Central and East European Security

New National Concepts and Defense Doctrines

by Jeffrey Simon

Conclusions

• Following the revolutionary political changes of 1989-1990 many Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states adopted new national security concepts, as well as new defense and military doctrines.

• Most CEE states are now revising their national security concepts and defense/military doctrines. Consensus-building on these tasks has become more difficult because many CEE states lack the inter-agency institutions necessary for formulating national security policy.

• Because many of the threats and risks to CEE security are either transnational and/or internal, and increasingly defined in economic terms, the participation of the European Union (EU) is becoming more appropriate and important.

• These concepts and doctrines have become more important for developing consensus on not only internal and external risks and threats, but also on the means (laws and institutions) to change concepts and doctrines, thus enhancing the legitimacy of their governments.

A Time of Change

Dramatic changes in the European security environment since the revolutions of 1989-1990 have been challenging for both CEE and NATO. The unification of Germany in 1990, the withdrawal of Soviet Groups of Forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in mid-1991, and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia in 1992, and the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993 stimulated most CEE states to adopt new national security concepts and new defense and military doctrines. The NATO decision in November 1991 to replace its 1967 "flexible response" strategy and to adopt a new Strategic Concept also reflected the change in the security environment.

Further changes in the European security environment continued to challenge CEE and NATO. These
included the increasing perception that:

- the threat of a large-scale war no longer existed, resulting in decreased defense expenditures and military establishments;

- the military might be needed in disaster relief; and

- the need to collaborate in a wide variety of peacekeeping missions—ranging from peace enforcement to policing—would grow in importance.

The impetus toward change was boosted in January 1994 when the Brussels Summit agreed to enlarge NATO, initiate the PFP Program and the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and issue its declaration on proliferation. Change was further evidenced in the decision in late 1995 to deploy NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia, the July 1997 Madrid Summit invitation to three states to begin accession talks, and the Alliance decision to prepare its own New Strategic Concept for adoption in April 1999. Although the New Strategic Concept is in the early draft stages, it will likely include:

- greater attention to non-defense issues such as crisis management and civil emergency planning;

- its increasing role in peacekeeping and the potential need to operate out-of-area; and

- the threats posed by proliferation and terrorism.

The changing European security environment and NATO actions have influenced CEE security concerns. Most CEE states are revising or writing new national security concepts, and defense and military doctrines. Their task is more complicated than in the early 1990s because they perceive the major challenges to their security as being internal in nature. Most perceive security problems arising from open borders which often lead to illegal migration and smuggling; organized crime, ineffective police forces, and government corruption; and, ethnic minority disputes. These are issues that extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military forces and require a broader societal discussion and consensus on how to solve these issues.

As CEE governments are successful in building a broad-based defense consensus, it will enhance their ability to develop and maintain effective crisis management institutions, enhancing governmental legitimacy. National security and defense doctrines are a necessary framework for writing military doctrine which provides the rationale needed to build appropriate armed forces.

The three NATO accession states—Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic—feel a sense of urgency with the impending April 1999 Washington Summit. They are convening periodic meetings of their defense ministers for consultation and coordination of their defense doctrines before accession.

Slovenia, Romania, and Estonia remain undeterred in their efforts to seek European integration. Slovakia and Bulgaria have expressed frustration and fears of isolation. They have even suggested following an option of neutrality. Austria, a PFP member, has yet to express any formal interest in joining NATO.

The progress and challenges facing the three accession states, as well as the six states just mentioned, follow.

Three NATO Accessors
**Hungary.** Hungary adopted its National Security Concept and Defense Principles in 1993. Drafting of the Defense Principles occurred in the Ministry of Defense (MOD), because there were not enough civilian experts on security and their experience was not welcomed by the military. The Defense Principles were drafted in 1992, well before the National Security Concept was developed. When the National Security Concept was finally drafted by the Foreign Ministry (MFA), the Parliament’s six parties and Defense Committee reviewed and debated the 13-page document. Parliament approved both documents, nearly unanimously, in 1993.

Now Hungary is repeating the process. Since mid-1997, it has been drafting new documents. The MFA is responsible for the National Security Concept which outlines the security environment, the dangers, and resulting necessary measures. While consensus exists on the security environment, differences exist over the document’s time horizon; the military wants the document to focus out 10 to 15 years, while the MFA prefers 2-to-3 years. The MOD will draft the Defense Strategy, with the assistance of the interior, industry, finance, and other ministries.

