NATIONAL DEFENSE FELLOWSHIP

FORCE PROTECTION: A NEED FOR GREATER SYNERGY

by

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Preface

As a career security forces officer who has commanded four squadrons in four different Air Force major commands, ensuring our troops return safely from contingency operations has always been my primary focus for our unit training program. You see, as the commander I was the one left standing with the families as the troops deployed off to all parts of the world. These families looked to me for assurances their loved ones would return home safely—I tried my best to assure them, but... This concern for our troops' safety was escalated when I was tasked as the deploying ground defense force commander for the planning and execution of all security and defense matters at a collocated operating base (COB) in the Republic of Korea. It was during a base support planning conference at this COB that I came to realize how disconcerted planning and execution of base support operations truly were. So much was dependent on the personal knowledge and experience of tasked commanders, especially the support group commander. This just did not seem an effective way to run an operation. So, when I was selected to serve as a National Defense Fellow at Florida International University, I knew immediately what the focus of my research would be—force protection on a larger scale.

My research for this paper was extensive, but it was my varied operational experience that I mostly depended upon to guide me. I thought of those families, the new lieutenants I commissioned when assigned as an AFROTC commander, and most notably the great airmen of all ranks I had served with over the last 21 years to guide me in this
endeavor. What does the term force protection mean to me? It means a lot more than just strong security programs designed to protect our airmen and families from acts of terrorism. Force protection to me means a concerted effort by the Air Force and the Department of Defense to ensure for the safety and well being of our troops, taking all actions necessary to protect them. Protection must include more than security programs to delay hostile actions, it must include protection from all threats and conditions that may prevent our troops' safe return back home.

My intent in writing this paper was to look at a broader force protection program, particularly during contingency operations, and make recommendations on an approach to accomplish this undertaking. These recommendations are based on my personal experiences, research into existing program development/execution, and most importantly, in talking with people throughout the Air Force who are working hard every day to ensure we remain the pristine Air Force in the world.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank members of security forces units throughout the Air Force for their undying dedication and sense of service. You are truly warriors--I salute you. I would also like to recognize a few people whom I relied on throughout the year for continual feedback and advice. Colonel (USAF retired) Bob Larson, who took time out of his horrendous schedule to trade ideas and correct me when I was wrong. Although now retired, the wellbeing of airmen throughout the world still remains his highest priority--we are blessed to still have him in our midst. I'd also like to thank Chief (USAF retired) Cecil "Woody" Woods, who's blunt but constructive feedback throughout my writing efforts were invaluable. Finally, I would like to thank Dr./MGen (USAFR) Clem for advising me throughout my year at FIU.
Abstract

Force protection in the Air Force has taken on greater significance in the new but well overdue recognition of its contribution to air and space power. It now has higher priority than ever with senior leadership, extensive research and development efforts are ongoing, and a Force Protection Battlelab has been established—all focused on this one complex mission. Herculean efforts by the entire DoD, particularly since the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers, have resulted in the publishing of literally thousands of pages on program guidance at all DoD levels. Unfortunately, the terms Force Protection and Antiterrorism are now nearly synonymous. This limited program focus does not facilitate a structure designed to ensure a true force protection effort, especially considering the challenges faced by today's Expeditionary Aerospace Force.

The purpose of this study is to review existing force protection programs and ongoing initiatives, and then attempt to contribute to further program development from a "bottoms up" perspective. The "bottom" in this case is the base level support group commander. The challenges facing support group commanders in today's Air Force are great, perhaps too great. Managing support operations at permanent main operating bases with all its built-in support structure is one thing. Leading deployed support operations, of which force protection is just one aspect, is another. Simply stated, current expectations of the support group commander are unrealistic and doomed to failure. This study reviews current USAF force protection documentation through a literature review and then proposes a systematic approach to program development designed to enhance synergy in force protection operations. It maintains throughout that the key to effective force protection operations is the role played by the combat support commander.
CHAPTER 1

The Problem

Colonel Bill Mulligan, a career C-141 pilot, suddenly found himself deploying to the remote country of Marumbu as the Lead Mobility Wing Commander in support of a United Nations humanitarian mission. After years of civil war in the country, peaceful conditions had finally been achieved with significant support of UN Peacekeeping forces. The peacekeeping forces had only been withdrawn for six months when an extended monsoon season caused major flooding throughout the southeastern coast of the country. Thousands of Marumbus died in the flooding and thousands more were sure to die from pestilence and disease. Colonel Mulligan’s mission was to establish and sustain an airbase capable of supporting incoming humanitarian relief supplies and equipment.

Upon arrival in Marumbu, Colonel Mulligan was kicking himself for having delayed his training for just this type of mission at Air Mobility Command’s Air Warfare Center. As a relatively new support group commander, he just never found the opportune time to attend the demanding Ground Combat Readiness Evaluation School, a part of the Air Warfare Center, for his contingency training. Who had the time, what with an Inspector General inspection coming up and competition for the Installation Excellence
Award? Oh well he thought to himself, we’ll just stick to our deployment plan for bare base operations and modify as necessary...adapt and overcome.

Colonel Mulligan and his forces received all their prophylactic medical care, were well briefed on the threat, and had the necessary supplies and equipment needed to establish and maintain bare base operations. The security forces commander, Captain Mary Healy quickly planned and prepared to execute a highly effective force protection program. She knew that during the civil war, the rebels’ favorite tactic was the use of satchel charges covertly placed in strategic locations designed to kill innocent civilians and bring discredit to the Marumbu government. Healy’s plan was specifically designed to ensure this never happened at her air base. The deploying civil engineer, Major John Murray, had worked long and hard with Healy prior to the deployment to build in all necessary passive defense measures into the defense plan. Colonel Mulligan considered himself fortunate to have two such fine officers covering his “six o’clock” in force protection; the last thing I need is a Khobar Towers like incident on my watch he thought to himself.

Colonel Mulligan’s confidence was building by the time he and his forces arrived to begin their operations. He was taking over an airbase recently abandoned by the UN peacekeeping forces and well maintained (relatively speaking) by the US friendly Marumbu Air Forces as a contingency operating base. The US Embassy in Marumbu and State Department officials assured him that his deployment base was safe from rebel attacks, as the rebels were now working with the government in recovery operations. The medical commander back at home base also guaranteed him the gamma goblin shots administered just prior to deployment would protect his troops from all threats of disease.
His assigned forces were all familiar with their duties, checklists had been discussed and modified as necessary on the flight over, shortfalls were addressed and compensated for, and priorities of work had been established for all. Everything was covered to ensure a successful operation.

Colonel Mulligan was proud when he saw his troops rapidly deploy out of their cargo aircraft and immediately set out to work with determination and direction. An hour or so after their arrival, Mulligan heard a massive explosion from his makeshift command post. Initial reports indicated a major aircraft accident. The disaster control group was immediately recalled and checklists for a major aircraft accident were initiated. Crash crews were dispatched to the scene and security forces were rapidly establishing a 2,000-foot cordon. Suddenly, Colonel Mulligan heard another explosion northwest of the plane crash. Over the radio, he was able to determine that one of the defense force vehicles responding out to establish the cordon suddenly exploded, killing one and seriously injuring another. Over the radio, Mulligan inquired of Captain Healy if the base was under attack. Healy tried to relay back to the Colonel that the base was in fact not under attack. Unfortunately it was too late for Colonel Mulligan to receive the transmission, he was dead, a victim of a landmine explosion.

Major Murray immediately assumed command of all base operations as planned, and froze all personnel in place. He then dispatched his Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel out to assess the situation. Chief Master Sergeant George O’Reilly, the EOD flight commander, was well ahead of Murray and was rapidly able to determined the cause of the explosions. It was soon evident to the EOD experts that during the flooding, landmines placed in the hills just above the air base during the civil war had
been moved by the flooding waters and reburied in the dirt throughout the air base. By now, numerous casualties had been reported, with a final count of 63 dead and 117 injured from the plane crash and landmine explosions.

Under current Department of Defense (DoD) and Air Force guidance, this scenario could not be classified as a force protection issue because the casualties to the force were not a result of terrorist or hostile force activities. This program limitation is the primary focus of this paper.

Statement of the Problem

Force protection in the United States Air Force (USAF) has taken on a greater significance in the new but well overdue recognition of its contribution to air and space power. It now has higher priority than ever with senior leadership, its programs are receiving funding to levels not seen since the Cold War, extensive research and development efforts are ongoing, and a USAF Force Protection Battle Lab has been established—all focused on this one complex mission. Herculean efforts by the entire Department of Defense (DoD), particularly since the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers, have resulted in the publishing of literally thousands of pages of doctrine, regulations, and general guidance at the DoD, joint, and service levels. With this guidance in place, it is time to expand on both the scope and integration management of force protection programs in the USAF, maintaining primary focus on force protection for the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). Under current guidance, the fictional scenario
described at the beginning of this chapter would not be classified a force protection issue. This shortcoming in program development and definition needs correction.

Currently, USAF guidance on force protection is limited to acts of hostility posed against the force, and even more specifically, to the terrorist threat. The Joint Dictionary defines force protection as:

A DoD security program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.¹

This definition limits force protection to only deliberate threats posed against personnel and resources. Dovetailing onto that definition, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.1, “Force Protection”, defines force protection as “a collection of activities that prevents or mitigates successful hostile actions against Air Force people and resources when they are not directly engaged with the enemy.” The doctrine goes on to state that force protection is accomplished by a “security program” designed to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations through planned and integrated application of the following: combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services.² Throughout DoD channels, the terms antiterrorism and force protection have become synonymous. This is evidenced by the title of the leading program compliance documents for both DoD (DoDD 2000.12) and the USAF (AFI 31-210), “The Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program”. Interestingly, the earlier versions of both documents were titled “The DoD/USAF Antiterrorism Program.” It is understandable from a planning, programming, and funding perspective that major
command headquarters and above limit the scope of force protection to intentional hostile actions, and more specifically, to terrorism.

