Out of the Closet: Addressing Policy Options

A MONOGRAPH
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Abstract

OUT OF THE CLOSET: ADDRESSING POLICY OPTIONS
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The status of American culture in the year 2000 indicates a liberalized change in attitude toward lesbians and gays, particularly in the area of military service. However, the military is staunchly opposed to full inclusion of known lesbians and gays in its ranks and, like other controversial social issues, has failed to consider a plan for implementing full integration in the event current policy should change.

The paper seeks to answer the question whether previous social changes within a military institution can provide an experiential basis for prescribing a contingency plan in the event known lesbian and gay persons are granted permission to serve in the US military.

The paper concludes that, although past military social transformations cannot provide an exact blueprint for integration of lesbians and gays, the experiences can provide a framework. The highly controversial and historic integration of black soldiers in the US military in 1948 and Canada's litigious complete integration of lesbian and gay soldiers in 1992, together provide the social construct to which a change model for large organizations is applied and used for analysis and the paper's conclusions.

The paper argues for anticipating change and initiating an early start to the planning process and to shaping operations. Most importantly, the paper argues for visionary leadership. The monograph concludes that a contingency plan is needed, and suggests a conceptual framework for the plan.
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In the year 2000, the United States Army does not have a contingency plan in the event the 1993 policy prohibiting homosexual conduct in the Armed Forces is lifted.\(^1\) The policy, commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT), has been steeped in controversy since its inception, and current trends indicate the potential for a liberalized policy change in the future.\(^2\) Though the US Army is accustomed to rapid changes in technology and battle threats, it is historically averse to social change. Despite such aversion, the Army cannot exempt itself from social change. It does, and must, reflect the will of the population it serves to defend. The challenge, therefore, is to identify a means for the Army to succeed in its mission against the changing social landscape on which it must operate. This paper seeks to draw upon the Army’s experience in an attempt to discern a contingency plan to formulate a policy that allows lesbians and gays to serve openly in the Army in the event that the current policy changes.\(^3\)

Many facets of current American culture indicate a change in attitude toward lesbians and gays throughout our society. The ongoing discourse in politics, law, media, and the military, indicates attitudinal changes, which could directly affect the current DADT policy.

Polls indicate American public support for acceptability and legality of homosexual conduct is at its highest level of support in the past decade (1990 – 2000).\(^4\) In 1999, half of Americans believed homosexual relations between consenting adults should be legal and considered an acceptable lifestyle. While the other half of the population believes homosexual conduct is immoral, there is
little question in the eyes of the American public that lesbians and gays should have equal rights in terms of job opportunities. Eighty-three percent of Americans support lesbians and gays having equal rights to job opportunities, and seventy percent support them serving in the military. The support of lesbians and gays in the military has significantly increased from fifty-one percent in 1977 to fifty-seven percent in 1992, the year before President William Clinton unveiled his DADT policy.

The DADT policy resurfaced as a major issue on the 2000 political scene at the highest level of interest since 1993. During the 2000 round of presidential debates, Vice President Albert Gore categorically affirmed his intention to, if elected, open the ranks of the services to homosexuals. Gore further asserted he would only appoint military chiefs who agreed with the policy. Though he later backed down from the last statement, saying he would not require of the brass an a priori litmus test, he had made his intentions known. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Senator Bill Bradley called for repeal of DADT in order to allow full participation of homosexuals in the military. Governor George W. Bush and Senator John McCain called for better implementation of the current policy. President Clinton described DADT as “out of whack” and in the December 2000 issue of Rolling Stone magazine, he called it a “dumb ass” policy.

The validity of DADT is being questioned, not only in the national media, but also increasingly in international media. Nationwide news headlines and reports of increased military discharges due to homosexuality, election campaign rhetoric, and the murder of Army Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell at Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, have both liberal and traditionally conservative newspapers questioning the future of DADT.\textsuperscript{9} The international media is becoming more focused on the United States' DADT policy due to the fact that only two NATO countries maintain a ban on homosexual conduct: Turkey and the United States. On January 12, 2000, Britain was forced to terminate its military ban on homosexuals, joining twenty-three countries that allow homosexuals in uniform.\textsuperscript{10}

While other countries have revised their laws and policies concerning lesbians and gays in the military, in the US, homosexual conduct in the military remains against the law, specifically Title 10, US Code §654. If however, the US decided to overturn the current law, it could do so by one of two ways: either through a court decision (ultimately a question for the Supreme Court) or through Congressional legislation. The Servicemen's Legal Defense Fund (SLDN), a DADT watch dog organization, prognosticates that more moderates would be needed in Congress to overturn the law, and that, at a minimum, two to four new moderate to liberal Supreme Court Justices would need to be appointed.\textsuperscript{11} However, they contend that trends indicate the law is likely to be overturned due to the increased frequency of federal courts considering legal challenges to the current policy and to the ban on military service for lesbians and gays. Though courts have traditionally resisted ruling on military matters, there have been eleven challenges to the DADT policy to date.\textsuperscript{12}

As the rest of society appears to be liberalizing its view on homosexuals serving in the military, the military itself, "from top brass to new recruits, is overwhelmingly opposed to allowing homosexuals to serve."\textsuperscript{13} Reports of chains
of command not following policy and asking and investigatively pursuing its service members about sexuality are increasing. In spite of this, the military has never held any commander accountable for violating the current policy.¹⁴

Nearly every credible study states that the DADT policy failed due to senior military complacency in its implementation. Over the past six years, the policy has been entrenched in controversy. Discharges of lesbian and gay soldiers have drastically increased while the services struggle to meet retention and reenlistment goals. Early release of these soldiers has have cost American taxpayers over $160 million.¹⁵ In considering the validity of a change in policy, pundits charge that, in a democracy, a military that fails to evolve in concert with the civilian culture it defends will inevitably become a threat to that democracy.

Whether the military likes it or not, it is widely viewed as a pioneer in providing equal opportunity for its uniformed members. From the 1948 Executive Order signed by President Harry S. Truman that formally began the long process of racial integration to the more recent admission of women into most military occupational specialties, the military services have compiled a good record for providing equal opportunity that often exceeds the progress of civilian society. While the Army is traditionally the slowest service in accepting civilian-forced social change, it enjoys a reputation as being the most successful Service when it eventually implements social change. The Army has a history of resistance to change and thus does not plan for nor implements social change expeditiously or efficiently.
Current societal attitudes coupled with ongoing political climate shifts could affect a change in the law regarding homosexual conduct in the military. The Army needs to be prepared. The official military position is that “institutionally, the Army is not projecting incorporation of openly serving homosexuals…no planning has been done in anticipation of changes in the law regarding homosexual conduct.” However, unofficial dialogue has begun in senior military circles. During the October 28 to November 3, 2000 Brigadier Generals Training Conference at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the attendees were tasked to consider, as part of the course curriculum, a strategic problem counter to Army official policy. One of the topics assigned for discussion was a strategic action plan for the following statement problem: “The prohibition against homosexual conduct for the Armed Forces will be lifted effective 01 January, 2005.”

The purpose here is not to argue the morality or immorality of homosexuality, or the validity of the current military policy, but rather to analyze historical social change cases to provide an experiential basis for a contingency plan should the law change. The integration of blacks into the US Army and the integration of homosexuals into the Canadian military will serve as model examples.

CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGY

The most significant social change in the US military after World War II was the integration of blacks into the military. The policies leading to this controversial change are widely known, however little is understood about the execution of the policy. In 1992, the Canadian military experienced a significant social change when it implemented policy to lift its ban on homosexuals.
Investigation into the leap from policy to execution should provide insight to the unit level, the level where implementation of a policy determines its overall success or failure.

The methodology for analyzing the historical models for affecting social change will use a corporate business model to assess the strategic and operational trends as well as interviews with service members who were in the midst of these great social changes in the military to enhance the analysis.

The strategic model is based on John P. Kotter’s action plan from his book “Leading Change”. Kotter’s model is a blueprint for strategy implementation in large organizations in the twenty-first century. Kotter outlines an eight-stage process of creating major change.16

1. Establishing a sense of urgency
   - Examining the audience.
   - Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities.
2. Creating the guiding coalition
   - Putting together a group with enough power to lead the change.
   - Getting the group to work together like a team.
3. Developing a vision and strategy
   - Creating a vision to help direct the change effort.
   - Developing strategies for achieving that vision.
4. Communicating the change vision
   - Using every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision and strategies.
   - Having the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of the soldiers.
5. Empowering broad-based action
   - Allowing key personnel to take ownership.
   - Changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision.
   - Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions.
   - Getting rid of obstacles.
6. Generating short-term wins
   - Planning for visible improvements in performance, or “wins”.
   - Creating those wins.
   - Visibly recognizing and rewarding people who made the wins possible.
7. **Consolidating gains and producing more change**
   - Using increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit together and don’t fit the transformation vision.
   - Hiring, promoting, and developing people who can implement the change vision.
   - Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents.

