NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT AND COALITION INFORMATION OPERATIONS

by

Aletha S. Tatge

June 2001

Thesis Advisor: John Arquilla
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The purpose of this study is to analyze various methods of perception management and determine how they can be incorporated into current US Information Operations. One area of study will be the importance of credibility of our leaders when placed in a position of authority. This study will show that credibility is one of the toughest factors to achieve. A second area of study will be the value of story telling in gaining populace support and validation for intervening in conflicts that require the use of force and soldiers. As Stephen Pease said, “the message must be believable, though not necessarily true.” (Stephen Pease 1950)

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PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT AND COALITION INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Aletha S. Tatge
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS & OPERATIONS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2001

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Approved by: John Arquilla, Thesis Advisor
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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this study is to analyze various methods of perception management and determine how they can be incorporated into current US Information Operations. One area of study will be the importance of credibility of our leaders when placed in a position of authority. This study will show that credibility is one of the toughest factors to achieve. A second area of study will be the value of story telling in gaining populace support and validation for intervening in conflicts that require the use of force and soldiers. As Stephen Pease said, “the message must be believable, though not necessarily true.” (Stephen Pease 1950)
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION
   A. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL CRITERIA ............................................. 1
   B. DEFINITION OF TERMS ............................................................................. 5
   C. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 9

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
   A. THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEABILITY OF PERCEPTION .......................... 13
   B. MANAGING PERCEPTION THROUGH STORYTELLING ................................. 28
   C. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 30

III. PERSIAN GULF CASE STUDY
   A. RELEVANT USE OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT ....................................... 35
   B. GULF WAR BACKGROUND ......................................................................... 35
   C. KUWAITI PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN ................................. 37
      1. Kuwaiti Perception Management Tools .................................................. 37
      2. Results of Kuwaiti Perception Management Campaign .......................... 38
   D. IRAQI PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN ....................................... 38
      1. Iraq’s Targeting of the Arab Audience ................................................. 40
      2. Targeting the American Audience ....................................................... 42
      3. Iraq’s Perception Management Tools ................................................... 43
      4. Results of the Iraqi Perception Management Campaign ....................... 44
   E. COALITION FORCES PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN ............ 46
      1. Coalition Perception Management Tools ................................................. 46
      2. The Importance of Target Audience ..................................................... 47
      3. Result of Coalition Perception Management Campaign ........................ 56
   F. MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT ............................. 60
   G. POTENTIAL METHODS FOR ACHIEVING INTEGRATED EFFORT ............ 60
   H. SUCCESS OR FAILURE? ............................................................................ 61
   I. SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 62

IV. KOSOVO CASE STUDY
   A. RELEVANT USE OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT ................................. 67
   B. KOSOVO WAR BACKGROUND ................................................................ 67
   C. ALBANIAN PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN ............................ 68
      1. Albanian Perception Management Tools ............................................... 70
      2. Results of Albanian Perception Management Campaign ........................ 72
   D. SERBIAN PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN ................................ 73
      1. Serbian Perception Management Tools .................................................. 73
      2. Results of Serbian Perception Management Campaign .......................... 75
   E. NATO PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN ..................................... 78
      1. NATO Perception Management Tools .................................................... 80
2. Results of NATO Perception Management Campaign..............82
F. MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT...........82
G. POTENTIAL METHODS FOR ACHIEVING AN INTEGRATED
   EFFORT ........................................................................84
H. SUCCESS OR FAILURE?..................................................85
I. SUMMARY ......................................................................87

V. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS........................................91
A. LESSONS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND THE KOSOVO
   CONFLICT ..................................................................91
   1. The Role of Story and Storytelling...............................92
   2. The Use of Media to Promote Themes.........................92
   3. Credibility..............................................................93
   4. Target Selection......................................................94
B. RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................95

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................97

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .............................................101
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Disciplines Involved with Perception Management (PM)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Operational Model of Information Operations (IO)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>PSYOP Tools Used Today</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Information Model of Warfare</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Young Woman/Old Woman</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>Brotherhood Leaflet</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Surrender Leaflet Sample</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>Models of Saddam Hussein’s Actions</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>Brotherhood Leaflet</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Surrender Instructions</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>More Surrender Leaflet Samples</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>Bombing Leaflet Sample</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td>More Bombing Leaflet Sample</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15</td>
<td>More Bombing Leaflet Sample</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 16</td>
<td>The Daisy Cutter Bomb</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 17</td>
<td>Map of the Region</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 18</td>
<td>Serbian Leaflet Sample</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Chronology of the Persian Gulf Conflict.................................64
Table 2. PSYOP Impact on Surrenders...............................................65
Table 3. Gulf War Surrender Themes.................................................65
Table 4. Chronology of Events 1989-1999 Relating to the Crisis in Kosovo.........89
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFCEA</td>
<td>Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD)(C3I)</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>FWO/TL</td>
<td>Frontier Works Organization</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Forces</td>
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<td>INA</td>
<td>Intelligence Analysis Flight</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Public Information</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>Information Warfare</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JFC-East</td>
<td>Arab Joint Forces Command-East</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<td>LIWA</td>
<td>Land Information Warfare Activity</td>
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<td>MARCENT</td>
<td>US Marine Forces Central Command</td>
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<td>MUP</td>
<td>Ministerstvo unutrasnjih poslova/Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military operations other than war</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NPGS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Perception Management</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>RAND</td>
<td>National Defense Research Institute</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>UCK</td>
<td>Ushtrise te Cilrimatare te Kosoves</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Resolutions</td>
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<td>VJ</td>
<td>Vojska Jugosлавije</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

There are three sides to every story—yours, mine, and what really happened."

-COL Bryan N. Karabaich, USA

Many of the elements of Information Operations (IO) have been used for some time, but IO as a recognized US military strategy is relatively new. The military has been trying to integrate the disparate functional areas of IO into a cogent strategy. Information operations are used to affect the flow and content of information to key leaders and population groups within the area of operations to ultimately gain information superiority. Due to the rising influence of IO, physical destruction is no longer the only means of enabling victory in a conflict. A key part of IO, Perception Management (PM), is being given increased attention for its possible role in supporting US national objectives. Perception Management (PM) focuses on a small piece of the offensive component of IO. It may be used to reshape the logic and cognitive processes of individuals and can influence group behavior. Professor Dorothy E. Denning suggests that PM can even target entire nations for the purpose of influencing that nation's policies or the world population with the objective of altering international policy\textsuperscript{1}. If handled correctly, PM can be an enabler and force multiplier for IO. However, if handled incorrectly, PM can disrupt IO; therefore it is important for military commanders and planners to understand how to use this manipulative tool to achieve successful IO against an adversary and gain an operational advantage through information superiority.

\textsuperscript{1} Dorothy Elizabeth Denning. Information Warfare and Security (New York: Addison-Wesley Press Books, 1999), 101-451. See Figure 1.
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**Figure 1.** Disciplines Involved with Perception Management (PM).

Operational advantage may be achieved by using PM to manipulate the perceived environment to alter the story of the conflict, especially for long-range success. It takes time and many preparations to project the truth to an individual or group. In order to influence an individual or group, the focus of PM should start with subject area expertise, especially in long-range IO planning. Then, using models such as the IO objectives hierarchy\(^2\), an Intelligence Officer or planner can construct measures of effectiveness that should: (1) cause the enemy to reject their truth, (2) cause them to accept the desired false data, and (3) cause them to accept the desired truth and or reject false data.

The ultimate goal of PM is to convey to potential adversaries, through conscious decision-making processes, the commander’s ideals in order to achieve the desired outcome. The military definition of PM is taken from Joint Publication 1-02. It defines PM as information operations that aim to affect the perceptions of others in order to influence their emotions, reasoning, decisions, and ultimately actions. Getting into the mind of an individual or group is quite difficult, but not impossible. Certain psychological tools (e.g., deep techniques, liking, authority, social proof, etc.) have proven to be effective influencing practices\(^3\). To measure the effectiveness of these psychological tools, the author will focus on the IO objectives hierarchy.\(^4\) Using the IO objectives and psychological references, commanders and planners will be able to create a story or a frame with set boundaries of any situation. In this way, they will be able to change or influence the construction of an individual or group’s reality to the point of causing them to react in a predetermined manner to the event at hand. To learn to use PM, one must understand human cognitive processing of information.

The way in which the human brain has evolved seems to optimize it for telling stories. Cognitive psychology and human factors establish frameworks that explain how people understand and use information. Sources attempt to put a “spin” on information to make their organization look better or emphasize a particular perspective.

Psychologists define perception as a process of inferences in which people construct their own version of reality based on information provided through the five senses. They believe that an individual’s perception is influenced by past experience,

---

\(^3\) See definition of terms as well as books written by Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1984), 8-9. Self-generated persuasion: induced by group discussion, by getting someone to role-play an opponent’s position, or by asking a person to imagining a course of action.

\(^4\) (Doyle 2000, 7).
education, cultural values, and role requirements. According to Robert Cialdini, "people tend to perceive what they expect to perceive." For example, a military intelligence officer may be tuned to perceive specific indicators of potential conflict when reviewing intelligence.

This thesis focuses on the actions taken during coalition operations by two information rich groups, the military and the mass media. Such actions, whether intentional or not, shape perceptions. But how can one organize an information strategy for an overall understanding of perception management? Several psychologists believe they have the answer; a few of whom, doctors Erving Goffman, Donald Pennington, Robert Cialdini, and Susan Fiske, will be highlighted in this thesis. The overall purpose of this study is to define problems associated with conducting PM during coalition operations by drawing from the experiences of recent participants. This thesis summarizes some of the insights and lessons drawn from two case studies, the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo conflict. This study will show that despite the disparities of culture, perception management in a coalition environment is possible. The lessons from the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict highlight the importance of perception management as an element of the information campaign and its ultimate importance in conflict resolution.

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6 This thesis focuses more on the air portion of the Kosovo conflict, which started in 1999 instead of 1998. European Command (EUCOM) believed they actually established an IO cell to support Operation Allied Force. There was reluctance on the part of senior commanders to employ IO since Air Force culture is to bomb targets.
A. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL CRITERIA

Very little has been written about perception management; most literature deals with psychology and social cognition. The literature studied for this thesis dealt with social cognition. The author examined if some of the literature conclusions applied to perception management. Accounts such as *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* by Robert B. Cialdini, *Social Cognition and Social Perception* by Susan T. Fiske, and *An Essay on the Organization of Experience Frame Analysis and The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* by Erving Goffman touch on the issue of approaching perception management from the aspect of story telling. The collection of essays by Larry Wentz identifies coalition operations lessons learned from Kosovo.7

A review of the literature indicates most authors agree that (1) perception defines an individual or group’s reality, (2) anyone’s perception is vulnerable and is susceptible to attack, and (3) everyone lives by rules and principles which guide one toward understanding the meaning of experienced events. The two case studies, the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1998 Kosovo Conflict, were chosen because they represent recent coalition operations and showcase US involvement with two completely different cultures. With two different cultures, the author intends to show that when handled correctly, perception management, regardless of cultural and social differences, is still a manipulative tool that can be used to one’s own operational and strategic advantage.

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7 Larry K. Wentz Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR experience (Vienna, VA: CCRP National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997) discusses some IO aspects. Mr. Wentz is an independent consultant on contract to ASD C3I C4ISR Cooperative Research Program to produce a book on “Lessons from Kosovo” (not yet published) which addresses IO use in peace operations. He has extensive experience in NATO C3 and C4I support to Coalition Joint Task Force operations, including leading a number of Lessons Learned Studies for operations such as Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope. Also, Mr. Wentz authored a chapter pertaining to IO in two other books: Alan D. Campen CYBERWAR: Security, Strategy, and conflict in the information age (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press) and Alan D. Campen The first Information War; the story of communications, computers, and intelligence systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992).
Perception management targets will be the same, the enemy commander or the morale of the enemy soldiers or the local population. The enemy will attempt to apply propaganda against either the US Armed Forces or the civilian population. There will be political actions taken in the form of demonstrations, protests, petitions, strikes, boycotts, violence, embargo, violence against people, etc. There will be attempts to apply covert influence in the form of clandestine broadcasting, forensics, disinformation, covert press activities, and website control, photo image manipulation, and staged events.

The goal of perception management, whether the US is operating on its own or in a coalition, is to erode, reduce, or eliminate the enemy's capability to fight or resist. This can be done in several ways: impede maneuver, demoralize the enemy forces, discredit the enemy's military, create doubt or confusion, inundate the commander's decision cycle, create dissent, polarize, and/or distract the enemy from attaining its goals.

Edward Waltz described three levels of IO: level one--perceptual level; level two--information structure level; and level three--physical level. According to the operational model of Information Operations, perception management occurs at level one. The model recognizes that targets exist in (1) physical space, (2) cyberspace, and (3) the minds of humans. At level one, the goal is to aim at the management of the perception of a target audience. At this level, the strategic objective defines the desired actions of the target and the perception(s) that will most likely cause those actions. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, the desired action for the US coalition was to reverse an act of Iraqi aggression. The Coalition's main perception objective regarding Saddam Hussein was to promote a loss of Iraqi popular and military support and a loss of political

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8 Edward Waltz, *Information Warfare: Principles and Operations* (Boston: Artech House, 1998), 148-149. See Figure (2).
control. Of course, these perception objectives may be achieved by a variety of physical or virtual means with the ultimate objective of influencing the operational behavior of the target audience.

Figure 2. Operational Model of Information Operations (IO).

Waltz feels that the highest-level target of IO is in the human perception of decision makers, policymakers, military commanders, and even entire populations. In his opinion, and the author agrees, the ultimate targets and the operational objective is to influence enemy perception which will in turn, affect their decisions and resulting activities. The situation requiring perception management will either be ad hoc or unexpected, event driven, crisis-driven, or long-term. Any medium can be exploited,
including face-to-face communications, print, telecommunications, broadcast, and computer networks\(^9\).

![MILITARY PSYOP--“TOOLS OF THE TRADE”](image)

**PSYOP Tools Today**

Figure 3. PSYOP Tools Used Today.

This study does not judge the reasons why the United States decided to enter these conflicts, rather, it examines the methods used to control the adversary’s perception of the conflict and it identifies the theoretical framework used by the author to determine the feasibility of managing an individual or group’s perception. The case studies examine

\(^9\) See Figure 3.
the success or failure of US usage of perception management in their coalition operations by exploring rules used when agencies within the US are required to interface.