Limiting the scope of force protection makes the program more manageable from a higher headquarters perspective; unfortunately, senior commanders deploying as an Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) do not share the luxury of such a limited focus. However viable the terrorist threat is, there is still a host of other threats that must be managed by an installation commander to ensure overall protection for his entire operation. Indeed, installation commanders must plan, organize, and train to protect the force from any and all threats, both deliberate and non-deliberate, that may have an impact on the force's ability to accomplish the mission at hand. Table 1 lists just some of the threats installation commanders must be fully prepared to manage at any time, under any threat condition.

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<td>Unbalanced work/rest cycle</td>
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<td>Natural Disasters</td>
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<td>Mine/bomb clearance from previous operations in the area</td>
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Table 1. Threats to the Force

Taking into mind the above list of threats, it is evident that force protection is a complex mission involving a wide range of specialists who must be trained to respond and control these threats, some of which may occur simultaneously. However, current organizational structure of the USAF does not facilitate the centralized management of this larger and more realistic force protection program. There is also no written guidance
or formal training available for the commanders ultimately responsible for all aspects of force protection, particularly when deploying as part of an AEF or Lead Mobility Wing (LMW).

The day to day planning/programming responsibility for the base level force protection program has been largely relegated to support group commanders with wing commander oversight. Unfortunately, support group commanders are simply not staffed, organized, or effectively trained for this huge responsibility, especially when deployed as part of an AEF. Unlike operations (XO) and logistics (LG/IL) group commanders, support commanders do not have functional representation at either major command or air staff. This void in organizational structure has led to a lack of efficient operational structure, specifically in the area of agile combat support under which force protection doctrinally lies. These lapses in structure have resulted in the absence of a command and control network for support forces, a defined concept of operations, and virtual non-existence of USAF standard operating procedures on common tasks.

Presently, deploying support commanders must develop their own concept of operations as they deem fit, and hope there is time to plan and train all forces associated with a deployment prior to the actual movement. This mission planning approach under the EAF concept is just not feasible. How can the USAF expect an array of support and logistics specialists from various bases to effectively integrate into sub-units, under a single support commander, to a forward location, without training to a plan? Problems are only exacerbated by the fact that many support group commanders come into the position without a traditional support career field background. How can this senior officer be expected to gain the expertise necessary to command such a diverse
organization without any technical training or written guidance? What is an effective command, control, and integration architecture for force protection? Ultimately, the lack of synergy in support operations caused by these shortfalls will place both the force and mission at risk. Given the recent history of various CINC's dependence on aerospace forces in today's joint/multinational military operations, this shortcoming must not only be addressed, but resolved.

**A Historic Model--Air Base Operability from 1978-1992**

The challenges of an integrated force protection program for today's Air Force is new only in name, not concept. *Snakes in the Eagle's Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases*, delves into the history and tactics of offensive operations waged against air bases since the inception of aircraft as a military weapon of choice. It also discusses in some detail air base ground defense doctrine and tactics of the USAF during the war in Vietnam.\(^3\) Out of the experiences of Vietnam, the Air Base Survivability (ABS) program was initiated. According to Colonel (USAF, retired) Robert A. Larson, one of the initial ABS air staff planners and a career Disaster Preparedness officer, "air base survivability, as it started in the mid-to-late 70s, grew out of the recognition that we were behind in Europe as a result of the military's almost total focus on the war in Southeast Asia."\(^4\) The US military; more specifically the USAF, found itself facing a more lethal and versatile foe in the USSR, with its fixed bases in Europe and the Pacific vulnerable to attack from the air, ground and sea. In response, the ABS program grew in significant proportions at
a very rapid pace. It is the Air Base Survivability Program that will serve as the historical model, modified in Chapter 3; to address today’s challenges in force protection.

HQ AF/XOORB was established in the late 1970’s as an integrator of the many functional organizations tasked with independent portions of air base survivability in war. Membership included field grade officers from security police, civil engineering, disaster preparedness, explosive ordinance disposal, communications, a weapons controller, planners, and programmers, to name a few. New initiatives generated within this office were overseen by an ABS General Officer Steering Committee chartered by the Air Force Chief of Staff’s office. This committee was co-chaired by HQ AF/XOO and HQ AFOSP with membership from the various functionals to ensure coordination and input from all involved agencies. This systematic approach to integrating support functions into a synergized force ultimately led to new Program Decision Packages (PDPs), numerous requirement documents, innovative operational concepts, capability demonstrations, and new technologies. More importantly, it led to a force better trained and organized to ensure for the survivability, rapid build-up, and sustainment of air bases.

In 1984, the term Air Base Survivability was changed to Air Base Operability (ABO) to reflect the larger mission of continual sustainment of effective air operations. The primary planning concept used by the ABO community was based on five pillars, with supporting capabilities under each pillar. This ABO framework structure, shown in Table 2, was designed to illustrate ABO as the overarching concept which all aspects of support operations must fall under to ensure successful air operations. Each pillar represents a supporting beam, essential to the stability of the entire structure.
HQ AF/XOORB's charter was never to assume control over any one of the ABO pillars, and they never did. Actually, no single functional agency owned any of the five pillars. It is useful in this regard to consider the Defend pillar. The three capabilities listed under this one pillar were managed by separate agencies. The US Army was responsible for the development of operational concepts and technology for air defense (surface to air) and the army's military intelligence branch took the lead on tactical indications and warnings. Meanwhile, the HQ Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP) managed its own PDP and was responsible for developing operational concepts for air base ground defense. This diversity in ownership held true for each pillar. Rather
than control the pillars directly, XOORB’s responsibility was to ensure integration/synergy in both funding and operations for the overall ABO mission. It is important to note that a PDP, with significant funding, had also been established for ABO and was managed by XOORB. This “pot of money” encouraged the other functionals to work within the ABO structure, providing funding to initiatives that contributed to the larger mission. To obtain these monies, funding recommendations were briefed to the ABO General Officer Steering Committee, then through the Air Force Board structure for funding approval.

After two years of intensive planning by all functionals involved in ABO and under the leadership of XOORB, SALTY DEMO ’85 took place at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany. The intent of this first comprehensive test of ABO, which involved thousands of USAF and contractor personnel, was to evaluate the operational concepts for every capability listed under the five pillars. It also tested both existing and new technologies in a realistic wartime exercise environment. At the end of the grueling three-week demonstration, thousands of pages of technical data were collected by hundreds of well-trained controllers. With data in hand, XOORB and all involved functional agencies now had validated documentation to justify new program developments, both from an operational and technical perspective.

Using the SALTY DEMO results as its primary source document, XOORB designed two information management tools to effectively steer a coordinated ABO effort. The Base Operability Annual Analysis (BOAA) captured the operational needs of ABO, while the Base Capabilities Acquisition Plan (BCAP) included all development and acquisition requirements. “The BOAA/BCAP process identifies ABO requirements,
prioritizes ABO capabilities, and identifies funding programmed for acquisition of those capabilities.5 From these two guiding documents, a “USAF Air Base Operability Research, Development, and Acquisition (RD&A) Strategic Plan” was built in 1989. The purpose of this plan was to “furnish the Air Force with a consolidated source of information for planning, budgeting, and technical decision making relative to the Air Force ABO RD&A programs both ongoing and planned.”6 Another service provided by the ABO RD&A plan was to find on-going RD&A programs throughout DoD and commercial industry which matched the prioritized problem statements listed in the BOAA. This search also led to the identification of RD&A voids. The ABO Systems Management Office, AD/YQ, located at Eglin AFB, was the integrating product division, formally chartered for all ABO research and development. Once a program void was identified by the user to AD/YQ through XOORB, in theory, either a formal requirements document would be generated or a funding line would be added in the appropriate PDP.

In combination, the BOAA, BCAP and RD&A plan provided validated and prioritized problem statements, matched these problems to an acquisition plan, and established a long term strategic plan to resolve the myriad technical issues and operation concepts related to air base operability. The ABO General Officer Steering Committee approved funding priorities annually to ensure the ABO program was continually adapting to changes in the threat environment. In the end, these synergistic efforts provided decision makers at all levels and in all functional agencies the information needed to ensure for both the survivability and operability of air bases.

The ABO model, as presented, could be readily adapted to provide a systematic approach in the continuing development of the Agile Combat Support core competency.
Indeed if synergy is to be achieved in force protection, it is essential that the overarching support structure for this critical mission be well organized and thus prepared to support the force from any and all threats posed.

**Significance of the Study**

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the ABO program as it had become known. The program’s focus on major attacks against NATO by the Warsaw Pact was no longer deemed feasible. Furthermore, the downsizing of the USAF as a whole led to many program consolidations and the ABO community was absorbed into Civil Engineering Readiness at base/MAJCOM level and HQ AF/ILE at Air Staff. Moreover, as the world’s lone superpower the United States also accepted its new obligation for an increased use of its military for operations other than war (MOOTW). In response to these changes, along with a congressional dictum to be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, major operational and structural modifications were in the making. The Air Force transformed its modus operandi from forward basing to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF), focusing on rapid forward deployment. This transformation brought with it a multitude of new challenges in air base support operations, especially considering major force downsizings and civilian outsourcing of traditional military duties. Further compounding these major organizational changes was a growing threat to the force. This evolving threat took the forms of domestic and international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be used by either terrorists or rogue nations, and a whole host of other natural/manmade threats
posed in the conduct of MOOTW. Force protection became the new "buzzword" for both our military and national civilian leaders. The loss of US citizens in incidents like Somalia and Khobar Towers would no longer be tolerated. After the success of the air campaign in Kosovo, there was much discussion within both military and civilian channels about "zero" loss of US lives as the only acceptable standard for future overseas military operations. Force protection was no longer just an operational concept, but a dictum. Combining all factors, the USAF is facing significant challenges in its new role as an Expeditionary Aerospace Force. To continue fighting and winning America’s wars from the skies, a solid support structure must be firmly established. With the virtual absence of an organized support structure for contingency operations, an alternative concept must be developed if rising expectations are to be even closely achieved.

