelligence analysts as seen in the case of Rear Admiral Turner, and negatively impacted the dissemination of meaningful intelligence to operational commanders. The Navy Department did have an intelligence source not available to the Army: COMINT on Japanese ship movements derived from traffic analysis. This form of COMINT was less closely guarded and allowed ONI and theater analysts to monitor Japanese naval and merchant marine activity. Traffic analysis was not foolproof, however. It was an inexact science of trying to determine ship movements through association with radio call signs and direction finding.⁴⁰ While reasonably accurate, analysts could not be certain the information was completely correct. Other sources of information (attaches, observers, and agents) were limited in effectiveness and timeliness. These generally produced reporting of a dated and static nature, and energetic Japanese security practices successfully restricted their utility.

Overall, security concerns forced ONI to provide fleet decision-makers with largely static information, not the type of dynamic indications and warning material that might have helped avert the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

The factors discussed above directly impacted the Pacific Fleet's intelligence capabilities at Pearl Harbor to support Admiral Kimmel. The traditional lack of emphasis on intelligence within Navy operational circles and lack of trained personnel hampered development of a robust fleet intelligence capability. Commander Layton was the first permanently assigned intelligence officer to the Pacific Fleet staff when he reported for duty in December 1940. This position was an additional duty prior to that time, and no files, records, or current intelligence on Japanese forces were kept.⁴¹ The assumption of intelligence dissemination responsibilities by Rear Admiral Turner also affected support for Admiral Kimmel. Both Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner thought that Admiral Kimmel was receiving MAGIC decrypts and never checked to determine otherwise. This oversight probably prevented Admiral Kimmel from completely appreciating the severity of the crisis between Japan and United States during the six months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor.⁴² The stringent security associated with MAGIC information further limited Admiral Kimmel's situation awareness as the crisis in the Pacific became acute. As Commander Layton later complained "because we were not being sent any diplomatic MAGIC, neither Kimmel nor I had any way of knowing what dire intelligence prompted Washington's fears."⁴³ If Admiral Kimmel and his staff had access to MAGIC derived information, they might have been more attuned to the other intelligence anomalies discovered by COMINT personnel stationed in Hawaii. It is possible that the second change in Imperial Japanese Navy call-signs in 30 days and the "loss" of the

carriers in message traffic would have prompted a different response—one that placed the entire Pacific Fleet at war readiness on December 7, instead of its peacetime routine.

Such external factors as budgetary restrictions and the nation's isolationist sentiments that limited ONI's size and subsequent capabilities at home and abroad; the lack of prestige for ONI within the Navy hierarchy; the diminished role of ONI in the production of intelligence; and COMINT security concerns at the expense of operational awareness were largely beyond the control of ONI in Washington and the naval intelligence community in Hawaii. All contributed to the disaster at Pearl Harbor, but they are directly attributable to naval staff decisions—not ONI policy. Overall, the naval intelligence community performed well given its inherent limitations and existing technology capabilities.

Summary

The traditional neglect and lack of appreciation for the intelligence community within the United States government and military is amply reflected in the organizational histories of the FBI, State Department, and the War and Navy Departments during the interwar years. Despite acknowledged intelligence shortcomings in the United States Senate and House of Representatives' *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, dated 16 July 1946, the cause for the failure at Pearl Harbor cannot be placed on the intelligence community. The Committee correctly recognized that supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies, not intelligence incompetence or negligence, were to blame.⁴⁴ The practice of intelligence within the United States was primarily limited to times of war;

government and military decision-makers made little effort to support or utilize intelligence during peacetime. This resulted in an underdeveloped intelligence system sorely tested to support national and military decision-makers as the crisis in between Japan and the United States intensified in 1941.

Notes

¹ William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977), 94.

² *Ibid.*, 93.

³ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁴ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 125.

⁵ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 442-443.

⁶ Ladislav Farago, *Burn Before Reading: The Espionage History of World War II* (New York, NY: Walker & Co., 1961), 179.

⁷ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 78.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁹ Ladislav Farago, *Burn Before Reading: The Espionage History of World War II* (New York, NY: Walker & Co., 1961), 187.

¹⁰ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 131-132.

¹¹ Ronald Lewin, *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982), 33.

¹² Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *“And I Was There”* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1985), 39.

¹³ Ladislav Farago, *Burn Before Reading: The Espionage History of World War II* (New York, NY: Walker & Co., 1961), 177.

¹⁴ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 112.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 111.

¹⁶ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 280.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

¹⁸ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 113.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

²⁰ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 279.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 290.

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²² Ibid., 290.

²³ Ibid., 176.

²⁴ Ibid., 281.

²⁵ Ibid., 281.

²⁶ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 338.

²⁷ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 281.

²⁸ Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, "Appendix A: The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community—An Historical Overview" in *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence*, 1 March 1996, 1; on-line, Internet, 15 December 1996, available from <http://www.gpo.gov/su.../epubs/int.report.html>.

²⁹ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 315.

³⁰ Ibid., 314.

³¹ Ibid., 314.

³² Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 32.

³³ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 171. By comparison, the end of the war found 6000 personnel employed in this particular area—an increase by a factor of 600!

³⁴ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 288.

³⁵ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 317.

³⁶ Ibid., 317.

³⁷ Ibid., 319.

³⁸ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *And I Was There* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 21.

³⁹ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 171, 176.

⁴⁰ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 133.

⁴¹ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *And I Was There* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 38.

⁴² Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 214-215.

⁴³ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *And I Was There* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 90.

⁴⁴ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 552.

Chapter 4

The Success of Intelligence Collection Prior to December 7, 1941

By “intelligence” we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country—the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.

—Carl von Clausewitz,
On War

Overview

Intelligence collection capabilities prior to Pearl Harbor were primitive when compared to those available today. U.S. intelligence organizations relied primarily on COMINT, HUMINT, and imagery assets for the bulk of their information. A brief discussion of each and their limitations is required to determine the types of information available to national and military decision-makers prior to Pearl Harbor.

COMINT

COMINT is “intelligence derived from intercepting messages transmitted by radio or similar means.”¹ It is divided into two subareas: cryptanalysis and traffic analysis. Cryptanalysis is the science of breaking codes and ciphers in order to read encoded messages. It is based on principles of mathematics and language.² If successful, cryptanalysis provides the party reading intercepted messages with great insight into an adversary’s plans, thoughts, and capabilities. Traffic analysis is a process that attempts to

identify radio transmitters through the use of callsigns; analyze communications networks to determine their chain of command and lines of communication; and locate radio transmitters using electronic direction finding equipment. It is not an exact science, but can reveal order of battle data, unit and ship locations, activity levels, and other indications and warning information.³

Cryptanalysis was the principal source of information for the United States concerning Japanese government and military activities prior to Pearl Harbor. The success enjoyed in this area was the result of Army and Navy efforts to maintain and expand their COMINT efforts during the 1930s. Under the leadership of William F. Friedman, the Army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Naval Communications Division (CD) succeeded in breaking the Japanese diplomatic code, nicknamed Purple by the U.S. analysts in 1940.⁴ They also successfully penetrated to varying degrees the J-19 diplomatic code and the PA-K2 consular code.⁵ Working together the codebreakers provided American decision-makers with a steady stream of messages from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and embassies around the world.

While not all message traffic could be read, the resulting information provided valuable insights into Japanese foreign policy and during the last six months of 1941 foretold the imminence of hostilities in the Pacific.⁶ The weaknesses described previously in Chapter 3 concerning the misuse of intelligence by national and military decision-makers, however, nullified the full exploitation of this exceptional resource.

The system was a hodgepodge. No one was responsible for the continuous study of all material. Recipients would read their portion of intercepts, and then it would be whisked away, never to be seen again. There was very little that could be done to put together all pieces in a cohesive form, or to correlate them with information available from other sources.

