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School of Advanced Airpower Studies
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: A MISSION METAMORPHOSIS FOR THE 21st CENTURY?

by

Greg E. Metzgar, Major, USA

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Lt. Col. Wray R. Johnson, Ph.D., USAF

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2000
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
About the Author

Major Greg E. Metzgar (BA, Boise State University, and MSA, Central Michigan University) was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, Boise State University, Boise, Idaho, as an infantry officer in 1986. Graduating from the Infantry Officers Basic Course, Basic Airborne School, Ranger School, and Air Assault School, his first assignment in July 1987 was with 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. While assigned to Fort Campbell, he served as a rifle platoon leader, anti-armor platoon leader, rifle company executive officer, and finished his tour as a support platoon leader during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991. After completing the Infantry Officers Advanced Course in January 1992, he attended the Special Forces Assessment and Selection and Special Forces Qualification Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. After graduating from the Special Forces Language Qualification Course (Spanish) in May 1993, he was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), serving as a detachment commander (Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha 783) and Headquarters Support Company commander. Other assignments were as a Special Forces Detachment-Alpha observer/controller and special operations planning officer at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, from February 1996 to June 1998. Major Metzgar is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, June 1999, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2000, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In July 2000, Major Metzgar was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as an operations officer. He is married to the former Denise Ann Barton from Pasadena, Texas. They have three children; Jacqueline (6), Alexis (4), and Barton (2). Major Metzgar’s father is a retired Air Force (Reserve) officer, and he has one brother, Major Tal Metzgar, who currently serves in the United States Air Force as a C-17 Loadmaster II command pilot.
Acknowledgments

My interest for this study traces to influences well before my enrollment in the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Since pre-commissioning I have had the desire to serve in the Special Forces and worked throughout my career to obtain that goal. Along the way, a host of Special Forces professionals, both non-commissioned and commissioned officers, active, and retired have influenced me. They have all contributed invaluable knowledge and foresight, which I have tried to capture in this study. Their names are too numerous to mention here, but they know who they are and I hope they find my efforts worthy of the task. I owe a special thanks to my faculty advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Wray Johnson and thesis reader Dr. Jim Corum. Their knowledge and expertise challenged me to look deep and arrive at a greater understanding of my chosen profession. To their credit, they had their work cut out for them in order to get me to the final product. Any failure in this study is purely mine, and I accept full responsibility for it. I thank the faculty and students of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. The coaching, teaching, mentoring, and friendship from the past year are memories I will continue to carry with me on the adventure of service to our country. To my family, I cannot begin to describe the love and admiration I have for all of you. To my wife Denise, and our three children Jacqueline, Alexis, and Barton, I appreciate the time you tolerated daddy tied up in the office typing and reading when you would rather have him out playing. Finally, I thank our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. Through Him, all things are possible. It is through His hand that I had the unique opportunity this education has provided, and to Him I give the credit, now and in the remaining years of my life (Colossians 3:17).
Abstract

The intent of this study is to provide special operations planners with a means to determine a new definition and application of unconventional warfare beginning, with an examination of its roots during World War II to the present day. Additionally, this study demonstrates that Special Forces have never been employed within the traditional doctrinal role outlined for unconventional warfare, but rather in matter most benefiting of the current campaign objectives. Training under the umbrella of unconventional warfare has provided Special Forces with versatility, in both peace and war to accomplish all assigned missions. This study documents and analyzes the evolutionary role of unconventional warfare and its changing significance and priority to other special operations missions such as direct action, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense.

Finally, this study provides a model for determining how unconventional warfare can be useful in a future environment. Students who wish to expand their understanding on unconventional warfare and its employment, may capitalize on the information provided in this study to the benefit of their own education concerning unconventional warfare.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

*More than most professions, the military is forced to depend upon intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future. Devoid of opportunity, in peace, for self-instruction through actual practice…the soldier makes maximum use of historical record…The facts derived from historical analysis he applies to conditions of the present and the proximate future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization and doctrine.*

*General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, The Army Historian*

Statement of Research Questions

At the beginning of the Cold War, military planners concerned with growing Soviet conventional strength in Europe created forces specifically to conduct unconventional warfare behind the lines in the event of a Soviet invasion. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the requirements for the unconventional warfare mission withered and received less and less priority in training and resources. This study examines the continuing relevance, if any, of the unconventional warfare mission in the post-Cold War environment.

Unconventional warfare as a formal mission can trace its roots to the opening days of World War II and the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services. This study must therefore start by examining briefly its origins and growth through both periods of war and peace. By analyzing the national goals and military strategies past and present, this study seeks to reach some conclusions about the future of unconventional warfare in United States military doctrine. However, from the author’s initial examination, it is apparent that unconventional warfare as defined and practiced today is undergoing a mission metamorphosis for the 21st century.
Specific questions this study will examine include:

1. What is unconventional warfare?

2. What is the American experience within the last 20 years with respect to unconventional warfare and how has it shaped our doctrine?

3. How has the doctrine and training for unconventional warfare been applied in conflict?

4. What variables are there to force a change in unconventional warfare?

5. If unconventional warfare is indeed to undergo a metamorphosis, how will it be defined and applied in the future security environment?

**Background and Significance of the Problem**

From its genesis as a permanent capability within the United States armed forces, the unconventional warfare mission has been seriously questioned in terms of its viability in producing battlefield success. Owing to a Clausewitzian view of unconventional warfare, critics have questioned its legitimacy: First, in terms of the political ramifications of a form of warfare thought of as less than gentlemanly and not within conventional western methods of fighting; second, critics have asserted that resources dedicated to unconventional warfare could be better used elsewhere.

Nevertheless, since the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, proponents

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1 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 479. Specifically commenting on this subject, Clausewitz summarized the threat as “a state of legalized anarchy, this is as much of a threat to the social order at home as it is to the enemy; or else on military grounds, because they feel that the results are not commensurate with energies that have been expended.” B.H. Liddell Hart, in his work *Strategy* gives a more updated observation stating, “Violence takes a much deeper root in irregular warfare than it does in regular warfare. In the latter, it is counteracted by obedience to constituted authority and violating rules. It becomes very difficult to rebuild a country, and a state, on a foundation undermined by such experience.” B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York, N.Y.: Meridian Printing, March 1991), 369.
have argued that unconventional warfare remains a viable part of our military capability. However, at the conclusion of World War II, Army and Air Force units assigned unconventional warfare tasks with the Office of Strategic Services all but disappeared. With the outbreak of war in Korea, military leaders found themselves in need of ad hoc units to conduct unconventional warfare against the Chinese and North Koreans. Thus, proponents for unconventional warfare were again able to regain lost ground and used the Korean War as an example of the need to maintain a permanent unconventional warfare capability. In Korea, the lack of experience of hastily organized ad hoc units plagued initial efforts to establish unconventional warfare forces. Consequently, proponents argued the need for a peacetime capability to sustain this perishable and valuable military skill.\(^2\)

Military leaders and policy makers reluctantly accepted a permanent unconventional warfare capability after Korea, primarily to face the burgeoning Soviet threat in Europe. U.S. Army Special Forces and other joint service units stood up to answer this challenge. When the war in Vietnam erupted, unconventional warfare forces answered the call to expand their role and took on counterinsurgency as part of their repertoire. In Vietnam, United States unconventional warfare forces found themselves better prepared than in Korea, but performed much the same mission of leading indigenous personnel in support of conventional operations.

\(^2\) Personnel assigned to conduct guerrilla warfare in Korea had little to no unconventional warfare experience. This caused numerous problems for those inexperienced advisors attempting to gain credibility with their Korean counterparts. This problem is expertly outlined in Ben S. Malcom’s *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s), 1996.
Unconventional warfare as a mission in the post-Vietnam era all but ceased to exist. The few unconventional warfare forces that did remain found themselves fighting for resources. However, in the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan became president, unconventional warfare in particular and special operations forces in general experienced a period of revitalization. Specific and “fenced” funding ensured that special operations forces missions would receive priority consideration, allowing for a well-trained force. President Reagan emphasized unconventional warfare in his foreign policy battle with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, existing traditional conventional commanders in the 1980s still regarded unconventional warfare as a tool to support conventional campaigns and wrote formal doctrine accordingly. Albeit this was true in the early years, unconventional warfare proponents argued that unconventional warfare was best used as a tool to combat low-level conflict without resorting to general-purpose forces.

Different interpretations regarding the nature of unconventional warfare continue to plague the debate about its viability in the post-Cold War environment. It is therefore crucial to distinguish the way in which unconventional warfare was practiced in the past from the manner in which it is practiced today, as well as in the future. Current doctrine stems from the Cold War competition with the Soviets. With our recent military adventures in the Balkans and elsewhere, it has become conventional wisdom that the

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3 During the conduct of research, the author was informed by one officer that much of the unconventional warfare mission that Special Forces was accustomed to conducting prior to Vietnam was practiced by Reserve and National Guard Special Forces units, while active Special Forces units seemed to move away from this traditional mission. The reason for this is that many of the Vietnam veterans transferred to the Reserve and National Guard after leaving active duty. This observation is apparent when reading Hans Halberstadt’s *Green Berets: Unconventional Warriors* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988).

American public is casualty averse. Using indigenous forces may therefore be an attractive alternative to using general-purpose American forces. Special operations forces would play a critical role in raising and leading indigenous forces to accomplish American policy aims. Thus, how we define unconventional warfare for the future is the first step.

**Limitations of the Study**

Within the academic and military communities, numerous works exist highlighting the development and use of unconventional forces. Academics and military officers have made careers contributing to and advancing unconventional warfare thought. This study is not intended to simply rehash the history of unconventional warfare. Nevertheless, a certain amount of historical discussion must occur in order to set the stage and frame a logical transition to the future in terms of employing unconventional forces. It is understood that the specialist will be keenly interested in this work, but it is the author’s optimism that the general reader will find it valuable as well.

In light of the above this study will limit itself to only a few essential sub-issues. Relevant questions include:

1. What are the priorities and requirements for updating unconventional warfare doctrine and training?

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(2) How do we redefine, articulate, and update the meaning of unconventional warfare in keeping with the new security environment?

(3) With a new definition for unconventional warfare as it applies to the 21st century, what must policy-makers and strategists focus upon in terms of employment and training of special operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare?

Certain contextual elements affect any study. With this in mind, environmental factors relevant to this work include doctrine, policy, and formal organization. In addition, unconventional warfare is by definition a broad-spectrum mission. In this regard, other joint forces assigned to US Special Operations Command can potentially replace unconventional warfare forces. However, for the purpose of this study, the author will focus only on the two primary elements of unconventional warfare, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force special operations forces.

**Definitions**

Although the term unconventional warfare is rather loosely used to describe anything considered outside of “normal” military operations or capabilities, unconventional warfare as it applies to special operations forces has remained fairly precise in meaning since formal doctrine was established in the early 1950s. The most common definition of unconventional warfare is that of training, advising, equipping, and assisting indigenous foreign personnel to perform certain missions. Generally speaking, these missions are guerrilla warfare, sabotage and subversion, and escape and evasion.

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For the purposes of this study, we will focus on guerrilla warfare, primarily because this is considered to be the *raison d’être* for special operations forces conducting unconventional warfare. In view of the above, the following two working definitions define guerrilla warfare for this study. The first type involves guerrilla fighters operating as an auxiliary to regular military forces of a nation. These guerrillas are hereafter referred to as “partisans.” They generally operate on a conventional battlefield. The second type is that of the insurgent. Insurgents operate as armed political dissidents within a society seeking revolutionary social and political change. The insurgent, unlike the partisan, has the potential and ability to operate independently and without any external material support, or sponsorship. The insurgent immerses himself in the political as well as military dimensions of the struggle whereas the partisan generally does not.

**Review of the Argument**

This study will follow a chronological approach starting with World War II and carried forward to the recent conflict in the Balkans. Chapter 2 will discuss the rise and fall of American unconventional warfare capability during and shortly after World War II. The organization for unconventional warfare employed by the Office of Strategic Services would serve as the template which all subsequent organization for unconventional warfare would be measured. Chapter 3 will focus on the painful rebirth of unconventional warfare in the Korean War and the steps taken to maintain this

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6 Cable, Larry E., *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1986), 5. Dr. Cable is the author of several books and articles concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency, and for a time was a notable guest lecturer at numerous military institutions and academies. However, in 1997, Dr. Cable abruptly resigned as a professor at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington when his claims of being a Vietnam veteran with covert operations experience proved false. This incident aside, many still consider Cable’s works as noteworthy.
capability after the Korean War ended. It was during the Korean War that the need for formally establishing another organization that existed in the former Office of Strategic Services was fully realized. Chapter 4 will examine the changes in unconventional warfare as experienced in Vietnam. During Vietnam, a crucial event occurred which would change the nature of how unconventional warfare would be defined. Unconventional warfare would be integrated with insurgent theory and used in a counterinsurgency role, a role not envisioned by the original organizers of Special Forces. Chapter 5 will examine the evolution of special operations in the 1970s and 1980s and the indirect use of unconventional warfare skills during the Gulf War in 1991. Chapter 6 will analyze what has changed during the last decade of the 20th Century, highlighting the historical growth and change of unconventional warfare and attempting to predict how it applies to the post-Cold War environment, and close with recommendations for strategists to consider for the 21st century.
CHAPTER 2

THE PALADINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

It was as if in this war a fourth dimension had been added to the three military dimensions—air, land, and water—of the last war. This fourth dimension is the fight behind the enemy’s own lines. This war has proved that the attack from within is an important complement of the attack from without.

Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa

Introduction

Unconventional operations and guerrilla warfare in particular are as old as history itself and the American experience predates World War II. Francis Marion, better known as the “Swamp Fox,” campaigned against the British during the American Revolution. During the Civil War, Confederate guerrillas such as the 43rd Battalion, Virginia Calvary, better known as “Mosby’s Rangers,” disregarded established rules of war, fighting by principles which their enemies could neither discover nor guard against. Robert Asprey describes the American Civil War as a display to the world of the frightening influence of technology, particularly the killing power of rifle and cannon in defense. Nevertheless, it also produced some lively examples of army vulnerability to partisan warfare. The American Civil War reinforced Clausewitz’s theory that the nation learning to use a “people in arms” effectively gained some superiority over those disdaining its use.

As the twentieth century dawned, and the United States found itself fighting in World War I, little thought went into partisan warfare, simply because it was not a necessary element of American combat capability. In contrast, the British, specifically T.E. Lawrence, found guerrilla warfare to be a valuable adjunct, especially when matched to the emerging technology of aircraft to conduct limited aerial raids. Even with the success of Lawrence, dedicated thought outside of Britain regarding guerrilla warfare in

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the inter-war period was minimal. However, by early 1941 the tide changed concerning
the literature on guerrilla warfare. American military observers began to write about
guerrilla warfare in professional journals. The authors highlighted the importance that
this form of war could have on military campaigns. According to Stewart Alsop and
Thomas Braden, guerrilla warfare on a grand scale was one of the most striking features
to emerge from World War II. Resistance forces within the countries conquered by the
Axis fought with amazing heroism and contributed to the ultimate defeat of the invader.¹¹
Not until liberation did the existence of this clash become well known, however; even
today it is still shrouded in some mystery and is shot through with myth and legend.¹²
This chapter will examine specifically what happened and why.

**Strategic Context**

In their book, *Thinking in Time*, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May describe
context in this fashion: “the more history one knows, the better one understands the
options.”¹³ With this in mind, it is important to understand the state of affairs that
affected the establishment of American unconventional warfare at the outset of World
War II. Before American entry into the war, the armed forces were dangerously
undermanned and ill equipped.¹⁴ Moreover, the American public, traumatized by the
recent Great Depression, was less than enthusiastic about becoming involved in another
foreign war.¹⁵ Therefore, defense planners and other critics were finding it difficult to
win over policy-makers to dedicate the scarce dollars and resources necessary to
revitalize the U.S. military. Cognizant of inevitable American involvement in the war
and the need for solid intelligence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the office
of Coordinator of Information to prepare for unified intelligence collection and eventual
unconventional operations by U.S. forces.

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¹⁵ Of course there were Americans who started to fight very early in the war, just as there had been
idealistic Americans who went to Spain to fight in the International Brigade. The Eagle Squadron of the
Royal Air Force is another example. The Flying Tigers under Claire Chennault went to China, some of
them as mercenaries, some of them because they believed in fighting against aggression. See Edwin P.
At the head of the Coordinator of Information office was William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, a charismatic Ivy League Irishman of enormous energy and wide-ranging interests who won the Medal of Honor during World War I. In many ways Donovan was a man ahead of his time. Envisioning matters outside the normal parameters of traditional military intelligence, Donovan filled the higher echelons of the Coordinator of Information office with white-collar intelligentsia with expertise in economic and political matters, which gave the appearance more of a university than an intelligence office. He also set about to organize, train, and equip forces for unconventional warfare operations as well as cooperate with the British on intelligence and unconventional operations already established by the latter on the continent of Europe. Clashes were inevitable with other federal and military intelligence agencies, but President Roosevelt placed his trust and support in Donovan. Thus, with the dramatic entry of the U.S. into the war following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor—given the state of general military preparedness at the time—one of the few organizations capable of near-term offensive operations against the Axis powers was Donovan’s office of Coordinator of Information.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine concerning guerrilla warfare was all but nonexistent before the start of the war. There was, however, a certain amount of military experience in battling guerrillas. In theory, the army should have been far better prepared for the guerrilla mission. With the exception of the Mexican war (1846-48) and the Civil War (1861-65), its primary role for a century had been to fight guerrilla style campaigns—particularly

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16 G. J. A. O’Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Actions from the American Revolution to the CIA* (New York, N.Y.: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), 403. O’Toole points out that Donovan had traveled extensively throughout Europe on official visits for the U.S. Donovan’s friendship with the president dated back more than thirty years, to when the pair had attended Columbia Law School together.

17 Donovan ended the war at the rank of Major General. He also was persuasive in the post-war period in convincing President Harry S. Truman on the need for a centralized intelligence service (which became the Central Intelligence Agency).

18 O’Toole, 403. In December 1941, special operations and strategic bombing were the only modes of warfare available to attack the Axis in Europe. Guerilla warfare would also play a crucial role in the Philippines, where those personnel remaining after Japanese occupation conducted intelligence collection and sabotage for General MacArthur.
guerrilla warfare practiced by Native Americans. Similarly, the Marine Corps busied itself with numerous counterinsurgency campaigns following World War I in the Caribbean and Central America. Nevertheless, small wars took a back seat to the emerging mechanized warfare sweeping across Europe and the amphibious warfare doctrine needed for operations in the Pacific. Although there was no official doctrine for conducting or countering guerrilla warfare, “unofficial” doctrine took the form of articles published in prominent military journals and books of the time. Counter-guerrilla operations existed in some school environments. The Marines, influenced by their experience in Nicaragua, included 19 hours of study devoted to small wars in 1932, increasing that number to 45 hours by 1938. In some ways, the apparent disregard by both the army and the Marines to expend any intellectual energy on unconventional warfare is explainable. On the cusp of World War II, the greatest threat remained conventional warfare.

The *Infantry Journal* in June 1941 published one insightful article in which Lieutenant A. Stuart Daley criticized the sole focus on mechanized warfare, omitting the potential of guerrilla warfare. Lieutenant Daley argued that the guerrilla of the twentieth century was more capable by virtue of the technology emerging at the time. He concluded by stating prophetically, “If the present war continues, we may expect to see more and more guerrilla fighting, in Africa, Asia, and Europe, and if it is properly managed, it will prove effective.” Later that same year, the *Cavalry Journal* concentrated on guerrilla warfare. One article within this issue falsely claimed that Soviet partisans had captured German General Guderian. In the same issue, Nikita Khruschev expounded on the guerrilla warfare occurring in occupied territory as a strategy to defeat the Germans. In another article of the same issue, Marine Corps

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19 Ian F.W. Beckett, *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945* (New York, N.Y.: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1988), 109. According to Beckett, there had been over 1000 engagements against hostile Indians between 1866 and 1890 but there was a continuing tendency within the army to regard the mission as an irrelevance. Professionally, the U.S. Army looked to Europe and studied conventional warfare, each Indian campaign being seen as a tiresome temporary irritant.

20 “Official” means published doctrine. In a lesser sense, “unofficial” efforts published in professional journals describe the Services’ understanding and application of military doctrine.

21 Beckett, 123.


Captain, James B. Griffith described Mao’s ideas regarding guerrilla strategy and revolutionary warfare.\textsuperscript{24} The strategic and tactical aspects of these writings would not have surprised anyone familiar with Clausewitz and T. E. Lawrence, though Mao added some memorable metaphors to their theories—most famously, perhaps, that of the people as the water in which the guerrilla fish must swim.\textsuperscript{25} Mao was not organizing partisans against an invader in the Clausewitzian sense; rather, he was turning the people against their own government—and guerrilla warfare was to be one of many tools to be used. The significance of this essay would emerge in the post-war ideological struggles concerning communist insurgency.\textsuperscript{26}

In general, official thought regarding the utility of unconventional warfare as a strategy against the Axis did not emerge until the formation of the Office of Strategic Services, which linked up with its British equivalent, the Special Operations Executive, in 1942.

**Organization**

We have already noted the bureaucratic infighting between the Coordinator of Information and other military and federal agencies concerning centralized intelligence. From the start, Donovan faced an uphill battle in keeping the Coordinator of Information alive. The same problem faced the British equivalent, the Special Operations Executive. To protect the Coordinator of Information, President Roosevelt issued an executive order

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\textsuperscript{26} Postwar commentators on strategy would notice what Captain Griffith already had written. B. H. Liddell Hart in his classic *Strategy* (New York, N.Y.: Meridian Printing, 1991), 363, stated: “Since then, the combination of guerrilla and subversive war has been pursued with increasing success in the neighboring areas of South-east Asia and in other parts of the world—in Africa, starting with Algeria; in Cyprus; and on the other side of the Atlantic, in Cuba. Campaigns of this kind are likely to continue because they fit the conditions of the modern age and at the same time are well suited to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment, and nationalistic fervor.” On the other hand, Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie wrote in his benchmark work, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1967), 49, “But the current theory and the current practice are new. Mao Tse-tung is the father. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap and Fidel Castro and Che Guevara are the able disciples and propagators of the faith. The bibles (in English translation) are *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret), which contains General Griffith’s excellent translation of Mao’s *Yu Chi Chan of 1937; People’s War People’s Army* by Vo Nguyen Giap; and *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare* by Major Harries-Clichy Peterson, USMCR, which contains Major Peterson’s translation of Guevara’s *Guerrilla Warfare*, written in 1960 as a primer for Latin-American revolution.”
on June 13, 1942, which changed the Coordinator of Information to the Office of Strategic Services and placed it under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The most significant development of this new arrangement was the establishment of the Special Operations Branch. The Special Operations Branch would become the tactical agency controlling resistance movements in all major theaters except the Pacific. The Special Operations Branch established a liaison with resistance movements as well as established Special Forces Headquarters in all theater and field headquarters. Personnel assigned to the Special Operations Branch designated to infiltrate behind the lines received intense screening and training before insertion into an area where an active resistance cell was working. These infiltrated personnel provided organization and training and arranged for the clandestine delivery of equipment and supplies for employment against Axis forces.