8. **Anchoring new approaches in the culture**
   - Creating better performance through behavior, attitudes and leadership.
   - Articulating the connections between new behaviors and organizational success.
   - Developing means to ensure leadership development and success.

Adoption of a ‘known lesbian and gay’ policy would cause significant social change for the US Army. Many of the characteristics of the US military racial integration case and of the Canadian military case would be present: pre-policy controversy, staunch military opposition, turbulence within the ranks, and top-down management. The parallels between these situations, while not exact, may allow the Army to draw conclusions about what a contingency plan should look like for successfully integrating known lesbians and gays with minimal operational impact.

**CHAPTER THREE – US MILITARY RACIAL INTEGRATION**

The environmental conditions surrounding racial integration are similar to, if not more harsh, than the circumstantial conditions surrounding the debate on lesbians and gays in the military. However, in the span of six years, the Army moved from a state of racial intolerance to indifference and acceptance, becoming America’s model of institutional behavior and attitude change. The change came with President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 (E.O. 9981), which
provided “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”

**Background**

Before E.O. 9981, the American public vehemently opposed racial integration of the military. In 1943, ninety percent of white civilians and eighteen percent of black civilians favored continued segregation in the military. Similarly, in the military eighty-eight percent of white soldiers and thirty-eight percent of black soldiers believed that whites and blacks should be assigned to separate units. The Army discussion on racial integration centered on the projected breakdown of combat effectiveness, specifically unit cohesion, morale, and discipline. Five years later, when President Truman signed E.O. 9981, a Gallup poll revealed that support for segregation still remained very high, although it had noticeably declined. Sixty-three percent of American adults endorsed the separation of blacks and whites in the military, while only twenty-six percent favored integration. A year after E.O. 9981, military support for segregation declined. A survey of white Army enlisted personnel and officers indicated that thirty-two percent of white soldiers opposed any degree of racial integration in the Army. However, sixty-eight percent, expressed tolerance for the idea of partial integration, in which blacks and whites worked together but did not share dormitory and mess facilities. The major concerns among white soldiers seemed to be the prospects of intimate physical contact with blacks not the presence of blacks per se.
Establishing A Sense Of Urgency

The catalyst for racial integration in the military was twofold: leadership and military manpower shortages. First, President Truman may have used integration as a political platform to obtain endorsement from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and ultimately the black vote for reelection, but it was his singular leadership in the face of opposition which provided the driving force in this historic step. Second, the Navy and Air Force were experiencing a manpower shortage and could no longer continue as they were.

The Navy and Air Force experimented with racial integration prior to E.O. 9981 (in 1944) purely out of manpower necessities. Both Services formed planning groups and conducted limited integration experiments. The Navy racially integrated ships in 1944 to solve a crew distribution problem. Two navies, one black and one white, proved inefficient and expensive. The Air Force racially integrated flying units in 1948 due to a shortage of black pilots. It had become impossible to fill all the positions in the black air units, to rotate pilots through advanced training, and to provide normal rotation at the same time.

The integration of the Army was more protracted. The Army did not have an initial manpower shortage nor did it have an internal group of officers, or change agents, who favored racial integration. Therefore, no contingency planning or large-scale experiments occurred until after E.O. 9981. Even then, the Army expended time and effort resisting the change. The Army did not establish a
sense of urgency until the Korean War, two years after Truman’s Executive Order.

Creating The Guiding Coalition

President Truman signed on July 26, 1948, Executive Order 9981, entitled “Equal Treatment and Opportunity Order.” The order did not promise integration, but rather the “equality of treatment and opportunity” for blacks. In addition, it established the first of a series of guiding coalitions; the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, better known as the Fahy Committee.23 The Fahy charter was to provide a plan for racial integration and “to examine into the rules, and procedures and practices of the armed service in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order.”24 Initially a military coalition, in 1949 the committee was integrated with civilians. Civilian membership provided differing points of view into the military complex to counter the rigid outlook the military had on racial matters. While the Fahy committee put promise on paper to achieve true integration, blacks remained segregated.25

The second guiding coalition was established in late 1949. The Chamberlin Board reviewed the Fahy Committee’s racial plan to see if integration was feasible.26 Despite E.O. 9981, the Board vigorously opposed the combining of white and black units and strongly urged the retention of the all-Negro unit. Ultimately it was the Board’s findings that there would be widespread resentment on the part of most white soldiers, which would consequently destroy combat effectiveness. Integration would place the Negro in a competitive field he was
not prepared to face, thus denying him opportunity and retarding the
development of Negro manpower in the military. Furthermore, integration would
place Black officers and NCO’s in command of white troops, a position which
only the exceptional Black servicemen could successfully fill.27

However, it was the Fahy Committee Report that prevailed, receiving
approval on 1 March 1950. In accordance with the report findings, the Army
announced that beginning in April 1950, enlistment was “opened to qualified
applicants without regard to race or color”. Segregation was out.28

The coalitions guiding the individual services differed in their implementation
of the new policy. According to MG (Retired) Vance Coleman, the true catalyst
for establishing a sense of urgency in the Army was the Korean War in the Far
East Command (FECOM) in 1950.29 The guiding coalition was composed of
combat regimental commanders who cut through the politics and said, “give me
good soldiers,” without regard to race. These commanders were backed by
General Ridgeway, Eighth Army Commander.30

In sharp contrast to the FECOM, there was little support and universal
skepticism for full integration among senior Army officials in Europe at the United
States Army European Command (USAREUR). Most commanders were
unaware of the Army’s success with integration in FECOM and in the training
divisions at home. When they were informed of integration progress elsewhere,
they were quick to declare such a move impractical for Europe. They warned of
the social problems that would arise with the all-white civilian population and
predicted that the Army would be forced to abandon the program in midstream.
Developing A Strategy And Vision

There was no overarching vision to racially integrate the military, only President Truman’s vague declaration of policy. “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President of the United States that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity of all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.” While the translation of this declaration into a directing vision did not occur, different strategies on how to implement the declaration began to emerge.

Communicating The Change Vision

The absence of a vision and the Army’s reluctance to racially integrate created an atmosphere of secrecy and a general lack of policy awareness throughout the chain of command. Generally, neither officers nor enlisted understood the new policy. Most soldiers tended to think that Department of the Army policy was whatever they had experienced in their own unit – i.e., segregation or mixing. Yet, born from this confusion, the Army produced two strategies. The first integration strategy was almost accidental. In the summer of 1950 MG William B. Kean, Commander of the 25th Infantry Division (ID), FECOM, declared that the all black 24th Infantry Regiment (IR), constituted a threat to the security of his division and requested its replacement. While there were individual acts of heroism, the 24th (IR) performed poorly as a whole, and was considered the weak link on the 25th ID line. Kean concluded that
segregated units would not work in a combat situation and that the combat value of black soldiers would never be realized unless they were integrated into white units. This pronouncement by Kean coupled with battle losses in white units and a growing surplus of black replacements resulted in the Eighth Army assigning individual black soldiers to under-strength units. The practice of assigning individual blacks throughout white units in Korea accelerated during early 1951 until it became systemic, with a caveat not to exceed fifteen percent ‘black’ strength.

In 1951, Lieutenant Vance Coleman, serving with a Kentucky National Guard Field Artillery in Korea, was only the second black officer in the unit. It was the first time the unit was integrated. As a forward observer and then a Company Executive Officer, Coleman never saw command policy or guidance on unit level issues pertaining to racial integration. According to Coleman, “It just happened.” The unit, previously all-white, was now approximately thirty percent blacks. Coleman professes that in terms of unit cohesion, morale and discipline, “there were no problems whatsoever.” Individually Coleman heard comments such as “I never looked at blacks as people before.” However, Coleman attributes the success to “the leadership environment, which provided room to grow and to accept.”