The purpose of this study is to review existing force protection programs and ongoing initiatives, and then attempt to contribute to further program development from a "bottoms up" perspective. The "bottom" in this case is the base level support group commander. The challenges facing support group commanders in today’s Air Force are great, perhaps too great. Managing support operations at permanent main operating bases with all its built-in support structure is one thing. Leading deployed support operations, of which force protection is just one aspect, is another. Simply stated, current expectations of the support group commander are unrealistic and doomed to failure. This study will review the current USAF force protection documentation through a literature review in chapter two. Chapter 3 will then recommend a systematic approach to enhance program development designed to achieve synergy in force protection operations from the perspective of the deployed support commander. With America’s reliance on
aerospace power to fight and win its wars, and today’s political demands of zero loss of military lives in the conduct of wars/MOOTWs, the role of USAF support commanders has taken on greater meaning than ever. It is time to provide them the tools they need to do the job. With modifications to the ABO model of the past, the same basic tools can be used again to strengthen today’s critical support structure for the US Air Force. In the end, synergy in force protection operations will be achieved as a result.
Notes

3 Vick, Alan, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest (Santa Monica: Rand, 1995).
4 Larson, Robert A., Telephone interview. 9 Mar 00
5 HQ AF/XOORB, “USAF Air Base Operability Research, Development, and Acquisition Strategic Plan” (Nov 89) vol. 2, pp. 2-3.
CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

Introduction

Protection of today's military force has taken on a great deal of significance in planning today's US military operations. During testimonies before congress and in the public media, military leaders have continually gone on record to state that the wellbeing of military personnel is their first priority in planning and executing missions. Following suit, military doctrine, regulations, guidance, and money have been funneled down to the operational units to tackle this perplexing problem.

The purpose of this literature review is to compile and contrast the various guiding documents on the subject of force protection since the publication of the 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen. The review will cover the guidance found in the QDR and Joint Vision 2010, as well as existing Air Force doctrine and guidance. The limited focus is intentional, as force protection challenges faced by the USAF vary significantly from the other services. The following true anecdote serves as pointed clarification on the philosophical
differences between the military services when it comes to protecting the force. During a 1987 Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe briefing to the Kaiserslautern Community Commander on the U.S. Army’s new mission tasking for the exterior defense of air bases in war, the U.S. Army lieutenant general’s only response was: “the day the army protects air bases, is the day they put air bases on [expletive] wheels.” He then went on to clarify that the army is purely an offensive force, resorting to defensive tactics only long enough to reconstitute the force, and then reassume offensive operations. The Navy’s dependence on mobility for force protection is even greater than that of the Army’s. Unfortunately, air bases are not on wheels or water, but remain fixed sites. Their locations and operations are therefore well known to the enemy who maintains the offensive advantage. Whence, this limited review.

Review of Literature

Quadrennial Defense Review and Joint Vision 2010

The 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) laid the conceptual framework for future planning and organization of the US military into the 21st century. Specifically, JV 2010 describes the importance of “full spectrum dominance” as the key characteristic of the armed forces. To achieve this, improved intelligence and command and control are essential for the development and implementation of four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Considerable emphasis is also placed
on six critical elements necessary to transform these operational concepts into capabilities and they are people, leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizational structure, and material.\textsuperscript{2} Full dimensional protection coupled with the six critical elements serve (or at least should serve) as the cornerstone guidance for force protection.

As a means of organizing the review of these two essential guidance documents from a force protection perspective, three themes were extracted. First, that full-dimensional protection, of which force protection is a subset, must be addressed as a systematic process. Secondly, defined concepts of operations are necessary to ensure integration of forces. And the final theme addresses the threats posed against today’s military force.

\textit{Full-Dimensional Protection: A Systematic Process}

The QDR describes full dimensional protection as:

Multiple layers of protection for U.S. forces and facilities at all levels will enable U.S. forces to maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement. To achieve this goal, full-dimensional protection requires a joint architecture that is built upon information superiority and employs a full array of active and passive measures.\textsuperscript{3}

The report then goes on to address the criticality of a “system of systems” that will integrate intelligence collection and assessment, command and control, weapons systems, and support elements of all four operational concepts ensuring a full range of information
to commanders. JV 2010 pictures full dimensional protection to look like the following:

Figure 2. Full Dimensional Protection

The conversion from a concept to an operational system will require a systematic approach for future for full-dimensional protection planning.

According to the QDR, protection for the force and their facilities must be provided across the entire threat spectrum in peace and all levels of conflict. To achieve this goal, "full-dimensional protection requires a joint architecture that is built upon information superiority and employs a full array of active and passive measures at multiple echelons"\textsuperscript{4}. This stated goal will be achieved through the development of an advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network architecture which will be made up of five principal components:

- Multi-sensor information grid for battlespace awareness;
- Advanced battle-management capabilities for rapid employment of forces;
- Capability to penetrate, manipulate, or deny an adversary's battlespace awareness;
- Joint communications grid to support the above capabilities and the required range of communications
- An information defense system\textsuperscript{5}
The impact of such a C4ISR network is expected be great: "...commanders will be able to attack targets successfully with fewer platforms and less ordnance while achieving objectives more rapidly and with reduced risk. Individual warfighters will be empowered as never before, with an array of detection, targeting, and communications equipment that will greatly magnify the power of small units." In the end, one of the key elements essential to the success of the C4ISR network is anticipated to be the accurate collection of data for input into this system, which will then be analyzed and either up or down channeled to the appropriate level commander for action.

There is a definite correlation between defined operational concepts, the C4ISR network, and the USAF force protection program. Accurate data collection for input into a larger system can most effectively be achieved through well-defined USAF concepts of operations and standard operating procedures in the support and protection of air bases. These standards will ensure consistency in operations and terminology throughout the USAF, simplifying requirements development and ultimate design for a force protection sub-network to the larger C4ISR network. Data must be consistently collected and input into a common system if that data is to be effectively disseminated and used by commanders at all levels throughout the entire network of air bases. Defined concepts and procedures will also prove fruitful in integrating units within the USAF, as well as the integration of joint and coalition forces.

Need for Defined Operational Concepts

The QDR and JV 2010 address the need for improved joint and combined operations at length. In its discussion on the requirement for the military to respond to the full spectrum of crises, the QDR dictates the need for conducting these operations
jointly and in coalition with other nations. It recognizes up front the challenges posed by this requirement, particularly given the US military’s capability to develop new technologies and operational concepts at a pace greater than any other nation. On one hand, U.S. technologies and operational concepts need to continue to evolve; however, consideration must also be given to the challenges these present from policy coordination at the strategic level to interoperability of diverse forces at the tactical level.\textsuperscript{7} JV 2010 goes into further detail on this issue stating that “...although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all our future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must recognize this reality.”\textsuperscript{8} Both documents identify joint doctrine as the key element to ensure successful joint/multinational operations. “As we change the way we fight, joint doctrine will remain the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for joint military operations”\textsuperscript{9}.

JV 2010 specifically addresses the need for future doctrine to define the process for successful planning while remaining flexible enough to serve as a framework from which military leaders can plan and execute their operations. Doctrine being a fundamental for effective joint/multinational planning, innovative leadership will be the linchpin to ensure effective execution of the actual operations.

The dynamic nature of joint operations in the 21st century battlespace will require a continued emphasis on developing strong leadership skills. While we must do everything possible to leverage the power of advanced technologies, there are inherent limitations. Confronting the inevitable friction and fog of war against a resourceful and strong-minded adversary, the human dimension including innovative strategic and operational thinking and strong leadership will be essential to achieve decisive
results. Effective leadership provides our greatest hedge against uncertainty.\textsuperscript{10} Innovative leadership in conducting military operations has proven the only true mark of success throughout history. However, this leadership must be developed through a rigorous selection process, and extend beyond formal education and training; indeed, future leaders must have hands-on experience in a variety of progressive positions and stress innovation in thinking, management of ambiguity, and an in-depth understanding of the military art.\textsuperscript{11} In addition to defined, yet flexible, doctrine and innovative leadership to ensure successful joint/multinational operations, there is a third essential requirement. New concepts/technologies must be tested to ensure integration. “Modeling, demonstrations, simulations, technology wargames, and joint exercises will help assess and validate these concepts, as well as assist in developing new operational procedures and organizations.”\textsuperscript{12}

As stated in the problem statement in chapter 1 of this paper, the USAF has no doctrine, strategy, or standardized operational concepts for the command and control of support forces that are responsible for the build-up and sustainment of air bases. Without such standardization, an organized process for the protection of the force can not be feasibly achieved. This void in standardization lends itself to further complications when considering forward deployed air bases are highly dependent on joint/multinational forces for both sustainability and survivability. How can the USAF integrate its support operations at the joint and multinational levels when operational concepts are not defined and standard operating procedures are not developed? This violates the very essence of both JV 2010 and the QDR. While it is essential for innovative military leaders to develop doctrine, strategy and tactics that are both defined and flexible, they must also
take into account the full spectrum of operations they may face, as well as the threats posed to their forces.

