RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS: A FLAWED CONCEPT

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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### Abstract
This paper examines serious weaknesses with U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept that, unless modified, will adversely affect its chances for successful application. Overall, RDO provides a deceptively simple, single correct answer to the complex issue of responding to small-scale contingencies. That single correct answer is: the employment of physical coercion, through integrated joint tactical actions, by a standing joint headquarters to rapidly achieve decisive outcomes. In addition to a flawed overall notion, the basic elements of RDO are faulty. This paper focuses on the mismatch between the key elements of RDO: coercion, rapidity, and decisiveness. It will show that military outcomes are unlikely to be rapid or decisive, even when coerced. The characteristics of military operations, combined with the complexities of social and human behavior, make the nature of war too complicated to support achieving rapid results. In addition, military success on the battlefield is not sufficient for ultimate victory. Military operations can only bring the nation to a point short of victory. At that point, the military must have created the conditions that allow the other elements of power to finish the job. This paper recommends that, instead of seeking more and lower military integration, future Integrating Concepts should provide the means to synthesize the actions of all players involved in the transition from battlefield success to a lasting peace. The U.S. knows how to win on the battlefield and continued emphasis on that area will not significantly enhance national security.
Abstract

RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS: A FLAWED CONCEPT

This paper examines serious weaknesses with U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept that, unless modified, will adversely affect its chances for successful application. Overall, RDO provides a deceptively simple, single correct answer to the complex issue of responding to small-scale contingencies. That single correct answer is: the employment of physical coercion, through integrated joint tactical actions, by a standing joint headquarters to rapidly achieve decisive outcomes.

In addition to a flawed overall notion, the basic elements of RDO are faulty. This paper focuses on the mismatch between the key elements of RDO: coercion, rapidity, and decisiveness. It will show that military outcomes are unlikely to be rapid or decisive, even when coerced. The characteristics of military operations, combined with the complexities of social and human behavior, make the nature of war too complicated to support achieving rapid results. In addition, military success on the battlefield is not sufficient for ultimate victory. Military operations can only bring the nation to a point short of victory. At that point, the military must have created the conditions that allow the other elements of power to finish the job.

This paper recommends that, instead of seeking more and lower military integration, future Integrating Concepts should provide the means to synthesize the actions of all players involved in the
transition from battlefield success to a lasting peace. The U.S. knows how to win on the battlefield and continued emphasis on that area will not significantly enhance national security.
Introduction. At first glance, Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) Rapid Decisive Operations concept appears to be an excellent product of USACOM’s focus “on high-priority tasks… in the April 99 Defense Planning Guidance and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Instructions on Joint Experimentation.” Combining lessons from the past with reengineered functional areas, RDO seems to represent a truly visionary “Integrating Concept” that addresses “the biggest national challenge today and into the future…a rapid and decisive response.”

However, closer study reveals significant weaknesses with the concept that, unless modified, will adversely affect its chances for successful application. Overall, RDO represents a deceptively simple answer to a complex issue. It is offered as the single correct method to respond to Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) throughout the world. That single correct answer is: the employment of physical coercion, through integrated joint tactical actions, by a standing joint headquarters will rapidly achieve decisive outcomes. This risks what Dr. Milan Vego, professor of operations at the Naval War College, described as one of German General Alfred von Schlieffen’s fatal errors, “fixation on a single solution to a complex strategic problem.” It also risks reduced freedom of action and more centralized execution. Certainly, a commander can adapt a single concept and apply it flexibly in response to different situations. However, there are limits to the amount of variation that each situation can have before an alternative method is required. When discussing strategic monism, Professor Mackubin Owens, professor of strategy and national security affairs at the Naval War College, pointed out the inability of the Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy to respond across the spectrum of conflict.

In addition to a flawed overall notion, the basic elements of RDO are faulty. First, RDO proposes to transform “joint operations from today’s operational level synchronization of the dimensional campaigns of service components to a coherently joint campaign that integrates joint tactical
action across service lines.” This could lead to the unintended consequence that F.G. Hoffman, a retired Marine LTC and historian, described as an increased “centralization of authority, power, and defense resources” that would reduce any “real chance for operational innovation and strategic adaptability.”

