THESIS

POST-COLD WAR RUSSIA/WEST RELATIONS:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, SOURCES OF
FRICITION, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

by

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June 2001

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Russia’s newfound isolation is the result of an evolving process that has begun to destabilize global security. The failure of structurally and financially inadequate economic reforms led to Russia’s catastrophic 1998 market crash, provided Russians with a scapegoat, and helped silence reformers. The expansion of NATO showed Russia that it had no part in the West’s newly envisioned security system. Furthermore, the Kosovo campaign nullified Russia’s UN veto and consequent global influence, armed NATO’s threatening encroachment, and bolstered a Russian, anti-Western body politic.

Consequently, the West must reassess its current stance and set Russian inclusion as its first priority, for history suggests that without Russia, there is can be no stability in Europe.
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ABSTRACT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyzes the three most prominent U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward Russia since the end of the Cold War — immediate economic reform, NATO expansion to the East, and the Kosovo campaign — in an attempt to identify the efficacy of such a policy and its utility in the future.

Russia demonstrated its initial pro-Western, pro-democratic stance with reform efforts aimed to privatize the economy, democratize the government, and reorient the nation toward the West. Plagued with historical paranoia, debilitating corruption, and the desire to retain influence and prestige, Russian statecraft can still be described as one of naive cooperation toward the West.

Conversely, U.S. attempts at global reorientation were undermined by a combination of Cold War hegemonic biases, by a reflexive distrust of Russian intentions, and by a preponderance of East European nations desiring Western security guarantees. Most Western policies, consequently, were based on rhetoric, and efforts at creating a peaceful arena seem to have gotten lost in the chaos of the time.

Initial attempts at reform devastated the Russian economy, awakened recently silenced anti-Western impulses, and became — according to Russians - the reason for their nation’s current predicament. The first round of NATO expansion proved to Russia that it had no role in the West’s post-Cold War security system. Finally, the Kosovo campaign made Russia’s UN veto ineffectual, neutralized the nation’s position in world affairs, and transformed expansion into a veritable peril. In essence, U.S.-initiated Western policies have aided and abetted in transforming the psychological threat of
Western exclusion into an armed menace that concerns not only Russian policymakers, but also the Russian body politic.

Since 1991, hopeful Russian attitudes have been replaced with anti-Western inclinations and a severe loss in the influence of democratic reformers. This antagonistic predisposition is not a mere characteristic of extreme Russian politics, as anti-Western inclinations have created political coalitions that have altered Russian society. In essence, the West (with the United States in the lead) has alienated Russia from the newly defined, Western, post-Cold War security system. Russian isolation has in turn begun to destabilize European security.

The West should well re-evaluate policy and strategy toward Russia. A way through which to satisfy Russia and quell East European fears must be created as history attests that a security system without Russia is bound to fail. The first post-Cold War decade is lost, but hopes for the future, though dim, are still present. The West must find a way to first include Russia, and then enshroud Eastern Europe with comprehensive security guarantees. If the situation is left unaltered, it is highly probable that this newly forged Russia/West rift will transition from that of being simply one of this era’s characteristics, to being its defining feature.
I. INTRODUCTION

As the twentieth century closed, an epoch of uncertainty arose in Europe. The Cold War’s bipolar arena had given way to an erratic, multipolar world. The Clinton administration therefore found itself in a momentous period of promise and peril. World events had opened a window of opportunity during which the powers might shun historical stereotypes and an unparalleled rapport between the East and West might ensue.

With Russians looking hopefully Westward in 1991, why now is the West faced with antagonistic, nationalist Russian attitudes reminiscent of those characteristic of the Cold War?1

This study will attempt to answer this question through the analysis of U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward Russia during the Clinton administration.2

1 While acknowledging that blame must be proportionally allotted in every endeavor, in an effort to keep this study succinct and as a result of the limited availability of such analysis, this study will attempt to look at the immediate post-Cold War years from the point of view of both the Russian politic and public.

2 Among the leading sources used to formulate this study are: Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander. Force and Statecraft, Daalder, Ivo and O’Hanlon, Michael. Winning Ugly, de Wijk, Rob. NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, Judah, Tim. Kosovo – War and Revenge, Kaplan, Lawrence. The Long Entanglement, Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement – Opinions and Options, Solomon, Gerald. The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997, Thomas, Ian. The Promise of Alliance, and The Cox Report, completed in September 2000, was a congressional inquiry chaired by the Honorable Christopher Cox, at the request of House of Representatives Speaker of the 106th Congress, the Honorable Dennis Hastert. The commission was composed of the Speaker’s Advisory Group on Russia, as well as multiple area experts, and its purview was to investigate the Clinton administration’s foreign policy in regard to Russia.
This periodization has been chosen for two reasons. First, it was during that period of time (1993-2000)\(^3\) that the center of gravity of U.S. economic and political initiatives toward Russia can be found. Second, the effects of immediate post-Cold War economic reform, the first round of NATO expansion,\(^4\) and the Kosovo campaign have had on Russia/West\(^5\) relations do not stand in isolation. Russia has adopted an anti-Western stance in economic, political, military, and strategic venues in open resistance to feeling threatened by the combined effects of these initiatives and in complete contrast with immediate post-Cold War attitudes.

Russia’s frustration with the West warrants attention because it is not merely reminiscent of extreme, communist, anti-Western rhetoric representative of the past seven decades. An unusual degree of Russian, anti-Western political equilibrium has permeated the public sector and created a veritable, anti-Western sentiment that crosses political and social boundaries. The effects of this newly awakened Western/Russian rift have manifested themselves in: a negative Russian political and public view of the West; the end of the tenure of Western-oriented reformers and constructive political debate on foreign policy initiatives; an antagonistic Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2000) and National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (1998); a drive to create

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\(^3\) This study defines 1993-2000 as the immediate post-Cold War era.

\(^4\) It is habitual for NATO, and consequently Western journalists to speak of NATO “enlargement.” Russians continue to use the word “expansion” which is what this author will use without intending to sway the reader.

\(^5\) Instead of using East/West this study will utilize Russia/West since there is no longer a true “East,” just Russia.
new anti-Western partnerships on a plethora of levels, and an increasingly authoritarian government.

This study will attempt to look at the causes and effects of this process of deterioration from the Russian point of view. For though these hostile views may seem to Westerners as being ridiculous and unfounded, to Russians they are more than a mindset; they represent the reality that the United States, through misdirected foreign policy, has neglected its share to aid in the redefinition of Russia's place in the new, international system of states. Understanding Russia's historical and psychological origins can therefore help to explain why the last decade has made Russians feel alienated from world affairs, and consequently pursue a course of isolation from the West.

This thesis includes five chapters. The introductory chapter will provide an in-depth background to the situation at hand, including an explanation of initial U.S. and Russian postures towards each other and the remainder of the international community. The next three chapters, which make up the body of this study, will include both a description of the events at hand and their immediate and long-term effects on Russian relations with the United States, NATO, and the international community. Chapter two will concentrate on U.S.-led economic reform initiatives. Chapter three will deal with the way in which the United States led the realization of the first round of NATO expansion. Chapter four will examine U.S. policymaking with regard to NATO's Kosovo bombing campaign. The final chapter will include conclusions and recommendations for future policy.
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II. ECONOMIC REFORM INITIATIVES

Russia’s economic reform — which was comprised of U.S.-initiated, bilateral policies conducted through programs carried out by various international organizations — was only one of numerous types of agendas initiated during the immediate post-Cold War era. Characteristic of much of the period, Russia looked to the West with naïve, overly optimistic expectations, a complete lack of technical “know-how,” and a propensity, in the end, to rely on corruption for economic, political, and social amelioration. At the time, the United States was preoccupied with domestic politics and satisfied with a policy based upon assertions of empty promises, a reliance on misperceptions, and a propensity to disregard failures and publicly praise shortcomings. This chapter is written in opposition to studies that state Russia is the cause of its own economic failures because of its reliance upon corruption and inexperience with alternatives to a command economy. It argues that together, Western approaches helped to crush economic reform initiatives, breed a phenomenally corrupt oligarchy, strip a people of first-ever hope for the future, and hamper chances for future economic, political, and strategic cooperation.

This analysis also seeks to identify which steps should have been initiated in 1993-95 in order to create a free-enterprise system. The collapse of communism in Russia provided the world with a first-ever opportunity to build a democratic, market infrastructure out of the remains of a command economy. Simply put, communism was to be replaced with a free-enterprise system. While the question of where and how to
begin was yet to be answered, at the onset of reforms, the necessity to create the following fundamentals was clear: market-determined prices and production, binding, enforceable private contracts, individual ownership rights in land, private mortgage lending, commercial banking, uninhibited individual investment in “for-profit enterprises,” and taxes light enough to minimize penalties on work, savings, investment, and risk taking. A discussion of why these fundamentals were disregarded and what was attempted in their stead can help explain why the Russian economy is in its present dismal state.

This chapter begins with a general description of the immediate post-Cold War arena, including a brief description of the alignment of both the United States and Russia. Next follows an explanation of common Post-Cold War oversimplifications to include mutual misconceptions and the West’s dependence upon both the “zero-sum game,” and the idea of Russia’s recreation in an image of the West. A quick Polish//Russian comparison and a discussion about inadequate expertise will follow. After an illumination of the task ahead there will be a detailed description of initial reform programs to include an analysis of: the Troika, the Washington Consensus, shock therapy, and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Then, an in-depth description of the presence and handling of corruption will lead to an explanation of the rise in Russia’s organized crime. An illumination of Russia’s challenges with the demilitarization of its economy will lead directly to a discussion on weapons proliferation. Finally, with

conclusions and recommendations, this study will discuss the emerging "cold peace" and hopes for the future as a lead in to a discussion on what course must be taken in order to: find "the Russian way."

A. GENERAL BACKGROUND

It was evident as early as 1991 that Russia would have to pursue economic reform. Knowing nothing but communism, though, the nation did not advocate programs void of democratic transition. Instead, the fledgling nation chose to strive for the creation of a democratic market economy. Since Russia had waited centuries for this opportunity to join Europe and build a democratic system and market economy from within, the rapidity of reform seemed imperative to its advocates. Most Russians hoped to enjoy Western standards of living almost immediately following the collapse of communism.\(^7\) Without a foundation to build upon, Russia naively prostrated itself to the West. After all, who better to turn to than the United States? The only remaining superpower and the leader of the democratic free world, had, by default, inherited the responsibility of assisting this transition. In essence, "U.S. midwifery" was necessary for the birth of the Russian market economy.

B. RUSSIAN POSTURE

Russia's history makes an instant metamorphosis from a command to a market economy an untenable goal. Interrelated threads of social, cultural, civic, economic, political, and strategic strength -- all necessary for the creation of a democratic market economy -- were absent in Russia at the dawn of its rebirth. The Soviet State had imposed a burden of indefensible security concerns upon its population and the organizational capacity of the state.\textsuperscript{8} Having spent its finances on building a military machine and empowering the ruling class, only miniscule fiscal remnants were spent on health, education, and social welfare. The USSR, large and arrogant, historically failed to engage the concerns of its population. The resulting society, void of private enterprise, civic structures, and legal codes was helplessly dependent upon the state for survival. Consequently, when the Soviet Union imploded, an immense ideological void was left in its wake, making Russia's rapid, democratic transition much more difficult. Returning to coercion and corruption became a tempting prospect because of the reformers failure to create fundamental democratic institutions such as civil society, a private sector, the rule of law, and social and political rudiments of a free-enterprise system.

Russia needed a total bailout from impending economic collapse. The result of a common expectation that the United States would fix everything, was exactly what the nation sought. The Clinton administration's "Russia rhetoric" and numerous influential Westerners encouraged Yeltsin and his entourage at the onset of reforms in 1993 that

they would receive the following: large-scale Western credits, an immense amount of investment, and most importantly, Western acceptance of Yeltsin’s Russia as the legitimate heir of the superpower attributes of the USSR, to include its sphere of influence.⁹ So while society enthusiastically hoped for recovery through partnership, exaggerated hopes drove the ruling elite to believe that Western subsidies would ensure its political survival.¹⁰

C. AMERICAN POSTURE

As a result of his proclivity toward domestic politics, Clinton made no serious attempts to garnish public support for concrete, large-scale reform initiatives. In keeping with the spirit of the times, in the absence of concise action, the administration put powerful rhetorical emphasis on making significant financial assistance available to Russia for its transition. To Russia, such words were promises; to the United States, such narrative constituted intentionally hollow pledges. Policy characteristics aside, actual support for significant financial assistance would have been extremely difficult to obtain from Congress.¹¹


¹⁰ Ibid., p. 291.

¹¹ Though counterfactual, if the President would have shown resolute leadership and an ability to conduct a meaningful lobby for support, history suggests that he might well have gained the support of the American public.
In addition to a fundamental reluctance to provide fiscal augmentation, the situation in the United States was characterized by mass military restructuring in response to the end of the Cold War. The economy was in recession, military bases were closing, and the Department of Defense was in the process of executing significant cutbacks in personnel, equipment, and budget. The pendulum in the West was swinging back toward isolationism and Russia’s problems seemed of little significance to many. Given the administration’s propensity to see foreign policy as a mere auxiliary to domestic policy, the acquisition of sufficient unilateral capital was unlikely. The few within the United States Government who did fight for “Russian money” had to use intimidation methods based upon visions of a nuclear meltdown. Even the funds that were eventually appropriated were too little too late.\textsuperscript{12} The IMF and World Bank were consequently Russia’s only hope for attaining massive financial aid.

Estimates vary on how much money Russia would need to revive an economy that in 2001 is presently half of what it was a decade ago. The estimate given by Nikolai Shmelov in \textit{Voprosy Economiki} puts the amount at $500 billion over a ten-year period. Some observers confer that $500 billion is far to great a price; especially in comparison to the $65 billion the West seems to have lost by lending or giving to Russia between 1992 and 1999. When looked at in relation to: the trillions of dollars the United States spent attaining nuclear supremacy during the Cold War, the projected $836 billion to $1.9 trillion U.S. budget surplus over the same period of time, and the monumental long-term

international security it could buy, some scholars attest that $500 billion is a temperate investment.\textsuperscript{13}

D. POST-COLD WAR OVERSIMPIFICATION

In addition to misaligned policy initiatives, the West’s entire outlook was plagued with “post-Cold War simplistic expectations.”\textsuperscript{14} The United States secured the goal it had been striving to obtain since the debut of the Cold War – the ability to introduce quick, all-encompassing economic reform aimed at recreating Russia in the West’s likeness.\textsuperscript{15} The utter complexity of the Russian situation, however, continues to make such oversimplification a dangerous proposition. Reformers in the East or West still do not understand the unique sensitivities the Russian experience brings to the fore.

The underlying mistake made by the United States was assuming that Russia would react like the West when in reality it had no basis for doing so. Plagued by the tendency of looking at Russia through a prism of Western ideology,\textsuperscript{16} policymakers lost the conundrum created by Russia’s 70 years of communist captivity. In order to understand Russia, one must put aside those preconceived notions and learn about both


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 106.


\textsuperscript{16} Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, p. 70.
the nation’s past and present. For as Churchill stated, “Russia is a riddle wrapped inside an enigma”\(^17\) and if one neglects to first solve the puzzle inside, Russia will continue to remain a mystery.

Four examples of such oversimplifications and misperceptions will be debunked here before proceeding with this study. The first explains U.S. infatuation with the “zero-sum game,” the second addresses the characteristics that the Soviet economy willed to the “new Russia,” the third clarifies the existence of a Russian/Polish comparison, and the fourth discusses the present lack of bilateral expertise.

1. Zero-Sum Game
Many economists stereotypically assigned Russia’s economic choice as being a simple one between black and white. This reliance upon zero-sum tactics seriously exacerbated problems with regard to Western support and advocacy of economic reforms. It was increasingly common for Western reformers to equate Russian nationalism with conservatism and to place it alongside other anti-democratic, anti-reformist phenomena that appeared unattractive to the West.\(^18\) Individuals such as Yeltsin, Chubais, and Chernomyrdin were therefore seen as the only reformers available, when in reality they proved to be the real hard-liners in their unrelenting drive to impose policies that had little support in society.\(^19\) Other true reformers including Yevgeny Primakov, whose

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\(^{17}\) Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, p. 69.

\(^{18}\) Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 349.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 629.
views did not guarantee viable solutions but remained influential, lacked political power and influence under Yeltsin and were essentially discredited and politically marginalized.

What Western reformers failed to see was that the economic debate was not new; it had been ongoing for at least ten years. The real debate was consequently not between those in support of, or opposed to, reform, but rather between the proponents of different methods that were split along political and cultural lines. As Peter Reddaway, scholar of Soviet and Russian politics, states, "In any event, the cyclical paradigm of Russian history – in which top-down reformers have clashed with proponents of change from lower social strata – reproduced its zero-sum game: the radical freemarketeers (with support from the IMF and the Western governments) won and the democratic movement lost."  

2. "In the West's Likeness"
The West's incapacity to understand the unique characteristics of Russia's immediate post-Cold War economy proved grave for reformers. In typical fashion, in an effort to fit Russia neatly into a "Western mold," oversimplification undermined true analysis. The hope that Russia's competitive market merely had to be awakened was destroyed by the reality that such a market never existed. The idea of an economy existing without an underlying market infrastructure, almost inconceivable for

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Westerners,\textsuperscript{21} remains a defining characteristic of Russia’s fiscal situation. Primarily due to ideological constraints, Russian authorities historically attached a low priority to making service and retail trade available to the public. As a result, Russia inherited one of the lowest store-to-consumer ratios in the developed world.\textsuperscript{22} Difficulties experiences in attempting to build a competitive, market economy were therefore intensified, as Russians have had virtually no foundation to build upon.

3. Russian/Polish Comparison

Economists have often compared Russia’s possibilities with Poland’s accomplishments, suggesting that Russia should follow suit and “jump-start” capitalism. Though helpful for analyzing certain stages of economic growth, one must realize that communism was instituted from within Russia, whereas it was imposed upon Poland. Private farming and a rudimentary market infrastructure had already existed in Poland,\textsuperscript{23} whereas Russia’s extra 25 years of “original” communism guaranteed that traces of a market system were almost non-existent.\textsuperscript{24} This bankruptcy of basic market foundations in Russia played an insurmountable role in the failure of Western reform initiatives.


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{23} Cohen, Stephen. \textit{Failed Crusade}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{24} Goldman, Marshall, “Reprivatizing Russia,” p. 5.
4. Lack of Sufficient Expertise

The glaring educational deficiencies that continue to characterize the East and the West are both a cause and effect of these oversimplifications and misconceptions. From 1992, Russian government officials lacked any knowledge on how to pursue democratic, economic reforms. Civic education projects and public policy schools were also very scarce. Furthermore, only a few organizations dedicated to distributing information about democracy could be found.\textsuperscript{25} With no historic foundation to build upon, Russians needed hands-on assistance and significant amounts of capital, in addition to basic instructions as to the nature of a democratic market economy and the requirements for ones establishment.

The Russians, however, were not the only ones who lacked such knowledge. The same problem existed on the U.S. side where Americans understood neither the intricacies of a command economy, nor the communist remnants present in Russia. Generally, across the board, there existed a lack of understanding on the evolution of the Soviet Nomenklatura and the direct links between corruption, crime, tax evasion, and the path of economic transformation that was chosen.\textsuperscript{26} Additionally, at the onset of reforms, the United States had not yet invested sufficient resources into this area of expertise. In reality, after spending more than five decades trying to figure out how to defeat the Russians, very few took the time to study how to build a cooperative rapport with them. Consequently, those involved in reform from the beginning hadn’t really studied

\textsuperscript{25} McFaul, Michael, “Getting Russia Right,” p. 5.

\textsuperscript{26} Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 291.
Russia. In-country training and expertise were sorely lacking. In contrast, most Western “experts” had experience working with the Third World, specifically Africa. Familiarity in the area of democratic consolidation and developmental economies was seen as sufficient. This debilitating naiveté needlessly exacerbated both Russian and U.S. policy failures.

E. CHARACTERISTICS OF INITIAL REFORM PROGRAMS

Though reform initiatives fluctuated rapidly on both sides, a base-line understanding of both Clinton and Yeltsin’s initial policies is necessary as a starting point for analysis. The Clinton administration adopted the standard macroeconomic mindset of the IMF and World Bank with such priorities as: a) dramatic deficit reductions, b) tight monetary policies, c) price liberalization, d) aggressive privatization, e) sharp reductions in industry and agriculture subsidies, and e) the abolition of import restrictions. Yeltsin, on the other hand, pushed for: the transfer of price-setting authority from state bureaucracies to semi-governmental trade monopolies, the freezing and devaluation of most savings accounts, the issuance of transferable vouchers to all citizens, and the privatization of most companies.

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28 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 390.