In Europe, the Office of Strategic Services organized and trained three-man teams, code named “Jedburghs,” for missions in occupied countries. The three-man teams selected each other as teammates and consisted of a linguist (normally a native of the occupied country), a highly trained communications expert, and an operations officer. All the personnel were cross-trained in weapons, explosives, sabotage and subversion, evasion, and covert tactics. Later in 1944, the Office of Strategic Services Jedburgh

28 In an article appearing in 1952, Lt. Col. George T. Metcalf stated the following concerning General MacArthur and partisan warfare in the Philippine Islands: “General MacArthur himself directed and supervised the development of the intelligence net and the resistance movement based on his intimate knowledge of the Philippines’ internal situation and personalities.” MacArthur established his own organization to collect intelligence and control partisan efforts, known formally as the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). George T. Metcalf, “Offensive Partisan Warfare,” Military Review, April 1952, 55.
29 Today this type of arrangement still exists in what is termed the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) and the Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCORD).
30 Personnel selected to perform duties behind enemy lines received intense screening for both mental and physical prowess. Selection remains an essential event in today’s Special Forces. There was a high attrition rate, but this is necessary due to the sensitivity of the missions. For an authoritative article concerning screening during World War II, refer to (no author) “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” Fortune, March 1946, 92-5.
31 According to Colonel Arron Bank, the term Jedburgh was derived from the twelfth century border wars between the Scots and the British invaders in the Jedburgh area of Scotland where a local Scottish group conducted guerrilla warfare. Arron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces, (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), 35.
32 Some select personnel received training under the British in order to learn about and possibly execute industrial sabotage in occupied areas. All candidates were trained in unique hand-to-hand and “silent kill”
teams and British Special Air Service parachuted into occupied France shortly after D-Day to facilitate the transition of the Free French from simply resistance to a more active guerrilla phase. Following the success of D-Day and the winding down of special operations in Europe by September 1944, many of the Office of Strategic Services personnel transferred to the China-Burma-India Theater for ongoing operations in Indochina against the Japanese.

The inclusion of guerrilla operations into conventional campaigns is not a new idea. Nevertheless, operational planners of the day had to devise modern techniques for unconventional warfare operational areas, the link-up of resistance forces to advancing conventional units, and integrating partisans into follow-on operations. Employment of these underground forces required theater level liaison. At the theater level, the Strategic Services Officer filled this liaison requirement. The Strategic Services Officer usually worked as a subsection of the G-2 (Intelligence) or G-3 (Operations). The Strategic Services Officer monitored his assigned underground forces, passed intelligence, reported their current conditions and locations, and de-conflicted actions with regular military forces prior to their link-up.

In Europe, General Eisenhower integrated the Special Forces Headquarters into the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces to oversee operational control of the resistance in France. The Special Forces Headquarters proved helpful in passing intelligence and providing situational awareness to the allied armies advancing out of Normandy across France. For army groups operating in the field, Special Forces detachments were put forward with corps tactical centers to deconflict link-up and resistance activities. Although these arrangements were far from perfect, they appear to have been the best solution at the time.


33 Personal accounts of these efforts can be found in the following books: Colonel Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces, (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986); Ronald Seth, How the Resistance Worked, (London, England: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1961); and Ian Wellsted, In Action with the French Resistance—June-September 1944, (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1994).


35 S. J. Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, October 1991), 6.
In the China-Burma-India Theater, a similar Special Forces Headquarters was established. Significantly, the Special Operations Branch and the conventional forces appeared to have experienced less strain than in Europe. The Tenth Air Force established a special operations element directly within the air operations center with the Office of Strategic Services liaison for Detachment 101. This liaison was an important element of the Tenth Air Force success during the war. Office of Strategic Services elements operating in the field passed up to 80% of the intelligence that Tenth Air Force relied upon to interdict Japanese forces.\(^{36}\) The operational significance of Detachment 101 combined with tactical airpower provides a good example of what can be accomplished with limited resources and a little resolve and cooperation.\(^{37}\)

### Technology

In the 1986 version of *Makers of Modern Strategy*, John Shy and Thomas Collier stated, “Resistance movements during the Second World War were so diverse that all generalization is hazardous; but one common feature, seldom noted, was technological.”\(^{38}\) Numerous authors have also pointed out specific technologies that allowed unconventional warfare to develop into a unique strategic military capability in the twentieth century. The three most significant technologies that concern the advancement of unconventional warfare were the airplane, personnel and equipment parachutes, and the mobile radio.\(^{39}\)

#### The Airplane

Air Force history concerning the use of aircraft in support of resistance movements is accurate when it states, “A large part of these special operations depended upon the airplane for their execution, and the assistance provided by the Royal Air Force and Army Air Force constitutes a chapter in the history of air warfare as significant as it

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\(^{39}\) Alsop and Braden, 135-36.
is unique.” Army Air Force planners in Europe were zealous in proving the effectiveness of daylight strategic bombing and were for the most part unsupportive of any effort that would redirect bomber aircraft away from this mission. Correspondence from Donovan to General Hap Arnold in early 1944 was critical of the Army Air Force for not providing enough aircraft, and pointed out that Royal Air Force support was double that of the Army Air Force. Tensions continued concerning theater priorities and the Army Air Force allocation of assets to the combined bomber offensive was in full swing by late 1943. By June 1944, General Spaatz, the Eighth Air Force Commander, in what appeared to be divine intervention, ordered B-24s and their assigned crews conducting antisubmarine patrols suddenly turned over to him. These antisubmarine B-24s were quickly modified to fulfill the mission requirements of the Office of Strategic Services. These aircraft played a critical role in supporting the French partisan operations in the weeks after D-Day, their role demonstrated by the amount of material dropped to them as delineated in Appendix A.

In the China-Burma-India Theater, the Office of Strategic Services operated with Detachment 101. Detachment 101 did not have the same problems that plagued the Office of Strategic Services in Europe. For example, Detachment 101 had their own light

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41 Major Bernard Victor Moore II recognized this shortfall in Air Force history and noted in his thesis as a student at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, “This is one of the least-known chapters in the air war over Europe. It is also one of the forgotten chapters in the history of the USAF. Yet, this episode marks the origin of special operations as a role in American air power. Little has been written on the subject, and much of what has been published is inaccurate or incomplete. Several items covered herein are being presented for the first time.” Bernard Victor Moore, The Secret Air War Over France: USAAF Special Operations Units in the French Campaign of 1944 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, November 1993), 2.

42 Donovan was very critical of General Arnold in his correspondence from late February 1944, in which he stated that British airplanes carrying American supplies to French groups had placed the Office of Strategic Services in a “secondary” and “humiliating” position in the eyes of the French underground. MG William J. Donovan, chief, Office of Strategic Services, to Commanding General, USAAF, General H. Hap Arnold, letter, subject: Aircraft availability to OSS in the European Theater, 25 February 1944. On record at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, call number #187.16A.

43 Moore, 16.
a aircraft squadron under their operational control. In addition, the Tenth Air Force provided dedicated aircraft to support routine and emergency resupply missions behind enemy lines. The efforts to keep Detachment 101 combat effective in the China-Burma-India Theater are impressive.44

Appendix B lists a month-to-month record of resupply activities to special operations in the China-Burma-India Theater, which illuminates the necessary aerial logistical effort. Clearly from the evidence shown in both cases, the airplane revolutionized unconventional warfare and became a critical asset for success, but this was still only half of the contribution.

*The Personnel and Equipment Parachute*

A massive quantity of supplies was delivered by parachute. The parachute and airplane go together like a hand and glove. One author claims that 20,000 tons of arms and material were air dropped to guerrillas all over the world. Using this figure the author stated firmly, “This is picayune compared to the tonnage of bombs dropped by the air force, but a good case could be made that ton for ton it contributed more to the downfall of the enemy.”45 This hypothesis warrants further study, but certainly the parachute combined with the airplane advanced unconventional warfare to a strategic level.

*The Mobile Radio*

If there is one piece of equipment that was strategically crucial to special operations and unconventional warfare in World War II, it was the mobile radio.46 For

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44 For the sake of comparison with total supplies dropped in February 1945 and to give some idea of the quantity necessary to keep even 12 men going in the jungle, a total of 13 containers weighing about 115 pounds each, packed with everything from pencils, sewing kits, and combs, to Thompson sub-machine guns, ammunition, and food, were dropped in early February 1943 to the first mission of Det. 101. Two years later 1,492,889 pounds of cargo packed with foodstuffs, gasoline, rice, medical kits, salt, equipment, guns, ammunition, etc., were dropped by C-47s in 269 sorties during one month, and another 168 persons were carried (exclusive of the number transported in other type aircraft) and 21 parachuted into enemy territory, without a single causality.” Report of Detachment 101 to the Tenth Air Force Headquarters, September 1942-March 1945. On record at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, call number #859.011.

45 Alsop and Braden, 135.

46 Martin van Creveld has stated: “The radio, which for the first time in history came close to making reliable, instantaneous two-way communications between mobile forces possible,” certainly cannot be neglected as a contributor to the Allied success in the war. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 193.
operations behind enemy lines, the radio link was a critical asset. The radio link was the lifeline for not only requesting supplies, but also relaying crucial real-time intelligence to higher headquarters. There is no better example of the importance of radio communications than that of Detachment 101 in the China-Burma-India Theater. Official reports estimate that “at least 80 percent of all information on Japanese camps, dumps, movements etc. came from Detachment 101.”\(^{47}\) The intelligence gathered by Detachment 101 was passed solely by means of radio.

**Political Factors**

World War II triggered and catalyzed a large number of revolutionary outbreaks and upheavals, the results and sequels to which continue to change the world.\(^{48}\) From a strictly *ex post* viewpoint, one might ask if the conflict in Vietnam and possibly in Korea were preventable? The Office of Strategic Services supported Ho Chi Minh and he actively solicited American assistance for the Vietminh.\(^{49}\) Major General John Singlaub, in his autobiography, *Hazardous Duty*, stated that the communist guerrillas received aid in order to leverage them to assist in defeating the Japanese. After the war, Roosevelt wanted to assist in the establishment of decolonized “protectorates.” However, Roosevelt’s death preempted this idea and it failed to materialize under Truman.\(^{50}\) The hypothesis that America could have avoided a future Indochina war by fostering a better relationship with indigenous resistance movements is an interesting question, worthy of further study.

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Cultural Factors

Cultural awareness is an essential factor when operating with indigenous people in occupied territories. However, cultural awareness is more than just being able to speak in a native dialect. It includes the social and religious structures that characterize a certain population. Some training was afforded to Office of Strategic Services personnel before infiltrating behind enemy lines, but they were not expected to blend into the target population like spies.\(^5\) The Office of Strategic Services teams that operated in the operational groups in France infiltrated and conducted their missions in a clandestine manner, but wore American service dress.\(^2\)

On the other side of the globe, however, for those personnel operating in the China-Burma-India Theater things were drastically different. The primary obstacle was the inability of white American and European operators in blending with the indigenous Asian population of Indochina. Nevertheless, Kachin tribesmen in Burma proved to be able fighters led by Detachment 101. The first detachment personnel to infiltrate were pathfinders who had to determine the Kachin capabilities and limitations as well as social and cultural norms while staying hidden from the Japanese. Detachment 101 personnel assigned to train and lead indigenous personnel lived with them and endured the same hardships.\(^3\)

\(^5\) A highly specialized training program was required to encompass the political, social, military, and linguistic requirements of this type of duty. Unless the personnel selected for duty with the underground were of the highest quality and thoroughly versed in the language, background, and philosophy of the people with whom they were to work, they could easily be worse than useless in affecting the much needed understanding and liaison with Allied forces. Lt. Col. Henry G. V. Hart, “United States Employment of Underground Forces,” Military Review, April 1946, 54.

\(^2\) As for how the concept of their employment differed from other Special Operations activities, an Office of Strategic Services general orientation booklet published in 1944 described it thus: “OG [operational group] personnel activate guerrillas as military organizations to engage enemy forces. They always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with individual acts of sabotage.” Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a “Special Warfare” Capability for the United States Army,” Study Project, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, November 1979), 45-6.

\(^3\) The descendants of the Office of Strategic Services, today’s US Army Special Forces, are regionally oriented in order to maintain some proficiency for operations within an assigned area with indigenous...
During World War II, partisan campaigns were fought against both the Germans and the Japanese. In Greece, Albania, and the U.S.S.R., this type of warfare seems to have achieved positive results. It was also a factor in France, Italy (after 1943), and especially Yugoslavia. One author stated “that in no two theaters of operations were the results quite the same. No two peoples, no two nationalities, were organized along exactly parallel lines. In no two theaters were the benefits we received from this work quite the same.” This observation perhaps explains the difficulty in trying to codify unconventional warfare doctrine. It would be wrong to draw the conclusion that because unconventional warfare was applied in World War II that it secured ultimate victory. A more accurate view is that unconventional warfare was a combat multiplier. The effects of strategic bombing, having access to secret codes, namely ULTRA, all contributed enormously to degrade the Axis war machine.

Unconventional warfare efforts did draw some notice from the top brass. In Europe, Eisenhower praised the actions of the Free French. Eisenhower stated, “Without their great assistance the liberation of France and the defeat of the enemy in Western Europe would have consumed a much longer time and meant greater losses to ourselves.” On the other hand, Patton erred on the side of caution stating at a 7 September 1944 press conference, when asked directly about the support he received from the Free French, that support was “better than expected and less than advertised.” Perhaps the greatest contribution that unconventional warfare provided was in the form of populations. As part of this training it includes formal language training and repeated trips within the theater working with host nation counterparts in order to build their trust and to obtain cultural appreciation and orientation, build language skills, and obtain geographical orientation.

55 Hart, 53.
56 “Guerrilla warfare has not been an American forte [because] in most of its wars...the United States has not had to rely upon guerrilla warfare. American experience with guerrilla warfare has been limited by the strength of American arms. The United States has been able to mobilize overwhelming economic and military power and to bring it to bear directly on the enemy, attacking him not where he is weakest but where he was strongest, because we are stronger still. American military doctrine has reflected this experience.” Franklin Mark Osanka, ed. Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961 (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), xxiii. As cited in Paddock, 54.
57 Eisenhower, 296.
intelligence. Intelligence reports and partisan actions allowed for the fixing and destruction by airpower of many targets in all theaters.

From the German viewpoint, unconventional warfare posed a very real problem. Field Marshal Albert von Kesserling, commander of German forces in Italy, stated after the war that the German Wehrmacht “had neither a training program nor directives concerning guerrilla warfare…. It became necessary for me to issue strict orders to the CiCs to force them to devote the same amount of efforts to this battle as to the fighting at the front.”

Office of Strategic Services efforts in the China-Burma-India Theater proved to be one of the great success stories concerning unconventional warfare. According to Lieutenant Colonel W.R. Peers’ account, Detachment 101 personnel killed well over 5,000 Japanese and captured another 75. Detachment 101 also assisted in the recovery of 300 downed allied airmen, derailed nine trains, and destroyed 56 bridges and 252 vehicles. Peers observed that the U.S. should remain prepared to exploit unconventional warfare in the future, and on a prophetic note stated that the U.S. must prepare to defend itself against an enemy who would use this same capability.

Although the Office of Strategic Services was successful in the China-Burma-India Theater, General MacArthur did not allow any Office of Strategic Services organized resistance to be employed in the Pacific Theater. U.S. Army Forces in the Far East under General MacArthur organized the Allied Intelligence Bureau and conducted many of the same functions of the Office of Strategic Services such as intelligence gathering, guerrilla warfare, and sabotage until liberation of the Philippines occurred in late 1944. The Office of Strategic Services, operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, was a perceived threat to General MacArthur’s autonomy. Those personnel

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59 These observations from Kesserling are true even today, where commanders devote little to no attention to what are now called counterinsurgency operations. Additional observations by Kesserling are in Appendix C, and are worthy of note by military planners faced with employing unconventional warfare or counterinsurgency forces in any future conflict. Field Marshal Albert von Kesselring, “The War Behind the Front: Guerrilla Warfare,” Air Force Historical Research Agency, call number #K171.3-24, (Draft Translation originally prepared for Headquarters, European Command, Office of the Chief Historian), 12.
employed in occupied territory supporting the Allied Intelligence Bureau shared much of the same experiences as personnel in the Office of Strategic Services, and often duplicated many of the same tactics, techniques, and procedures.63

**From the Past, The Future**

World War II is the cornerstone of what would eventually become American “Special Warfare.” During the war, the Office of Strategic Services controlled the unconventional warfare assets. After the war, when the Office of Strategic Services became the Central Intelligence Agency, the covert “cloak and dagger” mission remained a civilian responsibility, but the clandestine unconventional warfare mission, under the Special Operations branch of the former Office of Strategic Services, remained in the military. Given that unconventional warfare was initially established under the civilian Office of Strategic Services, there was little appreciation paid by conventionally minded commanders to this capability and the civilian-military tie remains a source of conflict even to this day.64

During the post-war years, personnel influenced by their wartime experiences petitioned for an unconventional warfare capability. Eight years after the close of the

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63 Accounts of personnel working to support General MacArthur’s Allied Intelligence Bureau were written in the decade following the close of the World War II. These texts have long been out of print but can be found in some larger libraries or obtained through inter-library loans. Good sources of information include—Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1945); Colonel (USA, Ret.) R.W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954); and recently released from the Naval Institute Special Warfare Series—Bob Stahl, *You’re No Good To Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995). These texts give good accounts of what occurred from actual participants.

64 Alfred H. Paddock noted: “The point of this particular discussion, however, is not to attempt to judge the relative success of OSS unconventional warfare operations, but rather to illustrate—as another resistance participant, Charles Thayer, has done—that the first American experience with modern, sophisticated and large scale guerrilla movements took place during World War II. More importantly, it was basically a civilian-led United States agency—the OSS—and not the military services, that stepped in to attempt to capitalize on the potential for guerrilla warfare.” Paddock, 50.
war, the 10th Special Forces Group was activated for the unconventional warfare mission under the leadership of Colonel Aaron Bank, a former Jedburgh in France. The 10th Special Forces Group would take on the same organization as that found in the wartime Office of Strategic Services operational groups, even borrowing many of the same terms and names.\textsuperscript{65} Other individuals, such as Russell Volckmann and Wendell Fertig, both veteran guerrilla leaders from the Philippines, would write and formalize the doctrine used by the new Army Special Forces in the early 1950s. Today, unconventional warfare terminology and practice has changed very little from what was learned during World War II, and was later articulated in the early 1950s. A quick review of the 1990 version of the Field Manual 31-20, \textit{Doctrine for Special Forces Operations}, can demonstrate this point.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{65} Paddock, 46.
\textsuperscript{66} Special Forces doctrine concerning unconventional warfare can be somewhat confusing or misleading without careful examination. As noted in the text, the CIA maintains control of the covert actions approved under the National Command Authority (NCA). On occasion, Special Forces personnel have been employed by the CIA for peacetime unconventional warfare type operations (an example is advice to the Contras in the 1980s). However, Special Forces doctrine is consistent in that the majority of the missions for unconventional warfare are “conducted primarily to complement, support, or extend conventional operations.” This theme remains consistent in doctrine for Special Forces from the 1961, 1969, 1974, and 1990 versions of FM 31-20. However, of notable interest is the 1998 (Draft) version of FM 31-20, which is a departure: “Contemporary UW is significant for several reasons. Historically, SF has focused on UW as an adjunct to a major theater war. The new strategic environment, however, requires SF to focus on UW during MOOTW [Military Operations Other Than War], especially as it relates to UAR
[UnconventionalAssisted Recovery]. Moreover, global urbanization dictates a shift in SF emphasis from rural guerrilla warfare to all aspects of clandestine UW.” 2-2.
CHAPTER 3

KOREA AND BEYOND: “ALL THE KING'S HORSES, AND ALL THE KING'S MEN”

Although I was a twenty-three-year-old first lieutenant with no experience in unconventional warfare I had somehow been chosen to serve as an advisor to Mr. Pak’s Donkey-4 unit.

Col. Ben S. Malcom, USA (Ret.), White Tigers

Introduction

After World War II, the Office of Strategic Services was deactivated and its unconventional warfare capability ceased to exist, except for the few remaining Office of Strategic Services veterans scattered throughout the active force. Contrary to the belief that all thought about unconventional warfare as a mission died, it did continue to receive some, albeit scant attention. During the war, American service personnel had worked under a formal organization, the Special Operations Branch, which controlled partisan efforts in the occupied territories in support of conventional operations. Nevertheless, at the opening of the Korean War, an ad hoc organization was hastily established for partisan efforts operating in North Korea, but few personnel involved in this effort had any unconventional warfare experience. Based on the performance of ad hoc operations in Korea, and a growing Soviet threat in Europe, some of officers lobbied for a permanent unconventional warfare capability in the American military.

67 According to Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., Secretary of War Robert Patterson in 1946 directed that the Army look into creating some capability that existed in the former OSS for “airborne reconnaissance.” As part of the effort to examine this question, Colonel Ray Peers, the former OSS commander in Burma, was interviewed and gave numerous recommendations. Eventually an unconventional warfare capability would emerge, but on a relatively small scale. “Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a “Special Warfare” Capability for the United States Army, “ Study Project, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, November 1979), 108-113.

68 As noted in Chapter 2, the personnel given credit for lobbying unconventional warfare as a permanent capability include, but are not limited to, Philippine guerrilla veterans Colonel Russell Volckmann, Wendell Fertig, and Office of Strategic Services Jedburgh veteran Colonel Aaron Bank. Their initial vision was to establish a force which could conduct unconventional warfare, much like was conducted with the French Maquis partisans in occupied France, if the Soviets conducted a conventional invasion of Europe.
Strategic Context

With the unconditional surrender of the Axis, America emerged as one of the world’s predominant superpowers, and initially the only one with an atomic bomb. Like all wars fought by Americans, the emphasis was on quickly returning the soldiers back to civilian society and directing resources back into the economy. Nevertheless, the world had changed and the Soviets would quickly emerge as a competitor, conducting a protracted struggle on political, economic, and sometimes military fronts. In the “Cold War,” the two most powerful nations on earth would not confront each other directly, but chose to confront each other through proxy wars, conducted on the battlefields of the developing nations for the next 40 years.69

The emphasis placed on the possibility of a major confrontation with the Soviets on the plains of Europe overshadowed many of the attempts to build a force able to conduct operations in what became known as “limited wars.” In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States initiated a strategy of containment and President Truman asked Congress in 1947 for economic aid to rebuild Europe and worked to build collective security arrangements against the Soviets. As part of this strategy, American advisors were sent to the Philippines and Greece to support these countries in their fight against communist insurgency. Key figures from these advisory efforts would have an impact on unconventional warfare in the following decade.70

Doctrine

From the end of the Second World War to the onset of the Korean conflict, there was virtually no published doctrine on unconventional warfare. There were, however, a few intuitive personnel working individually to publish some form of doctrine and in 1949, during maneuvers, “secret forces” were incorporated against allied occupation

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69 This would be a confusing time for policy makers, since it was so difficult to measure exactly what the Soviet intentions were. Sarah-Jane Corke, “Bridging the Gap: Containment, Covert Action and the Search for the Missing Link in American Cold War Policy, 1948-1953,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, (December 1947), 46.
forces in Germany.\(^{71}\) Personnel involved with the Korean partisans had few examples in their formal training and no organization to oversee training as had been with the Office of Strategic Services Special Operations Branch.\(^{2}\) This is one of the constant problems in special operations and particularly unconventional warfare. Without a historical perspective, folktales and fictional exploits discredit actual operational capability.\(^{73}\)

By the middle of 1951, articles appeared in professional journals that argued for the establishment of an “underground army.” One article of August 1951 supported the establishment of specialized units for the conduct of emerging insurgent models of guerrilla warfare.\(^{74}\) The communists were already practicing this form of warfare in the developing nations, but it would take awhile for the United States to catch on.\(^{75}\)

By 1950, a few dedicated believers were at work in the Pentagon to provide an embryonic unconventional warfare force and doctrine for the armed forces that would provide updated unconventional warfare applications. Another article written during this timeframe referred to Department of the Army Special Regulations 320–5–1 that outlined a definition for guerrilla operations as:

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\(^{70}\) One of these individuals would be USAF Major General Edward Lansdale. A lieutenant colonel while advising counterinsurgency efforts in the Philippines, he would later emerge during the Kennedy administration as a renowned expert in counterinsurgency for the civilian policy makers.

