JTF Operations Since 1983

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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
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Contents

Summary ................................................. 1

Overview ................................................. 5
  Who has historically been chosen as CJTF? ........... 5
  What types of operations have JTFs conducted? ...... 6
  What types of operations have Navy CJTFs
  commanded? ........................................ 7
  How often has the Navy participated and what has
  it done? ............................................. 8
  What are the major lessons learned from past JTF
  operations? ........................................ 9

  Coordination was a critical element of all
  operations ........................................... 9
  There is a lack of doctrine covering humanitarian
  operations ........................................... 11
  Nearly half of the operations have been conducted
  on extremely short notice ............................. 14
  How have JTFs terminated their operations? ....... 15

Introduction to the individual write-ups ......... 19
  Criteria for selection ............................... 19
  Roadmap ............................................. 20

Operation Urgent Fury (October–December 1983) .... 23

JTF Lebanon (February–April 1984) .................. 33

JTFME and Earnest Will (September 1987–April 1989) .... 39

JTF Yellowstone (September 1988) .................. 49

Alaskan Oil Spill TF (April–September 1989) ....... 55

JTF Philippines—Philippine Coup (December 1989) ... 61
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation / Date Range</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Just Cause (December 1989–January 1990)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sharp Edge (May 1990–January 1991)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Proven Force (December 1990–February 1991)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF Provide Comfort (April–July 1991)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Sea Angel (May–June 1991)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Fiery Vigil (June 1991)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Quick Lift (September–October 1991)</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Provide Relief (August 1992–February 1993)</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Los Angeles (May 1992)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Provide Transition (August–October 1992)</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Andrew (August 1992–October 1992)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Marianas (August–September 1992)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Hawaii (September–October 1992)</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Restore Hope (December 1992–May 1993)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Provide Promise (January 1993–Present)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Provide Refuge (February–March 1993)</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other operations</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Pheasant (March 1988)</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Squared (October 1991)</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Hope (February 1992)</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (May 1992)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Watch (August 1992 to Present)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (September 1993–ongoing)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-Somalia (October 1993–March 1994)</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of tables ......................................................... 191
Distribution list ..................................................... 193
Summary

This research memorandum summarizes recent Joint Task Force (JTF) operations. We reviewed the operations at the request of CINCLANTFLT to help the fleet determine its requirements for training Navy officers and staffs in JTF operations. The goal is to extract lessons learned that define high-leverage training topics.

Table 1 shows an overview of the JTF operations we reviewed. Based on the available data, the table includes every JTF operation since 1983 in which the JTF:

- Was created for a limited period of time in response to a contingency
- Involved primarily conventional forces
- Actually executed operations
- Reported to a unified CINC—and not to another CJTF as a component of a larger joint task force.

In table 1, the Year column shows the year of the JTF’s establishment, and the Approximate size column refers to the number of American servicemembers that participated in the JTF at its maximum size. In some operations, substantial numbers of foreign military also served. For example, in Provide Comfort, the CJTF eventually had about 11,500 foreign military members from eleven nations under his tactical control (TACON). The Mission column shows what we perceived to be the primary mission of the JTF.

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1. There are several omissions from the list due to our inability to gather data on those particular operations. For brief descriptions of the information we do have on other post-1983 operations, please refer to the final section, titled “Other operations.”
Based on the past 10 years, who should the Navy train? Past experience suggests that most Flag officers of operational commands (both afloat and ashore) should be viewed as potential CJTFs or Naval component commanders. They and their staffs should be candidates for appropriate schoolhouse and exercise training. In addition, Naval officers of lower ranks can find themselves serving as action officers on joint staffs or liaison officers to a wide variety of organizations, such as country teams, foreign military components, and non-governmental organizations (such as the Red Cross).

Based on the last ten years, what sorts of operations can we expect a Navy-led JTF to conduct? Experience suggests that more often than not, the operation will be sea based. It is also more likely than not to involve either combat operations or an uncertain security environment. We do not expect Navy-led JTFs to play a prominent role in humanitarian assistance operations within the continental United States. This last restriction will probably limit, without eliminating, the number of Navy-led JTFs dealing solely with humanitarian assistance operations.

What major issues should training cover for Navy CJTFs and their staffs? During our review of the past 10 years of JTF operations, some issues came up time and time again. This repetition suggests that trainers should provide CJTFs and their staffs with the following information:

- Training in coordination with organizations outside the JTF’s chain of command, and information on how some of the more commonly encountered organizations, such as UN relief agencies and the State Department, operate.

- Doctrine for humanitarian assistance operations, particularly as it relates to staff responsibilities, determination of end-state, measuring progress, logistics issues, and legal issues.

- Joint Crisis Action Planning procedures capable of being executed on extremely short notice (time scale of a few days).

- Doctrine for assuming responsibility of ongoing operations from another command structure or turning over operations to other military and non-military organizations.
Table 1. Summary of selected Joint Task Forces since 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>CJTF</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Approx. size</th>
<th>Supported CINC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urgent Fury</td>
<td>COMSECONDFLT</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Invasion of Grenada</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>LANT&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Lebanon</td>
<td>CG 22d MAU</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Military assistance</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnest Will</td>
<td>COMCARGRU 5</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Escort shipping</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>CENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Yellowstone</td>
<td>Asst. CO 9ID</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Firefighting</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>None&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaskan Oil Spill</td>
<td>CG AAC</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Cleanup of Valdez spill</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>None&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Coup</td>
<td>CG 13th AF</td>
<td>O8</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Military assistance</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Cause</td>
<td>CG XVIII Corp</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Invasion of Panama</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>SOUTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Edge</td>
<td>COMSIXTHFLT&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Liberian evacuation</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Force</td>
<td>USAFE G-3</td>
<td>O8</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Desert Storm combat operations</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>EUR&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>DCINCUSAES&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, Kurdish refugees</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Angel</td>
<td>CG III MEF</td>
<td>O8</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Disaster relief in Bangladesh</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiery Vigil</td>
<td>CG 13th AF</td>
<td>O8</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Evacuation of Clark AB, Philippines</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Lift</td>
<td>CG 322 ALD</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Zaire NEO support</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF GTMO</td>
<td>CG 2d FSSC&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, Haiti migrants</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>LANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td>CINCCENT J-5</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance in Somalia</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>CENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>CG 7th ID</td>
<td>O8</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Civil security in Los Angeles</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>FORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Transition</td>
<td>37th ALS G-3</td>
<td>O5</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance in Angola</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Andrew</td>
<td>CG USATWO</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Disaster relief in Florida</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>FORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Marianas</td>
<td>COMNAVMARIANAS</td>
<td>O7</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Disaster relief in Guam</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Hawaii</td>
<td>CG USAPAC</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Disaster relief in Kauai, Hawaii</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope</td>
<td>CG I MEF</td>
<td>O9</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Disaster relief/security in Somalia</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>CENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Promise</td>
<td>CINCUSSAVEUR&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>O10</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance in Bosnia</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Refuge</td>
<td>CG 25th ID</td>
<td>O8</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, Chinese migrants</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>PAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> USACOM is the current name for USLANTCOM.
<sup>b</sup> Organized directly by the Secretary of Defense and reported directly to the Department of the Army.
<sup>c</sup> Later CJTFs included COMPHIBRON 4, CO USS Whidbey Island, and a USN O6.
<sup>d</sup> JTF was OPCON to USCINCEUR and TACON to USCINCENT.
<sup>e</sup> Provide Comfort was a multinational combined task force, CTF. The table entry reflects absorption of an earlier JTF Provide Comfort commanded by the USAFE G-3 (an USAF O8) and JTF Express Care, a special forces task force led by an USA O7.
<sup>f</sup> Later CJTFs included a USA O7, another USMC O7, then a series of USA and USMC O6s.
<sup>g</sup> The original CJTF was the CO of TF 212, a mobile MASH unit. We believe he was an USA O6.
Overview

This section presents results from our review of the 21 operations shown in table 1. In the following subsections, we answer six questions:

- Who has historically been chosen as a CJTF?
- What types of operations have JTFs conducted?
- What types of operations can we expect a Navy CJTF to command?
- How often has the Navy participated in JTF operations and what has it done?
- What are the major lessons learned from past operations?
- How have JTFs terminated operations in the past?

Who has historically been chosen as CJTF?

If history is any guide, the Navy should consider the staffs of most of its operational commands headed by a Flag officer as the nucleus of a potential JTF headquarters or Naval component commander. In some cases, procedures being developed by individual regional CINCs may identify the Navy staffs most likely to become a JTF headquarters.

In general, the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF) has been a Flag or General Staff officer already in command. There is one case in which the CJTF was a department head on a unified CINC staff (Provide Relief), and four cases in which the CJTF was a staff director or deputy for a theater component commander or subordinate (JTF Yellowstone, Proven Force, Provide Comfort, and Provide Transition).
In only four cases has the rank of the CJTF been below O7. In two of the four exceptions, a Flag or General Staff officer was the original CJTF. The CINC's involved replaced the original CJTFs with lower-rank officers only after operations had become well established. In a third exception, as more and more responsibilities accrued to the JTF, the CINC reorganized the JTF to include a Flag-level CJTF.

We also have some indications that in a few theaters the choice of CJTF is being standardized at the O8/O9 level. Currently, USCINCPAC has identified three commands as the most likely nucleus of a JTF staff (two commanded by an O9 and one by an O8); a recent draft CINCUSACOM JTF training document speaks of “eight three-star warfighters” and their staffs as being the most likely to become a JTF staff.

Over the 23 operations we reviewed, the ratio of USA:USAF:USN:USMC Joint Task Force commanders was 7:6:5:5—indicating that each of the four armed forces has about an equal likelihood of providing the CJTF. Because the service of the CJTF generally also provides the majority of the JTF HQ staff, each service has also been equally responsible for providing servicemembers to a JTF headquarters staff.

The past history of JTF staffs suggests that the Navy must be prepared to provide its share of officers familiar with joint doctrine and able to serve at any level of the staff.

What types of operations have JTFs conducted?

Historically, over half of the JTF operations we reviewed (15 of 23, or 65 percent) had as their primary mission to provide humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. Admittedly, in some of these operations (Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, and Provide Promise), there was also a strong security element.

Most JTF operations have been short-lived. In 14 of the 23 cases, the operation either terminated or the command and control structure evolved to a new (non-JTF) structure within 60 days. In only 3 cases
did the operation and the JTF command structure last longer than one year—Earnest Will, JTF GTMO, and Provide Promise.

What types of operations have Navy CJTFs commanded?

Although five operations do not provide much of a database from which to draw conclusions, in those operations conducted by Navy CJTFs:

- Four of the five featured the actual unavailability (Urgent Fury, Sharp Edge, Earnest Will) or potential unavailability (Provide Promise) of land bases within the area of operations. The unavailability of land bases translated into actual or potential sea-based operations for these four operations.

- Four of the five featured either actual combat operations (Urgent Fury, Earnest Will) or an uncertain security situation (Sharp Edge, Provide Promise).

- One operation (JTF Marianas) provided disaster assistance in an isolated area (Guam) where a U.S. Navy officer (COMNAVMARIANAS) was the senior military officer on-scene.

What missions have Navy CJTFs not been called upon to command in the past? With the exception of the Guam relief operation, Navy officers have not commanded any JTFs where land bases were available within the area of operation. Consistent with this, Navy CJTFs have not commanded humanitarian assistance operations within the continental United States. We expect this to be the case in the future.

Within the United States, the Department of the Army is the lead military agency for humanitarian assistance. As part of that responsibility, the Army does disaster planning with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other federal agencies. Thus, the Army seems likely to be the lead service for most domestic humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations.
How often has the Navy participated and what has it done?

Although the types of operations a Navy CJTF will lead may be limited, the experience of the past ten years shows that once a joint task force stands up, Navy participation will be the rule rather than the exception. Of the 23 operations we reviewed, the Navy played a significant role in 17. That finding suggests a continuing requirement for the Navy to provide units and officers capable of serving at all levels of a joint task force. It also suggests that the lessons learned in a JTF operation that did not involve the Navy should be taken under consideration by the Navy. The next time, the Navy could well be faced with a similar problem.

Table 2 lists Navy participation in the JTFs shown in table 1 and briefly describes the major roles played by the Navy. An “X” in the participation column indicates the Navy provided either units that were under JTF operational control (OPCON) or significant numbers of service-members on the JTF staff.2 The list of roles played by the Navy covers many traditional warfare roles and logistics support functions.

The listing of roles in table 2 does not completely capture the extent to which these roles are executed in a joint environment. For example, in JTF GTMO, the CO NAVBASE GTMO (acting as the Navy component commander) provided extensive base support to the Marine Corps and Army units involved in administering and running the migrant camp. One of the base support functions was housing for the troops. The actual housing (reinforced tenting with climate control) came from the Air Force in the form of one of its Harvest Eagle temporary base kits.

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2. This definition is intended to stress direct, intimate involvement with the JTF. In many cases, although there might be no X in the Navy participation column, the Navy provided significant support without being under JTF OPCON. For example, an Amphibious Task Force provided “presence” off the coast of Somalia during much of Provide Refuge, and Naval units in the Mediterranean participated in Desert Storm under direct CINCEUR OPCON while JTF Proven Force was in operation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Navy participation</th>
<th>Major USN roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urgent Fury</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Command, planning, strike, amphibious, sea lift, special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Lebanon</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Strike, sea lift, amphibious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnest Will</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Command, planning, convoy, strike, sea control, mine clearance, surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Yellowstone</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOS-TF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Sea basing, cleanup, air lift, communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Coup</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Surveillance, air superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Cause</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Base support, special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Edge</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Command, planning, sea basing, sea/air lift, evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Force</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Air superiority, relief/reconstruction, special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Sea Angel</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Sea basing, sea lift, communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Lift</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Fiery Vigil</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Sea lift, evacuation control, humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF GTMO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Base support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF LA</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Transition</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Andrew</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Food storage, relief/reconstruction, air and sea lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Marianas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Command, planning, relief/reconstruction, base support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Hawaii</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Relief/reconstruction, sea lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Sea Lift, amphibious, air support, port control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Promise</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Command, planning, air superiority, surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Refuge</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**What are the major lessons learned from past JTF operations?**

The following lessons learned are topics that came up in more than one operation. We present them with the caveat that, in most cases, we did not directly observe the operation. Our sources included command histories, record message traffic, and Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS) observations.

**Coordination was a critical element of all operations.**

In every operation we reviewed, the JTF coordinated with forces or agencies outside the JTF’s chain of command. JTFs in humanitarian
operations usually had to coordinate with more organizations than those involved in "pure" combat operations. The list of vital players in the operations we reviewed included:

- Foreign militaries—in the context of both coalitions and independent operations in the same general area. Relations ranged from harmonious (coalition partners in Provide Comfort) to adversarial (Iraqi forces in same operation).

- U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

- Ad-hoc U.S. government interagency teams.

- U.S. embassies and the local country team.

- Multinational organizations, such as the United Nations (with its various agencies) and NATO.

- Foreign governments and their agencies.

- Non-governmental organizations, such as the International Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders.

- Corporations such as Exxon and the Kuwait Oil Tanker Corporation.

- Non-governmental local leaders, such as the heads of rebel factions, warlords, and village elders.

In general, the cast of characters varied from operation to operation. In most cases, the relationship was truly one of coordination—the JTF could not task the outside organization, and the outside organization could not task the JTF. Instead, the JTF negotiated mutually agreeable combined courses of action.

The barriers that individual JTFs had to overcome before establishing effective coordination include the following:

- **Security issues**—In Operation Just Cause, classified plans prevented the CINC and JTF from coordinating with the Department of State and other federal agencies responsible for the reconstruction of Panama until after the invasion started. As a result, when the JTF eliminated the Panama Defense
Forces (and with it the law-enforcement infrastructure), looting and general lawlessness broke out in urban areas, and the JTF had to quickly improvise plans to replace those forces.

- **Lack of established relationships**—In Operation Sea Angel, the first contact the JTF had with the Bangladeshi government and private relief organizations was when it arrived on-scene. The JTF was unfamiliar with the various relief organizations’ capabilities and methods of operation. Similarly, the relief organizations were unfamiliar with the militaries’ capabilities and operating methods. In addition, the JTF’s problems were exacerbated by the lack of trust between the Bangladeshi government and many of the private relief organizations. As a result, several days were spent just on arranging coordination, not delivering relief.

- **Lack of authority at the working level**—In Operation Restore Hope, negotiations with the United Nations for the turnover of the JTF’s Somalia operations to a UN task force were hampered by UN officials’ lack of authority in-theater. UN officials had to refer most matters back to UN headquarters for resolution. In contrast, the U.S. military provides CJTFs with enough authority to make agreements at the local level and relies on command by negation.

**There is a lack of doctrine covering humanitarian operations.**

Even though more than half of the operations we reviewed featured some form of humanitarian operations, lack of doctrine for such operations was a common theme in the after-action reports. Problem areas included:

- **Responsibilities of staff departments.** The proper role of the J-2 (Intelligence) department was a problem mentioned in several sets of after-action reports (JTF GTMO, Sea Angel, and JTF Andrew). In JTF GTMO the after-action reports also noted that given the logistics-heavy nature of the operation, the proper division of responsibility between J-3 (Operations) and J-4 (Logistics) was difficult to determine.
• **Determining the end of mission and measuring progress.** In the AOSTF and Provide Transition operations, the JTF began with well-defined, arbitrary end-states. In both operations the termination date was part of the original tasking. In most other humanitarian operations, the JTF struggled to define both the desired end-state and how to measure progress.

For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the opening of schools seemed to signal the return to normality and came at the same time local authorities willingly assumed relief functions previously provided by the JTF. Paradoxically, although the JTF helped rebuild some schools, that was not one of its priority missions. In Operation Provide Comfort, tracking the number of blankets delivered to the Kurdish refugees helped measure progress early in the operation, but, as the weather warmed and the Kurds moved to lower altitudes, it became less useful as a measure of effectiveness.

• **Logistics for humanitarian operations.** Humanitarian operations tend to be logistics-heavy, especially because the ability to move large amounts of supplies is one capability the military brings to the table. However, in several operations (JTF Andrew, JTF Marianas, and JTF Hawaii), the JTF reported difficulties in maintaining accountability and visibility of relief supplies provided by non-military sources that were being moved by the military. In part this is because of the specialization of logistics tools for military operations.

In a related matter, several JTFs wrote in their after-action reports that supplies purchased for military use do not always make the transition as well to humanitarian uses as might be thought. For example, in both JTF Sea Angel and JTF GTMO, the JTF reported that Meals Ready To Eat (MRE) rations, while a stopgap to prevent starvation, are not appropriate for the long term with populations unused to a high-protein diet. In response to these lessons learned, the U.S. developed a new type of MRE ration specifically for humanitarian assistance operations.
were bundled with items useful primarily for combat. Separating the two was time consuming.

Finally, in the early response to an emergency, relief agencies and the military tend to quickly push relief supplies toward the afflicted area. Both JTF Andrew and JTF GTMO found that pushed items often either arrived without proper documentation or were quickly separated from their documentation by events. In either case the logisticians have a problem with accounting for the items and restocking them after the operation. A related accountability problem is the restocking of custom supplies purchased by the military for the humanitarian operation. JTF GTMO procured custom kitchen equipment—after the operation, it was not clear where to “restock” it.

- **Legal issues.** During humanitarian operations within the United States, the military must comply with a large body of federal laws and regulations—some of which are ambiguous or contradictory. Activities such as patrolling an area, transporting relief supplies, directing traffic, and issuing rules of engagement (ROE) quickly become tinged with legal overtones. Over one-third of the JULLS submitted after JTF Andrew discussed the impact of complying with various laws and regulations.

- **Responsibilities of the JTF within the context of the Federal Response Plan.** For domestic disaster relief, each federal agency and the military has a designated area of responsibility under the Federal Response Plan. According to the plan, the military is the lead agency only for urban search and rescue (for example, finding survivors in the rubble following an earthquake). However, in the response to Hurricane Andrew, the JTF found itself taking the *de facto* lead for many tasks where other federal agencies were supposed to take the lead. It also had to work through sometimes confusing command and control problems with the

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4. In a proposed revision to the Federal Response Plan, FEMA would assume the lead role for Urban Search and Rescue, the Navy would assume the lead role for oil spills, and the Army Corps of Engineers would retain the lead for sanitation and water system restoration.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is given specific responsibilities by the Federal Response Plan to coordinate such things as restoration of utilities and debris removal. When units of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers became OPCON to JTF Andrew, they in essence had two chains of operational command—one through the JTF and one through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Nearly half of the operations have been conducted on extremely short notice.

In reviewing the operations shown in table 1, we found that in nearly half the cases (10 of 23 operations), the CJTF and his staff had less than 72 hours’ notice to plan and prepare for execution. The short-notice operations included:

- Two military operations—Operation Urgent Fury and the Philippine Coup response.
- Five disaster response operations—Alaskan Oil Spill-TF, Operation Sea Angel, JTF Andrew, JTF Hawaii, and JTF Marianas.
- Two refugee assistance operations—Operation Provide Refuge and Operation Provide Comfort.
- One civil emergency—JTF Los Angeles

Problems either caused or made worse by the lack of time for planning included:

- Initial lack of vital information about the situation. In Operation Urgent Fury the CJTF did not know where all of the Americans he was supposed to rescue were. In the same operation, JTF forces were sometimes forced to use tourist maps of the island for maneuver.

- Difficulties in communication. During the Philippine Coup response, nearly 24 potentially critical hours passed before the Naval forces received the rules of engagement and identification, friend or foe (IFF) codes used by the rest of the JTF.
• *Poor coordination.* Upon arrival in Bangladesh, the JTF had to work for several days to set up coordinating committees that provided for a means of communication among all of the relief participants and some measure of control over the distribution of relief supplies.

• *Difficulties in assembling a joint staff.* In the Philippine Coup response, the short notice limited Navy participation on the JTF staff to one officer. Arguably, the CJTF could have used more in-house Navy advice in an operation in which he had operational control of two battle groups for execution and two amphibious ready groups for planning purposes.

How have JTFs terminated their operations?

By doctrine, contingency JTFs are set up to accomplish well-defined objectives and then disbanded when those objectives have been accomplished. In nearly half of the JTF operations we examined, the JTF’s end-state included turnover of the operation to another agency or military command structure. That implies the services—or the joint doctrine community—should develop doctrine for various types of turnovers. They should also train potential CJTFs and their staffs in turning over operations to someone else.

When we examine the 22 completed operations\(^5\) we reviewed as a group, we found that the operation termination conditions can be grouped into five categories. In increasing order of prevalence they are:

• *The military mission ceased when its accomplishment no longer seemed feasible.* One operation (4 percent) falls into this category. JTF Lebanon had as its goal support of the Lebanese government and limitation of Syria’s influence. The operation terminated shortly after the Lebanese government signed an accord with Syria that promised peace in return for heavy Syrian involvement and influence in the affairs of Lebanon.

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5. Provide Promise is still under way. Its termination mechanism has yet to be demonstrated.
• All mission goals were met by the JTF’s military operation with no significant follow-on operations required. Three operations (13 percent) fall into this category. JTF LA had as its goal restoration of civil security in Los Angeles. When the local authorities had reestablished the pre-riot level of security, JTF LA disbanded. JTF Fiery Vigil stood up to evacuate Clark AB in the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. The JTF stood down when the evacuation was complete. Similarly, JTF Yellowstone stood up to fight fires in Yellowstone Park and stood down when the blazes were out.

• The original mission was defined in terms of effort expended. Once the JTF provided the promised effort, the operation terminated. Two of the operations (9 percent) met this criterion. In AOS-TF and Provide Transition, the JTF ceased operations on a date pre-set before execution began.

In the previous category (mission accomplished), the end-state definition defines the desired effect, and the JTF operates until the problem is solved. In this category, the end-state definition specifies the amount of effort to be expended, which means that in some cases the original problem persists after the operation. For example, the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill were still noticeable long after the AOS-TF ceased operations.

• A change in the environment substantially outside the control of the JTF eliminated the reason for the operation. Seven operations (32 percent) fall into this category:
  — In Earnest Will, the belligerents ceased hostilities.
  — In JTF Philippines, the coup attempt ended.
  — In Sharp Edge, the security situation in Monrovia improved slightly and the Department of State released the military from the requirement to support the American Embassy.

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6. This termination mechanism does not imply the operation was a failure. Rather, it can be viewed as the military successfully limiting the damage a crisis causes until it passes.
— In Proven Force, the coalition forces liberated Kuwait.

— In Operation Quick Lift, the rapid evacuation of Americans by private means and successful negotiations between the Zaire government and opposition quickly defused the crisis.

— In JTF GTMO, legal decisions resolved the status of the Haitian migrants.

— In Provide Refuge, negotiations cleared the way for repatriation of the Chinese migrants.

• The JTF turned over operations to one or more organizations to continue working on the problem. We have grouped nine operations (41 percent) into this category. By operation, the mission being turned over was:

— In Urgent Fury and Just Cause, the JTF turned over civil military operations aimed at restoring the governments of Grenada and Panama to other U.S. agencies and non-JTF military organizations.

— In Sea Angel, JTF Andrew, JTF Marianas, and JTF Hawaii, the JTF turned over continuing relief and reconstruction efforts to non-military agencies.

— In Provide Comfort, the JTF turned over relief operations to several relief organizations working for the United Nations and security operations to a multinational coalition force.

— In Provide Relief, the JTF turned over humanitarian relief operations to another JTF (JTF Somalia) with an expanded mission that subsumed the original effort.

— In Restore Hope, the JTF turned over relief and security efforts to a United Nations military force and relief agencies.

Turnover of operations is the flip side of assuming control of an operation from an existing command structure. At least five of the JTFs we surveyed assumed responsibility for an on-going operation when they were established.
• JTF Lebanon assumed responsibility for the American forces in Lebanon from the U.S. Multi-National Force.

• JTF Middle East assumed responsibility for Operation Earnest Will from the Mid East Force.

• JTF Yellowstone assumed command of a U.S. Army TF fighting fires when U.S. Marines joined the fire lines.

• JTF Provide Comfort changed from a U.S.-only to a multinational Combined Task Force (CTF).

• JTF Provide Promise assumed responsibility for diverse activities such as operation of a field hospital in Zagreb, liaison with the UN High Commission on Refugees, and relief flights into Sarajevo from a variety of EUCOM commands.