The Threats

The third and final theme extracted from the QDR and JV 2010 was the spectrum of crises today’s U.S. military must be ready to respond to, as well as the myriad of threats posed against those forces. The QDR sums it up nicely:

The defense strategy requires that our forces be capable of responding across the full spectrum of crises - including deterring aggression and coercion in crises, conducting smaller scale contingency operations, and fighting and winning major theater wars. They must be able to do so in the face of asymmetric challenges, including the threat or use of NBC weapons, information operations, or terrorism. This means our forces must be multi-mission capable, proficient in their core fighting competencies, and able to transition from peacetime activities and operations to deterrence to war.”

JV 2010 goes into more specifics in anticipation of future threats. It predicts that future adversaries will respond to the dominance of the U.S. military through the use of asymmetrical tactics. This will hold particularly true in the area of attacks against our information technologies, wherein lies both our greatest strength and greatest vulnerability. It also anticipates that given the ever-increasing availability of information technologies/counter technologies throughout the world, the probability of facing technological or operational surprise will increase. “The US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity.”

The overriding theme found in both documents, what will drive planning, programming, and execution of all future military operations, is the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). RMA is referenced extensively in both the QDR and JV 2010
as the means of transforming U.S. military superiority to ensure future dominance in the face of changes in the security environment and in the art of warfare. "This transformation involves much more than the acquisition of new military systems. It means harnessing new technologies to give U.S. forces greater military capabilities through advanced concepts, doctrine, and organizations so that they can dominate any future battlefield." ¹⁵ A revolution must take place to ensure full spectrum dominance is achieved "through the synergy of four new operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. Achieving this full spectrum dominance means continuing to build an integrated, complex set of systems..." ¹⁶

Force protection in the USAF must be methodically integrated into this envisioned "complex set of systems". To accomplish this, a more systematic approach must be taken to ensure integration of its technologies and concepts into the larger full spectrum dominance system. This systematic approach must start with defined operational concepts supported by standard operating procedures to ensure survivability of the force from any and all threats posed.

**U.S Air Force Doctrine**

The three guiding official Air Force doctrine documents (AFDD) on force protection are AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine; AFDD 2-4, Combat Support; and AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection. All these documents clearly subscribe to the relationship between an effective force protection program and successful air operations under the full
spectrum of military operations. All three also recognize that force protection falls under the Full-Dimensional Protection concept outlined in the QDR and JV 2010. However, in the cascading guidance from the broadest perspective (Basic Doctrine) to more specific direction (Force Protection), the focus of force protection narrows.

_Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine_

One of the seven basic tenets for successful air operations outlined in the basic doctrine is “Synergistic Effects.” This tenet is described in the following manner: “the proper application of a coordinated force can produce effects that exceed the individual forces employed separately.” In the case of force protection, synergy is achieved through the Agile Combat Support Core Competency, one of the USAF’s six core competencies. To clarify, a core competency is a means of transitioning central beliefs found in doctrine into operational concepts. The objective of agile combat support is to outline the basic operational requirements for the build up and sustainment of air bases in a forward deployed location. It includes all forward base support operations to include, but not limited to, maintenance, supply, transportation, communications, services, engineering, security, medical, and chaplaincy. Under this core competency, these various functions must fuse together into “a seamless, agile, and responsive combat support system of systems”—synergy must be achieved for overall mission success.

Returning back to the QDR and JV 2010, synergy is achieved through effective organizational structure and closely coordinated plans.

Chapter 4 of AFDD 1, Organizing U.S. Air Forces, provides both the philosophy behind and direction for organizational structure within the USAF. Philosophically it states that “organizational structures and processes must be simple, responsive, and
flexible”. It also mentions that these structures must be designed to “exploit air and space power’s versatility and flexibility to ensure that air and space forces remain responsive, survivable, and sustainable.” Responsive aerospace forces are primarily achieved through four of the six core competencies: Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Global Attack, and Air and Space Superiority, and in part Information Superiority. Survivability and sustainability of these CINC essential aerospace forces are achieved through the remaining two core competencies of Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support.

Given this doctrinal guidance at the highest level, force protection must be inherent in combat support’s seamless “system of systems” to ensure responsive air operations are sustained and can survive in forward operating locations under any threat situation. A daunting endeavor especially given today’s USAF organizational structure and the complex mission demands placed on support forces.

*Air Force Doctrine 2-4, Combat Support*

AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, serves as the keystone doctrinal guidance for combat support operations and as supporting doctrine for AFDD 1. It lists five core combat support principles necessary for successful combat support operations: responsiveness, survivability, sustainability, time-definite resupply, and information integration. Force protection is not a principle per se, but falls under the survivability principle. “Survivability is a critical element of aerospace power. In the broadest sense, it includes protecting people, weapons systems, and support structures.” In this sense, survivability equates to force protection and vice versa. The survivability principle encompasses a number of operations essential to all phases of a deployment to include air
base defense; oversight of food, water, disease, and other individual, occupational, and environmental health-related factors; and protection measures to detect/counter nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional threats. These diverse survivability operations clearly extend the force protection role beyond the scope found in current “force protection” guidance. Indeed, it involves services, civil engineers, safety, and medical personnel as well as security forces. To ensure survivable operations, this doctrine also addresses the importance of cohesive planning.

Effective combat support operations can be achieved through an effective organizational process which is continually trained on. Combat Support doctrine states:

Combat support is a process that begins at the unit level during peacetime and is recognized for its vital importance during deployments or war. The Air Force trains to accomplish the mission in a safe operating environment, taking full advantage of integrated base support functions. Forces should train like they will fight so they are fully prepared when they mobilize or deploy for exercises or actual military operations.21

Listed under the combat support structure, which drives this process, is an array of support specialists. In peacetime/home base operations, these specialists fall under the operational control (OPCON) of either the support group commander, hospital commander, logistics group commander, or wing commander; each function having its own set of mission priorities and tasks. However during forward deployed operations, this organizational structure will likely change. Depending on the size and scope of a contingency, all, some, or just one of these group level commanders may be tasked to deploy as integrator(s) of combat support operations. The Global Combat Support System (GCSS)22, currently being explored at the USAF Command and Control BattleLab, will hopefully one day assist the deploying combat support commander(s)
with their complex information management task, thus facilitating a more efficient force. However, requirement documents for combat support information management/command and control architecture must be developed before design of the GCSS can begin. Without defined combat support concept(s) of operations or standard operating procedures, requirements can not be established and consequently, the GCSS can not be fielded.

In addition to its guiding principals, this doctrine also defines a Combat Support Process with seven elements.

Figure 3. Combat Support Process

The description of “protecting the force” as a critical element of the combat support process reflects the same components found in the survivability principle. “Force protection provides the safe and secure operational environment necessary to ensure mission completion.” Listed is the role force protection plays in conducting surveillance against threats, air base defense, protecting against health threats, providing community safety, and protection of communications and information systems. It also makes the profound statement that “everyone is responsible for force protection.”24
To sum up this document, combat support has been deemed one operational process within the larger aerospace mission, with an expanded survivability/force protection mission serving as an integral component. While this is a sound theoretical concept, its transition into operational concepts at the installation level will be very difficult, especially under the existing organizational structure.

_Air Force Doctrine 2-4.1, Force Protection_

The final doctrine document reviewed was AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection. Here, force protection is described as

"a collection of activities that prevents or mitigates successful hostile actions against Air Force people and resources when they are not directly engaged with the enemy. Such hostile actions may include environmental, health, and safety threats." It later goes on to state that "force protection is accomplished by a security program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations. This is accomplished through planned and integrated application of the following: combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services. Force protection is supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs."^{25}

It is within this document that force protection becomes more limited in scope. Although it recognizes environmental, health and safety threats to the force; the threats are only considered a part of force protection when generated by "a hostile force." Neither the Basic nor Combat Support doctrine documents make this delineation. This position is further clarified in Chapter Three of the Force Protection Doctrine, Force Protection Threats, which defines the force protection threat spectrum to include:

- **Conventional Threat**: Regular military forces from a recognized government.
- **Unconventional Threat**: A broad spectrum of military/paramilitary operations; i.e., guerilla warfare, covert operations, sabotage, intelligence activities.
• Terrorism Threat
• Criminal Threat: Criminal activities with applicability to enemy actions/threat to friendly forces.
• Insider Threat: Threat from assigned personnel, host-country nationals, third country nationals or other persons assigned to or transiting the area of interest.
• Environmental Threats: Threats by hazardous waste areas and hazardous materials, production facilities, disease, pestilence.
• Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Threats, which come from systems that, are capable of a high order of destruction or destroy large numbers of people.
• Civil Unrest Threat: Violence by a population related to friendly force operations.
• Information/Data Threat: Information warfare
• Future Threat: Threats from hostile forces using new technologies

The threat spectrum identified above and the threats listed in the Combat Support Doctrine, all but mirror each other, with one caveat. This caveat is what steers the USAF force protection toward a “physical security program” as stated in the Force Protection Doctrine, vice a “survivability” program designed to protect, respond, and recover from any and all threats posed to the force found in the Combat Support Doctrine. That caveat is “threats from hostile actions”, a significant phrase.