The second strategy emerged on 1 April, 1952 (four years after E.O. 9981), when the Army initiated integration in the European command. While integration may have quietly occurred in FECOM, segregation was still the rule in
USAREUR where many were unaware of the progress that had been made elsewhere.\footnote{35}

The European strategy was one where publicity was avoided and units were quietly phased into racial integration. The planning prior to implementation was classified. However, the Army in Europe did formalize the system and communicate the strategy through a series of letters of instruction to all major subordinate commands. Numbered units received individual black soldier replacements on a predetermined schedule. Combat arms units were the first to integrate. Each unit integrated over a six-month period. No official announcements were made to the public until the program was completed.\footnote{36}

**Empowering Broad-Based Action**

Once President Truman ordered the integration of the services and directed the Fahy committee to develop acceptable racial programs, he quickly turned the matter over to his subordinates in the Department of Defense, severing White House ties to the issue. “The necessary programs have been adopted,” he told Fahy, it was time for the services "to work out in detail the procedures, which will complete the steps so carefully initiated by the committee.” In effect, the president was guaranteeing the Services freedom to put their own houses in order.\footnote{37}

Implementation plans differed throughout the Army because there was not an overall strategic action plan. The Army did not extend its command policy or empower its subordinates evenly. Different Commands received authority to execute the policy at different times (first FECOM, then USAREUR, then
Northern United States, followed by the South). Even then, command policy did not extend within the commands evenly. For example, southern states were told to wait or slow down the integration process due to perceived local disruption. Commands were requested to submit their own action plans. Some commands got carried away and incidents of “unauthorized integration” occurred, while other commands were complacent and did nothing toward racial integration. It was not until the early 1970’s, that a training program on equal opportunity and race relations was integrated in the Army’s education and command systems.

**Generating Short-Term Wins**

Racial integration highlighted fears long entertained by military traditionalist leaders. Of immediate concern was the breakdown of combat effectiveness, unit cohesion, morale, and discipline. The short-term goals addressing those concerns were preventative in nature: do not lose combat effectiveness, do not lose unit morale, and do not increase race-related crime.

The standard Army guides for determining combat effectiveness and appropriate levels of performance are the various unit training tests and inspections. As units were integrated and then tested either through training events, inspections, or actual combat, the level of performance of former all-Black units increased and the combat effectiveness of former all-white units did not decrease.38

The next short-term goal was to stabilize morale in units. Prior to integration, the morale and retention of black units was low due to a myriad of problems such as second-rate training and equipment, limited educational opportunities, feelings
of inferiority, and poor leadership. Retention rates in all-black units were also low. As units integrated, and education and training opportunities for blacks increased, the morale of the black soldiers increased and, contrary to previous rhetoric, the morale of white soldiers remained the same. In fact, high rates of reenlistment and extensions caused black ‘overages’, and white soldiers became more favorably disposed toward serving in the same units with black soldiers.\textsuperscript{39}

Finally, it was feared that social mingling would cause breakdown in unit discipline, which, it was thought, would lead to racial incidents and crime. However, the complete opposite occurred. There was no increase in racially motivated crime, and in 1953 most all official military dances were racially integrated without incident. Additionally, success with social mingling on military installations changed racial attitudes and behavior outside the confines of the bases, causing racial attitudes generally to become more progressive.

\textbf{Consolidating Gains And Producing More Change}

Segregation officially ended in the active armed forces with the announcement of the Secretary of Defense in 1954 that the last all-black unit had been disbanded. In the six years since President Truman’s Executive Order a quarter of a million blacks had indiscriminately mixed with whites in military units worldwide. However, local communities were still discriminating against blacks in residential areas and business establishments. In a 1963 directive, Secretary of Defense McNamara outlined a new racial policy. The new policy vowed to carry the crusade for equal treatment and opportunity for black soldiers outside the military compound into the civilian community beyond. The new policy ordered
the Services to launch integration programs in communities (near military bases) and made the local commanders responsible for its success. In conjunction with other federal officials operating under provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, local commanders helped open thousands of theaters, bowling alleys, restaurants, and bathing beaches to black servicemen. Only in the face of continued opposition to open housing by landlords who dealt with servicemen, and then not until 1967, did McNamara decide to use the powerful and controversial weapon of ‘off-limits sanctions’.  

Anchoring New Approaches In The Culture

The military was the only segment of American society to have integrated, however imperfectly, the races on so large a scale. In doing so, they demonstrated that a policy of equal treatment and opportunity is more than a legal concept; it also ordains a social condition. Between the idea of change and its eventual fulfillment, traditionalism and bigotry shadowed progress. The record shows Services surmounted bigotry and rejected the old ways, and were successful in bringing the races together thus prospering the nation’s ideal of equal opportunity for all citizens.

CHAPTER FOUR – CANADIAN MILITARY

In 1992, the Canadian Forces (CF) experienced significant social change when it implemented a lesbian and gay non-discrimination policy. Where pre-policy controversy and staunch military opposition existed before this policy change, they steadily dissipated with the acceptance of the policy. While
Canada’s experiences cannot necessarily be reproduced by another country, insights can be gained on how to successfully implement a controversial policy.  

**Background**

Prior to 1988, lesbians and gays were prohibited from serving in the Canadian Forces. Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) argued that the special mission of the Forces necessitated an exclusionary policy. Military leadership feared that lesbian and gay soldiers would compromise operational effectiveness, as well as damage “cohesion, morale, discipline, leadership, recruiting, medical fitness, and the rights to privacy of other members”.  

Additional fears from the field, such as, sexual harassment by homosexual soldiers, gay-bashing, and heterosexual resignations and refusals to work with homosexuals, spurred continuing support for an anti-homosexual policy.

Military personnel, particularly men, were strongly against removing the ban. Service members expressed concern about all aspects of serving with lesbians and gays; sixty-two percent of male soldiers stated that they would refuse to share showers, undress or sleep in the same room as a gay soldier, and forty-five percent declared that they would refuse to work with gays. 

According to a field grade Canadian combat arms officer, Major Doug Claggett, the overall sentiment of the CF during this time was ‘restrictive and exclusionary’ in nature toward minorities, citing the role of women as an example. “The roles in the military were very traditional. Women were excluded from the combat arms and worked as clerks in logistics units.” When asked about the sentiment of the soldiers toward homosexuals prior to lifting the ban, Claggett
responded that “The Canadian regimental system fostered an idea of camaraderie where a soldier had to be a ‘man’ and drink beer, hit on women, and joke with the boys. Soldiers did not want to be associated with gays for fear of being labeled a ‘fag’ and excluded from the group.” Claggett continued that there was a general perception that “gays were sexually liberated and predators.”

The military policy was relaxed in 1988 and allowed homosexuals to serve, but with restrictions. The order to inform was removed and those discovered to be gay, were not summarily dismissed. The interim policy began when Michelle Douglas and four other service members filed separate lawsuits against the Canadian Forces that directly challenged the new policy toward homosexuals. Michelle Douglas won the lawsuit and the Canadian Federal Court decision extended the rights of lesbians and gays under both the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Act. As open dialogue on the policy circulated, young Army leaders such as Claggett began to ask of themselves how they could “foster and develop small group cohesion, particularly in the regimental system?”

In preparing for the appeal in the Douglas case, the DND concluded that it could not meet the standard of proof required for a “reasonable limitation” argument. Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain privately informed members of parliament that the ban was about to be lifted in late 1991. However, the federal government delayed the lift due to adamant refusal by some Conservative Members of Parliament to support the policy.
Establishing A Sense Of Urgency

Unlike the US Military, which has the leeway to be separate and distinct from society, the Canadian military has a different tradition. Due to the close reflection of military policies to Canadian civil laws, it was natural that the military revoke its policy and removed all restrictions on homosexuals. In 1992, when the Human Rights Court ruled that the military’s policy concerning homosexuals was unconstitutional, Canadian culture hastened military acceptance because a basic value upon which the Canadian culture is predicated, and which is reflected in its constitution and legislation, is that of equality.

Creating The Guiding Coalition

In a communiqué entitled “Homosexual Conduct,” Chastelain revoked Canadian Forces Administration Order (CFAO) 19-20 and all related interim policies. The military would no longer make distinctions between its heterosexual and homosexual soldiers. He expressed his “full support” of the Federal Court’s decision and stated his expectation the chain of command would also support the policy change. Senior leaders endorsed the change and appealed to service members’ sense of duty. Unit leaders relied on a strict code of conduct of equal standards for the conduct of lesbians, gays, and heterosexuals. Several years later, upon reflecting on the smooth transition of the policy, observers attributed the lack of problems to the unified military leadership’s public support for the new policy.
Vision

The publicly stated vision came in the form of a press report where General de Chastelain declared: “the Canadian Forces will comply fully with the Federal Court’s decision. Canadians, regardless of their sexual orientation, will now be able to serve their country without restriction.” In private military circles, the vision included an implementation plan with three phases: obtaining compliance with the new policy, promoting acceptance of the policy, and finally changing the attitudes of military personnel toward homosexuals through training.49

Communicating The Change Vision

Once the demise of the ban was imminent, General Chastelain and other military leaders took decisive steps to create a smooth transition. They dissolved any distinctions in the regulations between heterosexual and homosexual soldiers. They made it clear that the policy change had the full support of the CF leadership. The DND outlined the standards of behavior that would be expected of all military personnel, regardless of sexual orientation, and widely distributed both those standards and the changes in military regulations. In addition, the military leadership emphasized the distinction between beliefs and behavior. The personal attitudes and decisions of individual soldiers would be respected, but soldiers would be expected to put personal feeling aside to accomplish military objectives and to uphold the law.