29 Ibid., p. 34.
1. **The “Troika”**

The Western approach, based more on rhetoric than reality, was driven by President Clinton’s attempts to delegate both the authority and responsibility of Russian policy decision making to a troika of subordinate officials: Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary and then Secretary of the Treasury, and Vice President Al Gore. This policy-making group was given the approval to act independent of normal checks and balances within the executive and legislative branches and consequently left the remainder of the government either unwilling or unable to assess the direction in which the policy was moving.\(^{30}\) The resulting disorganized and free-form nature of policymaking that developed independent of sufficient guidance from above had devastating effects on the development and execution of U.S. policy toward Russia.\(^{31}\)

2. **The Washington Consensus**

Plagued with the necessity to believe in an ideal, universal, and preferably scientific solution to any problem, remnants of what was known as the “Washington Consensus”\(^{32}\) appeared to be the cure for Russia’s economic ailment. The program,

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\(^{31}\) Ibid., p. 65.

\(^{32}\) The Washington Consensus presents a set of standard measures for economic policy based on monetarist theory. Designed for developing Third-World economies already based on the market, the program’s focus was to remove hurdles in the way of market forces. Its prescription is to privatize, liberalize, and stabilize.
which became the underlying concept of most initiatives, attempted to base Russia’s transition on what many economists term the “American experience.”

Presenting a set of standard measures for economic policy based on monetarist theory, the Washington Consensus was designed for developing economies that were already based on the market. The main component of the doctrine was an effort to remove hurdles that stood in the way of market forces (privatizing the state sector and liberalizing domestic and international economic activity) and providing for financial stabilization. Such reforms apply Milton Friedman’s ideas of favoring monetarism and unrestricted capital flows and have underpinned most of the work of the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990’s. Simply put, the Washington Consensus is what necessitated that all reforms emphasize macroeconomics over the establishment of the fundamental preconditions for a free-enterprise economy.

There are two main problems with this “cookie-cutter approach:” one is that it is based on an egoistic, Western belief that if all countries follow the appropriate footsteps, they will reach Nirvana; the other is that it is too simplistic for Russia. The program is inutile for Russia for thee main reasons. First of all, post-communist Russia was not a market economy; market institutions were yet to be substituted for those of a planned economy. Second, though Russia has roots as an industrial country, the allocation of its

33 Cohen, Stephen. Failed Crusade, p. 5.


35 Reddaway, Peter and Glinksi, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 237.

36 “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” The Cox Report, p. 69.
resources was not in agreement with market principles. Third, Russia shares virtually no common historical characteristics with the developing Third World. It was clear that such stark differences needed to have been taken into consideration before prescribing a policy. Yet empowered by international funds, U.S. initiatives carelessly retained the above recipe for Russia’s economy, which was unfortunately laced with residue from the Soviet Union’s hybrid, Marxist, command system. In keeping with the Washington Consensus, Western efforts were focused on top-down, macroeconomic aspects of economic reform; and the absence of institutional preconditions for the proper functioning of a democratic economy was ignored. Even as negative effects were felt and policies necessitated altering, these underlying principles remained primarily consistent.

3. “Shock Therapy”
These U.S.-initiated, top-down reform programs, often under the guise of shock therapy, were conducted without broad, Russian social consent. Based upon a marriage of sorts between a few senior members of each society, actual reform lost its significance to a necessity to blindly rationalize and support policy choices. There were several fundamental flaws in the Clinton administration’s Russian policy that can be attributed to this unorthodox arrangement. According to the Cox Report, these flaws included:

- Support for and dependence on a few individual Russian officials instead of a consistent and principled approach to policy that transcended personalities
- A focus on the Russian executive branch to the exclusion of the legislature and regional governments

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• An impatience with Russia’s nascent democratic constituencies that led to attempts at democratic ends through decidedly non-democratic means

• An unwillingness to let facts guide policy

• A preference for strengthening Russia’s central government rather than building a system of free enterprise.

Over-politicized and under-democratized, the system focused on strengthening the central government rather than building the fundamentals necessary for democracy. The consequences of these policy weaknesses were the administration’s a) strikingly public support for Yeltsin and the executive branch, and b) indifference toward Russia’s opposition parties and the legislature. As stated in a George Washington University journal entitled Aid to Russia:

> Instead of encouraging market reform, this rule by decree frustrated many market reforms as well as democratic decision making. Some reforms ... could be achieved by decree. But many other reforms advocated by USAID, the World Bank, and the IMF, ... depended on changes in law, public administration, or mindsets and required working with the full spectrum of legislative and market participants—not just one group.

F. THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COMMISSION

During his first meeting with President Yeltsin, in April 1993, President Clinton delegated the management of U.S.-Russian relations to Vice President Al Gore. The U.S.-Russia Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation was to be co-chaired

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38 "Russia’s Road to Corruption." The Cox Report, p. 69.

39 Wedel, Janine. Aid to Russia, p. 3.
by Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. According to a joint statement signed at the summit, the first task of the U.S.-initiated commission was to promote cooperation between the United States and Russia on space and energy issues. Critics claim that eventually, the commission inherited the responsibility of determining all aspects of U.S. policy toward Russia.40

Numerous fundamental flaws began to emerge during the first year of the Commission’s origin - 1993. First of all, routine managerial responsibilities overshadowed necessary leadership. Strong, resolute, U.S. presidential leadership was vital in the midst of this historical period during which decisions could alter worldwide economic and security alignments. Second, by almost totally removing presidential guidance from the situation, the administration sent a formidable signal East that Russia was of secondary importance to the United States. Third, the formation of the committee and the rhetoric that followed seemed to be the only elements of importance to the administration. As a result, no coherent and farsighted, let alone successful U.S. policies toward Russia were championed.41 Lastly, with U.S. foreign policy based exclusively on Yeltsin and his handpicked entourage, other elected Russian leaders and their institutions, including the parliament, were virtually ostracized.42 The power and representation of the few operable democratic and legislative vehicles in Russia were consequently usurped.

40 “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” The Cox Report, p. 88.

41 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 390.

1. Commission Operations

The mode of operations of the commission, a direct by-product of its structure, consisted primarily of discussions between representatives from the Russian and American bureaucracies. As the years went by, the commission developed a Secretariat with numerous sub-committees comprised of respective working groups, subgroups, and assigned staffs established for the purpose of exchanging papers, distributing memoranda, and planning for additional meetings. Gore’s national security advisor, Leon Fuert, who became —in the words of The Washington Post — “the virtual day-to-day manager of U.S. relations with Russia,” headed the American component of the Secretariat. By substituting a bureaucrat whom the Post identified as an “obscure force in national security” in place of the vice president, — who himself was already a stand-in for Clinton — the importance of U.S. policy making for Russia was even further diminished.

Despite the commission’s elaborate structure and the hundreds of people involved, it had no full-time professional staff. Instead, it relied on the principals to detail their own staffs as required. As a result, the preeminent forum for U.S.-Russian relations was both twice removed from the president and lacked a dedicated staff to give it full attention. Meeting only twice a year, the commission managed to produce a great deal of paper; the problem was that this written word proved to be superficial as it boasted few, if any successful initiatives. According to the Cox Report, “Not since the

43 “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” The Cox Report, p. 89.

44 Ibid., p. 90.
days of the Soviet Union had the unrelenting issuance of so much government paperwork been viewed as a prime measure of achievement."45

2. Internal Corruption
In the business of creating bureaucratic amenities in lieu of making real decisions, the commission’s survival necessitated blind acceptance of deficiencies and public praise of shortcomings. This type of self-justification naturally grew to define the commission’s efforts to retain Western support and IMF and World Bank Loans.46 Gore characteristically displayed reticence about directly confronting the Russian government on difficult bilateral issues to include: the receipt of public reports of Russian assistance to the Iranian missile program, urgent requests from the Israeli government to focus on weapons proliferation, a U.S. Congress initiative to consider legislation providing for sanctions against Russian companies guilty of selling missile technology to Iran, and widespread reports of Russian violations of its non-proliferation commitments.47 An AP reporter at a commission meeting effectively summed up the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission by stating that:

The committee was deeply flawed by its own structural defects – the need for a facade of success regardless of the reality, an excessive dependence on personal relationships... and a willful blindness to conflicting information about Russian affairs from sources outside the commission’s staff bureaucracy.48

45 “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” The Cox Report, p. 90.

46 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 594.

47 “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” The Cox Report, p. 94.

48 Ibid., 87.
In essence, the commission further exacerbated the impending effects of an already superficial U.S. policy and corrupt Russian initiatives.

G. SYSTEMATIC DISREGARD OF EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION

Inherent in the United States' sole reliance on Yeltsin and his cronies was the necessity to proclaim unfettered support for and complete resilience to all assertions of corruption in conjunction with the newly created bureaucracy. Tangible concern for or even knowledge of the progress of reforms was overshadowed by a dependence upon public support and blind loyalty to the institution in place. Clinton and his staff went far beyond the norm of international relations as they became Yeltsin's "cheerleader, accomplice, and spin doctor," and thus implicated the United States in some "ill-advised and wicked deeds."49

1. The 1995 CIA Report

In 1995, CIA officials dispatched to the White House a secret report documenting some of Chernomyrdin's corrupt practices. The report stated that the private assets he had accumulated while in his official position amounted to billions of dollars. According to numerous sources listed in the Cox documents, when the report reached the vice president, he not only refused to accept it, but also sent it back with "bull ****" scrawled across it.50 Gore grew increasingly effusive about Chernomyrdin's good will as evidence

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of corruption continued to surface and intensify the Russian people’s dissatisfaction with the overarching power of the oligarchs. “Friends have a right to be proud of friends,” Gore proclaimed months later to a group of reporters while in Moscow meeting with the prime minister, “The longer one works with [Chernomyrdin], the deeper one’s respect grows for his ability to get things done.” The extent of available, supportive, open-source information makes such knee-jerk dismissals of top-secret allegations of corruption all the more remarkable. As David Ignatius quoted in a Washington Post article, “It was all laid out for Gore … and he didn’t want to hear it. Our government knew damn well what was happening.”

2. “Plausible Deniability”
As a means of self-protection, the administration sought plausible deniability - the ability to deny involvement in a situation in such a way that culpability is overridden by seemingly overwhelming evidence. Attainability of this “innocence,” however, grew increasingly more difficult as Russian assessments of U.S. knowledge of corruption further undermined the administration’s claims of innocence. A 1995 report by a think tank associated with the Russian military, the Russian Institute of Defense Studies, stated in a report issued contemporaneously with the Gore “bull****” incident:

Special services of Western countries have full access today to all documentation of joint ventures and other partners of Russian exporters, they have the originals of financial documents, they are knowledgeable regarding the movement of commodity resources and financial flows, they have information on bank account numbers of the ‘new Russians,’ and they know about their real estate and securities transactions abroad.

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51 “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” The Cox Report, p. 98.

52 Ibid., p. 100.

53 Ibid.
Even as such publicly available Russian sources began to conclude that Western intelligence services knew about the full extent of Russian official corruption, top Clinton administration policy makers continued to ignore it.54

3. Standards of Proof
In order to better hedge against the necessity to concede to the knowledge of such allegations, Gore and other top Clinton administration officials conveniently demanded a "smoking gun" whenever they sought to suppress unpleasant facts. By establishing standards of proof that were impossible to meet, they created a system designed to reject all "inconvenient" intelligence when it suited the purposes of the White House. According to one CIA official:

These people [the Clinton-Gore administration] have expected something no one in the intelligence community could provide – judicial burden of proof. ... Did we have an authenticated videotape of the person actually receiving a bribe? No. But reporting from established, reliable sources was written off as vague and unsubstantiated.55

Numerous serious allegations against Chernomyrdin, made by both open and official, U.S. and Russian sources, were simply rejected by the Clinton administration. According to Wayne Merry, head of the U.S. Embassy's political section in Moscow, the administration's desire to make the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission a success prevented reporting about the realities of crime and corruption.56


56 Ibid., p. 103.
Even in 1998, after Yeltsin terminated Chernomyrdin’s tenure as prime minister (after which Chubais, Nemstov, and Kulikov departed); force-fed Kirienko as premier (which took three coercive attempts in the Duma); appointed Berezovsky (a strong-minded ally, “clan member,” and oligarch he had fired only five months earlier) as executive secretary of the CIS; and approved Chubais’ assumption of the post of the chairman of the board of the electricity monopoly (which made him a full-blown oligarch); the U.S. government continued to operate in “Panglossian mode.”

H. THE RISE OF ORGANIZED CRIME

The United States can certainly not be blamed for creating Russian corruption. Even though the Russian elite started making their newest fortunes during the last years of the Soviet Union, this type of self-aggrandizement, though deplorable, has been a general phenomenon in all transitioning post-Cold War economies, and a logical extension of the Soviet Nomenklatura. In 1992 alone, through the sale of commodity exports, subsidized credits, and food imports, almost 80% of Russia’s GDP was amassed in the hands of a few corrupt individuals. By purchasing commodities at state-controlled prices and selling them abroad at world rates, $24 billion (30% of Russia’s GDP) was garnered by a few state enterprise managers, government officials, politicians, and commodity traders. The issuing of “gift” credits at 10-25% in the midst of 2,500 % inflation accumulated another 32% of Russian GDP in the hands of a few privileged bankers and “friends.” Finally, as subsidies for food were lifted in an effort to feed the

57 Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms, p. 597.
masses, importers who paid only 1% of the going exchange rate when purchasing essential foods from abroad sold them freely on the domestic market and accrued 17.5% of Russian GDP.\(^{58}\)

Unfortunately, this corruption permeated below the head. The nation’s economy had been badly broken for some time. By the onset of the new millennium, some 50% of Russians lived below the poverty line of $30-$35 a month with a probable additional 20-30% very near to it.\(^{59}\) People needing to make ends meet looked for alternatives and often theft, counterfeiting, tax evasion, extortion, and barter became the best available options.\(^{60}\) Russians therefore have no one but their own leaders to blame for their nation’s innate corruption.

Though the Clinton administration’s failure to place a primary emphasis on replacing Communism with the basic elements of a market economy severely intensified Russia’s problems, it cannot be held completely responsible for them. The neglect of the U.S. administration, intensified by the tendency to openly support and praise corrupt leaders and their practices, greatly exacerbated Russia’s financial problems and social strife by helping to create conditions under which Russian corruption could continue to flourish. In sum, it was a combination of Western-initiated reforms and Russia’s corrupt handling of them that: increased crime and disorder, weakened peoples hopes for


\(^{59}\) Cohen, Stephen. *Failed Crusade*, p. 49.

\(^{60}\) “Russia’s Road to Corruption.” *The Cox Report*, p. 105.
democracy and a free market economy, and created and empowered an oligarchic economy which placed influential elite above the law and worsened the standard of living for ordinary Russians.

1. **Privatization**

Yeltsin’s decision, and Russia’s for that matter, on whether or not to move towards capitalism had already been made. The defining choice that remained was what role state power would play in the upcoming “Big Grab” of Soviet State assets. Yeltsin had a choice between fostering unbridled *Nomenklatura* capitalism or utilizing the non-privileged classes and emerging civil society to create necessary market infrastructure. In keeping with Soviet tradition and seeking to avoid confrontation with the *Nomenklatura*, Yeltsin chose the former.⁶¹ Before continuing it is essential to note three facts. First, organized crime was both a cause and effect of the outcome of privatization. Second, privatization was carried out with direct assistance and guidance from the U.S. government. Third, rather than creating competitors, privatization created oligarchs.⁶²

To effectively critique Russia’s privatization process it is essential to first discuss how such an initiative should have been approached and what outcomes were expected. Reformers should have sought to ensure that privatization: was carried out in a theft-free environment; did not benefit any group unduly; resulted in increased efficiency by bringing in new management, restructuring, or closing down inefficient divisions;

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encouraged local and foreign investors; promoted startups; further developed a market infrastructure; and contributed to the strengthening of democracy.\textsuperscript{63}

Privatization failed mainly because of a tragic, mutual misunderstanding of the characteristics of the post-Soviet economy and the inaccurate ways in which the United States anticipated that the Russian people would react to reform. Russia’s economic system at the collapse of the Soviet Union was an anomaly. A result of Stalin’s collectivization, all remnants of a market economy had been decimated. In essence, the very foundation of a basic market system and all of its supporting checks and balances were nonexistent in Russia and needed to be built from scratch before any reforms could take hold. Russia’s market economy didn’t need to be revived as many had anticipated; it needed to be created.

To have shaped this free-market economy, the public at large and the business community would have had to pressure the new government for both a set of equitable laws and its stringent enforcement from above and below.\textsuperscript{64} A competitive market economy composed of entrepreneurs who have an interest in self-enforcement of laws, codes, rules, and regulations needed to have been first on the agenda. Broad social consent was necessary so that it could preempt programs that aimed to impose progress from above.\textsuperscript{65} To achieve this, Russia would have had to enact a system of laws, codes, rules and regulations governing market activity and create a viable, competitive market infrastructure from within. Only after this had been successfully completed should large,

\textsuperscript{63} Goldman, Marshall, “Reprivatizing Russia,” p. 2.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{65} Reddaway, Peter and Glinski, Dmitri. \textit{The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms}, p. 641.
state-run institutions have been privatized. In this way, with a viable, self-enforcing competitive market already firmly in place, privatized companies would have been forced to comply in order to survive. For the sake of clarification, one touchstone fact must be reiterated; after 70 years of communist oppression imposed from within, very few if any Russians had the slightest inkling of what a market economy was comprised of, how it operated, or what to do to create one.

As a result of this benchmark misunderstanding, poorly structured, inefficient, and insufficient Western loans, and incredibly prevalent corruption, Russia’s attempts at privatization were near disastrous. Programs including “Loans for Shares,” enabled a few rich bankers and oligarchs to pursue key resources at bargain prices and use them solely for self-aggrandizement by establishing businesses that pulled assets out of the system and the country itself. Furthermore, even those sparse companies that did manage to transition properly had difficulties operating without input/output data and imposed time-linked production goals. Seventy-six percent of Muscovites acknowledged that they did not know how to operate without an “umbrella” or a “mafia roof.”66 Simply put, it was as difficult for Russians to instantaneously create operating codes, accounting practices, bankruptcy procedures, property rights, tax laws, a fair and functioning tax collection system, and commercial banking requirements, as it would be for Americans to blindly create a fully functional communist system.

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I. DEMILITARIZATION

One of the Soviet Union's defining tasks during the Cold War, the achievement of military parity with the West in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons, necessitated the development of a powerful military-industrial complex. Consequently, nearly two-thirds of Russia's labor force was employed in the defense industry. A successful transition of the majority of Russia's industrial complex was therefore necessary in order to shift the economy from being defense-based to consumer-oriented. Yet lacking proper funding and expertise, to date, most reforms have been completely unsuccessful. By 1997, although 90.0% of Russia's industrial output was produced outside the state structure, 47% of those companies were registering negative growth. Partly responsible for this failure is the terrible physical shape of Russia's industrial industry. The average age of plants and equipment is three times higher than the OECD average. In 1998, 50% of fixed assets were more than 15 years old and only four percent were less than five years old.

Another factor that intensifies Russia's inability to adapt from a military economy to a civilian one is the fact that capital has historically been a poor substitute for labor.

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With a low ease of substitution index, Russia is increasingly constrained by outdated technology and an absolute inability to accrue funds for its modernization.\textsuperscript{70}

Also problematic for successful industrial transformation is the poor condition of infrastructure. The Soviet industrial system was based on the size and makeup of the Union in its entirety, not Russia proper. The breakup of the Union therefore caused numerous unforeseen consequences, namely the fact that Russia has no national infrastructure. Component industrial plants are dispersed between fourteen sovereign, independent states; and existing roads, railways, pipelines, power lines, water systems, and sewers presently remain in dire need of repair.\textsuperscript{71} Consequently, as held true during Soviet days, the only Russian industrial goods that are presently competitive on the world market are those related to military hardware, nuclear power plants, and space engineering.\textsuperscript{72}

J. WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

The failure of Russia’s economic transition has created irresistible incentives for its military-industrial complex, individual military units, research facilities, design bureaus, and individual officers, soldiers, bureaucrats, and scientists to sell even the most sensitive


\textsuperscript{71} “Prospects for Economic Growth,” p. 2.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
hardware and technology to virtually any interested customer.\(^73\) Further intensifying this problem is the fact that most interested customers are rogue states with clear anti-Western agendas. To many in the government who searched for ways to overcome Russia’s economic crisis, exporting nuclear, bio-chemical and conventional contraband solves various economic problems. It generates hard currency; utilizes the few operable existing Russian industrial assets; and employs hundreds of thousands of economically misplaced Russians. For those who delve in corruption and organized crime, another benefit of such sales remains the opportunity for significant personal wealth.\(^74\)

The following are examples of ongoing Russian weapons proliferation: multifaceted assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program, the sale of valuable missile technology to Iraq in violation of the U.N. embargo; and the sale of advanced conventional weapons systems to any and all interested parties. In sum, Russian officials’ continued willingness to export advanced weapons to U.S.-declared “countries of concern” like Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria,\(^75\) is increasingly troubling as for the time being it remains the most lucrative way to accrue capital in Russia.