\(^{71}\) (No Author) “Secret Forces and Sabotage in Maneuver,” *Military Review*, (January 1951), 108.

\(^{72}\) Ben S. Malcom stated that during his initial training there were only “passing references in history lessons to partisans,” based upon OSS experiences in World War II. Those like himself, who were called upon in Korea to conduct unconventional warfare with the Korean partisans, had nothing they could turn to for guidance. Ben S. Malcom, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*, (McLean, Va.: Brassey’s Inc., 1996), 33-4.

\(^{73}\) The author reviewed several prominent professional military journals during the conduct of research. The actual number of articles appearing from 1946-1952 that concerns unconventional warfare is around 18: *Military Review* (13), *Armed Cavalry Journal* (2), *Marine Corps Gazette* (2), and *Combat Forces Journal* (1). Today, Appendix C of the *STP 31-18II-MQS Military Qualifications Standards II, Special Forces Branch (18) Company Grade Officer’s Manual*, (September 1991), contains the branch reading list for a professional reading program. This is a useful tool, but many of the articles and books are out of print and are hard to come by unless the reader has access to a library inter-loan service or service school. Although personal opinion at this point, those personnel taking the time to seek out these texts and becoming familiar with them will advance ahead of their peers, and possibly superiors, who lack a focused reading program for gaining a historical perspective.

\(^{74}\) Yves Igot stated: “We are not speaking of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is the instinctive fighting of a people against an invader. Rather, underground warfare takes preparation and effective leadership; its forces require special training and adequate material assistance for their use. Yves Igot, “The Underground Army Must Become the Army of the Future,” *Military Review*, (August 1951), 77.

\(^{75}\) Lt. Col. Wray Johnson of the School of Advance Airpower Studies has observed: “Prior to Mao, guerrilla warfare was viewed primarily as an adjunct to conventional armies, or partisan warfare. Following World War II, however, guerrilla warfare becomes most closely associated with insurgency and revolutionary warfare. The American experience was primarily partisan, but in the 1950s the principle threat became insurgent.”
Activity carried on against an enemy by people who are devoted adherents to a cause, but who are not members of organized and recognized military forces. *It includes guerrilla action, passive resistance by underground groups, espionage, sabotage, and propaganda* (emphasis in original).  

The example given in the article concerning the quote above was from the Philippines in the World War II. At the time that this definition appeared one of the important lobbyists and doctrine writers for unconventional warfare was LTC Russ Volckmann, a former guerrilla leader under General MacArthur in the Philippines. Later, Volckmann would expand the definition of guerrilla warfare in FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* (October 1951):

Guerrilla warfare is defined in [Special Regulation] 320-5-1 as operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting military operations of the enemy. The term is sometimes limited to the military operations and tactics of small forces whose objective is to inflict causalities and damage upon the enemy rather than to seize or defend terrain; these operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise and emphasis on avoidance of causalities. The term…includes organized and directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage and propaganda, and in some cases, ordinary combat. Guerrilla warfare is ordinarily carried on by irregular, or partisan forces; however regular forces which have been cut off behind enemy lines or which have infiltrated into the enemy rear areas may use guerrilla tactics.

This definition remains within the Clausewitzian framework, but does lead one to think that it could have limited peacetime application under an agency such as the Central Intelligence Agency. Initial efforts to define guerrilla warfare accelerated with ongoing

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78 “As our policy-makers struggled to find effective means to respond to the perceived military and ideological threats, they examined ways to improve U.S. capabilities in intelligence and psychological and
actions in Korea. Partisan forces saw limited use in Korea, with lackluster results attributed to an ambiguous strategy of employment. Doctrine and organization continued to be refined as analysis of the 1950s Korean conflict and other world events emerged. By 1959, a minority of authors picked up the pace in articles for professional journals, pushing for greater guerrilla potential “based upon the best available information and experience.” In May 1959, Edward F. Downey, Jr. wrote an excellent summary calling for the need for education and doctrine dealing with the uniqueness of guerrilla warfare. Downey wrote in *Military Review*:

> Naturally, the first step should be an exhaustive study of guerrilla warfare. Our objectives and the means of accomplishing them must be outlined clearly in our own minds. We must create a sound theory for a resistance movement, and determine the most suitable tactics and organization to implement it. To accomplish these objectives we must glean every lesson from existing literature. More than this, we must search out guerrilla leaders who have not published their experiences. Full development of any theory waits upon accumulation of information.  

The words penned by Mr. Downey over forty years ago continue to serve as a sound reminder to experts and journeymen today, tasked with efforts to outline the role and employment of forces to accomplish what is now termed unconventional warfare, as well as its application to the 21st century security environment.

**Organization**

Unconventional warfare capability and application underwent an evolutionary period during the 1950s. The only other agency working such issues was the Central

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At the time that Aaron Bank and Russell Volckmann started their efforts, the Army had only an outline on paper. Over time, as they built up Army unconventional warfare doctrine, the Army acknowledged that the Central Intelligence Agency would conduct “peacetime” unconventional warfare and that the Department of Defense would assume responsibility once overt hostile action occurred.

The eruption of hostilities in Korea in 1950 found both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency woefully unprepared to provide any form of unconventional warfare strategy to the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. Reluctantly, MacArthur was forced to accept the Central Intelligence Agency working in his theater, since it was now a National Security Council asset answering to the President versus the old Office of Strategic Services under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rather than attempt integration, MacArthur opted to build his own unconventional warfare capability in the form of Ranger companies.

With the firing of General MacArthur and later departure of his intelligence chief, General Willoughby, a few Far Eastern Command staff officers and the Central

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81 Both organizations, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, were born out of the restructuring which occurred in the late 1940s under President Truman.

82 The first Rangers to form were under a newly graduated West Point lieutenant, Ralph Puckett. The former captain of the Academy boxing team, Puckett took on the task with vigor. His only stipulation was that he could not recruit any trained infantryman. Puckett instead recruited cooks, clerks, and mechanics from service support units. Harry J. Maihafer, *From the Hudson to the Yalu: West Point ’49 in the Korean War*, (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1993), 140. The author would also like to note that Colonel Puckett, later served in the 10th Special Forces Group and went on to form the Colombian Ranger School (Lancero) during the 1960s to assist that country to develop a cadre of trained personnel for counterinsurgency efforts.
Intelligence Agency found an opportunity to introduce unconventional warfare to North Korea through partisans recruited from refugees. A Philippine guerrilla veteran, Colonel John McGee, established the initial partisan effort. McGee’s organization, the Miscellaneous Division, initially fell under operational control of the Eighth Army G-3 (see Appendix D, Figure 1), despite arguments to place it under the theater commander for easier access to joint support assets.

In December 1951, General Ridgway took control of all partisan activity through the Far Eastern Command/Liaison Group (FEC/LG) 8240 Army Unit (AU). A new organization also emerged, the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK). Eventually the CCRAK ended up controlling all special operations in Korea. Also part of the CCRAK was the Central Intelligence Agency’s Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK). A depiction of this arrangement is in Appendix D, Figure 2.

In June 1952, General Mark Clark replaced Ridgway. Clark was very interested in partisan activities and asked for a full assessment of their operations. By best estimates, there were several thousand partisans operating behind the lines at that time. Under General Clark, recruiting of partisans increased in an apparent attempt to step up activity behind enemy lines.

In December 1952, the Far Eastern Command finally organized under a joint headquarters. General Clark in turn designated the commanding general, Army Forces Far East, General Thomas S. Harrold, as the executor of all special operations in Korea.

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83 Steve Fondacaro best describes General Ridgway’s reorganization: “General Ridgway became the new FECOM commander and General Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army in April. On May 5, 1951, Van Fleet dissolved the Attrition Section and reorganized it as the Miscellaneous Group, 8086 Army Unit (AU). This was primarily due to an EUSAK SOP, which prohibited staff agencies from conducting operations. As a numbered Army Unit, the Miscellaneous Group was authorized a Table of Distribution and Equipment (TDE) which provided badly needed equipment and personnel. In July, armistice talks began at Kaesong while hostilities continued along a stabilized line of resistance. On July 26, 1951, Ridgway redesigns FEC/LG as FEC/LG, 8240 AU. On the same date, he created the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea [FEC/LD (K)], and 8240 AU, under FEC/LG control to conduct intelligence operations separate from partisan operations. Control of special operations remained under G-3 supervision at Eighth Army, and under G-2 supervision at FECOM. “A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations during the Korean Conflict, 1950-1053,” (master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff College, 1988), 65.
Under this arrangement, partisan units took on the identifier United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea (UNPFK). By April 1953, estimations of partisan strength reached its highest point of 22,000 men. An important note here is the fact that although the reorganization became joint, the unit responsible for partisans had no organic naval or air assets under its operational control.

The final arrangements occurred by August 1953. There was an eventual transition of the partisans into the Republic of Korea (ROK), but not without much negotiation by the Americans and South Koreans, which will be covered later.

**Air Force Special Operations in the Korean Conflict**

As had occurred in World War II, the Air Force was again an essential player in sustaining the partisan efforts. The Air Force entered the conflict with some distinct disadvantages. For example, the Air Force had only just emerged from a bruising battle to gain independence from the Army in 1947. In addition, the Air Force focus was not limited wars such as Korea, rather it was strategic nuclear war. Therefore, the Air Force was generally unprepared for a conventional limited war in Korea. Air Force personnel assigned to Korea conducting special operations were divided on trying to balance support of the Central Intelligence Agency’s JACK and Far Eastern Command’s CCRAK. The problem with the chain of command caused frustration for airmen and operators alike (see Appendix D, Figure 3). In summarizing, Air Force unconventional operations during the Korean conflict were moderately successful despite the odds being

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85 Futrell, 319. In fiscal year 1951, the Air Force expanded aircraft procurement for 8,578 aircraft. Of these airframes, a dismal number of aircraft used in special operations made the order form (22 SA-16A search and rescue amphibians, 182 helicopters, and 111 liaison aircraft, of which, all had to support global mission requirements.
86 Aerospace Studies Institute, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53,” project no. AU-411-62-ASI, January 1964, 196. The United Nations command failed to effectively organize and use partisan resources available. Compare for example, the allied support of the French resistance during World War II with the United Nations support of the North Korean partisans. No joint politico-military establishment existed under the UN command, such as the Special Forces Headquarters in London during World War II, which combined the Office of Strategic Services and Special Operations Executive with the leadership of Allied governments-in-exile and, consequently, provided a coordinated, security-conscious, quick reaction, and positive leadership. No Carpetbagger group operated under the Fifth Air Force, as did the Eighth Air Force in England. The air unit, which came closest to resembling the Carpetbaggers, was the Kyushu Gypsy Squadron, officially the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, which happened to draw most of the missions flown in support of the partisans.
against them. Those that participated in air operations noted that had a better command structure been in place and doctrinal application been developed and applied, the outcome could have been more productive for the Central Intelligence Agency, Army, and Air Force unconventional units. It is interesting to note that one would be lucky to find even a passing reference to unconventional warfare in post-Korea official concepts or doctrine of the Air Force.\footnote{Based on the authors’ review of Robert Frank Futrell’s, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1960. Two sources with excellent information concerning Air Force operations in support of unconventional warfare both during and after Korea include Report, Aerospace Studies Institute, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53,” project no. AU-411-62-ADI (January 1964) and Michael E. Haas, Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).}

**Post-Korean Organizational Changes: The Birth of Army Special Forces**

The effort to establish a permanent unconventional warfare capability started before the outbreak of Korea. In 1946, one insightful Brigadier General, Robert A. McClure, proposed a psychological warfare course be inserted into the service school curriculum. Initially unsuccessful, he sent his former boss, General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff of the Army, a personal memo calling for action. The outbreak of the Korean conflict gave McClure the support needed to get his fledgling project off the ground.

Because of his association with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, McClure appreciated the potential role of unconventional warfare and lobbied for proponency of unconventional warfare.\footnote{Alfred H. Paddock Jr., “Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of Army Special Warfare,” Special Warfare, Fall 1999, 6.} On January 15, 1951, the Army established the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, the first of its kind in the Army structure. The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare eventually organized itself with three sub-components: Psychological Warfare, Requirements, and Special Operations. Realizing that the efforts for unconventional warfare were too late for Korea, the Special Operations section set its sights on Europe and set into place a seven-step strategy for unconventional warfare with the newly activated 10th Special Forces Group.\footnote{COL Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Beret: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), 151. According to Bank’s account: “We determined the following: (1) Europe, primarily the Soviet Satellites, would be the prime target area. Current intelligence confirmed the existence of a huge, dormant resistance/guerrilla potential in that area. (2) Since the Army had never conducted covert unconventional warfare operations in Europe, the Office of Strategic Services heritage would be utilized as}
The Air Force, too, had a small group busy trying to establish an unconventional warfare capability within its own ranks. The apparent interest of Air Force in unconventional warfare originated from a request by an agency “outside the Department of Defense” (assumed to be the Central Intelligence Agency) looking for a means of infiltration behind the Iron Curtain. 60 Finally a capability was established and the aircraft authorization tables allocated to each wing included 12 B-29s, four C-119s, four SA-16s (amphibian aircraft), and, for the 581st only (operating in Korea), four H-19s (helicopters). 61 However apparent the need for specialized units, the units were deactivated on 1 January 1954. In order to continue providing the air support required by the Special Forces and Central Intelligence Agency, the Air Force elected to transfer the capability to the Air National Guard. 62

**Technology**

Korea brought about three significant technological advances that had significant impact in the coming decade: the helicopter, the amphibious plane, and long range infiltration platforms.

*H-19 Helicopter*

In development during the closing days of World War II, the helicopter caught the interest of the Office of Strategic Services which recognized the helicopter’s potential value in special operations. 63 The helicopter conducted most of the recovery pickups of downed airmen in Korea, despite the fact that there were only four helicopters

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60 Haas, 98.
61 Haas, 104.
62 Haas, 130.
63 In a letter dated 25 February 1944, Major General Donovan stated to General “Hap” Arnold, “When you get the new helicopter s we would be very grateful if you would assign a few of them to us for experimental purposes and also if you could give us some advice on pick-up planes that would be better than the Lysanders.” (Air Force Historical Research Agency document, call # 187.16A).
employed. In addition to rescue, the H-19s were invaluable for inserting agents and resupplying guerrillas in the field, often in the face of great danger and in limited visibility.

SA-16 Amphibian Sea Plane

The seaplane was not unique to the military services or to action in Korea. The uniqueness of Korea is the fact that water surrounds most of the country. Thus, the SA-16 proved quite valuable. This clandestine capability is missing in today’s inventory. It appears to make sense to have a variant of the SA-16, given the fact that today’s strategic focus is on the possibility of conflict in the littoral regions.

Infiltration and Exfiltration

In the opening days of establishing unconventional warfare in Korea, the immediate problem was insertion and exfiltration in denied areas. One quick solution was to use modified B-29s, which had the range to infiltrate behind enemy lines and parachute agents. This posed a problem for two reasons: first, the B-29 was unforgiving at the low altitudes required to avoid communist radar; second, the B-29 was operating at near stall speed when exiting parachutists. Experimentation continued on infiltration platforms once the special operations airframes transferred to the Air National Guard. However, nothing significant would occur until the early 1960s when President Kennedy would direct the Department of Defense to focus on insurgency.

Political Factors

Unconventional warfare in the 1950s involved political theory as well as military theory. The Communists certainly viewed unconventional warfare in this manner. The

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94 Haas, 86.
95 Haas, 86. One must keep in mind that in Korea, the Allies had no equipment which allowed for precision navigation or night vision equipment. As pointed out by Michael Haas: “Without the benefit of today’s reliable radar altimeters, night vision goggles, and sophisticated navigation equipment, these missions demanded superb airmanship at the rawest “stick and rudder” level. Close calls were inevitable. Robert Sullivan, then a second lieutenant, vividly recalls the night he felt the nose of the helicopter tug and dip slightly as he flew the helo’s nose wheels into frigid ocean waters; it would happen again to others.”
96 Haas, 129-35.
97 F.O. Miksche, *Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements* (London, England: Faber and Faber Limited, June 1950), 12. Miksche states: “The reader will also understand what Lenin meant when, during the study of a book by Clausewitz he penciled in the famous marginal comment: ‘War for a Communist state is the continuation of the revolution by other means.’ When one regards world events in this light it becomes clear that we are already at war with the East to-day, whether we care to acknowledge this state of things or not (emphasis in original). It is possible to fight battles not only with conventional armies, but also with revolutionary forces.”
Communists guessed right that the West would not risk nuclear war with them for the Third World. Toward the end of the 1950s, the newly established, albeit fledgling unconventional warfare units had a hint of what lay ahead. Revolts in Poland, Ukraine, and Hungary gave some proof that there was a potential for unconventional warfare to be useful. Nevertheless, this would undoubtedly be a Central Intelligence Agency function. The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency worked out a rudimentary system, however, conflict escalated.

The Central Intelligence Agency had the overall responsibility under the National Security Council directives for covert operations to support unconventional warfare. The Central Intelligence Agency would be the “peacetime” agent. In a theater, where hostilities were occurring that required military forces to conduct unconventional warfare, the Department of Defense would outline the employment method. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) developed their concept through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the theater Unconventional Warfare Annex, with an information copy going to the Central Intelligence Agency for a support estimate. In addition, as the Central Intelligence Agency was in the lead in peacetime, it was necessary to integrate them fully into any war plan. This process, using Europe as an example, is demonstrated in Figure 3-1.

![Figure 3-1: Unconventional Warfare Planning Cycle](image)

Although there was “hard won recognition for the value of unconventional warfare,” the special operations units were by the end of the 1950s decaying and the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, responsible for training and doctrine, had become marginal, requiring a purge in leadership. Units were evicted out of a garrison environment and immersed in the Army Training Test system to regain their atrophied field skills. One conclusion from this fact is that had political leaders seriously turned to special operations for unconventional warfare in wartime, there were no forces adequately trained to meet the task. The shake up and its effects were still ongoing when President Kennedy turned his attention to special warfare in the early 1960s.

The Korean conflict highlighted a substantial problem in the post-conflict demobilization phase concerning partisans. In FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (20 April 1990) it states briefly, “Demobilization is an important and difficult phase of UW, yet it is often neglected in initial UW planning.” Very few planners of unconventional warfare “look forward, reason back.” In Korea, these problems quickly became evident with the signing of the truce accords.

Many overlooked the fact that the partisans largely were refuges that had taken up arms to support the United Nations objectives. There was a problem of allowing the partisans into the ROK forces. This is due to their northern origins. The South Korean forces looked upon the partisans with trepidation, fearing them to be communist agents. The second issue was the fact that many of these partisans still had family in the north. In the end, two rather perplexing choices were available to the partisans: (1) continue to receive logistical support until they were integrated in the ROK forces, or (2) stay at their island bases and have all logistical support cut off and become stateless refugees. The problem of demobilization is the one aspect of unconventional warfare that remains a

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99 Ian D.W. Sutherland, 210-14.
101 No effort had been made by either the Republic of Korea government or American officials to address the legal status of the partisans before it became a problem. This was particularly significant in this conflict where political considerations played a major role in military strategies and tactics during the war and became the overriding factor in the talks to end the war. Malcom, 183.
102 Malcom, 188.
problem and demands the greatest amount of intellectual energy if it is going to be a viable option in the future.

**Cultural Factors**

The unconventional warfare concept developed during the Korean conflict includes some valuable “lessons learned” concerning culture that warrant scrutiny. One of the greatest defects noted was the fact that the incoming Special Forces personnel had no cultural knowledge or language capability.

With the focus on Europe and Congress passing the Lodge Act, immigrants, many of whom had defected from Eastern Europe, could earn their citizenship through military service. Special Forces benefited from the Lodge Act and certainly exploited the cultural and language expertise of refugees in this regard. Colonel Bank pointed out: “Although personnel can be taught the basics of UW in a three-month crash course, it takes at least a year to teach a foreign language to the point where one is operationally language capable. Area studies also require considerable time.”

**Results**

The Korean conflict produced a permanent, albeit miniature unconventional warfare capability in the U.S. armed forces. By 1956, articles began to appear concerning this new capability, often taking on the form of an advertisement for recruits rather than a discussion of operations and theory. However, unconventional warfare became understood as support for partisan elements behind enemy lines. Although partisan activity in Korea was not well established, it did allow concepts to be tested and it does appear that a select few had the foresight to pay attention to what had occurred.

So what did the partisans accomplish? Ben Malcom states:

Records show that between May 1951 and the signing of the truce in July 1953 the partisans claimed to have conducted 4,445 actions throughout North Korea in which 69,000 causalities (dead and wounded) were inflicted, 950 prisoners and 5,000 weapons were captured, 2,700 vehicles and 80 bridges were destroyed, and 3,800 tons of food were destroyed or liberated from the North Koreans. The total

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103 Bank, 131.
cost to the U.S. government: roughly $100 million.  Malcom acknowledges that actual verification was difficult concerning partisan efforts. He states: “partisan claims of success were probably no more inflated than those of many American line officers in Korea and later in Vietnam.”

Certainly, variables such as new technology (rotary wing aviation) gave promise of greater things to come. By focusing on unconventional warfare, the cadre formed would have a significant impact on special operations in the coming decade. The principle lesson learned was that unconventional warfare must be prepared to change directions from its focus on operating strictly behind enemy lines and employing partisans in guerrilla warfare to learning how to fight communist insurgents in the “counterinsurgency era.”

Thus, in September 1957, then Air Force Colonel E.G. Lansdale drafted a memorandum (see Appendix E) entitled *A Cold War Program for Defense*. The issue according to Lansdale was his attempt to outline a policy to ensure that every effort was employed to use the unconventional warfare capability correctly during the Cold War.

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105 Malcom, 192. It is noted that advisors to the partisans in Korea were technically not allowed to accompany their partisans on raids in North Korean territory. This fact makes accountably all that much harder.

106 Malcom, 192.

107 Ben S. Malcom, a Korean partisan veteran leader stated: “By the time I returned to the United States in September 1965, the transition from guerrilla insurgency to full-scale war had been completed [Vietnam]...The opportunity to win the people had passed. Unconventional warfare and special operations would now have to be employed in a different manner, as a smaller part of a wider war in which more conventional units and tactics were also being employed. During my time in Vietnam I saw no indication, other than among the Special Forces personnel, that any of the knowledge we had gained about special operations and unconventional warfare in Korea had been passed along.” Malcom, 209.
Within the memo, Lansdale mentions special warfare directly and indirectly 11 times. Much of the memorandum appears applicable to today’s security environment and is worthy of at least a cursory review.