Considering the combat support process identified in AFDD 2-1, the statement “threats from hostile actions” places the now limited force protection mission subordinate to the larger survivability principle, which in turn serves as a subset of the much broader full-dimensional protection concept found in the QDR and JV 2010. Although this delineation in definition between force protection and survivability facilitates “security” planning, it does not contribute to cohesive combat support operations. Indeed, the two need not be separate programs, as passive defense actions in preparation for projected natural disasters are remarkable similar to pre-attack actions before hostile activities begin. Facility hardening and dispersal of assets are two of the leading common factors. Base recovery after attack procedures are also very similar to base recovery operations after a major accident or natural disaster--both requiring many of the same response
forces, training and procedures. Response to a mass casualty caused by a hostile force is very similar to the response caused by a major accident. Is there really a difference between rapid building evacuation procedures generated by enemy threats or chemical mishaps? Protection of the force from health hazards, whether deliberate or non-deliberate, require many of the same pre-deployment precautions to include personal fitness and prophylactic medicine. All these operations are basically the same tasks conducted under different operating/threat conditions.

Contrary to the force protection threat spectrum identified above, there is a section in the Force Protection Doctrine identified as “Deny Influence”. This section significantly broadens the scope of force protection to more closely resemble the survivability principle. “The Air Force denies adversarial influence through force health protection, disaster preparation, and ability to survive and operate (ATSO) actions.”\textsuperscript{27} Compiled in this section is a host of multi-functional programs that cover the entire spectrum of force protection concerns of the deployed commander, including both deliberate and non-deliberate threats. Successful implementation of these programs through synergized combat support operations will not only “deny adversarial influence”, but ensure survivability of deployed forces operating in wartime or MOOTW operations, anywhere, and under any threat condition. The force protection doctrine sums up this section on Deny Influence very appropriately, “the comprehensive measures outlined above are tasks and objectives historically proven to be effective in providing force protection when properly implemented.”\textsuperscript{28} What does “properly implemented” imply?

It is logically assumed, based on previously reviewed documents, that proper implementation of a force protection program from all threats and adversarial influences
equates to the centralized control of force protection/survivability under a single combat
support commander, normally the support group commander. To be successful, this
commander must possess a synergized concept of operations and a well-trained force
capable of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any and all threats posed to
the force.

DoD and USAF Directives

The leading directives for the USAF Force Protection program are DoDD
2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program and AFI 31-210, The Air
Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program Standards. The directives are
very consistent in requirements and scope, with both focused on the threat from
terrorism. Force protection is defined in both documents as:

Security program developed to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities and
equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through the planned and integrated application of
combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services supported by intelligence,
counterintelligence, and other security programs.²⁹

DoD policy is also clearly outlined for this program (not all-inclusive):
• To protect DoD elements and personnel from terrorist acts.
• The DoD AT/FP Program shall be an all encompassing program using an
integrated systems approach.
• AT/FP is the Commander’s responsibility. AT/FP considerations must be balanced
with mission accomplishment imperatives.
• AT/FP is a high priority item with the DoD.
• Ensure the AT/FP readiness of all DoD personnel
• Geographic CINC’s FP policies take precedence over all FP programs/policies of
any DoD component deployed in the area of responsibility.³⁰

The USAF program standards are based on this policy directive. The sole focus of force
protection, as driven by these documents, is now limited to the threat posed by terrorist
activities. The cascading evolvement of force protection from a full-dimensional protection to combating terrorism has been steep.

**Inferences Drawn From Literature Review**

Certain conclusions can be drawn from this literature review. First and foremost, there is a direct correlation between force protection and the US military strategy for full spectrum dominance; one is simply a subordinate mission to the other. Hence, force protection must be developed in such a manner that ensures its information management/C4I systems remain compatible with the much larger full-spectrum dominance systems. Secondly, operational integration of intra-service, joint, and multinational forces is the wave of future military operations in support of US National Security Objectives. To ensure the effective integration of these forces, defined operational concepts for combat support/survivability/force protection must be developed, trained on, and exercised to reduce the fog and friction of future military operations. And finally, U.S. forces must be fully prepared to operate freely within the entire spectrum of military operations under all threat conditions; hostile, accidental, or natural.

DoD leadership envisions a transformation of military operations, organizational structures and technologies through what they term a “Revolution in Military Affairs.” In his 1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Cohen addresses this key issue, recognizing the foresight of JV 2010.

Creating new operational concepts to conduct battlefield operations and developing innovative force designs that
provide versatile new organizational and employment arrangements are essential to the success of Joint Vision 2010 and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The very foundation of Joint Vision 2010 involves the harnessing of new advanced technologies via emerging operational concepts that dramatically alter how U.S. forces conduct the full range of military operations. These alterations subsequently lead to significant changes in joint and Service doctrine and ultimately to new organizational arrangements.\(^{31}\)

Leading the RMA efforts is the Advanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) network architecture—a “system of systems.” Supporting network systems, such as the Global Combat Support System (GCSS), will be designed to integrate into the larger C4ISR network, with force protection information requirements designed to integrate into the GCSS. In order to tie into this network, the USAF must establish a more systematic planning/programming approach to ensure effective force protection operations. To be truly effective, this approach must include all conceivable operational missions as well as cover the entire threat spectrum, both deliberate and non-deliberate, posed to the force. And, it must be a closely coordinated effort by all involved combat support functionals as well as the other military services to ensure operational integration of forces.

The revolution in military affairs has started, and new tactics must be taken by the USAF to address an all-encompassing force protection mission. As a minimum, a standardized command and control operational infrastructure must be outlined, supported by a detailed concept of operations for combined force protection/combat support operations. In turn, standard operating procedures on common tasks must be developed to support the concepts of operations. Furthermore, detection sensors of all kinds; intrusion, chemical/biological, bio-environmental, and other like sensors, must be
developed with annunciation compatibility in mind and design. The key ingredient to ensure compatibility in operations and technology is standardization. Without standards for common data input, information management systems can not be linked. However, standards for data input can only be achieved through defined operational concepts. Without defined operational concepts, not only will data be inconsistent, but troops from various USAF units, joint forces, or multinational forces can not be efficiently integrated. Without standard operating procedures, units tasked to integrate in with others will not be trained to perform common tasks to the same set of standards. During General McPeak's tenure as the Air Force Chief of Staff in the early to mid-nineties, regulations and standards were significantly downsized and/or eliminated to facilitate independent thinking and flexibility at unit level. Although seen by most as appropriate at the time, things have changed. RMA is a reality, and the Expeditionary Aerospace Force is a net result of the revolution. An expeditionary force made up of organizations from various units must better define standard operating procedures if they are to integrate effectively. In response, the Air Force needs to incite its own internal revolution for future planning and execution of combat support operations.

Concepts of operations and standard operating procedures for combat support operations in the USAF are presently being developed independently by every AEW. Furthermore, new and improved sensors of all kinds are being developed independently by the various functionals. All admirable efforts; however, anarchy is the wrong approach to accomplish complex tasks. It is essential that a more systematic approach govern force protection and combat support operations to ensure compatibility. For this to occur, configuration management must become the lead planning/programming factor.
in all future initiatives. Indeed, antiterrorism/force protection/survivability must be planned as subsystems of the larger agile combat support mission, which in turn will ultimately serve as a subsystem to SECDEF’s goal for a C4ISR network. The optimal means to ensure a well coordinated configuration management effort occurs for all combat support operations, is to identify an integrating office dedicated to this one task. The lead office must be located at HQ Air Force level, with consideration for new combat support integrating offices at at all operational MAJCOMs.

In conclusion, the requirement to respond anytime, anywhere, under all threat conditions, for a wide spectrum of operations, is a monumental task for today's military leaders at all levels of command. And although terrorist tactics can be used anytime, anywhere, and in the conduct of any military operation, it is not the sole threat to the force. Inherently, it is the responsibility of USAF support commanders to integrate all support operations as well as plan for/anticipate any and all threats, deliberate or non-deliberate, posed to the force. Unfortunately, these essential integrating commanders are not provided the guidance, training, or tools necessary to accomplish this critical mission so essential to successful air operations in independent operations or in conjunction with joint/multinational forces.

Notes

1 Author was the briefer, 1997.
4 Cohen, QDR: section VII, p.3.
7 Cohen, QDR: section III, p. 17.
Notes

8 JCS, JV 2010, p. 9.
9 JCS, JV 2010, p. 29.
10 JCS, JV 2010, p. 28.
11 JCS, JV 2010, p. 29.
12 JCS, JV 2010, p. 32.
13 Cohen, QDR, section IV, pp. 10-11.
14 JCS, JV 2010, p. 11.
15 Cohen, QDR, section III, p. 12.
16 Cohen, QDR, section III, p. 12.
18 AFDD 1, pp. 34-35.
19 AFDD 1, p. 61.
21 AFDD 2-4, p. 9.
22 AFDD 2-4, p. 7.
23 AFDD 2-4, p. 12.
24 AFDD 2-4, p. 12.
26 AFDD 2-4.1, p. 15.
27 AFDD 2-4.1, p. 28.
28 AFDD 2-4.1, p. 31.
30 DODD 200.12, pp. 3-4.
CHAPTER 3

Synergizing Force Protection

Redefining Force Protection in the United States Air Force

The terms Force Protection (FP) and Antiterrorism (AT) have become synonymous in definition and program development. Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated “Our adversaries - unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily - spend millions of dollars each year to finance terrorist organizations that target US citizens, property, and interests. Consequently, our Combatant Commanders and the Services continue to focus on force protection issues as a first order priority.”¹ This statement reflects two separate issues, the realization that terrorism is a threat to national security and the interchangeability of the AT/FP terms. Indeed, the terrorist threat to the force and nation is real and must be defended against with all US military and national might. However, antiterrorism must be formally identified as a subordinate mission to the larger force protection program. There are currently moves afoot at both the J-34 division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and HQ USAF/XOF (Security Forces) to rectify this conceptual
misnomer, breaking AT out from the larger force protection mission. This is not intended to negate the terrorist threat in any way, just place it properly under the larger force protection mission objective.