Though the technical side of COMINT, particularly the breaking of Purple, had been performed with genius, the analytical side had become lost in disorganization.⁷

A prime example of this was MAGIC intercepts of “deadline” messages sent from the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Washington embassy during November 1941. From the beginning to the end of the month, “there was scarcely a message from Tokyo that did not reiterate the need for speed and the fact that this was the last chance.”⁸ These built to a crescendo on November 22 when Tokyo sent an explicit deadline to its ambassadors:

...Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, [author’s italics]* but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth)...we have decided to wait until that date. *This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen [author’s italics].* Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before.⁹

This series of messages, culminating with the one above, provided national and military decision-makers with clear indications that the Japanese were preparing to conduct some type of military activity in the Pacific after November 29, 1941. While war warnings were sent to the Hawaii commanders on November 24 and November 27 respectively, they did not convey the urgency in the original MAGIC “deadline” intercepts. In addition, neither warning was correlated by Washington to later COMINT information that could have increased the Hawaiian commanders’ sense of urgency.

Correlation of the MAGIC “deadline” messages was available through traffic analysis of Japanese Naval communications provided by the Navy’s Strategic Mid-Pacific Direction Finder Net, a series of intercept sites in the Pacific and continental United States.¹⁰ It monitored Japanese naval communications and copied message traffic

“externals,” such as sender and recipient callsigns, radio frequencies, transmission schedules, volume of traffic, and message precedence. Net personnel also performed direction finding against the transmitting station. By triangulating bearings from a number of intercept sites, analysts could pinpoint the location of the sender. Analysis of the externals and resulting location data produced correlation to headquarters, units, and individual ships, and provided indications of the type of activity taking place. Although an inexact science, traffic analysis could supply key indications and warning of impending activity when viewed in conjunction with other indicators.

Three major traffic analysis events took place between are worth consideration: a complete Japanese navy communications change on November 1, 1941; the lack of Japanese carrier and submarine communications after November 16, 1941; and a second complete Japanese navy communications change on December 1.¹¹ These events, particularly the two major communications changes, provided clear indications that the Japanese navy was preparing to conduct some type of major operation(s). Japanese navy practice was to conduct a communications change every six months at that time. The one which occurred on November 1 fit this pattern, but the next on December 1 was unprecedented. Both within 30 days of each other were a clear indication that the Japanese were increasing communications security and attempting to deceive U.S. intelligence. The loss of the Japanese aircraft carriers in radio traffic was also cause for concern. While not unprecedented, their disappearance provided another strong indicator of impending naval activity when viewed in conjunction with Japanese preparations to move into Southeast Asia and the tense state of relations existing between the U.S. and Japan.¹²

These events were noted by decision-makers and intelligence personnel in Hawaii and Washington. They generated concern, but the correlation between them and the earlier MAGIC traffic responsible for generating the late November war warning messages was overlooked. This is understandable to some extent for the Hawaii commanders who did not have access to MAGIC information; but only to the vaguely worded war warnings. Washington, however, had the original MAGIC text. Decision-makers and analysts should have recognized the seriousness of this activity after intercepting the November 29 deadline which read “*things are automatically going to happen [author’s italics]*.”¹³ If they had, a subsequent, more strongly worded warning could have been sent to the Hawaiian commanders.

This example clearly points out the danger of divorcing intelligence collection from analysis and dissemination. As Ameringer aptly points out in his analysis of the causes of Pearl Harbor:

The highest U.S. officials, themselves performing the function of intelligence officers, learned a great deal about Japan’s intentions from MAGIC. But they were looking for the needle in a haystack, for the telltale signal. (Roosevelt insisted that he see the original decrypts, not just summaries.) They were unable to piece together the relationships between and significance of signals that they saw only in isolation. Considering the thousands of intercepted Japanese messages, the system was bound to break down.¹⁴

HUMINT

Human intelligence (HUMINT) involves the collection of information by individuals, either covertly or overtly. Covert collection is clandestine in nature, inherently risky; and almost always illegal; overt collection is conducted using available open source materials and nonclandestine methods.¹⁵ Spies and counterintelligence

agents perform covert collection, while military attaches and diplomats carry on open collection of information.¹⁶

Prior to Pearl Harbor the principle U.S. intelligence organizations conducting HUMINT activities were the FBI, the State Department, and the War and Navy departments. The FBI relied on its agents within the continental United States and overseas possessions; the State Department was solely dependent on its diplomats, both ambassadors and lesser officials; and the military relied on its attaches and observers in foreign countries, as well as counterintelligence personnel within the United States and its possessions.

HUMINT activities enjoyed limited success within the U.S. intelligence community concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States did not engage in espionage activities prior to the attack, and was solely dependent on diplomatic, military attaché, observer, and counterintelligence reporting.¹⁷ This limited its ability to collect relevant information that could have indicated Japanese intentions concerning Pearl Harbor.

Diplomatic reporting from the American Embassy in Tokyo provided information of limited value from a military perspective. While Ambassador Grew was an experienced diplomat, his expertise lay in the areas of political and economic developments. There were two exceptions, however.

The first consisted of a report forwarded by him to the State Department on January 27, 1941, based on information received from the Peruvian ambassador. Grew reported:

My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.

He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.¹⁸

Grew nor anyone else within the United States government had any way of knowing that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had written of such a plan on January 7 in a letter to the Japanese Navy Minister.¹⁹ The report was shared with ONI who believed the information was not credible based on current Japanese force dispositions, and forwarded it to Admiral Kimmel with similar comments. While this analysis was technically correct at the time, this information would not be remembered nine months later as tensions increased in the Pacific. Had someone within the intelligence community or the decision-making chain performed a historical trend analysis, it may have been possible to remind the Hawaii military commanders that the Japanese considered Pearl Harbor a viable target.

The second was an analysis of the Japanese national character with reference to entering into hostilities with the United States. Grew reported on November 3, 1941, that the United States should avoid “any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic.”²⁰ This warning also failed to register with U.S. decision-making circles and overcome their inherent bias: “the Japanese would not dare to attack the United States, and...that they could not pull it off if they wanted to.”²¹

U.S. Military attaches assigned to the American Embassy in Tokyo were unable to add anything to Ambassador Grew’s reporting. Their efforts to collect information were hindered by pervasive Japanese security measures. They were kept under constant

surveillance, and police informers shadowed their movements. While military and naval attaches were frequently guests of the Japanese military at social affairs, they were not invited to observe ground, air, or naval displays. The Japanese also made extensive use of “fortified zones” around installations of potential military interest where foreigners were arrested on sight. In addition, bamboo screens were used to conceal ship building facilities.²² Overall, U.S. military attaches contributed nothing of value that could have foretold of Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor.

Another potential source of HUMINT information was U.S. military observers assigned to various ports and cities in the Far East. Over three hundred were employed worldwide, with twenty-one assigned in the Far East (four Army and seventeen Navy). The Army stated it received very little from its observers, although the Navy reported it obtained the bulk of its information from them.²³ Unfortunately, their reporting concentrated primarily on unit and ship movements in non-Japanese ports. While they provided indications the Japanese were massing forces in Indochina in preparation for their attack on Malaya, they could obtain nothing that would foretell of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

FBI and military counterintelligence personnel constituted another possible source of information concerning Japanese activities, particularly in Hawaii. Their contribution, however, was extremely limited. They had little success against Japanese intelligence personnel assigned to the Hawaii Consulate, despite suspicions of espionage and the use of illegal telephone wiretaps.²⁴ The openness of American society and Japanese precautions to conduct only “legal” activities with Consular personnel precluded detection. This operation did collect one bit of important information, however, prior to

the attack. On December 3, a wiretap maintained on the Consulate's cook's quarters by FBI agent Robert Shivers revealed that the Japanese "Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers."²⁵ Shivers shared this information with Captain I.H. Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, and Lt Col George W. Bicknell, the Hawaiian Department Deputy G2. This information also coincided with the arrival of two messages from CNO that reported Japanese embassies and consulates in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and Batavia had been ordered to destroy their Purple code machines.²⁶ These three events were clear indications that the Japanese planned some type of activity in the Pacific within a matter of days. Unfortunately, the information failed to strike this chord with the commanders in Hawaii. Lieutenant General Short never received the information, and Admiral Kimmel theorized that the Navy Department "might very well have enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant."²⁷

Aerial Reconnaissance

Aerial reconnaissance for intelligence purposes prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor was largely impractical. While providing both imagery and visual observation, its use in other than international airspace was primarily restricted to wartime operations. The requirement to overfly and violate the territorial integrity of sovereign states made these missions all but impossible without presidential approval. Although the Army planned to overfly Truk and Jaluit Islands in the Japanese Mandates with B-24 aircraft, these missions never took place due to the attack. One of the aircraft was destroyed at Hickam Field, and the mission requirement was canceled.²⁸

Overall, it is unlikely that aerial reconnaissance for purely intelligence purposes could have accomplished anything to prevent the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Only overflights of the Japanese home islands and the Kuriles would have detected the absence or presence of the missing Japanese carriers destined to conduct the attack. These were unfeasible from operational and political perspectives, however.