CHAPTER 4

THE KNIGHTS OF CAMELOT

My congratulations to you personally for your part in the presentation today... The challenge of this old but new form of operations is a real one and I know that you and the members of your command will carry on for us and the free world in a manner which is both worthy and inspiring. I am sure that the green beret will be a mark of distinction in the trying times ahead.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy to General Yarborough, 12 October 1961

This great people’s war has gloriously defeated the U.S. imperialist’s special war and is on an irreversible course of vigorous development. Events have proved from the time they began to send U.S. troops to wage direct aggression in the south, the U.S. imperialists have been defeated. They have been compelled to scatter their forces and are in a defensive position on all battlefields. In waging the war of aggression against the north, the U.S. imperialists have knocked their heads against a firm steel bastion.

General Vo Nguyen Giap, “Big Victory Great Task,” 1968

Introduction

The 1960s ushered in what Francois Sully described as the “Age of Guerrilla War.”[109] In 1962, Franklin A. Lindsay wrote in Foreign Affairs concerning communist “unconventional warfare”:

As yet the West has not developed a form of defense that is adequate against this form of warfare. And even where the defense has been effective, the cost to the West of suppressing such attacks have been many time the costs to the Communists mounting them.[110]

In closing his essay, Lindsay concluded with an observation of ongoing American efforts in standing up the Army’s Special Forces for a role in counter-guerrilla fighting. He noted: “This capability must be quickly matched with the political skills to conduct

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unconventional warfare at the village level. This will require training in depth and an extraordinarily high level of individual aptitude and competence.”

President Kennedy, a noted student of insurgency, pushed a reluctant “military establishment” toward an increasing attentiveness to their role in counterinsurgency. In October 1961, President Kennedy witnessed a dramatic display at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he saw the Army’s Special Forces up close. Not having any other force which met his expectations, the President ordered an increase in Special Forces, but this was welcomed by some and scoffed at by others.

The commitment of Army Special Forces to operations in Vietnam would move them to the opposite end of the spectrum, now they were not the guerrilla, but his hunter. In this role, Army Special Forces would retain the guerrilla warfare ethos, however, as they recruited and employed indigenous “guerrillas” to fight the Viet Cong, as well as perform special reconnaissance and direct action missions.

What emerged from Vietnam was confusion, disappointment, and some rhetorical overstatements from various authors, many of which distort the truth of operational capabilities. Others simply want to forget the history and move past mentioning the special operations role in the war. However, Vietnam seemed to redefine

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111 Lindsay, 274. Ironically, in the paragraph before this statement, he stated: “The West needs to acquire the ability to conduct unconventional warfare successfully, and it must do so quickly. The Communists have evolved a highly effective strategy combining grassroots political organization and guerrilla warfare which they are employing against the non-Communist world. They have devised a totalitarian political structure that is highly resistant to counter-attack. The creation by the West of an adequate defensive and offensive capability for political and guerrilla warfare will require time and effort. It must be pursued vigorously and without further delay.” This same article also appeared in the June 1962 issues of the *Air Intelligence Bulletin* and *Military Review.*

112 The impact of this visit to Fort Bragg was mixed. Ian D.W. Sutherland stated: “Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg in October 1961 was a triumph in the Special Warfare marketing process.” Ian D.W. Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army, 1952-1982* (San Jose, Calif.: R. James Bender Publishing, 1990), 219. Others writing about the visit are harsher in their analysis. Michael T. Klare noted: “Former Green Beret Master Sergeant Donald Duncan, who participated in the exercise while a student at Fort Bragg, later described this event as an elaborate farce: So few qualified men were around that the judo and [other stunt] teams were imported from the Ranger School at Fort Benning…Much of the equipment shown, including the rocket, had never been seen before and probably would never be seen again.” Donald Duncan, *The New Legions* (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1967), 146, as cited in Michael T. Klare, *War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams* (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972), 40.

113 Richard H. Shultz, Jr. who had access to recently declassified documents concerning special operations in Vietnam stated: “While a library full of books has been written on almost every other aspect of the Vietnam War, missing from those studies is a strategic and operational assessment of SOG [Studies and Observation Group]….Without the full story of the covert paramilitary campaign waged by SOG there are important chapters missing from the histories of the conflict.” Richard H. Shultz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam* (New
unconventional warfare. Larry Cable best describes this: “It [the Vietnam War] combined aspects of conventional and guerrilla war. It mixed insurgency with partisan conflict.”\[^{114}\] It was Vietnam that confirmed the idea that unconventional warfare is political as well as military and not simply the Office of Strategic Services partisan-type guerrilla operations generally thought of.

**Strategic Context**

The Korean conflict affected the way that the U.S. looked at itself concerning the Cold War and containment. Candidates for political office were soured on containment and promised another way by either “making liberty a beacon-light of hope” or promising to conduct arms control and summit talks. The U.S. spent vast amounts on national defense, and supported the first peacetime conscription, only to find by the end of the 1950s that a request for more was being asked due to the new focus on "limited wars."\[^{115}\]

Kennedy understood Communist goals. In January 1961, Chairman Khrushchev stated at a party conference that he openly supported “liberation wars” and within the body of that speech he spoke specifically of Vietnam.\[^{116}\] Khrushchev knew of what he


\[^{115}\] In the June 1958 *Army Information Digest*, readers were informed, “The deterrent to the all-out war is not enough, for it cannot assuredly deter limited war, and it is not designed for the conduct of limited operations.” A new doctrine focus was occurring and there were seven principles outlined in this new shift: (1) Limited war is possible; (2) There is a valid distinction between unlimited and limited operations; (3) Maintenance of the objective; (4) In limited wars, limitations will be placed upon area of conflict, targets subject to attack, and weapons employed; (5) The absolute precondition for limited war is the maintenance of the strategic deterrent; (6) Rapid and effective counteraction is the single most important operational capability for limited war; and (7) Mutual support. “Limited War: The Prospects and Possibilities,” *Army Information Digest*, June 1958, 20.

spoke. One only need recall that he controlled Soviet partisan efforts during the Second World War. When this news hit the West, Kennedy quickly focused his efforts upon Southeast Asia. However, in light of facts known today, the strategy for fighting in Vietnam was ambiguous, especially when President Johnson took over the White House in late 1963.

**Doctrine and Organization**

The Army was the largest agent, and for the most part the sole agent for advancing any form of unconventional warfare doctrine. Initially, the Special Forces focused on conducting exercises and developing doctrine concerning unconventional warfare. By 1959, the idea of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) was imbedded into the doctrine, which would employ the Special Forces in support of campaign objectives (refer to figure 4-1) of a theater commander.

In figure 4-1, the JUWTF established itself as a component command, parallel with the Navy, Air Force, and Army under the theater commander in order to meet his requirements outlined in the Unconventional Warfare Annex. Once hostilities started, the JUWTF would designate a Special Forces Liaison Party (SFLP), attached to the Army component commander, to deconflict and control ongoing unconventional activities occurring with Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFOD). The SFODs, working behind the Forward Line of Troops, would report their locations, intelligence, and other

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117 In three separate issues of the information paper, *Armed Forces Information and Education for Commanders*, the reader would find increased emphasis on Southeast Asia: “Viet-nam: Crucial Testing Ground for Freedom” (vol. 1, no. 2, 1 August 1961); “North Viet-nam and the Threat to Southeast Asia” (vol. 1, no. 11, 15 December 1961); and “LAOS: Hot Spot in the Cold War” (vol. 1, no. 22, 24 May 1962).

118 The overall American strategy concerning Communism had three overarching goals: (1) To prevent the Communists from extending their domain and to make it increasingly costly, dangerous, and futile for them to try and do so; (2) To achieve agreements or understandings which reduced the danger of a devastating war; (3) To encourage evolution within the Communist world toward national independence, peaceful cooperation, and open societies. “U.S. Policy Toward International Communism,” *Armed Forces Information Education for Commanders*, vol. 3, no. 18, 15 March 1964, 3. In one RAND report from January 1964, the author, G. C. Reinhardt, wrote the following which sums up the questions many policy makers did not seriously define during the conflict in Vietnam: “Public understanding of national policy today leaves vague three critical aspects: (1) What constitutes the threat in South Vietnam; native insurgents who must be converted into loyal citizens or covert invaders from a foreign power whose will to continue the struggle must be broken? (2) How to enunciate our policy in terms likely to obtain full support of the American people for what promises to be a lengthy effort? (3) What is being done to deter or, if necessary, defeat any escalation of “creeping aggression?” *Guerrilla-combat, Strategy and Deterrence in Southeast Asia*, RAND Report P-2706-1, (Santa Monica, Calif.: January 1964), 6. On file, Air Force Historical Research Agency, call number K146.003-78.
important information to the SFLP, which would pass this information to the conventional commander. As corps and divisional elements took control of the areas where SFODs were established, the SFLP forward would transfer to the corps/division headquarters to provide liaison functions.¹¹⁹ A depiction is in figure 4-1-A. The JUWTF would continue to provide logistical support for the deployed SFODs.¹²⁰ This is largely reminiscent of the command and control described for the Office of Strategic Services, mentioned earlier in Chapter 2.

It is important to note that Special Forces employment was predicated on the lessons of the Second World War and Korea; that is, Special Forces soldiers would raise partisan units behind Soviet lines to conduct raids, sabotage, intelligence collection, and other missions. In Vietnam, “partisans” translated to the indigenous populations in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, organized to secure South Vietnam.

However, when President Kennedy entered office, the focus turned away from

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¹¹⁹ Stanton, 64-86. According to Shelby L. Stanton, the Special Forces were employed along the border in camps in an attempt to secure the border from North Vietnamese infiltration. The employment of these camps takes on much of the same doctrinal organization under the JUWTF.

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partisan warfare. As noted, special operations forces, namely Special Forces, became the counter-guerrilla experts based on their guerrilla warfare training experience. This doctrine change was reflected in September 1961 with the publication of FM 31-21,

*Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, which stated: “In addition, they [Special Forces] may train foreign military personnel in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, thus enhancing the defense capability of the nation concerned. When so employed, special forces units supplement the U.S. military assistance groups and army missions.”¹²¹ The employment of unconventional warfare in a counterinsurgent role would now become the primary focus of the Special Forces, which would continue for the next thirty years. Gary Jones and Christopher Tone have argued that the 1969 edition of FM 31-21 reflected an incorporation of insurgent (I) doctrine into guerrilla warfare (GW) and stated, the “Special Forces role [as written in the 1969 doctrine] was training

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indigenous forces and leading them in the conduct of guerrilla war or insurgency as unconventional warfare (UW). Their formula, UW=GW+I, is exactly the role that unconventional warfare played in Vietnam where unconventional warfare was carried out under the counterinsurgency umbrella, known now as “foreign internal defense.” As a result, Special Forces today believe in thinking that if they can do foreign internal defense they can also do unconventional warfare, since unconventional warfare in their minds is merely foreign internal defense in a denied area.


As noted the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg released a new FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations,* in September 1961. Then commander

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121 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations,* September 1961, 12. Keep in mind that military advisors were working in the Philippines and Greece long before Special Forces came into existence.

122 Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces,” *Special Warfare,* Summer 1999, 6.

123 Jones and Tone, 6.


125 Doctrine according to Andrew F. Krepinevich, “is developed in several ways. Service schools (such as the Command and General Staff College [CGSC] and the Army War College), certain service commands (such as the United States Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command), and the professional journals (such as *Parameters, Military Review,* and *Armor*)…all contribute.” Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37-38. In the first four years of the decade, 1960-63, there was a sharp increase in articles within the professional journals that dealt with unconventional warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency. The increase grew 50% from the previous decade. This is purely a non-scientific approach used by the author. A simple count was made in prominent professional journals (i.e., *Marine Corps Gazette, Military Review, Infantry, The Airman, Military Affairs, Armor, Air Intelligence Training Bulletin,* and *Foreign Affairs*). From this research, the author came up with 21 articles concerning counterinsurgency, insurgency, or unconventional warfare from 1960-63.
of the Special Warfare Center, Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough said of the
time: “Familiar with the irregular-war doctrine of Mao Tse Tung, the president insisted
that the armed services prepare to cope with the new form of aggression. Thus the term
‘counterinsurgency’ was born and, with it, the presidential mandate to build an elite force
that could translate theory into action.” According to Yarborough in the same
interview, the Special Warfare Center stepped up its programs to meet the need for more
graduates (on the other side, critics argued that increases in programs would allow
standards to drop in order to meet the demand). In addition to the guerrilla theorists of
the time (Mao, Che’, and Giap), the instructors used Bernard Fall’s *Street Without Joy* as
a virtual textbook.

The fact is, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Special Warfare was suffering
from a leadership crisis in the late 1950s. Facts such as this raise the question if haste
was taken going into the conflict in Vietnam, was Special Forces truly ready for their new
role? Charles Simpson noted that “everyone rushed to get in on the act.” Simpson
summed up events in this manner:

> The services rushed new field manuals into print, and commercial
> publishing market brought out new books on resistance, insurgency,
> and guerrillas. The writings of Mao, Che, and Giap neared best-seller
> status, although it remains doubtful that many of those who acquired
> the books actually read them, or that of those who did, many grasped
> their lessons. The nation’s “think tanks,” from Santa Monica to
> Washington, joined in the chorus with a great rash of new studies. If
> there was a surfeit of information about the subject, there was also a
genuine enthusiasm, one reason for which was that, on paper,
counterinsurgency seems both logical and practical. Practice, of
course, was and is something else.

The Air Force under the leadership of a bomber-centric General Curtis Lemay
wasted little intellectual energy on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.
Dennis Drew of the School of Advanced Air Power Studies recently highlighted this fact.
Drew stated, “Air Force airmen seemed either supremely uninterested in the subject, or
assumed that in terms of airpower, protracted revolutionary warfare was just warfare writ

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127 Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,
1983), 65.
small.” A study conducted by the Airpower Research Institute in 1961 supports Drew’s statement. In preparing what later became Air Force doctrine for unconventional warfare, organizations and aircraft required to support unconventional warfare would come from those that currently existed in theater. This would lead the casual observer to conclude that unconventional warfare was not unique in any sense. In addition, the report went on to say that specialized aircraft were unnecessary. Moreover, in summarizing, the report stated that although there was no active duty organization specifically tailored for unconventional warfare, the four National Guard units could step up in a time of war. One cannot help but draw the conclusion from these facts that unconventional warfare was a secondary effort, and that it really was just a “small war” in view of the Air Force leadership.

Doctrine in place and developed over time influenced the way the war was fought in Vietnam and elsewhere in Indochina. Apparently unknown at the time, the Kennedy administration was committing more and more personnel to the cause in Vietnam as advisors and in the case of the Special Forces and Air Commandos, as actual combatants.

Although the expansion of “special warfare” occurred for worldwide deployment, the main effort was in Vietnam, and over the course of the involvement there, supporting the mission in Vietnam would take almost all of Special Forces’ talent. According to Francis John Kelly, the initial involvement of Special Forces in Vietnam occurred in 1957, with the training of some 58 Vietnamese soldiers. Ten years later, Special Forces would be advising and assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional and Popular Forces soldiers.

By 1964, the Special Forces in Vietnam were working regularly with the Montagnard tribes. The purpose of recruiting and training the Montagnard was that they were to provide the first line of defense against the increasing combat power of the Viet Cong. The Special Forces approached this mission in much the same manner as they had planned for unconventional warfare; the new twist was that they were now operating to

defeat another band of guerrillas versus a conventional military threat. Some cultural issues also occurred with the Special Forces supporting the Montagnards. As the Montagnards grew in capability this upset the South Vietnamese.¹³¹

Long range reconnaissance and raiding (later known as “special reconnaissance” and "direct action") also became important. By 1964, Special Forces had laid the groundwork for the Studies and Observation Group. The missions under SOG would be conducted on some occasions solely with U.S. special operations forces, but would eventually include indigenous formations conducting operations with Special Forces. The Studies and Observation Group operations would eventually involve reconnaissance in Cambodia and Laos. Special Forces would make up the greatest portion of this effort. The Studies and Observation Group never showed up on the official wiring diagram for forces inside Vietnam, rather it was a secret organization answering directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff after Kennedy relieved the Central Intelligence Agency from covert actions and forced it upon the Pentagon. Once indigenous personnel were organized for reconnaissance activities, the Studies and Observation Group established three field commands in Vietnam. The three commands consisted of Command and Control South (CCS), Command and Control Central (CCC), and Command and Control North (CCN).¹³² President Kennedy in effect removed the CIA from clandestine operations and turned it over to the military early in the war. The Studies and Observation Group became in effect the Office of Strategic Services, and the 5th Special Forces Group the Special Operations Branch. This arrangement over time would become clumsy and lead to a convoluted chain of command, with 5th Special Forces Group under the theater commander, and the Studies and Observation Group working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The twelve man operational detachment operating with the indigenous population was the basic “maneuver element” for special operations in Vietnam. The commander of each a detachment had full autonomy to conduct the war as he saw fit. The detachments

were however controlled and supported by their company headquarters (B-Team) operating with one of the five corps tactical zones within Vietnam. This type of arrangement was a first for American special warfare. Debates continue today regarding its effectiveness.

**Technology**

Like previous conflicts, Vietnam would continue to provide emerging technologies that would enhance the ability to conduct special operations, including gunships, night observation devices, and other unusual weapons. The greatest technology that emerged was the gunship. As the Special Forces pushed farther into the countryside, they did not have the luxury of artillery support for protection. Other than the mortars that were organic to Special Forces units, they had no other source of indirect fires. The gunship ultimately provided this support.

Due to the environment in which Special Forces found themselves operating in during Vietnam, one fact became immediately clear and that was the need to have dedicated aviation support. The Army Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (SWAD) concept originated from the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board in the early 1960s. Annex J concerned itself with Special Warfare Concepts and Requirements. The first SWAD was organized in January 1962. Although the vision by the SWAD concept did not materialize, a composite cousin to support SOG operations established itself in Vietnam. Starting in early 1964, the 75th Air Studies Group stood up under SOG. This

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133 Initially the concept started by using Air Force Air Commandos to drop flares on besieged camps. Air Force Captain Ronald W. Terry, after a fact-finding trip to Vietnam in 1963, wondered if more could be done. After returning, Terry observed the General Electric SUU-11A, a 7.62 mm minigun in use on a C-131 at Eglin, AFB. Within 90 days, Terry’s team was back in Vietnam to modify two C-47s into gunships. Thus the concept was born and continued to mature through out the conflict. Several years later, the AC-119 would emerge with target acquisition radar, a fire control center, and night observation devices (NOD). In addition, the armament increased from just 7.62 mm miniguns to two 20mm cannons. Other attachments included a 1.5 million-candlepower variable beam illuminator that could light up an area the size of a football field. A definite asset for troops engaging in combat at night. Eventually, the AC-119 technology would give way to better improvements. By 1967 the AC-130 was conducting field tests in Vietnam and this system proved even more potent than previous gunships, to include the largest weapon ever mated to an airframe, the 105 mm cannon.

134 Report on U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, “ANNEX J: Special Warfare Concepts and Requirements,” 31 July 1962, 12-13. The board conducted individual, specialist, counterinsurgency, and team training, and underwent partial evaluation and a limited wargame to test the organizational adequacy of this unit. With correction to the deficiencies from the testing, the proven concept was viable.

135 This unique and hybrid unit consisted of heavy, long-range airlift (C-130/C-123) and an assortment of rotary wing assets (AH-1, UH-1H, CH-3, CH-34, and the giant CH-53). In addition, forward air control assets came in the form of O-1, O-2, and OV-10s from both the Army and the Air Force. This unique
composite wing would later serve as an example for future Air Force Special Operations squadrons and wings as well as Army Special Operations aviation.

**Political Factors**

Starting on 8 May 1961, the Kennedy administration moved to increase the Special Forces in Vietnam. In a “Program of Action” meeting, Kennedy received a recommendation to deploy a Special Forces Group to Nha Trang in order to accelerate Vietnam’s own Special Forces training. Eventually, the 5th Special Forces Group established itself in-country per the president’s request. At the same time, Operational Plan (OPLAN) 34 was initiated by the Kennedy administration. OPLAN 34 activated the Studies and Observation Group with relative autonomy, and the unit began conducting agent insertions into North Vietnam in an attempt to foster some type of internal insurgency. Kennedy actively supported these programs, and for all practical purposes, he did not seem worried about their political ramifications. Later, the Studies and Observation Group would employ forces originally stood up by the 5th Special Forces Group in cross-border target acquisition and reconnaissance on the Ho Chi Minh trail. President Johnson on the other hand was opposed to these and other initiatives. Johnson approved all Studies and Observation Group missions conducted before execution and he severely limited what could be done by the Studies and Observation Group in North Vietnam because he was afraid that if an insurgency started in the north, it could bring China into the war. As revealed later, all of the agents were eventually captured or rendered ineffective.

Cloak and dagger operations always have some element of moral consequence. In late 1969, this was demonstrated when the commander of the 5th Special Forces Group, a promising West Pointer, stood accused of murdering a Vietnamese civilian. As the trial was underway and the publicity started to crank up, the charges were dropped. For reasons only known now, the “civilian” murdered, was in reality a double agent. This example serves to demonstrate the complex nature of special operations and the fact that sometimes what appears, as extreme measures to the casual outside observer, are combination of aircraft and pilots (to include contracted nationalist Chinese) provided a unique mix-and-match capability desired for special operations forces. Michael E. Haas, *Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 291-314.
necessary to protect your forces and operations in the field.  

Other questions have remained that are unnerving to political and military leaders alike. Whenever a certain group is sponsored in the conduct of unconventional warfare, a limited moral obligation is incurred to those risking their lives in those operations. Unfortunately, when the U.S. left Vietnam the indigenous personnel were left to their own fates at the hands of both the North and South Vietnamese who did not care for them. This example makes it harder for the United States to find “volunteers” in the future.

Results

Quantifying the measure of merit concerning the use of unconventional warfare in Vietnam continues to elude scholars, and not unlike previous uses of unconventional warfare, the results are intangible. In a breakthrough book, Richard H. Schultz, Jr. has identified seven issues that are important in examining the use of unconventional warfare during the Vietnam conflict. These observations are still fitting today:

First, the derring-do nature of special operations has had an enduring allure for the White House. However, while being drawn to the use of covert action in the belief that it will quickly resolve a difficult foreign policy problem, presidents have generally shown little understanding of what it can and cannot accomplish.

Second, presidents have also worried about employing clandestine methods, fearing the potential political fallout if the operations were exposed. This anxiety has led to uncertainty over the extent to which covert proposals should be carried out and has resulted in reduced efforts that then produced limited results.

Third, the effective use of covert action as an instrument of policy proved to be a persistent challenge for the White House during the Cold War. Presidents and their advisors were frequently inept in the coordination and integration of covert action with political, economic, military, and information warfare capabilities while

138 In 1995, these veterans of America’s covert war filed a class-action suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C., for compensation—back pay in accordance with their contracts. The federal government decided to fight the case using shabby legal maneuvers. The commandos, Pentagon lawyers argued, had no contractual arrangements with the United States—they had signed agreements with SOG’s South Vietnamese counterpart, the STD. Shultz, 324.
simultaneously meeting political objectives. All too often, covert action was viewed as something detached from these other instruments of policy.