These examples indicate that changes in command structure and turnover of responsibilities have played a prominent role in many past JTF operations. Arguably, the Joint Staff should provide doctrine for changing command structures, and services should train potential CJTFs and staffs in conducting turnovers.
Introduction to the individual write-ups

Criteria for selection

As discussed earlier, we limited our research to operations in which a JTF:

- Was created for a limited period of time in response to a contingency.
- Involved primarily conventional forces
- Was activated after 1983
- Actually executed operations
- Reported to a unified CINC—and not to another CJTF as a component of a larger joint task force.

The first two restrictions follow from our charter to review JTF operations with a view toward helping CINCLANTFLT structure its training program for preparing conventional Naval staffs to become the nucleus of a JTF headquarters staff. Note that these restrictions eliminate from consideration JTFs run as Special Forces operations.

The post-1983 restriction is in part practical—the further back in time we go, the harder it is to obtain good information on some operations. The restriction also acknowledges the large changes that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 made in how the armed forces organize themselves for combat. We went back to 1983 to include Operation Urgent Fury—the invasion of Grenada—in the write-ups because the lessons learned from that operation provided part of the impetus that fueled the changes of 1986.

The last two restrictions are primarily practical. A number of JTFs have been stood up for planning purposes, but obtaining information on their existence and plans is often difficult due to their
classification. Also, some JTFs have activated one or more Joint Task Forces as components to the larger JTF. We mention these within the write-ups of the larger operation.

As a practical matter, we also eliminated from consideration operations for which we could not get enough information on the JTF before our editorial deadlines (May 1994). Many of these operations are either ongoing or very recent and no military histories or lessons learned are available. We give brief sketches of the information we do have on these operations at the back of this memorandum.

Finally, although we tried to find out about all of the JTF operations since 1983, we cannot guarantee that we succeeded. In some cases (such as Provide Hope, which we discuss briefly at the end of the document), the available information does not conclusively document the command and control arrangements. And there is always the possibility that minor operations have never been documented.

Roadmap

The following sections present a short write-up on each of the 21 operations we reviewed. For ease of assimilation, each write-up has the same structure:

- **Mission**: A short statement of the JTF's mission.
- **Background**: A short description of how the JTF's problem came into being and a short summary of the JTF's contributions at solving the problem.
- **Timetable**: A chronology of significant events.
- **Participants**: A short description of the major armed forces participants.
- **Command and control**: A list of the supported CINC, the identity of the CJTF, and the JTF's prominent liaison partners.
- **Lessons learned/unique features**: A description of the most important operational lessons learned or unique features of the operation. We extract these from third-party analyses and
descriptions of the operation. For the most part, we did not observe or develop them ourselves.

- **Summary:** A summary of the JTF's overall impact.
- **References:** A listing of the references we used in developing the write-up.

The write-ups focus on the formation of the JTF, its relationships to the rest of the military and other organizations, and major operational decisions made by the JTF. For some of these operations, a wealth of historical information is available on the tactical lessons learned. We judged the examination of the material for lessons learned at the tactical level to be beyond the scope of this investigation.
Operation Urgent Fury
(October–December 1983)

Mission

As contained in the JCS Execute Order, the purpose of Operation Urgent Fury was to:

Conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadan forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants, assist in restoration of a democratic government on Grenada.

Background

Grenada has a population of about 110,000 and a total surface area of about 133 square miles. In 1974 it received its independence from the United Kingdom and became the smallest independent nation in the western hemisphere. In 1979, a leftist-socialist party called the New Jewell Movement, led by Maurice Bishop, overthrew the government in a bloodless coup. The new regime received both military and economic aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Later, infighting within the New Jewell Movement saw the murder of Bishop, rule by a “Revolutionary Military Committee,” and widespread unrest on the island.

At the time of Bishop’s murder, the largest community of Americans on Grenada consisted of several hundred students attending medical school. During the unrest, the Grenadan military closed the university and confined the students to their residences. Based upon the threat to these students and a concern that the new regime would seek to destabilize the neighboring states, the President of the United States ordered the invasion of Grenada to evacuate the American
students and restore a democratic government. In the international arena, the President secured the support of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States for intervention.

Four days after the NCA's decision to invade Grenada, elements of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps assaulted the island. The operation rescued the American students and eliminated the Grenadan military government with relatively light casualties (18 U.S. servicemen killed, 116 U.S. servicemen wounded). Restoration of Grenadan democracy was the task for civil-military operations that continued with substantial U.S. military involvement for over one year following the invasion.

### Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- **13 October**: Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the Governor General of Grenada are arrested by left-wing elements of the ruling party.

- **14 October**: Based on instructions from the NCA, JCS tasks USCINCLANT to begin planning a possible evacuation of U.S. citizens from Grenada.

- **19 October**: Thousands of supporters free Bishop from house arrest and march to Fort Rupert. Attacking army troops seize Bishop and kill him along with three members of his cabinet. Unrest increases on the island.

- **19 October**: JCS Warning order to USCINCLANT requests evacuation plans within 24 hours.

- **21 October**: NCA modifies mission guidance to add "...neutralization of Grenadan Armed Forces, stabilization and, as requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean states, restoration of democracy in Grenada." NCA orders diversion to Grenada of a naval task force originally en route Lebanon.

- **22 October**: JCS Execute order for Urgent Fury released in early evening.
- 23 October: USCINCLANT designates Commander, 2nd Fleet as the Commander of Joint Task Force 120. Attempted insertion of Special Forces to place ground radio beacons near the Pt. Salines airport fails due to high seas. Execute hour delayed for 3 hours (from 02:00L to 05:00L on 25 October) to allow for second attempt. This decision caused the initial assault to be in daylight instead of at night.

- 24 October: Second failure to place ground radio beacons due to high seas.

- 25 October: JTF forces assault Grenada starting at dawn. Cuban and Grenadan armed forces offer strong resistance to Ranger units attacking Pt. Salines on the southwest corner of the island. The Rangers secure the airfield by midday and the 82d Airborne begins arriving. They evacuate one group of students nearby and learn of the existence of others.

- 25 October: Elsewhere, a Grenadan counterattack forces one SEAL team to withdraw from a radio station and another is surrounded at the Governor General's residence. Grenadan forces also repulse an Army Special Forces attack on the Richmond Hills Prison. Marine aerial assault at Pearls airport in northern corner of island sees little opposition.

- 26 October: Marines from northern end of island relieve SEALS at Governor General's residence. Governor General evacuated to USS Guam. Marines evacuate a second group of students. The Marines also capture the Grenadan military sector HQ at Fort Frederick—that event ends organized resistance.

- 2 November: Redeployment of forces starts

- 14 December: JTF stands down, all combat forces redeployed. In cooperation with the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, U.S. Forces conducted civil-military operations aimed at restoring the Grenadan government for 18 more months.
Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Seventeen U.S. Navy officers of the COMSECONDFLT staff formed the nucleus of the CJTF 120 staff. The Navy officers were augmented by an Army Major General (Commanding General 23d Infantry division) acting as the Deputy CJTF, liaison officers from the Army, Special Forces and Air Force, and representatives of the State Department and CIA. Amphibious Squadron 4 (TF 124) was OPCON to the JTF. The Independence battle group acted in support of the JTF until November 2. (Independence and its escorts were under JTF TACON, CINCLANTFLT retained OPCON of the battle group.) The Marine Corps participant was the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit (battalion size) designated as TF 125 once onshore.

Other forces

The major Army participant was the 82nd Airborne Division (designated TF 121). Special forces included U.S. Army Ranger Units, U.S. Army Special Forces, and Navy SEAL teams (the JSOWTTF was designated TF 125). The Air Force participants were detachments from the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing and 552 AWAC (designated TF 126). The Air Force also provided C-130s for lift and KC-10 tankers.

In addition to these U.S. Forces, small contingents of the Jamaican and Barbados armed forces participated in the operation under the umbrella of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. Barbados also allowed the JTF unrestricted usage of its international airfield—located about 120 n.m.i. from Grenada.

In all, about 5,000 U.S. servicemen invaded Grenada (total size of the JTF was about 20,000 servicemen). The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force consisted of about 300 troops. Opposing the JTF were 1,000 Grenadans, 600 Cubans, and a handful of eastern European military advisors.
Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Forces was the supported CINC. He designated Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf (Commander, 2nd Fleet) as the Commander of Joint Task Force 120. The CJTF flagship was USS Guam (LPH-9). The JTF was organized along service lines.

Liaison

The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force reported to the Governor General of Grenada (head of state, appointed by the Queen of England). It coordinated its operations with those of JTF 120.

Lessons learned/unique features

Communications were very difficult.

Probably the largest single problem noted in the after-action reports was an inability of units from different services to communicate with each other. Incompatibility in equipment purchased by the services was the main culprit. For example:

- The CJTF (embarked on USS Guam) did not have a single command net to communicate with his task force commanders. The CJTF was collocated with the Amphibious Group Commander (TF 124) and the Marines (TF 125). He also had good communications with the battle group and USCINCLANT, but communications with the commanders of the 82d Airborne (TF 121) or the Special Forces (TF 123) were very difficult and relied on balky portable equipment (VHF radios) subject to frequent equipment failures.

- Marine Corps and Army ground forces operating in adjacent areas did not have any information listing the radio frequencies, ops codes, or key lists used by other friendly troops. In addition, the rocky terrain often blocked transmissions by the relatively low-powered VHF/FM field radios.
• Record message traffic was often delayed by the different routing management systems used by the services.

• Army elements on the ground were initially unable to speak to the Navy ships offshore to request and coordinate naval gunfire. In one celebrated incident, a frustrated Army officer used his AT&T credit card on an ordinary pay telephone to call Ft. Bragg, NC, to have them relay his request for support. Even when a Navy liaison unit (2d ANGLICO) arrived to assist the ground forces, they did not have the necessary information (codes, frequencies, call signs, etc.) to communicate with Naval units.

Very little information was available initially.

A severe lack of basic information about Grenada and the situation on the island hampered planning and the early execution phases of the operation. Examples of missing information included:

• Accurate charts and maps of the island. In some cases units resorted to tourist maps. In addition, the lack of high-quality maps contributed to the use of no less than four grid systems to describe the location of sites on the island. The multiple grid systems contributed to the confusion among the services.

• Location of U.S. students. The JTF knew the whereabouts of only about a third of the students before the invasion. Some students were not contacted until days after the invasion began.

• Assessment of Cuban and Grenadan military capabilities. Although the order of battle (OOB) of the opposing forces was reasonably accurate, there was no assessment of their capabilities or intent to fight.

• Assessment of opposition deployment status. Open press reports had convinced the Grenadan leadership that an invasion was imminent by October 22. They allocated their scarce resources to defense of the southwestern corner of the island. The JTF was unaware of the Grenadan redeployment or increased state of readiness.
- Location of the Grenadan military sector HQ. The Grenadan army coordinated its resistance to the invasion from Fort Frederick. The JTF was unaware of the existence or location of the HQ at Fort Frederick until after JTF forces captured the installation.

**Command and control was tenuous at times.**

The JTF staff in Urgent Fury was quite a bit smaller (numbering perhaps 25 officers total) than most of the JTF staffs for the operations we review in this memorandum. In addition, the JTF staff was nearly all Navy, with light representation from the Army, Special Forces, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Each of these services were represented by one to three officers. The relatively light representation of other services limited the scope of joint advice available to the CJTF. The representatives of the other services had also not been involved in the planning for Urgent Fury. For example, the senior U.S. Army officer (then MG Norman Schwarzkopf) was assigned to the JTF less than 48 hours before the invasion.

The joint planning effort for Operation Urgent Fury was very uncoordinated. For example, the Rangers and the 82d Airborne Division, though collocated at Fort Bragg, did not share planning information. Even though the 82d Airborne was supposed to relieve the Rangers at the Pt. Salinas Airport on the first day of the invasion, the 82d Airborne did not learn about the Rangers' mission until 24 hours before the invasion.

In Urgent Fury, there was no central airspace coordinating authority. With air assets coming from various sources, this caused a number of problems and led to the CJTF imposing some operational limitations.

On the ground, three task forces operated (82nd Airborne—TF 121, Special Forces—TF 123, and the 22nd MAU—TF 125). Each reported directly to the CJTF with no other overall ground force commander or coordinator. The poor communications between the flagship and the ground forces led to problems when the forces came were close to each other and had to improvise coordination of their efforts on the spot.
Summary

Operation Urgent Fury has to be considered a success since it met its mission goals with a relatively small loss of life. The large disparity in size between the invaders and the defenders probably had much to do with that result. After-action reports prepared by the services and articles in professional journals revealed serious problems in the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to operate jointly in 1983.

The biggest problem was the inability of the different services to communicate with each other. The extreme short-no notice character of the operation—Special Forces operations were under way within hours after the establishment of the JTF—also stressed the ability of the CJTF to establish coordination among all his forces. Another troubling aspect was the failure of the intelligence services to provide the CJTF with vital information.

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JTF Lebanon  
(February–April 1984)

Mission

The mission of JTF Lebanon was to complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the U.S. Multi-National Force (USMNF) in Beirut, provide security for the U.S. Embassy, and provide military assistance and training to the Lebanese Army.

Background

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a battalion-size Marine Amphibious Unit entered Beirut as part of a multinational peacekeeping force (USMNF) to escort the PLO away from the capital and help the Lebanese government re-establish control. Although the security environment was permissive at first, it steadily degenerated. Beginning in May 1983, the Marines came under increasing attacks. The attacks peaked with the October 23, 1983, terrorist bomb attack against a Marine barracks at the Beirut airport.

In the months following the bombing, the Lebanese government steadily lost control of more and more of Beirut. Finally, in February 1984, the Marines were left isolated within the Muslim quarter of the city facing a population that regarded them as invaders.

In response the U.S. decided to withdraw its forces. However, the U.S. government still wanted to signal its support for the Lebanese government and limit Syrian influence. To that end, USCINCEUR established JTF Lebanon to continue military-to-military contacts with the Lebanese Army.
JTF Lebanon remained in country until April of 1984, but it never really played a significant role. Instead, the Lebanese government looked to the Syrians for mediation with the Muslim factions.

**Timetable**

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- **October 23, 1983:** Bomb attack against Marine barracks in Lebanon. Over 200 members of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) die in the attack.

- **November 19, 1983:** 22d MAU (Commanding General, BGen. James Joy) relieves 24th MAU in Beirut.

- **December 28, 1983:** Long Commission releases its report on bombing of the barracks. Report is critical of the command and control arrangements for the U.S. forces in Lebanon. It concluded that different levels of command had different definitions of the mission of the forces and that chain of command starting with the commander on the ground to the CINC failed to take appropriate actions to ensure the security of the forces in Beirut.

- **January 1984:** Italian forces in the USMNF withdraw from their positions in Lebanon.

- **February 2, 1984:** Intense fighting between Lebanese army and Shiite militiamen at airport. The Lebanese army withdraws from airport leaving security solely in hands of 22d MAU.

- **February 7, 1984:** U.S. President announces decision to withdraw Marines to ships offshore, leaving a residual force to protect the U.S. Embassy.

- **February 8, 1984:** U.K. forces withdraw from Lebanon.

- **February 20, 1984:** JTF Lebanon established.

- **February 21–26, 1984:** Redeployment of 22d MAU from airport to ships of Sixth Fleet.

- **March 1984:** French forces withdraw.
• April 10, 1984: 22d MAU relieved (offshore) by 24th MAU.
• April 26, 1984: JTF Lebanon disestablished.

Participants

Before its redeployment on the ships of PHIBRON 4 on February 26, the 22d MAU was OPCON to JTF Lebanon. The 22d MAU consisted of a battalion-size landing team, a reinforced helicopter squadron, and a service support group. Once back onboard ship, OPCON of the 22d MAU reverted to SIXTHFLT. The MAU stayed off the coast of Lebanon in support of the JTF.

After the departure of the 22d MAU, the JTF consisted of a small headquarters (fewer than 10 members), Army Special Forces (200–300 service members) training with the Lebanese Army at the Office of Military Cooperation, 100–150 Marines responsible for the exterior and interior security of the U.S. Embassy, and an ANGLICO team to direct Naval fire support.

In support of the JTF, SIXTHFLT stationed a carrier battle group, USS New Jersey and PHIBRON ships off the coast of Lebanon. These forces remained OPCON to SIXTHFLT.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Europe was the supported CINC. He named BGen. James Joy as Commander, Joint Task Force Lebanon.

Liaison

With a functioning embassy, the JTF operated in support of the U.S. country team. The JTF coordinated U.S. support (training and fire support from U.S. Navy ships) with the Lebanese army. In fact, continuing liaison with the Lebanese army may have been one of the primary reasons for the creation of JTF Lebanon. Before its withdrawal
in March 1984, the JTF also coordinated with the French forces (a detachment of Marines) in Lebanon.

Lessons learned/unique features

Given the small size of the forces and limited mission, the question arises, “Why establish a JTF to control this operation?” Although we have not found authoritative sources that directly answer that question, the following factors may have influenced the decision to establish a JTF:

- Signals support for the Lebanese government by keeping a general staff officer in country.
- Simplifies the chain of command up through the CINC and JCS to address the findings of the Long Commission.
- Has a general/flag officer present if the MAU was reintroduced into Lebanon.

Summary

JTF Lebanon ended a two-year military intervention by the U.S. in the affairs of Lebanon. By the time the JTF was formed, the U.S. was definitely on the way out and JTF Lebanon had little chance to influence the situation.

References

This section draws on the following references:


JTFME and Earnest Will
(September 1987–April 1989)

Mission

The mission of Operation Earnest Will was to protect U.S. flagged vessels, and other vessels designated by the U.S. government, against attack during the Iran-Iraq war.

Background

The Iran-Iraq war began in September of 1980 with an Iraqi invasion of Iran. Although the initiative on the battlefield changed hands several times, neither combatant was able to establish a clear superiority on the ground. Seeking to bring economic pressure to bear on its adversary, Iraq intensified its attacks against Iran’s oil export industry in 1984. Iran retaliated by attacking tankers bound for Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The last two states, while technically neutral, provided large amounts of assistance to Iraq.

By the end of 1986, the Iranian anti-tanker campaign had greatly slowed the flow of oil from Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti government and Kuwait Oil Tanker Company approached both the U.S. and Soviet governments with requests for support. The U.S. responded by offering to reflag the 11 oil tankers of the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company. Once reflagged, they would be eligible for U.S. protection. To provide that protection, USCENTCENT planned and executed Operation Earnest Will.

Escort operations in Operation Earnest Will involved protecting convoys to and from Kuwait for a distance of about 700 n.mi. Convoy operations began in July of 1987. Over the next 18 months, U.S. forces escorted 127 convoys totalling 259 ships through the Persian Gulf. During this time only two tankers were damaged—Bridgeton by
a mine strike during the inaugural convoy, and *Sea Isle City* in a missile attack on the Kuwait Oil Terminal. U.S. combatant casualties included *USS Samuel B. Roberts*, which was severely damaged by a mine strike, and five helicopters that crashed due to pilot error or equipment failures.

During *Earnest Will*, U.S. forces conducted two operations against Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for the *Bridgeton* and *Sea Isle City* attacks and engaged Iranian forces on several other occasions. In coordination with other nations, they also cleared over 100 mines from the shipping route.

*Earnest Will* operations ceased after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire in August 1988.

**Timetable**

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- September 22, 1980: Iran-Iraq war starts.
- January 29, 1987: U.S. government states Kuwait can reflag its tankers if they meet U.S. regulations and reaffirms its intention to protect all U.S.-flagged shipping.
- March 7, 1987: JCS Warning Order to CINCCENT to plan for protection of “11 specifically identified Kuwaiti vessels within and through the Arabian Gulf, Straits of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman.”
- July 21, 1987: First Kuwaiti tankers reflagged; first *Earnest Will* convoy begins the next day.
- July 24, 1987: U.S.-flagged tanker, SS Bridgeport, hits a mine off Farsi island. Escort operations stop while mine countermeasure equipment is assembled in Gulf to sweep convoy routes for mines.

- July 29, 1987: Deployment order for four minesweepers to depart for Gulf.

- August 4, 1987: Six Army helicopters arrive in Gulf, four AH-6s and two MH-6s. Initially deploy off of USS LaSalle.

- August 11, 1987: France and the United Kingdom announce intention to send minesweepers and other naval forces to the Persian Gulf.


- September 22, 1987: Special forces stop, board, and seize Iran Ajr in the act of mining.

- October 8, 1987: First mobile sea base established in the Gulf. On the same day, Iranian small boats engage three Army SOF helicopters during a night patrol. One Boghammer and two Boston Whaler-type boats are sunk.

- October 16, 1987: Iranian Silkworm missile strikes the reflagged tanker SS Sea Isle City while at Kuwait City oil loading terminal.

- October 19, 1987: In retaliation for Silkworm attack, JTFME destroys two non-producing Iranian oil platforms being used for military purposes.

- February 15, 1988: CJTFME assumes collateral duties as Commander, Middle East Force and consolidates both staffs on board USS LaSalle in the Persian Gulf.

- April 14, 1988: USS Samuel B. Roberts strikes Iranian mine off of Qatar.

- April 18, 1988: In retaliation for Roberts mine strike, JTFME destroys two Iranian drilling platforms being used for military
purposes in southern Gulf. Iranian naval forces leave port in apparent attempt to attack JTFME naval forces. During following action, JTFME sinks 5 Iranian patrol boats and one frigate. A second Iranian frigate is severely damaged.

- April 22, 1988: U.S. government announces it will protect neutral shipping requesting U.S. assistance.

- July 3, 1988: USS Vincennes shoots down Iranian commercial flight during an engagement with Iranian small boats.

- July 18, 1988: Iran announces intention to abide by UN cease-fire resolution.

- August 16, 1988: JTFME provides airlift in support of the UN Iran/Iraq military observer group.

- August 20, 1988: Cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. JTFME begins phased withdrawal of U.S. forces.

- December 15, 1988: End of convoy operations. JTFME monitors situation in Persian Gulf but does not escort ships. JTFME begins slow redeployment of forces.

- April 15, 1989: End of Earnest Will. JTFME continues in existence as a standing JTF until just after the start of Operation Desert Shield.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

When Earnest Will started, nine U.S. Navy ships were in the Gulf (the Commander Mid East Force flagship USS LaSalle and eight combatants). Outside the Gulf the USS Constellation battle group (COMCARGRU ONE embarked) provided support and chopped to Mid East Force during the execution of convoy operations. Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operating out of Diego Garcia detached to Masirah to provide surveillance under the control of Commander, Mid East Force. Later on, minesweepers, mine countermeasure helicopters, and additional amphibious ships joined the operation, and the CINC established a semi-permanent MPA detachment at Dharan, Saudi
Arabia. With normal deployment schedules, eventually a large roster of Navy staffs and vessels rotated in and out of the operation. The bulk of the contingency JTF staff came from the staff of Commander, Carrier Forces Seventh Fleet (about 60 staff members total, all but 9 were Navy).

Navy special forces participants staged from the mobile sea bases and amphibious ships—which served as mother ships for the SEALs patrol boats.

U.S. Navy Reserves figured prominently in operating minesweepers and in providing tanker liaison officers.

Marine participants also rotated in and out of theater. From August 1987 to November 1988, one contingency MAGTF was part of JTFME.

Other forces

Other forces included Army special forces that staged from Navy vessels and two mobile sea bases (converted commercial oil drilling barges) in the Persian Gulf. Conventional forces included Army AHIPS helicopters, an Army signal brigade, and Air Force liaison teams to coordinate lift and tanking provided by Air Force KC-110 aircraft. To help supply the operation, MAC ran regular C-5, C-141, and DC-8 flights into Bahrain. Eventually, to reduce MAC's exposure, the JTF shifted to contracting commercial 747 and DC-10 flights into Bahrain.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander, U.S. Central Command was the supported CINC for Operation Earnest Will. Earnest Will started on July 21, 1987. Originally it was under the command of RAdm. Bernsen, Commander Mid East Force embarked on USS LaSalle. Mid East Force was a Naval task force OPCON to NAVCENT. When the operation began to grow in size, USCENTCOM established Joint Task Force Mid East (JTFME) on August 21, 1987, to simplify command and control for the operation. The first CJTFME was RAdm. Brooks (Commander, Carrier
Forces Seventh Fleet, CTF 70) embarked on USS Long Beach. At first the CMEF staff continued to function in tandem with the CJTFME staff. Eventually, in February of 1988, USCINCCENT consolidated the staffs to avoid overlap of functions.

Liaison

Working for the most part through USCINCCENT, the CJTFME coordinated with the Kuwait government for financial support (they provided fuel for the combatants and paid for the leasing of the mobile sea bases) and the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company to arrange convoy schedules. Navy P-3 aircraft supporting the operation were based out of Dharan, Saudi Arabia. The P-3 detachment coordinated locally for takeoff and landing times. In addition, JTFME coordinated with the Royal Saudi air force to provide AWACS coverage during transits of the Strait of Hormuz by the convoys.

Several other countries—United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, and Netherlands—also sent naval forces to the region. At the height of the operations, 42 ships from these 5 countries were present in JTFME area of operations. These forces operated independently of the JTFME forces. Areas of cooperation with the European forces included exchange of intelligence and informal coordination of operations—particularly minesweeping.

Lessons learned/unique features

Differences in equipment had to be overcome to employ special forces.

Though they were small in number, special forces played a very important role during Earnest Will—especially during combat operations. For example, the Army Seabat helicopter teams operating in concert with a Navy LAMPS Mk III for surveillance were arguably the most effective units at combatting small boat attacks by the Iranians. Still, several differences in equipment hindered employment of the special forces.
All special forces communications during operations were based on ad-hoc borrowing of radios. The attempted solutions were not always successful. For example, during the seizure of the Iran Ajr, multiple boarding parties arrived on the scene at different times unable to communicate with each other. Not until the second group was well within weapons fire range was the original boarding party able to recognize an approaching patrol boat as a U.S. boat—and not an Iranian boat.

The command structure changed several times.

When Earnest Will started, USCINCCENT placed the Commander, Mid East Force in charge of the operation. At the time Commander, Mid East Force had a flagship and eight escorts (destroyers and frigates) under its command. In addition, during times when a convoy was actually transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the Earnest Will orders called for a carrier and its air wing (operating in the North Arabian Sea, PACCOM waters) to come under Commander, Mid East Force TACON and provide air cover. (The CVBG(s) and its air wing(s) remained under USCINCPAC OPCON.) As the operation grew with the addition of mine countermeasure forces, special forces, and additional escorts sent to the Gulf, USCINCCENT activated JTFME to consolidate the operational control of the Earnest Will forces in a single command.