Second, RDO seeks not only to rapidly apply force, but also to rapidly achieve decisive outcomes. Two distinguished scholars have written books that dispute the ability of military forces to achieve such results. In The Art of War in the Western World, Professor Archer Jones, a military historian for over forty-five years, argued that military action rarely accomplished quick results. In The Age of Battles, Professor Russell Weigley, a military historian for over forty years, felt that if war had not been decisive in the “age of battles” from 1631 to 1815, then it could never be. Finally, RDO requires the use of physical coercion. In his book on coercion, Bombing to Win, Robert A. Pape concluded, “requirements for successful coercion are very high. Even when coercion succeeds, moreover, it rarely gains very much.”

Based on direction from the national level, JFCOM will play a major role in determining future operational concepts, force structure, and military capabilities. JFCOM was provided with wide ranging responsibilities and authority by the May 1998 Secretary of Defense Charter for Joint Experimentation; the Defense Planning Guidance Update: 2002-2007; and CJCS Guidance. As a result, JFCOM is the chief advocate for jointness, the DOD Executive Agent for Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, and is expected to play an increased role in the joint requirements process. To meet these responsibilities, JFCOM is expected to “create and refine future warfighting concepts and integrate Service efforts in support of JV 2020,…play a key role in the DOD Transformation Strategy,… (and) synchronize DOD’s joint experimentation efforts.”
From this position of influence, JFCOM has already publicly assessed that RDO will play a preeminent role in joint experimentation and in transformation programs throughout DOD. In the 1 December 2000 Joint Experimentation Annual Report to Congress, JFCOM described RDO as “the centerpiece of the joint experimentation effort,” and “the important construct, … (and) lynchpin… (to) help define the joint operational context relevant to the major service transformation activities.”

The following excerpts from JFCOM’s draft Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2001 (CPLAN 01) reinforce the significance placed on the concept:

“U.S. Joint Forces Command’s efforts in FY01 and beyond emphasize continued development and refinement of any experimentation with Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) as the integrating concept enabling a fundamentally new approach to joint and combined operations in the 21st Century.”

“The area identified by U.S. Joint Forces Command as the most fertile ground for DOTLMPF recommendations is that of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO).”

Given JFCOM’s influence, RDO’s preeminent role, and the flaws identified above, it is necessary to fully explore the weaknesses with RDO. Although four critical flaws with the RDO concept have been identified, it is beyond the scope of this effort to discuss all four. Therefore, this paper will examine the inconsistent logic of a concept that contains the elements of coercion, rapidity, and decisiveness. It will show that military outcomes are unlikely to be rapid or decisive, even when coerced. To do this, conclusions from noted historians will be provided. These noted academics argue that the historical record shows that achieving strategic goals requires a series of military actions executed over time. Then, even if these actions are successful, there is no guarantee that battlefield victories will accomplish policy goals. Based on current trends, there is no reason to expect that to change.
After discussing the mismatch, two counter arguments will be offered. First, the security environment and national level taskings require JFCOM to develop a concept that can rapidly achieve decisive outcomes. Second, the information revolution, combined with continually improving precision guided munitions, has the potential to render past lessons irrelevant. Finally, the paper will conclude by recommending that future Integrating Concepts provide ways to integrate key players’ actions that translate battlefield victories into the achievement of policy goals.

**Rapid Decisive Operations Concept.** Prior to examining the flaws with pursuing physically coerced rapid, decisive outcomes, it is necessary to briefly define and discuss RDO. Based on input from many sources, JFCOM has identified two types of concepts: Integrating Concepts and Functional Concepts.\(^{21}\) An Integrating Concept provides “operational context for supporting Functional Concepts.”\(^ {22}\) RDO is the only Integrating Concept that JFCOM has developed to date. A Functional Concept “amplifies a specific function…or describes how to employ a system or conduct a task.”\(^ {23}\) In conjunction with combatant commands, the Services, and DOD agencies, JFCOM has developed the RDO Integrating Concept supported by eight Functional Concepts.\(^ {24}\)

In its Annual Report to Congress, JFCOM defined Rapid Decisive Operations as a concept:

> “to achieve rapid victory by attacking the coherence of the enemy’s ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in timely and direct effects-based operations. It employs our asymmetric advantages in the knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against his critical functions to create maximum shock defeating his ability to fight.”\(^ {25}\)

The current JFCOM position is that in order to rapidly achieve decisive results, the operational level of war needs to be more joint.\(^ {26}\) In order to quickly synchronize joint tactical actions, a joint standing headquarters in each theater will be necessary to meet required levels of training proficiency and develop necessary tools. Under the previous method, Service-pure staffs were the basis for JTF
headquarters that deconflicted service actions. In the RDO concept, the standing JTF headquarters would “conduct highly interoperable joint tactical action that can achieve higher levels of integration between precision engagement and maneuver capabilities.”