Fourth, organizing and managing complex covert programs has also been hard for the United States because it can involve the coordinated use of different tactics—agents, deception, psywar, sabotage, paramilitary actions—focused on a strategic aim or objective. The tactics used in these larger efforts were often poorly coordinated in Cold War covert operations.

Fifth, when more than one government agency is involved in a covert operation, the organizational and managerial challenges multiply. These situations have frequently been characterized by disputes, rather than cooperation, among the agencies involved, which undermines effectiveness. The coordination process becomes even more exacting when U.S. agencies have to establish working liaison arrangements with foreign government or group to execute the covert program.

Sixth, employing different covert-action techniques, especially against denied areas and hard targets, presented the United States with persistent operational-level challenges. Using these methods required creative planners knowledgeable about the target and operators capable of developing and executing specific projects and action programs. There was often a shortage of both.

Finally, the difficulty of developing tools to measure the impact of covert-operations programs was an impediment that plagued U.S. efforts in Cold War operations.\[139\]

To some, special operations seemed to have proved its worth in Vietnam at least at the tactical and operational levels. They provided additional forces for conventional operations, albeit horribly misused, and executed reconnaissance and interdiction missions on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Nevertheless, given that these operations had no clear strategic direction, they appear on the surface to have been wasted efforts. As noted after Vietnam, special operations occur at tactical/operational levels, but have strategic effects. Once the conflict ended, a reduction in special operations forces occurred, that would render the special operations community all but ineffective until the mid-1980s. Part of the reason that special operations and unconventional warfare declined after Vietnam is the fact that they were never taken seriously or incorporated properly by the more conventionally minded traditionalists, who viewed them as mere “side-shows.” The

focus returned to Europe following Vietnam, much like it always has since the last days of the Korean War. Perhaps Francis J. Kelly, a former commander of Special Forces in Vietnam, said it best: “The record of service performed in the past becomes doubly valuable when viewed in the light of possible combat in the future. If, as predicted, the cycle of wars continues to emphasize the limited-objective, political-military struggle and to avoid massive dispositions of regular forces, the U.S. Army Special Forces will not have to prove its claim as an exceptionally effective combat unit in the limited conflict.”

Regardless of current attempts to turn away from what special operations did in Vietnam, any serious student of unconventional warfare would be ill served to disregard this important phase of special operations forces history. Within this decade is found many insights into what special operations is being asked to do in today's current strategic environment. Richard Shultz describes it this way:

Since the 1970s covert action has been the subject of intense public policy controversy. To what extent it should be employed by a democratic government has been widely debated. Many believe that it is inconsistent with American principles and, with rare exceptions, should be shunned. With the end of the Cold War those who hold this position have become increasingly outspoken. They believe that covert action employs morally and ethnically dubious means that violate America’s democratic values. Others disagree and call for a more balance approach.

Greg Walker maintains that conventional commanders could not effectively eliminate unconventional warfare and special operations because the Central Intelligence Agency needed the “manpower and technical expertise.” Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this study, the Vietnam War altered unconventional warfare as originally conceived in 1950s doctrine, by adding “insurgent theory” into it.

However, post Vietnam special operations doctrine would return to the 1950s as the focus returned to Europe and the Soviet threat. Special Forces would obtain credibility in the next decade by steering clear of unconventional warfare, instead turning to the new found foreign internal defense mission with host nation militaries and

141 Shultz, 327.
spreading the gospel of democracy. Marc J. Gilbert seems critical that the U.S. still can conduct foreign internal defense properly. He stated in 1993 regarding Vietnam that:

Yet, rather than accept the lesson that they had been out-thought, if not out-fought, some American military analysts claim that the final Communist offensive proves that they were correct in their original assessment. They are reluctant to advocate the updating of the United States Army’s counterinsurgency tactics, which they consider—as they did in the Vietnam era—a mere sideshow, diverting the American military from its real mission: the set-piece conventional battle. Even so, the Pentagon has recently made an effort to better integrate low-intensity warfare into its training programs. But it has yet to fully translate this training into operational policy—no doubt because it has failed to fully fathom the nature of armed struggle in Vietnam, or to closely examine why armed struggle has taken such different courses in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Central America.  

From the statement above, perhaps the prediction by Giap at the opening of this chapter is not far from the truth. In addition, taking on what has been described as “raids, rescue, and Rambo” direct action and special reconnaissance missions would make special operations look more adapted to the conventional military establishment, who after all control the purse strings and promotions. In the next major employment of Special Forces, the force would fit its new role. The veterans who grew up under the

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143 “Everyone forgets Special Forces was essentially and experiment in 1952,” recounts noted special-warfare historian Shelby L. Stanton. “After Vietnam, in my opinion, the army would have been pleased to simply do away with the entire unit. But this was not possible, for a number of reasons.” The approach taken was to get rid of as many Vietnam-era Special Forces operators as possible, through a number of means. Says Stanton of this purging, “The army wanted to start a new Special Forces, one whose ranks were untainted by everything Vietnam encompassed. In a sense, they wanted to take Special Forces back.
mantle of unconventional warfare would be scratching their heads, looking at the new
guys, wondering, and questioning where this mission disappeared.
CHAPTER 5

SINKING INTO THE ABYSS…RISING OUT OF PURGATORY

I question the prudence of announcing to the world that we will not participate in certain forms of conflict then sealing the invitation for those who wish us ill to practice those forms by rendering ourselves virtually impotent.

LTC Donald B. Vought, May 1977

Introduction

In the early 1970s, military strategists generally did not want to hear about special operations forces and unconventional warfare. The Vietnam operations gave the impression that results had been poor. However, a change in the national strategy would affect the posture of special operations in the late 1970s and 1980s. The first major shift was provided by the Nixon doctrine, which specified that assisted states would defend themselves and not rely on the use of US conventional forces. This was followed by President Carter’s policy that emphasized human rights in foreign and military aid programs.

During this period special operations suffered from the post-Vietnam drawdown. In the first half of the 1970s, there was an approximately 70 percent reduction in the manning of special operations forces and a 95 percent reduction in funding. World and national events soon unfolded however that postponed the death of special operations. A Defense Department reorganization resulted in the resuscitation of the special operations forces.

Rebuilding a capability for special operations in the mid-1980s proved a time of great success as well as frustration. The process carried on up to the opening days of Desert Shield in August 1990. As in the 1960s under President Kennedy, President Reagan proved unable to push the Department of Defense to organize special operations for what became known as “low intensity conflict.”

Under President Reagan, special operations used unconventional warfare to support national security goals. In addition, foreign internal defense, a more politically

acceptable mission, assisted nations such as El Salvador to oppose communist insurgencies with direct involvement of US advisors. This chapter will examine the efforts to rebuild special operations and the changes that occurred which eventually left unconventional warfare as a secondary mission.

**Strategic Environment**

The “wars of national liberation” were far from over after Vietnam. The foreword to *Special Operations in US Strategy* gives an account of insurgency in the last half of the 1970s:

Thus, in the last half of the 1970s, eight pro-Soviet communist parties seized power in Asia, Africa, and Central America with hardware (plus subversive software) provided by the Kremlin. These include Hanoi’s invasion of South Vietnam (1975), the Pathlet Lao’s triumph in Laos (1975), the MPLA’s defeat of two rival insurgent groups in Angola (1975-1976), Colonel Mengistu’s coup de main in Ethiopia (1977), Hanoi’s replacement of Pol Pot in Cambodia with a pro-Soviet regime (1979), and the Sandinista overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua (1979).

Against this backdrop Reagan initiated a conventional military buildup in 1981 which included a renewed emphasis on the special operations forces. Reagan’s policy was essentially containment of communism but also included a program to rollback communist gains. The strategy of rollback was carried out in sponsoring the Contras, Afghan freedom fighters, and in invading Grenada. Colin Powell described Secretary of

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145 One must keep in mind that in FM 31-21 (14 February 1969 edition), *Special Forces Operations*, there is no mission entitled “foreign internal defense.” Mission include “Plan, conduct, and support stability operations.” Additional guidance for this mission can be found in a manual produced locally by the Special Warfare Center in the early 1960s, ST 31-176, *Counterinsurgency Planning Guide*. Page 34 of ST 31-176 outlines paramilitary forces in concept (which include self-defense forces and civil defense groups). Both of the paramilitary groups outlined in ST 31-176 were developed, supported, and trained by Special Forces personnel in Vietnam. Again, reflection back to the 1969 version of FM 31-21, specifically Special Forces capabilities listed on page 1-2 will demonstrate a linkage to the ST 31-176 in that special forces possess specific capabilities according to FM 31-21 (1969) to—“Train, advise, and assist non-U.S. military or paramilitary forces, to include operational, logistical, and fiscal support.” This would lead one to conclude that this is the early genesis of what has evolved into foreign internal defense and a skill that has root and some characteristics of unconventional warfare, nevertheless applied in a different situation.

State George Schultz as seeing the contras as useful for pushing the Sandinistas to the bargaining table where they would be persuaded toward democracy. Powell describes Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger as seeing the contras and the mujahideen in Afghanistan in a “romantic vein” and as “freedom fighters.” Powell used his Vietnam experience to leverage legislative support for the contras by stating: “I’ve been in the jungle, I’ve been where the contras are now, except that it was in Vietnam in 1963. You cannot imagine how desperately we waited for that Marine helicopter to supply us every two weeks. Our lives, not just our comfort, hung on that delivery. It’s no different for the contras today.”

Nevertheless, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, communism in the Soviet Union was dealt its final death blow. Under President Bush, the Defense Department started reducing the armed forces on the eve of Desert Storm in August 1990. There was an understanding that the security environment had changed, and this left defense planners wondering about the new strategic picture where the US was the sole superpower.

**Doctrine**

Although set back by the experience of Vietnam, unconventional warfare doctrine and thought had supporters who worked to keep the mission alive. Under the “Nixon Doctrine,” the US provided protection from “nuclear powers,” but the burden was placed upon threatened allied nations to provide an adequate conventional defense. According to Thomas Adams: “Nixon’s announcement marked the beginning of a period extending through the end of the Carter administration in 1980, that critics saw as marked by the

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148 Powell and Persico, 340.
desire for a unilateral US withdrawal, especially unconventional, involvement out the North Atlantic community.”

Several events in the 1970s affected unconventional warfare and special operations doctrine in the 1980s and early 1990s. First was the return of conventional warfighting focused in Europe. From this traditional policy emerged the concepts of “active defense” and eventually “AirLand Battle.” This shift came from observing the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Army studied this war intensively and, under the tutelage of General William E. Dupuy, focused considerable intellectual energy on combat with heavy mechanized and armored formations. With this renewed conventional focus the requirement for unconventional forces was reduced considerably. Secondly, the terrorist threat became graphically apparent with the murder of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Olympic Games. This demonstrated the West’s vulnerability and the US moved to create special counter-terrorist units modeled on the British Special Air Service, the West German GSG-9, and Israeli Commandos. Finally, the overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua would establish another Marxist state in the Western Hemisphere in 1979.

In the mid-1970s, British Brigadier General Frank Kitson’s book, *Low Intensity Operations*, became known in the US. According to Thomas Adams, the term “low

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151 Counters to the initial 1976 FM 100-5 by special operations comes in another article appearing in the February 1978 *Military Review*. The authors, one from the Air Force and from the Army, challenge directly the field manual’s failure to address the special operations forces application to the “modern battlefield.” The authors in their summary state bluntly: “We have attempted to remind the US strategist of the utility of special operations in supporting the main battle. We have accepted that the Army will not change the thrust of its preparation; therefore, special operations forces must be applied within that context or be labeled “not applicable” which we feel, is the first step in an institutional process that ultimately will do away with the forces.” David C. Schlachter and Fred J. Stubbs, “Special Operations Forces: Not Applicable?” *Military Review*, (February 1978), 15-26.
intensity conflict” was derived from the text and would fill the US lexicon in the 1980s, replacing the term “limited wars.” The rebuilding process of the 1980s saw the special operations forces adopting a new doctrine of direct action, foreign internal defense, and special reconnaissance as missions.

This drift away from the “classical” unconventional warfare tasks began in Special Forces doctrine in the mid-1970s. Comparing the types of operations for Army Special Forces between their 1969 and 1974 versions of FM 31-21 demonstrates that advisory roles outside of unconventional warfare were considered special forces missions, consistent with the emergence of a new “foreign internal defense” mission (refer to Appendix F).

It made sense to tie special operations to the mission of foreign internal defense brought about by the Nixon Doctrine. Recognition of this linkage occurs starting in 1972. Two articles in professional journals, “Military Advisors in a New Era: We’ll Have To Do It Their Way,” Army (September 1972), and another “The Changing Role of the Military Advisor,” Military Review (September 1974), called for a specially selected

152 According to other scholars, the term “low intensity conflict” was used in RAND Corporation studies of the same time period and appeared previously in Andrew R. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1966).

153 As the conventional Army returned to its roots, so too did the unconventional warfare forces. Charles Simpson writes: “Within Special Forces itself, there were those who, frustrated with the inconclusiveness of counterinsurgency and the loss of Vietnam, reverted to the old guerrilla warfare mission, in conjunction with direct action missions, or ranger/commando roles. Charles M. Simpson, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), 208. Shelby Stanton gave an accurate assessment in that Special Forces were never employed in their traditional role, leading one to reason that change was inevitable to fit the foreign internal defense and anti-terrorism requirements which emerged in the early 1980s. Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets At War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), 291-293. Stanton stated: “The early Special Forces reconnaissance and special missions were limited insertions intended to resupply rebel contingents, scout out partisan targets, and emplace atomic demolitions. In a ‘cold war’ environment the Special Forces was expected merely to train military personnel in guerrilla warfare and the techniques of combating guerrilla and terrorist activities...The actual combat role of Special Forces was far different...a renewed emphasis was placed on rebuilding the Special Forces as a viable military instrument to counter terrorism and insurgency where the use of conventional forces was considered premature, inappropriate, or unfeasible.” 291.
advisor, highly trained in military skills and the social sciences. One Air War College thesis in 1976 summarized the linking of special operations to accomplish the Nixon Doctrine in this manner:

The best force capable of providing the assistance required are those forces trained in unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and trained to operate the type of equipment most of the emerging nations operate. These are the special operations personnel, people who are trained in languages, who know how to live with the indigenous forces, people who know the culture, people who can teach, and people who understand the kinds of wars being fought. These are the forces that can be effective and decisive.154

Two other articles of the mid-1980s described development of doctrine for Special Forces to fit their new roles in the post-Vietnam restructuring. The first was by Colonel David J. Baratto (who would later go on to command the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg). In the March 1983 issue of *Military Review*, Baratto’s article “Special Forces in the 1980s: A Strategic Reorientation” was critical of efforts not to seize on the emerging security assistance missions as the armed forces shifted to focus on low intensity conflict.155 Baratto argued that withholding Special Forces from security assistance forces in internal defense and development showed “a great unwillingness to grant Special Forces a free hand in meeting US needs to counter insurgency.” He concluded, “By and large, the old classical role of organizing guerrilla warfare and

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155 David J. Baratto, “Special Forces in the 1980s: A Strategic Reorientation,” *Military Review*, March 1983, 7. Baratto stated: “On the surface, it would appear as thought the US Army was finally attempting to come to grips with the incipient aspects of “small wars” and was plotting a course in the proper direction. Furthermore, Special Forces would play a significant part in that process. Yet, as one examines follow-on supporting and implementing documents, he is only chagrined to find a dearth of information on the same course. FM 31-22, *Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations*, dated 23 December 1981 (almost one year later), is devoted almost entirely to unconventional warfare; only two pages are focused on FID. This hardly recognizes—let alone addresses—the unique interfaces of command, control and support functions which would be inherent in SAF [Security Assistance Forces] operations as part of the country team concept”
conducting special operations looms heavy over the day-to-day training world of Special Forces.” Baratto intended to take Special Forces to the strategic level in supporting Internal Defense and Development operations and tying Special Forces directly with the country team. In addition, there was a requirement for developing a set of skill qualification tests and evaluations to meet these new goals specific to special operations. In Colonel Baratto’s words, “In the simplest sense, the Special Forces Soldier is primarily a trainer (a force multiplier) in a benign or semihostile environment, whereas the conventional soldier is a team player on a lethal battlefield.” What is apparent is a reorientation of Special Forces to meet the emerging security requirements.

In 1985, Major Glenn M. Harned, a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, wrote an article entitled “Special Operations and the AirLand Battle.” Harned’s purpose was to point out how special operations forces should fight across the entire spectrum. Harned mentioned unconventional warfare, strike operations, strategic reconnaissance, and counterair and suppression of enemy air defense as means by which special operations forces could support conventional commanders. Harned’s article failed to discuss how special operations forces could affect the campaign before hostilities.156

Harned was one of the authors of the initial draft of a new FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations and a change in focus was evident. Within a later article, there was still linkage with the primary role of Special Forces “to fight as part of the unified

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156 Glenn M. Harned, “Special Operations and the AirLand Battle,” Military Review, September 1985, 72-83. Harned’s reference to direct action missions were what Barratto (p. 11) warned as “difficult to justify the use of Special Forces units in direct-action missions in a wartime situation. Limited availability, coupled with limited survivability in ‘throw-away’ type missions, would be a tragic misuse of a valuable strategic asset.”
commander’s deep operations.” However, he acknowledged the foreign internal defense mission and the strategic utility that it brings:

SF elements are committed now to a number of security-assistance and foreign-internal-defense operations against Soviet surrogates and other threats in a number of Third World countries. SF has become a vital instrument of national policy. SF can preclude open hostilities by providing the NCA with options for discriminate engagement beyond those of an nonmilitary nature but short of the employment of conventional military forces.\[157\]

Harned concluded that within the emerging roles for Special Forces and foreign internal defense, there were some doctrinal shortcomings:

Published SF doctrine predates AirLand Battle doctrine and the current strategic environment in which SF must operate, and it is next-to-useless for the present generation of SF soldiers. Even worse, joint-special-operations doctrine is almost nonexistent, so SF has to write its new doctrine without having the benefit of a higher doctrinal framework.\[158\]

Nevertheless, despite Harned’s critique, Special Forces personnel would not see formal doctrine concerning foreign internal defense until the release of the ARTEP 31-807-33-MTP Foreign Internal Defense in December 1990, followed four years later by the release of FM 31-20-3 Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces on 20 September 1994. Even more influential, special operations forces were mobilized for Operation Desert Shield in August 1990 without the doctrine being codified. After Desert Storm, doctrine continued to change, adjusting to lessons learned from the role of special operations in Desert Storm.

Developing unconventional warfare doctrine for the Air Force has often proven elusive. In an interview in January 1972 with General Maxwell D. Taylor, he was asked,

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157 Glenn M. Harned, “Bridging the gap: Special Forces as a member of the Combined Arms Team,” Special Warfare, October 1988, 5.
158 Ibid. p. 7.
“Do you think the Air Force should maintain this special air warfare capability?”

Taylor’s answer is both interesting and prophetic. He noted:

It’s awfully hard to answer that. I would say the Air Force has the hardest problem in deciding on a doctrine for this kind of thing because of the nature of the Air Force. Its standard equipment is designed for fighting a major war against the Soviet Union. It is hard to know just how you can define the Air Force role, in unconventional warfare, particularly since every place is going to be different, and the kind of aircraft you are talking about are specialized aircraft…So I don’t know. I just have a feeling that the Air Force, like the Navy, and to some extent the Army (now the Army is not quite so bad because its equipment costs are less) has priced itself out of the small war market. [159]

Ironically, the next question in the interview was, “Do you foresee more wars of this nature? More unconventional counterinsurgencies, insurgencies?” Taylor replied “I think so.”

Air Force Manual 1-1, *USAF Basic Doctrine* (1976), recognized the need for special operations forces and doctrine. Air Force Manual 1-1 stated “Insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and subtheater conventional attacks will continue to threaten the security of some allies in the foreseeable future.” [160] Nevertheless, like the Army, the Air Force focused its attention on Europe. Developing doctrine for low intensity conflict and unconventional warfare did not take a high priority, as pointed out by Colonel Dennis Drew: “The current author [Drew] was told in the mid-1980s by a very senior Air Force general officer that the Air Force should not be distracted by ‘those kinds of wars’

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(insurgencies) since we can always just “muddle through.” Rather, we should concentrate on wars “that can eat our bacon.”

**Organization**

There is much written about special operations organization between 1970 and 1990. Perhaps the best synopsis of what happened during this crucial period in special operations history is covered in Susan Marquis’ work, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces*, published in 1997. Marquis laid out the foundation for building what became the U.S. Special Operations Command. History of a unified command structure for special operations forces can be traced back to February 1973 and the study *Restricted Engagement Options*. This study argued that special operations were “ineffective” and that there was “fragmentation” of counterinsurgency assets. Commenting on the study, William P. Yarborough said: “The armed services called for a mechanism that could orchestrate training, monitor readiness, and ensure availability of types and quantities of equipment not normally available through standard supply channels.”

In 1987, the 1st Special Operations Command was activated at Fort Bragg. The 1st Special Operations Command took control of the Army’s 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions, Task Force 160 (later redesignated as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment), and the three Special Forces Groups. In 1990, 1st Special Operations Command was redesigned as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to control the Special Forces,

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Rangers, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, the special operations signal and support battalions, and the Special Warfare Training Group.

The Air Force

Air Force Special Operations had its greatest buildup in the Vietnam War. However, at the conclusion of that conflict, the Air Force cut all special operations by 90 percent. What units remained were slated for transfer to the National Guard and Reserves, not unlike after Korea.164 At one point, there was talk of transferring all rotary wing units to the Army. Within the Air Force, few knew what to do with special operations aviation platforms. Lace of centralized control over special operations and standardized procedures was dramatically exposed in the Iranian Desert in April 1980. Years of neglect of special operations by the armed forces was just one of the contributing factors affecting the increase in congressional involvement in the 1980s.165

Technology

The greatest requirement for technology within US Special Operations Command has always been aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing. During the late 1980s, demand for upgraded Air Force MC-130 Talon, MH-53 Pavelow and other aircraft took center stage. On the Army side of the house, the improvements for rotary wing capability for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment required much of the available funding making the Blackhawk (MH-60) and Chinook (MH-47) special operations capable with enhanced avionics, global positioning systems, satellite communications, and aircraft survivability

equipment. One requirement that became apparent was the need for the rotary wing aircraft to be refueled in the air. Over time this concept evolved and allowed special operations to employ techniques that reduced the possibility of scenarios such as Desert One.

With increased funding, US Special Operations Command upgraded special operations equipment and weapons used by the individual operators themselves. Improved small arms, enhanced body armor, and other such items once thought of as only luxuries began to appear in the inventory beginning in 1992. Another advantage for US Special Operations Command was that it could leverage a top priority for newly emerging technologies.

**Political Factors**

The will to use unconventional warfare is just as important as having the capability. During the 1980s, President Reagan exhibited a propensity to support unconventional warfare. Colonel Harry Summers noted that Reagan took “a page from the Communist revolutionary manuals.” The United States “backed successful insurgencies in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua.”

However, the Central Intelligence Agency with select involvement of special operations personnel directed most of these efforts. Toward the end of President Reagan’s second term, some members of his administration would be charged with misconduct when it was revealed that arms were being illegally sold to Iran in efforts to fund the Contras.