The JTFME AOR included parts of the North Arabian Sea normally in the PACOM area. The carrier operating there was OPCON to JTFME. So, in addition to consolidating command functions, the creation of the JTF, in effect, rearranged operational boundaries between PACOM and CENTCOM to better reflect the needs of the operation. At first the Mid East Force continued to be a separate component of the JTFME, but when the Commander, Mid East Force ended his tour of duty in February 1988, USCINCCENT consolidated the Mid East Force and JTFME staffs into a single entity to avoid overlap of efforts.

ROE were not coordinated with other intervening forces.

During the height of the “tanker war” between Iran and Iraq, several western navies operated independently in the Gulf and the North
Arabian Sea conducting mine clearing and escorting flag vessels. Each country had its own rules of engagement, which were shared only informally—if at all—with JTFME.

Due to the confined nature of the area, all the naval forces operated near each other. Although no problems surfaced during Earnest Will, operating close to other naval forces with different rules of engagement has the potential to create an incident.

For example, At one time during Earnest Will, relations between France and Iran deteriorated to the point that France sent an aircraft carrier and escorts to the North Arabian Sea. If France had chosen to conduct combat operations against Iran, JTFME forces might have found themselves trapped in the middle of an engagement.

Host nation support was limited.

During Earnest Will, the Arab nations in the Gulf area offered only limited host nation support. There was limited basing for aircraft (such as P-3 surveillance aircraft) and command and control ships (such as LaSalle) with limited offensive roles—but none at all for more offensive aircraft (such as F-14s or attack helicopters) and ships (such as destroyers or cruisers).

Other restrictions typically included:

- Restricted overflight privileges
- Refusal to routinely allow transshipment of munitions
- Refusal to allow use of facilities for training or recreation by large numbers of servicemembers.

Lack of basing agreements was one factor leading to the development of the mobile sea base concept. Another consequence was to place the JTFME forces at the end of a long supply line with limited ability to store a working surplus in-theater. When combined with the high tempo of operations, the long supply lines occasionally led to severe shortages of munitions, fuel, and spare parts.
JTF Yellowstone
(September 1988)

Mission

JTF Yellowstone fought fires in and around Yellowstone Park.

Background

The summer of 1988 was unusually hot and dry in the western United States. When, as happens every summer, fires started—they became larger and stayed burning longer than had been the case in previous years. In Yellowstone Park alone, 1.6 million acres (over half of the park) caught fire.

At the time, the Forest Service’s policy viewed fires started by natural causes (such as lighting strikes) as a normal part of the forest cycle. Unless the fire directly threatened built-up property or people, they let the fire burn itself out. However, the large number of big fires in the intermountain west and the location of several fires in the popular tourist destination of Yellowstone Park brought intense political pressure on the Forest Service to revise its firefighting policy.

On July 21, the Forest Service made a temporary change to the “let it burn” policy and began fighting all fires. As the summer wore on, over three-quarters of the available civilian firefighters were on the line fighting fires. On August 19th, the federal agency responsible for fighting fires (the Boise Interagency Firefighting Center—BIFC) requested military assistance. Within two weeks, DOD members were helping fight fires at several locations. At Yellowstone Park, the effort grew to involve eight battalions of Army infantry and Marines. To provide local command and control for the firefighting efforts at Yellowstone, the Secretary of Defense activated a JTF.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were:

- June-July: Hot, dry summer breeds numerous large wildfires.
- July 21: Forest Service revises firefighting policy.
- August 18: BIFC requests helicopter support from USA SIX.
- August 19: BIFC requests first battalion of soldiers to fight fires at Yellowstone Park.
- August 20: Army units begin BIFC firefighting course at Ft. Lewis, Washington.
- August 23: TF Recondo arrives at Yellowstone with two battalions of soldiers trained to fight fires. Over next week, two more Army battalions arrive.
- September 8: Secretary of Defense activates JTF Yellowstone; two Marine battalions and two Army battalions tasked to relieve soldiers on firelines. The Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) establishes a joint crisis response cell in the Pentagon Army Operations Center.
- September 10-14: Rain and snow begin at Yellowstone. Intensity of fires greatly reduced. Marines complete BIFC firefighting course at Camp Pendleton.
- September 15: 1st BN of 5th Marines relieves battalion of Army soldiers at Yellowstone.
- September 28: BIFC releases last military units from firefighting duties.
- October 1: JTF Yellowstone deactivated.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Two battalions of the 5th Marine Regiment totalling about 700 servicemembers were chopped to JTF Yellowstone. A Marine colonel was
the Marine component commander. Navy participation was limited to three doctors and 71 corpsmen. They were OPCON to the Marine component commander.

Other services

The Army provided the bulk of the firefighters. Over the course of JTF Yellowstone, six Army battalions from the 9th Infantry division helped fight fires. The total Army involvement came to over 3,600 servicemembers. The Army also provided about 20 helicopters that ferried firefighters to base camps close to the hot spots and did medical evacuations. The Air Force flew six C-130s specially configured to deliver water and firefighting chemicals from the air and four RF-4 infrared reconnaissance aircraft to help locate hot spots. The aircraft are part of the Air National Guard's inventory, and the Guard provided maintenance support for the aircraft. Total Air Force service members OPCON to the JTF was about 30. The Air Force also provided lift to help deploy firefighters to the Yellowstone area and set up a Air Lift Control Element (ALCE) at West Yellowstone.

Command and control

Chain of command

The Army's DOMS coordinated the overall DOD firefighting response from the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon. To do this, DOMS established a Joint Firefighting Task Force to stand watch 24 hours a day, monitor the situation, and help source BIFC requests for assistance. Through the Secretary of Defense, DOMS arranged for the activation of JTF Yellowstone. The CJTF was BGen. Taylor, USA (Assistant Division Commander of the 9th Infantry Division). The CJTF reported to the Secretary of Defense through DOMS. Supporting CINCs included USCINCFOR, USCINCPAC, and USCINCTRAN.

Liaison

The Boise Interagency Firefighting Center (BIFC, currently called the National Interagency Firefighting Center) is a joint Interior and
Agriculture agency responsible for fighting wildfires. They provided overall direction of the firefighting effort and the bulk of the firefighters (at Yellowstone alone some 9,000 civilian firefighters worked alongside the military). The Federal Aviation Authority set up a special restricted airspace for the Yellowstone firefighting efforts and provided air traffic control for both civilian and military aircraft in the area.

Lessons learned/unique features

Comprehensive standing agreements between BIFC and DOD facilitated integration between the JTF and civilian firefighters.

BIFC (now NIFC) and DOD have standing agreements that carefully define the responsibilities of both BIFC and the military for joint firefighting efforts. The agreements also spell out in advance when the military will consider helping BIFC and how the military firefighting effort will be funded. The military and BIFC have used these agreements to fight fires on at least five occasions since JTF Yellowstone.

Under the agreements, BIFC supplies the military with:

- Two-day firefighting courses for all troops sent to the fireline
- Special firefighting equipment (axes, hoes, protective clothing, etc.)
- Logistics support for basecamps such as laundry and messing facilities
- Overall direction (command and control) of the firefighting effort.

The military provides cadres of troops for the firelines and helicopters for transport and medical services; flies National Guard C-130s specially modified to fight fires; and flies reconnaissance flights to determine the extent of the blaze.
Liaison between the military and BIFC was comprehensive and available at all levels of command.

BIFC sent liaison officers to multiple levels of command to facilitate coordination with the military. BIFC liaison officers were located at DOMS in the Pentagon, with the JTF headquarters, with each battalion commander, with each company commander, and with each platoon. One additional factor easing coordination between BIFC and the military is BIFC’s organization, which is based on 1920’s Army doctrine. That means that BIFC firefighters use much of the same language as the military, and the liaison officers provide connections between similar levels of each organization.

The JTF had to abide by BIFC policy.

In firefighting, BIFC is definitely the supported activity and the military is in a supporting role. That means that the military has to abide by BIFC policy—even when this results in certain inefficiencies.

For example, BIFC has its own rules for accrediting helicopter pilots to carry passengers. During JTF Yellowstone only 19 of 40 Army helicopter pilots met the requirements. That resulted in underutilization of the Army’s CH-47 helicopters due to lack of pilots. It also added to the amount of maneuver on foot by the firefighters (both civilian and military).

BIFC also insisted on maintaining absolute control over the airspace above the fires. That meant the military had to work through the BIFC chain of command to receive authorization for flights.

JTF Yellowstone had less responsibility for planning than in other contingency JTFs.

The strong role played by BIFC relieved JTF Yellowstone of many planning functions other JTFs normally performed in other contingencies. In particular JTF Yellowstone did not have to:

- Develop courses of action—BIFC developed the overall plan for fighting the fires.
• Assess the state of the fires—BIFC fused reports such as surveys of the forest, weather forecasts, and aerial imagery to make a comprehensive assessment of the situation.

• Determine the end state—BIFC determined when it could release the troops from the firelines.

• Determine the content of training required—BIFC used its normal two-day firefighting course to train the JTF’s troops.

Summary

The smooth integration of military and civilian efforts demonstrated by the JTF Yellowstone firefighting experience is evidence that the military can operate efficiently with civilian agencies. Factors that seemed to contribute to the efficient response include the careful prestaged agreements between BIFC and DOMS, which spell out exactly what each party will bring to the table in a firefighting role, and the comprehensive liaison between BIFC and the military at all levels from the Pentagon to the platoons on the fireline. Although not all of these lessons could be copied for other missions that are less well-defined than firefighting—the agreements would seem to be worth careful study by the military as models on how to work in close harmony with another organization.

References

This section draws on the following references.


3. DOMS Briefings to the Secretary of the Army, September 12-30, 1988, Unclassified


7. These last two references are unpublished material in the DOMS files at the Pentagon Army Operations Center.
Alaskan Oil Spill TF
(April–September 1989)

Mission

The Alaskan Oil Spill Task Force (AOS-TF) provided military assistance to the Coast Guard and Alaskan authorities in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Background

On March 24, the Exxon Valdez, a tanker carrying over 50 million gallons of crude oil, ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. The subsequent oil spill covered over 1,000 square miles in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska.

On April 6, President Bush directed the Department of Defense to provide assistance to local authorities and the oil companies. DOD responded by organizing the AOS-TF to coordinate military support for the cleanup. The Coast Guard served as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator for the operations.

Support provided by the military included the airlift of over 1,000 tons of cargo; command, control and communications support; oil skimmers; dredges; emergency medical facilities and medevac; and ships for berthing civilian workers in the remote oil spill area.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

• 06 April: President Bush orders military assistance. AOS-TF formed by Secretary of Defense.

• 10 April: DOD Assessment Team surveys affected areas to determine what kind of assistance may be needed.

• 14 April: First Navy ship arrives on-scene.

• 16 September: Last Navy ship leaves.

• 22 September: End of operations.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Six amphibious transports (two on-scene at any given time) provided support to AOS-TF. USS Juneau arrived on-scene first on 28 April, staying until 31 May. It was joined by USS Fort McHenry, arriving on 4 May. These ships were relieved in succession by USS Cleveland, USS Mount Vernon, USS Ogden, and USS Duluth.

Navy ships served primarily as “floating hotels” during the operation, providing berthing and mess facilities for both military and civilian personnel. The Navy also provided 22 skimmers, plus salvage experts, from Naval Sea Systems Command and PACFLT. Some of these skimmers were in operation before the 6 April order establishing AOS-TF, under a standing agreement with authorities.

Marine Corps CH-46 helicopters participated in AOS-TF operations by flying medical evacuations and other sorties in support of the cleanup operations in Prince William Sound.

Other services

Air Force C-5 and C-141 aircraft provided airlift for AOS-TF. Cargoes consisted primarily of booms for the confinement of oil and decontamination kits.

Army support for AOS-TF was two-pronged. The Army Corps of Engineers provided two dredges, Essayons and Yaquina, for cleanup operations and command and control. Three Army UH-60 helicopters also
served as medevac/SAR aircraft. All three Army helicopters qualified to fly from the decks of the Navy ships during the operations.

The Coast Guard played a major role in the Alaskan Oil Spill cleanup operations. A series of Coast Guard officers served as Federal On-Scene Coordinator for the duration of the operation. The Coast Guard also provided SAR and reconnaissance for the operation. Alaskan Army National Guard and Air National Guard forces also participated in the response to the spill.

Command and control

Chain of command

The CJTF reported directly to the Director of Military Support, Office of the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of Defense named Lt.Gen. Thomas McInerney, USAF (Commanding General of the Alaskan Air Command) as the CJTF. The deputy CJTF was RAdm. Edward Baker (Commander, Amphibious Group Three).

The JTF staff was almost identical to the staff of JTF-AK, established by OPLAN 9639-83 to provide support to Federal Emergency Management Agency in the event of a natural disaster in Alaska. Because the command and control arrangements called for in OPLAN 9639-83 were not used, JTF-AK was not considered to be activated. The participants considered the AOS-TF to be a JTF, however, and it fulfills all of the doctrinal requirements for a JTF.

Liaison

AOS-TF had to have all its actions approved by the Coast Guard, acting as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator also approved requests for AOS-TF operations generated by other state and federal agencies and monitored Exxon's cleanup efforts to ensure compliance with federal statutes.

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8. JTF-AK, when activated, supported USCINCFOR, who reported through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense.
Exxon was responsible for the cleanup, and the federal government made a deliberate policy decision at the beginning of the operation not to release the corporation from that responsibility. Thus, Exxon, although it had to comply with federal and state oversight, was primarily responsible for organizing and funding the cleanup effort. So, in effect, the JTF acted in support of Exxon. With Exxon paying the JTF’s bills in excess of those that would have been incurred in the absence of the cleanup, the JTF had to coordinate and negotiate with Exxon for both the conduct of operations and determining which forces should be part of the JTF.

Lessons learned/unique features

Command and control arrangements were unique.

Command and control for AOS-TF were significantly different than for most other JTFs studied in this paper. The activation order came not from a unified CINC, but directly from the Secretary of Defense. In addition, AOS-TF reported directly to one of the services—who are normally in a supporting vice a supported role during JTF operations.

AOS-TF modified an existing OPLAN—one for responding to a natural disaster on land in Alaska—to handle the oil spill. That allowed AOS-TF to exploit the table of organization already drawn up for JTF-AK. One important change to the command and control arrangements envisioned by OPLAN 9639-85 was the replacement of Federal Emergency Management Agency by the Coast Guard as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.

Mission termination was difficult.

In reviewing the other operations, it appears that deciding when to terminate disaster relief operations is often difficult. This dilemma was especially so in the case of the Exxon Valdez spill where a full cleanup was a practical impossibility. In the case of the AOS-TF, the CJTF and Secretary of Defense made a perhaps arbitrary decision at the beginning of the operation—military support for the cleanup would end at the end of summer. (Exxon and the Coast Guard did not believe cleanup operations during winter were possible.)
Summary

The U.S. military provided beneficial assistance in the cleanup of the oil spill resulting from the grounding of Exxon Valdez. Members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and National Guard augmented Coast Guard capabilities to contain and remove spilled oil from Prince William Sound. The operation was costly—DOD estimates indicate nearly $58 million were spent during the operation, only $18 million of which did Exxon reimburse.

References

This section draws on the following references:


JTF Philippines—Philippine Coup
(December 1989)

Mission

The mission of JTF Philippines was to coordinate aid given to the Philippine government during a coup attempt, safeguard the American bases and embassy, and prepare for the possibility of evacuating American servicemembers and civilians.

Background

On December 1, 1989, up to 3,000 members of the Philippine armed forces organized by Colonel Gregorio Honansan (leader of a 1987 coup attempt) mounted a coup attempt against the government of President Corazon Aquino. The rebels attacked military bases in suburban Manila, bombarded the capital and presidential palace, and seized the international airport in Cebu.

President Aquino requested assistance from the U.S. Government. In response, the NCA authorized the establishment of JTF Philippines to coordinate military aid given to the Philippine government and prepare for a possible evacuation of American citizens.

The most visible (on the ground in the Philippines) aid given to the government of Corazon Aquino was the overflight of Philippine Air Force bases by USAF F-4 jets to discourage participation in the coup by the Philippine Air Force. The coup ended with a cease-fire on December 6.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:


- December 1, 1989: Philippine government asks for assistance from U.S. government. NCA directs the USCINCPAC to offer assistance. USCINCPAC establishes JTF Philippines.

- December 1, 1989: USAF F-4s from Clark field start combat air patrol over Philippine Air Force bases. E-2C from Midway air wing provides surveillance of Manila area.

- December 2, 1989: Rebels seize control of Manila financial district, trapping some 200 Americans in hotels there. At the request of the Philippine government, U.S. “persuasion” flights stop.

- December 6, 1989: Rebels allow foreigners to leave Manila financial district. Government and rebels agree to a cease-fire.

- December 7, 1989: Rebels in Manila return to their barracks. Rebels in Cebu hold airport for two more days.

- December 8, 1989: JTF Philippines disestablished. Carriers begin redeployment to Japan. Marines augment security at American Embassy for several more days.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

USCINCPAC gave JTF Philippines OPCON over all U.S. Forces in the Philippines, including the sizeable Navy and Marine contingents at Subic Bay. In addition, two carrier battle groups, USS Midway and USS Enterprise with their associated air wings operating in the Philippine Sea, chopped to JTF Philippines. During the operations, the carriers maintained deck alerts and 24-hour coverage of Manila with E-2C aircraft.
During the crisis a company of Marines (120 total) from the CTF 79 Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) reinforced the embassy. The Marine component commander for JTF Philippines was the Commanding General of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Other Marine Corps forces involved included two amphibious ready groups placed on alert for a potential NEO—without being placed under the OPCON of the JTF.

Other forces

The 13th Air Force staff at Clark AB essentially became the JTF HQ staff. One Navy officer and one Marine Corps liaison officer augmented the staff.

The 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing of the 13th Air Force flew combat air patrols over Philippine Air Force air bases to discourage participation in the coup. In addition, about 100 Naval and Army special forces were chopped to JTF Philippines, primarily for combat search and rescue. In Hawaii, USCINCPAC placed the 25th Infantry Division (Light) on alert, without placing them under the OPCON of JTF Philippines.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Pacific was the supported CINC for the U.S. support of the Aquino government during the Philippine coup. He designated MGen. Don Snyder, USAF (Commanding General of 13th Air Force) as the Commander, Joint Task Force Philippines. The Naval component commander was COMUSNAVPHIL.

Liaison

The CJTF maintained liaison with the country team at the U.S. Embassy. In addition, the CJTF used informal contacts within the Philippine military to secure the release of U.S. servicemembers temporarily trapped on rebel-held bases when the coup began.
Lessons learned/unique features

During the initial hours of the operation, there was a significant lag in information reaching afloat forces.

Although the after-action reports generally reported good communications between the JTF HQ ashore (at Clark AB) and the afloat units, nearly 24 hours passed before complete descriptions of the rules of engagement (ROE) and identification friend or foe (IFF) codes arrived at the afloat forces. With no tasking other than surveillance and reporting, the omission did not have a serious effect on the outcome. Had the Philippine Air Force chosen to challenge the JTF Philippine forces, the situation might have been different.

Navy representation on the JTF staff was very thin compared to the number of forces committed.

One liaison officer represented the Navy on the JTF staff. With the large Navy participation (two carrier battle groups chopped for execution, two amphibious ready groups available for planning purposes), that representation was a little thin. Had the operation continued for an extended period of time, a single Navy liaison officer would not have (1) been enough for the JTF staff to handle the administrative upkeep associated with Naval forces or (2) provided sufficient staffing to manage multiple fleet warfare tasks. Given the short duration of the operation (U.S. operations other than monitoring virtually ceased within 24 hours at the request of the Philippine government), the thin staffing had no substantive effect on the operation.

The Naval component commander had insufficient staffing and communications circuits to oversee the naval operations.

The JTF Philippines command structure was specified in an inter-service agreement for contingency operations in the Philippines. As the ranking Naval officer on-shore, COMUSNAVPHIL, was the pre-designated Naval component commander. However, COMUSNAVPHIL had a very small staff not accustomed to operating Naval forces and lacked direct access to important command and control circuits such
as FLEETSEVOX or M-HOP. During the Philippine coup operations, another Subic tenant command acted as an ad-hoc “mail drop” and communications center for COMUSNAVPHIL.

Summary

In general, the Philippine coup was almost over before it started, and the rebels never made good on hinted threats to endanger U.S. citizens. The relative lack of threat placed little stress on the JTF command structure, which was fortunate. Several after-action reports noted potential problems with adequate staffing on the JTF staff and Naval component commander to adequately provide command and control for the relatively large Naval force being assembled. In the actual event, the less-than-optimum command structure did not prevent the JTF from accomplishing all of the assigned missions.

References

This section draws on the following references:

1. USCINCPAC 010604Z DEC 89, Activation of JTF PHIL, Secret/NOFORN

2. JULLS 10444-51969, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Submitted by CJTF Philippines, Unclassified

3. JULLS 10450-82497, Seventh Fleet/PAC Air Force IFF Codes, submitted by CJTF Philippines, Secret

4. COMPAC HONOLULU HI, Philippines Intelligence Team - Philippine Coup Update 89-05 (U), Secret/NOFORN/WNINTEL

5. JULLS 10545-39776, Chop of Naval Forces to CJTF (U), submitted by CJTF Philippines, Confidential

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Operation Just Cause  
(December 1989–January 1990)  

Mission  

The mission of JTF South was to:  

- Protect American lives.  
- Secure key military and canal sites.  
- Neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF).  
- Prepare to restore law and order.  
- Support installation of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama.  

This military mission was in support of U.S. political goals that the President of the United States defined as:  

- Protect American lives.  
- Protect American interests and rights under the Panama Canal Treaty.  
- Apprehend the leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, for trial on drug charges in the United States.  
- Restore Panamanian democracy.  

The military mission essentially satisfied the first three political objectives. The final political objective—restoring Panamanian democracy—was the object of a follow-on operation called Promote Liberty.
In 1987 relations between the United States and Panama began to deteriorate when a PDF colonel publicly charged that the de facto leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, was involved in drug trafficking, electoral fraud, and murder of political opponents. The revelations caused several days of rioting in Panama. The Noriega government restored calm using violent repression. The result was a public denunciation by the United States government that began a quiet diplomatic campaign to persuade Noriega to leave Panama.

The diplomatic campaign to remove Noriega became public in early 1988 when two American grand juries indicted him on drug trafficking charges. Noriega responded to U.S. diplomatic efforts to remove him by charging interference in Panamanian affairs and sponsoring harassment of U.S. citizens in Panama. The U.S. continued diplomatic efforts to persuade Noriega to leave office, refused to recognize his handpicked government, imposed economic sanctions, and began contingency planning for an operation to remove him from power forcibly.

Throughout 1989, Noriega stepped up his harassment campaign, and the United States responded by continuing the sanctions, attempting to encourage a coup, and stepping up the pace of military planning. On December 15, Noriega declared that a state of war existed between the United States and Panama. One day later, PDF forces killed a Marine Corps officer at a roadblock. As a result, the President of the United States ordered the invasion of Panama the next day.

All together, some 26,000 American servicemen took part in the invasion. The plan for Operation Just Cause stressed the use of overwhelming mass and tactical surprise to decapitate the PDF by knocking out key installations, apprehending Noriega, and disbanding PDF units judged to be most loyal to Noriega. Organized resistance was over within two to three days as the invasion force effectively eliminated the PDF as an entity. Civil military operations aimed at restoring a Panamanian government took much longer.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- February 28, 1988: JCS Warning Order to CINCSOUTH orders contingency planning to deal with Panama situation. CINCSOUTH produces two plans: Blue Spoon—a military plan to remove Noriega, destroy the PDF, and secure the canal; and Blind Logic—a civil military plan to reconstruct Panama in the aftermath of Blue Spoon.

- July 1988: The CJCS approves CINCSOUTH’s nomination of the CG XVIII Airborne Corps as the potential CJTF South for contingency operations in Panama.

- May 10, 1989: Noriega annuls the results of the Panamanian elections after counts by outside observers and the Catholic Church give the opposition a 3:1 victory. PDF Dignity Battalions brutally attack opposition politicians at a rally protesting the annulment of the elections. The U.S. recognizes the opposition leader, Guillermo Endara, as winner of the election.

- June 1989: U.S. steps up training exercises in Panama to exercise parts of Blue Spoon, assert U.S. maneuver rights, and gauge the Panamanian reaction.

- August 5, 1989: CINCSOUTH directs XVIII Corps to accelerate planning for its potential role as the headquarters of JTF South. XVIII Corps planners produce OPLAN 90-1 as a replacement for the Blue Spoon plan.

- October 3, 1989: Noriega survives attempted coup by dissidents within the PDF. Based on an analysis of the PDF’s reaction to the coup, XVIII Corps planners update OPLAN 90-1 to OPLAN 90-2.

- October 17, 1989: XVIII Corps publishes OPLAN 90-2. CINCSOUTH tasks components with developing detailed plans to accomplish missions outlined in plan.

- November 3, 1989: JCS approves and publishes OPLAN 90-2, which was the plan for Operation Just Cause.
- November 16, 1989: Based on intelligence of impending terrorist attack, CINCSOUTH activates JTF South. CG of XVIII Corps is the CJTF.

- November 15–17: JTF South infiltrates into Panama with Sheridan tanks and AH-64 helicopters under cover of darkness.

- December 15, 1989: Noriega removes the President of Panama, declares himself head of government. Panamanian Assembly declares that Panama is in a state of war with the United States.

- December 16, 1989: Marine Lt. Robert Paz killed by PDF at checkpoint. A Navy lt. and his wife who witness the shooting are held, beaten, and interrogated by the PDF for several hours before being released.

- December 17, 1989: CINCSOUTH recommends execution of Operation Just Cause to CJCS. NCA issues execute order with C-day/H-hour set for 1:00 A.M. (Panama time) on December 18, and D-day/H-hour set for 1:00 AM (Panama time) on December 20.

- December 17, 1989: CINCSOUTH begins a review and update of the Blind Logic plans for the follow-on civil military operations. The code name for these operations is Promote Liberty.

- December 20, 1989: A few minutes after midnight, a Panamanian Justice of the Peace swears in Endara as President of Panama at a U.S. military base in Panama City.

- December 20, 1989: At 12:45 A.M. JTF forces strike 27 targets simultaneously. The stiffest fighting occurs at the PDF headquarters (La Commandancia) in Panama City and at Rio Hata. Both are in U.S. hands by mid afternoon.

- December 20, 1989: Widespread looting and civil unrest starts in urban areas along canal in the absence of any organized police force. The rioting and looting continued for several days.