On the surface, therefore, RDO appears to be a highly competent development that will allow a Joint Force Commander to more effectively integrate operational functions and tactical actions. It includes all the areas necessary for success and is comprised of the latest elements and ideas. Finally, it seems to downplay the role of technology by recognizing that a comprehensive concept needs to provide for the integration of changes in DOTLMPF (doctrine, organization, training, leadership, material, personnel, and facilities).

**Rapidly Achieved Decisive Outcomes.** However, as previously discussed, RDO is fatally flawed because its key elements are faulty. With RDO, military thought has once again fallen prey to a form of the age old lure of “decisive battle” producing decisive strategic results. However, the search for mythical decisive outcomes is a throwback to Napoleon and Mahan that fails to acknowledge how rarely they have been achieved or how often they have had unintended consequences.

During the period 1631-1815, referred to by Russell Weigley as the “age of battles,” it has been accepted that this was a time when tactical action could generally achieve decisive results. However, a closer look revealed that there was a lot less decisiveness than was usually thought. Weigley wrote,

> “Yet the age of battles nevertheless proved to be an age of prolonged, indecisive wars, wars sufficiently interminable that again and again the toll in lives, not to mention the costs in material resources, rose grotesquely out of proportion to anything their authors could hope to gain from them.”

> “In fact, war in the age of battles was redeemed by no appreciable greater capacity to produce decisive results at a not-exorbitant cost than in the more recent era or in any other age.”
Weigley saw the pursuit of decisive battle as the professional officer’s way to minimize the costs of war and balance cost benefit ratios. At times, the officer’s pursuit seemed to be rewarded by a rapidly obtained victory that was arguably decisive. However, the effects of rapid results were almost always short lived. War was an interactive affair in which enemies learned from past mistakes, and came back to fight again. Referring to the battles of Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, Williamson Murray observed that “the first victim of the Napoleonic legend of decisive victory was Napoleon himself.” The other nations of Europe embraced the successful characteristics of the French way of war, united, and then continued to absorb defeats by Napoleon until they, in turn, defeated him. In two other examples, Murray concluded, “Just as Israel’s stunning success in 1967 turned to dust in the blood bath of 1973, so too did Saddam Hussein’s launching of Iraqi armies in 1980 result in needless slaughter—and decide nothing.” In addition, in his examination of western warfare from the early Greeks through the mid-1980’s, Archer Jones felt that the impact of tactics, strategy, and logistics alone were sufficient to restrict the ability to achieve an early military decision. There were just too many different factors affecting “the outcome of a battle, campaign, or series of campaigns that rarely can all favor a quick result.” Then, if these purely military elements were combined with the social and human aspects of war, the possibilities for quick results were further decreased. In his article, “When Are Wars Decisive?,” Sir Michael Howard recounted that Confederate, German, and Japanese efforts to achieve rapid decisions resulted in protracted defeats. At the outset, each believed that it could achieve quick victories that would convince their adversaries that continued conflict was futile or too costly. In each case, however, their opponent refused to succumb to early defeats and displayed unexpected conviction.
In a more recent example, Operation Allied Force supports the previous conclusions. In 1999, to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO political leaders felt that they could achieve their objectives “after a few days of light bombing.” However, Milosevic failed to react as predicted and the operation lasted seventy-eight days. By the end, the prospect of employing the previously ruled out ground option had become a distinct possibility. The view that air power offered a cheap, easy way to solve a complex problem came dangerously close to creating a failed policy.

Coercion. Military operations, in general, and RDO, specifically, require coercion. As discussed in JFCOM’s annual report to Congress, once deterrence has failed and “physical coercion is necessary,” joint forces will apply RDO to accomplish U.S. objectives. Also, in their CPLAN 01 (Draft), JFCOM wrote that “concept development and experimentation programs will continue to develop the integrating concept of RDO to achieve the national aims of a brief, powerful, and effective coercive campaign.”