Reagan used covert aid and U.S. advisors from the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations to increase the effectiveness of the Contras. With covert aid, the

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Contras were able to draw more recruits to confront the Sandinista armed forces in prolonged operations. In *Commandos: The CIA and Nicaragua’s Contra Rebels*, Sam Dillon summarized the efforts of the CIA contracted Special Forces personnel training:

> On the one hand, it was obvious that the U.S. training had brought changes; the rebels fought more like soldiers and less like hooligans. Within months, insurgent missilemen had knocked down nearly half the helicopters in the Sandinista air force. American military officers resumed control of the rebel army, and in two CIA-directed battles, thousands of rebel fighters converged to overwhelm half a dozen rural towns, seizing Sandinista missile stocks and destroying Soviet radar installations. In addition, the rebels won wide support among Nicaraguan peasants. Many civilians interpreted the $100 million program as an overwhelming and unequivocal U.S. commitment that brought thousands of Nicaraguans into the war on the contras’ side, as recruits and collaborators. Many put themselves at the contras’ service as they never had before.

According to Colin Powell, support for the Contras was a tactic that worked at keeping the Sandinistas at the bargaining table. He warned, however: “I believed that in order to keep the pressure on, we had to continue to supply arms to the contras, not through the back door, but with Congress’s approval.” What Powell advocated was not the use of unconventional warfare as a strategy, rather, keeping lawmakers informed in order to avoid embarrassments such as the Iran-Contra affair.

**Results**

There are several considerations drawn from the period 1970 to 1991 concerning unconventional warfare. The most significant is that, starting with the Nixon Doctrine,

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167 Leroy Thompson wrote that “other organizations” assisted the contras along with the Central Intelligence Agency. Later within Thompson’s book, he wrote, “Former US Special Forces troops showed the combined guerrilla forces how to make improved mines and place them at critical points along the Nicaraguan road network.” What is not shown in Thompson’s text is whether these “former” US Special Forces were actually retired or loaned to the agency for a specific purpose as Sam Dillon maintains in his book, *Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare* (New York, N.Y.: Sterling Publishing, 1994), 76.

special operations functions have occurred more in an advisory role than in the traditional unconventional warfare mission behind the lines. Through an evolutionary process, the mission now called foreign internal defense took center stage. By the mid-1980s, one could ask whether special operations could still conduct unconventional warfare. It is often too late to ask the question once the orders have been given. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind what Charles Simpson observed in his analysis of special operations forces missions:

Training in UW is the flesh and blood of Special Forces. Knowing how to operate as guerrillas is the basis for successful counterinsurgency operations. However, if there are few well-trained detachments and UW training opportunities are scarce, it may be somewhat optimistic to stress UW. The UW mission, above all, requires experience, training, and maturity, together with the understanding of the importance of having people on your side.\[170\]

Based on Simpson’s comments above and analyzing what occurred with the Contras, one is hard pressed to find the classical guerrilla warfare described by doctrine.\[171\] Major Ronald Johnson pointed out that “SF soldiers involved in this operation were generally in an advisory or teaching role and did not serve as guerrilla leaders, thus the individual skills most critical to the operation were primarily those in the indirect kind. SF soldiers participating in this operation did have to possess and be proficient at direct skills, but it was mainly for the purpose of advising and teaching, not executing.”\[172\] Johnson identified the two most frequent indirect skills that were in high demand were cross-cultural communications and the ability to speak a foreign language.

\[169\] Powell, 367.
\[170\] Simpson, 212.
\[171\] The Contras conducted guerrilla warfare, a subset of unconventional warfare, but the Contras did not have direct Special Forces leadership accompanying them into enemy territory. In addition, the author and others would openly contend that just because you can conduct guerrilla warfare you can be successful in counterinsurgency. An understanding of guerrilla warfare is helpful in counterinsurgency, but study in theory and practice is also required.
The Contras employed were largely uneducated and few spoke English. The need to understand the Contra psyche was also an invaluable asset. However, Special Forces personnel could not accompany their Contras on cross border operations although this might have eliminated some of the actual or perceived violations of the laws of land warfare that occurred. It became a true test of the SF advisor to persuade his Contras to act properly when away from the Special Forces personnel. On the other hand—United States troops going with the Contras would legally be an act of war, an invasion of a sovereign country.

According to Johnson the direct skills that Special Forces personnel acquired came in the form of operational art. Johnson wrote, “Many advisors found themselves organizing the purchase of weapons, ammunition, and equipment; planning and coordinating covert aerial resupply missions, and planning large offensive operations all at the same time.” Special Forces apparently were able to use their limited resources and modify them in ways that would meet the needs of their peasant army.

172 Johnson, 81.
173 Sam Dillon wrote that Green Beret instructors were employed to teach human rights after an incident which appeared in Newsweek. According to Dillon, the attempt at human rights training backfired on the Green Beret instructors. Sam Dillon, Commandos: The CIA and Nicaragua’s Contra Rebels (New York, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Company, 1991), 171-73. Earlier in the Contra movement, the Central Intelligence Agency circulated a ninety page booklet entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. This booklet immediately caught the attention of the media who stated it was an assassination manual. According to Joseph E. Persico, the word “assassination” did not actually appear in the manual, but it left the perception with the press that the Contras were thugs and murderers and Central Intelligence Agency director, William Casey, could not ward off attacks by Congressional leaders critical of the Contras. Joseph E. Persico, Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey—From the OSS to the CIA (New York, N.Y.: Viking Books, 1990), 417-8. John Singlaub commenting about the incident wrote: “So the myth that the Contras were basically vengeful National Guardsmen and disgruntled right-wing oligarchs was simply disinformation spread by the Sandinistas….Faced with skillful manipulation, it was easy to understand how well-meaning and gullible young Americans would believe Sandinista propaganda. But I had a hard time grasping how experienced members of Congress like Ron Dellums of California and Pat Schroeder of Colorado could campaign for financial aid for the good works conducted by men like Tomas Borge. The Sandinistas took full advantage of their powerful American allies.” John K. Singlaub and Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century (New York, N.Y.: Summit Books, 1991), 462-63.
Starting in early 1981 and going until 1990, the principle US concern in Latin America was El Salvador. By 1989, the majority of special operations personnel working in Central America were in El Salvador and Honduras in foreign internal defense roles. On the surface, personnel in El Salvador and with the Contras in Honduras were doing about the same thing in teaching basic combat skill tasks. However, there is a big difference between foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Francois Sully observed: “Counterinsurgency is not guerrilla warfare, and this is not an artificial distinction; it arises from the practical reality of fighting two types of war, for example, it is one thing to destroy a railroad as a guerrilla insurgent; it is quite another to defend the same railroad against sabotage or attack by guerrillas.” Both cases, Contra support and El Salvador counterinsurgency, required unique skills by personnel conducting those efforts. As Johnson points out, one of the greatest lessons learned from the Contras was “Bringing out the implications of working with surrogate forces in a border state.”

The biggest opportunity to test unconventional warfare in an ideal conventional doctrinal environment comes with Operation Desert Shield in August 1990. There is still considerable secrecy concerning special operations, especially those dealing with unconventional warfare. However, enough information is available to warrant an initial analysis. General Schwarzkopf was reported as having a general disdain for special operations during the war. However, he actually had two special operations elements

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174 Thompson, 78.
176 Johnson, 85.
177 Rick Atkinson wrote: “Conventional wisdom held that Schwartzkopf was wary of unorthodox warfare; perhaps more to the point, he distrusted anything that could subvert the precise timetable of his four-phase attack—such as a few heavily armed commandos crashing through Iraq. ‘How am I going to explain,’ he asked Stiner and Downing [commanders of United States Special Operations Command and the Joint Special Operation Command] ‘what Delta Force is doing three hundred miles deep in Iraq?’” Rick
working for him: Major General Wayne Downing, who ran the Joint Special Operations Command, which was attached to a theater Commander-in-Chief, commonly referred to in the special operations business as the “black side.” The other was Colonel Jesse Johnson’s Special Operations Command-Central, the subordinate special operations in Central Command, controlling “white side” special operations. Although General Schwarzkoph mentions little of Downing in his autobiography, *It Doesn’t Take a Hero*, he praised Johnson as “one of” Desert Storm’s unsung heroes.  

Most writing concerning unconventional warfare in Desert Storm provides few details. John M. Collins, a senior specialist in national defense wrote in *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment 1986-1993*, that special operations helped “organize resistance inside Kuwait, and destroyed suspected terrorist safe houses in Kuwait City.” Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor in their book, *The Generals’ War*, state “By the evening of February 26, the Kuwaiti resistance, wearing red and orange armbands, began linking up the Americans.” However, they did not elaborate on what exactly the Kuwaiti resistance provided to aid in the liberation of Kuwait. Until more information is available, one can only make assumptions.

The U.S. Special Operations Command acknowledges unconventional warfare occurring in Desert Storm, specifically stating:

American Special Forces units helped to reconstitute a number of Kuwaiti military forces, both conventional and unconventional. As a result of meetings between the SOCCENT commander, Colonel Jesse

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Johnson, and the Kuwaiti Armed Forces Chief of Staff, soldiers from the 5th SFG(A) began training Kuwaiti soldiers in mid-September at KKMC. The initial mission was to form a Kuwaiti SF battalion and a commando brigade, but the training went so well that the mission grew to include four additional Kuwaiti infantry brigades. Eventually, SOF units trained a total of 6,357 Kuwaitis, who formed an SF battalion, a commando brigade, and the Al-Khulud, Al-Haq, Fatah, and Badr infantry brigades...Colonel Johnson also formed a Special Planning Group to conduct specialized unconventional warfare training for selected members of the Kuwaiti military. About a month before the start of the Air War, 17 Kuwaiti military personnel underwent a rigorous five-week training course, but when DESERT STORM’s air attack began on 16 January 1991, the Iraqis closed the border, limiting infiltration options. Out of necessity, training then concentrated on infiltration methods.

The US Special Operations Command History confirms interviews conducted by this author on unconventional warfare during Desert Storm. Special Forces involvement with the Kuwaiti resistance was limited to mainly intelligence gathering. A lesson apparent from Desert Storm, is that Special Forces must be prepared to stand up an short notice unconventional warfare capability in the event of another contingency operation.

In closing, there is no simple answer to assessing the effectiveness of unconventional warfare from the 1970s to 1991. Certainly, in the case of Desert Storm in 1991, special operations had limited potential to develop true partisan efforts on the scale witnessed in World War II or even Korea given the time to prepare a partisan force. However, further study is warranted, as more reports on the Gulf War on the limited unconventional operations become declassified. At the close of Desert Storm, Special Forces inherited a new mission that would, over time, become a collateral activity and an adjunct to unconventional warfare. The mission of “coalition support” has been described as reminiscent of Special Forces missions with indigenous personnel in Vietnam. This mission was instituted after being lobbying by Colonel Johnson so

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General Schwarzkoph could deconflict the Arab allies during ground operations in the closing days of the war.\textsuperscript{182} Coalition support missions after the war were codified and now have become part of US Special Operations Command collateral mission activities.

During the last decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, the special operations forces would be involved in new indirect missions such as nation building, joint combined exercises for training, drug interdiction, and peacekeeping in what became known as “military operations other than war.” With the election of President Clinton in 1992, the armed forces would find themselves without a direct opponent. Clinton would introduce “engagement and enlargement” as part of his National Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{183} It is within this new environment that critics emerged stating that Special Forces had lost its compass for the conduct of unconventional warfare.

\textsuperscript{182} Rick Atkinson described this mission: “The 5\textsuperscript{th} Special Forces Group farmed out more than a hundred teams to allied units in response to the CINC’s request for ‘ground truth.’ (After some initial puzzlement—‘What the f—k is ‘ground truth?’’ muttered the group commander, Colonel James W. Kraus—the Green Berets concluded that Schwarzkoph sought a candid assessment of Arab combat prowess and fighting spirit.) Among other services, the teams tried to convince Saudi troops their flimsy sand fortifications—‘kill-me berms,’ in the American vernacular—would not stop enemy tank rounds. They also implored commanders in the six Kuwaiti brigades to prevent vengeance killings during the liberation of their homeland. ‘Make sure they understand,’ Kraus told his soldiers, ‘that he who commits the last atrocity is the one who is remembered.’ Atkinson, 369.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION - AN ENDURING LEGACY OR A PASSING FED?

We trained hard—but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.

Petronius—written over 2000 years ago

American academic analysis of the special-operations phenomenon dates back more than a quarter of a century. SOF theory has been examined and discussed from every conceivable angle. What is needed now is practical, pragmatic application of the accepted principles that have emerged from the volumes of philosophical conjecture.

Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, USA (Ret.), July 1995

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, a considerable amount of literature has accumulated about the nature of irregular warfare and the principles of its conduct.184 General Wesley Clark, who commanded NATO forces during the Kosovo Air War, recently stated: “Doctrine cannot be frozen, there is no timeless recipe for a military force.”185 Almost as if on key with General Clark, those concerned with unconventional warfare are coming to terms with this mission as the 21st Century unfolds. Our strategists, policy-makers, and political leaders will eventually be required by circumstances—domestic concerns, budgets, intractable international tribal conflicts—to substantially reform our outdated military strategies, structures, and doctrines.186

Today, leaders charged with unconventional warfare are asking two questions: Is

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185 Vince Crawley, “What’s wrong with keeping the peace?” Army Times, May 22, 2000, 8.
unconventional warfare still relevant? If not, why continue to train for this mission? These are engaging questions, especially since they concern a form of warfare that has had application since the Old Testament times. Army Special Forces, of all branches, should be the most aware of and receptive to the military history of unconventional warfare. Perhaps this is why we have to re-learn what we should already know. Unconventional warfare is a protean form of warfare that demands more than what most special operations journeymen can offer with their current level of training and experience. Even more perplexing is the observation by Lieutenant General William P. Tangney, commander of the US Army Special Operations Command, who stated that Special Forces “missions are really imbedded under the umbrella of unconventional warfare, which is our most difficult mission and, together with the foreign language capability, gives Special Forces the flexibility they need to meet the challenges of the future.” If commanders are questioning the relevance of training for this mission, this seems to be a confession that they do not understand the importance of advanced unconventional warfare given Tangney’s observation.

The Changing Global Environment and Demands for Unconventional Warfare

Throughout this examination, it has been noted that unconventional warfare has evolved through peaks and ebbs influenced by several factors (refer to Appendix G). First is the national security strategy of the period. Second is the doctrine. Doctrine undergoes evolutionary change. Proof of this is in such cases as Vietnam, where counterinsurgency was added as another Special Forces mission. Doctrine is essential, according to Larry Cable: “The doctrine in effect prior to the start of a war powerfully conditions the military and civilian perceptions and decisions which lead to the on set of

189 The Armed Forces Journal International reported that special operations forces [taken to mean Special Forces] are employed more for foreign internal defense, mobile training teams, coalition warfare, and humanitarian assistance. An Army expert on special operations forces also told the Armed Forces Journal International that “special operations forces missions are becoming more conventional as opposed to the classic behind-enemy-lines type of missions, so they need interoperability with conventional forces.” Glenn W. Goodman, “New Radio Technology Specified by SOCOM Could Jeopardize Covert Missions,” Armed Forces Journal International, August 1993, 45.
Finally, there is the issue of interest. During the 1980s unconventional warfare became important again after a thirteen year hiatus. Nevertheless, by 1992, the shift toward a new paradigm of “military operations other than war” and reliance on US airpower moved many of the Army’s primary warfighting missions towards tasks conducted for support and stability goals in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. Additionally, there has been little civilian enthusiasm for special operations like that found in the Kennedy and Reagan administrations.

It is imperative before proceeding further in our examination to establish a basic direction of what the future environment might look like. Special operations are assumed to be important in the future security environment, but as pointed out by Thomas Adams, “Joint Vision 2010 manages to discuss the military future for 35 pages, including several mentions of ‘land, sea and maritime’ and even ‘space forces’, without mentioning Special Operations Forces.” However, the US Special Operations Command SOF Vision 2020 seems to counter this oversight. Nevertheless, to the casual observer reading SOF Vision 2020, one could be misled to think that all forces assigned have regional, cultural, and language skills. In reality, the only units that US Special Operations Command can call on for this unique capability is the Army’s Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, the Air Force Special Operations Command’s 6th Special Operations Squadron, and a small number of Navy SEAL personnel trained to conduct foreign internal defense.

In 1995-96, the Air University conducted a year long, in-depth study involving distinguished academics such as Alvin Toffler, Admiral William Owens, Martin van Creveld, and numerous other academics to assist in laying down a foundation for the future. Their efforts produced an Alternative Futures Strategic Planning Space as depicted in Figure 6-1, and described in more detail in Appendix H.

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191 As cited in Hart, 27: “In a recent book by Robert Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth, A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy, the author says that, of the eighty wars since 1945, only twenty-eight have taken the form of fighting between regular armies of two or more states. Forty-six were civil wars or guerrilla insurgencies. The fighting in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, and elsewhere suggested that this anarchic trend was proliferating. In 1993, forty-two countries were immersed in major conflicts and thirty-seven others experienced lesser forms of political violence: sixty-nine countries were in the developing world.”
What emerged from the Air Force 2025 White Paper concerning special operations is the prediction that special operations regional engagement forces (SORE) will be the warriors needed in less developed, but no less threatening environments—the niche warriors of 2025. The 2025 report warns:

The US is riding high on the crest of “third wave” technology as it leads the world’s rush into the information age. It must not become so fixated on the information-based future that it is unprepared to deal with the 78 percent of the world’s population who will still be living in preindustrial and marginally industrialized societies late into the twenty-first century...SORE forces will be the warriors the US needs to engage in these less developed, but no less threatening arenas of the first and second waves...SORE forces have several core competencies that make them capable of meeting these challenges. First, they possess the cross-cultural skills—foreign language proficiency, cultural and area awareness, nonverbal communications skills, and interpersonal skills—needed to build trust in underdeveloped regions. Second, they can blend into their environment using these skills and third-wave technologies. Third, SORE forces are to help others help themselves without developing a dependency on their helpers. Fourth, SORE forces are the experts in the procedures, tactics, and support requirements necessary to prevent and counter the spreading threat of small wars as threats to US security...SORE forces may find themselves being employed across the spectrum of conflict and called upon to engage in noncombative environments on the one hand, and those requiring anything from guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, and intelligence activities of a clandestine and covert nature to active combat in some circumstances.

Based on the 2025 analysis, unconventional warfare and its indirect skills seem to have a future, albeit with an updated doctrinal focus and mission requirements. Other special operations units acknowledge the burden of training for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense in order to maintain proficiency in these indirect skills and are avoiding any attempt to fill any indirect skills void.

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195 “‘We have no regional orientation because the entire world is our area of operations,’ explains Major William James, plans officer for the regiment [75th Ranger Regiment]. ‘In some cases, that’s a luxury in that we do not have the same challenge as Special Forces do with Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and some of their other missions. Because, as governments and political climates change, and as units with FID missions have to maintain a tremendous amount of flexibility to be able to work in theater. For us, with a focus on direct action, we can maintain a very, very high level of proficiency in our, if you will “bread and
The Great Doctrine Debate

Colonel Mark Boyatt’s October 1994 article, “Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations,” which appeared in Special Warfare opened a debate concerning a revised definition of unconventional warfare. Boyatt argued that the term “unconventional operations” should replace “special operations.” Under unconventional operations, Special Forces would “principally organize and train to accomplish their missions with, through or by counterpart relationships with indigenous personnel.”

The fulcrum point of Boyatt’s article however, is that today’s Special Forces are too focused on the unilateral tasks of direct action and special reconnaissance which, in butter” of raids, urban combat and airfield seizures.’” Scott Gourley, “Boosting the OPTEMPO,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 July 1999, 28.

reality, are better performed by other special operations units. By focusing on these unilateral missions, Special Forces have lost valuable training time and resources that should be going into unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.197

A year later, Glenn Harned would counter Boyatt’s premise in his article, “Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?” Harned argued that “doctrinal changes are not panaceas; they cannot solve problems in training, in force structure, or operational commitment.”198 Harned observed what to this author is one important point in the argument:

If some SF [Special Forces] units “seem fixated on CT [counter-terrorism], DA [direct action] and SR [special reconnaissance] missions,” as Boyatt contends, one would hope that these units have been so tasked by their theater SOC [special operations command]. If that is not the case, Special Forces has a problem that transcends doctrine.199

To test Harned’s hypothesis, one can consult the Government Accounting Office’s Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse. Within the body of this work regional priorities for Special Forces Groups and their theater commander are stated. The results are listed in the Table 1 entitled “Priorities for Primary Special Operations Forces Missions.” The report stated:

The theater special operations commanders appear to have had some, albeit not complete, success in establishing a common understanding of primary SOF mission priorities in theaters. Responses to the “primary SOF missions” segment of our questionnaire show that in the European Command and Southern Commands, CINC officials and the leaders of

197 Colonel Boyatt’s views are very strong concerning this observation. In a video presentation he conducted while commanding the 3rd Special Forces Group in Haiti, he stated: “And I’m telling you this, if any of you in here think that SF [special forces] is about black velcro, DA [direct action], and SR [special reconnaissance], then don’t ever come work for me! This not Special Forces, this is not our job; it should not even be, as far as I am concerned, in our lexicon. It should be out of our doctrine. Unilateral SR and DA as far as I am concerned, is not a Special Forces mission. We do everything we do through, with, and by indigenous people, populations, and personnel. This is our job. That is the thing we bring to the battlefield, that nobody, nobody else, in any other service brings to the battlefield, is our ability to work through, with, and by indigenous populations. Those skills, used in that manner, not the traditional French Maquis UW [unconventional warfare] of the Second World War, no, but it is the training for those skills, that allow us to do this. To allow us to be successful in Haiti and that is the mission of Special Forces. Every other mission we have is second. That is my opinion, not shared by everybody.” Mark D. Boyatt, Haiti—Unconventional Operations, 3rd Special Forces Group video, 30 min., 1994.
199 Harned, 12.
Army SOF units oriented to those theaters agree on the top three mission categories for supporting the CINC’s regional strategies. Our questionnaire results showed disparities in primary mission priorities in the Pacific, Central, and Atlantic Commands, as shown in Table 1.  

### Table 1: Priorities for Primary Special Operations Forces Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE</th>
<th>SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE</th>
<th>UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE</th>
<th>COUNTER-TERRORISM</th>
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The survey by the Government Accounting Office reveals that the majority of theater commanders prioritize the foreign internal defense mission as being the most important. In light of this report, it appears that Harned’s prediction of a doctrinal problem within special operations is warranted. Foreign internal defense has a high priority, after all, from their inception Special Forces were designed to provide a unique capability to train foreign personnel that had not existed before. At no time in its inception was Special Forces regarded of as a unilateral actor. 