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\(^73\) Russia’s Road to Corruption.” *The Cox Report*, p. 137.

\(^74\) Ibid., p. 141.

\(^75\) Ibid., p. 150.
K. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

Consequently, the "Golden Opportunity of the 20th Century" seems to have been missed. Economic reform initiatives, both in the United States and Russia, were superficial and conducted on the cheap. Russia is guilty of crime, corruption, manipulation, and naiveté; the West is guilty of arrogance, neglect, corruption, and impotency. Reform attempts were characterized by: a lack of mutual understanding, satisfaction with preconceived misconceptions, and inappropriate support of top-down macroeconomic policies based on a Washington Consensus model designed for nations with a previously existing market economy.

1. Apportioning Responsibility
Although ultimate responsibility must be shared, as is common with elder siblings, this author assigns the majority of the blame to the United States. Culpability should be assigned as 51% for the United States and 49% for Russia. Western reforms, which proved to be rhetorically based and effectively hollow, overtly ignored Russia’s incapacity and corruption. Russians have no one to blame but themselves for corruption; but the United States was in a position to be able to at least cut off what was known to be "dirty money," if not go a step further and actually attempt to make a difference in curtailing corruption. In essence, U.S. leadership aided and abetted the corrupt Russian elite who in turn facilitated the further weakening of the state and degradation of society.

After a decade of failed attempts at economic reform, players on both sides of the court are frustrated and have little or no interest to continue. The tragedy in this is that both nations could have built upon the momentum, enthusiasm, and euphoria of the immediate post-Cold War period. Conversely, Westerners now see Russia as a large,
corrupt state that they prefer to ignore, while Russians see the United States as an aspiring hegemon on whom they have begun to give up hope. Though blame cannot be directly assessed, many Russians look at the United States as bearing much of the responsibility for the nation's recent economic failure. Russians attest that after agreeing to transition with the assistance of the West, the United States merely looked on, feigning assistance and then quickly criticizing failed efforts. Westerners, on the other hand, claim that "Russia lost Russia."

2. **Hope for the Future**
A decade has been lost and with it has disappeared the golden opportunity of the century; but there is still a chance for revival. Though Russia does not yet have a legitimate democratic system, many elements of democracy are firmly in place. Russia has held successful democratic elections, has a relatively free press, and has created the workings of a market economy. Fifteen years ago, no one would have guessed that U.S.-Russian relations would be where they are today. As the only remaining superpower at the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States inherited the innate moral responsibility to assist Russia's transformation. After a decade of failure in this arena, that responsibility not only still exists, but also has been exponentially heightened.

3. **Realignment**
Russia's future and consequently the future of the U.S.-Russian rapport rely on both nations' ability to rid themselves of Cold War stereotypes. At present, the U.S.-

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Russian relationship is reminiscent of a duel between a bully and a sore loser. For the United States, re-engaging Russia means rising above Cold War arrogance and realizing that even in its weakened position, Russia has legitimate interests, rights, and responsibilities in world affairs.\textsuperscript{77} The United States must engage Russia in a conciliatory manner, looking at the nation as a partner and no longer a "failed state." For Russia, re-engaging the United States means being capable of transitioning from a Cold War superpower to one of many powerful European states in a newly forged multi-polar community. Russia needs to engage the United States as a new, cooperative, powerful nation vice an ostracized "fallen angel." Russia's future no longer remains in parity with the United States; it lies in concert with Europe. Demonstrations like that which occurred in Pristina\textsuperscript{78} highlight the fact that Russia is fighting to retain its prestige and find its place in the world. The United States needs to not only support this, but also to play a sincere, supportive, and unintrusive role in its coming to fruition.

The West cannot just cut Russia off since what happens in Russia has historically proven to affect the entire Eurasian region. With half its population living below poverty conditions, Russia can be seen as more a Third-World country than a great nation, but in reality it cannot be treated as such. Though one cannot mistake Russia's present army for the Soviet military machine, the fact that Russia retains a significant nuclear capability cannot be overlooked.

\textsuperscript{77} Cohen, Stephen. \textit{Failed Crusade}, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{78} A detailed description of this event can be found in Chapter 4.
L. FINDING “RUSSIA’S WAY”

The West presently has the opportunity and the obligation to respect Russia’s democratic choices, even if they may be “imperfect” in comparison with Western ideals. Though Western reformers continue to assert that, “democracy in Russia is a precondition for cooperation,” this mindset is paradoxical since Russia cannot consolidate its democracy without Western assistance. Russia is unique; it possesses its own distinct history, culture, and future aspirations. Its people, its leadership, and its youth have their own ways of viewing themselves and others. The nation’s economy must therefore reflect this singularity. George Kennan described what the West must do if it is not to be held accountable for the continued decline of Russia’s internal and external state of affairs:

Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. ... The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good.80

Russia will not react like the West because it is not like the West; Russia’s economy will not respond like those of the developing Third-World nations because its problems are of a different nature; the Washington Consensus is therefore an inappropriate prescription for economic reform.


80 Ibid., p. 285.
There are many ideas on the table as to what is the best way to accomplish Russia’s second attempt at a democratic transition. Some theorists advocate a system similar to Germany’s social democracy. Others propose a Russian “mixed economy” and “regulated market” of gradual, state-guided reform. Many argue that anything short of occupation is doomed to failure while others attest that a program similar to the Marshall Plan would be successful. Personal preference aside, it is paramount that the foundation of Russia’s plan be comprised of three of the underlying principles present in both the Marshall Plan and the occupation of Germany. First, they were both backed by massive amounts of capital and hands-on assistance; second, they were executed in the true spirit of rendering aid as their goal was to assist ensure proper destinies for war-torn nations; and third, they were both administered with long-term solutions in mind. Many propose that Russia has had and lost its chance for democratic consolidation. This statement in itself is absurd. It took 178 years for African Americans to exercise their basic right to vote in the United States of America, the leader of the free, democratic world. Democracy, and the formation of a corresponding market economy, is a process, not an event. It takes time and trial and error. Russia deserves this opportunity.

What the United States and Europe need to do is make a tremendous, joint effort to move in a major, structured, and heavily funded manner with the assistance of large, powerful corporations. If such cooperation is still possible, a team of experts needs to be sent to Russia to discuss, debate, and formulize practical policies before financial assistance is rendered. This cannot however, be done in a condescending manner.

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Attitudes need to reflect a thorough understanding of the peculiarities of Russia and the particulars of its present situation, and a sincere, unbiased desire to assist.

The Russian way has yet to be discovered. One thing is for certain; that neither The Washington Consensus, nor any of the other aforementioned programs are a sufficient recipe for fixing Russia’s disaster because they were all specifically designed for different countries, in different situations, with different problems. What is necessary is an in-depth study of all these programs, and any others that have been attempted or even suggested, in an effort to extract essential, successful elements and use them as building blocks for Russia’s system. Regardless of what the specifics of such a system will end up being, Russia’s economy must be based upon a democratic market system, yet be specially tailored to fit the unique characteristics of Russia, its people, and its history. The previously discussed multinational economics team needs to help Russia find its own third way, its own middle road. Most importantly, Russians themselves need to be able to create and implement this system with sincere, unfettered, long-term, academic and financial assistance from the West. Such assistance however, must be made contingent upon the mutual understanding that if Russian corruption is not effectively curtailed, Western support and funding will be cut off immediately.
III. NATO EXPANSION

The abrupt end of the Cold War and communism’s dominance over Eastern Europe left in their wake an immediate influx of new states – fraught with cultural, economic and ethnic strife – which continue to aspire to become democratic nation-states and seek inclusion and protection within NATO. The United States, as the champion of the Cold War, offered a hand to these newly freed nations and their struggle for inclusion into the “West.” Since NATO held a monopoly over the most effective global security institutions, it was the logical Western choice for the foundation on which to build the post-Cold War security system. Russia’s ideal choice, conversely, lay with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a Euro-centric organization, absent NATO’s antagonism toward the Soviet Union, wherein the Russian Federation could act as an equal in a system of great European powers. The West, however, turned to the North Atlantic Alliance for security, and in doing so expressly isolated Russia.

In response to NATO’s first round of expansion in 1999, the Russian public has since 1999, overwhelmingly embraced an anti-Western, anti-NATO attitude. Though this consternation was initially, politically motivated, its follow-on Russia/West schism has manifested itself in: a seldom-attainable Russian political-public consensus, a new antagonistic military doctrine and security concept, difficulties in the adherence to existing international agreements, increased anti-Western, targeted military deployments and demonstrations, the forging of new anti-western military, strategic, economic and technical partnerships and alliances, and a government that increasingly reorients itself to the right of an already conservative political spectrum.
Often overlooked by observers with regard to NATO expansion is the underlying principle of the rebuilding of the European security arena and the institutions required for its contemporary relevance. Although the 1999 accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary has served as a short-term benefit to those three nations; their membership, as well as the proposed—and arguably inevitable—future expansion of NATO has significantly weakened the stability of pan-European security.

This chapter seeks to illustrate how and for what reasons NATO expansion has resulted in the formation of a formidable anti-Western/anti-NATO Russian political-public coalition and consequent Russia/West rift. The analysis will begin with a general background of contemporary Russia-NATO relations. The next section details Russia’s reaction to expansion and defines which components of the Russian psyche underline Russia’s actions. The following section explains how Russia views NATO as a direct, military threat and leads into a discussion on Russia’s fears of isolation and containment. Next will follow a section that outlines governmental, political, and public aspects of Russia’s psychological and physical isolation and leads into an explanation of the myriad ways a revived US/NATO-Russia schism has manifested itself within the concepts of European Security. The next section breaks from present day effects and details why Russia, as a vanquished power, must be readmitted into the security system. Following this will be a return to a description of Russia’s global reorientation and an exploration of the state of East-West relations. The concluding section will reiterate the effects NATO expansion has had on the security arena, discuss how expansion missed its reason-for being because of NATO’s failure to reorient to the needs of a new, multi-polar security environment, and present a final evaluation, or scorecard detailing how well the
objectives of NATO expansion have been met. Further recommendations for the future, based on the failures of the most recent round of accession into NATO, will be detailed in the concluding chapter of this study.

A. BACKGROUND

From 1991 onward, Russia made prominent efforts to transform itself into a democratic, market-driven society, a “Western moral project.” Regardless of the nation’s insistence upon being “adorned” with an unrealistic amount of influence and prestige, Russia’s posture was one of hopeful cooperation with the West. Efforts materialized into numerous strategic initiatives and concessions made by Russia in coordination with the United States. Though many of these initiatives failed because of a lack of Western guidance, money, and leadership; and a shortage of Russian expertise, precedence, and corruption-control procedures; the sentiment of the day was clearly one of nostalgia, change, and reorientation toward cooperation as partners in lieu of competition as adversaries.

Under former President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets surrendered their Eastern European buffer zone, permitted the unification of Germany, signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaties, and

provided for massive reductions in Europe’s conventional forces and the continent’s nuclear and strategic nuclear forces.\textsuperscript{83}

In response to this willingness to acquiesce, Russia expected at least an environment of transparent cooperation in which it could transition from its reign as Cold-War superpower to its role as one of many strong states in a newly forged multipolar community. Clearly stated Russian contention over NATO expansion aside, Russia trusted that the West would refrain from expanding the institution into the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Soviet military. Russian leadership fully believed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would take the place of NATO and become responsible for the peace and security of the region.\textsuperscript{84} As explained by Yeltsin in 1993, the spirit of the stipulations on German unification in 1989 was believed to have ruled out the possibility of further NATO expansion. Instead, Russia and NATO should, “...officially offer [Central European states] security guarantees...enshrined in a political declaration or a treaty on cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO...and a truly pan-European security system (not, however, on the basis of blocs)....”\textsuperscript{85}


\textsuperscript{84} Powaski, Ronald, E., “Joining the March of Folly.” \textit{The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists}. Available [Online]:

The United States, conversely, immediately assumed the role of arbitrator in its own unipolar world. Western actions during 1990’s were characterized by aloof ambivalence. A Pentagon draft study released in March 1992 described a desirable American policy objective as being “...a unipolar world in which the remaining superpower, the United States, would guarantee global order, while deterring any other nation or group of nations from challenging its primacy.”86 The Russian preference for a multi-polar balance was therefore overridden by an American desire for “...exploiting Europe via NATO once again to achieve world hegemony....”87 Disregarding both Russia’s outward contention toward expansion and the nation’s continued attempts at privatization, democratization, and Western orientation, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were admitted into NATO. As a result of its size, history, prestige, and nuclear inventory, the West should have given Russia the opportunity for real consultation in negotiations concerning political and strategic matters as significant as expansion, regardless of the nation’s economic and military bankruptcy. Instead, NATO, with the United States in the lead, in effect gave Russia the status of a vanquished nation and began to treat it as such.


Stripped of its position and inherent great-power dignity, Russia has recently demonstrated open resistance to Western actions. The strategic arena's new, debilitating Russia/West rift can be regarded as the first of many unforeseen consequences. Even though the stated objectives of expansion were to: make NATO stronger, secure democratic gains in Eastern Europe, foster regional stability, and erase Stalin's artificial dividing lines, overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the first of the previously mentioned goals is subjective, the second is primarily limited to new inductees, while that which the third and fourth objectives were intended to abolish, was actually intensified.

Russia's pro-Western, pro-democratic, post-Cold War outlook has been replaced by one of suspicion and alienation; one that identifies the West, the United States, and NATO as adversaries and has started to lead Russia towards countries like China, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq for economic, strategic, and military alliances. It is in concert with these antagonistic nations that Russian initiatives could transform into legitimate threats and lead the security arena full circle, back into one comprised of Eastern and Western Blocs fervently opposed to one another in all aspects.

Many argue that Russian actions should be regarded as mere political sentiment and not realpolitik, with effects that will remain negligible and mundane, useful only for the intellectual exercise of politicians, theorists, and academics. Though an actual, physical Russian threat reminiscent of Soviet days is non-existent as a result of a crippled

economy; U.S.-inspired NATO actions taken since the end of the Cold War have created a seldom-attained political anti-NATO/anti-Western consensus in Russia which has trickled down to a once-Western-emulative general public and manifested itself in: the roll back of democratic and political reform; a government increasingly leaning toward nationalistic, authoritarian rule; the adoption of adversarial security and military doctrines which promote limited nuclear war and nuclear first-use; and ongoing attempts to create anti-Western alliances to counter Western hegemony.

B. RUSSIA'S REACTION TO EXPANSION

Russia made its case clear at the onset of discussions about the possibility of NATO expansion—the acceptance of new members would be seen as a direct threat to the sovereignty of the nation. This, however, did not alter Western actions. The first round of expansion was concluded in 1999; leaving Russia with only rhetorically based empty promises of a new era of cooperation, peace, security, and democracy. This state of affairs has resulted in a common sentiment among Russians that the West has betrayed them.89

Sergei Karaganov, one of Russia’s friendliest critics of expansion, was quoted as explaining Russia’s reaction with the following analogy:

In 1990 we were told quite clearly by the West that dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because, in the euphoric atmosphere of that time, it would have seemed almost indecent, like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other’s husbands.90

Faced with a first-ever opportunity to create an international environment characterized by democracy and partnership, as a result of U.S.-inspired NATO expansion, a groundless threat of the rebirth of Soviet/Russian aggression has recently emerged in the post-Cold War security arena. The initiative has formidably damaged once-hoped-for prospects of a bright future. George Kennan, the “father” of containment strategy described NATO expansion in the following terms:

The most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Expansion will inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion, adversely affect the development of Russian democracy, restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations, and impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.91 ... There was a total lack of necessity for this move.92

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91 Ibid., p. 3.

C. INCOMPREHENSION OF RUSSIA’S REACTION

Mutual misperceptions have regrettably characterized relations since the end of the Cold War. The incomprehension of why Russia is so vehemently opposed to expansion is one of the gravest of these errors. First off, broadly stated, the initiative excludes Russia from a region that has been within its sphere of interest for centuries. Russia openly perceives that NATO has plans for further enlargement and unilateral “out of area”93 operations in both the Balkans and the Caucasus, regions that have been of historical significance to Russian security interests. Such entanglements could destabilize bordering countries and spark internal splits and civil wars likely to drag Russia into conflicts it neither desires, nor can afford. Secondly, and on a more extreme note, many Russians view expansion, especially after the Kosovo campaign, as a direct military threat against the motherland.94 Lastly, and most problematic, Russians spanning all levels of society see expansion as a blatant, Western attempt to isolate Russia, taking from it its place in the international arena. Westerners cannot seem to comprehend that these convictions exist, let alone why.


1. The Russian Mindset

Before continuing with this analysis it is essential to take a moment to identify a few basic components of the Russian mentality. This is not meant to qualify, or brand "a Russian mindset," but to explain certain, recurring, psychological tendencies. Often used as key discussion points for Russian foreign policy elite, these psychological biases have permeated the civilian sector and now seem to be subconsciously ingrained in the ordinary Russian citizen's mind. First of all, Russia undoubtedly views NATO as a militaristic organization; and since it was initiated to counter the Soviet Union; asserts that it still exists in direct opposition to Russia. As stated by Alexei K. Pushkov, Director for Political and Public Affairs of the Public Russian Television, "Western countries, including the United States and Germany, were no longer regarded as Russia's enemies, NATO was still viewed as a potentially anti-Russian coalition. It was also seen as a collective enemy." Second, expansion is perceived as being the beginning of the creation of a buffer zone of anti-Russian populations, which isolate Russia from continental Europe. Third, another commonly held contention is that the West promised that after the inclusion of East Germany, NATO would not continue to expand. Resulting expansion, therefore, caused Russians to feel defensive and paranoid, as if they had been "stabbed in the back" by the West. Fourth, is a fear of externally imposed strategic

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95 An in-depth analysis of this subject can be found in Chapter 4.

96 Black, J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*, p. 65.


98 Black, J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*, p. 49.
confinement that has been deeply rooted in Soviet/Russian history, has with time become an almost primal instinct for Russians. Lastly, and arguably most significant, Russia presently struggles with an “inferiority complex”\textsuperscript{99} because of its financial bankruptcy, consequent economic dependence on the West, military inferiority, lack of respect and status, mute voice in world affairs, and loss of allies which, in the last decade have become anti-Russian.

These beliefs - intensified by 70 years of ideological isolation - are consequently ingrained in several generations of Russians and cannot be replaced in a mere decade or two. Whether seemingly irrational, unfounded, and arbitrary from a cursory Western point of view, these complexes have proven to play a significant political role as they can have implications for internal and external Russian affairs. Having already played a part in “pushing Russia towards an arms race, a nationalistic and anti-Western stand, and preventing democratic reforms,”\textsuperscript{100} these fears must be taken into consideration when dealing with issues sensitive to Russians. Although many critics claim that Russia’s sensitivity represents a clear exaggeration of the dangers inherent in expansion, it is on par with the predominant Russian disposition. Case in point, not a single official Russian document, to date, avoids the affirmation that Russia is a great power. The nation’s


\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 11.
reaction to expansion can therefore be partially characterized as an aversion to inferiority.\textsuperscript{101}

Enveloped by memories of more than four decades of Soviet control and aggression, it is almost impossible for the international community to remember that Russia has also suffered more than two centuries of invasion through the pathway of Eastern Europe. As significant as the desperate plight of countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, is the destruction brought to Russia through the nation’s eastern corridor. Napoleon’s Grand Army invaded Russia in 1812, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s soldiers took to the heartland in World War I, and Hitler’s Blitzkrieg ransacked the nation in World War II. In the latter conflict the Russian population was literally crippled, with more than 20 million killed by a nation with which Russia had signed a non-aggression pact.\textsuperscript{102} Just as East-West/West-East hatred had been bred with longevity during the Cold War, Russia’s intuitive defensive orientation has been paid for with the motherland soaked with Red Army blood shed for the Allies during World War II. To Russians, this devastation and suffering overshadows misfortunes that the Soviet Union brought to Europe as a result of its Western expansion both before and after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{103}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{101} Nazarkin, Yuri, “European Security in the Context of Russia’s Geopolitical Situation,” p. 3.