The senior leadership provided guidance for subordinate leaders. A “Post-Announcement Action” was issued by the Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel to provide military leaders with guidance to “communicate the rationale for the
change, encourage its acceptance, and respond to the personal concerns of the CF members.” A Canadian Forces Personnel Newsletter was also disseminated to the Force that described the policy change.

The CF promoted the policy change through explicit answers to specific questions about appropriate behavior. The National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) issued a “Questions and Answers” sheet for use within the CF that explained the change in policy. This message included likely concerns and emphasized that homosexual and heterosexual soldiers would be held to the same standards of behavior:

Q31: Will such activities as dancing, hand holding, embracing between same/sex members be accepted in mess social functions?

A31: Standards of conduct for homosexual members will be the same as those for heterosexual members. Common sense and good judgment will be applied and required of all members.50

**Empowering Broad-Based Action**

In December 1992, the CF issued a new regulation (CFAO 19-36) providing leaders and service members judicial guidelines. The regulation, entitled “Sexual Misconduct,” amended a personal harassment regulation to detail what constituted inappropriate sexual conduct for both homosexual and heterosexual soldiers.51

In 1996 the DND implemented a training program to increase general awareness among its civilian and military workforce about harassment and racist conduct, including harassment based on sexual orientation. The program was
based on social situation exercises designed to prevent, recognize and handle harassment. The Standards for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) anti-harassment training program did not institute a separate procedure to handle same-sex sexual harassment or personal harassment based on sexual orientation. The SHARP section on sexual harassment and sexual misconduct uses gender and orientation-neutral terms describing specific behavior that would be classified as harassment or misconduct. Examples such as leering, requests for sexual favors, derogatory name-calling and sexually suggestive gestures are listed without regard for the gender of either the harasser or the target. Sexual harassment by someone of the same sex or abusive comments about one’s sexual orientation falls under the general sexual harassment framework.52

While senior leader concerns centered on establishment of the policy, junior officers and NCO’s had other concerns about the new policy. According to Claggett, his initial concern was for the safety of the lesbian or gay soldier who theoretically might openly declare his or her sexual orientation.53 The next concern was disciplining service members who might harass a gay soldier, followed by how to build group cohesiveness in a situation where an openly gay soldier might be isolated. After policy implementation, in some instances, junior officers took advantage of the broad policy and reinterpreted the policy to find ways to “get him (a gay soldier) out of my unit”. When asked about the effectiveness of the SHARP training, Claggett expressed that initially, the program “was not well received” by the troops. Many soldiers perceived that they were being told to “love gays”, and Claggett believed that the initial reluctance to
SHARP training was due in part to soldiers’ values being ‘challenged’, and new values being “forced upon” them. However, as a leader, Claggett understood that while education training was centrally directed Army wide, he was empowered to execute. It was business as usual; any problems were solved at the lowest possible level.

**Generating Short-Term Wins**

Lifting the ban on lesbian and gay servicemembers surfaced fears long held by military traditionalist leaders. Of immediate concern was the breakdown of combat effectiveness, unit morale, and discipline. There have not been any reported problems with harassment, violence, resignations or recruitment associated with the policy since its inception. “Despite all the anxiety that existed through the late 80s into the early 90s about the change in policy, here’s what the indicators show: no effect.”54

Less than a year after the policy change, in a 1993 attitudinal survey, when asked to describe how satisfied they were with the policy on sexual orientation, only twenty-eight and one half percent of the CF polled were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.55

While the CF may not have conducted initial evaluations or surveys, other researchers did.56 Neither research results from Rand National Defense Research Institute, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and the US Army Research Institute, nor information gathered from US Congressional testimony or media accounts offer any indications of resignations, problems with morale, violence, or harassment due to the policy change.57
Data strongly suggests that fears of a substantial increase in personal or sexual harassment due to the policy change were unwarranted. The rate of self-reported harassment actually decreased overall during the period. The percentage of service members who reported experiencing sexual harassment in the previous twelve months declined from eleven percent in 1992 to six percent in 1998. Four percent of servicemen and seven percent of servicewomen who reported personal harassment had experienced harassment rarely or occasionally due to their sexual orientation.58

Observers were surprised at the level of heterosexual tolerance and offer the following reasons based on studies of foreign countries with a homosexual inclusion policy. Few lesbians and gays have actually “come out” or declared themselves homosexuals because they are reluctant to openly admit their sexual orientation for a variety of reasons: the fear of discrimination or negative reactions from peers or superiors, the belief that sexuality is a private matter, and the absence of any advantage to openly identifying homosexual preference. Claggett believes the reluctance to come out is because “homosexuality is a threat to the male psyche.”

**Consolidating Gains And Producing More Change**

One of the effects of lifting the ban on homosexuals has been the extension of benefits to lesbian and gay service members and their partners. In June, 1996, the Canadian federal human rights tribunal ordered the federal government to provide the same medical, dental and other benefits to gay and lesbian couples as provided to heterosexual common-law couples. The CF human
resources office distributed a memo in December, 1996, outlining the policy of granting same sex partner benefits to CF personnel. These benefits included: compassionate leave; leave without pay for spousal accompaniment on military, foreign service, or isolated post assignments; and relocation entitlements. Same sex partners would also be entitled to dental care and health care plans as dependents.\textsuperscript{59} In April, 1999, a DND report revealed only seventeen claims for medical, dental, and relocation benefits for gay and lesbian partners of soldiers had been filed in 1998.\textsuperscript{60}

In the years since the removal of the ban, the CF has continued to move forward in its full integration of lesbian and gay soldiers. It has done so as part of a larger effort to reduce harassment and discrimination of all types among its personnel.

**Anchoring New Approaches In The Culture**

Perhaps the best measure of acculturation is that the issue of lesbian and gay soldiers in the CF has all but disappeared from public and internal military debates, nor has it affected recruiting or retention in the Canadian Forces.

“From a long-term recruiting perspective, I think this was a necessary step for us, as were all of our other cultural types of initiatives in terms of recruiting, because the population base that we’re working with in terms of recruiting is shrinking. So by broadening the population base and making things more acceptable, some of our social policies, what we’re doing in effect is preserving the long-term quality of the Canadian Forces, because there are only so many white, Anglo-Saxon males that you can recruit.”\textsuperscript{61}
CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS

So, how applicable are the Kotter model and the experiences of the American and Canadian armies in determining a model for the integration of lesbians and gays into the US military?

Deconstructing The Models

**Kotter Model:** In an Autumn 2000 *Parameters* article, two social science instructors from the United States Military Academy attempted to deconstruct a perceived movement in the Army toward civilian organizational and decision making concepts which were intended to lead, design and restructure corporate institutions. They contend that corporate models are *efficiency-based* change models geared toward bureaucratic and non values-based organizations, while the Army requires *effectiveness-based* change models, characterized by professionalism and leadership. However, as both the business and military communities’ journey through their respective revolutions, they are learning from each other. Senior military leaders, such as General (retired) Gordon Sullivan and former Navy Captain Dick Marcinko, write organizational and leadership books for the business community, while the military increasingly searches for alternate methods of professionalizing its organization from corporate business. John P. Kotter’s successful book, *Leading Change*, has a multitude of new ideas for incorporating change in large organizations, including organizations similar to the military where leadership and values are stressed.

**Black Model:** Some argue that the black integration model does not correlate to a potential known lesbian and gay model, and former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, is one of them. Powell made clear in his 1995 best-selling book, *My American Journey*, that he saw no correlation between racial and sexual discrimination. “Skin color is a benign, nonbehavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the most profound of human characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient, but invalid argument.” However, as with most of the past military social change discourse, his comment appears based on feeling and emotion, not on fact. The correlation is not between benign and behavioral characteristics, but on discrimination itself.

Sociologists, anthropologists, clergy, and society in general have not come to a consensus on whether homosexuality is a result of “nature” or “nurture.” Naturists pose the question, why would anyone want to choose a lifestyle where full civil rights are denied, and second class citizenry, harassment, discrimination and humiliation are the norm? Nurturists point to the basic laws of mankind and procreation as the reason why homosexuality is learned behavior. However, the circumstantial issues for the military surrounding both the Black and Canadian cases such as behavior, attitudes, and rhetoric on combat effectiveness, are the same. Consequently, it is valid to say there is a correlation between discrimination in all three models.