- December 20, 1989: CINCSOUTH submits plan for civil military operations in the wake of Just Cause (an updated version of Blind Logic named Promote Liberty) to CJCS for approval.

• December 22, 1989: U.S. Army South organizes systematic patrols of Panama City and assigns 3,000 troops to police duties. In consultation with Endara, the U.S. Army South J-4 recruits 1,000 former PDF members for the new police force (Fuerza Publica), which begins joint patrols with U.S. Army Military Police the next day.

• December 24, 1989: Noriega seeks asylum in the Papal Nunciature. Looting ends as the JTF restores order to Panama City.

• December 24, 1989: Lt. Colonel del Cid surrenders with 2,000 PDF troops near Costa Rican border. The surrender ends threat of major guerilla operations by the PDF. Redeployment of U.S. forces starts.

• January 3, 1990: Noriega leaves the Papal Nunciature and surrenders to U.S. forces.

• January 11, 1990: JTF Panama (commanded by the CG U.S. Army South) assumes control of Just Cause/Promote Liberty. JTF South is disestablished.

• January 31, 1990: U.S. Forces in Panama make the transition from Just Cause ROE to Promote Liberty ROE. This marked the official declaration of the end of hostilities.

• February 18, 1990: U.S. troop strength in Panama reduced to pre-Just Cause levels.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Although several U.S. Navy vessels were placed on alert in support of the operation, the only direct Navy participants were special forces teams and base personnel in the Naval Forces, Panama. Prior to Just Cause, the T-AKR Bellatrix transported elements of the 5th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) from Louisiana to Panama. Marine Corps participants included the 6th Marine Expeditionary Battalion (3 companies) based at Camp Lejeune and Marine security detachments already in Panama.

Other forces

The JTF South headquarters was built around the core of the XVIII Airborne Corps. In addition to the 13,000 troops already in Panama—U.S. Army South, a detachment of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), and a detachment of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)—other major combat units in JTF South included the 82nd Airborne Division (Army), 7th Infantry Division (Army), and the 75th Ranger Regiment (Army, Special Forces). In all about 26,000 troops were available to JTF South within the first 48 hours of the invasion. Providing lift to get the troops in-theater was the mission of the Air Force. This was a major operation that, by one estimate, required 80 percent of TRANSCOM's total lift capacity for two days.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command was the supported CINC for the operation. He named Lt.Gen. Carl Stiner (U.S. Army), Commanding General of the XVII Airborne Corps, as the Commander of JTF South.

Liaison

The follow-on operation to Just Cause was a civil military operation code named Promote Liberty whose purpose was aid the reconstruction of Panamanian democracy. The military commander for Promote Liberty was the CINCSOUTH J-5, a general staff officer designated as COMCMOTF. COMCMOTF was subordinate to the Charge at the American Embassy. JTF South coordinated civil affairs issues with COMCOMTF. COMCMOTF handled relations with the fledgling new government of Panama, which for a time consisted of President Endara and his two vice presidents.
Lessons learned/unique features

An extended period of time was available for planning.

The slowly worsening nature of the crisis made planning for the military operations an exercise in deliberate planning rather than crisis action planning. This had the advantage of allowing more time to do the job. The potential disadvantage was that the plans would be outdated by changes in the situation. This to some extent happened with the plans for Promote Liberty (the restoration operation).

Transition to an effective Panamanian government was difficult.

Transitioning from combat operations aimed at destroying the PDF to restoration operations aimed at putting Panama back together proved to be difficult. A variety of factors contributed to the problem. Some of the more important ones were:

- The restoration plans for Operation Promote Liberty were not as mature as the combat plans for the invasion of Panama when the invasion took place. The only available plans were draft OPLANs (code named Blind Logic) dating from 1988 that did not reflect the changes made to the combat plans in 1989. Detailed planning for Promote Liberty did not begin in earnest until hours before the invasion.

- The Department of State and country team had not been included in the transition planning. Before the invasion, all plans were highly classified and held within compartmented channels inside DOD. This effectively prevented liaison with the Department of State or the country team until the time had come to execute the restoration plans.

- The PDF was thoroughly destroyed. Paradoxically, the nearly complete destruction of the PDF accomplished by the invasion forces made the reconstruction difficult. The PDF included not only the Army, but police, immigration, air control, and even postal authorities. Knocking out the PDF knocked out these and other basic services. Planning for Operation Just Cause did not address how these functions would be performed in the
interim between the destruction of the old government and the effective installation of the new government.

- The Endara “government” was not prepared to govern. At first, it consisted of three men—the President and two vice presidents. Three men do not a government make, particularly when the opposition parties they represented had been isolated from governing Panama for so long that they had no ties with the remaining Panamanian civil authorities. This situation is not unusual in countries emerging from a totalitarian period of rule.

- The JTF had trouble staffing the Civil Affairs Task Force with qualified experts. Most of the Civil Affairs expertise in the U.S. Armed Forces resides in the reserves. Unless the President authorizes a Selective Reserve callup—which he declined to do for Just Cause—they cannot be activated on an involuntary basis. Staffing with volunteers makes it harder to find the required experts and does not provide the unit level support available when the entire reserve units activate.

Communications were much improved over Operation Urgent Fury.

In Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, after-action reports named poor communications as the largest single problem faced by the invasion force. By way of contrast, communications worked well in Operation Just Cause. Factors contributing to the improved state of communications included:

- The existence of a large communications infrastructure in-theater due to the U.S. bases in Panama.

- The publishing of a Joint Communications-Electronics Operations Instruction (JCEO1) that specified how everyone would talk to each other. The JCEO1 took about two weeks to prepare.

- The establishment of a single set of crypto throughout the theater of operations.
• The overwhelming single-service nature of the ground operations. The Army provided the lion’s share of the combat assets, which simplified communications planning since there were only a few, well-defined, cross-service boundaries to communicate across.

Special forces were integrated into the JTF.

About 4,000 special forces troops participated in Just Cause, making it the largest special forces operation since Vietnam. The special forces were organized into five groups as part of a single Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) operating under the OPCON of JTF South. The five groups included:

• Task Force Red—consisting of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Its assignment was to secure the Torrijos/Tocumen airport for follow-on airlift operations and to prevent the PDF forces at Rio Hata from reinforcing Panama City.

• Task Force Black—consisting of the 3/7 Special Forces Group (Army Green Berets). Its assignment was to conduct several reconnaissance missions, blockade a key bridge, and seize the main Panamanian television tower to prevent transmissions by Noriega.

• Task Force White—consisting of two Navy Special Warfare teams assigned to disable Noriega’s private jet and block the runway at Portilla airport.

• Task Force Blue—a Navy Special Warfare team assigned to disable the PDF’s fast patrol boats and Noriega’s private yachts.

• Task Force Green—the Army’s Delta Force, assigned to rescue an American from prison just before H-hour and form a reserve team ready to snatch Noriega once intelligence located him.

Follow-on missions by special forces units included PSYOPS, pacification, and survey teams.
Summary

By almost any reasonable measure, the military operations of Just Cause were a success. All of the military objectives were achieved with limited American (23 killed) and Panamanian (314 PDF and 202 civilians killed) casualties.

Achieving one of the political goals of restoring Panamanian democracy is still in doubt. Basic institutions such as the newly organized police force, the Fuerza Publica, are still in a state of turmoil. For example, as of December 1993, the Fuerza Publica had just fired its fourth chief in four years. The coming 1994 Panamanian Presidential and Assembly elections will provide a good barometer of how far Panamanian democracy has matured.

References

This section draws on the following references:


5. JULLS 12452-0431, Lack of Planning for Refugee Camps, submitted by CINCSOUTH, Unclassified

6. JULLS 12850-44752, Rebuilding the Panamanian Judicial System, submitted by USARSO, Unclassified

7. JULLS 20238-09857, Contingency Plans Focus, submitted by 7th Infantry Division (Light), Unclassified
8. JULLS 22254-82212, *Insufficient Active Component Civil Affairs Forces*, submitted by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Unclassified


10. JULLS 22242-30224, *U.S. Military Sustainment Base Communications System*, submitted by USARSO, Unclassified

11. JULLS 2235-45094, *Joint CEOI*, submitted by XVIII Army Corps, Secret

12. JULLS 22236-13833, *Inter-theater COMSEC package*, submitted by XVIII Army Corps, Secret

13. JULLS 30533-59808, *Public Safety During Active Military Operations*, submitted by USARSO, Unclassified
Operation Sharp Edge  
(May 1990–January 1991)

Mission

The JCS warning order to CINCEUR gives the mission of JTF Sharp Edge as:

- Assist U.S. Embassy Monrovia with security
- Protect the lives of U.S. citizens
- Protect U.S. property
- Protect third country nationals
- Protect selected host-country nationals
- Prepare for a NEO of up to 3,000 people.

Background

In December of 1989, a civil war began in Liberia. Initially small in size, the rebellion grew and rebel forces began a slow advance on the capital of Monrovia. As the situation began to worsen, the American Embassy asked for military support to conduct a potential NEO.

Initial planning focused on an airlift from the international airport; however, the worsening security situation at the airport caused a change in plans. The JCS authorized the movement of a Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) from the Mediterranean to offshore Liberia. USCINCEUR designated Commander Sixth Fleet as the CJTF.

The insurgency gathered steam at a leisurely pace, and about four months elapsed from the time the MARG arrived to when the
evacuation began in earnest. The trigger for the evacuation was a threat by one of the rebel factions to take American hostages to use as a bargaining chip in the diplomatic discussions attempting to end the war. In all, the JTF evacuated over 2,400 civilians from Liberia over the course of about two weeks.

In addition to the evacuation, the JTF played a large role in supplying and providing security for the American Embassy in Liberia. That mission continued for several months after all the noncombatants were evacuated. The planned-for extraction of Liberian President Doe never happened due to his refusal to leave the country.

**Timetable**

The significant events in this operation were as follows:

- **December 1989:** Civil war begins in Liberia.

- **April 28, 1990:** JCS issues warning order to USCINCEUR to identify alternative courses of action. Initial planning focuses on the use of air-landed forces for the potential NEO.

- **May 25, 1990:** SECDEF authorizes deployment of the Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG 2-90) for a possible NEO. MARG to remain under CINCEUR OPCON. Commander Sixth Fleet is named as the CJTF.

- **May 27, 1990:** MARG 2-90 departs France for Liberia.

- **May 31, 1990:** MARG 2-90 Forward Command Element arrives in Liberia to coordinate with country team.

- **June 2, 1990:** USS *Peterson* arrives on station off the coast of Monrovia. The MARG arrives the next day.

- **June 11, 1990:** Liberian rebel forces overrun Roberts International Airport in Monrovia.

- **July 13, 1990:** COMSIXTHFLT and staff depart theater. Commander Amphibious Squadron Four is named as the CJTF.

• August 5, 1990: The JTF begins evacuation of U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals from U.S. Embassy and reinforces the embassy with a rifle company. Later operations expand to evacuations from the Port of Buchanan. In all, through 20 August, the JTF evacuates 1,648 people (132 of which are U.S. citizens).

• August 21, 1990: MARG 3-90 relieves MARG 2-90. The Commanding Officer of USS Whidbey Island is named as the CJTF.

• October–December, 1990: As fighting dies down, the U.S. presence is reduced to 40 Marines ashore and an element of the 26th MEU aboard USS Nashville. After December, JTF operations no longer included the NEO requirement and instead involved sea-based logistical support of the U.S. Embassy and security reinforcement of the Embassy.

• January 9, 1991: USCINCEUR disestablished JTF Sharp Edge.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

The initial Navy ships participating in the operation included TF 61 (consisting of USS Saipan, USS Ponce, and USS Sumter with about 1,500 sailors assigned to the ships companies), and a destroyer (USS Peterson with a crew of 251). COMFAIRMED set up and operated a forward logistics site at Lungi Airport in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to manage the airhead and the flow of supplies passing through it.

Later Navy participants included replenishment ships—USS Savannah, USNS Neosho, USNS Riegel, and USNS Kaiser, and a second amphibious task force (consisting of USS Whidbey Island and USS Barnstable County); the second task force was later relieved by USS Nashville.

The initial Marine forces included TF 62 (the 22d MEU-SOC with about 2,400 Marines). The Marines were embarked aboard the ships
of TF 61 with a small SPMAGTF of 75 Marines embarked on *Peterson*. Later Marine participants included MARG 3-90, a 500-man and 3-helicopter detachment from the 26th MEU.

Navy and Marine Corps active-duty and reserve C-130, KC-130, and C-9 aircraft kept open the lifeline to the American Embassy in Monrovia by airlifting supplies to Freetown, Sierra Leone. Thereafter, organic Marine Corps helicopters from the 22d MEU ferried the supplies to the ships and the American Embassy in Monrovia. During the height of the operation, at least three C-130 flights operated per week between Rota and Freetown.

**Other forces**

The 82d Airborne Division was placed on alert to participate if required by the security situation or the pace of events. It did not directly participate in the operation and was not chopped to the CJTF. Small Army special forces elements and special joint intelligence teams were chopped to the JTF. Otherwise, the operation was mostly a Navy-Marine Corps operation.

**Command and control**

**Chain of command**

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Europe was the supported CINC for the operation. He was supported by USCINCLANT, in whose AOR some of the operations actually took place. USCINCEUR named the COMSIXTHFLT as the CJTF. After the initial heavy deployment phase, Commander, Amphibious Squadron Four relieved him as the CJTF. Later, as operations wound down in August, the Commanding Officer, USS Whidbey Island (a Navy commander), became the CJTF. He was relieved after a few weeks by a senior Navy captain from Norfolk.

**Liaison**

Operation Sharp Edge was conducted in support of the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. To conduct liaison with the country team, the
CJTF sent a forward command element of the MARG to the American Embassy in Monrovia. The CJTF also coordinated with naval forces from the United Kingdom, the government of Sierra Leone for use of the airport at Freetown, and the peacekeeping forces of the Economic Community of West African States to share information. In addition, at least one evacuation operation required negotiation with rebel forces, who provided “security” for the site.

Lessons learned/unique features

Sharp Edge was primarily a blue-green operation.

Operation Sharp Edge was primarily a Navy-Marine Corp operation. The primary mission, a NEO, is one that the Navy and Marine Corps practice together. Although many tactical lessons learned were submitted by the participants after the operation, none of them challenge existing command and control or operational doctrine. That, and the successful completion of the mission, implies that the existing JTF and NEO doctrine were more than adequate for the conduct of the operation.

Two command and control issues were noteworthy.

Some command and control features of the operations were the:

- Successive changes in the Commander of the JTF. Starting with the commander of a numbered fleet (a vice admiral) and eventually ending up as the Commanding Officer of a Navy vessel (a Commander).

- JTF coordination with the country team through a forward command element of a component commander. Although forward command teams are a fairly common feature of the JTF operations we reviewed, in all other cases they were organized as a forward element from the JTF HQ staff.

Mission creep was evident.

The slow pace of operations was influenced by the gradual worsening of the security situation and by the long-term requirement levied by
the Department of State to keep the American Embassy supplied in a city under a virtual state of siege. The requirement to keep the embassy supplied does not appear to be part of the JTF's original mission, which reads more like a quick-response rescue. Rather, it appears to be the result of mission creep.

The change in mission had profound consequences for the JTF, which found itself on station for months after the NEO and executing several construction tasks such as the installation of reverse osmosis water generation plants and fuel tanks at the American Embassy. When Desert Shield/Desert Storm appeared on the horizon, the operations off of Liberia finally became too expensive to maintain.

Summary

Operation Sharp Edge was a success from the viewpoint of accomplishing the local mission. The evacuations all took place without loss of life, and the JTF was instrumental in keeping the embassy supplied over a seven-month period. However, the operation did represent a sizeable additional commitment for the U.S. forces at the start of the Gulf war. USCINCEUR tried unsuccessfully for several months to get permission from the NCA to disestablish the JTF after the evacuation took place.

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This section draws on the following references:

1. CNA Information Memorandum 168, Operation Sharp Edge: The Role of Naval Forces in Evacuation Operations (U), by Desmond P. Wilson, Secret/NOFORN, Jun 1991


JTF Proven Force
(December 1990–February 1991)

Mission

JTF Proven Force provided air support, combat SAR in northern Iraq, and PSYOPS support to Operation Desert Storm from bases within the EUCOM AOR—principally, Incirlik, Turkey.

Background

Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States assembled a coalition of forces to at first protect Saudi Arabia and later roll back the Iraqi gains. Starting in August 1990, the United States began negotiations with Turkey to gain permission for combat sorties and to increase the number of tactical aircraft based in Turkey. The Turkish government and people had wide differences of opinion on the issue. Finally, at the last moment before hostilities, Turkey permitted U.S. aircraft at Incirlik Air Base to participate in combat operations against Iraq.

Originally, the concept of operations was for the aircraft at Incirlik to act as a small decoy force to divert enemy equipment and resources. This was in part due to an uncertainty about the role Turkey would permit combat aircraft based within its borders to play. However, the concept quickly expanded to include attack of strategic targets (airfields, communication nodes, CW production centers, etc.) in northern Iraq. During Desert Storm, JTF Proven Force flew about 4,400 sorties, striking 120 targets in Iraq and downing 5 Iraqi aircraft.

9. For example, a NATO AWACS bases out of Incirlik. Because NATO was not a formal coalition member, that AWACS was used solely for defense. Additional “U.S.-only” AWACS deployed to Incirlik to support the combat operations.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

• August 2, 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait.

• September 1990: U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) proposes basing EW aircraft at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to complicate Iraqi defensive efforts. USCINCEUR and CJCS endorse the proposal and talks start with Turkey.

• October 1990: U.S. receives permission from Turkey to increase number of tactical aircraft at Incirlik to 96 (up from 48). EUCOM begins deployment of aircraft to Incirlik in the hope that Turkey will allow their participation in combat operations.

• December 23, 1990: USCINCEUR sends USAFE HQ the OPORD for Operation Proven Force.

• December 26, 1990: USCINCEUR establishes JTF Proven Force.

• January 12, 1990: Secretary of Defense authorizes deployment of Patriot missile batteries to Turkey.

• January 16, 1990: CJTF and staff deploy to Incirlik Air Base.

• January 17, 1990: Turkish Parliament authorizes Turkish government to allow JTF forces in Turkey to “carry out UN Security Council Resolutions.”

• January 17, 1990: Desert Storm air campaign begins.

• January 18, 1990: First JTF Proven Force air missions.

• January 22, 1990: Patriot missile batteries deploy to Incirlik.

• March/April 1990: JTF disestablished. Forces redeploy to home base.
Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Other than small numbers of Navy and Marine Corps officers included in the JTF staff, no Naval forces or servicemembers took part in Proven Force.

Other forces

About 4,500 Air Force servicemembers took part in JTF Proven Force. They provided the manning for a composite wing (about 20 percent larger than normal USAF wing size) of U.S. Air Force aircraft at Incirlik. Most of the wing operated out of Incirlik, with small detachments occasionally staging from Hellenikon and Andra vita in Greece and Soudha Bay, Crete. The aircraft came as small detachments from many units and, as of February 24, included:

- 3 EC-130s
- 6 RF-4Cs
- 13 KC-135As
- 6 EF-111s
- 3 E5-Bs
- 37 F-16s
- 28 F-15Cs
- 18 F-111Es
- 12 F-4Gs

Other Air Force assets coming under the tactical control of CJTF Proven Force included 22 B-52Gs basing out of Moron, Spain, and 8 B52-Gs based out of RAF Fairford, United Kingdom. Finally, the Military Airlift Command provided lift to move the JTF forces, equipment, and supplies to Incirlik.

About 1,500 U.S. Army servicemembers participated in Proven Force. For the most part, they operated Patriot missile batteries defending Incirlik.

Special Forces participants came from the 10th Special Forces Group (Army) and the 39th Special Operations Wing (Air Force).
Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, Europe, retained operational control of JTF Proven Force, and his service components retained their administrative support responsibilities for the JTF Proven Force units. Commander in Chief, Central Command exercised TACON and provided targeting requirements and tactical direction to the JTF. Within the USCINCECENT organization, CJTF Proven Force reported directly to the CINC—as if he were a component commander. MGen. James Jamerson, USAF (Deputy of Operations, USAFE) was the Commander, Joint Task Force Proven Force.

Liaison

CJTF Proven Force conducted liaison with the Turkish General Staff to coordinate airspace control over Turkey and establish safe passage procedures for returning flights. The coordination procedures were completed only after the JTF deployed to Turkey. In addition, the JTF had to clear combat missions with the Turkish government on a day-by-day basis. CJTF Proven Force also had to coordinate overflight privileges with other countries for B-52 aircraft staging out of Moron, Spain, and RAF Fairford, United Kingdom.

Lessons learned/unique features

JTF Proven Force coordinated with Desert Storm forces through mission orders and geographic separation.

Although USCINCECENT included JTF Proven Force missions in the Desert Storm master attack plan, their tasking was not as detailed. For example, Proven Force air sorties did not appear in the Desert Storm Air Tasking Order. Instead, the orders were written as mission orders such as “Destroy CW production facilities at Mosul.” Once assigned targets, the JTF Proven Force planners determined force size, mix, and desired weaponry—details normally contained in the Air Tasking Order. In effect, USCINCECENT gave JTF Proven Force route packages, and the Proven Force planners produced a local Air Tasking Order.
Factors driving the Proven Force air concept of operations appear to have been:

- A desire to minimize communications requirements

- The potential for forces outside of USCINCCEUР’s OPCON (USCINCEUR had OPCON, USCINCCEUР had TACON of Proven Force) to be given other tasking not visible to USCINCCEUР

- The last-minute approval by the Turkish government for Proven Force to operate (initial planning for the air campaign had to assume no Proven Force sorties)

- The continuing requirement for Turkish civilian government approval, which rendered each Proven Force sortie an unproven asset until just before takeoff.

To deconflict JTF Proven Force with other Desert Storm air activities, USCINCCEUР used geographic separation. Generally, most JTF Proven Force targets were in northern Iraq. The geographic separation reduced the need of JTF Proven Force to coordinate with other Desert Storm coalition forces—again lowering the communications requirements.

**Creation of a composite wing required extensive logistics support from the CINC’s service component.**

The aircraft in the composite wing at Incirlik arrived as small detachments from a number of different units. This provided a challenge for the supply and maintenance of the aircraft.

The logistics concept required each aircraft’s home unit to provide intermediate-level repair support. This placed a burden on the transportation system to deliver the spare parts. During Proven Force, airlift moved some 8,000 short tons into Incirlik. Sea/ground transportation moved an additional 3,000 short tons of equipment.

Once the equipment arrived in Incirlik, it had to be accounted for and properly distributed to each detachment. In the end, USAFE opted to establish a separate supply account for each aircraft type.
When the administrative overhead of this approach overburdened the facilities available at Incirlik, USAFE moved a number of the supply accounts to Ramstein AFB in Germany.

Summary

JTF Proven Force showed how the JTF concept can be used by one CINC to give combat support to another. With TACON, USCINCENT could incorporate JTF Proven Force into his master attack plan, while USCEUR handled all of the administrative details involved in maintaining the task force. The one concession involved was the need to handle Proven Force sorties outside of the USCINCENT Air Tasking Order. Because JTF Proven Force flew sorties into a part of Iraq that was very difficult for other Desert Storm assets to reach, having its sorties tasked outside of the USCINCENT Air Tasking Order appears to have had little effect on unity of effort during the air campaign.

References

This section draws on the following references:


CTF Provide Comfort
(April–July 1991)

Mission

Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort coordinated a multinational relief effort for Kurdish refugees in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq following the end of Operation Desert Storm.

Background

During the war against Iraq, President Bush encouraged Iraqis to oust Saddam Hussein from power. In March, following Desert Storm, the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq, apparently heeding this call, started a rising against the Iraqi government. On 22 March, Iraqi forces began a counter-offensive that led to millions of Kurds fleeing their homes toward Turkey and Iran. Having fled their homes with little preparation into harsh terrain, the Kurds soon faced massive nutritional and health problems. In part due to media accounts of their suffering, on 5 April the UN voted in Resolution 688 authorizing the use of force, if necessary, to protect relief efforts for the Kurdish refugees.

U.S. relief efforts began with airdrops of relief supplies the following day. Within days, at Secretary of State Baker’s urging, the relief effort expanded. With a growing U.S. and multinational commitment, on 16 April 1991, the Joint Task Force became a Combined Task Force (CTF) under the command of Lt.Gen. Shalikashvili, USA. The CTF had three objectives (which were also the phases for the operation):

- Stop the dying and suffering. Stabilize the population.
- Resettle population at temporary sites. Establish sustainable, secure environment.
• Return refugee population to their homes.

CTF-PC established forward ground bases in Turkey and northern Iraq to expedite the distribution of supplies and provide medical assistance. Then temporary communities were built to house the displaced civilian population inside northern Iraq, the first of these near Zakhu. By mid May, coalition forces began phase three to assist the Kurds to return to their homes. In all, the coalition forces delivered 27,000 tons of relief supplies and aid to about 850,000 Kurdish civilians.

The second and third phases, especially, had a security mission as well as humanitarian one. Through _demarches_ and shows of force, coalition forces managed to avoid any direct combat confrontation with Iraqi forces.

**Timetable**

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

• 4 March 1991: Kurdish rebels capture town of Rayna in northern Iraq.

• 14 March: Large-scale Kurdish revolt breaks out.

• 22 March: Iraqi counter-offensive begins.

• 1 April: Kurdish leader Barzani appeals for aid.

• 5 April: UN Security Council passes Resolution 688, which authorized the use of force to protect relief efforts in Northern Iraq.

• 5 April: President Bush directs U.S. forces to begin humanitarian assistance operations to help the Kurds.

• 6 April: Joint Task Force Provide Comfort formed; air drops of relief supplies begin. USAF fighter aircraft provide escort.

• 7 April: JTF Provide Comfort deploys to Incirlik AB, Adana, Turkey.

• 9 April: Secretary of State Baker visits a refugee camp.
- 10 April: MARG 1-91/24th MEU(SOC) sails for eastern Mediterranean.

- 13 April: 24th MEU and USN HC-4 helicopters fly relief operations.

- 17 April: Task Force Bravo established.

- 20 April: Elements of 24th MEU and 10th Special Forces Group enter Iraq and establish presence in Zakhu.

- 2 May: TF-Alpha begin to move refugees from the mountains to transit camps.

- 13 May: UN officially relieved of military responsibilities in Iraq.

- 25 May: Coalition forces and civilian organizations enter Dihok, Iraq.

- 7 June: TF Alpha redeloys as all refugees in transit camps or returned to their homes.


Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Provide Comfort involved a wide range of Navy and Marine Corps forces, some of which were already deployed in-theater (either as part of Operation Desert Storm or from normal forward deployments) and other units that deployed to Turkey from CONUS or other theaters. U.S. Navy forces involved included the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) shipping (LPH-7 Guadalcanal, LPD-4 Austin, and LKA-113 Charleston) and two carrier battle groups (Forrestal and Theodore Roosevelt with associated ships). Over 700 Navy personnel (including SEALs and Seabees) participated in operations ashore.

Marine forces involved included the 24th MEU(SOC) (from aboard the MARG), parachute riggers from III MEF (Okinawa) and I MEF (California), a remotely piloted vehicle detachment from II MEF
(North Carolina) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center (Virginia), an Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) brigade platoon from II MEF, a special-purpose MAGTF (CMAGTF 1-91) from III MEF Landing Support Battalion assets of III MEF, and 17 Marines from Europe and CONUS for positions in the JTF/CTF headquarters.

**Other services**

Provide Comfort involved a wide range of U.S. Army and USAF forces as well (6,119 and 3,588 personnel, respectively). USA assets came mainly from four types of units: helicopter aviation; special forces; civil affairs; and medical. Essentially the full range of Air Force units participated in Provide Comfort. Aircraft involved included A-10s, C-130s, F-4Gs, F-15s, F-16s, EF-111s, EC-130s, E-3 AWACS, KC/RC-135s, and RF-4s.

**Coalition forces**

Eleven other nations contributed some form of military forces to the relief operation. With the exception of Germany, all of these forces were (eventually) TACON to CTF Provide Comfort (and the German forces acted as if this was the case). These forces totaled about 11,000 and ranged in detachment size from 19 Portuguese (with a transport aircraft) to 4,192 British (with transport aircraft; a commando brigade; helicopters; and logistics, medical and EOD units). Table 3 lists the foreign contingents.

**Civilian presence**

As it was a humanitarian/relief mission, Provide Comfort forces interacted with a wide range of civilian organizations. About 30 countries contributed some form of relief assistance, and 60 non-governmental organizations from around the world were active giving relief to the Kurds.
Table 3. National contingents in Operation Provide Comfort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military personnel</th>
<th>Unit type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Admin, medical, engr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>Comm, medical, logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Aircraft, medical, logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td>Aircraft, helo, ABN, engr, signal, EOD, medical, logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>Aircraft, helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>Aircraft, helo, medical, ABN, engr, SF, MP, logistic, signal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Inf, logistic, medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>Helo, medical, amphib (Marines), engr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Aircraft, logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>Helo, ABN, engr, signal, medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>Aircraft, helo, security, medical basing facilities, inf bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4,192</td>
<td>Aircraft, helo, CDO BDE, engr, logistic, medical, EOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>18,285</td>
<td>Aircraft, helo, SF, signal, engr, MP, CA, Marines, medical, ABCT, Carrier Task Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> German forces did not ever officially operate under CTF-PC tactical control. The German Defense Minister assured Lt.Gen. Shalikashvili that German forces would operate as if they were under TACON, which they did.

Command and control

Evolution

Operation Provide Comfort’s mission changed and expanded from a rather small airdrop mission to a massive relief and resettlement mission. Reflecting this changing mission and the transition from a U.S.-only to a multinational operation, the command structure went through many changes. Table 4 provides a chronology of Operation Provide Comfort’s command and control history.

Chain of command

C/JTF Provide Comfort fell under USCINCEUR, with TRANSCOM as the major supporting unified command. Two major commands existed under CTF-PC, JTF-A and JTF-B (see table 4 for responsibilities). Alpha consisted principally of U.S. special forces and part of a Royal Marine command brigade. The principal elements of Bravo
included forces from five countries, with the 24th MEU(SOC), the remainder of the 3rd Royal Marine Commando Brigade, and French units. Other major subcommands included the Military Coordination Center, Civil Affairs Command, Medical Command, and the Humanitarian Service Support Bases.

Table 4. Provide Comfort command and control chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Command created</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 April 1991</td>
<td>JTF-PC formed</td>
<td>The Joint Task Force command is established. USAF MGen. Jamerson, Deputy Commander, USAFE, in command. He command the Proven Force JTF, which commanded the strike operations from Turkey during Desert Storm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>Air Force Component</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>JTF-A</td>
<td>JTF-A, originally JTF-Express Care, to aid relief missions for the Kurds in the mountains. BGGen. Potter, USA, commanded. He had command the JSOTF supporting the Proven Force strike missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>TF 60 chops to JTF-PC</td>
<td>TF-60 (the Roosevelt CVBG) had tasking to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. TF-60 did not assume the responsibilities of a component commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>CTF-PC</td>
<td>Reflecting the growing mission and the growing number of nations participating in the mission, CTF-PC is formed. Lt.Gen. Shalikashvili, Deputy Commander USAEUR, in command. Gen. Jamerson became Deputy Commander and BGGen. Zinni, USMC, the EUCOM deputy J-3, became Chief of Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>JTF-B</td>
<td>JTF-B, originally JTF-Encourage Hope, had responsibility for providing security and assistance inside Iraq to help return the Kurds to their homes. MGen. Garner, USA, commanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>Military Coordination Center</td>
<td>Formed from members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in Potsdam, Germany, the MCC negotiated with the Iraqi military and coordinated activities with relief agencies. (The MCC handled the responsibilities of a Civil-Military Operations Center.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Command</td>
<td>Coordinated civil affairs forces, principally in support of JTF-Bravo in northern Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April</td>
<td>Medical Command</td>
<td>Coordinated medical assets, both military and civilian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>Combined Support Command</td>
<td>The CSC, under BGGen. Burch, USA, had the responsibility to handle all logistical requirements for providing humanitarian and coalition supplies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lessons learned/unique features

Mission creep occurred.

As with many other operations, Provide Comfort experienced "mission creep." As Provide Comfort went on, the mission expanded greatly from the initial limited goal of providing emergency relief to Kurds in the mountains (through airdrops and a limited Special Operations Forces presence) to the aim of resettling the Kurds in their homes in Iraq (which involved major security as well as humanitarian aspects). In addition, to encourage Kurds to return to their homes, the mission's objective, U.S. forces conducted activities that could reasonably be regarded as reconstruction (such as repairing electrical generation equipment) rather than relief, which fall outside the normal charter for military disaster relief operations.

Coalition forces and the joint/combined task force problems arose.

Although Provide Comfort involved forces from a dozen nations TACON to the CTF, the command establishment remained almost entirely American (with the exception of Col. Holt from the British Army, who was the operations officer (C3)). In future operations where other countries contribute about 40 percent of the involved forces, a U.S.-only command structure might not prove acceptable.

In addition, while eventually under CTF-PC tactical control, many of the national contingents did not start under JTF-PC control. The French forces, for example, did not go under JTF-B's tacon until after they were already in northern Iraq. To get the French to accept CTF-PC TACON required an agreement that (1) the French would not be under a British commander and (2) coalition forces, including at times U.S. units, would fall under French TACON.

Rules of engagement in a multinational operation can conflict.

A number of rules of engagement (ROE) issues emerged during Operation Provide Comfort. Not all coalition partners were willing to adopt the U.S. rules of engagement. For example, the initial French
ROE initially allowed French forces to protect individual coalition soldiers under attack but not a unit. The British ROE did not allow deployment of artillery into northern Iraq (since this was a humanitarian operation, “there was no need for deployed artillery). When artillery support became necessary, the Turkish government would not allow the British to deploy the artillery into firing positions inside Turkey. These problems were eventually worked out with the home governments but caused problems during the operation.

**Host nation support and Turkish customs limited some military activity.**

Turkish officials often sought to limit foreign military activity on Turkish soil. For example, Turkish officials did not want U.S. forces to engage in convoy escort or to conduct traffic control in Turkey proper. On the high end, the Turkish government restricted British attempts to establish artillery positions in Turkey to support operations in Iraq (see discussion above on ROEs). During the opening days of Provide Comfort, Turkish customs dealt with incoming forces and relief with flexibility. This diminished as the operation progressed. For example, the Marine UAV detachment arrived in Turkey from the United States on 7 May. Turkish customs did not clear the equipment until 15 May. (Customs issues delayed redeployment at the end of operations. This had as much to do with a shortage of U.S. customs officials as with problems from the Turkish side.)

**Navy and Marine components were not established.**

Neither a U.S. Naval nor Marine component command was established in Provide Comfort. CINCUSNAVEUR established a Naval Liaison Cell (NLC) to represent naval interests at the JTF headquarters at Incirlik. FMFEUR staff augmented this cell and the FMFEUR staff maintained a liaison after NAVEUR personnel left. The NLC’s charter was informal and had an uncertain position in the command situation. The short staffing of the NLC combined with the large numbers of naval personnel involved ashore for Provide Comfort stressed the ability of the NLC to perform necessary component functions (such as administrative actions like personnel reporting as well
as informing the JTF staff of alternatives for fulfilling requirements from naval forces).

**Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) were sometimes misleading.**

Adequate measures of effectiveness for determining the success (or failure) of military humanitarian assistance operations remain a difficult subject. The following are three examples of potentially misleading MOEs during Provide Comfort:

- An initial priority was the delivery of blankets to Kurds high in the mountains at the tail end of winter. When the weather warmed and the need for blankets fell, the flow of blankets could not be quickly cut off as the daily “blanket count” had become a measure of mission success during the initial days.

- Provide Comfort mission planning called for three phases, with phase two the housing of Kurdish refugees in temporary camps. A daily count of tents constructed became the new version of “the body count.” Focus on constructing tents and moving Kurds to these camps obscured the possibility of moving some of the Kurdish refugees from the mountains directly to their homes.

- Similarly, the air drops at the beginning of Provide Comfort did not provide an efficient, nor particularly effective, means of aid delivery. Tonnage counts of relief dropped provided an early MOE for the operation, but this did not necessarily provide information on what aid actually was reaching Kurds in need.

**Coordination with USAID DART team is critical.**

In military disaster relief operations overseas, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) from the Agency for International Development’s (AID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) can play a critical role. DART personnel, among other things, can provide knowledge and handle coordination with civilian relief organizations. The head of the DART attached it to JTF-Bravo, the command responsible for operations in Iraq, because he believed that was where the DART could be most effective. In retrospect one observer felt the DART should have been attached to CTF headquarters and
not one of its subordinate commands because the attachment to JTF-Bravo limited the information flow between the DART and the CCTF, Lt.Gen. Shalikashvili.

C/JTF staffing changed often.

Due to the changing mission and force structure of Joint and then Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, the staff underwent many changes. The initial JTF staff came principally from USAFE forces because the mission started as an air operation. With the growing commitments and force structure, the JTF changed as well. During the initial period, the JTF staff had a difficult time providing 24-hour coverage. This caused difficulty, for example, in liaison with Washington across a six-hour time difference. To meet the changing staff commitments, USCINCEUR “almost continuously provided new personnel for every need as it came to light.”

Classification and intelligence issues arose.

Unlike Desert Storm (and Proven Force), which it so closely followed, Provide Comfort’s success rested on an ability to communicate openly with many other organizations—civilian and military—from around the world. In general, U.S. forces effectively made the transfer in mentality from Operation Desert Storm into this new environment. Problems existed, however. For example, intelligence products intended to support Provide Comfort were often marked ‘NOFORN’ even though it was a combined operation and the CTF intelligence staff had non-U.S. nationals attached to it.

Summary

Operation Provide Comfort seems to be a watershed operation for the U.S. military for a number of reasons.

First, Provide Comfort emphasizes the potential for many U.S. operations to go multinational. In this operation, the JTF command structure proved to be flexible enough (with some alteration in staffing and a change of name) to manage a large multinational operation. One consequence was that the CCTF had TACON only over about
half of his forces—not OPCON as was typically the case in most of the operations we reviewed.

Second, Provide Comfort is an example of an intrusive humanitarian relief operation. Much of the Provide Comfort activity took place inside Iraq. Iraq most definitely did not request humanitarian assistance; rather, its position as a recently defeated combatant obliged it to allow the infringement of sovereignty.\(^\text{10}\) This implies that future doctrine for humanitarian assistance operations has to address varying levels of security threats—from permissive to situations just short of major conflict.

References

This section draws on the following references:


\(^\text{10}\) Restore Hope provides a similar example—only there, with no effective national government in existence, talking about infringing on the sovereignty of a government does not seem to be a useful concept.


13. JULLS 91054-94925, *Component Issue in Operation Provide Comfort*, submitted by HQ FMFEUR, Unclassified, 10 Sep 1991

14. JULLS 91055-06088, Force Offering and Staffing the JTF HQ, submitted by HQ FMFEUR, Unclassified, 10 Sep 1991

15. JULLS 70132-67237, Initial Staff of JTF/CTF During Time of Crisis, submitted by USEUCOM/ECJ3-ODO, Unclassified, 1 Jul 1991


JTF Sea Angel  
(May–June 1991)

Mission

The mission of JTF Sea Angel was to help distribute immediate life-saving supplies and assist the government of Bangladesh in assuming responsibility for the long-term recovery from Cyclone Marian.

Background

On April 29–30, Cyclone Marian struck the southeastern coast and islands of Bangladesh. The immediate death toll was estimated at over 125,000. In addition, the cyclone destroyed crops, cattle, and fishing boats in the area, making the threat of starvation for the survivors a real possibility.

Relief efforts by the government of Bangladesh and non-governmental relief organizations were severely hampered by the damage done to the local transportation and communication systems. In addition, many of the coastal areas—including port facilities at the Chittagong seaport—remained under water for several days, and the weather continued to be rough. The U.S. government responded to a request for aid by the government of Bangladesh by providing grants to buy aid and relief supplies. And the President, via the JCS, directed the establishment of a JTF to aid in disaster assessment and distribution of the relief supplies.

Upon arrival in Dhaka, the JTF established a concept of operations that called for Air Force C-130 planes to ferry relief supplies from Dhaka to Chittagong. In Chittagong, Army and Navy helicopters and Navy landing craft picked up the relief supplies and ferried them to the outlying areas. Bangladesh armed forces and government agencies provided security and were responsible for final distribution of
the relief. Other activities conducted by the JTF included assessment of disaster damage and the setup of water purification equipment (reverse osmosis) at selected sites.

During the peak of operations (on 27 May), 164 tons of relief supplies flowed from Dhaka to Chittagong each day. The final figure for relief supplies delivered by the JTF was 2,430 tons.

**Timetable**

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- 29 April: Cyclone Marian strikes southeast coast of Bangladesh. The tidal surge of 20+ feet inundates coastal areas, causing widespread death and destruction.

- 9 May: US CINCPAC informally alerts III MEF of the potential requirement to stand up a JTF to support humanitarian operations in Bangladesh. III MEF begins conceptual planning and starts collection of information on the area.

- 11 May: US CINCPAC designates the Commanding General, Third Marine Expeditionary Force as the CJTF.

- 12 May: Advance elements of JTF staff arrive in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

- 13 May: Visual reconnaissance of disaster area by JTF air assets.

- 13 May: JTF concept of operations formalized and distributed up and down the chain of command.

- 15 May: First C-130 airlift of supplies from Dhaka to center of disaster area (Chittagong). Subsequent distribution to outlying areas by Army Blackhawk helicopters.

- 15 May: Amphibious Task Force (ATF) with the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked arrives at Chittagong.

- 16 May: LCACs and helicopters from the ATF begin relief operations.
• 17 May: JTF begins coordination of relief efforts with United Kingdom and Japanese forces.
• 29 May: Redeployment of ATF and 5th MEB.
• 6 June: End of JTF relief efforts
• 7 June: Redeployment of USS Saint Louis.
• 13 June: JTF Sea Angel disestablished.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

The III MEF staff, reinforced by the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) from USCINCPAC, formed the core of the JTF headquarters. Total headquarters size was about 250 personnel. Marine forces included the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Contingency Marine Air Ground Task Force 2-91. U.S. Navy participants included the Commander, Amphibious Group Three, his staff, and an eight-ship amphibious task force (USS Tarawa, USS Vancouver, USS Juneau, USS Mt. Vernon, USS Anchorage, USS Frederick, USNS Passumpsic, and USS St. Louis). About 7,500 Marines and sailors made up the amphibious task force.

Other forces

The Air Force (374th Tactical Airlift Wing based in Japan) provided four C-130 aircraft that ferried relief supplies from Dhaka into the disaster region. In addition, the Military Airlift Command established a C-141 channel between Dhaka and Japan to bring in relief supplies, equipment, and personnel. The Army provided Black Hawk helicopters that aided in the distribution of relief supplies from Chittagong to the outlying areas. A Joint Special Operations Force provided the initial disaster assessment for many of the outlying areas. Foreign forces delivering relief supplies included RFA Ft. Grange (United Kingdom) with Sea King helicopters embarked and helicopters from the Japanese Fire and Rescue Service.
Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command was the supported CINC for this operation. He designated MGen. H. C. Stackpole III, Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force as the CJTF.

Liaison

The JTF coordinated with the government of Bangladesh and non-governmental relief organizations through a coordinating cell organized by the American Ambassador and Bangladesh government in Dhaka. The government of Bangladesh chaired the committee, which included representatives from the Bangladeshi military, JTF, Agency for International Development, and non-governmental relief organizations. A similar committee chaired by a civilian Bangladesh official coordinated local affairs in Chittagong.

The United Kingdom and Japan subordinated their forces to the JTF and provided liaison officers to the JTF command post in Chittagong. Other countries participating in the aid efforts such as India and China did not subordinate their forces to the JTF; instead, informal agreements were reached geographically separating their efforts.

Lessons learned/unique features

Little information was available initially.

As in other disaster situations, the JTF found that information about the extent of the disaster and details of the afflicted area were sketchy and hard to come by. For example, charts of the Bangladesh coast were hard to obtain, and once obtained often proved to be outdated by the numerous obstructions created by the cyclone. In addition, communication with the in-country team was very tenuous prior to the arrival of the JTF on scene.

To hedge against the lack of information, when III MEF received informal notification that it might have to deploy as a JTF in response
to the disaster, the MEF planners decided to assume a worst case—no local communication available, a requirement to conduct an initial survey of the area, and a requirement to provide potable water (reverse osmosis). The intent was to scale back on the requirements as further information became available. In the actual event, the worst-case assumptions were not far from the mark. The final conceptual plan for JTF operations was not completed until about three days (May 15) after the CJTF and advance staff arrived on-scene.

**Host country sensitivities had to be accommodated.**

When the typhoon struck, Bangladesh had just emerged from a period of military dictatorship. The current civilian government had been in power only 39 days, and the JTF did not want the humanitarian assistance operations to give the impression of having shouldered the government aside. In addition, there was no tradition of intergovernmental cooperation in the country. Many of the non-governmental relief organizations did not fully trust the Bangladesh military, and they had become accustomed to providing their own transportation and distribution system.

To coordinate activities, the JTF established a headquarters cell in Dhaka, and, working through the American Ambassador, established a coordination committee chaired by the Bangladesh Prime Minister’s personal representative—Brigadier Shaffat. This ensured that the host nation took the lead on setting priorities and overall policy—and did so in a very visible manner.

To further accommodate host-country sensitivities the U.S. footprint on shore was kept as small as possible—all but a few hundred of the headquarters staff and some aviators returned to the amphibious transports each night. In addition, the JTF structured the operation so that to the maximum extent possible the final distribution of aid was done by the Bangladeshi authorities or a non-governmental relief organization.

**ATO coordinated air operations.**

The JTF did not use a formal JFACC cell to control air operations. Instead the coordination cell in Dhaka issued a daily Air Tasking
Order (sometimes only hours in advance of the first flight) for the C-130 and C-12 flights between Dhaka and Chittagong. The Chittagong command post issued a separate air schedule each day for the helicopters and landing craft delivering supplies in the local area. Factors influencing the choice of this scheme were the day-to-day changes in lift requirements and the very poor communications between Dhaka and Chittagong.

**Non-governmental relief organizations played a large role.**

Non-governmental relief organizations such as CARE and the Red Crescent played a key role in providing relief supplies. In this disaster, the various governmental and non-governmental relief organizations had adequate supplies of emergency food and relief supplies on hand. The problem was that with the destruction of the local infrastructure they had no way to deliver it or to communicate with the disaster area. The JTF filled this gap.

In addition, the relief organizations typically had individuals who had spent several years on site. Their familiarity with the area and good relations with the local population greatly aided in the assessment process. Tapping this source of information was one of the functions provided by the coordinating committees.

**The ATF was nearby.**

The Amphibious Task Force participating in Operation Sea Angel was already in the Indian Ocean redeploying from the Gulf war. Its fortuitous location provided large numbers of helicopters and LCACs to use to distribute the aid. In a future operations, these assets might have to be airlifted in if they are not already in the area.

**How to assess the situation was not clear.**

In the after-action report, the JTF staff noted that assessing a humanitarian situation is not clearly covered in doctrine.

First, there is the question of who does the assessment. In the initial phases of Operation Sea Angel, the CJTF J-3 operations shop did so. The disadvantage was that J-3 soon had more than enough to do with
the operations. The assessment responsibilities then devolved to the relatively small J-2 sections (five personnel in Dhaka and three in Chittagong). In the actual event, this caused no problems, but if the environment had not been permissive—assessing the humanitarian situation would have been a big distraction for J-2 also.

Second, there is also the problem of how to measure progress. Assessing a humanitarian situation calls for the gathering of information not usually associated with military intelligence and the construction of MOEs that tell the CJTF how much progress is being made.

The CINC augmented the JTF staff.

As mentioned earlier, USCINCPAC augmented the III MEF staff with a team of about 50 servicemembers (named the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell, DJTFAC) from the CINC's staff and PACCOM service components. Sea Angel was the first JTF operation for the DJTFAC team.

The DJTFAC team can be deployed on a few hours' notice. Currently, it trains with potential JTF staffs throughout PACCOM on a regular basis. The DJTFAC, in part, represents USCINCPAC's efforts to provide a sizeable joint component to a JTF staff and to improve the liaison between the JTF staff and the CINC.

Summary

Operation Sea Angel highlighted the “no-notice” character of many JTF operations. The staff that would make up the JTF learned of their potential deployment less than 48 hours before being activated. As a result, the concept of operations was completed only as the first major JTF elements arrived on the scene. With the situation rapidly changing as new forces and supplies arrived, the national coordinating committee in Dhaka and its local twin in Chittagong became key focus points for control of the operation. The coordination committees also helped reinforce the desired message that the local government was in control.
References

This section draws on the following references:

1. JTF SEA ANGEL 090743Z JUN 91, First Impression Report, Unclassified

2. 171100Z JUN 91 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR, Operations Sea Angel After Action Report, Unclassified


JTF Fiery Vigil
(June 1991)

Mission

JTF Fiery Vigil stood up to evacuate American servicemen and their families from Clark Air Base in the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo.

Background

On 8 June, the JCS approved establishment of JTF Fiery Vigil to evacuate nonessential personnel from Clark Air Base in the Philippines. JCS took this action on the basis of reports from U.S. Geological Survey and Philippine seismologists that a major eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was imminent.

On 12 June, Mount Pinatubo, near the Philippine city of Manila, erupted. The eruption sent huge clouds of ash into the air, which combined with falling rain to become a heavy gray mud. As the ash-water mixture fell onto Clark Air Base, concern for the well-being of Americans stationed there rose. The muddy mixture was very heavy, and officials at Clark were worried that the roofs of some structures were in danger of collapse.

In view of the impending closure of Clark AB and its return to the government of the Philippines, US CINC PAC decided to shut down operations at the base and evacuate base personnel and their dependents. Some evacuees went by air directly to their destinations, but the vast majority went via ship to Cebu. Once there, evacuees went to Mactan Airfield for airlift to Guam and on to their final destinations in CONUS and elsewhere.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- 8 June: JCS approves establishment of JTF Fiery Vigil, with CG 13 AF in command.

- 9 June: All aircraft leave Clark. Evacuation of base begins with motor convoy to Subic Bay. Marine forces provide security for convoy.

- 12-15 June: Mount Pinatubo erupts. A tropical storm strikes at the same time, turning the ash into falling concrete.

- 15 June: USCINCPAC orders evacuation of all dependents and most Air Force personnel from the Philippines. The Navy begins evacuation to Cebu, with ground transport to Mactan AB. Evacuees are flown to Guam, then on to destinations in the U.S.

- 24 June: Last flight leaves Guam.

- 26 June: Backload of personnel and equipment from Cebu complete.

- 30 June: JTF Fiery Vigil stands down.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

The Navy played a major role in JTF Fiery Vigil. Two carrier battle groups participated, as well as amphibious ships and merchant vessels. The following vessels participated in the sealift phase of the evacuation:


- Amphibious Ready Group Alfa (COMPHIBRON 3 embarked): USS *Peleliu*, USS *Cleveland*, USS *Comstock*, USS *Bristol County*
• Other ships: USS Midway, USS Curtis, USS Rodney M. Davis, USS Thach, USS Arkansas, USS McClusky, USS St. Louis, USS San Bernardino, MV 1st Lt. Lummus, MV American Condor, USS Niagara Falls, USNS Ponchatoula, USNS Passumpsic, USNS Hay- sayampa, USS Haleakala, USNS Spica, USS Cape Cod.

About 18,500 Navy (and Military Sealift Command) personnel participated in the sealift phase of the operation. Navy aircraft from COMFAIRWESTPAC and CTF 79 also contributed to the evacuation by flying passenger and cargo missions. On Guam, the Navy provided temporary lodging for the evacuees and essential services while they were waiting for follow-on transporation to CONUS.

USMC personnel also participated in JTF Fiery Vigil. Troops from 1st Bn, 24th Marines (a Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit), and elements of MAGTF 4-90 and 15th MEU assisted in the loading and off-loading of evacuees and provided security at Clark during the evacuation. Due to Operation Desert Storm, the bulk of MAGTF 4-90 (about 3,000 Marines) were reservists who had taken the place of regular Marines deployed to Saudi Arabia. The reservists had a wide range of civilian skills such as engineering and medical that gave the Marines a great deal of flexibility in responding to taskings.

**Other services**

The Air Force provided the CJTF and most of the JTF headquarters staff (taken from the staff of 13th Air Force). The Air Force also contributed Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft to fly evacuees from Mactan to Guam and then on to their ultimate destinations. (At the outset, some Air Force missions flew from Clark to Kadena AB, Japan, and other locations, but this stopped when Clark AB and the naval airfield at Cubi Point were closed due to ash fall and rains.) C-5, C-130, and C-141 aircraft flew sorties in support of JTF-FV. The following Air Force units took part in the JTF:

- HQ 834th Airlift Division (Hawaii)
- 347th Tactical Airlift Wing (Japan)
- 616th Military Airlift Group (Alaska)
• 603d Military Airlift Support Group (Japan)
• 611th Military Airlift Support Group (Korea)
• 624th Military Airlift Support Group (Clark AB)
• 605th Military Airlift Support Squadron (Guam)
• 619th Military Airlift Support Squadron (Hawaii).