Finally, it draws conclusions as to: (1) the significance of credibility (2) appropriateness of target selection (3) effectiveness of press statement coordination; (4) the importance of storytelling; and (5) whether or not it is possible to integrate PM with coalition operations.

B. DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Authority: Professor Stanley Milgram’s study (1964, 1974, 1976) that points out people’s compulsion to obey those placed in a position of authority. There are several kinds of symbols that trigger people’s compliance in the absence of authority: titles, clothes, and trappings of authority. (Cialdini 1984)

- Campaign: A series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JS 5-0)

- Categories of data: In the context of perception management and its constituent approaches, data obtained by adversary individuals, groups, intelligence systems, and officials. Such data falls into two categories:
  - Indications: Data derived from open sources or from detectable actions that adversaries can piece together or interpret to reach personal conclusions or official estimates concerning friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972)
  - Information: A compilation of data provided by protected or open sources that would provide a substantially complete picture of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972)

- Deception: Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interest. (JS Pub 1-02 1972)

- Defensive Information Operations: Integrate and coordinate policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972)

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• Denouncement: Messages that discredit, defame, demoralize or dehumanize an opponent. It is used to draw support away from the adversary and toward oneself, to win support for arguments or programs. (Toffler 1995)

• Door in the face: This technique allows the manipulator to make a large request that is most likely to be rejected and then following it with a smaller request. This theory states: “How can I repay my obligation?” (Cialdini 1984)

• Fabrication: It is subject to discrediting. What was real a moment ago can be destroyed. (Goffman 1986)

• Foot-in-the-Door: This technique uses the small/large comparison method to persuade individuals to commit themselves in a small way with the intention that they will commit themselves further in that direction. (Freedman & Karsh 1993)

• Frames: Rules and principles of organization that govern events, especially social ones, and our subjective involvement in them. They are subject to rework as people move from one frame to another. (Goffman: 1986)

• Graffalloons: Proud and meaningless associations of human beings (Pratkanis and Aronson 1992)

• Information environment: The aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate information, including the information itself. (Joint Pub 3-13 1998)

• Intelligence: 1. The product of resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of a available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information or knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JS Pub 1-02 1972)

• Keying: More creative process where transformation can take place through make believe, sporting, games, ritual, experimentation, practice. Keying is subject to rekeying. (Goffman 1986)

• Liking: The tendency for humans to like people who are similar to them. (Cialdini 1984)

• Military operations other than war (MOOTW): Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972)

• Mirror and matching: An extension of modeling theory that advocates that if behavior is modeled precisely, it can be duplicated by almost any individual (Cialdini 1984)
• Offensive Information Operations: The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers and achieve or promote specific objectives. (Joint Pub 3-13 1998)

• Perception (as defined by psychologists): A process of interference in which people construct their own version of reality on the basis of information provided through the five senses. For ease of recall, the categories used by psychologist in defining PM involve five verbs: deny, demean, deceive, and divide. (Denning 1999)

• Perception management (as defined by the military): Actions to convey and (or) deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations, security, cover, and deception, and PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972)

• Psychological Operations: Information Operations that aim to influence behavior by affecting the human psyche through fear, desire, logic, and other mental factors. (Joint Pub 1-02 1972)

• Rework (defined by two processes): Keying and fabrication. (Goffman: 1986)

• Rule of reciprocity: The tendency for human beings to feel obligated to return a behavior that they have received from another. It is a persuasion device that directs thoughts and carries its own motivation to act on those thoughts. If the norm is broken, one would likely receive some form of social sanction and disapproval. The norm of reciprocity states: “If I do something for you, then you are obligated to return the favor and do something for me.” (Cialdini 1984)

• Scarcity: Making something attractive by making it appear scarce and unavailable, by erecting barriers that make the object difficult to obtain. (Cialdini, 1984)

• Social Engineering: Operations that trick others into doing something they would not do if they knew the truth, for example, giving out a secret password or sensitive corporate information. It involves some form of impersonation, of either a particular individual or a role. (Denning 1992)

• Stories: Facts, beliefs, desires, affects, and the relationships people draw between these. They explain and predict objective reality as well as construct, modify, and limit our perception of that reality. (Goffman: 1986)

• The Commitment and Consistency Rule: A fundamental inducement of human behavior is the desire to be consistent in both our actions and our
thought processes. Commitment is the force that facilitates this compliance, as once a position is taken; there is a natural tendency to act in manners consistent with that belief (Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & Young, 1987). The consistency rule states "after committing oneself to a position, one should be more willing to comply with requests for behaviors that are consistent with that position" (Cialdini, 1984).

C. SUMMARY

Theorists of the RMA suggest radical changes in US military operations including in coalitions. The United States must not only consider the gap in technology advancement, the rules of engagement, and the constraints of war, but also the psychological aspect of executing any actions dealing with coalition operations. The use of perception management will be a great assistance to winning any war or conflict. However, there will always be fogs of war, frictions, and constraints that will inhibit the smooth flow of any operation. For this reason, the worst-case scenario must be considered and flexibility must be on the forefront of every commander's mind.

The next chapter compares past and current guidance pertaining to perception management and examines internal as well as external influences that affect the development of techniques to win in the battle for the best storyteller.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.

-Winston Churchill

A. THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEABILITY OF PERCEPTION

The social implication of perception management is that, despite the disparities of culture, humans live in a world they assume has a permanent tangible character. This means that once an event occurs, a permanent tracing will remain, and with proper research and interrogation, a record of the event can be uncovered\(^\text{11}\). In turn, perception defines reality as seen in the eyes of an individual or group. A manager of perception believes that individuals and groups can be influenced without much awareness or stirring of events. They achieve this mastery by using certain techniques or cues for achieving their objectives. One of these techniques is perception management. Like most tools, perception management can be used constructively or destructively.

Perception management is achieved by manipulating words, images, sounds and other sensory aids in the environment in such a manner that a story is created. The receiver reconstructs these very words in an attempt to understand the reality of the event.

Goffman describes the narrative thought process of a human brain as frameworks. He points out that all social frameworks involve rules, but differently.\(^\text{12}\) He asserts that

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\(^{11}\) Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1974, reprinted 1986), 288. A social psychologist view on what factors determine when an individual or group can be influenced and how one responds to a persuasion attempt. See Figure 4.

\(^{12}\) (Goffman 1986, 24).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Level</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities in the management/control path</th>
<th>Information fusion architecture</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities in the sensing/fusion path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Perception of the situation, if intercepted, can be exploited to reveal sensor and source capabilities.</td>
<td>Mission objective</td>
<td>Situation perception is vulnerable to cumulative uncertainty and subtle or unexpected large-scale deception activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the meaning of information about the environment and the achievement of mission goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>mission manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Resource management is vulnerable to deception which diverts resources from critical targets, and causes inefficient use of resources. Sensor behavior can be exploited to focus of attention, perceived knowledge or projected plans.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data placed in spatial and temporal context</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Data Measurements and observations | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 3 Threat assessment</th>
<th>Level 4 Resource</th>
<th>Translate information needs to specific source data requests and sensors controls.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Translate</td>
<td>Sensors, info sources, and dispatching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sensors, sources, and network links are vulnerable to denial (jamming), deception (target) deletion, insertion, or exploitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4. Vulnerabilities.**

Humans perceive events and their consequences through frames, whether they are reading a story or looking out a window, whether given to them by the social environment and culture or from their own experiences. It is the type of framework employed that provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied. Humans classify, organize and interpret their life experiences to make sense of them; the perception of what is real is inferred from the situation. The structure of the frame, unlike that of the situation, is fixed and not dependent on day-to-day events. Goffman sees language analogous to the
rules and syntax of the frame. In any one moment of activity an individual is likely to apply several frameworks. An individual perception of an event creates inherent biases that shape or slant events to fit their reality. He suggests that perception should be viewed as a form of contact and communication. In this form, control is established over what is perceived, over contact that is made, and this limits and regulates what is shown as a limitation and regulation of contact.

Goffman states that the mind’s center of gravity (COG) or point of view forms a context for what is experienced. This COG describes the primary frameworks of an individual or a specific social group’s central cultural element or schemata. The perspective from which an individual or group attack a problem could be called the context or perceptual set. Changing that individual or group’s perspective of a problem could be called “reframing,” which is a very useful way to look at things from new perspectives.

How humans perceive history, and even their own reality, depends on the kind of story they tell others or what they tell themselves. In fact, humans’ early judgments often adversely affect the formation of future perceptions. Once an observer thinks he or she knows what is happening, this perception tends to resist change and in turn, creates perceptual biases. Another term for this techniques is mirror imaging. Goffman defines actual scenes as events that present themselves through multiple channels or frames.

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13 Ibid., p. 25.
15 Ibid., p. 146.
Frames provide the rules and principles, which guide one towards understanding the meaning of experienced events\textsuperscript{16}. Since frames are built on structural rules, they are predictable and recurring. They are vulnerable because they define a close, finite set of rules about social life. Goffman points out that these channels are one person’s reality and that they may be totally different from what is really happening. In order to distinguish one reality from the other, the individual or group needs to apply different techniques.

There are a myriad of techniques used to influence one’s perception. One set of them is called the "deep techniques." They are considered "deep" in that they are applied below the surface of one's cognitive awareness and are done without the "critical awareness of those at their receiving end\textsuperscript{17}. An example of a deep technique is to subtly ask questions to direct or control a conversation, or to dominate or manipulate another. According to Frederick Mann and Russell Thomas, some people are in the habit of automatically trying to answer questions put to them. In this context, the exploiters take advantage of the situation and create a frame of questions that will manipulate the conversation.

The role of perception management is to influence the perception of human minds (both individually and as a group) to provide an advantage in crisis or conflict by influencing the human will with a minimal use of physical force. As Sun Tzu states, people should use any tools available to "break the enemy’s resistance without

\textsuperscript{16} (Goffman 1986, 247).

fighting.” The role of perception management will be determined by the context of the conflict, meaning the use of necessary tools to counter the adversary’s use of perception management. Technology has provided some new tools. It is the manner in which these tools are used that will define the effectiveness of perception management.

Perception is organized by what an individual or group expects to perceive as well as by the context in which it occurs. Different circumstances evoke different sets of expectations. Humans form patterns or frames of expectation that are deeply embedded to influence perceptions, even when people are alerted to and try to take account of the existences of data that do not fit their perceptions. This is often called wishful thinking.

How can this knowledge be applied to obtain successful management of an individual’s or group’s culture? The information model of warfare is a good start. As Edward Waltz puts it, “it is important to understand the role of information in conflict at the basic functional level” and to understanding the flow of information from the physical domain to the perceptual domain, in which the human mind is the central element. Society and its natural socialization process has trained people what not to see, limited their consciousness, perspectives, and brain’s construction of reality. Technology has made this process faster and easier to develop in society.

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19 See Figure 5.
Figure 5. Information Model of Warfare.

Technology has made the informational, perceptual, and physical domains vulnerable to attacks that do not require physical force alone. It has become the preeminent means by which military and political decision makers perceive the world, develop beliefs about the conflict, and command their forces. It allows leaders to instill these beliefs or stories in people’s lives using psychological techniques such as Cialdini’s “social proof.” According to Cialdini, this weapon of influence provides a shortcut for determining how to behave, but, at the same time, makes one who uses the shortcut vulnerable to the attacks of profiteers who lie in wait along its path. “Social proof” is influential under two conditions: (1) Uncertainty (when people are unsure, when the situation is ambiguous, they are more likely to attend to actions of others and to accept those actions as correct) and (2) Similarity (people are more inclined to follow the lead of
similar others). This is where perception management is essential to the success of an information operations campaign.

Information operations are, to a great degree, about perception management. Military commanders and planners have to know and understand their own perception(s) as well as the enemy’s perception. Most important, they must understand the opponent’s perception of them, the enemy’s perception of himself, his environment, the perception of their adversary’s perception, the nature of the conflict, and many other factors that influence perception (e.g., life, death, etc). To even come close to understanding the opponent’s perception, commanders and PM planners must avoid installing their own perceptual biases since they prevent them from seeing the situation objectively. To help them, commanders and PM planners should collaborate with country experts. These experts will ensure that there is no misconception or interpretation of cultural standards.

Manipulators are always attacking the context or perceptual set from which an individual or group draws conclusions about an event. Goffman suggests that perception managers look at everything using different frames. In doing so, one’s perception or construction of reality is less contaminated with bias and false information. It is imperative to be conscious of and open to the perspective or perceptual set used.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines vulnerability as: (1) the susceptibility of a nation or force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished. (2) The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a definite regression (incapability to perform the designated mission) as

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a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment\textsuperscript{22}.

Another condition, which leads to automatic responses, is the term “authority.” According to Cialdini, “authority” describes the acceptance of leaders or position. Society will automatically accept the words or story of this “authority.” People are generally taught that people of authority know best and should be obeyed in most matters. By accepting the words of the “authority”, people create shortcuts in our constructive building of people and events. Shortcuts eventually lead to subconscious thinking and automatic responses.

Cialdini points out another component that greatly affects human perception, the contrast principle; a “nice little weapon of influence” that is virtually undetectable\textsuperscript{23}.” He points out that anything can be seen very differently, depending on the nature of the event that precedes it.

With the contrast principle, Cialdini points out that despite cultural and political differences, everyone possesses cognitive bias, the basis of liking or accepting data into reality. In a way, humans create their own stories and biases of events occurring around them.

As Cialdini puts it, there are three basic biases. First, there is the “hot” or “motivated” bias that accepts things as they are. Second, there is “cold” or “confirmation” bias. This bias occurs when a person holds or is told that a certain piece of information is “true.” When confronted with conflicting information or evidence the

\textsuperscript{22} Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated term, Joint Publication 1-02 Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), (Washington, D.C., 03 January 1972), A-15.

\textsuperscript{23} (Cialdini 1984, 13).
person is quick to disagree or dismiss the information. People who are stuck in a "confirmation bias" type of mode will only look for information that confirms what they already know. In the process of finding their reality, they blind themselves to information that would conflict with their current frame of information. Finally, there is the "expectation bias" which is when people see what they expect to or believe they see. A classic example is the painting of the Young Woman/Old Woman where ambiguous patterns are examples of two-state, bimodal systems in psychology\textsuperscript{24}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure6.png}
\caption{Young Woman/Old Woman.}
\end{figure}

When the human brain perceives ambiguous figures, like the old woman, the perception switches between two interpretations, namely "old woman" or "young

\textsuperscript{24} Charles F. Schmidt. "Young Woman or Old Woman." This picture was originally published in \textit{Puck} magazine in 1915 as a cartoon entitled "My Wife and My Mother-in-law." The old woman's nose, mouth, and eye are, respectively, the young woman's chin, necklace, and ear. Retrieved on June 22, 2001, \url{http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/305_html/Gestalt/Illusions.html#anchor1337965} from the World Wide Web. See Figure 6.
woman” because it is difficult for the brain to recognize both interpretations simultaneously.