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D. NATO POLICY AS A DIRECT THREAT

A product of this psychological imprisonment, presently, some Russians actually feel that NATO expansion has become a direct military threat to the nation. Used intensely by Moscow in the mid and late 1990's, this paranoia has intensified and begun to take hold in the general public after only ten years of Russia's "new existence." According to Russian Chief of General Staff Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, a fear of encirclement exists because as a byproduct of the first round of expansion; NATO missiles, if stationed 650-750 km closer to Russia would render the nation's defenses ineffective, thereby reducing Russia's early warning time of an offensive.\(^{104}\) In effect, to Russians, expansion has rendered Russia's nuclear and conventional weapons insufficient as deterrents.\(^{105}\) As Gen. Kvashnin explains, Russian leadership now views Eastern European security as a zero-sum game played at the nation's expense. "The approaching of NATO's infrastructure to Russian borders is a direct increase of NATO's combat possibilities, which is unfavorable for our country in a strategic sense. We will regard the approaching of NATO's tactical aviation to Russian borders as an attempted nuclear threat."\(^{106}\)

As demonstrated by the Cold War arms race, Russia is extraordinarily uncomfortable with being poised against a number of states and alliances that possess

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\(^{104}\) Blank, Stephen J. *Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow*, p. 15.

\(^{105}\) Ibid.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.
superior armed forces. Over the next ten years, as a result of NATO expansion and the present conventional superiority in Europe of 2.5:1, NATO will possess substantial nuclear superiority over Russia with both tactical and strategic forces. This is a stark contrast from just ten years ago when in addition to parity with strategic forces; the Warsaw Pact enjoyed 3:1 conventional force superiority over NATO and a 2:1 theater and tactical nuclear weapons advantage.\(^\text{107}\)

The magnitude of this juxtaposition of the balance of power in Europe is extremely provocative toward Russia, especially with regard to the nation’s failing struggle to retain a respectable level of international prestige. The Russian Federation inherited everything from the USSR but its “territorial integrity, secure borders, and a sense of being an impregnable power.”\(^\text{108}\) Recent high-level actions taken on political and strategic levels are prime examples of attempts to counterbalance this tendency. Rhetoric aside, to date, NATO’s post-Cold War attempts to stabilize the security arena through the expansion of the Alliance have not only concentrated solely on specific areas in Eastern Europe, but have also had destabilizing effects on “other” areas and consequently on the system as a whole. The result is the beginning of the recreation of a Cold War-era\(^\text{109}\) adversarial rapport between Russia and the West.


\(^{108}\) Black, J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*, p. 7.

\(^{109}\) When Cold War is used in this manner throughout the study, it not used to signify all aspects of the actual Cold War, especially not economic and military aspects. Conversely, it refers to an antagonistic Russia/West rapport reminiscent of the Cold War-era.
E. CONTAINMENT REVISITED

The initiation of the three newest member states, often promised to be the first in a future filled with expansion, is seen by many Russians as a Western attempt to encircle the Cold War-weakened nation and return to NATO its main responsibility of containment. As a result of Russia's present-day inability to take unimpeded action, there exists a basic national assumption that NATO poses a threat to Russia. Many Russians therefore conclude that NATO expansion was not an effort to promote democratic principles and foster security in the new international arena, rather an attempt to deter Russia\(^\text{110}\) by moving to bring former Soviet satellite states under its wing before Russia was capable of attempting the same. Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, Director of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense briefly identifies the basis behind the threat posed by NATO's new proximity:

...strategically important targets, including the command posts and weapons of strategic nuclear forces, are within striking range [of NATO tactical aircraft]. Modern aircraft in the NATO arsenal can strike deep into Russia. Currently they have sufficient range to strike against fifty to sixty percent of facilities of Russia's nuclear arsenal, and practically all command posts of the government and high command.\(^\text{111}\)


This trepidation and the following “worst-case scenario” are examples of how Russian leaders commonly disseminate (to the public sector) political and military fears and speak to institutional imperatives of a rebirth of nuclear vulnerability.

Some assess that expansion has rendered NATO’s eastern frontiers have been rendered indefensible. With this in mind it can be argued that Slovakia and Slovenia must be included to protect the southern borders of Poland and Hungary. Additionally, since the Kaliningrad enclave cannot be liquidated, it must be isolated with the inclusion of Lithuania. Furthermore, if Poland’s northern flank is to be fully protected, the rest of the Baltic States must be included in an effort to shorten NATO lines and anchor the left flank of the Gulf of Finland. Additionally, in the south, Romania must be included to anchor NATO’s southern frontiers and defend the Hungarian plain. Finally, the inclusion of the Ukraine could create a formidable pincer on Belarus and the Baltics.\textsuperscript{112}

Though an extreme and seemingly absurd scenario, the rationale that lies behind it is in keeping with not only Russia’s fears of marginalization and encirclement, but also the Western fear of a revival of Russian power. Though not the official reason for the expansion of NATO, many Eastern European nations still believe in the epic myth that Russia aspires to restore its hegemony in the region. Regardless of the fact that the nation’s present status proves its inability to successfully act with aggression,\textsuperscript{113} a clear

\textsuperscript{112} Global Intelligence Update. “NATO Expansion and the Problem of a NATO Strategy,” 1.

\textsuperscript{113} Pushkov, Aleksei and Gazeta, Nezavisimaya, “The Shadow Goes East: Europe’s Security Cannot be Strengthened at the Expense of Russia, p. 3.
case can be made that this paranoia is a benchmark motivation for Eastern European nations’ quest for NATO inclusion.

The possibility of such containment foreshadows the very same envelopment Russia has begun to fear, and against which the nation stands. According to Russian strategists, the nation’s borders were rendered more vulnerable with NATO expansion than they had been since the late 1700’s, making NATO’s attitude a central issue for Moscow.114 Similar to the effect of the mere mention of Stalin’s annexation of Eastern Europe and creation of an empire, even the remotest possibility of such containment coming to fruition with Russia exudes conflict and chaos. Many share the view that one of Stalin’s main motivations for action was the fear of repeated invasion from the east. This rationale, if taken to the extreme, could prove extremely dangerous. Though not all Russians are wary of NATO literally attacking from the west, many believe Russia must consider being invaded an option as a result of its weakened state.115 The irony of the situation is that as a result of U.S.-initiated NATO expansion, Russia’s attempt to defend against the same phantom from which Eastern European nations sought NATO protection, has played a role in dragging the security arena back full circle to political and military containment. Regardless of one’s proclivity toward this type of conclusion, an understanding of these types of psychological barricades can often help explain why Russians react the way they do.

114 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 7.

115 Ibid., p. 158.
F. RUSSIA’S PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL ISOLATION

For Russia, disastrous, Western-structured economic reforms and expansion in the face of Russian contempt exacerbated the nation’s already anti-Western sentiment, which had remained dormant since the end of the Cold War. It has, therefore been convenient for Russians to oversimplify and blame their present political, economic, and military stagnation on Western initiatives. A result of this recently assigned culpability; as of 1993 there was a virtual consensus in Russia that NATO expansion would create conditions for the nation’s isolation.116 Although some critics argue that consternation over expansion exists only with politicians and government officials, the number of Russians concerned about it continues to significantly increase with time. According to a recent census, in 1994 only 18% of Russians had any interest in NATO. By 1997 that number had skyrocketed to 80%.117 In effect, Russians are beginning to see the West as looking to profit from their national weakness while strengthening itself and Russia’s surrounding nations.

1. Effects on the Russian Government

Poor social, economic, and military conditions, in addition to the nonentity many Russians feel their nation is becoming, as a result of both post-Cold War Western initiatives and Russia’s inability to keep its affairs in order, have begun to have an effect

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117 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 28.
on the Russian government. Two laws recently passed by the Duma highlight a transition toward a more centralized, authoritarian system of government. The first renders the upper chamber of the Russian Federal Assembly (Parliament) increasingly more subordinate to the President; the second makes it even easier for the President to dissolve the Duma.\textsuperscript{118} International concern has also been levied about the recent takeover of Russia’s largest independent television network, NTV, by allies of the Kremlin. The buyers immediately announced a move toward completely new membership and staffing, thereby justifying the criticism that NTV and its affiliates were becoming mouthpieces for the government.\textsuperscript{119} This growing moral and political estrangement from the West can be likened to a reversion to antagonistic Cold War attitudes which refute democratic principles and have been preventing Russia from breaking free from the “Soviet status quo” and in essence, have begun to force the nation back towards it. Though NATO expansion cannot be given full culpability in this, it has certainly been an enabling factor for it has “…contributed to such a political climate in Russia that hampers and even threatens democratization.”\textsuperscript{120}

2. Effects on Russian Society
The Alliance’s expansion has also begun to impair Russian society. The nation’s history attests that it was Russians who inspired the leaders of the Soviet Union to come

\textsuperscript{118} Blank, Stephen J. \textit{Threats to European Security: The View from Moscow}, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{120} Nazarkin, Yuri, “European Security in the Context of Russia’s Geopolitical Situation,” p. 11.
to the conclusion that it would be better to attempt to live more like the West. Asserting the fact that the highest members of the Soviet Union had voluntarily dismembered their empire, Russia feels it has not been treated as it deserves to be. Intensifying the resentment behind this "lack of proper attribution," the details of the Soviet Union's transition, once in its final phases, were realistically made in conjunction with the West. For Russians, this dual involvement necessitated continued, dual responsibility. Russians therefore feel as if they should be treated on par with the United States regardless of their present internal affairs. Yet instead of being dealt with as an equal, or even like a sovereign nation, Russians resent the fact that the West, especially the United States, has treated them like a second-class citizens. Though economically, socially, and politically vulnerable at present, Russia remains a powerful nuclear force and plans to return to the world scene as a powerful nuclear entity. Public and political assertions "promise" that Russia will remember all that has happened when it is strong again. The problem with recent NATO actions is that they appear to Russia as Western attempts to challenge its reentry. Further proof of dissention in the Russian public over NATO’s post-Cold War demeanor can be extrapolated from the 1996 presidential elections during which 30 million Russians cast their vote for Gennadii Zyuganov and his anti-NATO expansion platform.122

In addition to those who immediately rallied with the politicians against NATO expansion and those who crossed over with time, are the ordinary Russian citizens to

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122 Black, J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*, p. 13
whom expansion has also become of central concern since it now appears to be the cause of the social and economic disarray eroding their nation.\footnote{Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 2.} The spillover effects of this situation, as described by Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation are:

The U.S. public and Russian public do not see themselves as allies. They look at each other with suspicion, mistrust, and hostility. ... Before, Russia had no enemies. Now it is clearly stated that one of the primary threats to Russian security is the policy of the United States...\footnote{Tooher, Paul, “U.S. Russian Relations – A New Chill: Russian Liberal Blames U.S. for Growing Rift.” \textit{Global Reporting Network Publications}. Available [Online]: \url{http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs.html}, p. 2, Nov. 2000.}

This escalation of tensions is a far cry from any previously sought-after spirit of cooperation. Intensified by the fact that Russia was legitimately attempting to reform and re-orient, but was politically isolated and outwardly provoked, this anti-Western reorientation has formed coalitions seldom previously procurable in the Soviet Union/Russia.

3. \textbf{Effects on Russian Politics}

Russia’s political establishment experienced a general shift in December 1994 when a new anti-expansion coalition was born in which the Yeltsin administration, the military and state bureaucracy, and democratic opposition [with few exceptions] were regrouped. A communist-nationalist political alliance was also created.\footnote{Pushkov, Aleksei, K., “A View from Russia,” Available in Simon, Jeffrey. \textit{NATO Enlargement – Opinions and Options}, p. 135.} Though mundane to those not directly affected, the existence of such voluntary Russian unity
represents a significant shift in political opinion. This type of coalition, furthermore, does not end at the political level, but has also taken hold among the general public. As summarized by Gorbachev in 1997, "Both 'sides' (NATO and Russia) acknowledged that NATO expansion was the one issue on which Russians were unified."  

The West has conspicuously continued to disregard these inclinations, which remain momentous points of contention for Russians who feel that they have been continually forced to face categorical humiliation. In contradiction with the forward-looking, liberated, "post-lustration" Eastern European atmosphere, it seems to Russians that they have been condemned to live in a state of invariable reparation for seven decades of Soviet atrocities and aggressions.

G. RUSSIA/WEST SCHISM

The deeper tragedy of this degradation of relations between the East and West is that overriding political and public opinion hold that a mutually beneficial rapport is unlikely to be restored in the near future.  

The overwhelming present-day inclination is that, "Russia has the right to take whatever countermeasures it deems necessary to protect its own security." In April 2001 a Duma member even threatened to respond to

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126 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 39.


128 Ibid., p. 4.
NATO’s new foreboding demeanor with the deployment of nuclear weapons to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Examples of the corresponding social, political, economic, and military aftershock of this reorientation can be found in the recent silence of optimistic pro-Western voices and exploitation of Soviet-style security mentalities and measures.

1. Russia’s New Military Doctrine and Security Concept
This antagonistic reorientation has materialized in both Russia’s new security concept and military doctrine. Standing in stark contrast to that of their predecessors’ optimistic prognosis of “no direct threat,” these new documents examine 12 new external and six new internal threats. Russian leaders now see NATO expansion as a deliberate threat to all aspects of its existence. The authors of these doctrines stated the following in response to NATO’s post-Cold War initiatives:

The main objective of NATO enlargement is to weaken Russia’s influence in Europe and around the world. ... Russia will soon find herself surrounded by NATO countries, which will enable the West to apply effective economic, political, and possibly even military pressure on Moscow.

These new documents name the U.S., NATO, and the West as direct security threats and emphasize the following elements as primary foundations of Russian security:

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131 Ibid., p. 15.
nuclear defense and deterrence, a strong conventional force to be used to defend the motherland from threats posed by NATO, the routine use of force to deal with local and domestic conflicts, and nuclear first-use tactics.\textsuperscript{132}

In direct response to cavalier Western attitudes and the new threat of a continuously encroaching NATO - armed and in close proximity to Russia’s borders - Russia has lowered its threshold for the authorization of the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The strategy of limited nuclear war and the option of a Russian nuclear first-use have thereby been proclaimed as acceptable strategies in order to compensate for the nation’s new conventional inferiority.\textsuperscript{133}

What is most alarming is not the existence of this language since the mention of limited nuclear war and nuclear first-use have been subtly present in previous doctrines since 1993, but the fact that recent military exercises have been conducted throughout all of European Russia to reinforce the document and Russia’s underlying anxiety. Since the Kosovo campaign, active planning and extensive training exercises have been conducted to ensure the readiness of the Russian military to successfully execute limited nuclear war and nuclear first-use. Being that only two years have elapsed since the adoption of the previous, “vaguely antagonistic and nonaligned” military doctrine, it is evident that expansion has helped to reverse the positive course of relations that began between Russia and the West at the close of the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{132} Arbatov, Alexei, “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine,” p. 27.

\textsuperscript{133} Blank, Stephen J. \textit{Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow}, p. 10.
2. **International Agreements**

Further manifestations of this ominous reversion have already been demonstrated through a decreased level of cooperation between Russia and the United States on arms control issues, in terms of both violating existing agreements and refusing to ratify uncompleted treaties.\(^{134}\) Most notably, present Russia/West relations have placed the implementation of START II in doubt and retarded progress on cutting tactical nuclear weapons beyond the Gorbachev/Bush initiatives. Although Russian proposals on National Missile Defense (NMD) continue to be forthcoming, a fundamental disagreement on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty presently impedes international agreement on NMD implementation.

With relations in question and Russia feeling as though the West has ignored its strategic concerns, the expectation of a reduction of the nation’s most powerful strategic weapons is unrealistic, especially since the Russian military has repeatedly stated that it cannot maintain its nuclear arsenal at more than 1,5000 warheads. Dvorkin sums up this phenomenon in the following terms:

> NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders enables conventional weapons to carry out strategic missions against Russia’s territory; this might end up finally overthrowing all the system of military agreements between the Russian Federation and NATO (USA) and to make meaningless the already achieved agreements on strategic nuclear arms reductions.\(^{135}\)


\(^{135}\) Dvorkin, Vladimir, “Upsetting the Strategic Balance,” translated by Mikhail Tsypkin, p. 6.
On a more rhetorical level, the reemergence of such strategic maneuvering is one of many recently revived defining Cold War-era principles that demonstrates both this concrete degradation of Russia/West relations and a “by the numbers” reversion toward the past. Reminiscent of the days of mutual intimidation, instead of negotiating despite disagreements and competing priorities, Russia has returned to a “war of words” with the West. The United States seems to have returned the gesture in kind.

3. Military
This Russia/West fissure has not only occurred on political, public, and economic levels, but has also, and possibly more ominously occurred on military ones. After Russia’s refusal to submit Kosovo peacekeeping forces to NATO command, a convoy of 200 Bosnian-based Russian troops by-passed British and French NATO forces waiting on Kosovo’s Southern border to enter as part of a U.N.-sanctioned international peacekeeping force.\(^{136}\) After their unauthorized arrival at the Pristina Airport, the Russians blocked British reinforcements as Clinton and Yeltsin attempted to rectify the unapproved unilateral action.\(^{137}\) Certain that they rated the deployment of their peacekeeping troops in an exclusive section of Kosovo, Russia refused to budge until concessions were made. In stark contrast with the successful integration of 1,200 Russian


soldiers into a multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia,\textsuperscript{138} this tense and embarrassing standoff at the Pristina airport is yet another way through which Russia has recently shown the West that it does not appreciate its first-ever lack of status.

Exercise Zapad 99,\textsuperscript{139} a military training exercise involving Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Moscow, Volga, the North Caucasus, the Urals military districts, and the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, war gamed a nuclear campaign against NATO forces, thereby clarifying the probable options that lie behind Russia’s new military and security doctrines. Additionally, to demonstrate the strength of its nuclear capability to an eastward-expanded NATO, Russia recently launched two intercontinental missiles (one from a base in northwest Russia and one from a submarine in the Barents Sea).\textsuperscript{140} In light of these facts, it seems that Russia has been recently trying to evince that to a proud and geographically immense nation accustomed to being one of only two superpowers, Western-imposed marginalization is a direct and dangerous affront.

\textsuperscript{138} Dalziel, Stephen, “World: Europe – Russia’s Pride at Stake in Kosovo.” Available [Online]:


\textsuperscript{140} “NATO Conducts First Crisis Management Exercise with Partners.” \textit{NATO Notes – Centre for European Security and Disarmament.} Available [Online]:

H. NECESSITY TO READMIT THE VANQUISHED POWER

Briefly following the Soviet Union’s demise, NATO took a cautious stance against expansion. On May 6, 1991, NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner stated that Central European democracies,

“...neither want to be neutral nor components of a buffer zone, and nor do we. ... NATO did not want a shift of balance or an extension of its military borders to the East; ... our security spills over and contributes to deterring the idea that use of force, directly or indirectly, might lead to results.141

Skepticism about expansion was actually quite significant; it spanned East and West, existed in both the political and the public realm, was shared by Republicans and Democrats alike, and was even stated to have caught State Department and Pentagon officials off guard during a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting in 1997. Though it is not feasible to cite all comments here, the following two examples should provide a good idea as to what main concerns were expressed at the time. Sen. John Warner (R), former U.S. Secretary of the Navy, compared the possibility of future NATO engagement in Central and Eastern Europe to the Somalia situation and wondered whether instability would be bred in the region by inviting only some and not all nations. Sen. Ted Kennedy (D) argued that “ten times as much effort has been spent on NATO enlargement

compared to what seems to be a much more deadly, clear and present danger” (the safety of nuclear weapons and material in Russia).\textsuperscript{142}

This bipartisan concern, in concert with Russian objections, should have lead to an in-depth, NATO-led study that could have answered these types of pertinent questions. Instead, the West pushed for the initiation of the expansion process irrespective of its probable consequences. Henceforth, to many Russians, NATO expansion against its wishes and without its input confirmed the West’s intent to create a post-Cold War security system void of Russia.

History strongly validates the fact that a defeated power must be readmitted into the security system as a regular member to participate in the balancing process, regardless of what type system is being created.\textsuperscript{143} France’s re-admittance after the Napoleonic Era and Germany’s after World War II demonstrate how a more dignified option like inclusion assists in recreating an effective security system with the defeated power kept in check. Conversely, Germany’s isolation from the world scene following World War I illustrates how grievous estrangement can be. Disregarding this historical precedence, the West has presently failed to carve a niche for Russia in the post-Cold War security system because of a familiar inability to part with the past. Admiral William Smith, U.S. Military Representative to NATO alleged in 1993 that neighboring Russia must be successfully readmitted for any security arrangement to be effective. “We must be careful to prevent a new division from taking hold...that separates Western and Central

\textsuperscript{142} Solomon, Gerald B.  \textit{The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997 – Blessings of Liberty}, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{143} Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander L.  \textit{Force and Statecraft}, p. 39.
Europe from the former Soviet Union. On this argument, what happens to Poland and Hungary, for example, is important to us; but what happens in Russia is crucial.”