An examination of coercion reveals further insights concerning the inability of military operations to produce quick or decisive results. In his study of coercion, Bombing to Win, Robert A. Pape evaluated thirty-two military cases from 1917 to 1991. He examined five of these cases in detail: Japan 1944-1945, Korea 1950-1953, Vietnam 1965-1972, Iraq 1991, and Germany 1942-1945. As a result of his study, Pape made several conclusions regarding the use of coercion. First, he felt that the key to coercion was providing the adversary with a credible threat of military defeat that would cause him to doubt his own strategies and plans. He also wrote that coercion was not “defined by the intentions, or even behavior, of the coercer, but by the nature of the decisions faced by potential target states.” Although the coercer certainly played a major role by taking necessary, sometimes overwhelming, actions, “the success or failure of coercion rest(s) in the decision of the target state.”
Therein lies the beginning of the difficulties with coercion and the reason it takes time. The target-state must determine costs and benefits, compare values of costs and benefits, and then make decisions. None of these tasks is easy under the most favorable conditions. Their difficulty is significantly magnified when attempted during crisis or war. Nations must sift through the complexities described by Archer Jones, the fog and friction described by Clausewitz, and domestic issues defined by their own unique situations. Finally, the target state’s task is further complicated by the fact that the quality of information is always hard to determine.

Pape found that, as a result, nations did a poor job of assessing costs and benefits. He noted a tendency by states and militaries in serious conflict to control information and suppress criticism. In addition, governments showed a greater resilience to hold out longer than societies. One reason was an unwillingness to abandon sunk costs. Another was the desire to avoid appearing weak and lose prestige in the international community. Finally, governments could suffer domestic setbacks, such as removal from power, by giving in to coercion.

In addition, Pape found that coercive actions did not always have the intended effects. One reason was that coercer states may have employed the wrong means or identified the wrong objectives to achieve the desired outcome. Even if the coercer was successful with his plan, the adversary state could take defensive measures to minimize the impacts of coercive actions. Sometimes, it had excess capability to absorb losses. In other cases, it could replace losses. Also, it could divert resources from low priority efforts to higher priority ones.

Although he felt that governments saw military coercion as a “quick, cheap solution,” Pape found the opposite to be true. “The bottom line, then, is that coercion is extremely hard. Success in
conventional coercion can be attained only if the coercer is fully prepared to impose its demands by force and usually only after fighting a long way towards a military decision."\textsuperscript{45}

The Japanese case from 1944-1945 provides an excellent example of why developing a successful coercive strategy is so difficult. Even after years of study, it is not clear which method of attack was most responsible for Japan’s decision to surrender. Contrary to generally accepted views, there is a credible argument that air power, including the dropping of two atomic bombs, had little to do with it.\textsuperscript{46} Submarine warfare destroyed sufficient Japanese shipping to significantly reduce the import of raw materials. This had the effect of seriously diminishing Japan’s industrial capacity before the U.S. had the capability to conduct effective bombing. As a result, bombing destroyed factories that either had little capacity or produced defective products.

There is also evidence that Japan’s inability to win on the ground was the decisive factor in the timing of the decision to surrender. In June 1945, the Emperor ordered studies of Japan’s ability to repel an invasion of the homeland. In its report, the Army concluded that resistance would be futile. Combined with this realization, Pape argued that Russia’s successful 8 August attack in Manchuria changed the equation and became the proximate cause for surrender, not the dropping of the atomic bombs. It took the prospect of future defeat, combined with an actual defeat of Japan’s ground forces, to convince the Army to accede to the Emperor’s wishes. Even after fifty-six years of study, we are not sure if land, air, or sea operations contributed most to the Japanese decision to surrender prior to an invasion. However, we can safely say that combined, long term actions by all three services produced the necessary results.

**Counter Arguments.** Advocates of RDO will point to the security environment and threat, now and in the future, and conclude that the U.S. has a requirement to develop a concept that will
rapidly produce decisive outcomes. Overall, the U.S. will maintain global responsibilities but with a regional focus. Achieving security objectives will still require the U.S. military to help shape the environment and respond throughout the spectrum of conflict. Based on lessons from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, adversaries are expected to employ asymmetric access denial strategies to prevent the build up of U.S. combat power. Finally, taking advantage of the information revolution, adversaries will develop improved capabilities “whereby small, previously isolated groups can communicate, link up, and conduct coordinated joint actions as never before.”