Pratkins and Aronson, supporters of Cialdini, used the term “granfalloon” to explain another tool of perception management, the art of persuasion. Granfalloon is similar to Cialdini’s similarity principle in that it seeks multiple cues to bring things into liking. Granfallos are proud and meaningless associations of human beings. This means one individual could pass another on the street in America and say “hello” and not receive a response. However, when placed in a foreign country, that “hello” is readily welcomed since the two share the same nationality25.

During the Persian Gulf conflict, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, one coalition leaflet used the “granfalloon” technique in depicting the unity of coalition forces26. In PSYOP, leaflets are nothing but a sheet of paper that attempts to convey a message27. The message could be in the form of a drawing, picture, or writing. Coalition perception management planners hoped that the pictures and words would remind the Iraqi soldiers about brotherly love. The leaflets reminded the soldiers that “we are brothers, neighbors” and for them to stop their plundering of innocent lives.


26 Psywarrior. “The Gulf War.” Retrieved on April 22, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/gulf1.html. See Figures 7 through 9. Figure 7 illustrated Gulf War PSYOP leaflet portrays King Fahd of Saudi Arabia as wanting all Arabs to live together in peace as brothers while Saddam Hussein thinks of Kuwait, war and death. Figure 8 illustrated Gulf War PSYOP leaflet portrays the Iraqi soldier thinking.

Live Together In Peace Not War

"We are all brothers... neighbor Arabs... we want peace"

Do You Really Want To Die?

Figure 7. Brotherhood Leaflet.

"Staying Here Means Death"

Figure 8. Surrender Leaflet Sample.
Susan Fiske points out that people think about each other and events as well as the comprehension of things the same way that they understand stories. This means that people do not understand individual objects and actions in isolation but rather the ongoing and dynamic relations between objects in a particular holistic context or frame of reference. Fiske goes on to say that comprehension is not “merely perception, but explanation about what is happening and/or what will happen.”

Perception is closely related to memory in that they are both constructive, based particularly on cues (reminders in the current environment), expectations and one’s objective in perceiving and remembering. These constructions are shared social and cultural derivations as well as individual constructions. Many of them are automatic, meaning humans tend to do them without thinking about them. As a result, they are accurate enough in most cases. However, unlike memory, humans are not always capable of determining the source of their constructions and re-constructions. They struggle with the thought, did they perceive the event as they remember or did they add or delete things to get a better fit to their expectations about such events. As a result, perception is left vulnerable and subject to manipulation.

To overcome the vulnerability of thoughts, knowledge of the situation must be compared in different frames. Much of human knowledge is in the form of words. As Frederick Mann and Thomas Russell put it, “language is one of the fundamental ways our brains create our reality construction.”

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29 Ibid.

30 (Mann and Russell 1996, 22).
brains’ “reality construction since people create meaning of words and inevitably, certain expectations.”

In an effort to understand Saddam Hussein’s use of words, Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla developed two alternative models31. These models attempt to assess Saddam Hussein’s perception and the reasoning behind his actions against Kuwait. According to doctors Arquilla and Davis, the idea behind these three models is that “one forms a strong mental image of how the subject may reason; clarifies and communicates this image with descriptions, diagrams, and anecdotes; then proceeds directly to judgements about how the subject would reason on particular issues.”32 The study refers to Goffman’s use of multiple frames. It applies an experimental methodology for understanding the possible reasoning of opponents in crisis and conflict and for using that understanding to develop adaptive deterrent strategies. The 1991 Davis and Arquilla study attempted to explain Saddam’s behavior retrospectively, using alternative models. This model analyzed speculative questions such as “could we have deterred Saddam?”33 According to Davis and Arquilla, a different set of two or three models is needed for different crisis situations. In the case of Saddam Hussein, the model is focused on an individual, not one requiring the perception of group decision making by consensus. In developing these models, Davis and Arquilla emphasize cognitive maps that attempt to diagram how someone connects ideas (i.e., “what’s on his mind”).

31 See Figure 9.


33 (Davis & Arquilla, 1991, V). According to Davis and Arquilla, a different set of two or three models is needed for different crisis situations. In the case of Saddam Hussein, the model is focused on an individual not one requiring the perception of group decision making by consensus, 15.
The Davis and Arquilla approach to creating models includes three "borders" or "frames": (1) assume that policymakers do not make decisions "randomly," but instead follow a relatively coherent and consistent logic; (2) some plausible types of models simply do not apply in particular cases; (3) conduct sensitivity analysis at crucial points in the analysis. According to them, this approach is "potentially true."\(^{34}\) In their

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 12.
opinions, truth may be a combination of their models because real human beings often have competing personas that dominate under different circumstances.

Donald Pennington’s model states that almost all of cognitive communication can be taken via storytelling. He focused on the term schema to characterize a knowledge structure. He believed that social schemas are important for understanding how people represent their social world. He used another term to further define his theory on social schemas, “false consensus effect” where humans define their social interaction with everyone based on their interaction with their friends/partners, who by and large have similar views to their own. He goes on to say that humans will always have self-contained biases because their own attitudes, opinions and beliefs will be “highly salient and at the forefront” of their mind. Another term, social perception, further defines people’s interaction with others as a process that everyone goes through in search of understanding other persons. In short, Pennington points out some key features of the role social schemas play in social cognition. It enables efficient coding, influences what to pay attention to and what to ignore, influences what is remembered, consistent information stored, inconsistent forgotten, and influence impression formation and judgments of people. But, this approach may lead to error or bias.

Pennington also focused on the term “cognitive miser” to reflect the fact that people have a limited capacity to process social information and take shortcuts to develop simple rules to use where possible. This theory is supported by three important heuristics: availability, anchoring and adjustment, and representatives. Pennington points

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36 Ibid., p. 79.
out that the availability heuristic reflects humans' experience of the world and may lead to erroneous or biased inferences or judgments because of this.

B. MANAGING PERCEPTION THROUGH STORYTELLING

Storytelling is an ancient medium for communication and meaning making. It is a process that can nurture and create meaning or reinforce control and manipulate meaning. Short stories and storytelling can easily be used in the interest of perception management. Drawing on the history of influence and the cognitive psychology approach, the manner in which a situation involving individuals or groups is controlled and described can influence its eventual outcome. In the end, the story matters.

The cognitive response approach has given one of the most important rules for determining the effectiveness of a persuasive tactic. According to Anthony Pratkanis, and Elliot Aronson, the persuasion tactic directs and channels thoughts so that the target thinks in a manner agreeable to the communicator's point-of-view\(^{37}\). Erving Goffman believes that the way humans think about people and events as well as comprehend people and events are the same way that they understand stories. When humans talk or write, they are, in a way, writing a story so that their listener or reader can comprehend their ideas. In Goffman’s opinion, participants pursue a line of activity, a storyline, across a range of events\(^{38}\). Humans think by relating or elaborating concepts in story-like explanations.

Different cultures provide different stories that may result in very different perceptions. A military commander or planner must take this into consideration when attempting to control a particular individual or group. Fiske believes that stories

\(^{37}\) (Pratkanis, and Aronson 1992, 24).

\(^{38}\) (Goffman1959, 201).
construct, modify and limit humans’ perceptions of that reality. Objective events happen to humans in the world, but how they put these episodes together, interpret them and make them coherent determines their perception of them. For example, in order to remember all the Presidents of the United States, a student will use cues or mnemonics to recall a particular President and his significance in history. For example, to remember the fourth President of the United States, a student may find a word that rhymes with four. Another example is the various interpretations of the discovery of the Americas, which can be viewed as a story of valiant pioneers against a hostile wilderness or as a barbaric invasion, exploitation, and hemisphere-wide slaughter.

The rule of story telling is quite simple. According to Joint Publication 3-58, the story must be believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable. Often, the simple reporting of facts or their appearance can have an effect. For example, on Halloween night, in 1938, Orson Welles and the Mercury Theater Radio Company broadcast a dramatization of H.G. Wells’ famous tale “War of the Worlds” which recounted a Martian invasion of the Earth. The adaptation includes realistic radio news bulletins informing listeners of the developing saga. A music program was interrupted to brief listeners that an alien object had landed in Grover’s Mill, New Jersey.

Wells’ novel was written in response to several historical events. The most important was the unification and militarization of Germany, which led to a series of novels predicting war in Europe. Most of these were written in a semi-documentary fashion; and Wells borrowed their technique to tie his interplanetary war tale to specific places in England familiar to his readers. This attempt at hyperrealism helped to inspire

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Orson Welles when he latter created his famed 1938 radio broadcast based on the novel. The broadcast was his attempt to introduce a different way of broadcasting. Despite periodic interruptions of the broadcast to inform listeners of the dramatization, it produced panic in many parts of the state.

The whole episode illustrates a number of things about mass psychology, but also the willingness of people to believe that humans are not alone in the universe. This broadcast also brings to mind the first chapter of Wells’ novel. It asked the questions: From what perspective is humanity viewed? What qualities in the Martians make them dangerous to humanity? Wells several times draws parallels between the Martians’ treatment of the Earth and Britain’s treatment of its colonies. The two case studies will point out this technique of contrasting two dramatic characters and events. In today’s technology, the comparison is easily made with the help of the Internet. Advances in information technology are providing rapidly increasing number of individuals with more access to information at lower cost. However, technology does not explain spontaneity that penetrates our social world and reframes our current frames (e.g., television with its ready-made framing packages).

C. SUMMARY

Humans interpret the world and each other in terms of a stable set of stories, which can easily fit into events. Stories are made up of facts, beliefs, and desires, and affect the relationships individuals draw between these. Fiske and Taylor provide extensive coverage of social schemas in terms of what they are, what they do and how they relate to self. They believe that the “self” or “point of view” is the dynamic,

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40 The contrast principle is discussed in detail in Cialdini’s book Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.

narrative center of gravity around which these relationships form a context for human experience. Therefore, how humans perceive themselves, their history, and those around them, depends in part on the kind of story told, or what stories others relate.

Goffman explains that an individual’s or group’s view is distorted if an individual uses only one frame. Cialdini describes this process as single cueing. He, like Goffman, encourages the reader to use multiple cueing to frame their reality. For example, the perceptions and viewpoints of a preacher and a politician on the topic of religion are often different. He encourages the use of many frames to organize a form of reality or knowledge through a transformation process of viewing. Everything should be seen in the context of four perspectives42. In his expert opinion, all events in society can be contained and managed within the conventional system of beliefs.

Pennington defines social perception as the process through which an individual or group seeks to know and understand other people. Social schemas are cognitive structures, which represent knowledge about people and social situations. They are organized collections of knowledge stored in memory and based on past experience. Social schemas determine how information is encoded and help to process new information quickly.

1991), 16.

42 (Goffman 1959, 240). First, it may be viewed “technically,” in terms of its efficiency and inefficiency as intentionally organized system of activity for the achievement of predefined objectives. Second, everything may be viewed as “politically,” in terms of the actions which each participant (or class participants) can demand of other participants, the kinds of deprivation and indulgences which can be meted out in order to enforce these demands, and the kinds of social controls which guide this exercise of command and use of sanctions. Third, everything can be viewed “structurally,” in terms of the horizontal and vertical status divisions and the kinds of social relations, which relate these several groupings to one another. Finally, everything could be viewed “culturally,” in terms of the moral values which influence activity in the establishment-values pertaining to fashions, customs, etc
One of the many rewards of mastering the tool of perception management is an acute conscious awareness of events. It is a powerful tool of influence when used (consciously or subconsciously) correctly. Like the deep technique, the management of perception enables an exploiter to manipulate any individual or group with the use of adequate information and some basic psychological techniques. In Robert Cialdini’s words, “everyone is vulnerable to manipulation.”

To understand fully the nature of this vulnerability, Robert Cialdini encourages people to observe the work of the ethnologist. Upon inspection, he points out that humans have automatic responses, which are developed from psychological principles, or stereotypes they have learned to accept. Cialdini believes that everyone can be triggered to automatically respond to a situation with the use of words or images that engage a strong psychological principle. Besides these components of automatic response, Cialdini goes on to say that in the process of using automatic influence, the exploiters need hardly strain a muscle to get their way. It seems that perception management is a tool of mental perseverance rather than physical fortitude. The key to influencing an individual’s or group’s perception is “to trigger the great stores of influence that already exist in the situation and direct them toward the intended target.” Perception management, when thoroughly researched, can reduce damage to coalition forces. As former Secretary of Defense, William Perry stated, information operations in its entirety, made a drastic impact on how America fought the Persian Gulf War. General

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43 (Cialdini 1984, 14).
44 (Cialdini 1984, 8-9). Self-generated persuasion: induced by group discussion, by getting someone to role-play an opponent’s position, or by asking a person to imagine a course of action.
45 (Cialdini 1984, 10).
46 Ibid., p. 11
Schwarzkopf, also an avid supporter of perception management, stressed the importance of integrating PYSOP into the coalition military plan. The efforts demonstrated that "information operations can determine a mission's success."\textsuperscript{47}

The next two chapters examine a recent US coalition operation by assessing military operations in The Gulf War and in the Kosovo conflict.

\textsuperscript{47} DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, JCS, 03 January 1972), introduction.
III. PERSIAN GULF CASE STUDY

The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies of his troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that action will produce on the mind and will of the commander.

Captain Sir Basil Liddel Hart
Thoughts on War, 1944

A. RELEVANT USE OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

The 1990-91 Persian Gulf War was a war of carefully constructed words, as much as it was a war of high-tech weaponry. Both the coalition and Iraqi authorities used perception management to convey their purpose in the Gulf. Both conflicts were event-driven and close to the end, crisis driven. One methods used to win the perception management campaign was the negative deep technique. According to Frederick Mann and Russell Thomas, people using negative deep technique claim to be “authorities.48”

Political leaders and many other national leaders in the region with “authority” had one thing in common; they all attempted to frame the perception of events during the war. They used the mass media to ignite, structure, frame, and exploit latent ethnic hatred in hopes of skewing information about the reality of the war. As Captain Frank Petho, USN, once said, “words are like symbols bounded by rationality.”49 The arrangement of words means a difference in keeping something in memory for long period. In other words, people have limited long term memory. They forget details and

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49 Captain Frank Petho, USN, Chairman, NSA Dept. Lecture, course on Human factors in Information Operations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 24 June 2000.
logic collapses. In an attempt to rebuild or reconstruct that memory, the missing data can be provided with the help of the perception manager.