Aerial reconnaissance missions against the home islands and the Kuriles were extremely risky for two essentially political reasons. First, the state of relations between Japan was extremely tense, and the shoot down of an American aircraft or capture of aircrew members over sovereign Japanese territory would probably have precipitated a major diplomatic incident at best, or war at the worst. U.S. military leaders, in particular, wanted to avoid provoking a confrontation. Both Marshall and Stark wanted to concentrate on Europe and the buildup of American military forces.²⁹ Second, the American public and Congress were not prepared for the United States government to commit what could be perceived as a hostile act. Isolationist sentiment within the country was extremely strong prior to Pearl Harbor, and such an incident could jeopardize U.S. rearmament and support for Britain.

The best role for aerial reconnaissance in averting the attack on Pearl Harbor was in an operational sense. The Hawaiian commanders possessed limited numbers of long range seaplanes (PBY-3 and PBY-5) and bombers (B-17 and B-18), but chose not to use them for this purpose.³⁰ There were not sufficient numbers to conduct complete 360 degree surveillance operations around Hawaii, although they could have been employed in the sectors judged most likely to serve as the approach for an attacking force. The

issue of why the commanders did not conduct aerial reconnaissance, however, deals with operational matters and is beyond the scope of this work.³¹

Japanese Planning, Security, and Deception Activities

Three factors directly complicated the U.S. intelligence collection and analytical effort. These consisted of thorough Japanese planning; the strict security measures employed within Japanese society and by the military; and the use of deception. All three combined to conceal Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor; reduced the risk to the striking force; and limited the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence analysts and decision-makers as they tried to determine Japan's true intentions in the Pacific.

Japanese planning prior to the attack was very thorough and innovative. First, the planners selected a northern approach route to the Hawaiian Islands rarely used by merchant shipping during the winter months when storms and heavy seas were frequent. Second, they utilized the liner *Taiyo Maru* to scout this route en route to Honolulu and collect information concerning sea conditions, winds, visibility, and most importantly, the presence of other shipping and American aerial reconnaissance activity. Finally, trained naval intelligence officers sailed on board two Japanese liners that stopped in Hawaii between October 15 and November 1.³²

Japanese security practices further concealed preparations from the U.S. intelligence effort and primarily took two forms: counterespionage and operations security. As noted earlier, the Japanese had a "mania for spies" and implemented a far reaching national security program. Society was conditioned to distrust foreigners and avoid contact; the secret police and military security forces effectively surveilled and controlled the

movement of foreigners throughout the country;³³ and the government censored all wire cables, telephone messages, and newspaper articles being sent to foreign destinations.³⁴ This activity caused Ambassador Grew “to disclaim any responsibility for noting or reporting overt military evidence of an imminent outbreak of war.”³⁵ Complementing these activities were the operations security practices implemented by the Japanese Navy. Personnel preparing to depart their home ports as part of the strike force were informed that they were participating in a training exercise. The Japanese also chose to marshal their fleet in the Kurile islands prior to sailing. This eliminated virtually any chance of its detection by foreign attaches, observers, or agents. Most importantly, the entire striking force observed strict radio silence after leaving their home ports in mid-November. Some captains went so far as to remove radio fuses and seal the transmitter keys to ensure there were no accidents.³⁶

Complementing these activities were the deception techniques employed by the Japanese. These were quite thorough and designed to conceal the assembly, formation, and transit of the strike force from HUMINT and COMINT collection.

Japanese soldiers were dressed as sailors and sent on leave in Tokyo and Yokohama to give the impression that the fleet was still in home waters.³⁷ Aircraft designated for the carriers were replaced at their training bases by those from another unit in order to keep up the appearance of normal flight operations. Other deceptive activities included “reinforcing garrisons in Manchuria, implying a possible invasion of Russia” and sending “‘false war plans for Chinese targets’ to individual commanders.”³⁸ The most important, however, involved the simulation of carrier radio messages.³⁹ To enhance the deception, regular radio operators were left in home port by the departing task force to transmit the

simulated message traffic. Each operator has a distinctive “fist,” or means of sending Morse code, and was easily recognizable by trained COMINT intercept operators.⁴⁰ In addition,

every day false communications emanated from Kyushu at the same time and on the same wavelength as during the training period. This would give eavesdroppers such as Rochefort’s Combat Intelligence Unit [*COMINT unit located at Pearl Harbor, author’s italics*] the impression that the First Air Fleet remained in that area for routine training. Moreover, the Navy broadcast daily messages to Nagumo as intended during the cruise to Hawaii. To begin precisely on November 26, the scheduled day of sortie, might tip off the Americans that something unusual had started on that date.⁴¹

The final piece of deception was the continuation of negotiations in Washington, D.C., by Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura and Special Envoy Saburo Kurusu.⁴² Although neither suspected they were being used in this manner, MAGIC intercepts from November 28-30 indicate the duplicity of the Japanese government. Tokyo cabled Ambassador Nomura with the following instruction on November 28:

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, *the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific.*[author’s italics].⁴³

A cable to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin November 30 provided additional proof of deceit:

The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet...now stand ruptured—

*broken....In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.*⁴⁴

Summary

The success of U.S. intelligence collection prior to December 7, 1941, is mixed at best. COMINT, with its MAGIC decrypts, was extremely successful. It provided critical information on Japanese diplomatic activities in almost near-real-time. Traffic analysis provided useful information for tracking Japanese military and naval activity, although it was far from foolproof as the episode of the missing Japanese carriers demonstrates. HUMINT was marginally effective due to effective Japanese security measures in and around the home islands. Aerial reconnaissance for intelligence purposes was extremely risky and politically unacceptable. In addition, Japanese deception scenarios created a smoke screen that complicated information collection and evaluation, and helped hide their intentions towards Pearl Harbor.

Overall, the events described above clearly point out a major shortfall in the evaluation process as it existed prior to Pearl Harbor: the lack of a formal mechanism for sharing information and correlating it with other data. By themselves, the COMINT and HUMINT available prior to the attack do not contain any direct indications the Japanese intended to attack Pearl Harbor or the United States. When correlated with data from all

sources, however, it becomes readily apparent that war was a very distinct possibility and could occur within days.

Notes

¹ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 4.

² *Ibid.*, 89.

³ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁴ Ronald Lewin, *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1982), 36-43.

⁵ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 175.

⁶ Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *Captains Without Eyes* (London, UK: Macmillan & Co., 1969), 85.

⁷ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 135.

⁸ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 194.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 189-190.

¹⁰ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 133-134.

¹¹ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 40-42.

¹² Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 441. Kimmel testified that in the six months before the attack “there existed a total of 134 days--in 12 separate periods--each ranging from 9 to 22 days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.”

¹³ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁴ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 135.

¹⁵ William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977), 98n. In the case of counterintelligence activities prior to Pearl Harbor, persons within the United States had been prohibited by Section 605, Communications Act of 1934, from intercepting any wire or radio communication and making use of information contained therein, unless authorized by the sender. Exceptions were provided with respect to any radio communication, broadcast, or transmission by amateurs or others for the use of the general public, or relating to ships in distress. These exceptions did not, however, permit military officers to intercept communications in the performance of their official duties. This included the use of wiretaps as part of counterintelligence investigations.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

Notes

¹⁷ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 131.

¹⁸ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 31.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁰ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 132.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 130.

²² Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *“And I Was There”* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 64.

²³ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 281, 314.

²⁴ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 78-80.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 447.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 447-448.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 449.

²⁸ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 461-463.

²⁹ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 139.

³⁰ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 461-463, 410.

³¹ Additional information is available for interested readers in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, as well as publications by Gordon Prange and Roberta Wohlstetter, to name a few.

³² Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 313-316.

³³ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *“And I Was There”* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 40-41.

³⁴ Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *Captains Without Eyes* (London, UK: MacMillan & Co., 1969), 81.

³⁵ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 383.

³⁶ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 53.