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201 When Aaron Banks, the founder of modern day Special Forces was asked “Has the Special Forces lived up to your expectations?” he replied: “It certainly has. I envisioned that Special Forces would conduct Office of Strategic Services’ missions; that they would be more teachers than Rambo’s. But, because the number of missions grew like Topsy, that has not always been the case. In Vietnam—where Special Forces soldiers won 17 Medals of Honor and 90 Distinguished Service Crosses—they conducted anti-guerrilla warfare with indigenous troops that they trained. That was good, but they also were used practically as
In Spring 1999, Michael Ivosevic’s article, “Unconventional Warfare: Defining Definition” served to generate responses from the field. Two more articles have appeared since then. In the Summer 1999 Special Warfare, Gary Jones and Christopher Tone’s “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces” provided some scholarly analysis concerning a revised definition to unconventional warfare. In response to the two aforementioned articles, J.H. Crerar’s “Commentary: Some Thoughts on Unconventional Warfare,” in the Winter 2000 Special Warfare provided additional considerations, from the author’s experience. The issues raised show sound research and are relevant, and come at a crucial time for Special Forces (see Appendix I for the definitions proposed by these authors and others). These debates are on going, and will more than likely continue. According to Ivosevic, “Now is the time for Special Forces soldiers to address and discuss the unconventional warfare issue. With further discussion and comments from the field, we hope to clarify the definition of unconventional warfare and bring clarity with our doctrine.”[202] The challenge posed by Ivosevic and others is merited, but what this author believes is that the real problem is that we cannot challenge the special operations community to develop a new definition for unconventional warfare or operations, without first giving it a method which takes into account the history and development of doctrine. This has yet to be done.

**Developing an Unconventional Warfare Helix of Understanding**

In 1995, William H. McRaven, a Navy SEAL by trade, authored SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare—Theory and Practice, which swept the special operations community by storm and is also part of intermediate service school curriculum. Essential to McRaven’s thesis is his “Special Operations Model”, which consists of the principles of surprise, speed, purpose, security, repetition, and simplicity, infantry. That was not their function under my doctrine. I don’t believe that conventional military minds have grasped the potential of Special Forces. In Haiti, we had an infantry division sitting around, wondering what to do, while 20 Special Forces teams were out running the country. There were enough dissidents in Panama that 20 Special Forces teams could have raised a revolution that would have taken care of Manuel Noriega. Instead, we launched an invasion in 1989 and then had to pay for the damage.” John M. Glenn, “Interview: Father of the Green Berets,” Military History, February 1998, 56.

which are blocked in an inverted pyramid. Influencing the balance of this inverted pyramid is “frictions of war” and “moral factors." SPEC OPS is useful for understanding direct action, which is the focus of the case studies, but it does little for advancing an understanding of unconventional warfare.

I propose the above model, with the hope that it can assist Special Forces personnel to develop the same understanding of unconventional warfare that McRaven’s model did for direct action. It is a work in progress and a first step in articulating a revision of the theory of unconventional warfare.

Special Forces personnel generally have a rudimentary understanding of past unconventional operations. However, as noted by B.H. Liddell Hart:

The method in recent generations has been to select one or two campaigns, and to study them exhaustively as a means of professional training and as the foundation of military theory. But with such a limited basis the continual changes in military means from war to war carry the danger that our outlook will be narrow and the lessons fallacious. In the physical sphere, the one constant factor is that means and conditions are invariably inconsistent.

Generally, most special operations personnel tend to discount a serious study of history.

On the practice of using history to develop doctrine Ernest R. May remarked:

> When resorting to an analogy, they [policy-makers] tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present, they tend to assume that it will continue into the future, not stopping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection might prove to be mistaken.\(^\text{205}\)

John Keegan also points out that we “have much to learn from alternative military cultures, not only that of the Orient but of the primitive world also.”\(^\text{206}\) In the model, “C” represents the cases studied. Obviously, the more cases known, the greater level of initial understanding (depicted by U\(_{1}\)).

Concerning U\(_{1}\), a general level of understanding concerning unconventional warfare and its application is gained from the initial entry training of Special Forces personnel.\(^\text{207}\) Unfortunately, there tends to be an “audit the class” mentality and special operators fail to continue any serious study of unconventional warfare theory once their formal preparation is completed.\(^\text{208}\)

In the model, “G” is an unknown. This is where the strategist is now, trying to determine an accurate definition of unconventional warfare for the 21\(^{st}\) Century. In order to determine this, they must take what has already been presented (C and U\(_{1}\)) and determine the factors or “F” which emerged from C which, potentially, could affect the determination of “G” in present time. During the course of this study, I have used factors such as strategic environment, doctrine, organization, technology, political, and cultural factors. Others, such as Jones and Tone have used factors such as operational environment, campaign objectives, and success criteria.\(^\text{209}\)


\(^{208}\) Refer to footnote 18, Chapter 4, “The Knights of Camelot.”

\(^{209}\) Jones and Tone, 7-8.
Through what has already been stated in the model, one will eventually arrive at $U_2$ or, for lack of better terms, an “enlightened” understanding of unconventional warfare and how it applies to “$F_n$,” or “future application.”

**From the Past, The Future**

Two things appear relevant concerning the future of unconventional warfare. First, Boyatt is correct in his analysis that Special Forces is devoting too many resources to unilateral missions. The second, that Special Forces needs to accept the fact that unconventional warfare is not likely to be used in a direct role in the immediate future, in contrast to the indirect tasks are in demand today. Larry Cable says it well:

> Special Forces have never executed the unconventional warfare mission, and they never could have, given the politico-military realities that have surrounded conventional, interstate warfare since 1945. Special Forces continue to train for unconventional warfare, even though unconventional warfare remains a politico-military “mission impossible,” a fact underscored by the decision during the Persian Gulf War not to provide unconventional warfare assistance to the Kuwaiti Resistance movement…a unconventional warfare capability also provides the capability for indirect action…using indigenous assets as a multiplier of American forces.

Cases exist that argue for the potential of unconventional warfare in the future, such as the use of Special Forces with the Contras. However, Cable’s assertion still holds true, that this was in an indirect means of using Special Forces, (i.e., no US personnel went “behind the lines”). The most recent action in Kosovo might fit into the indirect application for unconventional warfare, and some have argued this point. Post-Kosovo Air War commentaries reinforce the notion that the Kosovo Liberation Army was actively employed in combat instead of NATO personnel. Using the “Contra Model” as a guide, it is logical to assume Special Forces personnel could have been trained the indigenous Kosovars in Albania and then allowed them to infiltrate for human intelligence and terminal guidance operations. More analysis is certainly warranted before adding any merit to this hypothesis. Nevertheless, superficially it appeared a

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ready-made guerrilla force potentially could have been exploited as an unconventional warfare resource.\footnote{212}

News of US efforts to stem illegal drug traffic and insurgency in Colombia is a reflection that tasks once conducted by Special Forces in previous campaigns might again have relevance today. According to the Government Accounting Office:

Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department officials, insurgent and paramilitary organizations are increasingly becoming involved in drug-trafficking-related activities and are controlling more territory. Active insurgent groups and their groaning involvement in drug-trafficking activities over the past several years are complicating Colombia’s ability to reduce drug trafficking. The most active insurgent groups are the FARC and ELN. These two groups are estimated to have as many as 20,000 personnel. Additionally, the number of municipalities in the rural areas of Colombia in which the FARC has a presence has been increasing: the insurgents currently can exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory, and area equal in size to Texas, east and south of the Andes.\footnote{213}

The report states later that “no decision had been made on the total level of U.S. support that will be provided.” Since there is only one company ready in a special counter-narcotics battalion of 950 personnel, responsible for an area the size of Texas, it is obvious that this alone will not be enough.\footnote{214} Although no decision has been made, some program similar to the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups in Vietnam might be employed by special operations advisors to restore the legitimacy of the government in insurgent-controlled areas. However, these missions seem ideally suited as indirect unconventional warfare tasks.\footnote{215}

Jones and Tone pointed out in their analysis that “today’s Special Forces does [do] not train for insurgency. There are no training materials to support insurgency training. Except for one block of classroom instruction on the theory of insurgency in the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, our unconventional warfare training focuses on guerrilla warfare.” J.H. Crerar, in reply to Jones and Tone, stated: “if the authors [Jones and Tone] are correct in saying, “Today’s Special Forces does not train for insurgency. There are no training materials to support insurgency training,” then there is a critical gap in Special Forces training, and Special Forces would appear to have lost part of its doctrinal basis.” If true, then, US Special Forces is fooling itself and is negligent in letting instruction on insurgency atrophy. It is imperative to understanding the flip side of the coin, foreign internal defense.

**Recommendations to Special Forces Doctrine**

Unless we deny it, our future, like that of the last Easter Islanders, may belong to the men with bloodied hands. America must not allow its warfighting skills to atrophy in light of the current “state of peace.” Conflict will come in the future. History is full of examples. There is nothing new in unconventional warfare, except perhaps the history or doctrine we have not studied. Perhaps military and political strategists have problems with this form of warfare for ethical reasons, “but we wrote the book on the insurgent environment on five different occasions between the 1750s and the 1960s.” Nevertheless, the days of U.S. Special Forces led ethnic minorities in the Third World are probably gone forever.

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216 Jones and Tone, 7.
218 Keegan, 392.
219 Cable, 16.
220 This observation was made by special operations veteran and author, Rod Paschall, who went on to state: “That era began to fade with the 1969 Guam Doctrine, relegating the American armed forces to assistance and advisory roles in Third World counterinsurgency campaigns. It probably died with the 1973 enactment of the War Powers Act in effect, altogether prohibited the use of low-visibility U.S. military operations in which armed American soldiers and airmen would directly participate in some other nation’s war. The gradual withdrawal of Western forces from Third World conflicts has also seen fewer southern hemisphere actions by the British SAS. London’s former colonies are increasingly independent of it in military affairs. However, there may well be a growth area for Western special operations forces in the field of Third World insurgencies—but in an indirect and supporting role.” Rod Paschall, *LIC 2010*.
In light of the issues brought up in this study, the US Army Special Forces Command must reform the following areas:

Determine what unconventional warfare tasks are pertinent to the security environment today and in the near term. It is apparent that unless the US finds itself in another high/medium intensity conflict, the guerrilla warfare portion of unconventional warfare will probably not be employed. However, the indirect tasks such as intelligence, sabotage, and subversion still have merit. Using the Strategy-to Task model (Appendix J), each Special Forces Group, in conjunction with its theater commander, could determine the unconventional warfare tasks and focus on those in training.²²¹

Synthesize and capture in doctrine the experiences of operating with proxy forces in democratic resistance movements. Little has been written concerning the involvement of Special Forces in democratic resistance movements. In 1988, the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs conducted a conference entitled Low-Intensity Conflict: Support for Democratic Resistance Movements. From the conference, a general agreement was met on the prerequisites for supporting an insurgency:

1. It must clearly be in the US national interest.
2. The insurgency must demonstrate an acceptable standard of behavior.
3. There must be a reasonable chance that the insurgency will succeed.
4. Support for insurgency requires an integrated, coordinated plan.
5. Each of the instruments of national power (political, economic, informational, and military) must be considered synergistically, and the plan must be approved by all participating agencies before implementation begins.²²²

Although this conference took place over ten years ago, the literature on the theory of democratic insurgency remains small. One British Army manual, Operations Other Than

Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century (McLean, VA: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990), 147.

²²¹ Planners might find it useful to use a modified plan developed originally by the 6th Special Operations Squadron. Their strategy-to-task model has eight questions to be answered: 1) What is the Host Nation strategy?, 2) How will the Host Nation integrate instruments of national power?, 3) What is the military role in strategy?, 4) What is airpower role?, 5) What are the airpower tasks (roles and missions)?, 6) What are available resources?, 7) What is remaining requirement?, and 8) What is best means to meet requirements?
War (1995), provided an entire section to the concept and practice of insurgency. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. said in 1988: “No subject could be more timely than thoughtful consideration of U.S. support to various groups resisting totalitarian forms for government. As we turn attention to our constitutional origins and to the resistance struggle that gave the opportunity to the founding fathers to frame our Constitution, it is only fitting that we should look closely at our efforts to sustain others in their struggles for liberty.”

Revise, update, or develop the planning process for the employment of unconventional warfare, and then ensure that staff officers know this system. During the author’s tenure at the Joint Readiness Training Center as a special operations planner, a scenario was incorporated which employed unconventional warfare. The exercise results indicated a lack of knowledge regarding documents, formats, and procedures used in planning previous unconventional warfare at the theater level. At one time, the Special Warfare Center conducted a Staff Officer Course for Special Forces staff officers that covered the particulars of their unique branch of service. However, that course was quickly dissolved in favor of sending officers to Hurlburt Field and the special operations courses there, such as the Joint Special Operations Planning Workshop and the Revolutionary Warfare Course. Nevertheless, operational tempo has all but made maintaining branch specific training impossible. It would be beneficial to reinstate some type of education system, perhaps even through correspondence or mobile training teams to the Groups, which would ensure a certain level of understanding of unconventional warfare planning at the operational and strategic levels.

Make historical manuals and doctrine available to a greater portion of the force. Many historical manuals have proved crucial to the development and understanding the

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223 Army Field Manual V (B), *Counter Insurgency Operations: The Concept and Practice of Insurgency*, 1-1—4-5.
224 Ibid, 59. Marsh also went on later to state: “Not every resistance movement that circumstances and national interest may call upon us to assist will be composed of budding Thomas Jeffersons and George Washingtons. Nor will the modern breed of resistance fighters necessarily share our faith in representative government, at least in a form congenial to our sentiments and experience. I believe, however, that the resistance group, to qualify for our support, should have a declared goal consistent with a democratic-type government coupled with assurances of respect for human rights and dignity.” Ibid., 60.
establishment of an unconventional warfare capability (see Appendix G). Currently the US Army Special Operations Command is in the process of putting these historical documents on the internet. Nevertheless, each successive generation of doctrinal manuals has become more generic and loses many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have potential application today.226

Leverage training resources to employ and train on unconventional warfare. To date, there has been only one unconventional warfare scenario conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The scenario employed at the Joint Readiness Training Center typically begins with deployment of a US brigade task force against an insurgency. One solution would be to have conventional infantry battalion (1st Battalion, 509th Infantry), which currently acts as the insurgents, be either supplemented or replaced by Special Forces acting in the insurgent role.227 This would allow a “role-reversal” of sorts and Special Forces battalions would be able to execute unconventional warfare rather than special reconnaissance and direct action normally found in their current training center rotations.

Assess impacts of information technology on unconventional warfare. David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla’s work, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico, should be

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226 There is a great demand for historical documents, and a good example of this is in a recent paper presented at the Society for Military History on 30 April 2000. Kalev Sepp related the following about the start of the counterinsurgency campaign in Central America in the early 1980s: “The complete absence of a formal counter-insurgency doctrine was strikingly evident in the Special Forces battalion in Panama, that sent the first American soldiers to El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, to turn the indigenous militaries into effective combat units. Considering the existing doctrinal manuals on analysis of insurgencies to be over-simplified, the ‘Green Beret’ battalion commander, then-Lieutenant Colonel Gene Russell, directed the development of a new guerrilla war paradigm. Based on a 1971 RAND study, shelved at the end of the Vietnam War, and the research experience and experience of Russell’s own Intelligence section, a sophisticated and intricate insurgency assessment model emerged…Nutting himself felt that there had been several counter-insurgency projects in Vietnam that had been on the right track. He read the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Guide for Province and District Advisors to South Vietnam, and the Agency for International Development Report on Economic Assistance to South Vietnam. He brought Ambassador Bob Komer, to discuss the multi-volume ‘Final Report’ of his experiences as head of the MACV-CORDS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Staff.” Kalev Sepp and Eliot House, “Strategy Without Policy: General Wallace Nutting and the Start of the Central American Campaign, 1979-1983,” lecture, Society for Military History, Quantico, VA, 30 April 2000.

227 As of this writing, some personnel from Special Forces are currently employed by the Joint Readiness Training Center opposing forces. The current battalion commander in discussions with the author would like to see more involvement of Special Forces in their guerilla role. This is a desirable goal, but could change if an incoming commander does not support or agree with this concept.
required reading for all Special Forces training courses. With the rapid advancement in information technology, the trend for insurgent groups to use the internet to advance their cause or exploit propaganda is sure to increase. Insurgent groups using the worldwide web can be traced back to early 1995, but little information is available on their efforts. However, in the recent case of the Zapatistas, they used “social net war” to put pressure on the Mexican government. Efforts such as this are expected to continue and are extremely important in the future of unconventional warfare theory and applications.

Conclusion

Theodore G. Shackley, former Associate Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency noted:

In the final analysis, the decision to use or ignore the potential of paramilitary operations as a force for peace or as an instrument of power will not be based solely on challenges, concepts, techniques, paramilitary manpower skills or weapons stockpiles. The decision will be made by those elected officials who have, or lack, the will to pursue policy goals through paramilitary techniques that have protected our interests in such diverse areas as the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Bolivia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines—just to cite a few success stories. The will to take these decisions has been rekindled in the land.

I believe there is, as Shackley points out, a “rekindled” interest in unconventional warfare. This interest is at a crucial time, especially concerning the fact that it has been over ten years since any experience with unconventional warfare last occurred. At the start of this study, my objective was to determine if unconventional warfare was undergoing a metamorphosis for the 21st Century. It appears that is has, but not in a sense that makes unconventional warfare unimportant for the future. However, more obvious is the conclusion that Special Forces need to adopt the theme of “back to basics.” In order for Special Forces and unconventional warfare to have any chance of success in the 21st Century four things must occur. First, Special Forces must re-establish

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an organization to develop unconventional warfare doctrine. This appears to be happening. Second, Special Forces must foster an attitude of creativity, and more importantly, it must put doctrinal debates into the open and allow those responsible for executing doctrine to have a say in shaping it. After doctrine is developed comes the third point. Strenuous simulation and testing must occur and this means more than a computer simulation or a “panel of experts” review. Clausewitz warns us: “But move from the abstract to the real world, and the whole thing looks quite different. In the abstract world, optimism was all-powerful and forced us to assume that both parties to the conflict not only sought perfection but attained it. Would this ever be the case in practice?” This brings us to our final step. At times, failure will be inevitable in this process. That can be borne, but only as long as we accurately determine what went wrong, why, and how we will fix it in the future.

230 Mervyn Berridge-Sills observed: “We are facing an era where costs and custom dictate that the majority of war experience that anyone has accumulated, form the private soldier to the commander, has been gained through computer simulations. These simulations will have represented best guesses about performance, capability, and conditions. It is unknown how well they will simulate the friction of war. We often rely uncritically on the answers produced by the black box; we seldom check on the source of the data; we do not examine the internal processes of the box itself. The wise commanders of the future will understand the limitations of the model and avoid dependence on it.” As cited in, Allan D. English, ed. The Changing Face of War: Learning From History (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 194.

Appendix A

REPORT ON MAQUIS MISSIONS JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1944

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<td>13</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>25-Jun-44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14-Jul-44</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        |            |            |            |            |    |    |    |    |
|        |            |            | ASSIGNED   | DELIVERED  | LOST | RECOVERED |

| 732    | 721    | 8784 | 8485 | 339  | 8145 |

"Aircraft Assigned" is the number of aircraft called for by the Field Order. "Aircraft Over Target" is the number actually reaching the dropping area. "Containers Assigned" is the number which were to be carried, 12 per plane, by the bomber fleet assigned. "Containers Delivered" are those actually released over the dropping points. "Containers Lost" includes, where possible, those actually reported destroyed or damaged on the drop. On the first Salesman mission 36 were destroyed and 14 damaged while on the second more than 100 fell free and were assumed destroyed while an additional 16 were added as an estimate of the number, above 100, which might have been destroyed. During FOOTMAN more than 500 were recoved, so a figure of 510 was assumed for those safely received. In all other cases a two percent loss was assumed. Even in those canisters which fell free at Salesman, a portion of the contents (medical dressings, some ammunition) would be usable.

The final results are:

98.4% of aircraft assigned actually reached their objectives.
96.5% of containers assigned were released over receiving grounds.
95.9% of these are assumed to have been safely retrieved.
Two bombers were lost. No crew personnel were killed; one man was slightly injured.
Division gunners claimed nine enemy planes destroyed, one probably destroyed, and five damaged.

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Appendix B
MONTH-TO-MONTH SUPPORT TO DETACHMENT 101

The following table shows a month-to-month record for the number of pounds of cargo dropped, together with the number of flights made by troop carrier transports from January 1944 through February 1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FLIGHTS</th>
<th>POUNDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-44</td>
<td>19 by C-47s</td>
<td>78,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-44</td>
<td>14 by C-47s</td>
<td>89,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-44</td>
<td>27 by C-47s</td>
<td>137,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-44</td>
<td>55 by C-47s</td>
<td>271,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-44</td>
<td>67 by C-47s</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-44</td>
<td>42 by C-47s</td>
<td>251,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 by B-25s</td>
<td>(decrease due to monsoon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-44</td>
<td>60 by C-47s</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 by B-25s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-44</td>
<td>107 by C-47s</td>
<td>850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-44</td>
<td>108 by C-47s</td>
<td>542,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 by B-25s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-44</td>
<td>215 by C-47s</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 by B-25s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-44</td>
<td>180 by C-47s</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-44</td>
<td>200 by C-47s</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 by B-25s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-45</td>
<td>200 by C-47s</td>
<td>1,009,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-45</td>
<td>261 by C-47s</td>
<td>1,492,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 by B-25s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 by B-24s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total amount of cargo and supplies dropped from the beginning of Det. 101 operations in February 1943 through February 1945 was almost 8,000,000 lbs. This was delivered in more than 1,500 flights by C-47s, B-24s and B-25s. C-87s were also used previous to January 1944. Beginning in March 1945, and during the next four months, ten C-47s a day were allotted to Det. 101 for drops, each aircraft carrying a load of three tons.\footnote{Report on Detachment 101, prepared by Major Chartraud, G-2 Office, NCAC. On record at the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, call number #859.011, September 1942-March 1945.}

\footnote{Ibid., 5.}
APPENDIX C

LESSONS DRAWN FROM PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE

IV. Lessons Drawn from Practical Experience.

A. 1. The expenditure of manpower by the guerrillas is in striking contrast to their actual achievements, speaking merely from the point of view of military tactics.

2. Guerrilla warfare develops according to its own rules, which are contrary to international law, and finally gets out of hand, thus opening the door to subhuman types of individuals.

3. Unrestricted acts of crude violence lead to unpleasant countermeasures, which in turn contribute to making the atmosphere more tense. A vicious circle!

4. By its very character this type of warfare is not limited to members of guerrilla bands, but also extends to the civilian population which has no part in it, by which injustice is multiplied and becomes a crime of indelible blood-guilt.

B. 1. For all these reasons guerrilla warfare was declared contrary to international law in the Hague Convention and placed under a ban. The signatory member States thereby voluntarily made themselves subject to these provisions. This means that guerrilla warfare as such could not be resorted to among the member States, no matter under what fine names and with what convincing and patriotic motives it might be camouflaged. Governments which create such irregular organizations in time war, support them with material or manpower or both, thereby commit a clear breach of treaty and are guilty of a violation of international law. Only states like Russia, which did not sign the Hague Convention are not bound by this agreement; however, by employing and supporting guerrillas they are violating the unwritten laws of war and this makes their offense a criminal action. What methods will be used to combat the guerrillas will depend upon the latter’s conduct in battle. However, even in these cases an effort should be made to adhere strictly to the dictates of humanity.

2. If insurgents are publicly and officially recognized as patriots and heroes during or after a war even by the governments of countries which have signed the Hague Convention this practice would constitute a complete disregard of agreements and would result in the invalidation of any concept of law. If in legal proceedings of this nature lawyers can say that guerrilla warfare is judged in two opposite ways, depending on whether it is judged by the guerrillas’ own country or that of their enemies, this view can no longer be justified from a purely legal standpoint, since international law, as a superior system of law, provides the sole basis for judgement.