**B. GULF WAR BACKGROUND**

On August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq launched an attack against Kuwait. The United States and Kuwait called for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council in an effort to stop "this blatant use of military aggression." The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed several resolutions (UNSR) pertaining to the situation in Kuwait.

Iraq not only refused to leave but also held foreign nationals hostage. As time passed, and with no results from their earlier warnings, the UNSC passed Resolution 662 and 664 in hopes of coming to a peaceful resolution. At four o’clock in the morning of February 21, 1991, the United States Central Command in Saudi Arabia led a coalition of forces from thirty countries in a massive ground, naval, and air offensive with the declared intention of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

It was reported that about a million women, children, and old people fled in terror toward Turkey and Iran, seeking safety from chemical bombs and the vengeful framing

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52 Saddam declared Kuwait "a comprehensive and eternal merger." Resolution 662 declared the annexation null and void. Resolution 664 demanded the immediate release of all foreign nationals. A total of eleven Council resolutions were passed to no avail.
of one man's attempt to cleanse his country of anti-Saddam Hussein compatriots. The massive violation of human rights was so great that President Bush, who had compared Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, was compelled to intervene further with the remaining American troops. After 100 hours of ground war, the Iraqi army fled or surrendered to "the largest single allied military offensive since World War II."\(^{53}\)

One could conclude that Model Two of the Davis and Arquilla study describe actions taken by Saddam Hussein.\(^{54}\) Model Two sees Saddam Hussein as cold, ruthless, calculating, and pragmatic.

C. KUWAITI PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN

Kuwait aimed its perception management toward the Kuwaiti population, the United Nations, and towards the United States leaders and population. They told the story of complete devastation and helplessness. They reinforced the perception that "Iraqi occupation forces were savagely intensifying their inhumane practices against innocent civilians in Kuwait," killing people in the streets, burning homes, and committing other atrocities such as murder, rape, plunder, and torture.

1. Kuwaiti Perception Management Tools

To create a credible story, Kuwaiti authorities detailed these atrocities via submission reports and videotapes presented to the Council. The royal family of Kuwait framed events and stories of "the horror" being forced upon them. They hired as many as twenty public relations, law, and lobbying firms in Washington, D.C., to convince


\(^{54}\) Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with Saddam Hussein (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1991), 13.
Americans to support that war. Dozens of fabricated video news releases were aired as news stories by television stations and networks around the world. In one instance, Kuwait's royal family hired Hill & Knowlton public relations firm to arrange a phony US Congressional hearing at which the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador, appearing anonymously, falsely testified to having witnessed Iraqi soldiers pulling scores of babies from incubators in a hospital and leaving them to die.\footnote{Retrieved January 9, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://members.nbcis.com/scone/hk.html. See also http://meme334.freeserve.co.uk/hk.htm.}

2. Results of Kuwaiti Perception Management Campaign

In the end, Kuwaiti authorities succeeded in gaining the support of the United Nations, including the United States. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660 with the main objective to “restore international peace and security” if Iraq failed to comply by January 15, 1991. As the conflict continued, Resolution 678 was passed authorizing member states to use “all necessary means to uphold” peace within the region. In this manner, the United Nations set boundaries (frames) around which Saddam Hussein had to react.

D. IRAQI PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN

Understanding Saddam Hussein’s perceptions of his opponents will help the reader to grasp why he followed the course he did. Hussein’s perception of the war was quite different than that of US President George Bush. Throughout the waiting period for the United Nations deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein continued to believe that he could avoid a serious military defeat. He, along with his advisors, was convinced that the United States would hesitate to use force against Iraq, and the crisis would turn into a long political contest of wills and words. He believed that his troops could hold out long
enough for the coalition to fragment, as Arab public opinion rose up against American forces.

In order to keep themselves in power, many manipulators follow certain steps to seclude their victims. In Saddam Hussein's case, he attempted to do the following:

- Cut the Iraqi people off from the outside world
- Induce a physical state conducive for manipulation. Increase the person's emotional arousal
- Confuse the person through guilt, self-doubt, and pressure
- Use repetition of slogans and symbols, indoctrination, and simple thinking to alter the person's thinking\textsuperscript{56}
- Use the "contrast principle" and other methods of influence to unite the Arab world against the Western nations of the coalition

Since 1968, Saddam Hussein rejected other ideologies, going so far as to execute, assassinate, or intimidate adherents of various ideological organizations. Furthermore, to prevent exposure to unacceptable ideas, Baghdad limited Iraqis' access to external sources of information and continues to do so. The readings point out that by aiming at the emotions of a target, Saddam Hussein intended to affect the American populations' perception of the Bush administration's reasons for entering the war. Saddam Hussein was a culprit for stating how things "ought" to be. In his realm of reality, he purposely confused his opinion of how things should be with the logic of a situation in order to get the support of his people and other Arab brothers. In an attempt to gain public support, Iraq began an intensive and almost successful perception management campaign. Iraqi's PM efforts included defaming Kuwait's ruling family and portraying Iraq as the champion of anti-colonist, social justice, Arab unity, the Palestinian cause, and Islam\textsuperscript{57}.


\textsuperscript{57} Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, JCS, 09 October 1998, I-20. This information was taken from the "Final Report to Congress", April 1992.
1. **Iraq’s Targeting of the Arab Audience**

First, Saddam Hussein sought to link together the Arab world and to make Islam a common bond among the Arab countries. Stories about anti-Arab sentiment in the United States were frequent, especially after the devastating air attack on Baghdad. He believed that he was in an epic struggle between right and wrong, between the oppressed poor and the unjust and opportunistic rich, between injustice, deception and treachery on the one hand and fairness, justice, honesty and loyalty on the other. Saddam Hussein vowed to fight even after the retreat from Kuwait. He declared: “Victory is sweet with the help of God.”

Saddam Hussein’s supporters shared his views about being victims of American and Israeli aggression. He attempted to intimidate his neighbors into either siding with Iraq or remaining neutral. He conducted numerous Scud attacks against Israel in an effort to turn the war into an Arab-Israeli conflict.

Most of the Iraqi population was adversely affected by the 1990 embargo on oil sales. They became highly susceptible to newspaper stories. One newspaper, al-Jumhuriyah, reported that the United States, not the United Nations, had resorted to the weapon of starvation to divide Iraq and turn it into a new Rwanda. The editor used misinformation: "The embargo has banned all the necessities of life, including food and medicine." When in actuality, the UNSCR 660 provided exemptions for food and humanitarian supplies.

Saddam Hussein pointed out that the withdrawal from Kuwait would not bring an end to the “real cause” of the war, the perceived international conspiracy against his regime. In a face-to-face communication attempt to influence the story, he told Soviet

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envoy Yevgeny Primakov (negotiator) that Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would be useless against the United States. He said, "if America decides on war it will go to war whether I withdraw from Kuwait or not. They are conspiring against us. They are targeting the leadership for assassination."59

Saddam Hussein and his Governing Council felt that their invasion of Kuwait was justified. The story told to the world was that the borders were fixed by an imperialist power. No border settlement had ever been reached between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq’s southern border with Kuwait dates back to an agreement with Turkey in 1913, which was never ratified60. Kuwait was the administrative sub-district of the Iraqi province of Basra. Iraq was declared independent in 1932 and came under the control of the Hashemite family who also ruled Jordan. In 1961, Kuwait was given its independence. Iraqi troops invaded but left soon after British troops returned in 1961. Again in 1973, Iraqi troops crossed into Kuwait but again withdrew after occupying a Kuwaiti fort for a short time. Much of the disputed area included the Neutral Zone (on the border between Iraq and Kuwait), which consisted of 2,000 square miles that was negotiated in 1969. Both nations agreed not to lay claim to this oil-rich area61.

Saddam Hussein felt that he should retaliate against Kuwait’s aggressive oil production. During the 1980-88 war, Kuwait had increased its oil production by one million barrels per day in violation of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agreements. Iraq claimed that Kuwait robbed Iraq of part of this pool of oil, thus


60 The Weinberg doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait described this epic long struggle over the balance of power. Keeping Israel, our strongest military partner in the region, at bay, pleasing our Arab coalition partners, insuring that Iran did not emerge as the dominant power in the region, and avoiding increased world terrorism were all sub-issues of the balance of power question.

depressing the price of oil by increased production. Kuwait drilled laterally into the Rumailla oil field of which 90 percent is located within Iraqi territory. Prior to the invasion, Kuwait had extracted approximately ten million barrels of oil from Rumailla. This was 0.5 percent of its total production of 2 million barrels per day and amounted to approximately $2.4 billion during the eight-year war.  

2. Targeting the American Audience

As Americans learned after the Vietnam War, citizens are often reluctant to go to war and suffer casualties without a legitimate reason. In an effort to recreate this "Vietnam syndrome" amongst the American population, a high-level Iraqi official threatened that if war came, the Americans would come home not only in large numbers, but also in body bags. One newspaper story claimed that the Pentagon had ordered several thousand body bags and that the factory making them was working twenty-four hours a day to fill the order. Another story claimed that the total number of body bags ordered for the Gulf War was forty thousand. Saddam Hussein hoped this tactic would compel the American people to demand US withdrawal since this war would be perceived not as a crusade to stop aggression but as an attempt to keep oil prices low; and therefore not a legitimate reason to sacrifice American lives.

With the hopes of creating the impression of American weakness and decrease the credibility of US capability in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein promoted a series of stories. One story sent the message that, as time passed, coalition air and ground power would be meaningless to the effort of stopping Iraqi forces. According to reports, Iraq

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62 Ibid.


scattered soldiers of the elite Republican Guard (RG) throughout the country and would try to shield them from American bombing by keeping them in places such as schools. One newspaper story claimed that Iraqi troops had laid more than a half a million landmines in two belts north of the Saudi border, while holding another twenty million in their arsenals. Other stories continued to build the Iraqi defense system. One story points out that coalition forces would be walking into a killing zone and would be met by the elite Republican Guard.

3. Iraq's Perception Management Tools

Iraq used various tools of perception management to convey their stories. One tool repeatedly used to generate propaganda was the media. It is difficult to measure the role the Iraqi media has played in maintaining Saddam Hussein's control over most of Iraq. Traditionally, the regime's information strategy included Ba'athist ideological indoctrination.

Iraqi propaganda themes tried to promote the attitudes endorsed by Ba'athist ideology. They reinforce the regime's ideology among Saddam Hussein's loyal supporters. The themes persuade some of the skeptical masses to support the regime. Specific propaganda themes discourage overt dissent by limiting discussion to the government "line." The Iraqi media's propaganda filled the information void that the regime has deliberately created (and United Nations sanctions have reinforced) so that it can control information.

In an attempt to appeal to a cultural archetype, the Iraqi media used similarity to portray Saddam Hussein as the ideal Arab father. According to one sociologist, the Arab

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65 This article and other related articles were retrieved April 28, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.cas.usf.edu/envir_science/espolicy/espolicies/espconcepts/Omar2.htm.
family is a cohesive social unit that works for the benefit of all, not just individuals; therefore, it was very difficult to shift Iraqi’s beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The father has both authority over and responsibility for the family. It is the father who calls on family members to make individual sacrifices for the greater good. During the past several years, the Iraqi media have emphasized that Saddam Hussein fulfills his responsibility to his extended family, the Iraqis. The media points out that he has subsidized food, raised the wages of government employees, and rebuilt the nation.

Another tactic used in the Iraqi media is that the United States maliciously involved Iraq's neighbors-Kuwait and Saudi Arabia-in US neo-colonialist plotting. The Iraqi media alleged that these two countries were the puppets of the United States, obeying all of its orders. The primary, recurring complaint voiced by the media was that US planes used Kuwaiti and Saudi bases to spy on Iraq. The INA's 29 December 1995 report was typical: US aircraft conducted 456 aggressive sorties between 11-20 December, in addition to some reconnaissance flights [which] broke the sound barrier over many areas.

4. **Results of the Iraqi Perception Management Campaign**

Saddam Hussein achieved the public support he coveted. There was clearly an Arab dilemma. The Arab Nations attempted to solve two problems. They wanted to avoid being branded as hostile towards a fellow Arab nation. As a result, the Arab League was split over the condemnation of Iraq. On August 10, 1990, 12 of the 21 votes dissented and did not vote against Hussein66. Those who did not vote stated that they opposed the presence of the United States in the Middle East and that they supported Hussein's desire to link the Gulf crisis to the Palestinian question. Furthermore, they

supported Hussein's grievances and opposed Kuwait's insensitivity and greed over oil in the area.

Saddam Hussein's attack of Israel and Saudi Arabia failed to reduce coalition efforts and will to fight. Coalition use of information operations was a major factor in defeating Saddam Hussein's propaganda campaign. Saddam Hussein's perception management tactics did not bring the desired effect on the United Nations deadline. It limited his time to withdraw from Kuwait. Perhaps, he felt that he was being constrained and being manipulated. He countered, using the same method of framing the story, by making his options clear to the public.

Saddam Hussein used perception management effectively to convince the US and allies that his forces would fight very hard. This caused much debate in the US Senate. A narrow 52-47 vote authorized the use of American soldiers. Saddam Hussein is a conscious exploiter of perception.

In order to become an effective perception manager, it is critical to analyze information and not just automatically or "blindly" accept it. Saddam Hussein felt that he could control the situation by driving events and thus, forcing coalition actions. He exploited the use of television, print, face-to-face communication, and the news. In comparison to coalition perception management, Saddam Hussein's story failed to convey the need for populace support. In the end, he lost the perception management campaign.

Saddam Hussein's political strategy failed to influence the decision making coalition nation leadership. His credibility was destroyed when he attempted to create an

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67 The author suggests based on Robert Cialdini's study, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.
environment conducive for manipulation and at the same time, induce an emotional state. He was willing to place his men and innocent civilians in harms way. In the end, millions of people were left in a starved and desperate mode. Of course, the “father” of Iraq will come and rescue them, under one condition, that they follow him and his beliefs.