Command and control

Chain of command

For JTF Fiery Vigil, USCINCPAC was the supported CINC. He named MGen. William A. Studer, USAF, Commanding General 13th Air Force (located at Clark AB), as the CJTF. The naval component commander was COMUSNAVPHIL (and later the CINCPAC representative in Manila). The commander of MAGTF 4-90 served as the Marine component commander. On Guam, USCINCPAC activated JTF Marianas with RAdm. Perkins, USN, in command. JTF Marianas coordinated the temporary housing of evacuees on Guam and their follow-on transportation to the United States.

Liaison with local elements

The American ambassador performed liaison with the Philippine government, primarily by keeping President Aquino and her military leaders abreast of the progress of the evacuation. The JTF also made American CH-53 helicopters available to the Philippines for assistance in local evacuation.

Lessons learned/unique features

It was difficult to manage flow of evacuees.

One significant problem in JTF Fiery Vigil arose during the sealift of evacuees from Subic to Cebu. The Naval component commander wanted to minimize the number of evacuees who had to wait at Mactan for outgoing flights to Guam by synchronizing the offloading of ships with the availability of aircraft. However, the MAC representative at Cebu did not have enough information to make this possible.
In addition, flight schedules changed, with unscheduled flights arriving and scheduled ones being cancelled with little or no notice. This resulted in a backlog of evacuees at Cebu and delays for the ships involved.

**Communications between the CJTF and field forces were difficult.**

Communications (or the lack thereof) also posed problems for forces involved in JTF Fiery Vigil. Insufficient communications between the CJTF staff and other elements made it hard for the forces involved to work out problems in aircraft scheduling and evacuee transport. From the Navy's point of view, it was unable to communicate with the Air Force scheduler to determine the number of evacuees and when they should transport to Cebu. The Air Force elements managing the air head at Mactan were similarly had difficulties in communicating with the CJTF and TRANSCOM to establish the future flight schedule estimate of the flow of evacuees.

**Summary**

The forces attached to CJTF Fiery Vigil evacuated over 21,000 American troops and dependents from Clark AB in about 14 days. Over 25,000 Navy, USMC, and Air Force personnel contributed to the overall success of the mission. This operation is also noteworthy because USCINCPAC activated two JTFs to deal with different aspects of the problem.

**References**

This section draws on the following references:


3. COMSEVENTHFLT Message 190225Z JUN 91, *Philippine Evacuation Sea Flow* (U), Confidential
4. COMSEVENTHFLT Message 220800Z JUN 91, *Philippine Evacuation Sea Flow (U)*, Confidential

5. COMSEVENTHFLT Message 240854Z JUN 91, *SITREP 009*, Confidential

6. COMSEVENTHFLT Draft Message (DTG unknown), *Fiery Vigil First Impressions Report (U)*, Confidential

7. CTF SEVEN ZERO Message 291229Z JUN 91, *After-Action and Lessons Learned*, Unclassified

8. CTF SEVEN ZERO Message 010638Z JUL 91, *Fiery Vigil After-Action Report / Lessons Learned (AAR/LL) (U)*, Confidential


10. CG III MEF Message 191143Z JUN 91, *III MEF/CTF 79 Fiery Vigil SITREP Number Four (U)*, Confidential

Operation Quick Lift  
(September-October 1991)

Mission

The mission of JTF Quick Lift was to assist the American Embassy in Zaire with the noncombatant evacuation of Americans and designated citizens of other countries. USCENTCOM also tasked JTF Quick Lift with providing logistics support for the evacuation efforts of Belgium and France.

Background

On September 23, Zairian paratroopers began a protest against low wages, which eventually turned into a looting spree in Kinshasa, Zaire. Opposition parties seized the opportunity to organize demonstrations against the Mobutu government. The security situation quickly deteriorated, resulting in severe shortages of food in the capital of Kinshasa.

Several European governments and the United States moved to evacuate their citizens from Zaire. On September 24, France and Belgium sent troops to provide security for the evacuation and protect their interests. JTF Quick Lift was the U.S. response. It provided logistics support for the European troop movement and evacuation efforts and airlifted about 700 noncombatants out of Zaire. A much larger number of Americans (and other foreigners) departed the country via Belgian and French military flights, Department of State chartered flights, and private transportation.

Payment of bonuses to the Zairian military and negotiations between the Mobutu government and the opposition to set up a government of national unity eventually resolved the crisis.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- 23 September: Looting starts in Kinshasa. JCS planning order for NEO.

- 25 September: Secretary of Defense authorizes movement of French and Belgian forces/cargo aboard U.S. military aircraft.

- 25 September: USCINCEUR transmits Commander's Estimate containing proposed military courses of action for dealing with crisis.

- 25 September: American Embassy in Kinshasa, Zaire, advises American citizens to depart the country.

- 26 September: Air Lift Control Elements (ALCE) deployed to Brussels, Belgium, and Dakar, Senegal, to coordinate airlift.

- 27 September: ALCE deploys to Kinshasa, Zaire. Five C-141 flights bring in the ALCE and supplies for the Belgian forces. On the return leg the aircraft carry evacuees.

- 28 September: JCS issues execute order and USCINCEUR issues OPORD for Operation Quick Lift. USCINCEUR tasks CINCUSAFE to choose the CJTF and form a JTF staff. JTF Quick Lift activated at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

- 29 September: Press accounts estimate 117 people killed in fighting. Mobutu government agrees to pay the military a special bonus and form a "government of national crisis" with opposition parties.

- 30 September: CJTF Quick Lift assesses that evacuation of all Americans wishing to depart is complete.

- 4 October: Quick Lift missions totalled 28 C-141 flights. A total of 716 Americans and others evacuated via U.S. military air. Many more (10,000+) left the country by other means.

- 5 October: JTF Quick Lift disestablished.
Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

As far as we have been able to determine, no Navy or Marine Corps servicemembers participated in Operation Quick Lift.

Other services

The Air Force provided the preponderance of staffing for the JTF headquarters, conducted the operations, and did most of the planning. Operationally, the Air Force provided 28 C-141 missions and forward-deployed ALCE teams in Dakar, Brazzaville, and Kinshasa, numbering perhaps 160 servicemembers total. The Army provided the Deputy CJTF (an Army Special Forces colonel) and about a fifth of the JTF Headquarters staff. All told, about 300 Air Force and Army servicemembers were OPCON to JTF Quick Lift.

Command and Control

Chain of command

USCINCEUR was the supported commander for Operation Quick Lift. He named BGen. James L. Hobson, Jr., USAF (Commander, 322 Airlift Division) as the CJTF. Supporting commands included TRANSCOM and SAC.

TRANSCOM aircraft used for inter-theater airlift chopped to USCINCEUR—and thence to CJTF Quick Lift—upon entering the EUCOM AOR. Other TRANSCOM and SAC aircraft participating in the operation were attached via TACON to USCINCEUR.

Liaison

JTF Quick Lift had to coordinate logistics flights with the French and Belgian forces and also with the government of Zaire and several of its African neighbors (Congo, Senegal, Rwanda). Coordination with the government of Zaire was particularly time-consuming since the Zairian government wanted to minimize the numbers of foreign
troops coming to Zaire. The American Embassy in Kinshasa provided overall control of the evacuation and helped the CJTF negotiate with the government of Zaire.

Lessons learned/unique features

The JTF was responsible for executing only part of the planned operation.

JTF Quick Lift executed the permissive NEO and foreign logistics support sections of the Quick Lift campaign plan. Had the security situation worsened, USCINCEUR planned for the contingency of providing enhanced security and conducting a non-permissive NEO. That part of the operation (which was not needed) would be commanded by COMSOCEUR.

According to the Quick Lift history, integrating CJTF Quick Lift’s planning with COMSOCEUR’s planning for the potential follow-on operations proved to be difficult. COMSOCEUR began planning for the potential follow-on phases concurrent with CJTF Quick Lift’s planning for the permissive NEO and foreign logistics support. Later on, both commands submitted conflicting requests for airlift. USCINCEUR ultimately resolved the conflict by directing CJTF Quick Lift not to make additions or deletions to COMSOCEUR’s airlift planning.

Why was a JTF activated?

The activities actually executed by JTF Quick Lift were fairly normal Air Force transportation missions. With the exception of the Army officers serving in the JTF headquarters staff, the historical records do not indicate any participation by other services. Since contingency JTFs normally control forces from two or more services, the question arises, “Why was a JTF activated?”

The historical records do not explicitly address the reasons for USCINCEUR choosing to activate a JTF. In Operation Provide Transition we speculated that the JTF was established, in part, to provide temporary command and control at a remote site. However, CJTF
Quick Lift established his headquarters in the operations center at USAFE—so command and control at a remote site does not seem to have been a consideration. We speculate that the requirement for CJTF Quick Lift to help plan for potential follow-on operations involving Joint Special Forces may have been one of the motivations for activating a JTF.

Summary

CJTF Quick Lift evacuated 716 people from Zaire and provided logistics support to Belgian and French forces that evacuated still more. In the event, the relatively quick removal of all Americans who wanted to leave the country (two days after JTF activation) and the speedy political settlement reached by the government and the opposition (one day after activation) lessened the need for U.S. military intervention.

References

This section draws on the following references:


2. HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE 012200Z OCT 91, JTF Quick Lift Sitrep No. 2, Unclassified
JTF GTMO

Mission

The mission of JTF GTMO was to provide humanitarian relief to Haitian migrants and offer assistance to U.S. Immigration officials and UN Relief agencies in screening the migrants for repatriation or continuing migration.

Background

The Haitian military overthrew Haitian President Aristide on September 30, 1991. President Aristide left the country the next day. The United States refused to recognize the military government and, by the end of October, had imposed a variety of diplomatic and economic sanctions on Haiti. Soon large numbers of Haitians began migrating toward the United States in a variety of boats and ships. Coast Guard and Navy ships intercepted the migrants and temporarily interned the Haitians at NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

At this point a series of court actions delayed repatriation of Haitian migrants. To deal with the mounting problem of Haitians rescued from the sea with no place to go, USCINCLANT established JTF GTMO on November 25, 1991. As formally stated, the JTF existed to:

- Offer emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitian migrants interned at NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

- Assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service in screening and moving eligible Haitians to asylum in the United States.

- Coordinate with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees and the Coast Guard for voluntary repatriation of Haitians or their follow on migration to third countries.
• Prepare to conduct involuntary repatriation of Haitian migrants when ordered.

CJTF GTMO established three migrant camps on NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay. The primary responsibility for establishing the camps fell to the U.S. Marine Corps.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

• September 30, 1991: Haitian coup

• October 1, 1991: United States suspends economic aid to Haiti, refuses to recognize military government, and suspends repatriation of Haitian migrants.

• November 13, 1991: First Haitian migrants offloaded by Coast Guard cutters at GTMO. The CO NAVBASE GTMO is the on-scene commander.

• November 18, 1991: United States resumes repatriation of Haitian migrants, announces intentions to repatriate 1,800 migrants currently being held by INS.

• November 19, 1991: Second U.S. District Court in Miami issues temporary restraining order forbidding repatriation of Haitian migrants.

• November 21, 1991: JTF GTMO activated for planning purposes.

• November 23, 1991: JTF advance team arrives at GTMO.

• November 25, 1991: JCS Deployment Order for JTF GTMO.

• December 15, 1991: Haitian protesters temporarily take control of one refugee camp.

• December 16-23, 1991: II MEF Air Contingency Force (2nd Bn, 8th Marines) deploy from Camp Lejeune, NC, to NAS Guantanamo Bay to assist JTF in control of Haitian protesters.

• January 1992: Camp migrant population reaches 11,000.
• April 1992: Camp migrant population at 2,000.

• May 1992: Series of legal decisions and repression in Haiti cause swell in camp population to close to 15,000.

• July 1992: Camp population decreases to about 250 hard cases—migrants with HIV who could not be repatriated to Haiti and could not be screened for entry to the U.S.

• June 8, 1993: U.S. District Court rules in favor of allowing remaining 158 Haitian migrants at GTMO to enter the United States as parolees until the INS finishes processing of their cases.

• June 30, 1993: JTF GTMO disestablished.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

The major participants were detachments from the 2d Force Service Support Group, 2d Marine Air Wing, 2d Marine Division, and Hotel Battery 3d Bn, 10th Marines—a force numbering about 400 total. On December 16, 300 Marines from the 2d Bn, 8th Marines arrived to augment camp security. NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay provided support for the camps and most of the Navy participants. At its height, just over 3,000 servicemembers—primarily Navy and Marine Corps—participated in JTF GTMO.

Other services and organizations

Major U.S. Army participants included a detachment from the 96th CA Bn (100 servicemembers), the 504th MP Bn (510 servicemembers, and in the later stages of the operation the 530th CS (116 servicemembers).

Although the JTF was not responsible for the interdiction operations, it coordinated closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy ships interdicting Haitian migrant vessels and transporting the migrants to NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay. The Air Force (Military Airlift Command) provided Harvest Eagle tent city kits to house the JTF troops
and lift to bring in supplies and rotate personnel in and out of NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay. Overall AFLANT support for the JTF averaged 120 servicemembers at GTMO.

Other governmental organizations involved included the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, Public Health Service and Community Relations Service. Non-governmental agencies involved included the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S Forces Atlantic was the supported CINC for the operation. He designated BGen. B. H. Walls, Jr., USMC (the Commanding General 2d Force Service Support Group) as Commander Joint Task Force GTMO. The Commander of the Marine Barracks at NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay was the Marine Force Component commander.

As the operation continued, BGen. Walls was replaced in succession by BGen. Simpson, USA, and BGen. Neal, USMC, before the CJTF was downgraded to an O6 position at the recommendation of BGen. Neal.

Lessons learned/unique features

Humanitarian assistance operations doctrine and procedures were needed.

The JTF struggled with the specific duties that should be assigned to various staff departments. The logistics-heavy nature of the operations clouded the boundary between the J3 (Operations) and J4 (Logistics) departments.

The JTF also struggled with the proper role of the J2 (Intelligence department). Only as the operation progressed did it become clear that the J2 department had a vital role to play in providing I&W of the
situation inside the camps, the impact that events in the country of origin will have on the camp, and recommendations for internal security of the camps (similar to "normal" counter insurgency operations).

Another humanitarian issue was the lack of an established system for identifying, tracking, and reporting on individual migrants. For example, many of the migrants did not want to return to Haiti and attempted to frustrate efforts to identify and locate them once they had been screened for repatriation. The lack of a solid identification system also made it difficult to identify and isolate chronic troublemakers or to follow up on immunizations (a special concern in crowded camps).

Finally, the JTF found no established doctrine for the planning and layout of temporary camps (e.g., where to put the shelter, the latrines, or health facilities).

**Logistics issues were difficult.**

The rapid buildup of the camps resulted in an intense, early demand for shelter and facilities. Supporting commands quickly "pushed" the needed equipment from CONUS. However, much of it either arrived without proper documentation or was quickly separated from its documentation in the rush to set up camp. When the time came to redeploy the JTF forces, the lack of accountability made it difficult to restore the equipment to its proper stocks.

The JTF also noted that many of the supplies they needed for the humanitarian operations are not normally stocked within the military supply system. JTF after-action lessons learned noted shortfalls in such diverse areas as civilian clothing (to replace lice infested clothes), pediatric and obstetrical equipment, and mess equipment capable of cooking large volumes of food. The JTF had problems not only in finding the needed supplies in the first place, but in returning the unneeded excess after the operation because the supply system was not prepared to stock the specialty items.
Communications problems were common.

Lack of common communications equipment made joint operations more difficult than they might have been. For example, the JTF forces relied heavily on hand-held radios in administering the camps. Even within the Marine Corps, each unit tended to bring its own hand-held radio set to different frequencies, which made coordination difficult.

Lack of compatibility in computer equipment also caused difficulties. For example, although the Marine Corps detachments relied heavily on a local-area network (LAN) for internal communications and a wide-area network (WAN) to communicate with CONUS commands. Detachments from other services did not have computer equipment compatible with the Marine Corps LAN and lacked a similar WAN to communicate with their parent commands in CONUS. Many of the JTF GTMO word-processing operators were also unfamiliar with the software provided by USCINCLANT as part of the DART and WWMCCS systems.

Summary

JTF GTMO achieved its stated purpose of providing temporary humanitarian assistance. As in other humanitarian operations, the JTF found that forces, doctrines, and supplies molded for combat did not always make a smooth transition into humanitarian uses. The JTF was also dependent upon other agencies to solve the root causes of the migrant problem. That dependence lead to the JTF being in existence (at a low level of manpower, 300 servicemembers) for nearly 12 months after the last wave of Haitian migrants crested in May 1992.

References

This section draws on the following references:


2. JULLS 03189-72435, Marine Barrack as MARFOR for JTF GTMO, submitted by USCINCLANT, Unclassified


5. JULLS 22531-12721, *Command Relationships/Task Organization*, submitted by USCIINCLANT, Unclassified


7. JULLS 31240-10665, *Intelligence Mission During Humanitarian Operations*, submitted by USCIINCLANT, Unclassified
JTF Provide Relief
(August 1992–February 1993)

Mission

The mission of Provide Relief was to airlift food relief supplies into Somalia and northern Kenya as the security situation permitted.

Background

Following the overthrow of Somali leader Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia slid into a state of anarchy as various clans and warlords started a violent struggle for power. By 1992, the situation in southern Somalia was particularly bad. Widespread violence, lawlessness, and banditry, together with a persistent drought in parts of the country, hampered food production and distribution resulting in widespread starvation.

In April 1992, United Nations Security Council Resolution 751 established United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Later resolutions authorized emergency relief flights. In response to requests by the United Nations, President Bush authorized U.S. military forces to airlift emergency relief food supplies into Somalia and northern Kenya. Agreements with Kenya, the UN, and international relief organizations mandated that the airlift be conducted on a strictly permissive basis—no security forces were to accompany the food.

By the end of August, JTF Provide Relief was averaging 20 sorties delivering 150 tons of food per day into northern Kenya and Somalia. In addition to moving food, JTF Provide Relief made repairs to several airfields in Kenya and Somalia, and provided a backup rapid-evacuation force for relief workers in Somalia.

Penetration of aid into the drought area was limited by the uncertain security situation. As it was, the CJTF estimated that 25 percent of the
aid delivered ended up in the hands of bandits or was wasted on the
ground due to an inability to move the food safely.

The inability to make progress at reducing the starvation rate in the
uncertain security situation later led the U.S. government to begin a
security restoration operation in Somalia in early December. We dis-
cuss that operation, Restore Hope, in a separate summary. By the end
of February, Restore Hope had absorbed all of the functions origi-
nally undertaken by JTF Provide Relief.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- August 14, 1992: President Bush announces humanitarian
  relief mission to Somalia.

- August 15, 1992: USCINCCENT orders deployment of a
  Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to Kenya to
  assess situation in Somalia.


- August 18, 1992: USCINCCENT execute order names the Com-
  mander of the HAST as Commander, JTF Provide Relief.


- August 27, 1992: First relief flight to land in Somalia (at Oddur,
  Somalia).

- September 29, 1992: CJTF Provide Relief requests maintenance
  team to repair airstrips.

- November 1992: Engineering team (11 members of the 823rd
  Red Horse Civil Engineer Squadron) deploys to Kenya. From
  November 23–30 it repairs airstrips at Oddur, Baidoa, Barderra,
  and Wajir.

- December 9, 1992: Operation Restore Hope begins under
  OPCON of JTF Somalia.
• December 15, 1992: JTF Provide Relief placed under the OPCON of JTF Somalia at the component command level.

• February 28, 1993: JTF Provide Relief disestablished; activities absorbed by UNITAF Air Force component commander.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Direct Navy and Marine Corps participation in JTF Provide Relief was limited to a handful of the servicemembers serving on the JTF staff and a small Navy Logistics Support detachment. In September, JTF Provide Relief supported the insertion of a 500-man Pakistani force into Mogadishu and was in turn supported by an amphibious task force carrying the 11th MEU (SOC) off the coast of Somalia. However, these forces did not chop to the OPCON of JTF Provide Relief.

Other forces

The bulk of the JTF Forces came from TRANSCOM, which provided 4 C-141 and 8 to 14 C-130 aircraft and a force of about 700 servicemembers. A small special forces detachment from the 5th Special Forces Group (Army) provided backup security and rescue in a modified C-130 that orbited between Kenya and Somalia during aid deliveries. In addition, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and Canada provided aircraft to airlift relief.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander, U.S. Central Command was the supported CINC. He named BGen. Libutti, USMC (USCINCENT J-5) as the CJTF. Between December 15, 1992, and February 28, 1993, CJTF Provide Relief reported to CJTF Somalia as a component commander.
Liaison

The JTF liaised with a variety of non-governmental relief organizations, Somali clan leaders, and the United Nations Somalia (UNOSOM) forces to arrange for (relatively) safe deliveries of aid to Somalia. Coordination with the Kenyan government took place at the JTF’s main HQ in Mombassa and in cooperation with the USAID/OFDA in Nairobi. The JTF also coordinated relief flights by four other western countries—United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and Canada.

Lessons learned/unique features

The ability of the JTF to provide security was limited.

Constraints imposed by a variety of outside organizations limited the ability of JTF Provide Relief to provide security for its operations. The primary constraints were:

- The Kenyan government did not want a large U.S. presence in Kenya and wanted to be able to monitor the inner workings of the JTF staff. This limited the forces in-country and forced the JTF staff to conduct all staff work (including intelligence) on a "releasable to Kenya" basis.

- The International Committee of the Red Cross refused to allow armed guards to accompany relief shipments. This led the JTF to develop an Airborne Communications Center (ABCC) concept for security backup. The ABCC was a specially equipped C-130 with a small special forces detachment. The ABCC maintained an orbit between Kenya and Somalia during relief operations to provide JTF with a quick extraction/security backup force.

- The international relief organization representatives in-country generally had the best information about the local security situation; however, to retain the trust of the locals, they were reluctant to provide the JTF with information unless relief operations were directly threatened.
The Relief Coordinating Committee was a vital coordination group.

The CJTF in coordination with the USAID/OFDA representative created a Relief Coordinating Committee in Nairobi. The Relief Coordinating Committee included as members representatives from the Kenyan government, USAID/OFDA, UNOSOM, non-governmental relief organizations, and the JTF J5. Although this body had no power to task any organization that participated, it did provide a clearing house for information and a way for all of the interested parties to get together under one roof and coordinate activities. Generally, because the goals of all the participants were similar, it was possible to reach compromises that let the work move forward.

Summary

JTF Provide Relief generally succeeded in moving emergency food supplies into Somalia. However, the poor security situation within Somalia prevented the food from circulating and meant that the JTF made little headway at reducing the overall starvation rate.

References

This section draws on the following references:

1. JULLS 30252-54853, Summary—JTF Provide Relief (U), submitted by USCINCENT, Confidential, 2 Mar 1993
2. JULLS 03002-29857, Relief Coordinating Committee, submitted by USCINCENT, Unclassified, 2 Mar, 1993
3. JULLS 03051-87877, Runway Maintenance, submitted by USCINCENT, Unclassified, 2 Mar 1993
4. JULLS 02749-51868, Ground Combat Element (ABCC) (U), submitted by USCINCENT, Confidential, 2 Mar 1993
5. JULLS 03143-79154, J2 Table of Organization (U), submitted by USCINCENT, Confidential, 2 Mar 1993
JTF Los Angeles
(May 1992)

Mission

The mission of JTF Los Angeles was to reduce civil unrest and help restore order in the Los Angeles area in the wake of the riots that began on 29 April 1992.

Background

On 29 April 1992, jurors in Simi Valley, CA, acquitted four Los Angeles Police Department officers of charges stemming from the beating of motorist Rodney King. As the news of the acquittal spread, racial tensions in Los Angeles exploded as rioting, arson, and looting occurred. The primary concern of law enforcement officials was to stop looting and harassment by armed gangs roaming the city (including members of Los Angeles's street gangs). The primary focus of unrest was the South Central section of the city; however, incidents occurred in all areas of Los Angeles.

In response to the growing chaos, the governor of California deployed 9,000 National Guard troops to the Los Angeles area, as well as highway patrol officers from other parts of California. Due to logistical problems, though, it required almost a full day to get troops in place to assist local law enforcement officers. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley requested Federal assistance to limit the violence on 30 April. In response, President Bush federalized the California Army National Guard and directed the deployment of Army and Marine Corps troops. To provide unified command and control over all of the federal military units, the Secretary of Defense activated JTF Los Angeles.
By 1 May, when Army and Marine units received orders to deploy to the area, much of the violence had ceased. Federal forces worked with law enforcement officials to curb remaining unrest through a show of military presence. Troops remained in place until 7 May, with redeployment starting on 9 May. By 12 May, the JTF stood down and all troops had redeployed. A few units remained on alert as a Quick Reaction Force for several additional days.

**Timetable**

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- **April 29, 1992:** Verdict announced. Violence erupts. California governor orders National Guard troops to area to keep order.

- **April 30, 1992:** National Guard troops deployed (pm). Mayor requests Federal assistance; National Guard federalized.

- **May 1, 1992:** JTF LA activated. Marine and Army troops deployed to operations centers. Civil unrest diminishing.

- **May 2, 1992:** Areas of responsibility (AOR) assigned. JTF forces moved to AOR to support local law enforcement officials.

- **May 7, 1992:** Troops return to staging areas.

- **May 9, 1992:** Redeployment to bases begins.

- **May 10, 1992:** Troops redeployed.

**Participants**

**Navy and Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps formed Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Los Angeles to support the JTF. This included the 3d Battalion, 1st MARDIV, as well as air assets, a command element, engineer, and MP units. Support elements also deployed with the SPMAGTF. All told, about 1,500 Marines participated in JTF Los Angeles.
Other forces

The California National Guard (40th Infantry Division) provided most of the troops in the area of operations. The 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, U.S. Army deployed as the JTF reserve. Additionally, Air National Guard units deployed separately (not as part of the JTF). All together, about 9,000 National Guardsmen and 2,600 Army soldiers participated in JTF Los Angeles. In addition, small contingents of the California Air National Guard conducted civil disturbance missions. The NCA did not federalize the Air National Guard units—they remained under the operational control of the governor of California.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command was the supported CINC for the operation. He designated MGen. Marvin Corvault (the Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division) as Commander, Joint Task Force Los Angeles (CJTF-LA). BGen. Marvin Hopgood, Jr., was the commander of Marine forces.