³⁷ Ladislav Farago, *Burn Before Reading: The Espionage History of World War II* (New York, NY: Walker & Co., 1961), 211.

³⁸ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 139.

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³⁹ Katherine Herbig, "American Strategic Deception in the Pacific: 1942-44," in *Strategic and Operational Deception In The Second World War*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1987), 260.

⁴⁰ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 139.

⁴¹ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 338.

⁴² Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 139.

⁴³ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 200.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 208.

Chapter 5

Intelligence Available to U.S. Decision-Makers

Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

Overview

Not all of the national decision-makers and military commanders involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor had access to the same information and intelligence products. Functional mission statements, information evaluation and intelligence dissemination practices, and security concerns combined in one form or another to limit availability. While those in Washington saw most of the COMINT information obtainable, the same was not true for the commanders in Hawaii. This chapter presents a listing of what is considered by researchers to be the most important information available to Washington and Hawaii decision-makers during 1941, and assesses its impact on the overall preparedness of U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor.

Washington, D.C.

Washington area intelligence organizations utilized information from COMINT and HUMINT sources for keeping decision-makers apprised of current events and preparing estimates of possible Japanese intentions in the Far East. The primary source of information was COMINT, the bulk of which was provided by decryptions and translations of MAGIC intercepts.

MAGIC Purple Code Intercepts

U.S. code-breakers succeeded in breaking the Japanese Purple code in 1940, allowing almost unlimited access to high level diplomatic communications between the Foreign Ministry and Japanese embassies and consulates worldwide. This, plus information obtained by breaking lesser diplomatic codes, provided a window into activity at the innermost levels of the Japanese government. The project was code-named MAGIC and run jointly by personnel assigned to the War Department's Signals Intelligence Section and the Navy Department's Communications Security unit.¹

MAGIC intercepts during 1941 showed increasing tensions between Japan and United States. This was particularly true for the second half of the year. It is possible to identify this and other trends, as well as to establish patterns useful for analyzing subsequent events, by dividing the MAGIC messages into related categories. These are best categorized as Negotiation Instructions, Codes and Code Destruction, "Espionage," and Last Minute Signals.²

Negotiation Instructions

A series of MAGIC intercepts between Tokyo and its Washington embassy concerning the status of negotiations between Japan and the United States showed a trend of increasing tension following the fall of the Konoye cabinet in mid-October. Analysis of those sent from Tokyo between November 2 and November 26, in particular, display an increasing sense of urgency regarding the negotiations and their outcome:

NOVEMBER 2—We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once. *This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once.* [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 2—I said (to the American Ambassador in Japan), “I am very sorry that *Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse.* If this continues, *I fear that unfortunate results will ensue.* [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 2—I saw him (the British Ambassador) again and *endeavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination.* [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 4—Well, *relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge,* and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them...*Conditions within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible...we have decided...to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort...indeed, the last. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured.* Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos...In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of the die...*This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain,* and I hope that we can thus settle all our trouble with the United States peaceably. [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 4—...*since the situation does not permit of delays,* it will be necessary to put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, *our second*

formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 4—*In view of the gravity of the present negotiations...Ambassador Kurusu is leaving—on the 7th by clipper to assist you. [author's italics added for emphasis]*

NOVEMBER 5—#736 - *Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement [the last Japanese diplomatic proposals before the outbreak of hostilities, known as Proposals A and B] be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese -U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. [author's italics added for emphasis]*

NOVEMBER 5—*As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over. [author's italics added for emphasis]*

NOVEMBER 11—*Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly [sic] criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time...You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short. [author's italics added for emphasis]*

NOVEMBER 11—*The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal...Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays...it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays...I pointed out the criticalness of the situation...That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. [author's italics added for emphasis]*

NOVEMBER 15—...Whatever the case may be, *the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date. [author's italics added for emphasis]*

NOVEMBER 15–In view of the fact that *the crisis is fast approaching*, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element along...*do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation.* [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 16–I have read your #1090...*but the fate of the empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before...*In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, *I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change...You see how short time is;* therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution. [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 22–*It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.* You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. *Spare no efforts* and try to bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-Americans relations by the 25th,* but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; *if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth);* if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, *we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.* Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 24–Tokyo reminds its Washington embassy that all times in the November 22 message are in Tokyo time.

NOVEMBER 24–We here in Japan, *in view of the extremely critical situation, only hope most earnestly for a speedy settlement.* [author's italics added for emphasis]

NOVEMBER 26–In view of the fact that *time is getting short* with but few days left this month, I would like to have you *at once contact the United States authorities* again. [author's italics added for emphasis]³

The trend of increasing tension between the Japan and the United States is definitely discernible by viewing the key excerpts from each message in date sequence, and it is possible to assess that some type of major activity will occur on or after November 29th. The insistence on a settlement by the required date is stronger in each subsequent message, and the message of November 22 also adds a definitive statement: “*After that things are automatically going to happen.*” The information by itself, however, does not point unquestionably to a military response against the United States or an attack against Pearl Harbor.

The trend of increasing urgency in the MAGIC intercepts reached a crescendo with the Japanese decision to terminate negotiations on November 28. MAGIC provided initial indications of this decision in the same message referenced in Chapter 3 as a deception activity. Confirmation of the intentions to break off negotiations was received in a message from Tokyo to the Berlin embassy intercepted by MAGIC on November 30. The Navy and War Departments did not issue subsequent warnings to their Hawaii commanders based on this information. The feeling was that the warnings of November 27 were sufficient to alert them to the possibility of hostilities.

Codes and Code Destruction

Another series of Japanese messages broken by MAGIC that indicated increasing tensions were those dealing with emergency procedures to be employed by diplomatic stations. These initially contained information on emergency codes, but began to take on a portentous tone as they listed codes describing the status of “U.S.-Japanese relations,

Russo-Japanese relations, and British-Japanese relations, “ and the destruction of codes, code equipment, and classified materials.⁴

The two “winds code” messages intercepted on November 19 were the first in a series of emergency procedures sent by Tokyo to the diplomatic community. The first stated:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. In case of emergency (*danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations*), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

1. In case of a *Japan-U.S. relations in danger*: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME [east wind rain].
2. Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI [north wind cloudy].
3. Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE [west wind clear].

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. *When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc.* This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. Forward as urgent intelligence [author’s italics].⁵

The second provided instructions for code words to be used in intelligence broadcasts:

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

1. If it is *Japan-U.S. relations*, “HIGASHI.”
2. *Japan-Russia relations*, “KITA.”
3. *Japan-British relations*, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.), “NISHI.”

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and San Francisco [author’s italics].⁶

MAGIC intercepts from November 26 and November 27 also discovered a telephone code and a “hidden word code” respectively. These were to be used in emergencies to pass information via telephone or telegraph concerning the status of relations, evacuation plans, and the existence of a state of war.⁷

MAGIC intercepts from November 30 took on a more ominous tone as the Japanese embassies in “London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila [were] ordered to destroy their code machines; Batavia’s machine was to be sent back to Japan.”⁸ Additional references to code destruction and the elimination of classified materials were reported in MAGIC intercepts beginning on December 2. In one of these, the Washington embassy was instructed “to burn all telegraphic codes except:

...those now used with the machine and one copy each of “O” (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (*Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.*) *Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.* When you have finished this, wire me back the one word “haruna.” At the time and in the manner you deem most proper *dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.* Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official Kosaka brought you [author’s italics].⁹

Related messages were sent to Havana, Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle, and Portland, which also contained an additional instruction:

Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling. *The above is preparatory to an emergency situation* and is for your information alone. Remain calm [author’s italics].¹⁰

Analysis of these messages again shows a clearly definable trend—from preparing for an emergency to the order for beginning destruction of codes and classified materials. While there are no references to the actual breaking off of diplomatic relations or war, they were indicators of the rising tensions between Japan and the United States and that some type of significant event would occur as a result.