E. COALITION FORCES PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN

The coalition perception management was aimed at several target audiences: the United States and European population, the Kuwaiti population, and most importantly, Arab unity, the Iraqi leaders and soldiers. It even attempted to affect Saddam Hussein’s control over his soldiers in hopes that he would lose control. The goal of the PM planning team was to deceive Iraqi forces regarding Coalition intentions and to conceal the Coalition scheme of maneuver. The overall objective was to subdue the will of Iraqi leaders, causing them to act in accordance with the Coalition objective to withdraw forces that had annexed Kuwait. The story told was quite convincing, especially in their amphibious efforts. Coalition forces conducted an intensive deception plan to convince Saddam Hussein of Coalition intent to conduct the main offensive using ground and amphibious attacks into central Kuwait, and to dismiss real indicators of the true Coalition intent to swing west of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and to make the main attack into Iraq itself\(^\text{68}\).

1. Coalition Perception Management Tools

Throughout the war, perceptual attacks included physical and electronic strikes on sensors and data links to destroy and disrupt the ability of Iraqi command to maintain awareness of Coalition actions or of their own force dispositions and status. These attacks were delivered via broadcast and physically in leaflets. The message these

\(^{68}\) Joint Publication 3-13, The Joint Staff Special Technical Operation Division, II-3.
perception management tools conveyed was the overwhelming fact that the coalition had the military advantage. The perception that Coalition military intelligence and force could penetrate every corners of Iraq was conveyed via the leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts. These PM tools also sustained the perception that specific allied attacks would be fatal and that the Iraqi soldiers should abandon their vehicles and surrender. The United States was a leading factor in the political perception that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be used if Saddam Hussein ever tried to use WMD against coalition forces.69

2. The Importance of Target Audience

United States Presidents and other politicians have used audience involvement, cultural symbols, and images to their advantage in telling their stories. President Bush gave the media several reasons for the American invasion of Iraq and in the process set the perceptual environment. One frame used was to uphold the United Nations commitment to defend member states against aggression. Another frame was to maintain a balanced economy. President Bush also stated that the United States was preventing Iraq from monopolizing “all the worlds great oil reserves.” Lastly, President Bush also claimed that Iraq was posing a nuclear threat. He stated that the goal of the coalition troops’ deployment to Kuwait was to remove Iraqi soldiers and to prevent Hussein from using his air force as well as chemical weapons against the Shiite and Kurdish rebel forces.

President Bush used words such as Saddam Hussein’s “aggressive attack on tiny Kuwait” to emphasized the disadvantage of Iraq over Kuwait. He pointed out that the

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69 Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations (Boston: Artech House, 1998), 9. US secretary of state made several statements indication in-kind responses to weapons of mass destruction are presumed to be an influencing factor in Iraqi command withholding available chemical-biological weapons.
United States and its allies refused to stand by and allow such “disruption of international order and civilized ideals.”

Using Cialdini’s principles of “social proof” and “liking,” Amnesty International as well as President Bush used both principles to prove that Saddam Hussein was evil. President Bush made many of these Kurd reports [about Iraqi troops pillaging the country] seem to have been true. A University of Massachusetts study later showed that the more television people watched, the more their attention was focused on fewer events, the less they knew about the entire situation in the Gulf, and the more they supported the war.70 Doubts gradually arose whether “a line drawn in the sand” of Saudi Arabia and an economic boycott would bring enough pressure on Hussein to accomplish United States goals.

Coalition forces framed or structured the situation. Again, leaflets, radio, and loudspeakers informed the Iraqi soldiers as well as the Iraqi population of the United Nations deadline. The information passed consisted of the United Nations resolutions passed against Saddam Hussein’s “aggressive acts” and complete disruption to “international order and civilize ideals.”71

The perceptual set of tools were used to induce guilt, fear, and at the same time, hope for a peaceful resolution. The question of credibility and believability comes to play an important role in influencing the Iraqi soldiers. The enormity of Saddam Hussein’s crime made it easier for the international community to accept the United

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71 President Bush speech to Veterans Memorial Ceremony. He actually broke his vacation to make this speech. From the web www.dcmilitary.com/army/pentagram/archives/archives/pt_bush_treegrove_510.html.
States’ and its Western allies’ response to the Iraqi challenge. The suspicion of US foreign policy was subsumed by the urgency to rid the threat of their country. President Bush’s administration knew that not only the credibility of the US was at stake, but also the trust of the international community.

To present different aspects of Saddam Hussein’s treachery, perception management planners used symbols and signs to influence the populations’ and Iraqi soldiers’ perception of real events. The main influential tools used were leaflets, radio, and loudspeaker in that order.

Leaflets were designed to strike cultural and emotional chords among Iraqi soldiers. They emphasized peace and brotherhood. The leaflet supported the themes of surrender, inevitability, abandon equip/flee, and the conflict and starvation of innocent people as Saddam Hussein’s Fault.

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72 See Figure 6.
73 See Figures 12 & 13.
Live Together In Peace Not War

"We are all brothers... neighbor Arabs.... we want peace"

Do You Really Want To Die?

Figure 10. Brotherhood Leaflet.

As events evolved, leaflet themes transitioned to emphasizing the United Nations imposed 15 January deadline. After the deadline passed, leaflet themes shifted to emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion as well as the location and time of bombing sites74. In a way, the leaflets told a story that coalition forces had far better equipment, weapons, and vehicles.

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74 See Figures 10 through 12. Figure 10 depicts the first leaflets to be dropped. This leaflet also let them know there was nothing they could do to stop the bombing short of surrendering. Figure 11 informed the Iraqi forces that the bombing they just experienced was nothing compared to what would be coming if they were foolish enough not to surrender.
Surrender Safely

This illustrated Gulf War PSYOP leaflet portrays the two choices that the soldier has, fight and die for sure, or surrender and live so they can be with their family again.

The instructions as to "How to Surrender" were published in both arabic and english on the back of the leaflet. The instructions were:

"To Seek Refuge Safely the Bearer Must Strictly Adhere to the Following Procedures

Remove the magazine from your weapon.
Sling your weapon over your left shoulder muzzle down.
Have both hands raised above your head.
Approach the Multi-National Forces position slowly, with the lead soldier holding this document above his head.
If you do this, you will not die"

Figure 11. Surrender Instructions.
Surrender Safely

For your safety follow these directions

1. Elevate your weapon's barrel to their maximum elevation.
2. Traverse the gun barrel to the rear.
3. Leave the tank hatches open
4. Place your hands over your head and proceed slowly.
5. Wave a white cloth as an indication of your peaceful intent or wave this leaflet.

All armies of the Multi-National Forces understand that this pass shows your honorable commitment to peace.

Figure 12. More Surrender Leaflet Samples.

هذه هو الانذار الأول والأخير !
سوف تقوم بقصف وحدتك عند
هرب من هذا الموقع حالاً !

"The 16th Infantry Division of the Iraqi army will be bombed tomorrow. Leave this location now and save yourselves."

Figure 13. Bombing Leaflet Sample.
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Can You Say More Bombs?

"Brother Iraqi Soldier... have you ever considered the power of the coalition forces?"

Figure 14. More Bombing Leaflet Sample.

Leaflet themes were changed to adjust to cultural standards. For example, red ink had been used in the initial design of some early leaflets. It was later discovered that in Iraqi culture red signaled danger and should be avoided. The colors were changed to other colors. The leaflets ensured soldiers safety and health supplies if they were to surrender to coalition forces. They informed the soldiers that Saddam Hussein was not telling the whole truth about the situation.
Figure 15. More Bombing Leaflet Sample.
"Voice of the Gulf" was the Coalition's radio network that broadcast from ground based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The radio script or story was prepared daily and provided news to counter Iraqi propaganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and surrender. The objective of the radio broadcast was to demonstrate to Iraqi officers that their communications were vulnerable, to force them to use alternate channels, to slow down responsiveness, to increase suspicion, and cause tighter control of commanders by security forces.
Loudspeaker teams accompanied units to Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of prepared surrender messages. One of the biggest themes broadcast was that if they (Iraqi soldiers) surrendered, they would be treated humanely and fairly.

Some use of distortion on television was cited from the B-roll of a Scud being intercepted by Patriot missiles over Israel at night is better than a long, hazy shot of the shelling of Khafji\textsuperscript{75}. There was so much action, drama and suspense in this Scud tape and reality so skewed that the counter-attack at Khafji was made less important than the destruction of an inaccurate missile.

The feeling of self-doubt and pressure is used to induce guilt about the events occurring. Saddam Hussein applied the technique of “social proof.” He instilled so much fear in his soldiers that no one wanted to disobey him. However, his attempted failed. Instead, social proof became one of the effective tools for the coalition forces. Leaflets, radios, and loudspeakers denoted to the soldiers that a peaceful safe haven was waiting for them if they headed south of Mecca. One video that was passed around chanted the Koran throughout its ten-minute duration. Saddam Hussein, the Coalition points out, was not following the teachings of the Koran.

3. Result of Coalition Perception Management Campaign
Perception management was an influential tool in erasing the so-called ‘line in the sand.’ It resulted in minimal coalition casualties while completely devastating the Iraqi

\textsuperscript{75} B-roll is footage of an event. Scud is the code name for the SS-1 missiles. Patriot missiles are US anti-ballistic missiles used to counter Iraq’s Scuds. In the early evening of 29 January 1991, Iraqi armor and mechanized infantry in eastern and southern Kuwait attacked US Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT) and Arab Joint Forces Command-East (JFC-East) units at several points along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border. The Iraqi offensive lasted a little over four days, continuing until 2 February 1991. Known collectives as the Battle of Khafji, the series of engagements between Iraqi forces and the US-led anti-Iraq coalition represented the first significant ground action of the Gulf War.
RG causing most of the troops to surrender en masse\textsuperscript{76}. The coalition kept up activity that made Iraq think that the main element of the attack would be a sea borne invasion. This pinned down large numbers of Iraqi troops along the Kuwaiti shoreline\textsuperscript{77}. The coalition relied on air power to wear down the Iraqi forces and isolate them in Kuwait and southern Iraq. When Iraqi planes fled to Iran and soldiers were blinded, the Allies were able to move around without revealing their dispositions.

The actual battle plan did not have any amphibious assault\textsuperscript{78}. The Iraqi RG was blindsided by the coalition ground maneuver. Coalition forces gave the impression that the RG was not the target. The Guard commanders assumed that the Coalition VII Corps was moving toward Kuwait City. The RG’s plan was to use the Iraqi 12 Armored Division to block this advance while they came down from the north. By the afternoon of 26 February, a coalition team consisting of rocket system, Apache helicopters, and fighting vehicles had three of the Guard divisions running. Other efforts included Navy feints and demonstrations in the northern Persian Gulf, Marine landing exercises along the Persian Gulf and Omani coast, positioning of a large amphibious task force in the Gulf, and air refueling and training activity surges that desensitized the Iraqis to the real pre-attack buildup.


\textsuperscript{77} Roger Hilsman George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure? (Novato, CA: Presidio & Lyford books, 1992), 130. General Schwarzkopf compared the maneuver to the so-called “Hail Mary” play in football. In the “Hail Mary” play, all the eligible receivers go way out to one end. When the play begins they all run like hell toward the goal. The quarterback takes the ball from the center and throws a forward pass to the receiver who is least effectively covered.

\textsuperscript{78} Actually, there would have been a landing had the “left hook” failed.
As Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla put it, there is a psychological tendency to rationalize information as long as possible within the preconceived mental "frame." In their example, the "frame" was that Saddam Hussein was bluffing, and that his preparations were merely to make that bluffing effective. They believed that much is accomplished from asking regional specialists for "predictions as well as itemizing the factors influencing nations' (or leaders’) behaviors, and how behavior will change as a function of those factors." Goffman, Davis and Arquilla believe that a lot can be gained from viewing an event from different aspects or "frames." Approaching an opponent or group from this aspect will allow the planner to adapt to events rather than stick with an original strategy.

Since every perspective has a limited range of usefulness, a large repertoire of perspectives is needed in order to function in all of the differing situations of the Gulf war. First, the situation must be clearly defined to the target audience. Table (3) shows the effectiveness of employing Cialdini’s “liking” and “contrast” principles conveyed through three PSYOP tools: leaflets, radio broadcasting, and loudspeakers. The leaflets and radios depicted Saddam Hussein as evil and selfish while at the same time portrayed the coalition forces as honorable and friendly. At the same time, these perception management tools informed the Iraqi soldiers that they stood alone in their effort to overtake Kuwait. They informed the soldiers about the economic sanctions placed against them. They warned them that coalition forces would bomb Iraq until Kuwait was

79 (Davis and Arquilla, 1991), x.
80 Ibid., 9.
81 Ibid., 11. Davis and Arquilla believe that much can be gained from viewing alternative scenarios, alternative futures, or alternative opponent models. This, they believe, will generate the open-minded and wide-ranging discussions that lead to an appreciation of the "game board."
82 Ibid., 11.
liberated. The leaflets in particular, told the soldiers the time and location of coalition bombing operations. They encouraged the soldiers to abandon their equipment and instructed them how to surrender to coalition forces.

Perception management was a key element to the successful mass surrender of Iraqi soldiers and abandonment of more than half of Iraq’s equipment. Coalition intelligence determined that the Iraqi soldiers were kept ignorant of the situation and did not know about their disadvantage, isolation, and the United Nations deadline. Themes were based on analysis of Iraq’s culture, preconception, biases, weaknesses, and strength.

The US public perception was hindered when Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Michael J. Dugan’s story about the US strategy to bomb Iraq with Saddam Hussein, his family, and his mistress as the principal targets. Firing General Dugan only made the story more believable. It left doubts in the minds of the American people as to the real reason for American intervention. President Bush repeated that the US goal in the Middle East was to defend Saudi Arabia, to get Iraq out of Kuwait, and to make Saddam Hussein understand that aggression would not be tolerated. The strategy to achieve those goals was to impose economic sanctions. President Bush told reporters that the United States itself was not prepared to support the overthrow of Hussein, but hoped that the Iraqi people would unseat their leader.

Finally, cultural background must be taken into account in any study of psychological warfare. Subject matter experts must be a part of the Coalition PM planning team. Davis and Arquilla made a good conclusion about culture specific models. They believed that it is “neither necessary nor appropriate to model opponents in

83 See Figure 12.
terms of culture-specific concepts such as the Arab mind." As all the supported works point out, it is important to include the study of background and culture of a particular opponent. But, culture and history should not be the only factors used in assessing an opponent’s perceptions and behavior.

F. MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

The media are a very influential group. They provide significant amounts of information but it is delivered within a very limited "frame," often in the form of a "sound bite." The transformation of this "framed" information into public opinion can generate attitudes based on few actual facts. These uninformed attitudes are dangerous in that they can lead to erroneous assumptions. Military leaders often use this as a weapon of population persuasion. President Bush used Cialdini’s "liking" principle to portray Saddam Hussein as a modern Adolf Hitler in order to get public support for US intervention in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Some recurring themes in Coalition newspapers:

- The humanitarian situation (if it is mentioned at all) is the fault of Saddam Hussein85
- The sanctions-busting flights will open the door to smuggling weapons technology
- Saddam Hussein received $37 billion for food and medicine86

The duel between Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles and President Bush’s Patriot missiles created an interactive dialogue of images, which fit precisely within the credible news frame.

84 (Davis and Arquilla 1991, 78).
86 Ibid. This quote was taken from C.E. Montague, writer and WWI veteran.
According to the Davis and Arquilla study, Saddam Hussein used the media as a source of considerable information. The rapid US buildup had gone on from some weeks to the point where Saddam Hussein felt that the US was just bluffing and would not attack. However, the Koran best states it: if two parties of the believers fight one another, reconcile between them. But if one of them becomes aggressive against the other, then fight the one that is aggressive till he reverts to God’s behest. Then, if it reverts, reconcile between them with equity and be just, for truly God loves the just.

G. POTENTIAL METHODS FOR ACHIEVING INTEGRATED EFFORT

The value of inter-service and country integration has been recognized for a long time. For the United States, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) made significant strides integrating the services. In order to form a successful coalition operation, there must be a written document from which to train and gain knowledge. For a successful coalition, a joint international doctrine is highly recommended.

H. SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

The International Coalition that the United States assembled for the Iraqi war was very successful in their efforts to liberate Kuwait. After six months of diplomacy, followed by six weeks of one of the most intense air campaigns in history, coalition ground forces, attacking along a broad front, crushed the Iraqi army. However, they wanted the war terminated without bringing any harm to Saddam Hussein. The author can only speculate one reason why no nation filed suit in front of the United Nations Security Council against Saddam Hussein. Maybe, Saddam Hussein’s media efforts succeeded in spreading propaganda about the illegal use of coalition forces and their

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87 (Davis and Arquilla 1991, 52).
desire to kill him along with his family because of power concerns. If this story were true, the United Nations would be condoning the same vicious and aggressive acts for which Saddam Hussein was being punished.

Most of the coalition success was produced by fear. The Iraqis’ unwillingness or inability to use chemical weapons was due to the fear that the United States would use even worse weapons of mass destruction in retaliation.

Success was impossible, on the other hand if a value or behavior promoted was totally alien to the Iraqi culture or challenged any of its core values, such as religion or nationalism, or was in conflict with its deeply ingrained perceptions, such as the values endorsed by the Koran which encourage the neutralization of any Arab brother who rise up against his fellow brothers.

I. SUMMARY

Based on the way the Iraqi media developed themes during the Gulf conflict, it is possible to conclude that propaganda assisted and still helped the Iraqi regime’s effort to exert control over its people. To achieve a successful integration of Coalition operations leaders need to integrate the media with military operations. Without a collated effort, the media might compromise security or simply get the story wrong and inadvertently affect public support. Saddam Hussein was said to get his daily update of Americans opinions on the Persian Gulf War from watching CNN daily.

Kuwait, the United States, and Iraq were all master storytellers. As Joint Publication 3-58 defines, a deception story must be credible and believable. Credible news frames the circumstances or context that create believable content or ultimately realities in news images. The story must be framed to support the policy of the
leadership; else, it will fail to build public understanding or support. The key to disseminating false stories is the credibility of its sender. In the end, the reader(s) and the receivers decides who is telling the truth. Once this decision is made, the receivers will construct a reality that supports their beliefs and opinion and make it easy to remember. However, it never fails, for any significant action or opposition to occur, social proof must be involved.

The story that the coalition would use weapons of mass destruction had instilled fear in the Iraqi's. It was fear and not virtue, which made it possible to keep the war from escalating beyond a regional conflict. In the end, our political leaders attempt to define reality. Not only that, the stories they tell the media, who in turn convey their rendition to us, define our perception of other nations.

Someone who is objective and who becomes aware that the brain "constructs" reality will be much more capable of spotting the tools of perception management being used against them. However, the reader should be careful not to create self-deceiving bias(es). Perception management in the Gulf war weakened the morale of Iraqi soldiers. The goal to discredit the Iraqi military and reduce its capability and impede its maneuver was achieved. Perception management was a part of the tool set used to create doubt and confusion amongst the Iraqi lower ranks. It was a contributing factor to the overall success of coalition operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Chronology of the Persian Gulf Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2</td>
<td>Iraq invades Kuwait. UN resolution 660 calls for Iraqi withdrawal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 3</td>
<td>Iraqi forces reach Kuwaiti-Saudi border. The Arab League condemns Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 5</td>
<td>President Bush declares that the invasion &quot;will not stand.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>King Fahd of Saudi Arabia meets with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and requests U.S. military assistance. UN resolution 661 bans the importation of Iraqi goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8</td>
<td>American fighter planes arrive in Saudi Arabia. Iraq declares a &quot;comprehensive and eternal merger&quot; with Kuwait and annexes it as its nineteenth province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 9</td>
<td>UN resolution 662 finds the annexation of Kuwait has no legal validity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12</td>
<td>Iraq offers to withdraw in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory (namely, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) and a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 18</td>
<td>UN resolution 664 demands that Iraq release foreign nationals who are being detained in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 21</td>
<td>Syria joins earlier Egyptian commitment to defend Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25</td>
<td>UN resolution 665 strengthens the economic embargo against Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 5</td>
<td>Iraq calls for the overthrow of leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9</td>
<td>Joint U.S.-Soviet statement made that &quot;we must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.&quot; (George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed [New York: Knopf, 1998], p. 368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13</td>
<td>UN resolution 666 asks for continuous information on the humanitarian situation within Kuwait and Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16</td>
<td>UN resolution 667 condemns Iraqi violation of diplomatic compounds in Kuwait and demands the immediate release of foreign nationals removed from Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24</td>
<td>UN resolution 669 imposes an air embargo on Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 29</td>
<td>UN resolution 667 reiterates the condemnation of Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals and demands their release.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Chronology of the Persian Gulf Conflict.
### PSYOPS Impact on Surrenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% exposed to PSYOPS</th>
<th>Leaflets</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Loudspeakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Believed PSYOPS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Influenced to Act</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Gulf War Leaflet drops (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Balloon</th>
<th>MC-130</th>
<th>F-16</th>
<th>B-52</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surrender</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitability</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandon Equip./Flee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saddam's Fault</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It is estimated that 98% of 300k Iraqis targeted were affected by leaflets.

Table 2. PSYOP Impact on Surrenders.

### LEAFLET THEME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAFLET THEME</th>
<th>BALLOON</th>
<th>MC-130/HC-130</th>
<th>F-16/FA-18</th>
<th>B52</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surrender</td>
<td>54K</td>
<td>11.5M</td>
<td>810K</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12.4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitability</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.3M</td>
<td>2.3M</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.6M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandon Equip./Flee</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.3M</td>
<td>585K</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.9M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saddam's Fault</td>
<td>90K</td>
<td>1.8M</td>
<td>835K</td>
<td>2.0M</td>
<td>4.7M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>186K</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.4M</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.5M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>330K</td>
<td>18.9M</td>
<td>7.8M</td>
<td>2.0M</td>
<td>29.1M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Gulf War Surrender Themes.
IV. KOSOVO CASE STUDY


- Joe W. Straley

A. RELEVANT USE OF PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

The war in Kosovo, like the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict, was a battle of words and sophisticated weaponry. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was unique in that it was the first time a United States information operations (IO) cell worked with a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) IO cell. During the 78-day crisis, NATO members and partner nations directly involved in its management were confronted with diverse political, military and humanitarian challenges.

Information operations are considered to be a large part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), in that the RMA often views conflict from an asymmetric aspect. This asymmetric approach to war occurs over and over again amongst our adversaries. As Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in a speech, “Kosovo…illuminates in many ways how America and our allies and adversaries are going to approach the art of war well into the next century.” However, unlike the Gulf war, information operations was not involved in shaping the environment in Yugoslavia prior to hostilities. Enough time was not given to manipulate the environment to alter the stories that were being promoted by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic.

Chapter Two points out that perception management is determined by the context of the conflict. In the case of Kosovo, the mass media and the Internet defined perception...
management. Both of these tools played a vital role in creating doubt about NATO’s abilities as well as in countering other propaganda stories disseminated by Yugoslav authorities.

Both NATO and Yugoslavia conducted extensive psychological campaigns. Serbian leader Milosevic had an aggressive media campaign. His campaign was so strong that NATO had to reconstruct its IO department to counter its effects. Kosovo provided a wake-up call to the military that public affairs officers and civil affairs officers are an intricate part of the perception management team. This chapter focuses on the powerful impact of the media on military efforts during the conflict and what could have been done better to lessen the tremendous damage to Yugoslavia’s infrastructure and stability.

B. KOSOVO WAR BACKGROUND

Kosovo’s history is rich in ethnic, linguistic, cultural, economic, social and religious differences. Serbs and Albanians disagree widely on the exact nature, origins and extent of their problem and agree only in admitting it has been around for many generations. Over the years, violence has moved from Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia and then to Kosovo89.

Following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 Kosovo was an autonomous province of Yugoslavia, with a multi-ethnic government. Prior its dissolution in 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was made up of six constituent republics (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina).

When Milosevic came into power in 1987, he took away that autonomy and implemented strict policies that excluded Kosovar Albanians from virtually all positions of responsibility. At the time, Albanians consisted of more than ninety percent of the Kosovar population\textsuperscript{90}. In 1989, President Bush warned Milosevic that Serb violence would not go unchallenged. He warned Milosevic that the violence and forced expulsion of Kosovar Albanians would bring about NATO military actions.

NATO announced that the alliance agreed to conduct a campaign against President Milosevic to:

- Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate end of violence and repression in Kosovo
- Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces
- Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
- Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations
- Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework based on the Rambouillet accords

NATO conducted one of the most advanced air campaigns against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). By the end of 1998 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated more than 300,000 Kosovars had already fled their homes and, various cease-fire agreements were stalled. The Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing had resulted in 226,000 refugees in Albania, 125,000 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 33,000 in Montenegro\textsuperscript{91}.


Anti-Milosevic groups such as the Ushtrise te Clirimatare te Kosoves (UCK) stepped up its activities, the response of security forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova-MUP) and, increasingly, the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije--VJ) became more heavy-handed. These groups' actions, in turn, galvanized further Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serb rule and contributed directly to an increase in support for the UCK, to the detriment of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The UCK increased its area of activity until it controlled about 30 percent of the territory of the province. It was able to cut off access to most of the main roads in the province and even forced Serbs out of some areas. However, these successes resulted in further Serb reprisals on the Kosovar Albanian population.

Diplomatic efforts to stem the violence were undertaken by the United States, Western European nations, and Russia. The international community imposed economic sanctions on the FRY. However, the Serbs resented and rejected almost all efforts at outside meddling. The Serbs created the perception that Kosovo problems were purely internal and were unimpressed by threats of Western intervention. In addition to allied intervention, all factions in Kosovo used media exaggerations or deliberate misrepresentation to both bolster internal support and shape international opinion.

C. ALBANIAN PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN

Albanian perception management targeted the global population in hopes of getting outside assistance to their dilemma. It was also aimed at the Serb authorities.

The LDK, led by former political prisoner Ibrahim Rugova, engineered a strategy of passive resistance to Serbian rule in Kosovo. Rugova and his supporters did not want to openly provoke the Serbian authorities because they feared the consequences of a
crackdown on the population at large. However, the LDK’s perceived lack of progress in gaining political autonomy or independence gave birth to a radical armed resistance movement lead by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), or in Albanian, UCK. It emerged in public only in mid-1997, when it claimed responsibility for several attacks on Serbian police and began referring to areas of Kosovo as "liberated territory." The growth of the UCK was aided by both continued Serbian repression and an influx of arms, which were looted from state arms depots in Albania during the unrest there in the spring and summer of 1997.\footnote{See Figure 16 for a map of the region.}
1. Albanian Perception Management Tools

The Albanians delivered their PM messages and themes through the media and refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. The Albanian media abroad regularly referred to Serbia as a foreign occupier, emphasized all actions taken against the Albanian population, and generally supported the existence of the "Republic of Kosovo" that was proclaimed by the LDK in 1991. The Kosovar Albanian media attempted to portray events in the province as a repeat of genocidal tactics used by the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also attempted to portray Kosovo as the main issue in world affairs, thereby generating the impression that outside intervention was just around the corner. Technology has made it possible for the usage of satellite dishes to bring updated events to Kosovar Albanians. On these international broadcasts, they saw that Kosovo was not, in fact, the dominant issue.

Albanian Internet sites told the story of Serbian cruelty. They warned its readers of the potential of being deceived or caught in a false reality by the Serbs. There were articles that pointed out Serbian intended perception management tactics. It pretty much outlined the target audience, the tools being used, and the intended results.

One article warned the Albanian population that the Serbs were using fear as one of their perception management tools. Using this to their advantage, Detroit Free Press photographer Gabriel B. Tait's photos told the story of Albanians sleeping in their shoes

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93 The media includes print, radio and television.


ready to run. Other stories told of the Serbian mass murdering, raping, and pillaging of innocent civilians. Most stories pointed out that the Serbs organized all their acts of violence.

2. **Results of Albanian Perception Management Campaign**

The Albanians succeeded in getting outside help from the United States and NATO. The refugee camps were a major success in conveying the cruel nature of the Serbs. The stories that the refugees told the media were very convincing. The credibility of the Serbs objective was lost and replaced with the question: If the Serbs were not promoting ethnic cleansing, why then, were there so many refugees?