It appears, unfortunately, that the logic applied for the admittance of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, should have first been used to integrate Russia. “Just as Washington proved the key to ensuring that security for all of Europe would best be served by a Germany within the integrative NATO community rather than adrift in an undefined gray zone, so too did U.S. leadership prove decisive in applying the same integrative logic to other nations.” Unfortunately, these “other nations” did not include Russia. Although the Alliance fully integrated the Federal Republic of Germany into the post-World War II security arena in 1955 and integrated Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the post-Cold War security arena in 1999, to date, the West has made only symbolic attempts to partially integrate Russia into today’s security system, let alone include it in its entirety. It is through NATO expansion that the West has effectively placed Russia adrift in this “undefined gray zone.” This result can in no way be deemed predetermined because emotions toward Germany following World War II were significantly more hostile than the present anti-Russian bias. Additionally, psychologically fragile and formidably nuclear, a flailing Russia is arguably much more dangerous than an unaffiliated Poland, Czech Republic, or Hungary.

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145 Ibid., p. 141.
I. RUSSIA'S GLOBAL RE-ORIENTATION

Putin's response to recent NATO initiatives can be described as a combination of obstinacy and necessity. In other words, Russia's urge for vindication through the forging of new, anti-Western strategic ties has been abetted by the nation's serious downward economic spiral.\(^{146}\) Recently, where the West has neglected to take Russia seriously, Russia has begun to look for other partners.\(^{147}\) Instead of promoting better relations between Eastern European nations,\(^{148}\) NATO expansion has played a major part in encouraging, and almost driving Russia toward non-Western, non-democratic nations for strategic, economic, and military partnerships. Furthermore, if the smaller members of the CIS continue to struggle with the consolidation of their democracies, they too may have no choice but to join these new Russian-led, anti-Western coalitions. The community's most noteworthy security institution has, in effect, created a post-Cold War environment that has encouraged and intensified Russia's historic tendency to deviate from the Western norm.

\(^{146}\) Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 122.


\(^{148}\) The Russian Federation must be considered an integral part of Eastern Europe for although a large part of its territory lays in Asia, another large part lies in Europe. Additionally, much of Russia is European being that it shares a similar culture, the Orthodox religion, the Cyrillic language, and a history with Europe. Additionally, with the dividing lines of the Cold War gone, Russia often acts as a catalyst in Europe. It is too big and too nuclear to be simplistically placed in Asia or "not in Europe."
Putin’s recent trips to China, North Korea, Iran, and India, like earlier meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Libya, highlight a continuation and expansion of former Prime Minister Primakov’s efforts to create a multi-polar international system as a counter-weight to U.S. primacy. Since most pro-Western, pro-democratic societies are either in NATO or aspiring to be so, this multi-polarity clearly favors provocative anti-democratic nations like Iran, to whom Russia is a major supplier of nuclear technology and materials, and antagonistic leaders like Saddam Hussein, to whom Moscow acts as an international partner. Though not completely new, this conduct, exacerbated by post-Cold War NATO policies, has evolved from being a single facet of Russian strategic policy to being its most defining aspect. In terms of intended political messages, Putin has recently made it very clear that Russia will not return to its past, Kozyrev-initiated, one-sided, Western-oriented policy. Expansion seems to be what necessitated the policy’s abandonment.

1. **The Sino/Russian Rapport**

To illustrate this point, significant steps that have already been taken to expand and solidify a new 21st century Russian/Chinese rapport aimed at countering U.S. domination will be discussed. In the military arena, Sino/Russian agreements with regard to the Chinese purchase and licensing of SU-27 fighters and the purchase of submarines,

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150 Andrei Kozyrev was a former, pro-Western Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

surface ships, missile systems, and surveillance systems have been initiated and in many cases concluded. Negotiations have also been conducted on: oil and natural gas delivery deals; the Russian construction of power plants in China; the delivery to China of an unknown number of Russian airborne early-warning radar systems (A-50E); the joint development of a satellite navigation system to rival U.S. GPS; the development of the Super-7 attack fighter; the fielding of an integrated land, sea, and air defense system; and the potential construction of a 1.8 billion-dollar pipeline from Siberia to China.152 Although the original basis for this relationship has been charged by critics as being a business proposal, the new Sino/Russian rapport is largely about Russian survival and is presently being used as political leverage with the West.

A simple awareness of these facts makes it evident that China is presently seen as one of Russia’s vital strategic partners. Beneficial for China’s defense aspirations and Russia’s economy, this military, political, and economic entente, in addition to a recent joint resolution signed by Putin and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin, help to maintain and protect a new anti-Western, “...global strategic balance and stability.”153 This new strategic partnership, for which NATO expansion bears partial responsibility; crosses political, economic, and military borders. Originally charged as having been a mere “mental exercise,” Russia’s new orientation stands in direct contradiction with the security environment’s present principle of democratic development, promises to act as


153 Ibid.
an extensive disruption to the full gambit of upcoming U.S. policies and initiatives, and could feasibly act as the catalyst for the construction of a sizeable anti-Western bloc situating NATO as the adversary.

J. STAGNATED AT PARTIAL APPEASEMENT

It was during Nixon’s presidency that the state of U.S./Soviet relations first moved from détente to rapprochement to partial appeasement. After the Soviet-induced chill of Prague in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and Warsaw in 1980 came a new warming of relations with Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika during which time the U.S./Soviet rapport was reinvigorated to a state of partial appeasement. Unfortunately, however, relations have remained stagnated throughout the first post-Cold War decade.

If partial appeasement was attainable in the 60’s with the roles of ideology, public opinion, and domestic constraints hampering efforts; then the fall of the Soviet Union, end of the Cold War, and unification of Germany should have been more than sufficient impetus to enable American leaders to move beyond a mere relaxation of tensions to a true alliance between Russia and the West. It seems, however, that the West stopped

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154 When appeasement is referred to in this study, unless otherwise noted, instead of referring to the common, negative inter-war years understanding of the term, it will refer to the classic definition of the word being: the methodical removal of the principal causes of the conflict, which can possibly lead to an alliance. Found in Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander L., Force and Statecraft, p. 157.

155 Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander L., Force and Statecraft, p. 156.

156 Ibid., p. 253.
short of aspiring to do so. In an effort to stabilize former satellite states, instead of attempting to remove the principal causes of conflict, NATO has reinvigorated old points of contention without heeding the destabilizing effects that Russia's previously promised reactions would have on the arena as a whole.

1. **Russia's Desire for a European Security System**
   It is also essential to note here that the Soviet Union/Russia's desire for a European security system is not new. The Soviet Union repeatedly made requests for a conference on security and cooperation in Europe during the Cold War and those requests gained legitimacy as time went on. Russians today have also ardently attempted to influence the creation of this same type of security arrangement through their post-Cold War requests to utilize the OSCE or the UN - organizations that could conceivably include Russia - as the basis of today's security system.

   Even while contesting NATO expansion, Russia sought to minimize damage in 1996 by asking for recognition of its desired "equal partner" status.\(^\text{157}\) Again, the West, with the United States in the lead has shut down all such attempts. Yet as the leader of the democratic free world, the United States cannot continue to let skepticism thwart legitimate attempts at making a universal change for the better even if there is not yet a clear definition of exactly what this change should entail. In sum, if the real objective of the first round of NATO expansion was truly to create a more peaceful and secure international arena in its entirety, then a case can be made that the initiative has failed.

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2. **Ad Hoc U.S. Policy**

Instead of making a concerted effort to build an alliance, it appears that Western leaders have been afflicted by a moralist mentality, one often more concerned with symbolic aspects of foreign policy than actual substance, and frequently less concerned with influencing policy than with registering virtuous attitudes.\(^{158}\) Additionally, instead of carefully basing a strategy on the complexity and dangers involved, and discretely controlling and timing diplomatic moves to solidify support and neutralize opposition,\(^{159}\) the West pursued an an-hoc policy, rushing into expansion and paying little heed to garnishing support or combating opposition. The Nixon and Gorbachev administrations found ways to adapt to accelerated change, thereby preserving and ameliorating the efficacy of their respective security environments. Conversely, the post-Cold War-West not only failed to properly adapt, but has also endangered its ability to maintain Russia, and consequently itself and NATO.

3. **Dialogue des Sourdes**\(^{160}\)

In all actuality, NATO expansion has recreated a defining vicious cycle of action and reaction to significant conflicts of interest that is driven by mutual distrust and misperception.\(^{161}\) The situation can be characterized as being similar to a dialogue des sourdes,\(^{162}\) with Russia misinterpreting Western actions and the West turning a deaf ear

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\(^{158}\) Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander L. *Force and Statecraft*, p. 278.

\(^{159}\) Ibid., p. 254.

\(^{160}\) Translated from French to mean a conversation between deaf people.

\(^{161}\) Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander L. *Force and Statecraft*, p. 103

to Russia's concerns. As it has held true numerous times in recent history, if there is to be any chance of easing present tensions, the West must begin to consult with Russia. Richard Nixon\textsuperscript{163} effectively described a historical example of this recurring condition during hearings before the U.S. Senate in 1966 when he stated, "Actions have been taken by the United States which vitally affected the security of our European partners, without even the courtesy of prior consultation.... It's time we began paying Europe more attention. And if our ideals of Atlantic interdependence are to mean anything in practice, it's time we began lecturing our European partners less and listening to them more."\textsuperscript{164} Just as this recommendation held true for Europe in the 1960's, it holds true for Russia today.

A prime example of this abeyance can already be seen in the short history of the 1997 NATO/Russia Founding Act\textsuperscript{165} that signaled an upswing as Russia appeared to have been attempting to put the first round of expansion behind. Soon after the document's signing, Yeltsin announced a nuclear de-targeting policy; signed a strategic agreement with Ukraine; signed a peace accord and oil pipeline pact with Chechnya; and

\textsuperscript{163} Richard Nixon was Vice President from 1952-1960, presidential candidate in 1960, elected president in 1968, and reelected in 1972.


\textsuperscript{165} The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was agreed on May 14, 1997 and approved on May 16, 1997. One of its most significant declarations was that, "Russia and NATO do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation."
began a new dialogue with Japan.\textsuperscript{166} Though the nation’s security policy at the time remained ambiguous, its orientation was notably pro-democratic and pro-Western.

Follow-on NATO actions, however, have let Russia know that even though it now has the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) through which it is supposed to have its voice heard, it is still ignored.\textsuperscript{167} A commonly cited suggestion from the Russian side as to how to avert conflict was described by Primakov in 1996 when he stated that a NATO/Russia treaty could not be reduced to a mere declaration but should contain true guarantees to allay Russian security concerns.\textsuperscript{168} Even though Russian sentiments about the nature and legitimacy of the Act were at first mixed, time has proven that it resembles more of a mere declaration than a substantive policy. It seems, therefore, that expansion has not only retarded the growth of the security system short of a Russia/West alliance, but it and subsequent NATO actions have also begun to unravel the few improvements that have been made.

K. THE ULTIMATE TEST OF RUSSIAN/WEST RELATIONS

Many experts - Easterners and Westerners alike – would agree that, “The prospect of previous and future NATO expansion has become the most significant and potentially volatile issue of Russia’s present-day foreign policy,” and that, “It should also be

\textsuperscript{166} Powaski, Ronald, E, “Joining the March of Folly,” p. 4.

\textsuperscript{167} Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{168} Solomon, Gerald B. \textit{The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997 – Blessings of Liberty}, p. 97.
regarded as the ultimate test of Russia's relationship with the West." The inherent danger in this, however, is not of the literal creation of another Cold War as Russia is in no state to reengage in this manner because of its: economic weakness, dependence on Western financial sources and investments, necessary integration into the world economy, desire to be an integral part of international decision making, and military insolvency. The initiative can, however, continue to create an antagonistic strategic atmosphere with far-reaching, long-term consequences for the West's relationship with Russia.

Pushkov predicted in 1995 that expansion would have the following seven ominous effects on the security system. First is the intensification of the schism between Russian civilization and that of the West. Reflecting an exclusive consolidation of Western civilization, he asserted that expansion would necessitate that Russia, left outside the alliance, would have to assert itself as a force starkly different from the West. Second, the initiative would cause Russia to reorient inward. Third, he stated that since Russia is sure to consider itself cut off from Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, it will have little choice but to strengthen its historical sphere of influence in its near abroad. Fourth and fifth, regardless of regional benefits, expansion would harm European security as a whole and jeopardize previously agreed to post-Cold War security

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169 Pushkov, Aleksei, K., "A View from Russia." Available in Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement – Opinions and Options, p. 123

170 Ibid., p. 136.

171 The near abroad refers to the non-Russian countries of the former Soviet Union.
arrangements. Sixth and seventh, he concluded that expansion would influence Russia’s internal balance of forces in favor of anti-Western factions; and promote military officials who favor a strong military to high positions within the government and military.\textsuperscript{172} To date, all seven “predictions” have at least begun to materialize if they have not already been crystallized. Unfortunately, it seems that their destabilizing effects have not yet come to full fruition.

At a minimum, a new “dividing line of mistrust”\textsuperscript{173} has already been drafted. Instead of allying NATO, Eastern Europe, and Russia into a new alliance aimed at deterring post-Cold War regional threats and promoting the principles of democracy and capitalism across historical borders, expansion has begun to once again poise Russia against the West. Regardless of intentions, NATO has isolated Russia and left it with no choice other than to reorient and counteract the continued isolation that lies ahead.

1. How Expansion “Missed the Point”
Overwhelming evidence exists supporting the claim that NATO expansion has missed the point. Many critics state that arguments for enlargement were often mechanical and somehow missing the meaning of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{174} Other than the promotion of democratic principles and a market economy in Eastern Europe, stated objectives do not coincide with real outcomes. Western shortsightedness and the stereotypical identification of Russia as the enemy, in concert with Russia’s defensive

\textsuperscript{172} Pushkov, Aleksei, K., “A View from Russia,” Available in Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement – Opinions and Options, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 138.

\textsuperscript{174} Kaplan, Lawrence S. The Long Entanglement-NATO’s First Fifty Years, p. 213.
and paranoid outlook and influx of corruption have assisted in the Western misidentification of how the post-Cold War security arena should have been constructed.

Presently, the state of Russia/West relations is undeniably worse than it was in 1991, or 1989 for that matter. To have avoided this result, a refined definition of the purpose, mission, and identity of NATO should have accompanied the process of expansion. If the alliance is to ever truly be "... an instrument of democracy, a defender of political and spiritual values... not a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but a guarantor of Euro-American civilization and thus a pillar of global security..." then further expansion must be postponed while the alliance, its members, its neighbors, its hopeful inductees, and its challenges like Russia take the time to redefine and reorient.

2. Failed Reorientation
Starting in 1990, the USSR legitimately sought entry into the democratic, capitalist world and looked to the West for accession, appearing to be prepared to be a part of a U.N. Security Council consensus. The West, disappointingly, was not ready to take the lead with apprehensive Eastern European nations. It was easier to seek the military "appeasement" of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary than to begin to create a veritably unified, Eurasian security system and international community. Consequently, NATO's new mission and enlargement's voiced intentions have proven to

175 Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The Long Entanglement-NATO's First Fifty Years*, p. 213.

176 Ibid, p. 87.

177 In this reference, appeasement refers to the negative sense of the word given during the inter-war years.
be hollow rhetoric as NATO, true to its long and proud history, has retained its purpose as a military alliance poised to counter a freshly nebulous threat from the East.

To the Soviet Union and Russia alike, NATO has always represented a “stronghold of militaristic circles in the West.” Russian leadership therefore figured it would be natural for NATO to dissolve with the Warsaw Pact as new security systems were built. This enduring national bias necessitates that Russia will orient itself against NATO as long as the organization is perceived to be a military bloc - in essence, as long as NATO’s mission, purpose, and orientation remain unchanged. “Until such time when NATO is no longer a military bloc, the further expansion of the alliance to the East, ...is incompatible with the Founding Act...between the RF and NATO.”

3. **Moving Past Article Five as the Defining Component**

The current situation is not unlike the one that was present during NATO’s formation in 1948 when the Alliance had to include additional members in order to become a vehicle of an Atlantic community centering on economic and cultural rather than military concerns. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s present dilemma, similarly, is to find the measure through which it can mature past its role as a defense organization oriented against historical threat perceptions. Russia irreversibly views cooperation coupled with expansion as a stark contradiction. The paradox, effectively explained by Senator Sam Nunn in 1995 is as follows, “Are we really going to be able to convince the East Europeans that we are protecting them from their historical threats,

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179 Black, J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*, p. 213.

180 Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The Long Entanglement-NATO’s First Fifty Years*, p. 2.
while we convince the Russians that NATO’s enlargement has nothing to do with Russia as a potential military power?\textsuperscript{181}

Secretary of State Madeline Albright illuminated the paradoxical nature of expansion from another angle during a 1997 Senate Armed Services Committee meeting when she virtually promised U.S. intervention in Eastern Europe without Alliance inclusion. “If there were a major threat to the peace and security of this region, there is a high likelihood that we would decide to act, whether NATO enlarges or not. The point of NATO enlargement is to deter such a threat from ever arising.”\textsuperscript{182} If this statement holds true and desiring countries are promised a NATO security guarantee while they augment their developing democracies, market economies, and military capabilities through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), then why risk the inherent destabilization expansion will ignite with neighboring Russia?

\textbf{4. Scorecard}

Aside from the noteworthy advantages NATO’s new members have been afforded since inclusion, only three of the seven officially stated objectives of enlargement have been met. A strong case can be made that the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary has undoubtedly fostered democratic reform and stability, a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and investment, and a more coherent Europe as a partner for the United States\textsuperscript{183} with regard to the three nations involved. These benefits, however, are exclusive, as they have not yet been afforded to countries in

\textsuperscript{181} Solomon, Gerald B. \textit{The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997 – Blessings of Liberty}, p. 81

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 123.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., p. 162.
the immediate vicinities of the new members let alone the remainder of the security arena as a whole.

The remaining four objectives have not only been neglected, but their antitheses have also been created. Instead of building stronger collective defense and the ability to address new security challenges, better burden sharing and contributions to Alliance missions, improved relations among Central and Eastern European states, and the avoidance of a destabilizing gray zone in Central and Eastern Europe,\textsuperscript{184} NATO expansion has antagonized Russia to the point of not eliminating, but simply moving a Cold War reminiscent dividing line and its inherent stability eastward.

Many critics argue the existence of numerous additional objectives, the most prominent of which revolves around inclusion. In Europe, it is about being either “in” or “out.” If a nation is “out,” then domestic difficulties are sure to ensue. This phenomenon, unfortunately, has been demonstrated through the recent history of many Central and Eastern European nations. These fledgling democracies are presently suffering a swift political turn to the right, a sharp rise in the influence and power of communism/socialism, and a virtual social crisis of middle class descent into the lower strata and consequent exponential increase in divisions of wealth.

A result of this apparent inevitability, almost all gray-zone nations fervently desire to belong to “Club NATO” for different and unique combinations of the following reasons: inclusion, Article Two guarantees of shared community and values, a leveraging measure for European Union (EU) accession, and Article Five collective

\textsuperscript{184} Solomon, Gerald B. \textit{The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997 – Blessings of Liberty}, p. 162.
defense guarantees. Though Eastern European nations’ desire for access and preservation of long-term interests is not refutable, it runs strongly contrary to Russian desires.

Moscow, recently dethroned from being the capital city of one of two world superpowers, also almost desperately seeks inclusion into Europe. Yet with NATO surviving the Warsaw Pact as the security institution for the future, Russia’s hopes have diminished. Expansion exacerbates this situation on two related levels. First, the more NATO expands, the more formidable adversary it becomes to Russia. Second, the diminishment of the gray-zone necessitates that Russia deal directly with its fully “encroached” NATO adversaries. In essence, not only does Russia remain excluded, but it has also lost its traditional buffer zone from the West.

Consequently, Russia is socially, economically, politically, militarily, and strategically further from the West today than it was during the Soviet Union’s last days. The paramount question one must ask, then, is verbalized by Senator Kempthorne (R) when he questions, “...whether NATO, as a military alliance, was the right vehicle to foster democracy, and whether enlargement would create, a situation where we would have to defend these new members, because we have inadvertently caused this sense of isolation with the very country...that still has the capability of destroying the United States of America.”

Overwhelming evidence seems to suggest that NATO expansion has, in effect, severely missed the mark and played a major role in rapidly reverting the puerile post-Cold War security system toward this volatile state of affairs. There is no ideal formula of what actions should have been taken in lieu of expansion to meet all seven stated objectives and result in a truly secure, peaceful post-Cold War international arena. It is
clear, however, that it is past time to begin the search for an alternate route. Bipartisan, international, military, and political commentary has suggested myriad options since the initiative was first considered. These recommendations must now be intricately examined in concert with both recent successes and failures in an effort to find a means through which objectives can be met while the further destabilization of the security arena is curtailed.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{185} The concluding chapter of this study will address alternative suggestions for the future.
IV. THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN

The international security arena has remained in a perpetual state of flux since the latter part of the 20th century as nations have been chaotically attempting to redefine and realign themselves within a new world order. Russia has begun to pass from a state of rapprochement with and emulation of, to a state of disaccord with and emancipation from the West. This transition, because of the inherent volatility of its results, must be analyzed in depth and if possible, reversed. It cannot however, be looked at as one mutually exclusive event since it has involved a continual process that began in 1991. This chapter will argue that the Kosovo bombing, to date has had the most catastrophic effect on the security arena because of its arrival as the catalyst in an environment, which had been previously destabilized by the failure of economic reforms and the expansion of the Alliance. The interdependent causes and effects of this decade’s reinvigorated distrust of and schism between East and West lay within the Russian psyche. Russia’s inability to reorient towards the West in the face of nationally perceived U.S./NATO antagonization has given rise to the “new Russian youth” and their anti-Western inclinations.