While NATO membership deepens Hungary’s commitment to a new security model based on cooperation, membership changes Hungary’s geopolitical position from having been a western part of the East, to becoming an eastern part of the West. Hungary will become a so-called "island" because it does not border another NATO state. It sees challenges coming from the south and east, and therefore wants to be part of NATO’s Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) command.

Hungary’s new Defense Doctrine reiterates the 1993 need to defend against attacks, but also addresses the need for the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) to fulfill NATO international (Article 4 and Article 5) missions, to increase defense expenditures by 0.1 percent per year to 1.8 percent of GDP by the year 2001, and to determine where to subordinate state institutions such as the border guard and intelligence.

**Poland.** When Poland adopted a National Security Concept and a Defense Doctrine in 1992, the documents stressed cooperation. Poland has been drafting new documents since April 1998. The prime minister tasked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to draft a new National Security Concept. When the document is completed it will be sent to Parliament for approval. The new strategy will stress three pillars—good neighbor relations, participation in European and UN peacekeeping activities, and integration in the European Union (EU), Western European Union (WEU), and NATO.

While NATO membership ends Poland’s "self-sufficient" defense doctrine and reduces the "gray zone" of security in Central Europe, it places Poland opposite the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Poland sees itself as the "edge" of NATO area, and as a "front-line" country. Being the NATO "strategic shield" is a challenge, and it motivates Poland to support further NATO enlargement.

The Polish MOD drafted the new Defense Doctrine in April-May 1998, and is coordinating the document with the MFA, Ministry of Interior, and other ministries. The Defense Doctrine’s three parts will be coordinated with NATO. The first section stresses the need to prevent conflicts and shape the environment; the second addresses crisis management and peacekeeping; and the third focuses on coalition war. The Defense Doctrine reflects the Polish perception of being a front-line NATO state. Hence, it seeks a NATO command headquarters in Poland as a NATO guarantee of resolve.

**Czech Republic.** The Czech Republic does not yet have a National Security Concept, though it does have Defense and Military Doctrines which were adopted in 1994. However, it is drafting three new documents. First, the Czech MFA is drafting, with defense ministry assistance, the National Security
Strategy. It will be discussed by the new State Security Council (RBN), which convened for the first time in June 1998.

Second, the National Defense Strategy defines the Czech state institutions and military functions, and outlines four conditions from peace to war. The government discussed and approved the Defense Strategy, which is to be reviewed annually in March.

Third, the 1994 National Military Strategy must be altered to allow Alliance membership reflecting a change from independent to coalition defense, preparing for coalition tasks, becoming interoperable with NATO, removing civil protection tasks from the defense ministry, and making Czech defense planning compatible with NATO defense planning. An updated version of the Military Strategy is being prepared for discussion in the new State Security Council and government.

**Aspiring Members**

**Slovenia.** Although Slovenia did not receive an invitation to join NATO at Madrid, it continues to prepare for NATO accession. Slovenian disappointment has been tempered with a bid for EU accession, associate membership in the WEU, and active engagement in the European integration process.

In 1993 Slovenia adopted National Security Principles (not a National Security Concept) which remain valid, though the European security environment has altered markedly. Although it has no Defense Doctrine, it nevertheless finally adopted a Military Defense Doctrine in May 1998.

Slovenia’s Military Strategy aims to shape a peaceful defense environment and ensure that the armed forces are capable of responding to many dangers and of operating with NATO by April 1999.

Slovenian efforts to write a National Security Concept began in 1997 when the Defense Minister attempted to write a White Paper, but his efforts failed because he wanted it to be only a defense ministry document. After the new government recently created a National Security Council under the Prime Minister, it began drafting the new National Security Concept.

Although a Military Doctrine was prepared by the defense ministry and adopted by the government on May 14, 1998, no Defense Doctrine yet exists. Producing one will not be an easy task, not only because different views prevail as to who should prepare and approve the document, but also because Slovenia’s political parties do not have a clear concept of defense policy.

**Romania.** The Romanian Parliament approved a National Security Strategy and a Military-Defense Doctrine in 1994 which were written by the defense ministry. During 1998, the Romanian defense ministry General Staff drafted a new 13-page Military-Defense Doctrine outlining the risks and threats to Romania (-ranging from neighborhood instability and conflicts, proliferation of arms and drugs, and the need for economic development) and its security and defense objectives during crisis, peace, and war. Romania remains committed to NATO integration, and participates as an associate member of the WEU.