**Canadian Model:** Most Americans believe the United States has the best military in the world.⁶⁴ The perception that the Canadian military is not a robust military and only conducts peacekeeping operations introduces the argument that the Canadian military does not require the same high level of combat effectiveness as does the US military and, therefore, cannot support an accurate
experiential basis to learn from. However, the Canadian model provides eight years of experience with an open homosexual policy whose society, military values and institutions are very similar to the United States.

**Background Comparison**

Despite the fifty-year difference between the Black and Canadian models, the pre-policy controversy that surrounded both are strikingly similar. Before policy change, both US and Canadian public sentiment wanted to keep the status quo, and was against the change. In both models, senior military leadership was adamantly opposed to inclusion, citing breakdown of combat effectiveness, unit cohesion, morale, and discipline as its official incantations. Small unit leaders of both models expressed fears of increased crime, and soldiers expressed fears of proximity in the field, barracks, and showers. The pre-policy environment surrounding the current discussion on lifting the ban on lesbians and gays in the military is virtually identical to both the Black and Canadian models.

Both models unsuccessfully attempted to liberalize their exclusionary policies before adopting full inclusion policies. For example, in 1944, the US Navy and Air Force conducted racial integration experiments prior to E.O. 9881, and in 1988 Canada officially accepted lesbian and gay servicemembers, but with restrictions. It could be argued that the DADT policy, is also an interim policy.

**Establishing A Sense Of Urgency**

External and internal catalysts generated a sense of urgency in both models. President Truman took the initiative in advancing the civil rights of Americans who were denied opportunity and used the executive arm of
government for change. The Human Rights Court extended its judicial arm for change in the Canadian model. Internally, the need for manpower, generated by the Korean War for the US and by the CF senior leadership, generated change in the Black and Canadian models respectively.

**Creating the Guiding Coalition**

The leadership alliances for each model were on opposite ends of the performance spectrum. In the Black model, the consortium of different guiding coalitions at different levels in different theaters, working on different strategies, provided general confusion and chaos during the process. On the other hand, the clear support from the top-down through the chain of command provided a more controlled environment in the Canadian model.

**Developing a Strategy And Vision**

Neither model produced long-term direction by Kotter’s standards. The Black model used a presidential declaration as a guide for senior military leaders, however, the declaration did not describe what the social environs of the military should look like as an end result. The senior military leaders failed to produce their own vision to clarify the presidential declaration for such a significant change to the institution. Though Canada delivered a vision via a press release, it too fell short of the Kotter model. Although Canada’s vision delivery was quick, and its message clear, it was too broad, failing to depict a successful end state.

**Communicating The Change Vision**

Both models chose to have a publicity blackout on their respective plans. The black model refused to broadcast its intentions both externally to the
institution, as well as internally. The American public was unaware of the changes occurring first in Korea, then Europe, and many segments of the Army were ignorant of the fact that racial integration had even occurred. Guidance to commanders, if given, was not consistent, varying at different places and times. Conversely, the Canadian model introduced guiding mechanisms to inform the entire force of policy changes, from the senior leader to unit level. It also provided a mechanism for dialogue and feedback through its SHARP training program. To avoid criticism, the Canadians also chose to have a publicity blackout external to the military. All queries from the media and news agencies concerning the policy change was “censored” (and further discouraged) through the public affairs office.

**Empowering Broad-Based Action**

Leaders must have an understanding of the vision if they are to take ownership of a policy and make viable decisions. A clear direction provides focus for both developing a corresponding strategy and for implementing one. Both models empowered their key leaders differently, but the end results were the same. At the unit level, basic leadership application coupled with soldier sensibilities prevailed.

The Black model did not have a vision and its implementation was decentralized, executed by requesting various commands to submit their individual action plans. It was not until the 1960’s that the strategy for integration became centralized through the systemic drive to integrate the civilian communities surrounding the installations. The execution of flawed strategies did
not empower soldiers or small unit leaders, however, they still took custody of
their soldiers and, as Vance Coleman said “it just happened.”

The Canadian model had an achievable vision and it centralized its strategy
starting with education and training, thereby ensuring all service members were
empowered with the same knowledge. Execution of the strategy was
decentralized, and leaders were expected to solve situations at the lowest level
possible.

**Generating Short-Term Wins**

Although a subjective benchmark, both models considered combat
effectiveness (unit cohesion, morale and discipline) as a vital interest and an
immediate objective during their respective social changes. Combat
effectiveness did not decline in either model. Since the inception of both
models, there have been several wars and numerous conflicts. If it were
perceived that either model disabled young soldiers from fighting effectively,
restrictions would most probably have been reimposed. To date there have been
no formal discussions on resegregating the US military or permitting restrictions
on lesbians or gays in the Canadian military.

**Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change**

Despite the precarious visions, significant social changes occurred far
more rapidly than expected in both the Black and Canadian models. Racial
integration in the military provided a beacon for civil rights activists and the rest of
society from which to integrate large segments of America, starting with the
military’s help in transforming civilian societies surrounding military bases.
The introduction of partner benefits in the CF is also compelling Canadian civil society to advance its human rights agenda.

**Anchoring New Approaches In the Culture**

Social attitudes become significantly closer in egalitarian settings where there are shared experiences.68 Today, it is difficult to imagine a racially segregated military. The Army is the most successful racially integrated institution in American society. That does not negate the fact that blacks and whites still have disparate views of equal opportunity. Fifty years ago, the military hierarchy was concerned only with incidents of behavior such as crime or harassment. Now punishment is meted out in incidents of attitude such as racial slurs, jokes, or subtle favoritism. Racist behaviors and attitudes are not tolerated within the leadership of the military organization, and exhibiting either can end a career. The fact that racial remarks are rarely heard among Army NCO’s and officers even in all-white groups, reflects the strict adherence to this norm.69

The social climate experienced in the Black and Canadian models is virtually the same as that facing the US military now concerning acceptance of lesbians and gays. Concerns of decreasing combat effectiveness and senior military leadership opposition permeate all three models. The current environment, however, may be more conducive to change. The American public supports lesbian and gay servicemembers openly serving and the military is socially smarter, having forged through racial integration, the all-volunteer force, and gender integration. In addition, a neighboring military ally, similar to the US military in structure and values has successfully implemented an open
homosexual policy with little to no adverse effect. A table method comparison analysis is at Appendix A.

Whether in one or twenty years, trends indicate there will be a change to the status quo in regards to serving lesbian and gay soldiers. Whatever the case, it will take time and resources to plan for change, particularly if military planners have to start from pure cloth. The consequences of not having a proposed contingency plan could have detrimental effects, particularly in this scenario.

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

FINDINGS

Both Black and Canadian cases are universally considered a success. The integrated Army is the most successfully racially integrated institution in American society. The Canadian model is considered a success by the very fact that it was a “non-event.” While there are many successes to be gleaned from these models, there were also mistakes made and lessons learned.

- Neither model anticipated the change to policy, therefore the force was not informed or prepared.
- Senior military leadership determined the level of chaos or control that policy implementation had.
- Vision was important to each model’s military force.
- Both models required interim policies.
- The implementation plans focused on behavior change instead of attitude change.
- Small unit leaders were responsible for the success of the strategic plan.

The Army can and should develop a contingency plan in the event either the law banning homosexual conduct from military service is changed, or the DADT
policy is lifted or liberalized. The plan should use historical cases to provide an experiential basis for success. Though the Army historically waits until the last moment to develop its social plans, the senior leadership and their planners owe it to the men and women in uniform to have a prepared contingency plan geared for success. The two cases discussed herein provide an experiential basis for planners to capitalize on successes and learn from shortcomings.

The real challenge to formulating a ‘known lesbian and gay’ contingency plan in the event the ban is lifted lies in the military’s aversion to social change. Even today, terms like ‘social experimentation’ conjure feelings of resentment among its members. The US military, and in particular the Army, has a history of avoiding and then fighting social change. This distaste is rooted in fear and prevents military traditionalists from even entertaining the idea of planning for change, for fear that "if we plan for it, we'll have to do it."