Success in this environment and against these threats will require an “increasing reliance on an expeditionary military capability” and speed. U.S. forces will need to act quickly, win decisively, and be prepared to immediately deploy to another crisis. Therefore, JFCOM has no option, except to develop concepts that must achieve what was unlikely in the past and that run counter to historical precedent.

However, while developing answers to national security issues, the U.S. military has a responsibility to realistically assess what is possible. It must render advice that it alone is uniquely qualified to provide: limitations of military action. The failure to do this has had fatal consequences in the past.

Based on the security environment and threat after unification in 1870, the Germans determined that they had a requirement for a specific capability: rapid achievement of decisive victory on one front in order to facilitate operations on another. Three successive chiefs of the German general staff, Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), Alfred von Schlieffen, and Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder’s nephew), loyally and conscientiously developed concepts and war plans to meet the requirement. The key concept in these plans was the rapid envelopment and decisive defeat of forces on the first front. This outcome
was necessary to allow the transfer forces to the second front before the adversary could adequately react.

In his article, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Gunther Rothenberg questioned whether the Moltkes and Schlieffen acted in the best interests of Germany with their dedicated pursuit of a military solution to the strategic problem. Rothenberg felt that changes in the material and social dimensions of strategy had significantly altered the way wars were fought. “Instead, the technologically determined impossibility of a rapid victory caused war to be increasingly dominated by such forces as national morale, social stability, and economic resources.” Although each general understood the extreme difficulty of achieving the military conditions necessary for success in a two front war, they failed to change the basic concept or make political leaders understand the extent of the risks involved.

In Rothenberg’s view, military leaders have a responsibility to identify limitations of military action and inform policy makers:

“…the German general staff would have served its nation better had it acknowledged after 1894 that the situation no longer could be solved by military means and that diplomacy would have to find at least a partial remedy for the mounting strategic dilemma.”

Given the weaknesses with RDO, there is a strong possibility that the U.S. military finds itself in just such a position. To meet national security needs and respond to taskings, the military is being asked to accomplish what has historically been highly improbable.

However, RDO advocates will say that changes in technology have made rapid, decisive outcomes possible, regardless of the lessons of history. They will point to improved precision guided munitions and the information revolution. Improved precision allows the increased destruction of
military targets with fewer platforms, less risk, and reduced collateral damage. The information revolution allows the U.S. to break through the fog of war and minimize friction. There is a group of experienced, senior military leaders who have proposed that the nature of war is changing and that commanders of the future will have “near perfect situational awareness” and know in real time where friendly and enemy forces are located.\textsuperscript{51}

However, in the end, these improvements will not lead to rapid and decisive outcomes. First, our adversaries will act to counter our technological superiority. They could do this in one of two ways. Using asymmetric methods, they could avoid our strengths and attack us indirectly. Additionally, since much of the new information is inexpensive and readily available, they will have access to it. With the technology, they could develop counter measures and directly challenge our superiority.

Second, Archer Jones argued the concept of the diminishing returns of technology.\textsuperscript{52} The improvements in technology earlier in the century represented a relatively greater impact on capabilities than current innovations. For instance, advancing from the horse to the tank, armored vehicle, and motor truck represented a relatively greater increase in capability than the design improvements that have since been implemented on these items. Also, advancing from lighter than air vehicles to the airplane was, quantitatively, a much greater jump than current incremental improvements to existing airframes. Finally, communications advances of the past had vastly greater impacts than those of today. For instance, the time to achieve intercontinental communications was reduced from months to days to hours to seconds prior to the invention of the personal computer. Current improvements to the computer and communications are small steps when compared to the leaps of the past.

Third, no matter how good the technology is and even if it can overcome diminishing returns, it cannot overcome friction or the fog of war. Despite claims to the contrary, no one has demonstrated
evidence of a solution to overcome these ever present realities. Therefore, we must allow for their effects. Although Clausewitz gets all the press for his views on friction, Thucydides also wrote on the subject. Williamson Murray wrote, “In Thucydides’ account change, ambiguity, fog, all the friction that Clausewitz lays out and more, dominate the landscape…” The employment of precision guided munitions is still affected by inaccurate targeting, weather and battlefield obscuration, and 1940’s technology air defense weapons. During Operation Allied Force, this was evidenced by the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, the downing of two U.S. aircraft, and the mistaken attacks on civilians.