Espionage

MAGIC also intercepted messages sent to Japanese agents throughout the Pacific and United States. These messages were sent in the simpler codes known as J-19 or PA-K2, and were translated and sent to national and military decision-makers with the Purple decrypts.¹¹ Most contained requests for information concerning shipping, ports, cities, and installations. A small number were sent between Tokyo and the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, and are important in the analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The first message was intercepted on September 24 and provided instructions for Tadeo Yoshikawa, an undercover Japanese naval intelligence officer assigned to the Honolulu Consulate. It specified:

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
2. Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
3. Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
4. Area C. East Loch.
5. Area D. Middle Loch.
6. Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes. 2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. if possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)¹²

This MAGIC intercept became known as the “bomb plot message” because it created a grid to plot exactly the location of ships in the harbor.¹³

Additional instructions were passed to Yoshikawa and intercepted by MAGIC in November. On November 15, Tokyo told him to:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.¹⁴

Two additional messages on November 20 and November 29 respectively directed Yoshikawa to “Please investigate comprehensively the fleet [unreadable] bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation,” and “ We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.”¹⁵

These messages clearly indicate interest in Pearl Harbor, but were not seen as threatening by Washington. Although Colonel Bratton in G2 thought it “showed unusual interest,” the message failed to attract much attention when routed through the MAGIC reporting chain.¹⁶ ONI regarded the instructions as a means of cutting down on the volume of message traffic from the Consulate because the Japanese Navy had a history of asking it for shorter reports.¹⁷ This lack of concern is somewhat understandable when the “bomb plot” is compared to the other intercepts from Japanese agents at ports around the Pacific. It was remarkably similar to the information they routinely passed from the Panama Canal, the Philippines, and the West Coast of the United States. As a result, it generated only passing interest among the analysts and decision-makers.

Last Minute Signals

The MAGIC intercepts that served as last minute signals to the Washington intelligence and decision-making communities are known as the “pilot message; the 14-

part message; the one 1 o'clock, or time-of-delivery, message; and the final code-destruction message."¹⁸ These provided significant indications that Japan was going to formally break relations with the United States and probably conduct some major operation in the Pacific.

The first of the four MAGIC intercepts told the Washington embassy that Tokyo was sending a reply to the American proposal of November 26. It was intercepted on December 6 and stated:

This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.¹⁹

This message set the stage for Japan's formal response to Secretary of State Hull's note of November 26. Briefly, the American note took the form of a three month *modus vivendi* designed to promote continued dialog on a Japanese- withdrawal from Indochina and China, in return for oil sales and the unfreezing of Japanese assets within the United States. Attached to it was an additional document known as the Ten Point Note which "was put forward as a basis for long-term discussions of Japanese-American differences, to be undertaken after acceptance of the *modus vivendi*."²⁰ It basically restated the American positions on issues ranging from withdrawal of military forces from China and Indochina, recognition of the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek, and Japan's withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact. While not an ultimatum, Tokyo viewed it as such and responded with its 14 Part Message.

The 14 Part Message began arriving on December 6, although the last was not received by MAGIC operators until 3:00 A.M. EST, December 7.²¹ It was Japan's formal notification that negotiations with the United States were finished. Immediately following the last part was the 1 O'clock message which informed Ambassador Nomura to submit the 14 Part Message to the Secretary of State no later than 1:00 P.M., December 7. The last message received by the Japanese Embassy was intercepted at 5:00 A.M. EST and provided instructions for the destruction of the code machine, associated codes, and classified materials.²²

The arrival of these messages was anxiously awaited by the intelligence community and national decision-makers, but the account of their final distribution is one of missed opportunities and what ifs. The MAGIC couriers began making their rounds with the messages between 7:30 A.M. and 9:00 A.M., notifying the Navy and War Departments, the State Department, and the White House. While all recipients recognized that the 14 Part Message meant the final severing of relations, it was the 1 O'clock message which sounded the alarm. Intelligence analysts in the Navy and War Departments recognized that the time was important, but did not know its exact significance. Both correctly surmised that war was likely and something would occur somewhere in the Pacific around 1 P.M. Washington time. Based on correlating COMINT and HUMINT information, most expected Japan to launch an attack in Southeast Asia, with specific concerns over the Kra Peninsula and Philippines. Of the key decision-makers seeing the messages, however, only General Marshall attempted to send a last minute warning to the Pacific commanders. At the urging of Brigadier General Miles (Army G2) and Col Bratton (G2 Far Eastern section), who "were convinced it meant Japanese hostile action

against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon," he quickly drafted a message addressed to Army commanders in the Philippines, Panama, the West Coast, and Hawaii.²³ Admiral Stark concurred with this action, and it stated: "Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication. Marshall."²⁴ This eleventh hour attempt, however, was unsuccessful. Atmospheric communications problems with Hawaii delayed its arrival until after the start of the attack.

Aftermath

MAGIC provided Washington intelligence personnel and decision-makers with their best opportunity to provide early warning to U.S. commanders and forces in the Pacific. Other COMINT and HUMINT sources showed Japanese order of battle deployments and preparations, but could not present a near-real-time picture of Japanese intentions. Although MAGIC never contained information that conclusively proved Japan would attack the United States or Pearl Harbor on December 7, there were adequate indications that something significant was going to happen on or around 1:00 P.M. that day. A comparison of the most important MAGIC messages reveals several trends, and when viewed in conjunction with each other, clearly indicates hostilities were imminent.

Table 1. Comparison of MAGIC Messages by Date and Key Words

Date	Negotiation Instructions	Codes and Code Destruction	Espionage	Last Minute Signals
Sep 24			Honolulu Consulate. Bomb Plot Message; divided Pearl Harbor into five grid areas; report warship and aircraft carriers, types and classes.	
Nov 2	Washington Embassy. This will be <i>our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave... urgent we reach a decision at once.</i>			
Nov 2	Washington Embassy. Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse...I fear that <i>unfortunate results will ensue.</i>			
Nov 2	Washington Embassy. ...the <i>situation is waxing more and more acute</i> and will not permit of procrastination.			

Table 1—continued

<p>Nov 4</p>	<p>Washington Embassy. <i>...relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge...conditions within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible...this is our last effort...indeed, the last. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured...we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain...</i></p>			
<p>Nov 4</p>	<p>Washington Embassy. <i>...the situation does not permit of delays...our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening.</i></p>			
<p>Nov 5</p>	<p>Washington Embassy. Because of various circumstances, it is <i>absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month...tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition.</i></p>			

Table 1—continued

Nov 5	Washington Embassy. ...this is <i>the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted...I wish to stress this point over and over.</i>			
Nov 11	Washington Embassy. ...there seem to be <i>indications that the United States is not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here...the date set forth...is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead line...it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time...</i>			
Nov 11	Washington Embassy. <i>The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal...That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate.</i>			
Nov 15	Washington Embassy. ...the fact remains that the <i>date set forth...is an absolutely immovable one...make the United States see the light...</i>			

Table 1—continued

Nov 15	Washington Embassy. ...the <i>crisis is fast approaching</i> ...do everything in your power to <i>make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation</i> .		Honolulu Consulate. ...relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week...take extra care to maintain secrecy.	
Nov 16	Washington Embassy. ...the <i>fate of the Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days</i> ...I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations...and there will be no change... <i>You see how short time is</i> ...			
Nov 19		Washington Embassy. Winds Code Msg Emergency codes for cutting off diplomatic relations with the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain. When this is heard destroy all code papers, etc.		
Nov 19		Washington Embassy. Code words for intelligence broadcasts to indicate diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous with the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain.		

Table 1—continued

Nov 22	<p>Washington Embassy. Spare no efforts...<i>There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th...if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me spell that out for you--twenty-ninth)...we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.</i></p>			
Nov 24	<p>Washington Embassy. ...in view of the <i>extremely critical situation</i>, only hope most earnestly for a speedy settlement.</p>			
Nov 26	<p>Washington Embassy. ...<i>time is getting short...at once contact the United States authorities again.</i></p>	<p>Washington Embassy. Hidden telephone code to pass information in emergencies via telephone for status of relations, evacuation plans, and a state of war.</p>		
Nov 27		<p>Washington Embassy. Hidden word code to pass information in emergencies via telegraph for status of relations, evacuation plans, and a state of war.</p>		
Nov 30		<p>London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila ordered to destroy code machines.</p>		
Dec 2		<p>Washington Embassy ordered to destroy code machine and burn other codes in custody; destroy secret documents.</p>		

Table 1—continued

Dec 2		Havana, Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle, and Portland destroy code machines and codes; take care not to arouse suspicion. This is preparatory for an emergency situation.		
Dec 6				Washington Embassy, Pilot Message, intercepted 7:20 A.M. EST: Embassy must be prepared for 14 part response to U.S. modus vivendi of Nov 26.
Dec 6				Washington Embassy, First 13 parts of 14 Part Message arrive; intercepted during morning hours.
Dec 7				Washington Embassy. Last part of 14 Part Message, intercepted 3:00 A.M.; Japan's formal notice that negotiations are finished.
Dec 7				Washington Embassy. 1 O'clock Message, intercepted 4:30 A.M.; instructed Embassy to deliver 14 Part Message to Secretary of State by 1:00 P.M. EST.
				Washington Embassy. Final Code Destruction Msg, intercepted at 5:00 A.M. EST; destroy remaining code machine, codes, and classified materials.