This analysis will begin with a brief illumination of how Russian fears of the West have changed from being psychological to being physical. The next four sections will analyze the main psychological effects that the Kosovo campaign has had on Russian-U.S. relations. The first of these sections will entail an in-depth analysis of the myriad aspects of Russia’s quest for a place in the new security arena. The next section will briefly discuss the rise of American hegemony. The following section will describe
how Russia’s fear of NATO has become one of an offensive military nature. The last of
the four “psychological” sections will discuss Russia’s alarm at losing the ability to effect
and police its historic sphere of influence. The following section will discuss how these
fears have transformed into a form of strategic destabilization with regard to Russia’s
new security concept and military doctrine, anti-Western alliances, and “new Russian
mindset.” The next section will detail Russia’s inutile attempts at joining the
international/European security arena in the midst of the above-mentioned events. Finally, with conclusions and recommendations, this study will attempt to propose viable
ways through which the United States can reverse previously caused damage and reopen
peaceful dialogue and cooperation with Russia in an effort to curb the nation’s growing
anti-Western orientation. The entire study will be conducted with the goal of determining
why Russia now feels alienated.

A. FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL TO A PHYSICAL FEAR OF THE WEST

For Russians, the Kosovo campaign turned many defining, psychological fears
into realities. Cold War-learned, stereotypical paranoia, mistrust, and hatred of the West,
that had begun to dissipate with bilateral cooperation, was revived in both the nation’s
social and political structures with immediate post-Cold War Western initiatives such as
economic reform programs and NATO expansion, and crystallized by the Kosovo
campaign. These newly forged fears included: a) Russia losing its place in the post-Cold
War security arena, b) the United States creating a unipolar world in which it reigns as
hegemon, c) Russia losing the ability to police its historical sphere of influence, and d)
NATO, seen as a defensive Western alliance, expanding east to soon include the Balkans, and certain nations within the Commonwealth of Independent States\textsuperscript{186} - Russia’s historic sphere of influence.

Although many attest that these fears can simply be disregarded as mere paranoia reminiscent of the last century’s defining security arrangement, it was concerns similar to these that created both the debut and finale of the Cold War. Additionally, these same grievances today have begun to recreate a divided security arena that resembles more and more that of the past. Of the many concepts that have been used to describe the nature and promise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, one in particular - “to balance a resurgent Russian in a post-Cold War-world,”\textsuperscript{187} helped to transform this type of Russian resurgence from an unfounded fear to a “historically based” reality. Tragically, it is paranoid, stereotypical Cold War perceptions like these that make policy.

1. Political Opinion

One of the most alarming aspects of these fears is that they have virtually united all Russian politicians, from liberals to communists, in opposition to NATO.\textsuperscript{188} All of Russia’s divergent political groups rallied together to denounce NATO’s poised posture to strike Serbia. The Russian Parliamentary Duma adopted a resolution declaring the use of force in Yugoslavia illegal unless sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council.

\textsuperscript{186} Though none of the nine aspirant nations are members of the CIS, Russia fears that future expansion is bound to include these nations.


Furthermore, the resolution stated that the Duma was ready to revise all existing agreements with the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{189} It is worth noting that the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, even in its declaratory phase, was powerful enough to bridge the gap of Russian political dissimilitude.

2. \textbf{Public Opinion}

It was no longer just the outspoken political elite, but also the "slumbering Russian public"\textsuperscript{190} who rallied against the Kosovo campaign. Public opinion surveys showed that 90\% of the "people in the street" believed that NATO had no right to bomb Yugoslavia, 48\% blamed NATO and Washington entirely for creating the crisis in Yugoslavia, and 70\% interpreted NATO’s military action in Yugoslavia as a direct threat to Russia.\textsuperscript{191} Within weeks, additional public surveys showed anti-American sentiment doubling from 23\% to 49\% and the favorable rating of the United States declining from 67\% to 39\%.\textsuperscript{192} For one of the first times since the nation’s rebirth, Russian citizens had come together freely against a perceived foe – NATO and the United States. This social fortitude, difficult to forcibly attain even under communism, caught the Western world completely off guard. As NATO research fellow, professor, and author J.L. Black states

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{189} Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p. 111.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.

\end{footnotesize}
in his work entitled *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*:

...No one doubted that NATO expansion would have a powerful impact on the Russian political arena and on Moscow’s political elite. In short, NATO’s decisions about enlargement and “out of zone” policing activities were made in full knowledge that the Russian government would be unpersuaded and angered. The degree to which anti-NATO and anti-American feelings would well up in Russia’s public domain, however, was unexpected at both the government and pundit level in NATO countries. ... Furthermore, it is ironic that the old Soviet image of a rapacious West has resurfaced on Russian streets, and this time the sentiment is more spontaneous than orchestrated.\textsuperscript{193}

B. **RUSSIA’S QUEST FOR A POSITION IN THE SECURITY ARENA**

One of the main reasons behind Russia’s current dissatisfaction is the nation’s inability to accept its new role in the security environment. Russia seeks respect, as it believes it played an instrumental role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and furthermore, should not have to bear the guilt for all of the Union’s atrocities. Most Russians, by now, begrudgingly accept that they no longer rate superpower status, but they continue to desire consideration as one of many great states in a multi-polar world. Alliance countries have not had the same read on the situation; they simply haven’t felt they needed to worry much about brushing aside Russian concerns.\textsuperscript{194} In the past, conversely, it seemed as though the airing of Russian views was at least tolerated. Even in 1990, as the Soviet Union was fast in its downfall, Western allies made sure Russia

\textsuperscript{193} Black, J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion*, p. 242.

was kept informed in the final days leading up to the Gulf War. Yet with regard to Yugoslavia, "...not even lip service was paid to such niceties. ... As far as the West was concerned, there was no reason to consult Russia before taking action."  Since its rebirth in 1991, Russia has found itself fighting for respect.

Before continuing, it is essential to note the importance of Russia’s position in the post-Cold War security arena. Simply put, without Russia, a new security architecture in Europe would not be complete. Spanning 10 time zones, Russia is a catalyst; what happens in Russia affects the entire region. According to Dr. Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO in a recent speech to the Oxford University Union Society, "... how Russia settles herself in this new Europe is perhaps the single most important issue of European security today. That is why our major Western institutions must seek to constructively engage this country."  

1. The Security Arena of Russia’s Choice
Russia has maintained an avid desire for inclusion in the new international environment, namely in Europe. From a cursory point of view, Russia’s logical choice would be NATO, the world’s most effective security institution. Yet because of NATO’s historic raison d’être - collective defense against coercion and aggression posed by the

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195 Dalziel, Stephen, "World: Europe - Russia’s Pride at Stake in Kosovo,” p. 2.

Soviet Union - and the United States’ role as archenemy and now aspiring hegemon, Russia cannot accept its ranking as being either under the alliance, or subservient to the United States.

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs’ Russia 2010 Report stated that Russia proposes a Europe without dividing lines, which will require a buffer zone of militarily non-aligned countries between the nation itself and NATO. The defining idea behind this security arrangement is an equal partnership between great powers and supportive geopolitical solutions.\textsuperscript{197} Col. Yurii V. Morozov and LtGen. Valerii K. Potemkin, of Moscow’s Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the RF Armed Forces General Staff, proposed similarly that there should be a convergence of military doctrines within the framework of the OSCE as a “subset of the United Nations.” The OSCE would need to be restructured and given a Security Council that would enable it to function efficiently. Russia’s role as the bridge between East and West would therefore be secured.\textsuperscript{198} Many attest that the OSCE, the only truly pan-European body that has remained untainted by the Cold War, is the natural choice to lead the way in promoting stability and peace in Europe....\textsuperscript{199} According to Gen. Kvashnin, an all-European system based on the OSCE framework would assure Moscow both an exclusive zone of

\textsuperscript{197} Blank, Stephen J. \textit{Threats to Russian Security: The View from Moscow}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{198} Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 159.

influence in the CIS and equal status with NATO and the United States.\textsuperscript{200} Though obviously unattainable in their entirety because of the desired equivalency with the United States, the most significant characteristic of these proposals is the fact that they concentrate on a Russian-European alliance, attentive to Russia’s significance and absent the hegemonic role of the United States.

2. Resurgence of Dividing Lines
Unfortunately, partially attributable to an instinctive dependence upon the simplistic identifications of the past, the quest for a new security arena has resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy of Russian strategic alienation. With Cold War-attitudes still prevalent in positions of power in both the United States and Russia, a psychological shift could only have been expected as either the result of an alteration of initiatives and realities, or a change of generation. Neither one of these options was given sufficient time to develop. A simplified, black and white threat was preferred to shades of gray in both the 1950’s and 1990’s, and the Soviet Union/Russia was again automatically designated as the “archenemy.”\textsuperscript{201} Though unfortunate, this choice is logical due to the fact that all for more than 50 years, psychological, physical, and fiscal energies were expended upon figuring out how each nation could impose mutual destruction on the other; cooperative engagement was not an area of concern. Consequently, Cold-War-characteristic dividing lines began to re-emerge again in Europe.

\textsuperscript{200} Blank, Stephen J. \textit{Threats to Russian Security: A View from Moscow}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{201} Thomas, Ian. \textit{The Promise of Alliance}, p. 20.
As described by Nadia Arbatova:

Since nobody knew where Europe ended, the post-communist space was divided between two security institutions: the OSCE became responsible for the post-Soviet space, and NATO for the rest of post-communist Europe. It was the first psychological division of Europe after the end of bipolarity, which afterwards resulted in its practical division. 202

3. The Forgotten Player
Many believed, because of the uncertainty caused by the end of the Cold War and the difficulties experienced in Bosnia, that NATO’s credibility was inextricably tied to the results of the Kosovo conflict. As stated by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in the early 1990’s:

...the choice for the Alliance was between “out of area” or “out of business.” NATO’s raison d’être was eroding because of the end of the Cold War. As the risk of a large-scale threat had disappeared, there was no longer a need for an alliance focusing only on collective defense. NATO had to transform. If not, it could die.203

Henry Kissinger summed up the centrality of this fear when he stated that; “...NATO could not be allowed to fail. If it did, the entire strategic architecture, linking American and European interests since World War II, would be in ruins.”204

This quest for the organization’s future in the “here and now” consequently took complete precedence over the recreation of Russia’s position in the post-Cold War

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202 Arbatova, Nadia, “Russia and NATO: A Russian View.” Available in de Wijk, Rob. NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, p. 49.


204 Ignatieff, Michael. Virtual War, p. 64.

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security arena. The fact that NATO’s future was secured by the Alliance’s actions in Kosovo, which were taken in direct and open disregard of Russian condemnation, sent a clear message to the East that the West did not see the new Russia as having a future role in the organization, let alone the overall environment.

Simply put, the post-Cold War role of the most powerful security organization in the world was secured without a U.N. Resolution, in the face of denunciation from two Security Council members, and completely void of Russian influence or inclusion. To “humiliated Russians,” 205 this growth of both NATO’s size and sphere is a logical continuation of the contest between East and West. The historical fright that the United States and Western Europe will stand as one and check Russian influence at the door has been abruptly awakened. The mere fact that NATO excludes Russia means to Russians that NATO ignores their security interests.206 Add the Kosovo bombing to this anxiety; and Russians have begun to feel an acute solitude in a hostile world.207

4. The End of Russia’s “Say”

Before the Kosovo campaign, though Russia did not have a concrete position in the security alignment, it seemed to have a voice in both its seat on the U.N. Security Council and involvement in the realization of the Founding Act and PJC.

205 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 239.


According to Dr. Alexei Arbatov:

... The framework of International Security that had begun to emerge with the end of Cold War hostilities: "... was based on an enhanced role for the UN and the OSCE. It assumed strict conformity with the U.N. Charter; compliance with international law; respect for existing agreements between Russia and the West (especially the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997), and a partnership between Russia and NATO, to include joint conflict-management and peacekeeping operations, as well as comprehensive arms control and disarmament regimes."208

Russia’s views about its involvement in the U.N. Security Council are easily explained. Russia’s veto, a remnant of pre-Cold War “big five” relations, was the only internationally accepted thread that linked the nation to world decision-makers. Kosovo made that veto completely abortive; Russia had lost its only say and consequently been rendered silent with regard to international affairs.

Discussions about the possible benefits that the Founding Act could bring ranged from those who saw it as a major accomplishment to those who saw it as empty rhetoric. According to its founders, the initiative was to commit at the highest political level to build a fundamentally new relationship between Russia and NATO. “They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency, a strong, stable, and enduring partnership....”209 The PJC, an integral part of the Founding Act, was


209 Ibid., p. 29.
created to be, "...the principal venue of consultation between Russia and NATO in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability."\(^{210}\)

To many Russians, this was an incredible breakthrough. Inclusion in NATO was not anticipated, nor generally desired. The Founding Act appeared to provide a sufficient compromise. Russia would now take part in essential European decision-making and have full membership in the G-8, the Paris Club and the World Trade Organization. It was almost as if Russia had regained its place in the world — powerful and unique. According to Sergei Rogov, the Founding Act necessitated that: a) Russia's interests be considered at least "to a minimum extent," b) force would not be used when Russia and NATO differed, c) the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe was almost guaranteed, and d) Russia had a voice in European security issues through the PJC.\(^{211}\)

Dialogue from a meeting between Robin Cook, Hubert Vedrine, Klaus Kinkel, the outgoing German foreign minister, Albright, Holbrook, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, various OSCE representatives, EU chairmen, ministers, and aides, best illustrates that the first, second, and last of Rogov's hopes were destroyed with Kosovo. The group


\(^{211}\) Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 53.
was arguing about the question of force and the necessity of a Security Council mandate.

Ivanov said, ‘If you take it to the UN, we’ll veto it. If you don’t we’ll just denounce you.’ Kinkel says he wants to take it to the Security Council, as do the British and the French. Madeleine and I say, ‘Let’s have another stab at it.’ But Ivanov says: ‘I just told you Klaus, we’ll veto it … ’ He says: ‘If you don’t we’ll just make a lot of noise … ’ It was all foreshadowed. The Russians can’t do anything. NATO is the power … 212

The Kosovo campaign therefore demonstrated that the Founding Act was meant to pacify the Russians, not engage them. Additionally, once the bombing began, the rhetoric that had surrounded the Founding Act had lost its opaqueness; its transparency seemed boundless. As described by Black, “Crises in Yugoslavia therefore tested the degree to which the Founding Act would provide Russia with a role in NATO decision-making, and found it coming up very short.” 213 The Security Council had allowed Russia to retain its stature as a player in world affairs. Yet with the devaluation of its veto, Russia was left powerless. The Founding Act has failed to provide the struggling nation with a substitute as NATO and the PJC have proven themselves to be organizations within which Russian opinion counted for little. 214 It is not only the majority of Russian politicians and government officials, but also Western experts who have come to identify the hollow nature of the Founding Act and PJC. Former U.S.


213 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 149

Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, admitted recently,

the symbolism of the Founding Act – Russia's acquiescence in NATO's involvement in Central Europe in exchange for some Russian role in discussing security issues at NATO – was more important than the substance; so too was the role of the PJC, at least so far in its history.\textsuperscript{215}

5. Neorealism

These results are not out of the ordinary in the politics of the past decade. During the Cold War, the balance of power was unquestionably in effect. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Russia's desire to retain influence in the international arena, a system of collective security was desired. For Russia, the acceptance of a position as "merely" one of many great states was a matter of pride and as it was, a difficult reality to come to terms with. The United States, however, as the only remaining superpower, had a different view of how things were to be. Since balance is unattainable when there is no power strong enough to counter one nation's hegemony; neorealism took to the scene. As Martha Finnemore states in \textit{National Interests in International Society}, realism doubts the relevance and existence of international law. "What order and rules exist in international politics survive because they are in the interest of strong states and are established and enforced by the strong."\textsuperscript{216} To the exacerbation of Russia's dismay, these "other strong states" had the tendency to kowtow to the interests of the United States; NATO had consequently become a mere tool of the West. An insightful

\textsuperscript{215} Nazarkin, Yuri, "European Security in the Context of Russia's Geoploitical Situation," p. 10.

description of this phenomenon can be found in Mikhail Gorbachev’s book *On My Country and the World* when he states:

... This war provides evidence that the United States, which plays a commanding role in NATO, is willing not only to disregard the norms of international law but also to impose on the world its own agenda in international relations and, in fact, to be guided in world relations solely by its own “national interests,” taking the United Nations into account only if U.N. decisions and actions serve U.S. interests.217

C.  THE DAWN OF U.S. HEGEMONY

The Russian psyche has little room for American hegemony. After the parity attained throughout the Cold War-years, subordination to the United States is presently and will most likely continue to be deemed unacceptable. The national belief that Russia greatly assisted the decline of the Soviet Union and should have consequently played a significant role in the creation of the new strategic environment, significantly intensified the affront U.S. supremacy immediately became to Russia. As explained by Ian Thomas in *The Promise of Alliance*, “NATO did not resolve the problems of the East-West geopolitical and ideological confrontation called the Cold War. ... NATO simply survived long enough for these problems to disappear.”218

Juxtaposed with Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts at promoting a type of “new thinking,” NATO’s survival doesn’t quite measure up. Russian views, therefore

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maintained that the nation should be given at least a cooperative parity with the United States. The United States, however, had quite a different reality in mind. "The U.S. position was that NATO could do what it liked."219 Russian political and popular opinion reacted fervently against such claims. As the Kosovo campaign brought the Russia/West rapport closer to the brink, Russian and Ukrainian communists started using the term "new world order" as a synonym for a Nazi-like attempt by the United States, via NATO to dominate the world.220 It was not only the communists, however who held these views. On the one-year anniversary of the debut of NATO’s bombardment against Yugoslavia, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov assessed the Kosovo campaign as follows:

This long-suffering region was just chosen as a kind of a test-site for trying the NATO-centrist concept of world order, where a group of states would misappropriate the right to dictate by force its will to the world community.221

Opinions such as these became more prevalent as the campaign waged on; as noted earlier, Russian public opinion wasn’t far behind.


220 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 67.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCRETE FEAR OF NATO

What was most alarming to Russia was the fact that these hegemonic tendencies didn’t stop at the rhetorical policy level. Russia’s fear of envelopment was real; from the onset, the nation saw NATO expansion as a direct threat against the motherland,222 after Kosovo, that threat acquired teeth. The Kosovo campaign acted as the turning point for Russia/West relations. Though Russians felt slighted from the onset of the first round of NATO expansion, no real danger was sensed until bombs began to drop on the sovereign nation of Serbia without prior U.N. Security Council approval. Boundless Cold-War rhetorical “warnings” had been transformed into legitimate threats of force. Expansion in itself was undesirable and destabilizing, armed expansion was untenable. History has proven time and time again that past grievances can easily be fueled with actual policies; Kosovo reinforced this prophecy.

A real sense of danger therefore immediately emerged after NATO began acting “out if zone” and outside the framework of international law and the U.N. Security Council.223 The foundation for this fear was twofold. First of all, as described by General Viktor Chechevatov, Commander of the Far East Military District, “The bombing of Yugoslavia could turn out in the very near future to be just a rehearsal for

223 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 238.
similar strikes on Russia." Second, NATO involvement in the Balkans suggested to Russians that the Alliance was preparing to continue its creep Eastward to include both the Balkans and former nations of the Warsaw Pact and CIS. These fears, though exaggerated by political rhetoric, remain prevalent in numerous spheres and reflect a significant aspect of Russia’s vision of itself and its future in world affairs.

1. **Perceived Intent of NATO’s Eastward Move**

   After the first round of NATO expansion, with the organization’s zone of influence having already significantly crept eastward, thereby reducing Russia’s warning time of an impending offensive, the idea of NATO in either the Balkans or the CIS, to Russians, seemed unpardonable. Furthermore, the combination of this new physical proximity, a result of the first round of expansion; the recently proven benefits of forward basing, logistical support, and over-flight rights granted by new-NATO and non-NATO, former Warsaw Pact states during the crises; and Russia’s failed attempts at power projection in Pristina, a result of logistical deficiencies and a denial of over-flight rights; made the idea of NATO’s further expansion almost debilitating. A central element of Russian perception is that NATO shelters desires of enlargement and unilateral out-of-area operations on the Balkans and the Caucasus, both considered to be vital to Russian national security interests.

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226 Ibid., p. 15.