Romania’s defense ministry first drafted a new National Security Strategy with the Supreme Council of Defense (e.g., National Security Council) in early 1997. When it was sent to Parliament for consultations, the Parliament required some changes. It is now being discussed and coordinated with other appropriate ministries and agencies. Once the draft National Security Strategy (NSS) is completed it will again be discussed in the Supreme Council of Defense probably in September 1998. Then the President must sign the document and send it to the Parliament for approval. Once the NSS is approved,
the Military Defense Doctrine, which was sent to the defense ministry in June 1998, will be sent to the government for approval.

**Estonia.** In the spring of 1996 Estonia’s Parliament adopted a General Political Guideline (e.g., National Security Concept) which stresses the establishment of a stable democratic state, preventing conflict, and deepening cooperation with European structures such as the EU and WEU.

The General Defense Plan (e.g., Defense Doctrine), which is to be drafted by the defense ministry, will comprise three documents. The first reviews the strategic status of Estonia; the second describes the structure and size of Estonia’s Armed Forces; and the third deals with preparing the state for defense.

**Slovakia.** Slovakia does not have a National Security Concept, in part because some politicians believe that only the ministries of defense and interior should be responsible for security. Despite this, Slovakia does have a Defense Doctrine (e.g., Strategic Concept of Defense of the Slovak Republic) that is based on the current position and needs of the Slovak Army; it does *not* take into consideration long-term projections of the political-military or military-strategic environment. The Defense Doctrine was prepared in large part to conform with Slovakia’s PFP membership.

A number of factors are likely to influence the preparation of Slovakia’s future National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. The Slovak Republic internal factors are its national interests and objectives, the risks and threats, and the potential of the country to withstand them. Externally, Slovakia’s geopolitical position will alter significantly when its neighbors join NATO and the EU, while it remains outside those structures. In a few years when 92 percent of Slovakia will be surrounded by EU members, Slovakia may become a point for illegal migration toward the West and its neighbors might begin to close their borders.

If the next NATO enlargement tranche excludes Slovakia, it could well lead to that state’s neutrality (defined to mean non-involvement in NATO and WEU).

**Bulgaria.** The National Assembly approved a new National Security Concept in April 1998, declaring that it has no territorial claims, maintains a defensive military doctrine, and desires to join the EU and NATO. It also sees security increasingly in internal terms involving the struggle against organized crime, fighting corruption, and raising Bulgaria’s low standard-of-living.

The National Security Concept defines the principles which are the basis of the draft Military Doctrine which is to be presented to the Council of Ministers for approval in the near future. The draft Military Doctrine envisions enlarging the functions of Bulgarian Armed Forces to include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and rescue functions.

Until Bulgaria becomes a NATO member, it will pursue a neutral regional policy toward Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Macedonia. Because of its geographic location, Bulgarian adherence to the EU and NATO is not just a vital national interest, but one of survival.

**A Neutral Partner**

**Austria.** Although it participates in the PFP, Austria remains neutral (as defined in its 1955 State Treaty) and has not expressed a desire to join NATO, in part, because no consensus yet exists among its political parties.
Though Austria has no National Security Concept, its neutral national security policy stresses the goals of preventing conflict, of not becoming involved in any military conflicts if they occur, and in restoring territorial integrity if invaded.

Austria does not have a Military Doctrine, but it does maintain so-called National Defense Principles which were drafted in the 1970s and adopted by Parliament in the mid-1980s. These principles, since the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, are no longer valid. Despite this, Austria has made no efforts to develop a new doctrine.

Recommendations

- Because many partners need assistance and have requested advice in developing their National Security Concepts and Defense and Military Doctrines, the George C. Marshall Center should hold a follow-up seminar for partners to share information on their processes of drafting the concepts and doctrines, institutional participation and ratification, and societal education.

- Many partners still do not have effective national-level institutions for planning and coordinating foreign, security, and defense policy; or for crisis management. U.S. bilateral military education and training programs, and military-to-military activities, could provide assistance where required.

- Closer NATO cooperation and coordination with EU programs could enhance the effectiveness of our assistance in meeting the needs of many partners.

This paper is a result of a conference hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Hungarian Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies held in Budapest June 11-12, 1998. Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow at INSS. He can be reached at (202) 685-2367, by fax at (202) 685-3972, or by e-mail at simonj@ndu.edu.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences, the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk
Editor - Jonathan W. Pierce

| Return to Top | Return to Strategic Forum Index | Return to Publications |
INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A. Report Title: Central and East European Security

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet: 09/24/01

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #): National Defense University Press
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Washington, DC 20001

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by:
DTIC-OCA, Initials: ___VM__ Preparation Date 09/24/01

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the above OCA Representative for resolution.