By placing the four message categories side by side in date order, the first apparent trend shows up in the Negotiation Instructions. Beginning with the November 5 intercept

which establishes the November 25 deadline for signing the agreement with the United States, the wording in each subsequent message indicates increasing urgency and seriousness on the part of Tokyo. This reaches a crescendo on November 22 when Tokyo extends the deadline to November 29 and states “After that things are automatically going to happen.” Almost concurrent with this is the beginning of a series of messages to Japanese embassies concerning the use of special codes (November 19, November 26) and the destruction of codes and code machines (November 30–December 2). These two trends suggest that Japan might break diplomatic relations with the United States on or about November 29. Add to that the Espionage messages, particularly the one on November 15 which referenced critical relations and directed two ship reports a week, and there is sufficient evidence to imply hostilities were a possibility. Then combine these three categories with the Last Minute Signals messages, and there could be no doubt that Japan was going to initiate hostilities in the Pacific sometime on or about 1 P.M. Washington, D.C., time, December 7. And if further proof is required, add to these categories the COMINT traffic analysis and HUMINT information showing Japanese naval forces en route to the Malay Peninsula.

This begs the question why nothing was done if this comparison indicates that hostilities or some major event are imminent. The answer is not straightforward, and there were many factors involved. These combined to blur the overall drift towards hostilities that is evident in the matrix at Table 1. The most prominent of them are MAGIC security concerns; the system for evaluating information and disseminating intelligence; and the lack of a single organization to combine all forms of intelligence into a single, coherent picture.

There were excellent reasons for controlling and protecting MAGIC products. Decrypted COMINT is exceptionally difficult to obtain, extremely valuable, and easily denied with the change of a code or an operating procedure. These concerns were also warranted. During May 1941 MAGIC intercepts revealed that the Japanese had information the United States was reading their codes.²⁵ Although the Japanese never discovered which ones, the potential existed for this valuable source of information to be cut off as tensions in the Pacific were beginning to rise.

The MAGIC operation was highly classified as a result, and dissemination of messages was limited in the Washington area to primarily nine persons outside the Navy and War Department's decryption and translation sections. This group consisted of: President Franklin Roosevelt; Secretary of State Cordell Hull; Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson; Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox; the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall; the Director of the Military Intelligence Division, Brigadier General Sherman Miles; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the Chief of the War Plans Division, Admiral Turner; and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Theodore S. Wilkinson. Couriers used locked briefcases to distribute individual copies to the recipients; waited by their desk while they read them; and returned the decryptions to the translators for destruction. Only one copy was kept for the official file.²⁶

Limited numbers of MAGIC translations were made available to military commanders in the Pacific. General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart in the Philippines received them because there was a MAGIC machine located at Cavite.²⁷ The terminal destined for Pearl Harbor was sent to London, and the original products were not retransmitted to Hawaii due to fears they might be intercepted by the Japanese.²⁸

Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short did have access to MAGIC through sanitized information contained in messages and intelligence estimates until July 1941, although this was cut off by an apparent policy change in the Navy.²⁹ Resumption of MAGIC traffic to Hawaii did not resume until the first week in December.³⁰ This led Admiral Kimmel and his fleet intelligence officer, Commander Edwin Layton, to complain bitterly that Washington withheld critical information from them prior to the attack.³¹

While ensuring adequate protection of the information, such stringent security practices had a detrimental effect in the long run. Readers could only skim the decrypts, nor could they “sit down and analyze the messages over a period of time, to check trends, to make quantitative estimates and comparisons.”³² This turned key decision-makers into de facto intelligence analysts, and negatively impacted the evaluation and dissemination of meaningful intelligence. Untrained, inexperienced, and overworked individuals were responsible for reading the raw, unevaluated data in the messages and making decisions.

The use of this top-secret material in 1941, then, had to be impressionistic. Its readers got a blow-by-blow, day-by-day view of diplomatic maneuverings. Only certain experts in the Far Eastern offices of ONI and G-2 had a proper view of the range and significance of this type of indicator, but their judgments unfortunately did not carry much weight outside of their own divisions.³³

This is especially evident in the role assigned to ONI by the CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark., at the request of the Chief of the War Plans Division, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner. Turner believed that ONI should not be responsible for determining enemy intentions in formal Estimates. Despite the objections of the Chief of Intelligence,

Captain Alan G. Kirk, Turner convinced Admiral Stark in April 1941 that ONI was “solely a collection agency and a distributing agency, and was not charged with sending out any information which would initiate any operations on the part of the fleet, or fleets, anywhere.”³⁴ Stark agreed with Turner and placed the final responsibility for evaluating intelligence in the War Plans Division. Rear Admiral Turner, who lacked the training, experience, and time for analysis, became the intelligence broker for national and naval decision-makers. It was he who had the final say concerning the content of intelligence estimates that were disseminated. Turner also kept to himself the results of his analysis. “He had daily strategic estimates made up in his own division, but he did not show them to ONI.”³⁵ This created a situation according to Roberta Wohlstetter where “the job of collecting information is separated from the job of assessing its meaning, [and] the fundamental motive or incentive for collecting information disappears.”³⁶ In addition, it can negatively impact the dissemination of intelligence to decision-makers and operational commands.

Two incidents that occurred within the Navy Department in the crucial days preceding Pearl Harbor show how this system undermined the intelligence evaluation and dissemination process. The first concerned a memorandum containing evidence of Japanese military preparations in Southeast Asia prepared by Commander Arthur H. McCollum of ONI’s Far East section on December 1. It outlined known Japanese naval movements and ground force activities in Indochina, as well as their headquarters’ requests for information on the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies. Commander McCollum “felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States,” and prepared a draft message to be sent to operating forces within

the Pacific.³⁷ The Chief of ONI, Captain Wilkinson, sent him to Admiral Turner for approval before transmitting. Turner reviewed the memorandum; crossed out the evaluations and only left specific factual information; and showed McCollum a copy of the November 27 war warning. He then informed McCollum that “if you want to send it, you either send it the way I correct it, or take it back to Wilkinson [Chief of ONI] and we will argue about it.”³⁸ McCollum returned it to Captain Wilkinson, but there is no evidence the message was ever sent.

The second took place after the arrival of the 14 Part and 1 O'clock Messages in Washington, D.C., on December 7. Commander McCollum and Captain Wilkinson read the 14th part at about 10:00 A.M. EST (4:30 A.M. Pearl Harbor time) and recognized the “virulence and tenor of the language.”³⁹ Both immediately took this to Admiral Stark's office where Wilkinson recommended he send an additional warning to Pearl Harbor. They discussed the issue, but nothing was done. Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer, Chief of the Translation Section, delivered the 1 O'clock message to Admiral Stark's office, and Commander McCollum recognized its significance for Hawaii: 1:00 P.M. in Washington, D.C., was 7:30 A.M. in Hawaii.⁴⁰ Despite this, no warning was sent from the Navy Department.