227 Ibid., p. 5.
To Russians, NATO’s involvement in the Balkans was proof of that the organization’s intended to continue its eastward trek. Though seemingly unfounded to most Americans, such sentiment was reality to the majority of Russians. The notion of an “inviolable red line” was raised to near doctrinal standards as threats of NATO air strikes abounded. As explained by Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to reporters in Moscow:

There is a red line, which we regard as a cardinal change directly related to our security. This line goes along the border of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic States. If matters come to this, we will have to fully revise our political relations with the North Atlantic Alliance, which we do not want to do, because we favor the continuation of cooperation.\textsuperscript{228}

Black gives historical reinforcement to this paranoia when he asserts that the official reason for the founding of the Warsaw Pact was not the actual founding of NATO, which took place six years prior in 1949, but the Eastern movement of NATO to include West Germany in 1955. Supporting this assertion was a citation concerning a Soviet-sponsored Conference on European security conducted in Moscow in 1954 that involved a condemnation by the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania of the rearming of West Germany. The conference continued by threatening that new Soviet security measures would have to be taken if West Germany joined NATO;\textsuperscript{229} the Warsaw Pact was then established.

\textsuperscript{228} Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., p. 120.
Although the Cold War-imposed “détente” replaced such defensive paranoia with concern over the possibility of isolation from Europe and its inherent loss of power, the reasons behind the constitution of the Warsaw Pact cannot be forgotten. Though unrealistic to assign full culpability for the creation of the Pact to NATO’s West-German inclusion - this expansion can be seen as the stimulant. Background had already been laid by the events surrounding the genesis of NATO. The Kosovo situation provides an almost complete redundancy. With damage from the first round of expansion already inflicted, the Russian-rejected, U.N.-omitted decision to bomb Kosovo acted as an accelerant in the degradation of Russia/West relations. In short, Russians interpreted NATO actions in Kosovo as concrete threats to the nation’s strategic interests.

E. RUSSIA’S LOST INFLUENCE OVER ITS HISTORICAL SPHERE

Russia’s consternation over most aspects of NATO expansion and the Kosovo campaign revolve around a fear of further marginalization and a major shift in the balance of power. Russia desires to be dealt with as a great nation with status commensurate to other powerful European nations. Russians want to break free from its inherited ranking as the Soviet Union’s “fallen angel” and begin anew as a unique member of the European community. One example of this exceptionality is the significance Russia puts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Many of Russia’s strategic priorities are linked to these nations, as they seem to be inextricably tied to Russia’s sense of being. It is evident that reigning over this territory as was done by the Soviet Union is not possible, but Russia still desires an influential voice. Gorbachev
described this unique global identity, which attempts to combine world unity with intensified diversity as:

...a world of worlds, living side by side and interacting, with a mutual interest in preserving life-giving differences. Differences will become the meaning and purpose of human activity, if you will, a decisive factor in the survival of the species ...  

Russia's new near abroad seems to have become its “life-giving difference.” Since the USSR functioned as a single unit, strategic, social, cultural, military, and industrial infrastructures were designed to empower the whole of the Union through Moscow. The destruction of the Union’s interlocking system of states has therefore created seemingly insurmountable obstacles for Russia, the nations of the CIS, the near abroad, Europe, and the United States. “Russia had the longest standing as an influential player in all these regions, but now stood a good chance of losing its lead everywhere. Thus Russia is compelled to advance its interests unceasingly, wherever possible, in Eurasia.”  

1. **Russian Inability to Police Its Sphere of Influence**

In the midst of an arguably disastrous attempt at democratic transition, local wars, ethnic conflict, and organized crime surfaced in 1993 as Russia's greatest threats. Russian troops were currently involved in Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. As Russia weakened and the United States

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strengthened, the fear of a growing American presence in Russian spheres of influence intensified. With the additional perturbation caused by later actions in Kosovo, Russian hopes for concrete bilateral cooperation had been nearly destroyed. This holds true because with Kosovo, the United States had made it clear that it would do as it pleased. Russian suspicions about American aspirations for control over the oil rich Caspian Sea region (using the Gulf War as a parallel) further aggravated the situation. An article published in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, though not representative of the Russian population in its entirety, provides a thorough explanation of this commonly held Russian paranoia:

...it is not unlikely that NATO could use or even organize crises similar to that in Kosovo in other areas of the world to create an excuse for military intervention since the “policy of double standards” where the bloc’s interests dictate the thrust of policy (the possibility of the use of military force in Kosovo against the Yugoslav army and simultaneous disregard for the problem of the genocide faced by the Kurds in Turkey, the manifestation of “concern” at the use of military force in the Dniester Region, Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh) is typical of the Alliances actions.233

Another widely held fear resulted from this newly found American hegemony and its probable effects on what many Westerners view as nationally crafted human rights abuses in Chechnya. The Alliance’s closer proximity to Russia, in concert with its determination to use force against a sovereign nonmember state, remains threatening to Russia partly because of its controversial involvement in the second Chechen War. To

Russia, after Kosovo, the likelihood of NATO involvement in its near abroad and even in Russia proper seemed greater than ever before.²³⁴

2. Paradoxical Justification

Lessons learned from Kosovo through the observation of Western actions²³⁵ could justifiably be summed up as: a) a powerful nation will reserve the right to take any measures it deems necessary to protect what it determines poses a risk to security, and b) that the use of massive force, without legal backing, and causing large civilian casualties in an effort to reduce the risk to military members is acceptable. Looked at from an eastern point of view, the Kosovo campaign created a paradoxical situation for Russia. Although NATO actions in Kosovo forewarned Russia of its own susceptibility to bombing, NATO’s air campaign can also be interpreted as having validated Russia’s actions in Chechnya. Serbians can be viewed as terrorists, so can Chechens. This oxymoron played a decisive role in the Russian government. First, it rallied strong Russian public support for the Kremlin’s involvement in the second Chechen War. Second, NATO’s proclaimed right to attack a sovereign state to secure its own aims seemed to validate Russia’s use of force on its own territory for its own national interests.²³⁶

²³⁴ Blank, Stephen J. Threats to Russian Security: A View from Moscow, p. 3.

²³⁵ Though actions in Kosovo were clearly taken by NATO, because of Russia’s sentiments about U.S. hegemonic tendencies, Russia often views them as having been taken unilaterally by the United States.

F. FROM SENTIMENT TO STRATEGIC DESTABILIZATION

To understand the significance of the previously analyzed fears, it is essential to note the centrality of the Russian self-image in post-Cold War relations. The dissolution of the Soviet Union stripped from Russians their ideological reason for being. Communism’s ultimate demise left Russia with an immense void that spanned all aspects of existence, making the quest for a new national identity the nation’s primary concern. The Kosovo campaign’s physical manifestation of psychological threats soon overcame both the political and the public sphere, and rapidly transitioned from rhetoric to reality. The cause and effect of this destabilization was a growing schism between Russia and the West. This rift manifested itself in three main areas: a) Russia’s new security concept and military doctrine, b) the initiation of non-Western strategic alliances, and c) the new Russian mindset.

As discussed earlier, the re-appearance of an antagonistic Cold War orientation is transparent in both Russia’s new security concept and military doctrine. In opposition to those released previously, which named no specific threats and had a pro-Western disposition, the new documents are expressly anti-Western and nuclear dependent. After the Kosovo campaign, strategists began to reevaluate an attack from the West.237 Experts began to discuss scenarios and actively plan. In essence, Kosovo moved the policy of nuclear first-use from a rhetorical affirmation to a necessary, routinely executed training

237 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 156.
evolution. As proclaimed by Dr. Arbatov, "The initial hopes and plans of the early 90's are dead. Relations have been severely damaged in recent years. ... Russia views NATO as a threat to its own international peace and security." 238

The manner through which the international arena transitioned during the first decade of the post-Cold War period caused Russia to feel as if a new security arena was being built as it stood by stagnated. In response to recent NATO initiatives, "wherever the West won't take Russia seriously," Dr. Arbatov attested, "Russia will look for other partners." 239 Since most pro-Western nations are already members of NATO or aspire to be so, this quest for multi-polarity has tended to ally the nation with anti-Western rogue states.

Though one could easily dedicate an entire dissertation to the metamorphosis of Russia's overall external orientation, a pragmatic look at the situation illuminates that the substratum of the rhetoric is the key to the destabilization of today's security arena. An anti-Western, anti-NATO political and public outlook is the driving factor that necessitates implementation tools such as the strategic and military documents mentioned above. In essence, the history of Russia's reactions to NATO expansion and the Kosovo campaign shed light on the intuitive preferences that have and will continue to shape the

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238 Arbatov, Alexei, "The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine," p. 24. Though the excerpt lays the majority of the blame for the schism on the West, Dr. Arbatov does also assign Russia blame.

decision-making process in Russia. The greater danger is not that Russia’s inability to deal with its diminishing influence has necessitated a nuclear confrontation, rather that the new Russia has yet to devise a strategy and policy based on reality. This phenomenon seems prone to continue since Russia’s new generation has inherited a resurgence of an anti-Western, anti-democratic, anti-NATO character similar to that possessed during the Cold War.

G. RUSSIA’S FAILED ATTEMPTS AT WESTERN INTEGRATION

Before concluding it is essential to note the efforts made by Russia in the midst of the previously discussed tumultuous campaign. Kosovo showed the West, not unlike Bosnia, that Russia did desire to play the game, and gave the West the answer as to how. Russia was eager to join the international community as a strong, proud nation of Europe and was additionally willing to participate in peacekeeping operations as long as it was invited into Kosovo by Yugoslav authorities. Russia was not, however, willing or able to be subordinated to NATO mainly because of what the organization continued to represent to Russians and arguably, Americans alike. Russia preferred to operate unilaterally with the United States, which, as the leader of the democratic free world and the driving force behind NATO decision-making and execution, could have proven to be

240 Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion, p. 237.


a viable option. In addition to the fact that it is preferable for the security arena as a whole to have Russia aligned with the West rather than the south, it can also be argued that Russia played a decisive role in ending the Kosovo conflict.

Russia became a vital player in Balkan diplomacy as early as 1994 with the initiation of the Contact Group\textsuperscript{243} and continued to play a vital role throughout the conflict. Russia’s assistance in limiting the number of casualties and terminating the conflict was a byproduct of both the nation’s action and inaction. The air campaign could have turned out quite differently had the Russians given the Serbs their latest technology. As it was, the campaign ended up being a duel between 1970’s Soviet technology and state of the art American technology. Conversely, if the Russians would have armed Milosevic with 1980’s Soviet missile system technology (as Milosevic anticipated),\textsuperscript{244} the coalition might have lost a significant number of aircraft, personnel, and consequent public support.\textsuperscript{245} With growing agitation over NATO expansion and the bombing campaign, recommendations that Moscow ignore the arms embargo against Yugoslavia and begin shipping weapons to Belgrade were made openly.\textsuperscript{246} Russia, thankfully, chose differently. The effects of this decision should not be taken lightly. Zivadin Jovanovic,

\textsuperscript{243} The Contact Group was comprised of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. It provided a way to avoid the complexity of negotiating with all twelve EU members, ensured the United States stayed within the European consensus, and confirmed Russia’s standing as an international power. Available in Daalder, Ivo. \textit{Getting to Dayton.} Washington, D.C., (The Brookings Institution: 2000), p. 28.

\textsuperscript{244} Judah, Tim. \textit{Kosovo: War and Revenge,} p. 272.

\textsuperscript{245} Ignatieff, Michael. \textit{Virtual War,} p. 109.

\textsuperscript{246} Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion,} p. 102.
Serbian Foreign Minister asserted, "The failure of the Russians to back the Serbs to the end was, 'I admit, very relevant.'"\textsuperscript{247}

On the other hand, Russia's concrete assistance took both psychological and physical forms. First of all, by May of 1999, Chernomyrdin was telling Milosevic that he estimated NATO would escalate to a ground option if necessary and attested that Russia would not have been able to do anything to prevent this reality.\textsuperscript{248} More fundamental than the deliverance of this forewarning was the mere fact that Russia had decided to join NATO's efforts at coercive diplomacy to attain Milosevic's acceptance of the organization's core demands.

At the time, Russian diplomatic assistance was not merely deemed helpful; it was necessary and its results decisive. In 	extit{Kosovo: War and Revenge}, Tim Judah includes a dialogue that expressly sums up the situation. "...Talbott, 'was getting sick and tired.' So, he surmises, he appointed Chernomyrdin, telling him; 'I don't care what you have to do, just end it, it's ruining everything.'"\textsuperscript{249} Diplomatic efforts took a serious turn for the better after Chernomyrdin's appointment – which ultimately proved a major reason for Milosevic's decision to accept NATO demands.\textsuperscript{250} Though a small piece of a large plan at creating a united front against Milosevic, the significance of Russia's actions is paramount.

\textsuperscript{247} Judah, Tim. 	extit{Kosovo: War and Revenge}, p. 281.

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p. 205.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., p. 274.

Russian participation also opened the door to outcomes that could have had much greater effects than even the termination of the conflict. Russia’s conciliatory diplomacy occurred after a significant amount of damage had already been done to Russia/West relations because of how the campaign had been waged. This ability to move beyond recent grievances and seek a compromise alluded to the fact that a strategic partnership with Russia was still possible. Objectively, since the Alliance not only requested, but also critically needed Russia’s assistance after having disregarded the nation’s strategic concerns, it can be concluded that the responsibility now rests with the West to “concede” in an effort to revive Russia/West relations.

H. THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN AS THE CATALYST

The Kosovo campaign had significantly destabilizing effects on present-day Russian-U.S. relations. One must note however, that Kosovo alone cannot be given culpability for the degradation of the East-West rapport; it was merely the catalyst. The West had created an already volatile situation since Russia was forced to endure the near catastrophic failure of economic reforms and the affront of NATO expansion after having prostrated itself to the United States in hopes of immediate solutions. The Alliance’s decision to bomb - which was made in the face of severe Russian protests and without a U.N. Security Council Resolution - sent Russia/West relations in a free fall.

The Kosovo campaign invigorated the embers of four benchmark Russian fears: a) a loss of position, stature, and a U.N. veto in the post-Cold War security arena, b) a forcible submission to a globally proclaimed U.S. hegemon, c) the actual fear of an
armed NATO expanding further East, and d) the inability to police its historical zone of influence due to the risk of NATO deciding that it is in its interests to bomb a sovereign nation in Russia’s near abroad.

These fears have begun to be realized in three distinct strata. First of all, Russia’s new security concept and military doctrine name NATO, the West and the United States as threats to Russia. Additionally, these documents not only reiterate and intensify the acceptance of nuclear first-use, but have also initiated the veritable, active preparation for the employment of this strategy. Second, feeling alienated by the West, Russia has begun to look south to anti-democratic, anti-Western rogue states instead of West to nations with “shared principles” for viable allies. The most devastating immediate effect of developing such strategic and economic relationships is the massive amount of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation that is ongoing.\textsuperscript{251} In Russia’s present toppled economy, this type of “weapons industry” remains one of few profitable enterprises. Though many refute the credibility of Russia’s anti-Western doctrinal shift, the identification of the third manifestation of Russian fears highlights the ominous nature of the situation. For the first time since the end of the post-Cold War and arguably ever, NATO has lost the Russian public. Often-refuted statements by hard-line Russian politicians would be easily disregarded if they were not a reflection of a renewed and growing assumption in the Russian public that all Western motives are suspect.\textsuperscript{252}

\textsuperscript{251} Though Russian weapons proliferation is not completely new as it was initiated to make a profit, it is presently more common as it means economic survival for Russia. An additional result of the present-day deterioration of relations is that Russians are much less cooperative in efforts to curb proliferation.

\textsuperscript{252} Black, J.L. \textit{Russia Faces NATO Expansion}, p. 160.
The mood of the immediate post-Cold War years is long gone. The Kosovo campaign has solidified the revival of an anti-Western, anti-democratic psyche in Russians. *Sovetskaya Rossiyya*, a leftwing Russian newspaper, though not reflective of the sentiment of all of Russia, describes the phenomenon quite accurately:

The tumultuous protest rallies around the U.S. Embassy mark the entry into the political arena of hitherto ‘slumbering’ social forces. The bombing of Serbia has led to the radicalization of youth. The United States has suffered a massive political defeat in Russia: the fruits of its efforts over many years and the many billions spent on indoctrinating Russian youth in the spirit of ‘Western values’ were destroyed in a trice.\(^\text{253}\)

Granted, the mobilization of the political elite in Russia is nothing out of the ordinary, but the voluntary rally of the Russian population against anything that represents NATO and almost all that refers to Western, democratic, and U.S. prosperity is alarming.

The end of this momentous period of post-Cold War détente is approaching. The United States not only has the ability, but also the responsibility to re-engage Russia in an attempt to democratize its economy and society.

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\(^{253}\) Johnson, David, “Russia Reacts to War in Yugoslavia,” p. 3.
I. FUTURE OPTIONS

A solid point of embarkation would be an effort to create a working relationship between Russia and NATO like the one that exists between France and NATO.\textsuperscript{254} Since France pulled out of NATO’s integrated military command in 1967, concerted efforts have been made to ensure French “appeasement” on most of the organization’s internal and external crises. A perusal of NATO strategy documents illuminates the same finding. Though not a member of the integrated military command, French acceptance with regard to security concepts continues to border primacy in the quest for consensus.

\textbf{1. France and NATO}

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has demonstrated a historical willingness to work within certain parameters to not only achieve French acceptance, but also involve France in all aspects of the process. The following three examples will seek to illuminate NATO’s propensity to seek French approval as a key to consensus building: a) not only was French involvement essential, but certain sections of NATO’s new 1991 Security Concept were actually given French signature,\textsuperscript{255} b) France not only participated fully in the Senior Group on Proliferation, but efforts were also made to include France in the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation – France was offered the first European co-chairmanship of the defense group,\textsuperscript{256} and c) France took part in the Long-Term Study

\textsuperscript{254} This is not to insinuate immediate Russian inclusion into NATO or any sort of Russian veto. It refers specifically to the bilateral, conciliatory dialogue present between NATO and France since France’s departure from NATO’s integrated military structure.

\textsuperscript{255} deWijk, Rob. \textit{NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., p. 107.
which led to Military Strategy 400/1 which integrated elements of NATO’s new Security Concept and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept.\textsuperscript{257}

It is clear that a direct parallel cannot be drawn between France and Russia, as Russia is not an integrated member of NATO. Additionally, notwithstanding the feasibility with regard to acceptance by other alliance members, messages of Russia’s intent to join have been mixed. The point here is that NATO has shown its ability to discuss, debate, and at times even concede to France in order to build consensus within the Alliance. Conversely, while in the midst of the NATO expansion debate, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, in an attempt to redefine the security arena and guarantee a place for Russia, presented an initiative for a direct link between the OSCE and the NACC. According to deWijk, the decision made regarding this proposal had nothing to do with viability or merit:

\ldots there was very little enthusiasm among the allies for a fundamental debate on the roles the various institutions should play in the new Europe. A majority of the representatives in the SPC (R) did not want to create the impression that the OSCE was being reinforced to make enlargement of NATO acceptable to the Russians. This would, after all, be an open acknowledgement of a major Russian influence on the enlargement process.\textsuperscript{258}

In effect, throughout the last decade, NATO decisions have been afflicted by a Cold-War stereotypical animosity toward Russia. Consequently, concessions NATO has

\textsuperscript{257} deWijk, Rob. \textit{NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium}, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., p. 92.
made for other "partially aligned" nations were not even offered to Russia. In essence, instead of "combining defense with dialogue" in order to, "...establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region..." as stated in the Alliance's 1998 Security Concept,259 NATO has contributed to the destabilization of an immense nation, with untapped natural and human resources, and a significant nuclear capability. Paradoxically, such "...uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area..." are named in NATO's above-mentioned Security Concept as security risks and challenges.260

2. U.S. National Security Strategy
The Clinton administration's last official National Security Strategy, published in December 2000 states:

Our engagement also helps frame the key choices that only the peoples of the former Soviet Union and their leaders can make about their future, their role in world affairs, and the shape of their domestic, political and economic institutions. Our strategy utilizes a long-term vision for the region, recognizing that this unprecedented period of transition will take decades, if not generations to complete.261

The United States, often through the auspices of NATO, specifically with expansion and the Kosovo campaign, has definitely helped "frame the key choices" made by the Russians. Unfortunately, these key choices have been to: create new strategic and


260 Ibid., p. 5.

military documents aligned against the West, encourage a weakened Russian military to actively train for nuclear first-use, and actively pursue anti-Western alliances (including WMD proliferation in violation of various arms agreements).

With regard to the strategy's reference to “generations,” the West has also played a decisive role. The blatant disregard and resulting intensification of Russian fears of: a) losing its position and veto in the post Cold-War security arena, b) being subordinated to U.S. hegemony, c) being pitted militarily against NATO with its continued plans for expansion, and d) being unable to remain engaged in and police its historical sphere of influence because of the possibility of NATO military action in the near abroad has had severely destabilizing effects on the Russian psyche.