The Army fears the loss of combat effectiveness due to the breakdown of unit cohesion, morale, and discipline if the ban were lifted. Army leaders fear anti-homosexual violence, and soldiers (mostly male) fear proximity to homosexuals. Others fear that homosexuals would band together and discriminate against heterosexuals. Some fear unwelcome sexual advances and some fear contracting AIDS. All of the fears mentioned (exchanging AIDS for venereal diseases) are identical to those expressed in pre-integrated WWII units by white military members. Lack of education and information inflame those fears. In addition, serving lesbian and gay soldiers fear intimidation, isolation, violence, and subtle retaliations such as loosing an assignment, promotion or receiving an
unfavorable rating on an efficiency report.\textsuperscript{71} However, the US military has the planning tools to overcome its fear of social change and prepare for the possibility of known lesbians and gays serving without secrecy in the future.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

According to the Department of the Army Command Policy Office, the Army does not officially have a strategy or action plan to put into effect if the military ban is lifted or the current policy liberalized.\textsuperscript{72} According to the Center for Studies on Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSM) or the SLDN, neither do the lesbian and gay communities. However, in formulating initiatives, the Army has several frameworks, models and blue prints to help formulate a plan. First, the Draft Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, provides a strategy framework composed of shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations. Second, a look at past national experiences with social change, coupled with the experience of foreign militaries that have planned for and implemented military cultural change, provides a baseline model for strategy considerations. Finally, the steps of a corporate business model for transformation provide an innovative and new way of preparing a contingency plan for the incorporation of known lesbians and gays into the military.
Figure 1. Known Lesbian and Gay Plan

The contingency plan would encompass the three phases of a campaign plan outlined in FM 3-0 (shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations). Shaping operations “create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation.” Decisive operations “directly achieve the mission of the higher headquarters,” and “... determine the outcome...” Sustaining operations “enable shaping and decisive operations by assuring freedom of action and continuity of operations.” Like most campaign plans, each operational phase would have a target and goal incorporated into the overall strategic target and goal. While the framework would be linear, the phases would often overlap. (See Figure 1).
The criterion for success in each phase would be the degree of adherence to steps of the Kotter model for large organizational change. Step completion allows forward movement to the next phase. (See Figures 2 through 4).

**SHAPING OPERATIONS**

**Target:** Inform the public (military and civilian)

**Goal:** Prepare the force

The more attention paid to shaping the environment and setting the conditions for success, the better the plan. The target of the shaping phase is to inform the public, both civilian and military of the forthcoming change. The goal
is to prepare the force through open dialogue to reduce distress and resistance. There is no timeline for this phase since the plan is predicated on a possible future event. Whether the event occurs in the next year or the next 50 years, the more prepared the force is, the less traumatic will be the event.

**Urgency:** The first step in the shaping phase is establishing a sense of urgency, usually accomplished through a catalyst. Realistically, there are three possible catalyst scenarios which could generate a sense of urgency: the Supreme Court could find the current law unconstitutional, the Congress could overturn the current law, or Congress could pass a new law. The likelihood of the military being its own catalyst in peacetime is extremely low, but war could cause a relaxation of the current DADT policy.74

Preparing the force should start at the top through educational dialogue at the senior military level. Examples include inserting recent editorial articles concerning lesbian and gay soldiers in the close-hold general officer (GO) electronic newsletter or as an agenda item at the CINC conferences. Senior level education in advance of reform would provide knowledgeable support from the top. Army leaders must be seen to support the change, not just pay lip service to a change imposed by an outside force.

**Coalition:** Kotter’s second step is creating the guiding coalition, a group with expertise, credibility, proven leadership, and positional power. An optimal guiding coalition would start at the highest civilian and military levels from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the CJCS and the Commanders-in-Chief, with active support from knowledgeable political figures including members of
Congress. Participation by known gay GO retirees, such as MG Coleman, could also provide credibility and legitimacy to transition efforts. Additional expertise could come from the directors of lesbian and gay military support organizations such as SLDN and the CSSM, and from representatives of the Canadian military.

On another level, each Service could provide its own guiding coalition. The Army could establish a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) that would meet regularly to discuss the issues and devise action where appropriate. GOSC agendas could include presentations by noted experts such as organizational behaviorists, sociologists, public affairs specialists, or members of the clergy to provide lectures in their areas of expertise. If the socially rigid and conservative GO cohort is educated on the issues, they are in a better position to formulate a well-thought out vision and strategy. The rest of the institution will follow their lead. The discussion must then trickle down to the rest of the senior military leadership to create the conditions that can support successful transformation.

It is in the senior leadership's best interest to draft a contingency plan during the shaping phase. Difficult social issues like this one can quickly become politicized and easily result in Congressional political groups dictating to the military how an implementation plan will occur. If the GO's already have a contingency plan, the likelihood for political interference decreases.

**Vision:** Kotter’s third step is the development of a vision and strategy. A function of the guiding coalition is to provide vision and strategy which are nested
to ensure leaders at all levels are working as one. For instance, top leaders create a sensible and appealing picture of the future and present the logic of how the vision can be achieved. Middle leaders create specific steps and timetables to implement the strategies and convert broad plans into specific financial projections and goals. Unit leaders execute and provide hands-on leadership.

Because the US military is a values-based organization, the vision must appeal to military cultural values. For example, in a recent statement regarding consideration of others, General Shinseki appealed to the military’s values of dignity, respect and trust: “When individual dignity and respect are violated, mutual trust and unit cohesion erode. Harassment of any kind violates individual dignity and tears at the fabric of this trust and the cohesion of our Army.”  

The long-range vision must move the Army from one state of being to another; from tolerance of known lesbians and gays serving in the military to acceptance. Anything less than acceptance would mean lesbian and gay soldiers would continue to live as second class citizens. The Army’s Public Affairs Office (PAO) in conjunction with the CSA speechwriters, must thread a clear, concise theme throughout the vision. Here are a couple possible vision statements:

"American is great today because of its people. The diversity of its people contributes to its enormous success and wealth. The United States Army is people - people from different ethnic groups, backgrounds and religious upbringing. Those people come from cities and hamlets across this great nation from sea to shining sea. They are America's finest sons and daughters and they are patriots. Whatever their background. Whatever their religious choice. Whatever their sexual orientation, they are first and foremost Americans. Americans who have volunteered to represent their country in defense of freedom and justice. The new Army Vision is one of acceptance, inclusion, and tolerance, not discrimination, exclusion, or indifference. To this end, we pledge a new effort to end discrimination in any form. We accept soldiers who are committed to the values of loyalty, dedication, respect, selfless service, integrity, and personal courage. These are the only standards by which soldiers are judged."
Or:

“It is our goal to remain the world’s dominant military power, headed by the world’s best leaders. We are successful due to all the men and women of our Service. Men and women, of all colors, ethnicity, religions. We are very proud of our status as the Nation’s leader in diversity and equal opportunity. In order to remain on top, we will continue our policy of inclusion and not exclusion. But there is more to do. Lesbian and Gay soldiers have been a part of, and contributors to, our Army’s history – but not without fear of retribution.

Our new policy is one of inclusion, tolerance, and acceptance not exclusion. All soldiers deserve dignity and respect, not abuse. Our vision is achievable. Virtually every modern army in the world recognizes and accepts lesbian and gay soldiers into their armies. Achieving this ambitious attitude will require us to not only take into our hearts, but into our minds – our army values. Dignity and respect. It will require all of us to grow. I sincerely believe that if we work together we can achieve change, and in this process create an environment of tolerance and acceptance. It is fundamental to the well being and success of the US Army to be free of abject discrimination. The Army is a place where all are accepted, as we continue to defend the constitution and the rights of all people. “

DECISIVE OPERATIONS

Target: Eradicate fear
Goal: Create a climate of respect
The acceptance of a ‘known lesbian and gay’ plan is decisive to the overall strategy of change. Success lies in what occurs at the unit level. The target of this phase is to eradicate the fear that manifests itself in violence and apprehension of proximity to homosexuals. Fear, as discussed in chapter one, is the root of complacency and resistance to change. Optimally the senior leadership, through information, dialogue, and education in the shaping phase, will have removed fear from its cohort group which will then skillfully lead the way for rest of the institution. It is important to provide clear command and legal policy and guidance, as well as implement a parallel PAO strategic plan.

**Communicating The Vision:** According to Kotter’s fourth step, the change must be quickly communicated throughout the organization. Human factors indicate that urgency levels drop when it becomes clear that quality program or cultural change efforts are going to take a long time. Communicating the change vision requires a PAO strategy, using different vehicles to repeatedly send the command message and elements of the vision. For example, the CSA is currently communicating his vision on Army transformation through civilian and military literature, interviews, and television. He rarely makes a speech without incorporating the Army’s transformation vision. Another way to communicate the vision is at educational institutions where leaders are being trained. Incorporating media “practice sessions” into the classroom and military exercises highlights the importance of effectively relaying polemic messages while attempting to convey an image of honesty and straightforwardness (particularly for those leaders who do not embrace the vision).
Communicating the vision at the unit level is the linchpin to success. Translating this vision at the unit level, where the highest levels of apprehension of violence and proximity exist, is important. At a minimum it should include a zero tolerance crime and harassment policy, a reiteration of the code of conduct, and a policy where all soldiers are treated the same. This last element would not provide for separate sleeping, eating or bathing facilities.