The Future. The exploration of the mismatch between coercion, rapidity, and decisiveness has highlighted recurring themes. First, military operations have often been viewed as quick, easy, simple solutions to intricate, complex problems. However, the promise has rarely been realized and has often led to disastrous results. Second, military prowess has seldom determined ultimate victory. In fact, history is filled with examples of nations that won all the battles but lost the war: the U.S. in Vietnam, Hannibal during Second Punic War, and Napoleon in the early 1800’s. Third, the key to achieving policy goals is understanding the relationship between military activity and political outcomes. However, developing an understanding is not something that is tangible, quantifiable, or easily articulated.

These recurring themes should serve as the basis for the development of future Integrating Concepts. The first two emphasize what an integrating concept cannot provide and, therefore, should not attempt to deliver. Yet, they are the substance of RDO. The terms rapid and quick should not be associated with achieving outcomes, results, or victory. They should only be used to modify terms such as deploy, plan, employ, and maneuver. If the military presents options promising rapid achievement of objectives, then it has failed in its responsibility to provide judicious, expert advice. The amount of time necessary to accomplish policy goals cannot be predicted with any reasonable certainty. Therefore,
entry into a conflict should not be contingent upon short duration operations, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. The risks are too high.

In addition, decisive outcomes should only be expected after long term, synchronized employment of necessary capabilities. The concept must highlight that military action can only bring the nation to a point short of victory. Once the military has reached that point by creating the necessary conditions, agencies that exercise the remaining elements of national power must finish the job.

Sir Michael Howard’s analysis of the characteristics of decisive victory offers keen insights into this problem. First, referring to Professor Brian Bond’s study, The Pursuit of Victory, Howard highlighted one of Bond’s conclusions. Bond observed that the translation of success on the battlefield to victory required: “firm realistic statecraft with specific aims, and the willingness of the vanquished to accept the verdict of battle.” Building on these insights, Howard offered his own conclusions concerning what made wars decisive. He had three prerequisites. First, convincing “operational victories must be gained.” Second, the defeated adversary must be isolated from “all sources of outside support.” Finally, “a government must be found in the defeated country” that will enforce the negotiated terms of the peace. Only the first of the three requirements is an outcome achieved by the military. Even if this first one is realized, it will serve no purpose unless appropriate entities accomplish the last two. In addition, the last two prerequisites provide even further insights concerning the difficulties and time required for decisive outcomes. Isolating an opponent and finding a government to accept and enforce the peace are not accomplished overnight. Therefore, in addition to the mismatch between coercion, rapidity, and decisiveness, the RDO concept fails to identify that non-military considerations are most important factors in producing decisive results.
The last theme provides insights concerning what the essence of an Integrating Concept should offer. Fundamentally, it should provide the basis to avoid the weaknesses of past approaches and thinking. One key past weakness has been to focus on the familiar. Personnel must resist the temptation to focus on the familiar because it leads to misplaced emphasis on improving the means of war. This focus on the means is a derivation of what Prof Michael Handel, professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College, calls the ‘tacticization of strategy.’ This phenomenon results when ‘lower level operational considerations’ define “the strategy in war.” Examples of such consideration would be the capabilities of specific weapons systems or outstanding tactical or operational performance. Handel’s specific examples include employment of U-boats by Germany in WWI, Ludendorf’s March 1918 offensive, and Rommel’s campaign in Africa.

Handel also felt that the “principle cause of the tacticization of strategy has been the uncontrolled ambition of military field commanders and the tactically and operationally oriented thinking of political leaders.” However, the issue with RDO today is that it follows a familiar trend: military officers reverting to their comfort zones when presented with problems. As a result, they end up thinking at one or two levels below where their efforts should be concentrated. In the end, all levels are immersed in the details; looking at the situation through the narrow field of view. None have risen above the fray to provide broad guidelines and goals; look at the situation through the wide field of view.