Though many would discount this as inconsequential rhetoric and declaratory posture, the result is that NATO, with the United States in the lead, has encouraged the radicalization of the Russian youth. The new generation of Russians has been given a defensive, anti-Western, anti-democratic, anti-NATO outlook reminiscent of that of the Cold War. If it is still possible to frame choices in this momentous period, the first step will have to be Western-initiated conciliatory engagement and dialogue on substantial issues. Without this, the West will continue to harbor its anti-Russian stereotypical preconceived notions and Russians will continue to intensify their anti-Western stance. With political and social spheres orientated in an increasingly antagonistic manner, consensus on strategic issues such as Kosovo will remain unobtainable; and the Russian-U.S. relationship will therefore continue to, “rot like a fish from the head.”
V. CONCLUSION

Through the implementation of numerous Clinton administration initiatives, "North America and Europe came together to shape the course of a new century." 262 The problematic characteristic of these policies is that they have chosen to explicitly exclude Russia. As many American, European, and Russian experts have noted, "A Europe without Russia cannot be peaceful, undivided, and democratic" 263 because the nation is too big, too nuclear, and too volatile to be ignored by the West. Consequently, to ensure the long-term viability of a peaceful post-Cold War security system, a modus vivendi must be found through which the West can both satisfy Eastern Europe and actively engage Russia. The expansion of the Alliance, combined with the West's overall demeanor toward Russia throughout the entire first decade of the post-Cold War, have successfully accomplished the former and neglected the latter.

For a present-day, all-inclusive system to be effective, it would need to be decentralized, self-regulating, and comprised of actors who realize that they all have equal responsibility for its maintenance. 264 It would also be susceptible to both U.S. leadership and Russia's ability to continue adequately its path toward the consolidation of its democracy and market economy. To date, however, mainly as a consequence of a


Western inability to rid itself of preconceived, historical biases and partially as a result of Russia’s inability to combat corruption, Russia has effectively been isolated from the post-Cold War security system. The effects of this alienation have already proven to be seriously destabilizing to Europe since 1999.

The Clinton administration’s policies toward Russia were typically based upon rhetoric, insufficiently funded, moralistic, and lacked clear objectives. As is historically true with U.S./Soviet negotiations, recent U.S. dealings with Russia have not aimed at enhancing mutual understanding because of an inability truly to reorient toward a non-adversarial Russia. This antagonistic approach has proven to be ineffective since Russia, at least in the early 90’s, actively sought conciliatory dialogue, a veritable Russia/West alliance, and inclusion in the post-Cold War security arena.

A. LOSING RUSSIA

Consequently, many Russians have lost their initial enthusiasm for Western principles, ideals, and practices. Initial efforts at building a market economy were characterized by Western aid acting as a substitute rather than a facilitator for economic reform. Though increased oil revenues have somewhat alleviated the situation created by the crash of 1998, the Russian economy continues to regress; the nation’s present GDP accounts for only 1.7% of world GDP.\textsuperscript{265} Traces of true reformers are scarce if existent

at all while almost-absolute power is now concentrated in the Russian presidency, thereby neutralizing any vehicle for comprehensive debate on policymaking.

The first round of NATO expansion has created anti-Western/anti-NATO/anti-U.S. political coalitions that the Russian public has voluntarily adopted as evidenced by the 1995/96 political platforms and elections. This newly forged Russia/West rift has manifested itself in: new antagonistic security concept and military doctrines that name the U.S. and NATO as potential adversaries and promote nuclear first-use for defense, the formation of anti-Western military, strategic, and technical partnerships and alliances. The most baleful effect of this phenomenon is the existence of a government that is rapidly reorienting towards authoritarian rule. The Kosovo campaign merely exacerbated these already tense relations as it intensified nationalist tendencies in the Russian body politic. In conjunction with the bombing of Serbia, NATO expansion: a) became a direct military threat to Russia, b) invoked historical fears of containment by encroaching on Russia’s borders, c) stripped Russia of its place in world affairs by neutralizing its UN veto, d) hardened political and public resolve against NATO and the U.S., and e) intensified Russian efforts to avoid marginalization and isolation.

The Clinton administration was well aware that NATO expansion could "...arouse Russian fears of NATO intentions, jeopardize President Boris Yeltsin’s efforts to westernize and democratize Russian institutions, and push the nation down the road toward extreme nationalism."266 Along with U.S. skepticism was Russian "obstructionism" and strong European desire to "...approach the issue gradually and

allow time for reflection.” Concern over Russia’s reaction was so great that the official announcement setting forth the debut of the policy was intentionally postponed until after Russia’s 1996 presidential elections. In light of Western apprehension, and through the guise of historical examples, Russia’s reaction to NATO’s first round of expansion was not only expected, but also not uncommon.

B. RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE COURSE

During the immediate post-Cold War period, and specifically since Putin’s inauguration, Russia has made many attempts to reverse the course of isolation that it believes the West has intentionally pursued. With Russia’s rank in world affairs still uncertain, these efforts were made at an international level during Yeltsin’s tenure. For example, Russia became a major player in Balkan diplomacy in 1994 after its initial aversion toward any form of U.S. involvement in Bosnia. Similarly, after official and popular reactions of “strident condemnation” toward the Kosovo campaign, “Yeltsin decided in mid-April [1999] to change tack, appointing his former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin as his special envoy to the Balkans.” President Putin has continued to make this type of attempt at inclusion; yet in recent months, with the tide having turned


268 Daalder, Ivo. Getting to Dayton, p. 28.


270 Ibid., p. 28.
back toward further NATO expansion, the West has virtually excluded Russia from institutional world affairs. Consequently, Putin’s efforts have been held mainly on a Russia+1 basis. For example, in response to the Bush administration’s initial “independent” stance on the “moral obligation”\(^271\) to provide “fortress America” with a National Missile Defense shield, the Putin administration revoked its immediate condemnation and responded to the United States with requests to build a Regional Missile Defense shield. Though some critics would argue this dialogue to be a contradiction to the claim that U.S. initiatives have alienated Russia and destabilized Europe, Putin’s demeanor can actually be seen as part of a logical struggle to vie for support and secure any role in international affairs. The nation has few, if any, choices on how to retain its status as a great nation.

1. **Putin’s Policies**
   Consequently, the main characteristic of the Russian president’s efforts has been broad outreach into the “...vacuum of policy we have in the United States.”\(^272\) A record year of more than 18 foreign trips and unprecedented travel within Russia has aimed primarily at neutralizing Soviet-era debts and opening markets for Russia’s nearly bankrupt heavy industries. Putin has made significant efforts to move closer to Europe and has taken steps to: settle a dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands, encourage reconciliation of the Koreas, and move toward enormous weapons assistance to Iran.

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This has all been in an effort to provide significant opportunities to the nation’s economy, which continues to struggle through the transition from 70 years of communism to that of a market economy.

Regardless of Russian alienation, Putin understands the necessity of U.S. involvement in Russian affairs, and therefore continues to pursue re-engagement through constructive dialogue with Washington. “Russia’s foreign policy,” he said, “will not include any great power chauvinism” and will continue to consider the United States “one of our major partners.”

Privately, though, many Russian officials fear that this sentiment is no longer shared and that Russia’s perceived isolation and tertiary ranking (behind the U.S./NATO and Europe) in world affairs are inevitable and demoralizing.

C. SUGGESTED FUTURE POLICIES

In the opinion of this author, NATO should now: fully assess the policies of the last decade, identify the characteristics of the current situation, and map out more effective alternatives for the future. That NATO inclusion has had benefits of paramount significance for its three new member nations cannot be argued. It seems however; that these advantages have been rendered virtually inconsequential when compared to the destabilization Russia’s continuous hostility towards expansion is charged with having had on European security.

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274 Ibid.
Unfortunately, there is no ideal solution for the problem at hand nor does this study conclude that the United States and NATO should be given full culpability since the immediate post-Cold War years were filled with a plethora of first-ever uncertainties for which no nation was prepared. The mistakes of the Clinton-era, though significant, are reparable.

The question therefore, is which policies can the West provide Eastern European nations with requisite security guarantees and political, economic, and social benefits without further destabilizing Russia's relationship with the West. Western strategic priorities should therefore aim at Russian inclusion in an effort to guarantee that Russia's nuclear power will be neutral, if not pro-NATO in the future. Russian inclusion is the easiest way through which to accomplish this; yet a consequence of Russia's unique identity, the ways through which the nation must be successfully engaged are yet to be determined. The following set of opposing courses of action and precondition for their success are therefore provided as reference points from which Russian policy formation should be reinitiated.

1. **Option One**
   The first viable option involves an intricately woven network of Western institutions centered on a yet more powerful PfP. First, the PfP must be strengthened in ways that render the institution's security guarantees formidable enough to ease Eastern European nations' fears while refraining from agitating Russia. In doing so, the PfP must retain its component of flexibility and continue to pursue individual relations with each member nation on a 19+1 basis, as this has proven effective in ensuring that each nation's specific security guarantees can be explicitly met.
Second, the EU must become the organization responsible for providing economic stability and promoting and facilitating nations’ transitions toward a market economy. This aspect would not encounter much Russian resistance as the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation proclaims the EU as being of “prime importance.” As “one of its political and economic partners...[Russia] will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation...” 275

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization would then be responsible for providing assistance to both institutions whenever necessary. A free-flowing, trilateral relationship between these three institutions must be created in an effort to ensure transparency and cooperation. Though difficult to implement because of Russia’s negative view of NATO, such cooperation seems plausible in light of the March 2000 initiation of a Russia/EU/U.S. mechanism developed to enhance relations with the EU and secure necessary U.S. interaction. 276

Russia, already a member of the PfP and engaged in partnership with the EU, would then be guaranteed an active role in the world’s premier institutions without NATO membership. With U.S. promotion of the initiative, this interlocking system of organizations could be the answer to being considered “in,” without continuing to erode the international arena through the deterioration of Russia’s rapport with the West. The continued expansion of NATO would become moot, as member nations would be granted Article Five guarantees. The system would therefore assure Eastern European nations


276 Ibid., p. 13.
through a more robust PfP, placate Russia through concrete inclusion, and preserve the efficacy of NATO and the stability of the trans-Atlantic arena as a whole.

2. **Option Two**
The second option involves the abandonment of future full membership for partial or associate membership – security affiliation without military integration. It is not realistic to expect many aspiring nations to be able to fulfill partnership requirements as originally set forth by NATO when such a feat was not attainable by Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. Additionally, extra capital would be better spent on social and economic measures than on the buildup of military infrastructure. Partnership could therefore be redesigned to permit early membership under Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty. This automatic assurance of full security for aspiring nations would negate the need for military exercises or SHAPE involvement to entice such security. Furthermore, with Russia’s present social, economic, and military strife, the nation is no longer considered an immediate threat. Consequently, it is not necessary to station NATO forces on the nation’s borders, for as long as NATO retains its present capabilities it will be able to effectively respond to any threat.²⁷⁷

In essence, history suggests that the Alliance can build confidence, consensus, and effective diplomatic relations without direct military involvement. The example of France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command (1996-7) as detailed in chapter Four provides an ongoing example of how influential nations can refrain from military involvement in the defense of Europe while remaining protected under Article

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²⁷⁷ Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The Long Entanglement-NATO's First Fifty Years*, p. 196.
Five and without incurring the organization's demise. Iceland and Spain can also be used as examples since both nations are fully protected under Article Five yet the former has no military and the latter's military is not integrated into SHAPE.

In this way, without the military aspect, NATO could expand and protect all aspiring nations while remaining non-threatening to Russia. Russian President Yeltsin practically promoted this sort of expansion in both 1994 and 1996 when he recommended to, “...do it like the French: becoming a member of the political committee without joining the military organization.”278 In sum, inductees must gain a position “outside a military structure but inside a security system”279 in an effort to quiet historical fears while avoiding further destabilization. Although this option strips the threat from NATO expansion, the inclusion of Russia in the international system would still be an issue. Since Russian accession grows increasingly unrealistic, a new rapport outlying Russia’s special status yet not alarming Eastern Europe would be a requisite “partner element” for this “new NATO.”

3. Finding the Right Institution to Act as the Russia/West Bridge
Many experts, Eastern and Western alike, suggest exploiting the OSCE to serve as a vehicle to build a comprehensive treaty between NATO and Russia. Though the organization's inability to conduct security operations in Kosovo has placed it in a perpetual role of non-military peacekeeping and democratization assistance, Russians believe the OSCE has retained its potential as a forum for dialogue and decision-making.


279 Kaplan, Lawrence S. The Long Entanglement-NATO’s First Fifty Years, p. 237.
Where Russians diverge from most Westerners, however, is that they regard the OSCE as the institution capable of conducting preventative diplomacy for all of Europe. In sum, Russia believes that the OSCE should act as the coordinating link between all European institutions.\textsuperscript{280} Many Western organizations and governments, on the other hand, consider the PJC, as is, to be an effective consultative body. According to the 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary NATO Handbook, “The Permanent Joint Council has already become an important vehicle for building confidence, overcoming misperceptions, and developing a pattern of regular consultations and cooperation,”\textsuperscript{281} when in all actuality the Council is more rhetoric than reality. Consequently, if the PJC is to be the means, then it needs to be further empowered by NATO.

First, NATO must broaden issues for consideration to include Russia-internal and NATO-internal issues. As it stands, the wording, “Consultations in the Permanent Joint Council do not extend to internal matters concerning NATO or its member states or Russia,”\textsuperscript{282} leaves a loophole through which either side can conceivably avoid pertinent issues. In the interest of increased transparency, this “workaround” should be eliminated. The Council needs to become one of permanent, regular nature with manned offices in Brussels and daily contact between representatives. Once-a-month meetings at the

\textsuperscript{280} Nazarkin, Yuri, “European Security in the Context of Russia’s Geopolitical Situation,” p. 5.


\textsuperscript{282} Ibid.
ambassadorial level\textsuperscript{283} are not sufficient. Another good recommendation for action is the creation of a more direct link between the PJC and the NAC that Russia could utilize when consensus on problematic issues is reached. In essence, if the PJC is going to be the means through which NATO and Russia achieve a viable post-Cold War rapport, the council needs to surpass rhetoric and transition into a concrete medium through which Russia can have a legitimate "voice without a veto."

The debut of the above-suggested policy of engagement should occur in three steps. First of all, the United States should hold a presidential summit on a broad range of issues at a U.S. location. This U.S.-hosted summit should be immediately followed by a Russian-led summit to be held somewhere in the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{284} The next level of negotiations must include: Presidents Bush and Putin, Secretary of Defense Colin Powell and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee and his counterpart, and any other teams deemed necessary. Subjects for discussion should only be limited by mutual agreement between all members involved. The final step should be a similar, comprehensive summit on the G-7/G-8 level at a neutral location. Throughout this process the United States must also publicly


\textsuperscript{284} Two good examples of what character these summits should take are the Reagan/Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, Iceland and the recent Bush/Blair Summit in Camp David, Maryland.
commit to stability within Russia and encourage international assistance for continued democratic and economic reform.

Only after this basis for mutual understanding and cooperation has been built can further improvements be made. Yet before initiating this new U.S./NATO policy of Russian engagement, objectives must be clearly stated by both sides. Suggested objectives should include: transparency, conciliatory dialogue, the international reinstitution of Russia as one of many great powers, concrete improvements in Russia’s economic and democratic “revolutions,” political, military, economic, and social cooperation, and a non-threatening agenda resulting in the concrete inclusion of Russia (without a veto) in all European institutions.

4. NMD as the Catalyst
   The last aspect necessary for a medium similar to this empowered PJC to gain efficacy is a significant issue on which to begin dialogue, coordination, development, and eventual implementation. The Bush administration’s proposal to build an NMD shield has plausibly become this issue. In essence, this initiative, acting as the catalyst, could terminate the continued destabilization that Western-led economic reform, NATO expansion, and the Kosovo campaign have caused and with time, also begin to evolve into true appeasement and eventual alliance.

   Russia initially and unconditionally condemned NMD after its announcement because it would violate the ABM Treaty. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has repeatedly countered with the administration’s willingness to proceed with the initiative
even if it could not overcome Russian, Chinese, and European objectives.285 Surprisingly, in response to the definitive U.S. position, Russia softened its initial denunciation and suggested active involvement in building a cooperative European anti-missile defense system - an alternative that would stay within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. In late February, Russia presented NATO plans for this system286 and in contrast to U.S. passivity in response to this compromise; Russia has continued to pursue this genre of program. Defense Minister Ivanov recently made public Russia’s latest proposal of creating two working groups with the United States to discuss strategic questions involved in establishing missile defense systems.287 The most difficult step - getting Russia on board - has conceivably already been taken.

The upcoming meeting between the two Presidents in Slovenia on June 16 presents the United States with a prime opportunity to take back the initiative on NMD. Even though Putin’s desire to wipe away Soviet-era debt and revive loan commitments from the IMF could be used as leverage, such concessions would arguably be well worth both their plausible benefits and the difficulties that refusal could initiate. Russia and the United States could forge a new, bilateral, cooperative relationship for the first time since

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relations began to deteriorate after the Kosovo campaign. Tied to debt liquidation and loan reconstitution, a partnered missile defense program could bind Russia to cooperative Western engagement, strengthen the nation’s economy through increased interdependence, encourage democracy through the promotion of a western ideal, and aid in the long-term stabilization of trans-Atlantic security. On the other hand, if this opportunity is not taken, Russia could rejoin with Chinese opposition and refute the initiative in its entirety, in effect clearly dividing Europe and reinitiating an arms race.

5. **Bush Administration Policies**

Whatever route is taken, the past suggests that the United States must take the lead in building a rapport of transparent engagement with the Cold War’s “defeated power.” The Bush administration’s exceedingly harsh rhetoric toward Russia in addition to the fact that neither President has visited the other during the first five months of President Bush’s term, have undoubtedly been steps taken in the wrong direction. Many critics describe Bush’s initial stance toward Russia as a hard-line, directive approach. As described in a recent *New York Times* article:

> His presidency has introduced a distinctly negative tone toward Russia, amplified by a contentious espionage dispute and policy debates that seem headed toward a significant downgrade of relations.\(^{288}\)

Fortunately, however, Bush’s strategy seems to have subdued into one directly contrasting that taken during the administration’s early weeks when the President and his National Security Advisor said they were prepared to speed ahead alone to undo the

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ABM Treaty. Conversely, Ms. Rice recently stated, “We want to convince the Russian’s that it is in their best interest to move beyond the ABM Treaty and to develop a new relationship with us. This appears to reflect that the administration’s stance has doubled back to one of conciliatory dialogue. According to senior administration strategists, to win Russia’s approval, the staff is preparing an offer of arms purchases, economic aid, military aid, and joint anti-missile exercises.

Critics of these “carrots” claim that the newest proposals are insufficient in two areas. First off, they fail to address Russia’s main concern of ensuring that there are clearly defined limits on the development and deployment of the system. “The bottom-line for Russians is that a defense has to be limited,” remarked Joseph Cirincione, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “They can’t go along with an open-ended defense that has the potential to overwhelm their deterrent.” Second of all, few of the suggested benefits are new and many are already in effect. For example, two joint exercises have already been held in Colorado and Moscow, the Clinton administration and the Kremlin reached an agreement to share early warning data on missile launches in 1988, and it was Moscow’s idea to sell S-300 antimissile systems for installation in Europe.

The administration’s proposals appear to be insufficient; and it is not only Moscow who feels this. Democrats are about to take control of the Senate and skeptics


290 Ibid., p. 1.

of NMD are presently in control of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees; making money for NMD difficult to obtain without Russian acquiescence. Furthermore, at a recent meeting of NATO Ministers held for the purpose of persuading NATO on the antimissile plan, the allies, afraid of NMD initiating another arms race and skeptical about technological feasibility, refused to even declare that they faced the “common threat” necessary to warrant NMD.\textsuperscript{292} Unlike the days of the Cold War, when Europe was less unified and Germany not assertive, Washington can no longer impose its will upon NATO with regard to missiles.\textsuperscript{293} As holds true with initiatives taken during the first decade of the post-Cold War, NMD will not add to American security if it undermines the cohesion of the Alliance and in turn, Europe.

In sum, if the administration’s real thinking is that, “...there was little Moscow could or should be able to do about it [NMD],”\textsuperscript{294} then the rhetoric is more important than the reality, as it was during the Clinton years and appeared to be when the Bush administration took office. And if present U.S. diplomatic efforts toward Russia are intended to be no more than a feint as it seems they were with initial economic aid, NATO expansion, and the Kosovo campaign, then the gulf between Russia and the West will continue to expand until it becomes unbridgeable. Perhaps then the hollow benefits that expansion has had on European security will become fully evident.


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