**Empowering Broad-Based Action:** Direction must be unequivocal from the top, and recourse for anyone experiencing discrimination must be clearly delineated. Leadership must make it absolutely clear that discrimination will not be tolerated under any circumstances. Soldiers should know their legal rights and where to find redress if those rights are violated. Unit commanders must be held responsible for a climate of tolerance within their units and must be swift to act if a soldier’s rights are violated. All soldiers should know the consequences if they harass or discriminate and punishment should be immediate and evenhanded.

**Generating short-term wins:** A decline in combat effectiveness is also the vital interest in this situation, as it was in the Black and Canadian models. Surveys monitoring crime and harassment statistics are easily implemented, however monitoring other effectiveness measurements could be difficult. Tracking promotion or retention, for example, would not be possible unless lesbian and gay soldiers disclosed their orientation. But there are other, more subjective short-term wins worth tracking. Climate surveys coupled with several other mechanisms could gauge progress. The PAO can track when debate on
the issue increases, decreases, or when it ceases to be debated in the news at all. The Army Chaplain Corps can gauge installation congregations. As the climate progresses to an environment of respect, the GOSC could be disbanded. The end result would find an environment where if a lesbian or gay soldier chooses can without fear of subtle retribution, feel safe to put a partner's photograph on his or her desk.

Figure 4. Sustaining Operations

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

Target: Erase institutional prejudice
Goal: Advance traditional American values of justice, equality, and freedom

Consolidating gains and producing more change: Climate surveys should continue to measure progress from tolerance to acceptance, or when verbal
harassment becomes the social deviation. Other institutions should also conduct climate surveys to gauge what effect the change may have on greater society. The attitudes of society in general toward the change, particularly those areas around military bases, should be measured. Political pundits should measure whether the activities of watchdog organizations, such as SLDN, decrease. Planners must also consider, from the very beginning, the issue of same-sex partner benefits, the natural progression to lifting the ban on homosexual conduct.

**Anchoring new approaches in the culture:** To institutionally change military culture, its constituents must believe that the new behaviors and attitudes have helped improve the performance of the group. Until new behaviors become rooted in social norms and shared values, they are always subject to regression as soon as watchdog mechanisms associated with the change (EO chain, chain of command etc.) become lethargic on the issue. Group success could include demonstrating the fiscal advantage of not discharging lesbian and gay soldiers, or the expansion of the recruiting pool. Unfortunately, the true validation of combat effectiveness with an open lesbian and gay policy is probably America’s next war. As Colin Powell was the epitome of the success of racial integration, ‘known lesbian and gay’ policy validation may require a modern day “Alexander the Great.”

**CONCLUSION**

Currently, the Army does not have a plan in the event the ban on homosexual conduct is lifted, even though trends indicate the cultural change will come.
Historically, the military has chosen to ignore the winds of change, and consequently, when it comes, is ill prepared to lead the soldiers expeditiously through cultural transformation. As so many senior leaders are quick to say, “the Army is soldiers,” yet we are hesitant to even dialogue on those issues that directly affect them. The Army today is no longer an authoritative dogmatic organization, but a participative, professional institution. The soldier of today, in the all-volunteer force, is older and smarter than the soldier of the past. What has not changed, though, is the critical importance of leadership. Leadership at the senior levels will need to step away from social constraints, take responsibility and provide the direction to shape the environment for the future and its impact on the Army. It is incumbent on Army leaders to initiate dialogue, to start a plan, and to ultimately lead the change. Leadership at the junior levels must help shape the soldier’s immediate environment and create a climate of respect and dignity for all soldiers. Leadership includes understanding the plight of lesbian and gay soldiers who currently work and live in an environment where the mantra of values, including integrity, is drummed everyday. Yet those soldiers are expected to lie, hide, and be someone they are not. Leaders must help soldiers transition from a climate where intolerance is the norm to a state where inclusion and acceptance is the norm. Only leadership can blast through the inertia of decades of intolerance. Only leadership can motivate the actions needed to alter behavior in any significant way. Only leadership can get change to stick by anchoring it in the very culture of an organization. Only leaders can take the first step in developing an action plan in the event the law is changed.
## APPENDIX A
Chapter Five Analysis Comparison

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<th>Kotter Model</th>
<th>Black Model</th>
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<td>• Strong top-down coalition</td>
<td>• Spoke with one voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a Vision/Strategy</td>
<td>• Decentralized</td>
<td>• Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicating vision/strategy change</td>
<td>• Publicity black out (internal and external)</td>
<td>• Publicity black out (only external)</td>
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<td>• ‘Surprise’ integration completion announcement</td>
<td>• SHARP training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Empower broad-based action</td>
<td>• Decentralized</td>
<td>• Decentralized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generate short-term wins</td>
<td>• Combat effectiveness</td>
<td>• Combat effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidate Gains</td>
<td>• Integration of surrounding communities</td>
<td>• Same-sex partner benefits</td>
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<td>Anchor new approaches</td>
<td>• Changed attitudes</td>
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APPENDIX B
Background on the Army and Social Change

Whether it wants the reputation or not, the military is the US standard for success in effecting major social programs. The civilian sector until recently did not have the leadership or understanding of large organizations to make any social transformations. The military, on the other hand, has a historical context of leadership and change in large organizations. From the Revolutionary war to World War II (WWII), the military has taken on social experimentation first out of need (expansion of the west), and later by assuming the moral high ground (assimilation of Negro soldiers). From the Revolutionary War to the Civil War, the small size of the Army and its general isolation from American society focused the military’s social action on economic programs to expand to the West. However, the assimilation of the Negro into the armed forces of the nation, albeit in a subservient role, provided the most significant social action during this early period. Between the Civil War and WWII no major social action evolved besides the late 1800’s commissioning of 700 Negro Infantry officers at the segregated officers training camp at Des Moines, Iowa.

Historians indicate the paradigm shift in truly important sociological programs in the military services began in WWII. Just before WWII, the US Army did something no Army in history had ever done before. Trained psychologists, sociologists and other experts were called in to conduct opinion research studies (over 300 reports) of the morale problems of soldiers assigned to all types of units. It was one of the largest social sciences projects in history. For the first
time on a large scale, an attempt was made to direct human behavior on the basis of scientific findings. Integration of blacks is considered by many to be one of the most significant social developments in American society. In the short span of 20 years, the military establishment had been transformed from a rigidly segregated institution into one that some view as the champion of racial equality.

After WWII, the Army changed its patterns of military authority. The Army moved from an authoritarian system of control based on domination (physical threats, and negative sanctions) to a system based upon the “techniques of manipulation” (group persuasion and positive incentives). The army also started to use attitude and opinion polls as a tool of management after a 1955 Gallup poll survey of civilian attitudes toward the military. The poll results showed the military had low prestige and that civilians regarded military service as an onerous obligation. The military also emerged as the largest educational system in the country.

Due to the large numbers of military personnel, the changing patterns of military authority, and the closer identity of the military with the civilian community, a new social awareness evolved after WWII which continues to have a profound effect on American society.
1 Department of the Army Office of Army Command Policy, November 07, 2000 email exchange between author and LTC Baugh.

2 The Department of Defense DADT policy has expanded to include “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass”. In November 1992, President-elect Clinton (D) told Americans he planned to lift the military’s fifty year ban on homosexuals. However, soon after taking office in 1993, Clinton faced senior military leaders and congressional opposition to lifting the ban. For the next six months, debate ensued about the military’s ban on lesbians and gays. In July 1993, a compromise policy was struck. The compromise, known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” allowed lesbians and gays to serve in the military as long as they did not proclaim their homosexuality or engage in homosexual conduct. Under the policy, military commanders would not try to find out the sexual orientation of personnel, and lesbian and gay personnel would not disclose their sexual orientation. The policy marked a change from past practice in that simply being homosexual was no longer a disqualifier for military service.

3 The term homosexual implies same-sex conduct. The terms "lesbian and gay" (male) describe a person who identifies with a lifestyle. “Open” lesbian or gay implies a declaration of lifestyle choice, commonly known as “coming out.” The term “known” implies an understanding of lifestyle choice without declaration. Therefore to be inclusive and properly reflect the wishes of currently serving lesbian and gay soldiers (per Servicemen’s Legal Defense Network or SLDN), the term “known lesbian and gay” will be used when referring to a contingency plan.

4 The strongest level of support for consenting lesbian and gay relations came in 1987, when fifty-five percent of Americans approved. Gallop Organization Poll releases, April 7, 1999.

5 Based on the noted 1956 Kinsey Study, a conservative, two to six percent of the American population is homosexual. It is reasonable to believe that there is the same representation within the military. Based on the 480,000 active duty population, there may be approximately 9,600 to 28,800 lesbian and gay soldiers currently serving.