Although it may seem simply a matter of semantics to some, the current interchangeability of the terms has resulted in numerous program oversights. This paper proposes the following construct. First, Combat Support doctrine remains the keystone doctrine for all support operations, with force protection doctrine serving to support that larger mission. Antiterrorism/combating terrorism would then be a subordinate program falling under force protection doctrine. Redefining terminology is the first task at hand. Secondly, the DoD and USAF directives on AT/FP must be divided into two separate directives, one on Antiterrorism and the other on Force Protection. This would require the renaming of DoDD 2000.12 and AFI 31-210 back to their original title of “The Antiterrorism Program”, with modifications. A “Force Protection” directive would then have to be written to serve as an integrating directive, serving as the cornerstone document for all functional level directives that provide measures to protect the force from any or all threats posed outside of direct engagement with an enemy, i.e., counterair operations.

Redefining terminology as suggested above would not require any significant changes, because definitions under different names already exist in the USAF. In all practicality, only program names need to be changed, with some minor modifications—the wheel is already built, why reinvent it? Under the construct proposed above, definitions for Combat Support, Force Protection, and Antiterrorism need to change, and new definitions will be proposed in that order.
A workable definition for Combat Support already exists in the guise of Air Base Operability. The current ABO and proposed Combat Support program is defined as:

- "Gives guidelines for maintaining air base readiness during contingencies.
- Brings together unit operations that interact during a contingency so that the installation can continue to execute its assigned missions.
- Includes guidelines for planning, organizing, training, equipping, and command and control during contingencies caused by nature, accident, or hostile or friendly operations."\(^2\)

This definition actually represents a better description of Combat Support as a "key enabler of all Air Force core competencies," than that found in the Combat Support Doctrine identified in Chapter 2 of this paper.

Force protection, a subordinate mission to combat support, could then be more broadly defined as:

"Force protection includes all active and passive defense measures designed to protect people, weapons systems, and support structures from all threats that may bring them harm."

This definition is basically the description of the Survivability Principle found in Air Force Doctrine 2-4, "Combat Support." The word force protection was simply substituted for survivability and "from all threats that may bring them harm" was added. In addition to broadening the scope of force protection, it also more clearly identifies force protection as one of the five "Core Combat Support Principles." As a subordinate mission to combat support, new operational concepts and technologies dedicated to force protection must be planned to ensure compatibility with the governing combat support mission. Consideration should be given to changing the name of the Survivability Principle to the Force Protection Principle; thus making it more compatible with DoD
and sister service terminology. Overall, these minor changes will allow for clearer lines of command, and a more systematic approach to force protection to ensure its ultimate integration into the C4ISR network architecture.

Definitions on terrorism already exist in DoD and the Air Force, and need not change. Furthermore, there is no need to establish Combating Terrorism/Antiterrorism CT/AT as a separate doctrine document, it would simply be listed as a program under the force protection doctrine. Combating Terrorism is defined in both DoD and the USAF as: “actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.” The terms antiterrorism and counterterrorism support this definition. Antiterrorism is defined as: “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces”, while counterterrorism is defined as: “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.”

**Synergistic Approach to Force Protection**

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) identified in the QDR and JV 2010, dictates a systematic approach to all technology development, operational concepts, and organizational restructuring to ensure integration of joint and multinational forces within the full spectrum of operations. In response to the “revolution”, the USAF rethought its concepts for fighting America’s wars from the skies, and the Expeditionary Aerospace
Force (EAF) was born and is now maturing. With the new EAF concept came a change in basic aerospace doctrine. However if compared to previous aerospace doctrine, the changes in basic combat support operations were not all that profound. Indeed, this proposal does not advocate major changes to historically proven aerospace combat support operations or structure, just some modifications to assure alignment with the EAF concept. Creating synergy in force protection is a relatively short term and achievable task, given a defined systematic process is developed and followed. This systematic process first requires the alignment of doctrine and a support structure that supports basic doctrine. Once these are established, operational concepts supported by standard operating procedures must be written to ensure the protection of people, weapon systems, and support structures from all threats that may bring them harm. When institutionalized, these operational concepts are the logical means to ensure the effective integration of units within the USAF, as well as integration of operations with sister services and coalition forces.

Aligning Combat Support Doctrine and Structure

First and foremost, force protection must be addressed as a systematic process. This statement is much easier said than done. Appendix A of this paper includes an abbreviated list of current Air Force guidance documents that directly relate to force protection under the proposed definition. Its purpose is to illustrate the massive number of requirements for this one subordinate mission, spread throughout many functional agencies. Primary responsibility for force protection at the operational level however,
lies with the medical, civil engineer, security forces, and operational plans functionals with oversight by support group commanders. Because there is no functional representation for support group commanders at the air staff, HQ AF/XOF (security forces) has been appointed the office of primary responsibility for all force protection matters, with the USAF Force Protection Battle Lab as a direct reporting function to XOF. HQ AF/XOF’s responsibilities include force protection planning, programming, and development efforts. Program ownership at major command and unit levels have followed suit. This leaves the support group commander, the key integrator of force protection program execution, at the tail end of program development. At this point in the development process, little flexibility is left for this key integrator. However, it is this commander and the senior installation commander who will be held personally “accountable” in the event of a mishap, not anyone in the directing staffs. This seems rather unjust.

Referring back to Appendix A once again, it becomes evident that the complexities of integrating the newly defined force protection program exceed the capabilities of the security forces staffs. Indeed, their primary role in planning, programming, and executing just the active defense and prevention programs for force protection is a monumental task in and of itself. This raises the question, where does the Force Protection Program belong in the USAF? In search of the right answer to this dilemma, three independently written papers were reviewed. Each addressed doctrinal/regulatory requirements on force protection, and their concept of where force protection “fits” in Air Force operations.
In his Air War College paper, LtCol Ron Newsom, a career security forces officer, logically articulates that the force protection mission should be segregated out from combat support operations. “Critical force protection assets should be organized under a single commander to prioritize, coordinate, and sustain force protection efforts.” He believes that by placing force protection under the control of the Support Group Commander during sustained operations in a high threat environment, these operations will not receive adequate emphasis given the numerous other responsibilities of this commander. A standalone force protection commander on the other hand, could focus exclusively on this one critical aspect of the overall mission. As a result, she could provide the senior deployed commander with a dedicated “911” force that continually monitors the ground threat, identifies vulnerabilities to the threat, and recommends changes to the base protection measures. Colonel Newsom pictures this one force protection commander controlling representatives from the most critical force protection functions to include EOD, fire prevention, NBC response, safety, and emergency medical care. Under the construct of the AEW, this lieutenant colonel force protection commander (no specialty mentioned, but security forces officer assumed) would work directly for the senior deployed commander to ensure force protection is properly balanced with other operational, logistics, medical and force support missions. A logical approach.

Two highly knowledgeable retired Air Force Colonels, now defense contractors, wrote the second paper (under contract by the USAF) reviewed. In their paper entitled “Force Protection-A Heading Check”; they recommend a number of doctrinal/policy changes, as well as the need to change the organizational placement of force protection.
One recommendation elevates force protection from AFDD 2-4.1 to AFDD 2-X. This would place force protection on the same doctrinal footing as AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, as opposed to its current position as a subordinate mission. Like Colonel Newsom, these authors also recommend force protection be aligned directly under the wing commander, on equal grounds with the operations, logistics, medical, and support commanders.5

Mr. Jim Lafrenz who looked at force protection from a different perspective, the perspective of an Air Force Civil Engineer, wrote the third paper reviewed. His opinion on the program requires a direct quote:

“Current Air Force philosophy encourages the civil engineers to do their thing, the medics to do theirs, and security police to do theirs. To date, the force-protection initiative is simply a collection of parochial activities by individual Air Force organizations without the integration of the resources necessary to counter a common threat. Much better coordination, based on articulated strategy and doctrine, is needed.”6

In his paper, he concurs with Lt Gen James F. Record’s position on the need to create a new organization at the air staff to manage force protection programs. This organization would:

- "write USAF doctrine and policy guidance on force protection;
- be the resource advocate for force-protection programs;
- monitor and select force-protection research and development programs."7

Mr. Lafrenz also believes that force protection programs, while under the control of the security forces functional, is being implemented as strictly a security program, omitting numerous other tasks essential for an overall successful force protection program. He particularly addresses the shortfalls in passive defense programs (hardening, camouflage, cover, concealment, deception, dispersal, etc) and especially in the role of disaster
preparedness planning/operations/training. Overall, he places blame for shortfalls in the force protection program on institutional shortcomings, specifically in organizational structure.

In reviewing these papers written by highly competent force protection “experts”, as well as conducting an intensive literature review on the subject and personal experience as a career security forces officer, certain conclusions became evident. If synergy in force protection operations is to occur, a systematic approach driven by doctrine and proper organizational structure must be pursued. Under the proposals in this paper, “another” AF reorganization with massive changes is unnecessary. No, the existing structures and doctrine driven by the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept are sound, just in need of tweaking.

A leading management philosophy has recently gained recognition in private industry called “The Fifth Discipline,” which promotes a systematic approach to successful business practices. In his book, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization*, Peter Senge promotes “systems thinking” and has developed “The Laws of the Fifth Discipline”. Two of these laws, there are 11, are particularly applicable to force protection modifications within the existing Air Force structure. First (law #8), “Small changes can produce big results— but the areas of highest leverage are often the least obvious” and (law #10) “Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two elephants.” Each of these laws will be explained and then related to the force protection issues at hand.