The events described above also clearly point out another major shortfall in the intelligence evaluation process as it existed prior to Pearl Harbor: the lack of a central organization within the U.S. government responsible for collating information from various collectors; analyzing and correlating it with other data; and producing finished intelligence for national and military decision-makers. The individual MAGIC messages did not contain any direct indications the Japanese intended to attack Pearl Harbor or the

United States, although they clearly showed that war in the Pacific could occur within days or hours when correlated with information from all U.S. intelligence organizations. A central clearinghouse for intelligence did not exist in 1941, however. Each organization performed its own collection, evaluation, and production functions. Formal coordination rarely took place, and consisted primarily of a series of informal liaison relationships between action officers when it did. As a result, national and military decision-makers failed to separate the most important “signals” from the surrounding “noise” and to analyze them properly.⁴¹

For example, in Washington, Pearl Harbor signals were competing with a vast number of signals from the European theater. These European signals announced danger more frequently and more specifically than any coming from the Far East.⁴²

This, however, was not a failure of intelligence. It had its roots in the parochial relationship that existed between the various departments containing intelligence organizations (Justice [FBI], State, and the military services) prior to Pearl Harbor.

President Roosevelt recognized the need to coordinate intelligence activities in the wake of the 1930’s spy scare, and directed William J. Donovan to establish the office of Coordinator of Information in June 1941. Its purpose was to:

...collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.⁴³

Donovan’s goal was to introduce order into the analytical process, as well as to bring clandestine operations under one roof. He initially met resistance from J. Edgar Hoover and the service chiefs as each attempted to protect their intelligence roles and assets.

There was wry humor in these objections because, as the intelligence leaders noted to one another, the army and navy's intelligence divisions, which had been treated like unwanted stepchildren by the 'planners and commanders,' were now considered too important to be given over to Donovan's foster home for intelligence personnel.⁴⁴

Donovan, however, convinced the FBI and services of the need to establish the office of Coordinator of Information. By mid-October the initial structure was in place, but it was too late to be of assistance in preventing the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

Hawaii

The military commanders in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, complained in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor that Washington had withheld important intelligence from them prior to the attack.⁴⁵ Both believed that access to the same MAGIC intercepts available to Washington decision-makers would have averted surprise and the resulting disaster. While this argument has some validity, it overlooks the fact that the 294 MAGIC messages intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor did not contain a clear statement of Japanese intentions.⁴⁶ At best, MAGIC would have augmented the already large amount of COMINT and HUMINT information available to them concerning Japanese activities in the Pacific.

COMINT provided the majority of this information, with the major portion consisting primarily of traffic analysis produced by the Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit, or station "Hypo," with occasional pieces of sanitized MAGIC information supplied by ONI in Washington, D.C.⁴⁷ HUMINT came from a variety of diplomatic, attaché, observer, and foreign sources. With the exception of diplomatic information from MAGIC, COMINT, and HUMINT furnished the Hawaii commanders with basically the same data available to the War and Navy Departments. In addition, the War and Navy

Departments also provided warnings and alerts concerning the situation in the Pacific. These were based on estimates compiled by the G2 and ONI.

The basic information available to Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short prior to Pearl Harbor is shown below in the matrix at Figure 2. It organizes the data by date, content, and recipient to permit ready analysis of the flow of information to Hawaii and between the two commanders. Although not intelligence products, war warnings and other pertinent messages sent to both commanders concerning the situation between Japan and the United States are also included.

Table 2. Intelligence and Other Information Available to Hawaii Commanders

Date	Content	Adm Kimmel	LtGen Short
Mar 31	Martin-Bellinger Joint Report: Discussed the possibility of an Orange [Japanese] attack against Hawaii. Postulated this would take the form of a surprise attack preceding a declaration of war; would be against ships and installations; launched from one or more carriers from within 300 miles; dawn air attack has high probability of complete surprise. Recommended daily air patrols through 360 degrees around Hawaii. ⁴⁸	X	X
Apr 1	ONI Message: "...be advised of the fact that...past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities...on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned...take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect." ⁴⁹	X	
Jul 19	MAGIC: Japanese military in Canton says the next targets are the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore: "We will crush British-American military power and ability to assist in schemes against us." ⁵⁰ CNO Evaluation: Not a directive; just Japanese military opinion.	X	
Jul 25	CNO/COS Message: "U.S. will impose economic [oil and cotton] sanctions against Japan on Jul 26...Japanese funds and assets will be frozen...CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction...but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date." ⁵¹	X	X

Table 2—continued

Oct 16	CNO Message: "...resignation of Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American...In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers...you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention no constitute provocative actions against Japan." ⁵²	X	X
Oct 17	CNO Message: Warns of possibility of hostile action by Japan against U.S. merchant shipping. All vessels in western Pacific ordered into friendly ports. ⁵³	X	
Oct 17	CNO Message: Warns Kimmel to "take all practicable precautions" for safety of airfields at Wake and Midway. ⁵⁴	X	
Oct 17	CNO Message: Orders all trans-Pacific U.S. flag shipping to and from Far East to...keep well clear of Japanese Mandates. ⁵⁵	X	
Oct 20	War Department Message: Explains that U.S.-Japanese relations are strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy is imminent. ⁵⁶		X
Oct 23	CNO Message: Orders all transports with reinforcements for Philippines to proceed only in convoy and under escort. ⁵⁷	X	
Oct 23	Letter from CNO: Clarifies the Oct 16 CNO message. Stark believes Japanese attack on United States is merely a possibility: "Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us." ⁵⁸	X	
Nov 1	COMINT from Commander Rochefort: Japanese Navy callsigns changed. ⁵⁹	X	
Nov 16	COMINT from Commander Rochefort: Japanese carriers unlocated by COMINT and traffic analysis. ⁶⁰	X	
Nov 24	CNO Message: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests...inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately." ⁶¹	X	X
27 Nov	Navy War Warning: "This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates [sic] an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 [the Navy's basic war plan]. Inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department." ⁶²	X	X

Table 2—continued

Nov 27	Army War Warning: “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [the Army’s basic war plan] so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.” ⁶³	X	X
Nov 27	G2 Message to Hawaii Department G2: “Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only.” ⁶⁴		X
Nov 28	CNO Message: “Army has sent the following to commander western defense command. ‘Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent...Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasked assigned I Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers...Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46, so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.” ⁶⁵	X	
Nov 28	ONI Message to Rochefort: Monitor shortwave for “Winds Message” execute codes.	X	
Dec 1	COMINT from Commander Rochefort: Japanese Navy callsigns changed for second time in 30 days. “The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.” ⁶⁶	X	
Dec 1	ONI Message: Magic based message to Commander Layton providing notice of “Japanese plan to entice British to invade Thailand and thereby permit Japan to enter that country in the role of defender. It was based on an intercepted radio message of November 29 from the Japanese ambassador in Bangkok to Tokyo.” ⁶⁷	X	

Table 2—continued

Dec 2/3	Message from British Honolulu representative to Hawaiian Department G2: Provided information about “Japanese troop reinforcements in Indochina, accompanied by an estimate of war in the near future between England and Japan.” ⁶⁸		
Dec 3	CNO Message: “Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.” ⁶⁹	X	
Dec 3	CNO Message: Tokyo ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also direct destroy Purple. All but one copy of other systems. And all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports embassy London had complied. [Author’s note: “Purple” is mentioned twice in this message despite its highest classified status.] ⁷⁰	X	
Dec 4	Information Only Message from CNO: Guam directed “to destroy all secret and confidential publications and retain only minimum cryptographic channels for essential communications.” ⁷¹	X	
Dec 5	G2 Message to Hawaiian Department G2: “Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.” ⁷²		
Dec 5	U.S. Naval attaché Tokyo Message: Confirmation of destruction of U.S. Naval attaché codes and papers in Tokyo, Tientsin, Chungking, Hong Kong, Saigon, Hanoi, Bangkok. ⁷³	X	
Dec 6	CNO Message: “In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.” ⁷⁴	X	
Dec 6	FBI Notice to Hawaiian Department G2: Japanese at Honolulu Consulate burning codes and classified materials.	X	X
Dec 6	CNO Message: U.S. ambassador in London forwarded following information from British Admiralty: “two parties [Japanese ships] seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.” ⁷⁵	X	

A review of the messages and information contained in the matrix points out several facts. First, it is apparent that the Admiral Kimmel has access to more information than Lieutenant General Short. The CNO, Admiral Stark, appears to have kept his subordinate better informed. It is relatively easy to see the use of MAGIC derived materials in the messages, particularly those which show the steady increase in tensions between Japan

and United States. In addition, the messages informing Admiral Kimmel of U.S. shipping restrictions, Japanese code destruction activity, and authorization for similar destruction of U.S. government codes at Far East embassies convey the seriousness of the situation. The information available to Lieutenant General Short, however, is Spartan by comparison. Other than the formal warnings from the War Department and local Hawaiian Department G2 intelligence reports, he received little intelligence concerning Japanese political and military activity from higher headquarters. This undoubtedly lowered his sensitivity to the seriousness of the overall situation in the Far East.