8 CBS Radio News Interview April 2000.

9 In the summer of 1999, PFC Winchell was beaten to death with a baseball bat, allegedly because he was gay.


11 SLDN’s Sixth Annual DADT Report.

12 Ibid.


14 SLDN Sixth Annual Report.

15 Ibid., 9. GAO 1993 dollars. This figure represents costs of retraining replacements alone and does not include the significant expense of investigations and separations. Senator Ted Kennedy used the figure “nearly half a billion dollars” to discharge 16,000 lesbian and gay soldiers over a twelve year period between 1981 and 1993. (March 31, 1993 Capitol Hill Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the role of cohesion in developing combat effectiveness in relation to a ban on homosexuals in military).

18 RAND Report, pg. 183 (Research Branch, Special Service Division, United States Army, Attitudes of the Negro Soldier, cited in Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. 305).
19 Ibid., 184. (The Gallup Organization: Survey of 3000 Adults Based on Personal Interview, June 1948).
21 The term Air Force is used throughout, but also includes the Army Air Corps and Army Air Service, when referring prior to 1947. The Air Force was not established until the National Security Act of 1947.
22 Incidents such as threats of mass resignations by military officers and General Omar Bradley warning a Congressional Committee that complete integration might seriously affect morale, and thus affect battle efficiency, were a few events designed to resist the oncoming change.
23 Named after the Committee Chair, the US Solicitor General Charles H. Fahy.
24 Paragraph three of E.O. 9881.
25 Promises included: Abolish quotas for units and schools, develop a new promotion system based on competition without regard to race, establish a board of army officers to review integration policies; and retain segregated units but give qualified Blacks the opportunity to gain skills previously unattainable and assign Blacks who had acquired skills to positions where their specialties might be applied in a manner useful to the military.
26 Named after its Chair, LTG Stephen J. Chamberlin.
27 Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, 44.
28 Martha S. Putney, When the Nation was in Need: Blacks in the Women's Army Corps During World War II. New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1992, pg.143.
29 Major General (Retired) Vance Coleman enlisted in a segregated Army in the later 1940's. He was a Field Artillery Officer, and the second black officer assigned to a newly integrated Artillery unit at the start of the Korean War. He is currently on the talk circuit for anti-discrimination practices in the Armed Forces. He has been interviewed by 60 minutes and other news shows and is thinking of writing a book on his experiences in the US Army.
30 The challenge Ridgeway faced was a severe shortage of replacements for depleted white units while accumulating a surplus of black replacements. On May 14, 1951 Ridgeway forced the issue of integration by formally requesting authority to abolish segregation in his command, and was approved on July 01. However, so pressing was his need that even before permission was received from Washington, integration had already begun on the battlefield.
31 Morris MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, pg. 312. The first paragraph of E.O. 9981 signed by Harry S. Truman on 26 July 1948.
32 The largest of the fourteen all-Black units in the Far East Command (FECOM).
33 Morris MacGregor, pg. 437.
34 Telephonic interview between the author and MG (retired) Vance Coleman, November 13, 2000.
35 The Army saw no need for publicizing the integration program. Far from precluding adverse reaction, releasing special publicity would invite criticism.
36 Morris MacGregor, pg. 9. “The public information aspect of the proposed integration program was a very important consideration. Properly presented, both to the public and Negro soldiers, the discontinuance of Negro combat units would be accepted as a logical, reasonable action. However, if an incorrect impression of the motive behind this action was imparted, the Department of the Army might be subjected to criticism and congressional pressure. Consequently, before implementation of the integration plan the Public Information Division was to prepare a press release announcing the change in policy. In addition the Troop Information and Education Division was to prepare an orientation lecture to be given to troops on the same subject.”
37 Ibid., 379.
38 Ibid., 332.
Ibid., 441-444. From the Operations Research Office (ORO) which performed qualitative and quantitative analyses of strategy, tactics, and materiel.

‘Off-limits sanctions’ meant using economic sanctions (prohibiting military members from conducting business there) against recalcitrant businessmen.

GAO Report to the honorable John W. Warner on Homosexuals in the military: policies and practices of foreign countries.

The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities (CSSM), Report on Effects of the 1992 Lifting of Restrictions on Gay and Lesbian Service in the Canadian Forces: Appraising the Evidence. By Aaron Belkin and Jason McNichol, Director, CSSM and Doctoral Candidate respectively. University of California Santa Barbara. Accessed September 2000; available from http://gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/canada_pub.htm; Internet. Hereafter referred to as CSSM Study. CSSM is an academic research center that promotes the interdisciplinary analysis of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered and other marginalized sexual identities in the armed forces by sponsoring conferences, fellowships and research.

Women now serve in combat arms units in combat arms roles.

Major Doug Claggett, Student, School of Advanced Military Studies. Interview by author, 10 November 2000, Leavenworth. Interview notes.

Canadian Forces recruiters would not knowingly enroll homosexuals. If servicemen or women were discovered or announced themselves to be gay, they would be asked to leave, but they would not be dismissed. Those who chose to stay would not be eligible for training courses, security clearances, transfers, promotions or reenlistment. “Administrative action might be taken to release a member of the Canadian forces who acknowledges that he or she is a homosexual and the member concerned does not object to being released. If the member did not agree to be release he or she would be retained with career restrictions which, …would have meant [he or] she was ineligible for promotion, for conversion of [his or] her existing terms of service, for posting outside the geographic area, for transfer to the reserve force or for any further qualification courses or training except that required to carry out restricted employment”

The Michelle Douglas case was probably the most notable case and received wide publicity and public sympathy. Douglas was an Air Command Lieutenant with an exemplary service record who had been charged with lesbianism, investigated, and had her security clearance revoked (with additional career restrictions).

A low profile was kept on the implementation process and the press was required to submit all questions relating to the policy to the public affairs office.

SHARP is similar to the US Army Consideration of Others program.

In all studies of countries where there is an open homosexual policy, very few gays have ‘come out of the closet.’ According to SLDN, there is still an environment of hostility, and therefore lesbian and gay soldiers will not come out unless it is in an environment of safety. In addition, lesbian and gay persons “come out” in stages over long periods of time due to the stigma still associated with a homosexual act. Stages are: personal acceptance, disclosure to lesbian or gay community, disclosure to trusted straight or heterosexuals of a close social network, and finally, the family or fellow lesbian and gay or straight colleagues at work.

Female service members were generally more accepting than males of the sexual orientation policy, and senior officers were overall the most dissatisfied (37.5%), and junior NCO’s were the least dissatisfied (25.7%).

To date, the CF has still not formally evaluated the effects of the full removal of the ban on lesbian and gay service in 1992. CF officials felt that making any distinction between homosexual
and heterosexual soldiers, even for the purposes of data collection, would itself be a violation of the CF policy of treating everyone equally without regard to sexual orientation. Therefore, despite the lack of formal analysis conducted by the CF, additional resources exist that shed light on longer-term consequences of the full lifting of the ban.

57 CSSM Study.

58 Teasing jokes and remarks remains the most common form of sexual harassment, and actual or attempted rape or sexual assault is the least common type of sexual harassment.

59 Same sex partners would be considered dependents for the purpose of benefits if: “…for a continuous period of at least one year, a member has lived with a person of the same sex in a homosexual or lesbian relationship, publicly represented that person as his/her life partner and continues to live with that person as his/her life partner.”

60 Women servicemembers made all of the requests.

61 CSSM Study.


63 Literature suggests the business community is going through a global revolution and the military through an information and technology revolution.


65 This situation is almost identical, with small changes. The current attitude is more acceptance oriented with 83%, as opposed to the 88%, and 68% Black and Canadian cases respectively.

66 DADT is considered a failure by reputable studies, and many suggest that DADT cannot stay status quo, therefore, another policy/law is on the horizon.

67 GAO Report offers insight into twenty-three countries that have various homosexuality inclusion programs, to include countries with more combat missions (such as Israel) have all shown no affect of declining combat effectiveness.


69 Charles Moskos and John Butler, pg. 133.

70 RAND Survey.

71 Interview with Michelle Benecke, Director, SLDN.

72 Department of the Army Command Policy Office and Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Office.


75 Potential congressional coalition membership. Senate: Ted Kennedy, Jack Reed, Barbara Boxer, and Diane Feinstein. House: Jerry Jadler, Barney Frank, and Lynn Rivers to name a few.

76 Current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, 21 July 2000.

77 Examples include, stressing how all members of the military are the same: human beings, sworn to support and defend the US constitution, or stressing military institutional values which stress dignity and respect toward a common mission.

78 Written by LTC Richard Matthews, Military Intelligence Officer, currently serving in Washington DC as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, (DCSOPS) speechwriter.

79 John Kotter Leading Change.
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