*Small changes can produce big results— but the areas of highest leverage are often the least obvious.*
Under this law, Senge explains:

“Systems thinking shows that small, well-focused actions can sometimes produce significant, enduring improvements, if they’re in the right place. Systems thinkers refer to this principle as “leverage”. Tackling a difficult problem is often a matter of seeing where the high leverage lies, a change which—with a minimum of effort—would lead to lasting, significant improvement.” Later on under this same law he explains, “Learning to see underlying “structures” rather than “events” is a starting point…”

This law’s relevance to force protection is profound. Indeed, through the Revolution in Military Affairs dictum, the USAF made major organizational/operational/philosophical changes in the name of the Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF). This was a necessary reaction to changes in world events and significant downsizing in personnel and budgets. Changes driven by the EAF however did not eliminate or even significantly alter any traditional support operations. The names may have changed, but not the missions. Combat Support is simply new terminology for the old Air Base Operability Program, with greater emphasis on logistics. And, force protection is simply a new term for the Cold War version of the Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO) Program, which over the years has been narrowed down to a chemical/biological defense program. One just need peruse Appendix A of this paper to gain insight into the multiple programs and levels of effort put into “force protection” over the years. These guidance documents along with functional organizations within the support structure have proven effective over the years, so why make major change to what has proven successful over time?

Synergized force protection operations measures can be achieved under the current doctrinal construct:
Full Spectrum Dominance
↓
Full-Dimensional Protection
↓
Agile Combat Support
↓
Force Protection

Once again, only minimal modifications need be made to established programs in support of existing doctrine. The definitions recommended in the first section of this chapter, is an important starting point. The next step is to overcome the force protection paradigm as an antiterrorism program. Delineating the term antiterrorism from force protection, as being discussed at the JCS and HQ AF, will rectify this. AT/FP regulations/policies/guidance will then have to be renamed and modified. Most likely, they will be modified to support the antiterrorism portion of the force protection program, given that is the primary focus of these documents. These modifications lead up to a requirement to rethink force protection from a doctrinal, operational, and technological perspective. As stated earlier, all supporting guidance for force protection already exists under the ownership of the various functional agencies that contribute to support force protection (see appendix A). “Rethinking” force protection is a matter of developing integrating doctrine and supporting instructions/policies/manuals. Whence, much of this work also exists.

AFI 10-212, “Air Base Operability” (ABO), states:

“The primary objective of ABO planning is to integrate and employ the components of the air base to ensure the installation is capable of sustaining its assigned mission(s) in the contingency environment presented by the expected threat according to location…Unit specific procedures will
normally be outlined in planning documents developed by
the responsible functional agency."9

The key phrase in this description of ABO planning is "to integrate and employ the
components"—the role of the support group/combat support commander in sustaining air
base support operations. This proposal does not advocate changing the term "Combat
Support" to ABO, it only recommends using the historic ABO organizational/operational
structure outlined in Chapter 1 as a model for integrating combat support operations.
Indeed, Agile Combat Support under the EAF concept is a more complex mission than
the old ABO program, as it encompasses all logistics and medical forces as well as the
traditional support group functions. But much like the Defend pillar in the ABO model,
the force protection/survivability "principle" is essential to ensuring overall combat
support mission success—one mission simply cannot operate without the other.

In reviewing present and historical USAF directives on force protection,
antiterrorism, and ABO, one document stood out as the most comprehensive; Air Force
Handbook 1-222, Volume 3, "Guide to Civil Engineering Force Protection." This one
document best integrates active and passive defense measures necessary to protect
people, weapons systems, and support structures. Because it is a Civil Engineering
document for force protection, its primary focus is on passive defense measures against
the terrorist threat. However using this as the cornerstone planning document for force
protection, with the addition of active defense/security and medical readiness measures,
and disaster preparedness, this modified document would serve well as "The Guide to
Force Protection Planning." Consideration should be given to modeling it in the same
general format as Air Force Manual 10-100, Airman’s Manual10, only at the support
group commander level of knowledge. Supporting documents to this manual would
continue to be controlled by the various functionals (Appendix A) and remain intact, this document would simply serve as the integrating document for force protection operations. When taken as a whole, these "Small changes can produce big results."

"Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two elephants."

Under this law of the Fifth Discipline philosophy, Peter Senge explains:

"Living systems have integrity. Their character depends on the whole. The same is true for organizations; to understand the most challenging managerial issues requires seeing the whole system that generates the issues." He goes on later to explain "interactions that must be examined are those most important to the issue at hand, regardless of parochial organizational boundaries." He sums this principle up by stating "sometimes people go ahead and divide an elephant in half anyway. You don't have two small elephants then; you have a mess. By a mess, I mean a complicated problem where there is no leverage to be found because the leverage lies in interactions that cannot be seen from looking only at the piece you are holding."

Force protection must be inherent in all support operations; however, it is combat support that serves as the linchpin to the build-up and sustainment of aerospace operations, not force protection. The analogy is clear. Combat support is the elephant in this case, the protector of the herd (aerospace operations), but the elephant cannot perform his role as protector if one of his legs are severed. Force protection is a leg, without which the elephant will surely die, leaving the herd vulnerable to its enemies.

In his air war college paper, Colonel Newsom proposes a Force Protection Squadron composed of 245 personnel, broken down into the traditional air base defense force structure (see AFPD 31-3). This proposed organization includes functions in administration, intelligence, operations, and plans and logistics; combining medical, engineering, security, administrative, communications, intelligence, AFOSI and logistics specialties. There is no doubt this organizational structure would enhance the ease of
managing force protection operations, independently of other support operations. In his paper, Colonel Newsom does not state if this force protection organization would include the entire security, civil engineering, and AFOSI force. It is assumed not, just a portion of the civil engineering and AFOSI force. It is also assumed that a commander for the greater engineering and AFOSI mission would still be deployed to lead their functional operations, while all security forces personnel would be assigned to the force protection group. Based on these assumptions, does the civil engineering captain assigned to the force protection squadron have greater say on engineering support for force protection than the deployed (and probably higher ranking) engineering commander? Will the deployed engineering commander be relieved of all passive defense duties? Do passive defense measures take precedence over the bedding down of forces deploying in? Who determines precedence of tasks for these redundant specialists assigned to two separate organizations, the support commander or the force protection commander? Colonel Newsom’s proposed organizational structure, although strengthening force protection operations, does not reflect a systematic process to ensure support for overall aerospace operations. It cuts off a leg of the elephant.

Mr. LaFrenz’s paper states “If there is to be a synergistic force-protection program at each US air base, then doctrine needs to be developed from the commander perspective.”\textsuperscript{13} In this case, he is addressing the installation commander, and advocates that the disaster preparedness program be placed directly under this highest level commander. Like Colonel Newsom, he is proposing a traditional support function be broken out from the support operations and assigned directly to the installation commander because of its essential role in air base operations. And like Newsom his
logic is sound, when only considering the disaster preparedness mission and not the entire support mission. As in most active defense measures, recovering an air base from an NBC attack takes a well coordinated effort by all (particularly support personnel) to ensure the base can either be effectively evacuated or restored. This proposal once again, while solving the problem at hand, does not look at the issue from a systematic perspective. Hence, placing disaster preparedness under the direct control of the installation commander raises the same concerns as separating force protection out from the larger combat support mission. Is disaster response/preparedness not a force protection/combat support mission? Does not the civil engineer, medical, and security forces commanders have a vestment in this mission? Are we now cutting off the lead elephant’s trunk, an essential component of the elephant’s ability to protect its herd?

It is the contention of this paper that all force protection programs/directives remain under the operational command and control of the support group commander. For a number of reasons, but most notably two. First, the force protection mission can not be accomplished in isolation. It takes a concerted effort from all organizations working together within the combat support function, and even those in the operational side of the mission, to ensure synergy in operations. The support group commander, operating within the purview of combat support doctrine, is the only logical integrator of these forces. With the larger combat support function as his only goal, this essential integrator of the force is in the best position to determine priorities of the various support functions during all phases of operations; initial beddown, sustainment, and re-deployment during pre-attack, attack, and post-attack operations. The second reason for keeping support functions/operations under the support commander(s), is a simple one: the
installation/wing commander is already task-saturated. The wing commander is the ultimate aerospace integrator ensuring all support, logistic, and medical operations are in place to ensure effective flying operations as directed by higher headquarters. Piecemealing various functions under his/her control will only result in chaos, crippling that wing’s ability to fly, fight, and win. The elephant must stay fully intact in support of the greater good of the herd.

So indeed, force protection operations under the EAF concept do not require major changes to the existing doctrine or another USAF organizational restructuring. However, the insertion of a support group commander equivalent functional representative is needed at both air staff and MAJCOM levels to work the integration efforts. These staff agencies must not only address doctrine and structure, but also develop combat support/force protection concepts of operations and standard operating procedures.

*Developing Force Protection Concepts of Operations*

Supporting and sustaining aerospace operations is a highly complex mission, especially in a forward deployed joint/combined operation. To reduce complexity in these operations, the USAF must resort to developing formal concepts of operations (CONOPs) and standard operating procedures (SOPs). This is contrary to the very fiber of the way support operations have functioned in the past. Many believe standardization takes flexibility away from the commanders in the field, and every USAF member knows “flexibility is the key to airpower.” However, given the dictums of the QDR and JV 2010
along with the structure and operations of the EAF, CONOPs and SOPs must become the *modus operandi* for combat support operations, particularly in force protection, if the USAF can expect to train and integrate its support forces effectively. Defined CONOPs will also lead to improvements in the acquisition and development of new technologies; technologies that are based on requirements derived from a systematic process, a process that supports the larger mission.