In the case of RDO, the employment of the means of war has become the focus of the operational level commander and his staff. In his discussions of “tacticization of strategy,” Prof Handel wrote,

“Recent events have shown that while enormous strides have been made in perfecting and developing the means of war, the same cannot be said of the ability to
understand the nature, purpose, and political direction of war, or the ability to translate military success into political achievements.”

In much the same way, RDO has focused DOD’s innovation efforts towards “perfecting and developing the means of war,” while contributing little to help the operational commander determine the military conditions necessary to achieve the strategic goal or the sequence of actions likely to produce that condition. The lessons of Kosovo demonstrated the weakness in U.S. thought concerning the elements of victory. As a result of his analysis of Operation Allied Force, Professor Milan Vego was concerned that the DOD community may not provide sufficient emphasis to “identify and then resolve serious deficiencies in the relationship between policy and strategy, strategy formulation, operational planning, and operational thinking.” This general concern was based on lessons that he had identified. One was that military commanders must be ready to recognize and report when constraints affect their ability to “properly and effectively use their forces.” Another offered that political leaders must “clearly define” objectives that are “achievable with resources on hand.” Again, military commanders have the responsibility to recognize and report when objectives are not achievable with available resources.

Future Integrating Concepts should emphasize bridging the gap between achieving battlefield success and implementing a lasting peace. The U.S. knows how to win on the battlefield and continued emphasis on that area will not significantly enhance national security. Instead of seeking more and lower military integration, future thinking should provide the means to synthesize the actions of all players involved in the transition from battlefield victory through the negotiation of the peace.

The best result from an integrating strategy would be to avoid all reference to the tactics and the means of war. The U.S. has always succeeded in those areas and there is no reason to suspect that the
future will be any different. Williamson Murray observed that for almost two centuries, Napoleon’s successes at Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 have confused military leaders concerning “the utility of force and the proper relationship between strategy and operations.” Remedying this confusion would be a good goal for the next Integrating Concept.

Endnotes

1 USACOM (United States Atlantic Command) was reformulated to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) at the beginning of FY 2000. Reformulated is the term used by JFCOM to describe the change from USACOM to JFCOM in its Joint Experimentation Annual Report to Congress on pages i and 1.
2 U.S. Atlantic Command. Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000 (CPLAN 00). (Norfolk, VA: 30 September 1999), iii.
5 CPLAN 01 (Draft), 3-6.
6 Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, (Newport, RI: 2000), 9. General Alfred von Schlieffen was chief of the German general staff from 1891-1906. He was credited as the author of the Schlieffen Plan, the plan Germany executed to begin WWI.
8 CPLAN 01 (Draft), 11.
Ibid, 2-2.
16 Ibid, 2-2.
17 Annual Report to Congress, 3.
18 Ibid, ii.
19 JFCOM, CPLAN 01, ii-iii.
20 Ibid, 3-4.
21 CPLAN 01 (Draft) pages 3-6 to 3-8. Sources include: joint and service wargames, the CINC's Integrated Priority
Lists, after action reviews from recent operations, and conferences.
22 CPLAN 01 (Draft), 3-6.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 3-7 to 3-8. The eight functional concepts are: Attack Operations Against Critical Mobile Targets (AOACMT),
Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2), Joint Interactive
Planning (JIP), Information Operations (IO), Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations (FLEEDO),
Forcible Entry Operations (FEO), and Strategic Deployment (SD).
25 Annual Report to Congress, 11.
26 Discussions of this position taken from Annual Report to Congress, 11
27 Ibid.
28 Russell F. Weigley. The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo,
(Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press 1991) xii.
29 Ibid, xiii.
1989): 100.
31 Ibid, 101
32 Discussions of Prof Jones’ conclusions were taken from the concluding chapter of The Art Of War in the Western
World.
33 Jones, 613.
34 Ibid.
38 CPLAN 01, 3-7.
39 Pape, 12.
40 Ibid, 13.
41 For discussion on friction see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
42 Supporting discussion is from Pape, 32-35.
43 Supporting discussion is form Pape, 29-32.
44 Ibid, 2.
46 Discussion of this case is from Pape, 87-136.
48 David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham E. Fuller and Melissa Fuller, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico (RAND
50 Gunther E. Rothenberg. “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” Makers of Modern
52 Jones, 711-714.
53 Williamson Murray, War, Theory, Clausewitz, and Thucydides: The Game May Change but the Rules Remain the
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