Liaison

Much of the tasking in the operation was directed through the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center. Police departments with requirements filed them with the Emergency Operations Center, which assigned priorities, consolidated the tasks, and passed them to the JTF for action. The JTF then validated each mission request to ensure compliance with the Posse comitatus act before accepting them. At the tactical level, Army and Marine Corps troops worked directly with police officers.

Lessons learned/unique features

Several features came into play in the operations in Los Angeles. The nature and location of the assignment assisted (as well as hindered) the JTF staff.
Communications

Two of the JTF's tactical communications requirements during the operation were communication with the police and communications among military units.

The JTF found that field communications between the military and the police were hindered by the lack of compatible equipment. The JTF eventually solved this problem by the use of cellular phones, pay phones, and portable fax machines.

Communications among military units were hindered by the urban setting. Even after setting up antenna stations on top of buildings, the JTF still found that buildings created many "blind spots" that blocked VHF radio transmissions. Eventually, the Marines bought commercial hand-held radios to replace the Marine AN/PRC-68 squad radios. The new radios partially alleviated the problem for the Marines, but they only provided for clear broadcasts.

At the operational level, the I MEF command element deployed without STU III telephones, which prevented I MEF from making secure phone calls or faxing classified documents.

Intelligence

Forces in JTF-LA used the knowledge of local police departments as well as on-the-scene reports to build up a picture of the situation and threats during the operation. A great deal of useful information was also gleaned with police scanners and through television and radio news broadcasts and newspapers.

Much of the intelligence effort concentrated on street gangs (the Crips and the Bloods) and their ability to influence the situation. Of particular concern was the possibility of sniper attacks and drive-by shootings aimed at JTF forces.

An important restraint on the JTF's intelligence efforts was the laws governing the collection of intelligence within the United States. Public laws explicitly forbid military units from gathering intelligence or maintaining domestic intelligence files. Although some of these restrictions are temporarily relaxed when the military participates in
domestic civil disturbance actions, they do mean that the military must begin domestic operations with very little information on potential threats such as gangs and local criminals.

**Liaison**

The Marines, who were primarily deployed in Compton, detailed a full-time liaison officer to the Compton Police Department for the duration of the incident. In addition, a representative from Compton attended all-Marine staff meetings. This facilitated a good flow of information significant to Marine operations in the area.

**Federalizing the National Guard had benefits and costs.**

Federalizing the California Army National Guard and including it into the JTF created a unified command for almost all of the military forces responding to the Los Angeles riots. Although that helped the JTF make sure the military forces worked efficiently toward common goals, federalizing the National Guard had some drawbacks.

As long as the National Guard is not federalized, it may, upon direction of the state authorities, conduct normal police activities—patrol streets, arrest suspects, direct traffic, etc. After the Guard has been federalized, it falls under the jurisdiction of the *Posse comitatus* act and can no longer conduct the same routine police activities.

At the same time, local government officials are used to working with the National Guard as it operates under state control. Many of them had to be educated about what the Guard could and could not do after being federalized.

**Doctrine for responding to civil disturbances was not appropriate.**

The doctrine, training, and specialized equipment (face shields, batons, shields, etc.) given to the National Guard, Army, and Marine Corps were designed for the control of large mobs. The actual situation on the ground in Los Angeles was somewhat different. Instead of mob violence, the predominant threat came from snipers, drive-by shootings, and small (but well-armed) groups of gang members. In
this event, the JTF found the civil disturbance doctrine in place at the
time to be unapplicable and explicitly rejected employing his forces
as suggested by the doctrine.

Summary

JTF Los Angeles performed its intended function quite well. Army,
Marine, and National Guard units, once deployed, concentrated on
preventing further looting and destruction of facilities, and reduced
the potential for gang-related violence in the area.

References

This section draws on the following references:

1. Marine Corps Gazette, “Another 911 Call,” by Capt. Matthew P.
   Bragg, USMC, Unclassified, Jul 1992

   A. Dotto, USMC, Unclassified, Oct 1992


4. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Newsletter 93-7,
   Operations Other Than War, Volume III, “Civil Disturbance,”
   Unclassified, Nov 1993

5. Military Review, Military Assistance in Los Angeles, by Major Gen-
   eral James Delk, USA Retired, Unclassified, Sep 1992
JTF Provide Transition
(August–October 1992)

Mission

The JTF Provide Transition mission statement was:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCEUR will conduct airlift support through the U.S. Liaison Office Angola to support repatriation of demobilized soldiers and material in support of Angolan elections.

Background

Early in 1992, the United Nations brokered an agreement between the government of Angola and the UNITA rebels to end the civil war in Angola and hold elections to determine a new government. The agreement called for demobilization of both government and rebel soldiers and repatriation of former soldiers to their home areas. The estimated number of soldiers to be resettled exceeded 40,000.

During June of 1992, the UN both formally and informally requested help from the United States in airlifting demobilized soldiers from their demobilization centers to other locations within Angola. The President of the United States agreed to support the UN and directed USCINCEUR to provide three C-130 aircraft for six weeks in support. USCINCEUR planned the operation, code named Provide Transition, and organized a JTF to execute it.

During Provide Transition, the JTF flew 87 missions that transported 8,805 passengers and 264.9 tons of cargo. The cargo included equipment from demobilizing soldiers, food for humanitarian relief, and election materials. The JTF also set up 5 refueling stations to support
UN helicopters, and provided command and control for three UN search and rescue operations.

**Timetable**

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- June 1992: UN officials approach U.S. about providing support for upcoming Angolan elections.

- July 23, 1992: The 37 Airlift Squadron, Rhein Main AB, Germany, notified of possibility of deployment to Angola—planning begins.

- August 3, 1992: President Bush pledges three C-130 aircraft for six weeks to assist with demobilization and the election.

- August 3, 1992: JCS Alert Order identifies USCINCEUR as the supported commander and asks for OPORDER not later than 5 August.

- August 5, 1992: USCINCEUR OPORDER directs immediate deployment of CJTF and advance party.

- August 7, 1992: JTF advance party departs for Angola. They arrive in Luanda two days later.


- August 17, 1992: Full operational capability (three C-130s on hand, flying two missions per day).

- September 17, 1992: USCINCEUR OPORD amended to include refueling of helicopters to mission


- October 3, 1992: Last employment mission.

- October 8, 1992: Redeployment of forces completed.
Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

No Navy or Marine Corps forces participated in Provide Transition.

Other forces

The Air Force contributed three C-130 aircraft and 76 personnel—principally from the 435th Logistic Group and 57 Airlift Squadron. The Army provided sixteen personnel from various supply and support groups to train UN personnel in the use of U.S. equipment for refueling of aircraft.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, Europe was the supported CINC. He named Lt. Col. Jerry Bryant, USAF (of the 37th Airlift Squadron) as the CJTF.

Liaison

The U.S. Liaison Office in Angola was in effect the supported agency in Provide Transition. They acted as an intermediary between the JTF and the parties to the Angolan conflict and defined the JTF’s mission requirement as providing two C-130 flights per day, six days a week, between August 12 and October 3. At the tactical level, the JTF coordinated demobilization flight schedules with a combined Angola government/UNITA opposition committee called the GTAD. The JTF coordinated flights in support of the election with a United Nations Development Program representative.

Lessons learned/unique features

Why use a JTF?

In terms of numbers of servicemembers participating, JTF Provide Transition is the smallest JTF operation we surveyed. It also started
out as an all USAF/AMC operation. The Army did not become involved until USCINCEUR broadened the JTF's original mission to include refueling UN helicopters in September. Because it also started out as a single-service operation, the question naturally arises, "Why was a JTF organized to control this operation?"

Although our available source materials (the after-action report and JULLS) do not answer that question, we speculate that the isolation of the operating area from U.S. force basing areas may have influenced the decision to create a JTF. It took the advance party two days to travel from Germany to Angola. For operations scheduled to last for about 60 days at a remote site, USCINCEUR may have used the JTF structure to set up a temporary command that could operate on a more or less autonomous basis in-theater.

Mission creep occurred.

The JTF's original mission was to ferry passengers. Before the operation was over, it found itself hauling cargo, especially food (92 tons) for humanitarian relief, operating gas stations for helicopters, transporting election materials, and running search and rescue operations for the UN. Evidently, even small, relatively short-lived operations are not immune to mission creep.

Summary

Provide Transition seems to represent the lower size limit for JTFs composed primarily of conventional forces. It also demonstrates that there can be reasons for creating a JTF other than those stated in the JTF doctrine (the desire to impose unified command and control on forces from two or more services).

Reference

This section draws on the following reference:

JTF Andrew
(August 1992–October 1992)

Mission

The mission of JTF Andrew was to conduct relief operations in Florida following the devastation left by Hurricane Andrew.

Background

Hurricane Andrew was perhaps the worst natural disaster to strike the United States. In Florida alone the storm caused 30 deaths, destroyed or damaged 85,000 homes, and left up to a quarter of a million people homeless. Damage estimates in Florida ranged as high as $20 billion.

As a result of Andrew's destruction, the President declared portions of Florida and Louisiana to be major disaster areas. The Secretary of the Army as the DOD executive agent designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces as the operating agent and supported CINC for disaster relief operations. The staff of the 2nd Continental U.S. Army provided the nucleus for the JTF headquarters.

In Florida, military relief operations were centered in Dade County. Over 24,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Canadian servicemembers deployed to provide the relief. The major relief services provided by the military included:

- Electrical generators for emergency power.
- 100,000 emergency rations (Meals Ready To Eat). The military served an additional 900,000 meals from 50 mobile kitchen trailers.
• Establishment of four Life Support Centers offering temporary housing, meals, medical care, childcare, and sanitation to displaced residents.

• Survey teams that went door-to-door to assess the damage and inform residents about the available help.

• Removal of up to 360,000 cubic yards of debris from streets and other public facilities.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

• August 23: Based on weather forecasts, the Florida governor declares a state of emergency in South Florida and orders evacuation of coastal areas. An estimated 700,000 residents depart area. Three state National Guard battalions deploy.

• August 24: Hurricane Andrew strikes Dade County, Florida, in the early morning hours. The President declares three Florida counties as major disaster areas.

• August 25: Initial deployment of military forces for relief efforts. First MRE rations distributed.

• August 26: Hurricane Andrew strikes Morgan City, Louisiana.

• August 27: At the request of Florida officials, the President orders deployment of additional federal troops to assist in relief efforts. The President also establishes a special Presidential Task Force headed by the Secretary of Transportation to oversee the federal disaster response.

• August 28: CINCFOR establishes JTF Andrew to coordinate relief operations in Florida. In Louisiana, there was much less damage and almost no requests for military support. By this date, up to 6,000 Marine and Army troops were in South Florida distributing food and building tent cities.

• August 29: The President raises the commitment of federal troops to 20,000.
• September 9: Military relief operations cease in Louisiana. Only local units provided support—no redeployment was necessary.

• September 14: CJTF Andrew begins the release and redeployment of military units. Local schools open.

• October 15: CINCFOR disestablished JTF Andrew. Military relief operations cease in Florida.

• October 20: Redeployment of JTF Andrew units is complete.

Participants

Armed forces

Table 5 lists the principal participants. Up to 24,000 service members from the U.S. and Canada participated in the operation. All forces shown in table 5 were OPCON to the JTF with the exception of the Canadian forces. The Canadians retained OPCON of their forces and gave TACON over them to the JTF.

Other organizations

The Federal Emergency Management Agency was the lead federal agency in charge of authorizing and coordinating all federal relief efforts. A Presidential task force provided oversight of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and also interacted directly with the JTF. In addition, JTF Andrew necessarily interacted with a large number of other federal, state, and local agencies and non-governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces was the supported CINC for the operation. USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, USCINCTRANS, and the services were supporting. CJTF Andrew was Lt.Gen. Ebbesen, USA (the Commanding General of the 2nd Continental U.S. Army—USATWO). All military relief operations were authorized by, and in
support of, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The JTF also had to coordinate with, and in some sense respond to, the Presidential Task Force; however, the command relationship between the JTF and Presidential Task Force is not clear from the sources we consulted.

Table 5. Principal participants in JTF Andrew

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CJTF Andrew, CG-USATWO</th>
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<td>Army Forces (ARFOR)</td>
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<td>TF Falcon (2d Bde, 82d Abn Div)</td>
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<td>Naval Forces (NAVFOR)</td>
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Table 5. Principal participants in JTF Andrew (continued)

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<td>Construction Bn Unit 419</td>
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<td>Amphibious Construction Bn 2</td>
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<td>Marine Forces (OPCON to ARFOR)</td>
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<td>Mobile Repair Tm</td>
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<td>HMCS Protectuer</td>
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Lessons learned/unique features

Humanitarian assistance doctrine was lacking.

There was a lack of established doctrine on how to conduct military relief operations. Issues the supported CINC and the JTF struggled with included:

- Whom to appoint as CJTF. Continental Army HQs have extensive experience in dealing with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and in planning for relief operations but do not have day-to-day experience in conducting operations. Army Corps and Marine Expeditionary Force HQs are experienced in conducting operations but have little experience in dealing with federal relief agencies.

- Role of the military. The military quickly assumed a larger role than that envisioned for it in the Federal Response Plan. In the Federal Response Plan, the military is the lead agency only for urban search and rescue missions. During the response to Andrew, the military became the *de facto* lead agency for a host of other missions.

- Role of ad-hoc federal teams. The Federal Response Plan also does not envision the creation of a special Presidential Task Force as happened for Hurricane Andrew. The relationships between the military, a Presidential Task Force, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are not covered by doctrine or federal policy.

- Dual reporting of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The JTF included units of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As part of the Federal Response Plan, the Corps also is the lead agency for an Emergency Support Function (ESF) and, as such, reports directly to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. At times the dual reporting system created confusion. Although the JTF could task U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Units attached to the JTF, it could not task the Corps’ ESF office, which was coordinating the overall federal response for emergency water supply, debris clearance, and emergency restoration of water
and sewage systems. Within those areas, the Corps' ESF office could respond directly to requests by state officials, but the JTF could not. The JTF required a tasker from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

- Procedures for tracking, storing, and supplying both military and civilian relief supplies.

- Proper JTF structure. During the operation, the JTF components were organized along service lines; after the operation, the CJTF wrote in after-action reports that a functional organization (i.e., Engineering Forces, Medical Forces, Supply Forces, etc.) might have been more appropriate.

- The proper role of Civil Affairs units.

- Relief responsibilities for military facilities and personnel such as Homestead AFB and ROTC units within the disaster area.

- Definition of the end-state and how to transition to civilian operation of services being provided by the military.

- The appropriate rules of engagement for relief operations—a particular concern in high crime areas.

**Legal issues abounded.**

If there was a dearth of military doctrine on how to conduct military relief operations, there was no lack of federal and state laws and regulations. The most basic federal law is the Stafford Act, which defines the military's domestic relief role as that of a supporting agency to Federal Emergency Management Agency. But, in some cases, existing laws and regulations are less than clear. Issues the JTF and supported CINC had to resolve included such things as the legality of military patrols, traffic direction by military police, participation by reserves, civilian requests for spiritual counseling by chaplains, and providing support for non-governmental organizations such as the American Red Cross.
Logistics planning consumed much time.

Unlike more “normal” military operations, there are no standard time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDDs) for humanitarian operations. This means that logistics planning occupied a large part of the CINC’s and JTF’s efforts. Issues addressed in covering JTF Andrew’s logistic requirements included:

- Accountability for items pushed into theater. In the initial response to the crisis, many different organizations pushed supplies into Florida. Providing proper accountability for these items to support eventual reimbursement by Federal Emergency Management Agency or restocking after the crisis often proved to be difficult.

- Accountability for non-military relief supplies. Much of the humanitarian supplies distributed by the military was provided by other federal agencies (such as the Department of Agriculture) or by private relief organizations. These supplies had to be accounted for and tracked while they were in the military’s possession.

- Suitability of military supplies for humanitarian relief operations. Although many military supplies are useful in a relief effort, others are not. Often the two are intermingled in prestaged deployment packages. Finding and breaking out the needed supplies takes time and expert knowledge.

- Proper accounting for expenditures. If the Federal Emergency Management Agency authorizes a military relief effort, in theory, it will pay for it. In practice this became an accounting problem of marrying up Federal Emergency Management Agency taskers with military efforts.

- Interoperability between services. Much of the refrigerated food was lifted by helicopter off Sylvania and Ponce. Some 90 Army CH-47 helicopters were in the area, but they were not qualified to take off or land on board ship, so all of the ferry duties fell to the Navy CH-46 helicopters of HC 8. This caused no problems, but it does highlight how service-dependent logistics operations can become.
Summary

Like JTF GTMO, JTF Andrew was faced with a logistics heavy task with little firm guidance in the form of military doctrine on how to conduct relief operations, what its objectives should be, and how the JTF would measure success and withdraw from the operation. In addition, JTF Andrew had to ensure compliance with federal laws and regulations governing domestic use of the military. Both JTFs succeeded in their missions, but their experiences do point out a possible need for the military to refine its doctrine for conducting humanitarian operations.

References

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4. JULLS 00145-83708, Treating the American National Red Cross as a Federal Agency, submitted by JTF ANDREW, Unclassified
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JTF Marianas
(August–September 1992)

Mission

JTF Marianas provided disaster relief to the residents of Guam after the passage of Typhoon Omar.

Background

In late August of 1992, Typhoon Omar hit Guam with sustained winds of over 130 miles per hour. The typhoon caused a great deal of damage to housing and the local infrastructure; virtually every utility was knocked out of service.

At the request of Guam's governor for federal assistance, the NCA authorized (among other measures) formation of JTF Marianas to assist in rendering immediate life-saving aid and cleanup effort. Over the course of the next month, the JTF provided food and water, cleared debris, restored electric and water services, and provided shelter for residents displaced by the typhoon.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- 28 August: Typhoon hits Guam. USCINCPAC activates JTF Marianas and dispatches the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to the JTF HQ. The President declares Guam a disaster area, clearing the way for federal assistance. Relief operations begin.

- 28 August–September: Relief operations continue.
• 19 September: JTF Marianas stands down.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Nearly 300 Navy personnel provided support to JTF Marianas. Among these were forces stationed on Guam (at NAS Agana) as well as personnel from USS Holland. Marine Corps forces serving in the operation included elements from 1st MEB and detachments from BSSG-1.

Other services

About 40 members of the Army Corps of Engineers provided support to residents of Guam during relief operations. Forces from 13th Air Force flew airlift missions and provided logistical support.

Command and control

Chain of command

USCINCPAC was the supported CINC. He acted in support of the Army’s Directorate of Military Support. When USCINCPAC activated JTF Marianas on 28 August, he designated RAdm. Edward K. Kristensen, Commander Naval Forces Marianas, as CJTF. CJTF Marianas also served as the Defense Coordinating Officer, coordinating DOD efforts with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and territorial officials.

Liaison with local elements

In the initial days of JTF Marianas, the CJTF served as the Federal Coordination Official as well as the Defense Coordinating Officer. In this capacity, he coordinated efforts between JTF assets and territorial workers. When the Federal Emergency Management Agency representative arrived on-scene, the CJTF relinquished the Federal Coordination Official hat to him.
Lessons learned/unique features

Doctrine for humanitarian assistance operations is immature.

One common thread among disaster relief efforts in Florida, Hawaii, and Guam is that many of the commands involved found little doctrine for performing disaster relief missions. This made it more difficult for commanders to carry out disaster relief efforts, because there was no clear definition of “disaster relief,” or, in other words, what the military should do or provide.

Tracking of relief supplies gives an example of how a military system and doctrine proved to be difficult to use in a humanitarian operation. One of the JTF's contributions was to transport relief supplies provided by other agencies to Guam. Coordinating the lift of these supplies was complicated by an inability to identify the supplies within JOPES—a planning system used by the military for contingency operations. Without visibility in JOPES, TRANSCOM had difficulties in estimating the lift requirements.

Coordination with other agencies is critical.

As in other relief operations JTF Marianas had to coordinate with a wide array of governmental and private relief agencies. With no doctrine, the JTF improvised with a combination of liaison officers and by collocating the command center with other federal agencies. To speed the process in the future, the JTF recommended that each unified CINC that might engage in disaster relief operations in the U.S. or its territories have a standing Federal Emergency Management Agency liaison.

Summary

JTF Marianas used about 800 military personnel to provide needed disaster relief to residents of Guam after the passage of Typhoon Omar.
References

This section draws on the following references:


JTF Hawaii
(September–October 1992)

Mission

JTF Hawaii provided humanitarian relief to residents of the Hawaiian island of Kauai in the wake of Typhoon Iniki.

Background

At 1600 hours (local time) on the 11th of September, Typhoon Iniki struck the Hawaiian Island chain. Damage from the storm—with its 120-knot sustained winds—was extremely heavy on the island of Kauai. The typhoon damaged many homes, left residents without power, and scattered debris over a wide area of the island.

On 12 September, President Bush declared the island of Kauai a disaster area, clearing the way for federal assistance of relief and cleanup operations. To coordinate the militaries' response, USCINCPAC activated JTF Hawaii, with the Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific as CJTF.

The JTF established five Full Service Centers, which provided water, food, and temporary shelter for displaced residents. The JTF also generated emergency power and provided medical care and communications. Operations continued until 6 October, when the JTF stood down.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- 11 September: SECARMY issues Warning Order to CINCPAC in anticipation of storm.
• 12 September: President declares Kauai a disaster area. SECARMY orders CINCPAC to conduct relief operations. CINCPAC activates JTF Hawaii.

• 13 September–5 October: Operations on Kauai continue.

• 6 October: JTF Hawaii stands down.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

Over 900 Navy servicemen participated or supported the cleanup operations. Navy units participating included USS Belleau Wood, which transported USMC/USA forces from Oahu to Kauai and provided emergency medical services and command and control support, and USS Bristol County, which helped redeploy the forces.

About 1,000 Marines participated in the Task Force USMC Engineers, which provided food, reconstructed schools and water supplies, and cleared debris. Most of them were from the 1st MEB.

Other services

Over 2,900 Army personnel (principally from the 25th Infantry Division) participated in JTF Hawaii. In an interesting twist, the Army provided some organic sealift by using at least two LSVs (Gross and Ginger) for moving forces between islands.

About 1,800 National Guard members participated. Many of these were Army Corps of Engineers personnel engaged in engineer support and public works projects.

Air Force personnel provided transport and logistical support.
Command and control

Chain of command
USCINCPAC was the supported CINC for JTF Hawaii, with FORSCOM, TRANSCOM, and the services as supporting forces. USCINCPAC itself acted in support of the Army's Directorate of Military Support. Lt.Gen. Johnnie H. Corrs, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific served as the CJTF for this operation. JTF Hawaii activated a subordinate JTF—JTF Garden Isle—to provide planning, coordination, and control of the relief efforts on Kauai. The Marine component commander was CG 1st MEB.

Liaison
The CJTF coordinated directly with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. That agency then handled liaison between DOD elements and local civilian agencies, providing tasking and coordination.

Lessons learned/unique features

Command and control lagged the commencement of operations.
The intended JTF Garden Isle command structure was not in place and functioning when relief operations began. Thus, forces started operations without clear lines of responsibility. For example, when asbestos appeared in the water supply, the TFUSMCE put a reverse osmosis water-purification unit (ROWPU) in operation in Hanapepe without waiting for tasking because the tasking authority was unclear this early in the operation. Without clear authority to task other forces, TFUSMCE “borrowed” their assets to put the ROWPU into operation.

Summary

JTF Hawaii provided timely disaster relief on the island of Kauai. Weather forecasts gave the planners advance notice of an imminent disaster and allowed some planning to take place before the fact. Still,
as the after-action reports make clear, not everything fell into place smoothly when the time came to execute. Over 5,000 military and civilian personnel took part in an action that cleared debris, restored power and water services, and provided basic necessities—including 326,000 meals—to the residents of Kauai.

References

This section draws on the following references:


Operation Restore Hope
(December 1992–May 1993)\textsuperscript{11}

Mission

According to the OPLAN, the JTF’s mission in Operation Restore Hope was to:

\begin{quote}
ensure the uninhibited movement of relief supplies through air and sea port facilities and allow the movement of relief supplies by UN (United Nations) and NGO (non-governmental organization) agencies to distribution sites.
\end{quote}

The goal of the operation was to create a secure environment for relief operations by the United Nations or other non-governmental relief organizations and eventually hand over responsibility for all security and humanitarian operations to the United Nations.

Background

Following the overthrow of Somali leader Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia slid into a state of anarchy as various clans and warlords started a violent struggle for power. By 1992, the situation in southern Somalia was particularly bad. Widespread violence, lawlessness, and banditry, together with a persistent drought in parts of the country, hampered food production and distribution resulting in widespread starvation.

\textsuperscript{11} The material in this summary is an extremely condensed version of CNA’s overall reconstruction of Operation Restore Hope. The references at the end of this section discuss the operation in much fuller detail than is possible here.
In April 1992, United Nations Security Council Resolution 751 established United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Later resolutions increased the strength of military units sent to Somalia and authorized emergency relief flights. Neither the additional security forces nor relief flights changed the situation substantially. The UNOSOM security forces were unable to provide security to prevent the food arriving in country from being looted when relief workers attempted to distribute it.

On December 3, 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 794 called for peace-enforcement operations in Somalia. In response, the President of the United States directed the USCINCCENT to conduct Operation Restore Hope. USCINCCENT activated JTF Somalia (later renamed United Task Force—UNITAF) and named the Commanding General of the First Marine Expeditionary Force as the CJTF.

Over the next six months, Operation Restore Hope established eight humanitarian relief sectors in southern Somalia, reopened key airports and ports, and provided security for relief operations. Actual aid distribution was the responsibility of the United Nations and a host of non-governmental relief organizations. More than 28,000 U.S. servicemen from all the services participated. In addition, over 10,000 servicemen from 24 coalition nations became part of the force. Operation Restore Hope ended with the transition to a UN force (UNOSOM II) on May 4, 1993.

For the most part, Operation Restore Hope forces concentrated on stabilizing the security situation so that relief organizations could do their job. The complete collapse of civil authority also meant that the JTF found itself performing many civil duties such as management of the port of Mogadishu, managing airspace over southern Somalia, and assisting in the reestablishment of police forces.