Once again, the various functionals that fall under combat support each possess, for the most part, directives/policies/guidance on their requirements to ensure the force is protected. And once again, there is no need for these to change; however, there is a need to develop integrating guidance to ensure synergized operations. Current force protection doctrine recognizes this need.

"Force protection requires a collaborative, integrated, cross-functional effort. Members of civil engineers, security forces, medical, communications, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence, and counterintelligence communities all play key roles in force protection."

In this same document is a "Force Protection Constructive Model" that maintains applicability to the larger force protection program under the support group commander.

![Figure 4. Force Protection Constructive Model](image-url)
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OSD/SOLIC), JCS J-34 staff, and HQ AF/XOF have extended tremendous effort into developing a DoD standard “Antiterrorism Force Protection Installation Planning Template.” This template was designed to serve as a guide for every installation to conduct a Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (as seen on the model above). Unfortunately, the focus of this planning tool is primarily limited to protecting the force from hostile acts of terrorism, and requires literally hundreds of manhours to complete the checklist. Implementing protective measures based on the findings of the assessment could take years to complete. If and when antiterrorism is identified as a supporting program to the larger force protection mission, it is anticipated that this template will fall under the Antiterrorism Program. It is also anticipated that this template will only apply to vulnerability and threat assessment at permanent installations, for it is far too complex to be applied for forward deployed operations. However, there is still great application for this document in developing force protection CONOPs and SOPs.

According to DoD requirements, an assessment team from either JCS J-34, HQ AF, or appropriate MAJCOM will be sent to each USAF installation every two to three years to provide expertise to the assessment process independently conducted by every installation. For the USAF, assessment teams are to provide their assessments to HQ AF/XOF, which compiles and distributes commonly found problems and best practices. This paper proposes the USAF take this requirement one step further. HQ AF/XOF should identify benchmark programs found at the various installations and do one of two things. Either build a CONOP/SOP based on the benchmark program and distribute to all USAF installations as a program standard, or develop CONOP and SOP templates and
request the unit with the benchmark program submit it as an Air Force program standard. Either of these options would prove beneficial in a number of ways. First, the units with the benchmark programs would gain recognition for their innovative efforts that should carry weight in their selection for the Air Force Annual Awards Program. Secondly, it would reduce the workload of every wing in improving its force protection program. Benchmarking saves time and ensures effectiveness. Finally and most importantly, it would ultimately standardize CONOPs and SOPs throughout the Air Force. This same concept for many issues could be applied at the DoD level.

It is also advocated that modifications to AFH 1-222, vol. 3, “Guide to Civil Engineer Force Protection,” be made to serve as the planning guide for force protection operations when deployed as part of an AEF/LMW. This guide would be designed with integration of all support forces in mind. It should be organized into the old ABO planning standard, with modifications, to include

(1) Pre-Attack/disaster/mishap measures
(2) Protective measures during attack/disaster/mishap
(3) Post-Attack/Recovery measures after attack/disaster/mishap

The CONOPs/SOPs developed through vulnerability assessments, as well as those developed through existing functional directives, and taken from lessons learned during major exercises, inspections, and actual operations would serve as supporting documents to this Guide. It is important to note that Air Force Handbooks, Concepts of Operations, and Standard Operating Procedures are not directive in nature, but only serve as guides to building plans and standardizing operations for purposes of training and integration of forces. Every effort should be made by the USAF to also ensure, when possible, standardization of SOPs on common tasks with the other military services. These
common tasks could include NBC personal defense measures, unexploded ordinance identification, building evacuation procedures, etc.

The QDR and JV 2010 also addressed the need to conduct exercises/demonstrations to validate new concepts, procedures, and technology as well as to identify voids in the same. The ABO community recognized this need and conducted the ultimate “combat support” exercise in USAF history in the name of SALTY DEMO. This demonstration, although very expensive and manpower intensive, proved to pay great dividends in the development of improved concepts for synergized air base operations and future technology development. The SALTY DEMO report is still available and should serve as a model for future planners of a Combat Support exercise.\textsuperscript{15} It is evident that a like exercise/demonstration needs to take place to determine current conditions of combat support/force protection operational procedures and technology. It would also serve as a good start in building a Combat Support Strategic Plan to ensure the world’s greatest air force maintains the world’s greatest support structure.

**Establishing an Integrating Office**

A total integration of effort is absolutely essential to ensure successful combat support operations; this is particularly true for force protection activities. According to Major General Steven R. Polk, 19th Air Force Commander and previous wing commander at Osan Air Base Korea, “to work, force protection must be an inherent part of every unit’s operation, it cannot be just a security forces program.” He went on to say, the role of the support group commander as the disaster control group commander and
integrator of a majority of force protection programs is key to program success. He also believes that like a majority of the functional agencies in the Air Force, the support group commander needs a single advocate, i.e. a higher headquarters office, to work the integration issues and receive feedback from the commanders on voids in existing programs.\textsuperscript{16}

Force protection as discussed in this chapter and under the proposed definition, can not be separated from the larger combat support mission--\textit{dividing an elephant in half does not produce two elephants}, it only makes a mess. Therefore, it is recommended that a Combat Support Integrating Office, with Force Protection (survivability) a key principle, be established within HQ AF/XOP, Directorate for Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation. More specifically, a division within XOP, an XOPC for example, should be established. The integration effort should be led by "a graduated support group commander with AEF experience."\textsuperscript{17} It is also recommended that this office assume control of the Force Protection Battle Lab and consider changing the name and focus to the Combat Support Battle Lab. It would also behoove this new division to use the Air Base Operability organizational and operational model described in Chapter 1 of this paper to build up its new Combat Support structure, remembering "\textit{small changes can produce big results.}"

Subordinate offices to XOPC must also be established at major command (MAJCOM) level. Although logically placed in Directorate of Operations Directorate, Colonel (USAF, retired) Bob Larson wisely recommended that each MAJCOM determine where Combat Support best fits in their particular organizational structure, given their specific mission focus\textsuperscript{18}--wise and heeded advice.
Finally, the Air Force needs to establish a manpower standard for Support Group Planners, much like those found in logistics, operations, and medical groups. These professional planners would be assigned directly to the staff of every support group commander. Their mission would entail the integration of all base operating support plans at the unit level, working very closely with the logistic, operations and medical planners as well as the planners in the functional organizations. These support group planning positions are especially critical at units with an assigned AEF/AEW/LMW mission and overseas units receiving time phased force deployment list (TPFDL) forces.

Given the organizational structure recommended above, concepts of operations and standard operating procedures can finally be established/standardized, resulting in a systematic approach to meeting combat support mission requirements. Finally, all airmen moving from one base to another will not have to be re-trained in force protection/survivability, i.e., building evacuations, base recovery after attack procedures, etc., because of major inconsistencies in operating procedures from one air force base to another. This one advantage alone will save thousands of training hours a year in the USAF. In the end, AEF/AEW/LMW commanders leading troops from various units throughout the USAF will finally have a standard by which they can expect their troops to perform. Lastly, when expected to operate jointly or in combined operations, these same commanders will have written and well-established operational procedures they can share with those commanders they are expected to fight with. If HQ AF/XOPC manages it effectively, these CONOPs/SOPs will be compatible with at least the other US military services. If all the above recommendations are considered, the combat support arm of the USAF will have attained a systematic approach to meet their mission requirements.
However to achieve true synergy, compatibility in technology must also be addressed. Just as there is a need for an integrating office to develop and support operational concepts, there is also a need for a technology integrating office.

Strong consideration should be given by the new HQ AF/XOPC to name the Air Base Systems Program Office, AAC/WMO (AFMC), at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, as the Combat Support Technology/Acquisition Integration Office. This is the ABO program integration office of old, now renamed. They maintain all the ABO documentation to include the ABO Strategic Plan, SALTY DEMO after action report and follow-up programs, and have an array of USAF functional representatives; acquisition, logistic, and new development experts; as well as two highly experienced contractor support organizations. This office could aid immeasurably by managing not just new technology and acquisition programs, but conduct studies on new operational concepts. The close proximity of this office to Tyndall Air Force Base, home to the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency, Mr. Jim Lafrenz, an Air Force Research Laboratory, and Silver Flag, is truly a bonus.

Synergy in force protection is achievable only if Air Force leaders properly invest in what now is considered the first priority for planning future military operations. With the proper organizational structure in place, establishment of operational concepts and standard operating procedures, good training programs supported by exercises and demonstrations, and a requirements driven and funded acquisition program; the world’s greatest aerospace force will continue to win America’s wars and then return safely home to a grateful nation.
Notes

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5 Robert Larson and Douglas Ferris, "Force Protection-A Heading Check", undated,
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15 "SALTY DEMO Report (classified)," available through the Air Base Systems
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16 Major General Steven R. Polk, personal telephone interview, 19 Apr 00.

17 Polk, personal interview.

18 Robert A. Larson, personal telephone interview, 18 Apr 00.
## Appendix A

### List of Air Force Guidance and Directives on Force Protection Related Matters

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AFPD 31-3  Air Base Defense
AFPD 31-4  Information Security
AFJI 31-102  Physical Security
AFMAN 31-201 v. 3  Civil Disturbance
AFI 31-207  Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel
AFI 32-3001  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program
AFI 32-4001  Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations
AFMAN 32-4002  Hazardous Material Emergency Response Program
AFMAN 32-4005  Personnel Protection and Attack Actions
AFI 32-4007  Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
AFH 32-40414 v. 1  USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare Environment, CB Planning and Analysis
AFI 33-102  C4I Capabilities and Planning Process
AFI 33-108  Capability, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
AFI 33-202  Computer Security
AFPD 34-1  AF Services Combat Support Programs
AFPD 51-4  Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict
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