D. **SERBIAN PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN**

Although Kosovo is predominantly Albanian (an estimated 90 percent of a population of about 2 million), all Serbs see Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian nation. In addition, many Serbs believe that the communist system founded by Josip Broz Tito (himself of Croatian-Slovenian ancestry and therefore allegedly opposed to Serbian interests) deprived them of rightful control of Kosovo by giving the province autonomy in the Constitution of 1974. When Slobodan Milosevic assumed power in Serbia in 1987, he assured the Serbians that resolving control over Kosovo was at the top of his agenda. This was accomplished as Serbia gradually eroded Kosovo's autonomy and restricted Albanian rights in the province.

Serbian authorities pressed a concerted propaganda campaign aimed first at Serb citizens and second at sympathizers worldwide. Their propaganda hinged on four messages:

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97 Gabriel Tait was working on a story about a Michigan group's efforts to aid Kosovor refugees. This article and other related articles were retrieved January 22, 2001, from the World Wide Web: http://www.freep.com/jobs/page/academy/kosovo.htm.
Serbia’s deprivations are exclusively due to the malevolence of the West in first ruining Serbia’s economy and preventing its rebirth

A unified Serbian government, army, and people could rebuild the country’s infrastructure in the face of embargo and severe financial shortages

Albanians were terrorists attempting to separate Kosovo from Serbia

NATO conduct was illegal and even a war crime

The Serbs’ belief that Albanians were impostors in their sacred homeland, combined with a pathological hatred, started a long line of arguments and fights for their rights. They targeted the Serbian population in Kosovo. Also, they targeted the world population in an attempt to validate their claim to Kosovo.

The main target was the Albanians. Some observers believe that Serbia’s repressive measures in Kosovo were designed, among other things, to provoke an Albanian armed uprising so as to create a valid reason before the world public opinion for a full-scale military intervention, leading to mass expulsion of Albanians and their replacement by Serb settlers. Serbian authority leaders arbitrarily arrested several Albanian leaders. These arrests were sometimes accompanied by torture or killing of civilians in order to intimidate and expel Kosovo Albanians.

1. Serbian Perception Management Tools

Some of the Serbs perception management tools were harsh and unacceptable to the coalitions forces. One tool, fear, was used to force thousands of Albanians out of their homes. They even went as far as mass killings, raping and other forms of sexual violence. There was even a specific focus on killing young Kosovo Albanian men of fighting age with the aim of terrorizing communities. The Serbs insisted that most of the refugees fled Kosovo because of NATO’s bombing. This random targeting of innocent lives was in hopes of producing the most potent weapon: fear. In certain places, the
Serbs compounded the fear with humiliation. Elders were beaten or forced to make the Serbian Orthodox three-fingered sign.

An important psychological factor in Kosovo since 1989 has been the demonization of the Albanian population in the eyes of the Serbs. This was based partly on religion, as the Orthodox Serbs hate the Muslim Albanians for being coreligionists of the Ottoman Turks who defeated Serbia in 1389 and who ruled Serbia for nearly five centuries.

Serbian use of propaganda during the Kosovo Crisis

Figure 18    Serbian Leaflet Sample.
Note: the poor spelling of “collateral”

Serbs in Kosovo were genuinely frightened, victims of their own perceptions of Albanians as terrorists. This view created a vicious circle: Belgrade media controlled by
Milosevic discussed Albanian aspirations in the worst light, as a threat to Serbian lives and property. Because the Serbs believed they were threatened by hordes of alleged rapists and murderers, the security presence was enormous. The security forces "discovered" numerous "terrorist groups," which reinforced Serbian fears. These anxieties were in turn encouraged by the Belgrade media to justify the repressive state apparatus existing in Kosovo.

Serbian leaders focused on the world’s population to tell the story about how coalition forces were being the actual aggressors. One letter published on the Internet told of the aggressor’s daily targeting of national parks, nature reservations, monuments of cultural and natural heritage, rare and protected plants and animal species and other items of international importance\textsuperscript{98}. The letter goes on to accuse NATO of not only genocide but ecocide of not only the Yugoslav environment but the whole Balkans and considerable parts of Europe as well.

Serbian perception managers exploited global television and the Internet. The Serbian Internet site consisted of links to Albanian terrorism in Kosovo and Metohia\textsuperscript{99}. It consisted of an extensive explanation of their fight against terrorism. Some of the links claimed that Albanians were committing genocide against the Serbs. It pictured them as murders, rapists, and violators of international human rights acts.

Serbian perception management attempted to create the perception of Serbia being the victim of western aggression and meddling. Since as early as March 1998, the


\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
Serbian media focused on the threat to the Serbian people in Kosovo through several main themes:

- Kosovo is an internal matter for Serbia
- Outside interference or mediation in this affair is not welcomed
- Albanians might expect some sort of cultural autonomy, not political
- The UCK is a terrorist organization supported by Albania, the United States, and other Western countries
- Kosovo is historically Serbian; and Albanians are guilty of ethnic cleansing of Serbian villages

The FRY wartime IO was very effective. They focused their themes against NATO; that the Alliance deliberately targeted civilians. As a result, Serbian sympathizers flooded the Internet with sites denouncing NATO forces for alleged atrocities and invited Serbian citizens and other sympathizers to join them. Their confirmed bias compelled them to conduct computer network attacks (CNA) and other cyberwar events against NATO. This campaign was not effective in the US and other western countries. However, it provided Eastern Europeans with a link to information from Serbia. The messages contained stories and graphic pictures of NATO bombing campaign victims, Serb refugees, and news on Serbian refugees, and news on Serbian military operations. Some stories were fabrications, like the one describing the shoot down of an A-10 aircraft.

2. Results of Serbian Perception Management Campaign

Having no contact with the other side of the story, Serbs’ perceptions of reality became so different, selective and ignorant of the other side's perceptions that they raised the question whether a mutually acceptable solution was at all possible. Living in a

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reality of their own, the Serbs had one distinct advantage over the Albanians: they need not bother with policy for the future of Kosovo, as their one and only decision-maker is Slobodan Milosevic. Although now nominally occupying the ceremonial post of federal president, Milosevic pulled all strings, made all decisions and made up all the mantras, which were then parroted by politicians and the media until they benumbed the minds of the chanters. The current mantra: “Kosovo is Serbia.”

Like the Kuwaiti authority, Kosovar Albanians, as in the case of their predecessors, the Muslim Bosnians, tried to manipulate a desperate situation to their advantage in the hope that outside intervention would help them accomplish their main goal of independence for Kosovo. Even though they damaged NATO’s credibility with western media, their perception management efforts failed to prevent outside intervention. They succeeded in ending the air campaign. Their perception management campaign succeeded in preserving Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo as enshrined in UNSR 1244, giving Serbs the right to return their army, police, and displaced citizens to Kosovo at the earliest opportunity.

E. NATO PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT CAMPAIGN

After assessing the environment in Kosovo, international and regional key audiences that may have an effect on the conduct of NATO or US information activities were designated. The primary focus was shaping the attitudes and behaviors of the local Kosovo leaders and population by disseminating factual information with related messages. These messages were disseminated with the intent of causing a motivational dilemma in an attempt to achieve desired attitudes and behaviors to support the NATO mission.
Perception management was primarily focused on shaping the attitudes and behaviors of the local Kosovo leaders and population by disseminating factual information with related messages. At first, the target was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s air defenses.

NATO’s 19 nations had a weak consensus leading into the campaign against Yugoslavia. The perceived frail nature of the coalition only strengthened Milosevic’s media campaign. It seemed almost as if Milosevic set the stage and NATO reacted to his every move. NATO attempted to frame the war by contrasting Milosevic’s “ethnic cleansing” to that of Hitler’s attempt to cleanse Germany of Jews. They likened his policies to those of the Third Reich.

One month into the air operations, NATO’s goals were as follows:

- A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression
- The withdrawal from Kosovo of the Serb military, police and paramilitary forces
- The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
- The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and humanitarian aid organizations
- The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformance with international law and the UN Charter
- Stop the ethnic cleansing
- Get both sides to agree to an equitable position

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103 Broadcast footage of Yugoslav authorities (including military personnel) shoving refugees aboard trains in Pristina.
1. NATO Perception Management Tools

NATO psychological operation (PSYOP) ranged from traditional leaflets targeted at Yugoslavian civilians, which had minimal strategic value. To disseminate information and associated messages, fliers, handbills, posters, and other print products were distributed amongst the population. The perception management team also used radio and television programming. The radio efforts played a key role in the success of disseminating coalition information.

Much of NATO’s perception management efforts were inefficient in their efforts to counter Milosevic’s propaganda. At the start of the conflict, the coalition was ill equipped (both in personnel and material) to carry out a good perception management campaign with a staff of five. The media focused greatly on collateral damage reports. According to Admiral James Ellis, USN, commander of Joint Task Force (JTF), the coalition had “all the tools” to effectively run an information operations campaign. However, the lack of integration of all “the tools” of information operations prolonged the Kosovo conflict.

Television in Kosovo was controlled by Serbs, and in December 1997 the Albanian-language press was shut down, allegedly due to nonpayment of a debt to a Serb-controlled printing firm. The Kosovar Albanians get most of their information from foreign radio broadcasts. Some other popular radio stations were used to convey Coalition themes. The Voice of America Albanian-language broadcasts were the most popular, followed by the British Broadcasting Corporation Albanian Service.

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As noted before, Milosevic controlled the journalists reporting from Belgrade. He and other Yugoslav authorities controlled the scene of the incidents. They made sure that reporters were brought to sites quickly that told a good Yugoslav story (such as in a non-collateral damage story, the crash site of the shot down F-117)\textsuperscript{105}. When an incident occurred, the Yugoslav authorities quickly put out information, creating the important first impression. NATO, on the other hand, did nothing to counter these accusations or false reports.

When they did respond, it was in such an ill-prepared manner that they only perpetuated the stories and gave Belgrade more credibility. The bombing of a refugee column on the Djakovica Prizen road is a prime example of NATO clumsy efforts at perception management\textsuperscript{106}. When the incident first occurred, NATO denied any involvement (accusing the Yugoslavs). They made a press statement that allied pilots had only bombed military vehicles. The next release was an acknowledgement that one F-16 might have bombed a civilian convoy (14 Apr 99). This was again followed by a press conference focusing on the tape recording of the voice of the relevant F-16 pilot talking about the difficulties of identifying targets. This recording was later proven to have had nothing to do with the incident. Five days later, NATO finally came out with statements that two, not one, F-16s had struck two civilian convoys North of Djakovica, killing a number of civilian refugees. NATO continued to lose its credibility with the media as events unfolded. Another incident that decreased NATO's credibility was the May 14, 1999 incident of collateral damage in NATO's bombing campaign in the village.

\textsuperscript{105} The F-117 was shot down one day after air strikes began on 27 March.

of Korisa, in south-west Kosovo. At least 100 refugees were killed and another 50 wounded when six NATO missiles hit this village packed with more than 500 ethnic Albanian refugees. In the case of the Korisa command post in late May 1999, NATO, again first refused to acknowledge that any civilians had been killed. This time, it took them two days to acknowledge the facts.

2. Results of NATO Perception Management Campaign

By delaying information, accusing the Yugoslavs and disseminating false information, NATO damaged its credibility. In a way, their failures gave some credibility to the accuracy of Serbian reporting. Again, the Serbians controlled what the media saw. So, what was reported was only one frame of the whole situation.

Kosovo showed how difficult perception management can be at different levels of authority. NATO was more reactive than proactive to many of the Serbian propaganda and perception management tactics. Perception management was more effective at the lower level, but they too had to revert to reactive measures because of NATO's tactics. NATO spokesman, Jamie Shae did an excellent job downsizing many media accusations about NATO's effort in Kosovo. The 4th PSYOP group was very active with leaflets and radio activities.

F. MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Stories reported by journalists bring to view all sides to every story. During coalition bombing campaign, the nightly news focused on whether the bombing was right or wrong, whether it was achieving its stated goals, and whether ground troops should be sent in.


108 This paragraph addresses the contribution factors of retired political-military actors, also referred to as “talking heads.” Unfortunately, they can adversely impact operational events by expressing their
In the Kosovo war, military and political actors deemed themselves experts and interpreters of events. But, their credibility was put in doubt mostly because of Yugoslavia’s convincing argument that there was never a humanitarian or refugee crisis in Kosovo until after NATO bombed and destroyed most of its infrastructure\textsuperscript{109}. There were both political and media pressures on the military to show the results of their actions. Most journalists were convinced that the prevention of “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo was not NATO’s main objective. NATO was questioned about their published statement of its “body count” of destroyed Yugoslav National Army combat vehicles in Kosovo.

NATO was not only accused of releasing false information, it was also accused of passing to the press unverified rumors and exaggerated speculation about what was happening inside Kosovo. For instance, on 29 March 1999, NATO announced that Yugoslav forces assassinated Fehmi Agani (Advisor to Ibrahim Rugova) and five other militants. This was not true and two days later, NATO retracted its statement\textsuperscript{110}.

As for exaggeration, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and the US special envoy, Catherine Bertini, all publicly claimed that Milosevic’s forces had killed tens (if not hundreds) of thousand of Kosovo Albanian. The official count turned out to be 2,108 corpses exhumed from mass graves across Kosovo. Reports still have several thousand still missing.

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\textsuperscript{109} The problem of providing too much information on the effectiveness of weapons systems is that it can set public and political expectations that nothing can go wrong and when it does it is hard to explain.

\textsuperscript{110} Paul Quillés and François Lamy, Kosovo: Une guerre d’exceptions, rapport d’information, Commission de la Défense, Assemblée Nationale, paris, Les documents d’information, 90.
Who is to say that the media themselves were not manipulated into printing the desired story? Before the war, the Yugoslav authorities agreed to have several Western networks stay and operate from Belgrade in the event of a conflict. These reports were under tight restrictions and sometimes made under duress. One article tells the story about several reporters who were roughed up, interrogated by police, and, in some cases, expelled from Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{111}. Milosevic controlled what areas or situations could be photographed. For example, reporters were invited to report when bombs hit hospitals but were refused coverage of a destroyed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site. In short, even the most truthful western reporting from the heart of Yugoslavia was partial, and thus distorted, framed around events that Milosevic wanted the world to see.

G. POTENTIAL METHODS FOR ACHIEVING AN INTEGRATED EFFORT

The United States took the lead in creating a coherent perception management team. President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive PDD 68 (\textit{International Public Information} or IPI) made it possible for the establishment of a potential national information team. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the IPI Core Group consisted of personnel from the Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury Departments in the United States. The United States incentives were not enough to counter the differing “Need to Know” policies of various countries. The fear that military operations data would be misused almost caused NATO to lose the information operations campaign.