A second factor pointed out by the matrix is the lack of coordination between the commanders in Hawaii. According to Robert Wohlstetter, the Army seemed content in the Navy's capability to warn it of any threat to Hawaii.

Army confidence in the Navy seems to have been matched by a kind of good-natured contempt on the Navy's part for Army performance. Naval fliers regarded most Army pilots as poorly trained; Naval Intelligence expected nothing from G-2 (Army Intelligence), and was constrained by a Washington directive from giving G-2 any of its privileged information [COMINT]...At any rate, Army officers did nothing to challenge the Navy's attitude. It was General Short's policy not to inquire of Admiral Kimmel about any naval details, and Admiral Kimmel kept the same respectful distance from General Short.⁷⁶

It is obvious the information provided to Admiral Kimmel would have benefited Lieutenant General Short's situational awareness. While some of the major information was passed directly from Admiral Kimmel, there was no formal agreement for sharing and coordinating information between the two commands. What little exchange of information that took place between intelligence personnel at lower levels was the result of personal initiative or happenstance. This problem went beyond intelligence, however.

It was symptomatic of the entire command relationship between the Army and Navy at that time.

Third, the information available to Kimmel and Short was not as complete as Washington's. Two elements available to Washington were missing: information concerning espionage activities in Hawaii; and the last minute signals contained in the 14 Part Message and 1 O'clock message. The information evaluation and decision-making process in Washington directly contributed to the omission of the espionage related messages. No one in the Washington chain of command recognized their significance or considered the information important enough in either case to forward it to Hawaii in time to avert the attack. It is unknown if this data would have heightened Kimmel or Short's concerns over a possible attack, although both incidents show the breakdown in the information evaluation and intelligence dissemination process in Washington.

Despite these faults, however, analysis of the data in the matrix shows that Kimmel and Short did have adequate warning. While there was no information directly pointing to Pearl Harbor, the signals available to both commanders clearly indicated a Japanese military move somewhere in the Pacific was probable within days or hours. The formal warning messages sent from Washington, plus the available intelligence, should have been sufficient to prompt an adequate state of alert to meet their command responsibilities. "Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that their primary mission—indeed virtually their only mission—was to prepare for war with Japan."⁷⁷ Both were also aware that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to surprise attack, and that Japan had a history of conducting sudden attacks. The Martin-Bellinger report prepared by members of their own staffs, as well as the CNO message discussing the Axis preference for attacking on

weekends and holidays, were read and understood by each. In addition, both failed to consider the capabilities of the Japanese. The Congressional Report of 1946 correctly pointed out:

Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality. The record tends to indicate that appraisal of likely enemy movements was divided into probabilities and possibilities. Everyone had admitted that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was regarded as at least a possibility. It was felt, however, that a Japanese movement toward the south was a probability. *The over-all result was to look for the probable move and to take little or no effective precautions to guard against the contingency of the possible action.*[author's italics]⁷⁸

Each was required to defend against all forms of attack, to include from the air. Preparing for sabotage and submarine attacks only fulfilled part of their responsibility for protecting Hawaii.

Summary

U.S. national and military decision-makers had extremely large amounts of intelligence available prior to Pearl Harbor. COMINT, HUMINT, and diplomatic reporting flooded Washington and Hawaii. While none directly mentioned an attack against Pearl Harbor, adequate information existed by the end of November 1941 that hostilities between Japan and the United States would occur within a matter of days or hours.

The failure to recognize this fact and adequately warn Hawaii was not one of intelligence, however. The intelligence community did its job in collecting, and for the most part, in correctly evaluating the existing data. MAGIC and other sources provided an unprecedented view into Japanese diplomatic and military activity. The fault lay primarily with properly utilizing the resulting intelligence by national and military

decision-makers. The security, information evaluation and dissemination, and intelligence coordination and production processes were severely flawed. Security concerns limited key information to a few decision-makers, who for the most part, were not trained intelligence analysts. This corrupted the information evaluation process and turned the intelligence community primarily into a collection agency. No one within the government had responsibility for conducting all source analysis, preparing a coordinated product, and ensuring timely dissemination to the proper organizations. These factors absolved the intelligence community from performing its primary function: to provide timely and accurate intelligence to support national and military decision-making.

Notes

¹ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 171-172.

² *Ibid.*, 211.

³ *Ibid.*, 187-196.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 204.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 214-215.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 215.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 205.

⁸ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 206.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹² Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 249.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 249.

¹⁴ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 212.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 212-213.

¹⁶ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 249.

¹⁷ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 213.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 222.

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- ²⁰ Ibid., 236.
- ²¹ Ibid., 222.
- ²² Ibid., 223.
- ²³ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 494.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 494-495.
- ²⁵ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 178.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 180.
- ²⁷ William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977), 82.
- ²⁸ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 179.
- ²⁹ Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *Captains Without Eyes* (London, UK: MacMillan & Co., 1969), 89.
- ³⁰ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 179.
- ³¹ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *“And I Was There”* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 21.
- ³² Ibid., 180.
- ³³ Ibid., 180.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 317.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 322.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 319.
- ³⁷ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 331.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 331.
- ³⁹ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 485.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 489.
- ⁴¹ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 1-3.
- ⁴² Ibid., 387.
- ⁴³ William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977), 139-140.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 131.
- ⁴⁵ Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, *“And I Was There”* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Col, Inc., 1985), 21.
- ⁴⁶ Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *Captains Without Eyes* (London, UK: MacMillan & Co., 1969), 92.
- ⁴⁷ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1990), 134.

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⁴⁸ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 95.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁵⁰ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 116.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 132-133.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁶² Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 406.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 402.

⁶⁴ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 62.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 48-49.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 62.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 50, 53.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷⁵ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *At Dawn We Slept* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), 464, 469.

⁷⁶ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 27-28.

⁷⁷ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. *Advancement of Read Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short on the Retired List*, 1 December 1995; on-line, Internet, 26 November 1996, available from <http://www.sperry-marine.com/pearl/dorn.htm>.

⁷⁸ Gordon Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1986), 559.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

The story of Pearl Harbor is one of national unpreparedness, not a failure of intelligence. Despite the claims of its critics, the United States intelligence community provided adequate warning that the Japanese would probably initiate hostilities on or about December 7, 1941. The root of the problem lay with the traditional attitude towards intelligence held by national and military decision-makers.

The United States prior to Pearl Harbor was never comfortable with the establishment and maintenance of a professional intelligence community. The nature of intelligence work did not correspond with the country's democratic ideals, and the use of intelligence was seen as a necessary evil for use only in times of war. This prevented the establishment of an appreciation for the role of intelligence in supporting government and military requirements. It also limited development of an intelligence profession and doctrine.

These factors limited the effectiveness of the intelligence community as World War II approached. National and military decision-makers viewed intelligence as a less than honorable profession. Budgets were small, and incentive to develop and maintain trained intelligence professional was low. Despite exceptional successes in the areas of COMINT and cryptology, under funding and under manning limited the capabilities to exploit these resources.

National and military decision-makers also underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese. Despite intelligence data to the contrary, the feeling in Washington and Hawaii was that the Japanese would not dare attack the United States. In addition, American policy-makers believed that the Japanese were incapable of developing and executing such a plan.

The Japanese disproved these biases through the surprise they achieved on December 7. Their detailed planning and deception activities successfully limited intelligence collection and evaluation efforts, although subtle clues were present. This information did not directly point to an attack on Pearl Harbor, but contained sufficient indications to alert our forces of impending hostilities in the Pacific. The system of information collection, evaluation, correlation, and intelligence production created by the national and military leadership, however, failed to recognize their significance until too late.

The subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor was not the result of a failure of intelligence. Rather, it was a failure of command and leadership by national and military decision-makers who did not appreciate the value of intelligence in foreign policy and military affairs. This traditional neglect of intelligence in American history was reflected in the

success of the Japanese attack and was only corrected with the National Security Act of 1947 which established the country's first national intelligence organization.

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