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12. The U.S. responded by initiating Operation Provide Relief—another JTF operation we discuss in this document.
Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:


- 24 November 1992: USCINCCENT Commander's Estimate provides potential military courses of action to the NCA. JCS recommends military action be taken contingent on UN authorization. I MEF begins detailed planning.

- 3 December 1992: UN Security Council authorizes use of force in Somalia to conduct relief operations. USCINCCENT officially establishes the JTF Headquarters using the I MEF staff as a nucleus.

- 9 December 1992: First Marine forces arrive in Somalia and secure Mogadishu port and airport.

- 10 December 1992: CJTF arrives in country, establishes headquarters at former U.S. Embassy. MV Lummus arrives in port to begin offloading supplies for the security forces.

- 11–31 December 1992: JTF Forces secure eight humanitarian relief sectors throughout southern Somalia. Among other things, operations included convoys (both short and long distance) of relief supplies, engineering work to restore roads, ports and airfields, and establishment of a Humanitarian Operations Center to coordinate operations with private relief organizations.

- 19 January 1993: 3d Bn/9th Marines redeploy to CONUS, the first major redeployment of U.S. ground forces. By the end of January the security situation had stabilized and the CJTF assessed the situation as being ready for turnover to the UN. The next few months were spent redeploying forces to CONUS and working out the details of the transition to UN control.
• 4 May 1993: Operation Restore Hope ends. About 5,000 U.S. servicemembers remain in-theater and transition to either UNOSOM II (a UN command) under a modified OPCON arrangement or direct CINCENT control in support of UNOSOM II.

Participants

-Navy and Marine Corps

Marine Forces included the First Marine Division (with the headquarters reinforced to act as the MARFOR HQ), elements from the Third Marine Air Wing, and the headquarters and units of the First Service Support Group.

Naval Forces underwent a number of changes during the operation. At the start, the principal naval forces were the USS Ranger battle group (with COMCARGRU ONE embarked on USS Ranger as COMNAVFOR), the Kitty Hawk battle group, an amphibious task unit including USS Tripoli, USS Juneau, USS Rushmore, and MV Lummus, and three ships from MPSRON TWO (MV Anderson, MV Bonnyman, and MV Phillips). Other events led to the departure of the carriers and, as a result, COMNAVFOR responsibilities devolved first to COMCARGRU THREE on Kitty Hawk, and thence to COMPHIBGRU THREE. Finally COMPHIBRON THREE became COMNAVFOR on 15 January with the departure of COMPHIGRU THREE after the completion of the MPF offload.

Other forces

The 10th Mountain Division (with the Commanding General acting as COMARFOR) provided the bulk of the Army Forces, which included (among other units) a brigade of infantry, an aviation brigade, engineer group, headquarters and support groups, medical company, military police battalion, and civil affairs battalion. The Air Force provided transport, tanking, and special teams such as combat camera. The U.S. Special Operations Forces Command provided a Ranger regiment and specialized teams in the areas of Civil Affairs and PSYOPS.
Twenty-four coalition partners provided over 10,000 troops. The largest forces came from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, and Australia.

Command and control

Chain of command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command was the supported CINC for the operation. He designated Lt.Gen. Johnston, USMC (Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force) as the Commander of JTF Somalia. Later during the operation CINCENT renamed JTF Somalia as UNITAF. For the most part the JTF was organized along service/force lines. Exceptions were: the JTF Support Command (with elements of the 13th COSCOM providing the headquarters), which provided logistics and medical support to the JTF forces; and the Airspace Control Authority (a joint staff built around the nucleus of the 9d MAW), which provided airspace management and airspace control, and JTF Provide Relief prior to the assumption of its airlift relief efforts by Air Force component.

Liaison with other elements

JTF Somalia/UNITAF had coordination authority with the United Nations forces in Somalia (UNOSOM I to start with and later UNOSOM II). JTF Somalia/UNITAF also had coordination authority (vice supporting or being supported by) with the numerous non-governmental relief organizations operating inside Somalia. To coordinate with the relief organizations, UNITAF established a Civil Military Operations Center as a discreet staff element. The Civil Military Operations Center provided the JTF's representative to the Humanitarian Operations Center, a center for coordination between the JTF, the UN, and the relief organizations.
Lessons learned/unique features

The transition to UN control was lengthy.

Transition of UNITAF operations to UN control was a long drawn-out process. Several issues required resolution before the transition was complete:

- Funding. The UN was hesitant to take over an operation that it did not know how to pay for. Similarly, U.S. units were hesitant to leave equipment for the UN due to fears they would not be reimbursed.

- Lack of permanent UN command structures. The UN does not have a standing army with permanent command structures. This complicated UNITAF transition planning because they did not know how the UN would organize the military forces. Also, some common U.S. military functions such as intelligence are specifically forbidden in UN military organizations.

- UN bureaucracy. The UN bureaucracy was both distant (in New York City) and used to operating on its own time schedule. Its multinational character also makes getting decisions in policy-tinged areas a slow process.

- Command relationships. For political reasons, the U.S. wanted to place U.S. forces under UN control to show support for the UN and encourage other countries to do the same. At the same time there was a concern that the UN might misuse U.S. forces. The UN, CJTF, CINC, and NCA resolved the potential misuse of U.S. forces by the appointment of U.S. military officers to key positions within UNOSOM II, development of a tailored version of OPCON, and by only placing support forces under direct UN control. All combat forces remained under CINCENT OPCON.

Although all issues were eventually resolved favorably, it is worth pointing out that many of them have a distinct political/policy cast. Their political nature put them beyond the ability of the JTF forces to resolve by a military operation.
Other command transitions lacked direction.

In Restore Hope, there were several cases where responsibilities were passed between different services. For example:

- MARFOR often arrived first in a sector and later handed off control of that sector to ARFOR (or foreign forces).

- Initial logistics responsibilities were handled by the JTF J4 and elements of the 1st FSSG. Later on these responsibilities were given to a primarily Army organization (the JTF Support Command formed around the 13th COSCOM).

- Commander Amphibious Group 3 was Commander, Mogadishu Port Facility until 15 January when these duties were passed to the Commanding Officer of the U.S. Army 7th Transportation Group.

There is only a limited amount of doctrine on the transition of operations between services and the new command relationships that often result. Although this has the potential to create a loss in capability when issues "fall between the cracks," the CNA reconstruction of Restore Hope did not uncover any problems due to the transitions.

Planning evolved into crisis action planning.

Planning for Operation Restore Hope started off as a deliberate planning process but quickly picked up tempo and transitioned to Crisis Action Planning procedures. Major issues during planning included:

- Uncertainty about the forces available. The planners knew for certain that the SPMAGTF aboard the Tri poli ATU and Marines attached to I MEF would be available, but there was less certainty about which Army and Navy forces would be available. In the case of coalition forces, sometimes the JTF did not know what their capabilities, lift, and support requirements would be before their arrival in Somalia. This greatly complicated the JTF's ability to assign missions to these forces. As a result, the CJTF relied heavily on his "known" assets, especially the SPMAGTF on board the Tri poli ATU during the initial phases of the operation.
• Ambiguity about the balance between security operations and humanitarian assistance operations. One specific case involved ambiguity with respect to the JTF’s role in disarming the Somali factions.

• Relief agencies and command relationships. The planners devoted a significant amount of attention to the interaction with relief agencies and command relationships. The interface between the JTF, UN, and relief agencies posed difficult problems the planners attempted to resolve before the start of operations.

Coordination with non-governmental organizations worked well.

As mentioned above, early in the planning phases the I MEF staff knew that the military would need to coordinate with non-governmental relief organizations. They set up a Humanitarian Operations Center to act as a central coordinating body and established a Civil Military Operation Cell to provide a single military point of contact. Although some contentious issues such as the confiscation of guns from the local “protection” forces the relief agencies hired were never fully resolved, on the whole the coordination arrangement worked well. By centralizing the requests of the relief agencies, the military could respond to them without becoming overburdened.

Few incidents of rules-of-engagement violations occurred.

Rules of engagement were an important part of Restore Hope. They had to be restrictive enough to prevent major incidents, flexible enough to prevent needless casualties if one of the many warlords decided to oppose the U.S. forces, and simple enough to be executed by soldiers without special training in peacekeeping activities. The few incidents of ROE violations by the JTF forces indicates that the Restore Hope ROE struck an appropriate balance. The relative lack of major incidents also supports the contention that it is not inappropriate to use regular, well-trained soldiers without specialized peacekeeping training in operations aimed at restoring order.\(^\text{13}\)

\[^{13}\text{This does not mean that, when available, forces with specialized peacekeeping training would not be a better choice for the task.}\]
Summary

Restore Hope was a successful military operation. Support for this statement comes from the accomplishment of objectives with little difficulty ahead of schedule, the subsequent improvement in relief operations, and the successful transition to a UN-run operation. As with some of the other humanitarian operations we have reviewed, the JTF forces were dependent on the actions of an outside agency (in this case the UN and department of State) to achieve their desired end-state (turnover to the UN once a secure environment for relief operations was established).

References

This section draws on the following references:


JTF Provide Promise  
(January 1993–Present\textsuperscript{14})

Mission

The original missions of JTF Provide Promise were:

- Be the primary point of contact between USEUCOM and the United Nations forces in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (former FRY)
- Exercise administrative control over all U.S. personnel in the former FRY
- Operate a field hospital in Zagreb for UN forces.

Within six months, the JTF's mission expanded to include:

- Plan for all future USEUCOM operations in the former FRY
- Coordinate U.S. participation in relief operations
- Conduct relief operations
- Exercise OPCON of operations by all U.S. forces within the former FRY
- Prepare to become the nucleus of a NATO headquarters that would direct implementation of UN resolutions.

\textsuperscript{14} As of this writing—March 1994—Operation Provide Promise is still in progress. Due to availability of information, this summary is based on Provide Promise activities prior to July 1993. Also, because these operations are ongoing and detailed information is not always available, the lessons learned section of this operation summary should be considered both tentative and incomplete.
Background

Fighting broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) between the Bosnian government and the Serbian population—backed by the Yugoslav army—a few days after a majority of the voters in Bosnia approved a referendum on independence. A bloody three-way conflict between the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs followed.

The fighting left pockets of refugees—mostly Muslim—isolated in small areas scattered across Bosnia. UN forces organized under the command of UNPROFOR monitored one broken cease-fire after another and attempted delivery of humanitarian assistance to the refugees.

U.S. participation began with airlifts of food and medicine to Sarajevo in July of 1992. The next step was establishment of a field hospital in Zagreb to treat UNPROFOR members in November 1992. By January 1993, the U.S. involvement in Bosnia had grown to the point that USCINCEUR established Joint Task Force Provide Promise to operate the hospital and coordinate with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR).

Later activities by JTF Provide Promise included air drops of food and medicine to isolated pockets of refugees (by June 1993, JTF Provide Promise had conducted over 160 drops totalling 5,000 tons of food and medicine) and responsibility for planning future U.S. and NATO operations.

At this writing, JTF Provide Promise continues. It is not yet clear how the situation in Bosnia will turn out and what future roles the JTF will play.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- July 3, 1992: USCINCEUR begins airlift of humanitarian assistance into Sarajevo in support of UNPROFOR.
• October 13, 1992: CJCS Execute Order for operation Provide Promise—the deployment of a field hospital to Zagreb, Croatia, not later than November 15. The field hospital deployed under a non-JTF command structure.

• January 30, 1993: USCINCEUR activates JTF Provide Promise. CJTF is the CO of TF 212—the field hospital in Zagreb.

• February 23, 1993: USCINCEUR OPORD for airdrop of relief supplies in the Bosnia-Herzegovina. Adm. Boorda (Commander in Chief, USNAVEUR and NATO Commander in Chief, South) becomes CJTF Provide Promise. Former CJTF and staff left in place in Zagreb as a forward command element. Although not explicitly listed as a task in the OPORD, JTF Provide Promise also began planning for implementation of future U.S. and/or NATO operations such as implementation of the Vance Owen Peace Plan.

• February 28, 1993: First airdrop of supplies into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

• March 16, 1993: Representatives of Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces accept Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

• April 3, 1993: CJCS Warning Order tasking USCINCEUR to begin planning for implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

• April 10, 1993: NATO begins enforcement of a no-fly zone over the airspace of the former FRY.

• May 13, 1993: USCINCEUR gives JTF Provide Promise responsibility for all EUCOM operations and contingency planning in the FRY.

• May 16, 1993: Bosnian Serbs reject Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

• June 11, 1993: CJCS Alert Order to USCINCEUR for deployment of a reinforced company of 300 military to support UNPROFOR operations in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia.
Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

The majority of the JTF Provide Promise headquarters staff come from the staff of CINCUSNAVEUR. Many of the JTF staff members also fill billets on the NATO CINCSOUTH staff.

The problem of which forces were assigned to JTF Provide Promise in June 1993 is not one we have been totally able to reconcile at this time. Depending on which view we take, the number of Navy service-members serving in the JTF ranged from a few hundred serving at headquarters to over 12,000 afloat.

JTF Provide Promise Situation Reports show that other Navy participants in June 1993 included COMSIXTHFLT as the Naval component commander and most of the forces assigned to Sixth Fleet such as: the USS Theodore Roosevelt battle group, an amphibious task force organized around USS Saipan, several logistics ships, and ground-based MPA. However, the same surface combatants that are listed as being under JTF OPCON in the JTF Sitreps, are listed in other sources as OPCON to a NATO commander COMNAVSOOUTH (an Italian admiral).

JTF Sitreps also show the 26th MEU (SOC) embarked on USS Saipan as being OPCON to the JTF. All told, JTF Sitreps show roughly 15,500 sailors and Marines as being OPCON to JTF Provide Promise in June 1993. According to the Sitreps, the total number of servicemembers participating in JTF Provide Promise during June 1993 was about 17,000.

Other services

The U.S. Army provided most of the command staff for the JTF Forward headquarters in Zagreb, a mobile surgical hospital unit (503 MASH), and rigging units for the airdrops. In addition to its JTF designation, the field hospital in Zagreb is also listed as a member of UNPROFOR. The Army also conducted liaison with the UNHCR and UNPROFOR.
The U.S. Air Force provided C-130s for airdrop operations. Germany and the United Kingdom also provided aircraft to the JTF for airdrop operations.

Command and control

Chain of command

USCINCEUR is the supported CINC for operation Provide Promise. USCINCEUR in turn is supporting both the UNPROFOR peacekeepers in Bosnia and the NATO/coalition force enforcing UN resolutions such as the no-fly zone and economic sanctions against Serbia. Originally, the CJTF was an Army officer in charge of TF 212 (the field hospital deployed to Zagreb). As of March 1994, the CJTF is Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Adm. Jeremy Boorda. In addition to his U.S. command, Adm. Boorda is also the NATO Commander in Chief, Southern Region.

Liaison

JTF Provide Promise is involved in planning for joint operations that may well be executed either as a NATO operation or as coalition operations. Given NATO procedural constraints, most of the liaison on future operations happens informally. Similarly, most contacts with potential coalition partners start out at the informal military-to-military level. The NATO Combined Air Operations Center and the JTF JFACC are collocated, and many JTF staff members also fill billets in the Combined Air Operations Center. These two staffs coordinate for air operations in the vicinity of and over the former FRY.

The JTF schedules airdrops in coordination with the UNHCR offices in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Geneva and UNPROFOR commanders on the ground. The JTF also coordinates with other agencies such as the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and Doctors Without Borders.

Finally, given the multinational efforts being made in the former FRY, the JTF coordinates with the Department of State and U.S. embassies of various western European countries.
Lessons learned/unique features

The JTF's primary focus was on planning.

After the February 1993 restructuring of the JTF, the primary focus of the JTF Provide Promise headquarters turned to planning for future U.S., NATO, or coalition operations. USCINCEUR confirmed the new focus of the JTF in the May 13, 1993, OPORDER revision.

One common feature of all of the JTF's plans was that they would be executed either by someone other than the JTF or by the JTF staff after converting it to a NATO staff.

What advantages accrued to having the JTF staff act as a planning cell for operations that would probably not be controlled by the JTF? The principal advantage appears to be a reduction in the lag time between tasking by the policy-makers and ability to execute the operation. Decisions about potential military operations in the former FRY are being made in a large multinational arena. Working out policy differences among all of the nations involved is time consuming. Because the JTF is a unilateral U.S. command, it can start planning in advance of the (anticipated) political approval.

The principal disadvantages of using the JTF as an advance planning cell appear to be a danger that the terms of the political agreement for an operation may render some of the planning obsolete and an inability to conduct effective liaison with all of the essential players before achieving the political agreement. The effectiveness of the current arrangement will be known only if any of its plans are actually executed.

15. Such disconnects are not without precedent and occurred during the planning for reconstruction operations in Panama after Operation Just Cause where the military planners could not formally talk to the State Department or country team before the invasion.
Staff responsibilities in a humanitarian assistance operation are not well defined by doctrine.

The J3 (operations) staff of JTF Provide Promise is responsible for targeting where to airdrop the supplies of food and medicine within the former FRY. To make that decision, J3 officers fuse information from a large variety of sources to evaluate the amount of food likely to be on hand in an area and estimate how long it will sustain the local population. If, instead of dropping food to alleviate starvation, the JTF was dropping bombs to destroy the military effectiveness of hostile forces, the fusion and evaluation process would no doubt be handled by the J2 (intelligence) staff instead.

The point of this observation is not that JTF Provide Promise has made a poor choice in apportioning staff responsibilities. Rather, the point is that as we have seen in other humanitarian operations (such as JTF GTMO and JTF Sea Angel), where to assign the responsibilities for staff functions in a humanitarian operation is not always well specified by current doctrine.

Summary

JTF Provide Promise is still in existence and no doubt its mission continues to evolve. So far, its unique contribution to the development of JTF doctrine appears to be the use of a JTF to plan operations for another command structure (that can not be established at the desired time for the beginning of planning) to execute.

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4. CJCS WASHINGTON DC 030130Z APR 93, ACTWARN-Planning for Possible Implementation of Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) (U), Confidential

5. USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE 181943Z MAY 93, Change to JTF Provide Promise (U), Secret

6. COMNAVSOUTH 121153Z JUN 93, Operation Sharp Guard Implementation (U), Confidential


JTF Provide Refuge
(February–March 1993)

Mission

JTF Provide Refuge stood up to assist the U.S. Coast Guard and Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel with the handling of 527 Chinese nationals attempting to enter the United States illegally.

Background

On 27 January 1993, distress messages from the Panamanian-registered MV East Wood indicated the ship was in distress. When the USCG cutter Rush arrived on the scene on 4 February, her crew found that the vessel contained over 500 Chinese nationals. The MV East Wood's crew had abandoned ship. Conditions were appalling.

The NCA authorized JTF Provide Refuge to provide humanitarian assistance to the Chinese nationals and to maintain security at the refugee camp set up on Kwajalein Atoll. The President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands agreed to permit the temporary housing of the refugees on the Army's Kwajalein Atoll base, but insisted that American forces provide security.

Timetable

The significant events of this operation were as follows:

- 29 December: MV East Wood leaves Hong Kong.
- 27 January: Receipt of first distress messages.
- 04 February: Rush arrives on scene.
• 12 February: USCINCPAC Crisis Action Team activated. JCS Warning and Execution orders received at USCINCPAC. The Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell and JTF staff departs Honolulu.


• 05 March: Chinese nationals repatriated.

Participants

Navy and Marine Corps

The documentation shows no Navy or Marine Corps participation in this JTF aside from participation in the JTF staff.

Other services

The Army played a major role in JTF Provide Refuge. The refugee camp was located at the Army’s base on Kwajalein Island. Army military police chopped to the JTF from Hawaii assumed responsibility for camp security upon their arrival. Army troops on Kwajalein constructed the temporary camp to hold the refugees during their processing.

The Air Force provided transportation and logistical support. MAC C-5 and C-141 aircraft flew food, supplies, and personnel to Kwajalein in support of JTF Provide Refuge. Elements of PACAF were part of the JTF planning cell.

The Coast Guard, although not a DOD agency, worked in support of the JTF. The crew of Rush was OPCON to JTF Provide Refuge during the operation. Coast Guard personnel also provided security during both the transit to Kwajalein and the initial phase of the refugee camp operations.

State Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service employees, although not under the control of JTF Provide Refuge, performed liaison with host nation and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
Command and control

Chain of command

On 12 February, when JCS approved USCINCPAC activation of a JTF to provide assistance to the Chinese refugees, USCINCPAC appointed the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light) as CJTF. Deputy CJTF was Commander, U.S. Army, Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA).

Liaison with local elements

The State Department coordinated JTF efforts with host nation officials and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees staff. The State Department also negotiated with China for the eventual repatriation of the refugees.

Summary

JTF Provide Refuge employed 289 military and 14 civilian personnel, as well as some personnel from USAKA, to provide humanitarian assistance and security for the 527 Chinese nationals attempting to enter the United States illegally on board the MV East Wood. Without this assistance, it is likely that many on board would have been malnourished or starving—some may have even died. Intervention by the Coast Guard prevented a possible tragedy, and the efforts of the State Department and JTF permitted the safe repatriation of the Chinese nationals.

References

This section draws on the following references:


2. USCINCPAC Message 120545Z FEB 93, Secret

3. CJCS Message 121558Z FEB 93, CJTF Provide Refuge Execute Order (U), Secret

4. USCINCPAC Message 140300Z FEB 93, Joint Personnel Status, Unclassified
Other operations

In this section we give brief descriptions of other post-1983 JTF operations or operations that may have used a JTF command structure. We did not include these operations in our earlier summaries for a number of reasons:

- The operation is recent or ongoing and lessons-learned material was not available.
- Inadequate information on the operation hampered analysis.
- The command structure for the operation is unclear.
- The JTF did not execute an operation.

For similarly brief descriptions of Joint Task Forces prior to 1983, see CNA FTC Interim Report 93-7, Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993, by Adam Siegel and Scott Fabbi, FOUO, Sep 1993. This report is a quicklook analysis that has not received our usual internal review. Although we believe it to be accurate, it is still subject to change.

Golden Pheasant (March 1988)

In response to a Sandinista incursion into Honduras, forces from the 82d Airborne and 7th Infantry Division (Light) executed an Emergency Readiness Deployment Exercise and deployed to Honduras with less than 24 hours' notice on March 17, 198C8. The deployment of some 3,000 troops was meant to discourage further Sandinista pressure on Honduras. The supported CINC was USCINCSOUTH and the supporting CINCs were USCINCFOR and USCINCTRANS.

USCINCFOR initially proposed packaging the response as a JTF deployed to SOUTHCOM. However, after Air Force combat support
aircraft dropped out of the force package, USCINCSOUTH organized it as a single-service task force.\textsuperscript{16}

**Victor Squared (October 1991)**

Following a military coup in Haiti, USCINCLANT ordered preparations for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) from Haiti. Specifically, the orders were to:

- Deploy JTF 129, a Marine force from Camp Lejeune, to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
- Upgrade the alert status of II MEF
- Put JTF 140 on notice.

With a stabilization of the situation in Haiti, USCINCLANT directed the redeployment of JTF 129 on 23 October 1991. By this time, the refugee situation leading to Operation GTMO was growing more serious.\textsuperscript{17}

**Provide Hope (February 1992)**

Under the control of USCINCEUR, the U.S. airlifted food and medical supplies into the former Soviet Union to show support for the fledgling government of Boris Yeltsin. A JCS task force inside the Pentagon planned the operation, which gives it some of the flavor of a JTF operation. However, Provide Hope did not use an explicit “JTF” command structure. USTRANSCOM and MAC assigned Colonel John B. Sams, Jr., USAF, commander of the 60th Airlift Wing, Travis, CA, as Commander Mobility Forces (COMMOMFOR) for Operation


\textsuperscript{17} CINC USACOM, Draft USACOM Special Historical Study, *Operation GTMO (U)*, by Capt. William McClintock, USNR, and Capt. Alexander G. Monroe, USNR, Secret, Feb 1984
Provide Hope. Col. Sams deployed to Rhein-Main, where he commanded the airlift operations into the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Sierra Leone (May 1992)}

With an uncertain security situation in Sierra Leone, a 79-member U.S. European Command medical team was withdrawn from that country earlier than scheduled. The State Department used the MEDFLAG exercise withdrawal to evacuate U.S. and other nations' civilians aboard U.S. military aircraft. The six aircraft (two C-141s and four C-140s) evacuated a total for 438 persons (260 American) on 3 and 4 May 1992. A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was activated to support this operation. We do not have details on the command structure for this JSOTF.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Southern Watch (August 1992 to Present)}

JTF Southwest Asia operates with UN authorization and a coalition of nations to enforce a no-fly zone in southern Iraq in Operation Southern Watch. JTF Southwest Asia commands USAF and USN forces. An Air Force Major General is the CJTF. We do not have detailed information on Southern Watch/JTF Southwest Asia.

\textbf{Haiti (September 1993–ongoing)}

In September 1993, CINCUSACOM activated JTF Haiti to support UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti. An Army colonel was COMJTF-Haiti. After Haitian irregulars prevented the landing of unarmed U.S.


\textsuperscript{19} CJCS WASHINGTON DC 021410Z MAY 92, \textit{Execute Order for Military Assistance to AMEMBASSY Freetown (U), Secret}

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GM ECPA 021901Z MAY 92, \textit{Public Affairs Plan (U), Secret}

military personnel en route Haiti for peacekeeping operations, the UN Security Council voted for a maritime interdiction operation to enforce sanctions against Haiti. In mid October, CINCUSACOM activated JTF 120 to command the maritime interception operation. JTF 120 also had tasking to be prepared to protect American citizens at risk in Haiti. CJTF 120 has been a U.S. Navy 0-7, first COMCRUDES-GRU 8 and then, from 6 January 1994, COMCARGRU 2. CINCUSA-COM disestablished JTF Haiti in early December 1993.

**JTF-Somalia (October 1993–March 1994)**

Following the 3 October 1993 firefight, USCINCENT activated JTF Somalia to command U.S.-only military operations in Somalia. MGen. Ernst, USA, commanded this JTF, which included elements from all four services and incorporated the JSOTF that had been operating in Somalia. JTF Somalia formed a part of U.S. Forces, Somalia, under MGen. Montgomery, USA. JTF Somalia oversaw the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia.
List of tables

Table 1. Summary of selected Joint Task Forces since 1983 . 3
Table 2. Major Navy participation in JTFs . . . . . . . . 9
Table 3. National contingents in Operation Provide Comfort 95
Table 4. Provide Comfort command and control chronology 96
Table 5. Principal participants in JTF Andrew . . . . . . 150
## Distribution list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SNDL</th>
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**Note:** The distribution list includes various military and government entities and their respective contacts, organized by SNDL and other categories.