\textsuperscript{111} For example, CNN lost about $1 million in equipment burned, destroyed or confiscated during the Kosovo crisis. Peter Johnson and Gary Levin, “Cost of War,” \textit{USA Today}, 29 April 1999, p 3D. Italian journalist Lucia Annunziata and French television reporter Memona Hinterman were both roughed up and expelled from Belgrade authorities. See “Abuse of reporter outrages Italian,” \textit{European Stars and Stripes}, 18 April 1999, 7.
An even greater challenge was trying to accommodate the many doctrines and
different views as to how to handle release of information and dealing with the media.
Throughout the conflict, most of the 19 nations issued different Public Affairs Guidelines
(PAGs)\textsuperscript{112}. They were not always consistent with each other, creating confusion at
subordinate command levels. Maintaining unity through the conflict was a challenge.
One newspaper article blamed the Europeans for exerting too much caution when they
refused to allow the use of ground troops, restricting the number of targets, and limiting
their assets in support of the campaign\textsuperscript{113}. It almost seems as if NATO was not fighting
against Milosevic but against the difference of opinion amongst its members and even
worse, against the media.

Countering propaganda and misinformation was a challenge. Direct refutation of
false information, especially propaganda, was avoided because it only lent the
propaganda credibility and risked potential loss of the moral high ground.

H. SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Operation ALLIED FORCE was successful in the area of military objectives
(strategically, operationally and tactically). Although a few casualties do not define
military success, the alliance sustained 78 days of around the clock operations, with
38,004 sorties flown while losing only two aircraft to hostile fire\textsuperscript{114}. However, they did
not have a clear strategy for Kosovo nor did they have an integrated plan. NATO had a
late and slow start in the perception management department. Many critics argued that

\textsuperscript{112} Public Affairs Guidelines are internal instructions detailing talking points for public affairs officers
to use with the media.

\textsuperscript{113} Dana Priest, "Risk and Restraint: Why the Apaches never flew in Kosovo," \textit{The Washington Post},
29 December 1999. This article was retrieved on April 12, 2001, from the World Wide Web:
and Journalist, 12.

\textsuperscript{114} Besides the F-117, an F-16 was shot down on 2 May 99.

85
NATO constructed an ineffective information strategy; even worse, many felt that they conducted it poorly. However, the alliance held together and proved its unity and its ability to resolve and defend its interest and values.

Leaflets were ineffective because the Serb population had been desensitized to this effort through the constant propaganda of their own government. In Kosovo, leaflets were designed for populations within specific geographical areas and it was often impossible to deliver these without endangering aircrews. Risk aversion has always been a political issue that some day the military needs to put to rest.

NATO IO teams came together close to the end of the war. One great and historical repeated error was that end state objectives were not clear. The main issue was a military culture issue. When should the military go in, what should they do and when should they leave. It is never clear in peace operations.

On the other side of the story, many argued that Milosevic led a successful campaign using the international media. His manipulation gave him leeway for a stronger information strategy than that of NATO. From his perspective, he won the war. One US officer agreed. Reporting from Macedonia, this officer claimed: “Milosevic is winning the information ops, the perception management. He’s the underdog and everybody else looks like a bully ganging up on him.”115 The Kosovo war challenged the credibility of the United States and NATO. Testifying before Congress, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton, USA, and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen commented, “the conduct of an integrated information operations campaign was delayed by the lack of both advance planning and strategic guidance

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denying key objectives.” Admiral James Ellis, USN, Commander JTF Noble Anvil pointed out that “the enemy was better at this [information operations]...and far more nimble.”

I. SUMMARY

The Kosovo crisis is proof that, besides military planning, it is at least equally important to put together an effective non-military plan in order to manage Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as humanitarian assistance. It is just as appropriate and necessary to enhance activities of a preventive nature. In the context of perception management, proper planning is required before it is successful. Erroneous assumptions and inadequate planning handicapped NATO’s public information effort. It was in no manner linked to operation cells at the beginning of Allied Force.

The media can be an influential factor to the success or failure of perception management in any campaign. The battlefield has expanded to include the media. However, it should not be an instrument of the military and the government. If properly made a part of the operation, the media can be of value if not viewed as an enemy. It is most certainly a delicate balance between informing and operational security and the media. Of course, this is the military’s decision to make; that is why PM should include public affairs officers who are knowledgeable about events as they unfold. However, one needs to be careful about how Public Affairs (PA) is integrated into IO. It is important for Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) to maintain objectivity and be perceived as an honest and truthful source of information. They are the spokespersons for the commander.


117 Admiral James Ellis, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe (NATO CINCSOUTH) and Commander-in-Chief, USN, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), “A View From the Top,” briefing, 1999.
Perception management and manipulation are not a part of the PA standards of operations. Public Affairs are definitely a player in IO, but need to be protected from being perceived as untruthful or as spin-doctors.

Commanders are no longer just fighting the enemy on the battlefield. Milosevic is a prime example of an enemy who manipulated the media to convey his reality. His stories were controlled, one sided, and at times, fabricated. The power of words used in the context of war is a critical component of the soft side of IO, with the help of technology.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic strips Kosovo of autonomy. More than 20 killed in protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Yugoslavia sends in troops to impose control. Serbia dissolves Kosovo's government. Albanian legislators in the province declare a republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Separatists proclaim Kosovo a republic, which is recognized by neighboring Albania. In a secret referendum, the Republic of Kosovo is created, which only Albania’s Parliament recognizes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ibrahim Rugova, who advocates a peaceful path to independence, elected president of separatist republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Pro independence rebel Kosovo Liberation Army emerges, claims responsibility for bombing police targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1998</td>
<td>95 percent of Serbs reject international mediation on Kosovo in referendum. International sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July and August 1998</td>
<td>KLA seizes control of 40 percent of Kosovo before being routed in Serb offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1998</td>
<td>Serb forces attack central Kosovo, where 22 Albanians found massacred. U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1160 calling for immediate cease-fire and political dialogue. NATO takes the first formal steps toward military intervention in Kosovo, approving two contingency operation plans—one for air strikes and the second for monitoring and maintaining a cease-fire agreement if one is reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1998</td>
<td>NATO allies authorize air strikes against Serb military targets, Milosevic agrees to withdraw troops and facilitate the return of tens of thousands of refugees. NATO extends the deadline for the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” to come into compliance with terms of the accord on Kosovo, giving President Milosevic until October 27 to honor the agreement. Belgrade agrees to allow 2,000 unarmed monitors to verify compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 6 -17, 1999</td>
<td>First, inconclusive round of talks between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Rambouillet, France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 1999</td>
<td>International peace monitors evacuate Kosovo, as Yugoslav forces buildup and launch offensives against rebels. NATO aircraft and ships ready for possible bombardments.</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 4. Chronology of Events 1989-1999 Relating to the Crisis in Kosovo.
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V. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting\textsuperscript{118}

-Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Sawyer

A. LESSONS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WAR AND THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

The overall purpose of this study was to examine the application of PM techniques within coalition operations. Both case studies show that control over perception is possible but requires extensive expertise in story telling; the use of various methods to convey that story; an ability to build and maintain credibility; and an understanding of the large audience culture and background.

An effective PM campaign attempts to frame the situation to favor its supporters by conditioning facts, opinions, beliefs, and even inserting false data. It may evolve smoothly and naturally over time or be a quick reaction campaign to control a situation. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that when used correctly, PM could be an enabler and force multiplier to IO. The Kosovo conflict demonstrated that PM is, indeed, an enabler to an IO campaign, but it takes time to be effective. Both case studies show that PM, when used before a conflict, shapes the military context used in diplomacy. During a conflict, PM is used to sway the enemy to act in the manner favorable to joint force end state objectives. After a conflict, PM is used again to shape how the US and joint forces are perceived as well as the credibility of our leaders.

This examination of the application of PM techniques has shown that coalition PM is feasible. There are, however, many pitfalls associated with PM, which must be avoided to help ensure successful integration of the PM campaign with the overall military operation. The areas, which, once mastered, help avoid the traps, include:

1. The Role of Story and Storytelling

Incorporating PM with coalition operations brings together subject matter experts who can create a better frame of the situation. As a result, the story told to the target audience via various media (Television, Radio, Print, etc.) creates a “spin” to the information relayed to the public. As a result, the context of a story forms the basis of its credibility. This study points out that the way in which the facts are presented determines who wins the propaganda or PM campaign for popular support and validation of their cause. The method of presenting the facts entails a lot of psychological techniques that are invisible to the naked eye. These invisible psychological tools are a threat if the intelligence community, as well as the commanders on the battlefield, are not aware of their power to influence the populace and the military. In a way, a good PM campaign maintains order and structure to the bizarre events occurring around a conflict or war.

A successful PM campaign will require experienced spokespersons. They should be versed in psychology as well as military science and should draw their knowledge from subject matter experts. But one of the most important qualities that they must possess is the ability to convey the information to the target audience. That is where being a good storyteller comes to play.

2. The Use of Media to Promote Themes

Advances in information technology are allowing ever increasing numbers of individuals access to information at much lower costs. Information, no matter the
medium in which it is carried, can be distorted to benefit its sender. The media message has become an important factor that must be addressed. The Internet alone, with its chat room capability, attracts thousands of users who take the information displayed at face value. The perception management team must be ready to deliver the right information quickly and accurately and in a manner that is as technologically aligned with the target audience. The case studies are show that PM teams must be able to react quickly to local situations; disinformation and information which runs counter to Coalition intent, can spread quickly. The PM team must understand how its target audience receives information (i.e., through which media) in order to quickly deliver themes, which support the theater objectives.

3. Credibility

Perception management uses truth, fiction, credible and consistent data to portray the capabilities and intentions of both the coalition and the enemy’s operations. Like PM, credibility is an international issue and takes time to become effective. For example, the various international news media in Kosovo each placed a “spin” to the stories printed in their newspapers. Credibility is in the eyes of the target. It does not matter what one thinks of oneself, rather, it is what others think. In a way, credibility breaks through the firewalls of people’s bias (es) and allows access to the human mind. Credibility is central to planning a PM campaign; the perceptions of credibility and the will of Coalition forces to follow through on its commitments are essential to a successful campaign. Even though Coalition IO conducted a successful PM campaign in the Kosovo conflict, the lack of credibility brought a lot of resistance to coalition operations. For example, the Coalition’s choice of bombing targets was often questioned.
To be effective, the PM team must be truthful, objective and unbiased with information. The team has to know the enemy’s stories and get “into their head” before they can attack an individual or group. In the Persian Gulf War, PM worked toward inducing fear in both the Iraqi leaders as well as their soldiers. Perception management weakened the morale and contributed to an overall success of coalition IO campaign. Most important, there was advance warning of activity and time to prepare a coalition force to response to Saddam Hussein’s threats. Coalition PM campaign did not want to use the fear factor in the Kosovo conflict because the situation was not as aggressive as in the case of the Persian Gulf War.

4. Target Selection

The medium for conducting a PM campaign has expanded with the advancement of technology, creating an even larger size of target audience to reach. In the Persian Gulf War, there were a limited number of target audiences, mainly the Arab League and the Iraqis. On the other hand, the Kosovo conflict numerous audiences to reach: the Serbs, the Albanians, the European public, the US, and many anti-Milosevic groups.

Besides the size of the target audience, there are regional variations of politics, ethnic and cultural values, religious influences, as well as different philosophies of life and as well as of the world (Western, Asian, Arab, Baltic). These factors affect the target audience and must be taken into consideration when planning a PM campaign. Like the coalition, planning for a PM campaign should consider the relevance of an individual’s perspective of the operation since it can at times determine the best way to achieve the desired response to an issue.
Perception management is a delicate tool used to influence an individual or group to act in the desired manner. It takes careful study of the environment in which it will be applied as well as the target audience. It is always good to be able to reach the target audience directly. But, in the case of the Persian Gulf War, many soldiers were isolated from any source of communication and were reached via leaflets and loudspeakers.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Integrating perception management with coalition operations is possible. It requires a strong leadership structure and prior planning. The commander must be more sensitive to the threat of PM. It is imperative to understand who and what is the source of threat. A leader must know his adversary’s psychology because the ultimate objective to conquer the enemy’s mind and to dominate him. As Davis and Arquilla state, “it is not enough to have the relevant facts about the opponent’s situation; to understand the opponent’s thinking, one must to some extent internalize those facts and play them against values and ambitions, taking into account emotional factors and recent history.”

The following are recommendations for integrating PM with Coalition Information Operations:

- Develop a perception management team diversified with government, civilian, and military backgrounds for designated potential threats. Culture is an important aspect, but is not a stopping factor. It does have a deciding factor in gaining populace support or creating doubt amongst the soldiers. Take the Persian Gulf War PM efforts included quoting the Koran.

- The Rules of Engagement for PM should be central and commonplace. One issue that must be dealt with is the release of information to the media. Modern wars are no longer solely fought on the physical

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battlefield. The media and its stories severely affect popular support, as in the case of Kosovo\textsuperscript{120}.

- Establish a frame or objective. Some call this an end state objective. As Goffman puts it, once the frame is set, day to day events will not affect it. However, it is easy to come up with an end state, but it is quite difficult to incorporate it into everyday operation. Kosovo demonstrated this difficulty when the NATO bombing campaign often countered efforts by perception management teams, in particular, 4th PSYOP GROUP.

- Understand media influences and embrace the press. Again, the media are not the enemy. They should be incorporated in keeping the public informed of the situations occurring in military operations. Public Affairs Officers should not fall into the trap of automatically responding to questions put to them by the press. After all, questions are nothing but one individual's perception of the situation. As Sun Tzu put it, know your enemy, but first know thyself. Remember, reporting in wartime stops when the soldiers go home but for peace operations, reporting stops when the media go home which is shortly after stability is achieved in the operation.

Perception management must be integrated into military planning. It is in a learning phase with some of the defense universities. Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) are a few organizations that are currently teaching it in an effort to implement PM with IO. As Joint Publication 3-13 depicts, organization is a key ingredient to successful IO.

Perception management is a flexible weapon of choice that is becoming a mainstay in US operations. It is associated with the term "force multiplier" and "combat reducer." PM can be effective in preventing conflicts and uprisings perhaps even wars; but it can only achieve its potential by means of its skillful applications in coalition settings.

\textsuperscript{120} The author references humanitarian support efforts for refugees in Albania and Macedonia and the intervention to stop the killing in Kosovo.

96
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