3. These views and proceedings are highly detrimental to the maintenance of a sound system of legal morality. One cannot undertake to give new laws to the world if one proceeds in an arbitrary way with the old, binding laws.

235 Field Marshal Albert von Kesselring, Commander, German Forces in Italy, “The War Behind the Front: Guerrilla Warfare,” Air Force Historical Research Agency, call number #K171.3-24. This is an extract from the draft translation originally prepared for Headquarters, European Command, 34-42.
4. There is only one way to prevent all the horrors of guerrilla war and that is not to let it come about. This means invoking international law to support the ban on guerrilla warfare and the outlawing by the community of nations of any state collaborating with the guerrillas, with all the legal and military consequences involved by such measures. If nations do not wish to subject themselves to these restraints, they should not promulgate an international law to this effect. Then they would at least remain honest and not injure other parties who are acting in good faith!

C. 1. From the purely military point of view guerrilla warfare is the same as any other tactical engagement. Since its combat methods differ from the norm, it requires special training, which in its theoretical part should also include instruction on the basic rules of international law.

2. The military character of anti-guerrilla fighting eliminates police organizations from playing a major role in the action. The task of the police forces is as follows:

   a. to organize and carry out reconnaissance missions against guerrillas,
   b. to keep the higher military authorities constantly informed with respect to these matters,
   c. to support local commands in their operations against guerrillas and
   d. to combat the enemy system of espionage and sabotage as a sole responsible agency.

   In this connection, too, no work should be done without the approval of the IC of the commands and troops can also be requested in support.

3. The prerequisites for a successful defense is the establishment of a network of reconnaissance, supervisory, and security agents over the entire area which is threatened by the guerrillas, the full efficiency of which should be developed by a properly organized network of signal communications. In addition to this, extreme vigilance is required of all soldiers in and outside of the local billeting area.

4. The registration, organization and training of all men capable of bearing arms in the various districts are additional essential factors in any successful anti-guerrilla operations. Measures for rendering these "alert units" ("Kampfbereitschaften") mobile are equally important.

5. Only disciplined, well-trained and strictly led troops should be used in anti-guerrilla operations, but it is not fundamentally necessary that they be frontline troops. However, if troops of slight combat value, or perhaps even inferior quality, are employed, the fighting will get out of hand and become savage.

6. In guerrilla fighting mere numbers are of less importance in forcing a decision than in other operations. However, large numbers of men prove necessary for blocking-off operations. Apart from these, the following are decisive factors:

   a. Through preparation based on accurate reconnaissance data while observing the utmost secrecy,
   b. Complete secrecy must be maintained while carrying out the operation with the aim of taking the enemy by surprise,
   c. well-planned organization of troops and equipment, so that the combat objective will be completely attained under any circumstances. Every weapon used by the Wehrmacht and the police can be employed in fighting guerrillas.
d. Strict enforcement; leniency is out of place, will be regarded as weakness and will be dearly paid for in future battles.

7. The peculiar character of guerrilla fighting requires the following special arrangements:

a. clear rules on taking hostages and carrying out reprisals,
b. clear rules on the establishment, effective sphere and jurisdiction of drumhead courts-martials (Standgerichte), as well as,
c. rules regulating conduct toward prisoners, collaborators, guerrilla suspects and members of enemy armed forces in or out of uniform. The order issued by the OKW in December 1944, stating that as a matter of principle members of guerrilla bands were to be treated as prisoners of war, is in this form unrealistic. Such an order can be generally observed only if the guerrillas conduct themselves like soldiers according to the accepted rules of war; if they act like wild animals this order, written in an office far from the actual events, will be simply disregarded. For even the combat soldier is only human! Orders of this kind have dangerous effect on the sense of responsibility of one’s subordinates! These special rules should be issued by an officer with the rank of division commander.

8. On 8.2.1945 I issued a detailed order to the troops containing the results of 3-4 years experience in fighting guerrillas; it was intended to protect the troops and teach them how to take fast, effective countermeasures, as well as to provide standard forms for anti-guerrilla operations; this order was supposed to close up the existing gaps in international law on the basis of actual experience. The order emphasized the following points:

a. Fighting is to be limited if possible, to the members of guerrilla bands and their collaborators. The rules of combat already mentioned have proved correct.

b. Before resorting to reprisals it should be ascertained whether they will tend to restore order or the contrary; they should only be ordered in the former case. Collective measures are only permissible if a fairly large part of the population has supported or tolerated crime. It must be made certain that the peace-loving elements of the population and proven friends are not affected by these reprisals. A permanent effect can only be achieved by quick and through action.

c. In order to simplify and expedite matters all penal measures which could be regarded as reprisals were divided into three groups:

Group 1: Mild measures, which come within the jurisdiction of superior officers with the rank of regiment commander; for example, imposition of a curfew, compulsory registration, ban on bicycle riding, etc.

Group 2: Severe measures, which can only be ordered by officers with the rank of division commander, for example, holding the population responsible for the protection of certain installations, etc.

Group 3: Extreme measures, which require an order from an officer with the rank of commanding general, for example making arrests, taking hostages, ordering buildings destroyed, executing guerrilla suspects and guerrilla accomplices. Exceptions are only permissible if there is extreme danger in delay, in which case a report must be made immediately to the competent authorities.
d. As a matter of principle the facts in the case and the persons involved in it should be investigated by a drumhead court-martial (Standgericht).

D. The self-protection of all responsible persons who may in anyway be connected with guerrilla warfare requires that every event of some importance must be carefully recorded and settled by the verdict of a person vested with judicial authority. Sworn dispositions by witnesses are to be obtained if possible. Such a record must include the following as a minimum:

1. The occasion for the intervention, with a brief description of the guerrilla situation.
2. Military combat report.
3. Result of investigation to determine status under international law.
4. Judicial and special measures.
5. Results.

It might be desirable to deposit these records, or at least a copy of them, with some neutral authority.

E. The organization created for defense against guerrillas is of equal value for reconnoitering and opposing air and sea landings behind the front. Here, too, at the outset mere numbers are less important than small, well-trained and highly mobile detachments. Whether the latter will be able to step in at the right time from a tactical point of view will again depend on a good and widespread signal communications network. The organization of the rear area in accordance with the above mentioned tasks is of the very greatest importance in planning resistance against enemy breakthrough operations, especially if it is supported by large-scale fortifications at favorable sectors of the terrain. Only that command and those troops will be able to accomplish their momentous missions in a theater of war where every soldier, regardless of the place where he is stationed, feels that he is serving as a frontline soldier and where the troops fighting at the front know that the same aggressive spirit prevails in the zone of the interior, right down to the last man. It is the sacred duty of every commander-in-chief to prevent his men from getting soft, or if a tendency in this direction becomes evident he must take the most severe measures to stamp it out completely. Every commander must be aware that the campaign and even the entire war may be decisively influenced by this.

28 July
signed: KESSERLING
Appendix D

KOREAN WAR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION 1950-1953

Appendix D-1: Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, G-3, EUSAK (January, 1951)

Appendix D (Cont.)

Appendix D-2: CIA-FECOM Special Operations Relationship, 1951
**Appendix D (cont.)**

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**Appendix D-3. Korea special operations air, land, and sea forces.**

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Colonel E.G. Lansdale

SUBJECT: A Cold War Program for Defense

1. The Problem: To insure that the Armed Forces of the United States make maximum effective use of their capabilities in the national interest during the cold war.

2. Definition of the Problem:
   a. United States national security planning is involved with the problems posed by three types of modern war—the “cold” war, the limited war, and the global war. Although our Defense establishment has played a major supporting role in the “cold” war, it has left the conduct of this war largely in the hands of other agencies of our government.
   
   b. It seems logical (due to the political goals of our major enemy and his expert use of a combination of “cold” and hot war instruments to attain those goals) our own concept of military activity should consider the three types of war as interrelated. Thus, our military participation and training in the “cold” war activity should not only ready our military for combat in a limited or “global” war, but should also achieve important immediate cold war objectives. This is particularly true of such special operations as guerrilla warfare, counter-guerrilla warfare, and activities designed to create desired political/psychological impacts.
   
   c. The enemy military is becoming expert in cold war action which has contributed largely to his successes. Since the cease-fire of World War II, the Communist enemy has conquered some 550 million people living on over 4 million square miles of territory. While most of our recent defensive tactics have prevented further conquest, there is no guarantee that further conquests cannot be made in the future—while “cold” war political strategy keeps conventional armed forces largely standing aside from the conflict. The Communist enemy is using the “cold” war to perfect his unconventional warfare techniques: Our Armed Forces are not, at first hand.
   
   d. Thus, it is the purpose of this paper, to point out that more effectively guided use of military assets can provide economical and important contributions to winning U.S. cold war objectives, and better prepare our military for waging limited or global war if required.

3. Factors to be Considered:
   a. Our Defense establishment has more people (military, employees, and dependents) stationed in foreign countries than any other entity of the U.S. Government. It has commands, MAAGS, and missions in 38 countries abroad. Most military are in uniforms which identify them more plainly as Americans than does the clothing of other U.S. officials. Further the military are plainly recognized in foreign countries as being there to help defend those countries and the freedom of the people.
   
   b. Among this great U.S. manpower pool of our Defense establishment abroad, there are many persons who could be engaged actively in the “cold” war in their present positions, with only slight

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redefinition of their present missions. These include personnel currently assigned to MAAGs, Special Warfare units, public information, and troop education information and education. As a step in this direction, the appropriate Department of Defense authorities are currently proposing increased attention to the politico-military-economic impact of MAAG activities, and to training designated to better plan and control these impacts.

c. Policy relating to the subject discussed in this paper is not viewed as a matter of immediate concern. It is noted however, that the charter of the Office of Special Operations includes responsibility for psychological warfare affairs of concern to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Subsidiary Activities Division, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, formulate policy, with emphasis on planning for limited global war. It is noted also that elements of Defense, such as ISA and MP&R, have policy responsibilities relating to important parts of the problem.

4. Discussion:

a. There is much that our Defense establishment could do with what it now has, and in complete harmony with other agencies now engaged in “cold” war operations. The decision is internal within the Defense establishment.

b. Some of the cold war actions open to implementation by our Defense establishment are:

(1) Giving our troops an equal chance with Communist enemy troops, in political knowledge. Admittedly, our Armed Forces have been apolitical in the sense of refraining from U.S. partisan politics and in being placed under civilian authority. However, they remain largely ignorant of our own political philosophy which helped bring us to world power (and which could be the most potent element of Pax Americana in the world) and are largely unaware of the issues involved in the countries where they are stationed and which are exploited by the Communist enemy. They need to have their interest in foreign places awakened so favorably that they will want and know how to make friends among the people; they need education so that they can be articulate in furthering their own heritage.

All personnel going abroad under Defense orders should be exposed to the most dynamic educational program possible. This could include movies (such as those made by a foreign country to attract tourists, as well as those portraying U.S. political philosophy in our history), language instruction, how to answer point made by Communists in the country where assigned, and adopting some of the more successful methods of indoctrinating MAAG personnel abroad (such as the wise practice in MAAG—Vietnam where an articulate Vietnamese Army general appears at monthly meetings of all MAAG officers and tells them what his brother Vietnamese officers think of their methods).

(2) Emphasis on a special program of bringing U.S. personnel and foreigners together under favorable circumstances abroad. While there is considerable activity along such lines today, on a happenstance basis, there is need for a planned program which will multiply such incidents as they visit of the USS Massey to Scotland last year, where its crew implemented a planned people-to-people program and inflicted a psychological defeat on a Soviet Delegation visiting in the area. The voluntary actions of the U.S. military in Korea in helping rehabilitate civilian institutions is a similar example. Many of our MAAGs would be helped in their work of building effective foreign armies if there were an off-duty program to teach these foreigners team-work through athletic games—starting with children who will be future soldiers; (this is particularly true in Asia and the Mid-East where most children’s games require individual rather than team effort; yet, countering the Communists and defending freedom demands work).

While this type of activity is primarily within the purview of Armed Forces Information and Education, OSD, it is believed that each Service should develop its own programs, or request the JCS to initiate joint planning, with priority given to areas of increasing political imbalance (such as Okinawa and Iceland, for example). The Navy would benefit by placing imaginative, forceful officers (Captain William J. Lederer and Commander Daniel V. James come to mind) in charge of global programs for activities ashore in foreign areas.

(3) A number of foreign armed forces we are now aiding are engaged in counter-guerrilla and other security actions which fall within the provisions of NSC 1290-d (the Overseas Internal Security Program). It is usually only by chance that any of the military assigned to MAAGs which advice those armies are familiar with the doctrine or tactics required for such actions. The Armed Forces should train personnel for this task, and then assign them to MAAGs to help with advice and
training. This would develop the integrity of a country’s armed forces within the national political structure being supported by the U.S. One trained military man of ability, assigned for this purpose in a MAAG today and thus helping to secure a nation, would be worth a battalion of Americans later in conventional combat.

Personnel for this task should be drawn from the Army’s Special Forces. Personnel so assigned would gain invaluable experience in a foreign area, working with natives, and learning the weapons of unconventional warfare at first-hand. They could have no finer preparation for future duties in a limited or global war.

(4) Our doctrine and use of unconventional warfare are in need of imaginative stimulation. We are still too dependent upon mechanical means of warfare, and this tends to make us conventional—even when we engage in unconventional warfare.

However, we have much to learn. Our doctrine should be expanded so that we understand the need for effectiveness of coordinated political-psychological military actions, as well as the intimate support role of operational intelligence. The U.S. now mostly separates these functions, to fight an enemy who uses them with coordinated precision. Our present experiences are teaching us little or nothing in preparation for coping with Partisan forces similar to those faced by the Germans in Russia in World War II.

Since imagination, forethought, and practical improvisation are invaluable to the success of unconventional warfare, it would be worthwhile to enrich U.S. doctrine as much as possible while opportunities exist to do so. Considering present budgetary limitations, one of the most economical methods of doing this would be to hold seminar sessions for U.S. personnel, conducted by some of the world’s outstanding persons experienced in unconventional warfare. Such seminars would be stimulatingly resultful if properly attended, conducted, recorded, and studied.

A series of seminars could be held, to insure full benefit from them in the generating of thinking for strategy, tactics, material, and training. Thus, several seminar groups might be formed to convene with each person invited to speak on a subject; seminar sessions could be held over a period of time, with the speaker moving to successive groups. U.S. personnel could be grouped as follows:

(a). Combat troops, meeting at Fort Bragg. Personnel could consist of selected officers and men from U.S. Army Special Forces and Special Warfare units, as well as Navy, Air Force, Marines, and CIA.

(b). Staff personnel, meeting in the Pentagon. Personnel could consist of selected members of all the Armed Services now on staff duty (relating to special warfare) in the Washington area, as well as CIA, State, and USIA. Selected R&D personnel and intelligence officers should be included.

(c). School personnel, meeting at the National War College. Shortened seminar sessions could be held at Fort McNair, perhaps at night if necessary, attended by members of the National War College class and by instructors from Service war colleges, command and staff schools, and academies whose subjects concern unconventional warfare, intelligence, and geo-politics.

If desired, the seminar idea could be tested by a trial run. A typical example of the type of foreign officer whose name belongs on the list of those who would conduct such seminars is currently on duty in Washington, is available upon proper request to his government, and is experienced in one of the least-known subjects; counter-guerrilla warfare. This is Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, now on special duty with the Philippine Embassy in Washington. He is under the orders of the President of the Philippines, and it is known that an official U.S. request to President Garcia personally for use of Colonel Valeriano for conducting such seminars would be granted promptly.

Following more than three years’ experience in guerrilla warfare in World War II, Colonel Valeriano has about seven years’ experience as the Philippines’ outstanding combat commander against the Communist guerrilla Huks. He first commanded the Nenita (Skull) Unit, then the 7th BCT, then became military aide and advisor to President Magaysay, and finally assisted other governments in Southeast Asia in solutions of their problems of internal security. He is a highly articulate soldier with a thorough grounding in U.S. doctrine. His most valuable contributions to seminar sessions would be on the following counter-guerrilla subjects (and he should speak on each):

(a). Large unit infiltration methods (based upon his experience in disguising infantry companies as enemy guerrilla; motion pictures of his training methods are available.
(b). Deceptive artillery support fire methods.

c. Air-ground intelligence, reconnaissance, and liaison methods (when enemy guerrillas are supported by the population).

(d). Anti-ambuscade and interdiction methods, as well as use of traps and mines.

e. Other practical counter-guerrilla lessons, including interrogation methods in hostile territory, signaling systems, movements over rugged terrain and inaccessible areas, and flora and fauna in areas of operations.

(5) Seminar speakers, both American and foreign with practical experience could be selected to assist in achieving the objectives of the seminars and other aspects of such a program.

(6) There is need for a Special Warfare trained officer at most of our MAAGs (after indoctrination such as envisaged above). We have the lesson of China where U.S. training and equipment were put to the test of battle, only to suffer an ideological defeat. Are we certain that the armed forces we are now equipping and training will stand up with us in case of need?

The Special Warfare trained officer should work initially on the morale of the armed officers in the country where assigned. This moral has many facets. It includes political indoctrination of the foreign troops (consisting with both the local national policy and U.S. policy) thorough a troop information and education program, the teaching and enforcement of true military courtesy (soldiers on our side need to be the brothers-protectors of the people to counter the successful Chinese Communist doctrine of “the Communist soldier is the fish and the people are the water”), enforcing honest practices in pay to the troops (to prevent exploitable discontent—and a number of MAAG chiefs have had bitter experiences with this), and even to establishing practical supply and messing for troops in the field (to prevent alienation of the civilian population through procurement of food at gun point).

When foreign armies are used to combat internal dissidence, the Special Warfare trained officer can gain valuable experience in advising the foreign army on its suppression or conversion activities against dissidents.

All of the above psychological actions must be undertaken overtly with the agreement of the foreign government.

c. It would be useful to interest the Navy and the Air Force in special aspects of operational problems in their current training on U.S. bases. The Army and Navy could practice secret, maritime delivery of Special Forces personnel and equipment; this is a highly-skilled operation requiring intensive training. New techniques of target identification by Special Forces teams on the ground would be of interest to SAC and also require intensive training.

d. Additional emphasis could be placed on military intelligence in foreign armies being advised by MAAGs, not only in conventional combat intelligence, but in intelligence for unconventional operations (such as counter-guerrilla and counter-subversion).

e. There is need in some countries for constructing a popular resistance organization, in presently non-denied areas, within the chain of command of the country’s armed forces. Plans made by native leaders will range from the conduct of total war, including “scorched earth” strategy, to the more elite type of organizations which can be quietly organized and trained prior to an over-run of the country by an enemy and then serve as the cadre for a gradually built-up resistance force. While much of our current preparations for future resistance are correctly the domain of our clandestine services, there is also a military domain of providing requested guidance in preparing for resistance in current non-denied areas. Any necessary agreement between the U.S. military and the U.S. clandestine services on this specific subject can be worked out locally.

5. Conclusions:

a. There are a number of actions which the Defense establishment should undertake to help the national effort in the “cold war, which are within its capabilities and prerogatives,........(The remaining pages are missing).
Appendix F

TYPE OPERATIONS US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
FM 31-21 SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS (1969 AND 1974 VERSIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>GENERAL WAR</th>
<th>LIMITED WAR</th>
<th>COLD WAR</th>
<th>PEACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFILTRATE DESIGNATED AREA AND CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONDUCT UNILATERAL OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES, OPERATIONS AGAINST SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CONDUCT DIRECT UNILATERAL OPERATIONS AGAINST SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES (1969)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPPORTING, ADVISING, AND DIRECTING THE OPERATIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORTING, ADVISING, AND DIRECTING THE OPERATIONS OF INDIGENOUS SPECIAL FORCES (1969)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARING FOR A LATER UW OR WAR LIMITING CAPABILITY</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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Appendix G
Appendix H

THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Nothing is certain except that we face innumerable uncertainties; but simply recognizing that fact provides a vital starting point, and is, of course, far better than being blindly unaware of how our world is changing.

Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century

The cornerstone to futures planning in 2025 is the use of the alternative futures methodology to construct an array of future worlds in which the US must be able to survive and prosper. Doing so was the first order of business.

The team created eight separate worlds. The four most challenging interesting and difficult for the US served as guides. Two additional worlds—an intermediary world with selected characteristics of other worlds and a world that was a partial evolution to the future of 2025. Crossroads 2015—served as baselines for the 2025 analysis. The worlds that emerged follow.

Figure 1. Alternative Futures Strategic Planning Space

TeK= is the differential in the rate of economic growth and the proliferation of technology.

**Gulliver’s Travails**

This is a world of rampant nationalism, state- and nonstate-sponsored terrorism, and fluid coalitions. Territorialism, national sentiments, the proliferation of refugees, and authoritarian means flourish.

The US is overwhelmed and preoccupied with such worldwide commitments as counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The US is attempting to be the world’s policeman, fireman, physician, social worker, financier, and mailman.

The US military, based in the continental United States, is not really welcomed overseas. This world forces the US military to devise systems and concepts of operation for meeting expanding requirements while maintaining a high operations tempo during a period of constrained budgets. The US worldview is global, Δ TeK is constrained—evolutionary, not revolutionary—and the global power grid is dispersed.

**Zaibatsu**

In Zaibatsu, multinational corporations dominate international affairs and loosely cooperate in a syndicate to create a superficially benign world. Economic growth and profits are the dominant concerns. Technology has grown exponentially and proliferated widely. Global power is concentrated in a few coalitions of multinational corporations.

While conflict occurs, it is usually through proxies and is short-lived. Military forces serve more as “security guards” for multinational interests and property rights.

The main challenge to the US military in this world, which is becoming unstable due to rising income disparities, is to maintain relevance and competence in a relatively benign world where the United States is no longer dominant. The US worldview is limited as domestic concerns take precedence.

**Digital Cacophony**

This is the most technologically advance world resulting in increased individual power but decreasing order and authority in a world characterized by fear and anxiety. Advances in computing power and sophistication, global databases, biotechnology and artificial organs, and virtual-reality entertainment all exist.

Electronic referenda have created pseudodemocracies, but nations and political allegiances have given way to a scramble for wealth amid explosive economic growth. Rapid proliferation of high technology and weapons of mass destruction provides individual independence but social isolation. The US military must cope with a multitude of high-technology threats, particularly in cyberspace. The US worldview is global, technological change exponential, and the world power grid dispersed.

**King Khan**

This world contains a strategic surprise in the form of the creation of a Sino-colossus incorporating China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. US dominance in this world waned as it has been surpassed economically by this entity and suffered an economic depression. This has led to a rapidly falling defense budget and
hard choices about which core competencies to maintain in a period of service austerity.

The American Century has given way to the Asian Millennium, and the power, prestige, and capability that were once American now reside on the other side of the Pacific Rim. This US worldview is decidedly domestic as it copes with problems at home, the growth of technology is constrained, and world power is concentrated in a Chinese monolith whose economy, military, and political influence dwarf those of the US. The US has come to resemble the United Kingdom after World War II—a superpower has-been.

Crossroads 2015

In Kurdish areas of Eurasia, the US uses programmed forces from 1996-2001 to fight a major conflict. The choices and outcomes made at this juncture have much to do with determining which of the worlds of 2025 will emerge a decade later. The American worldview is global, Δ TeK is constrained, and the world power grid is seen as concentrated but beginning to become dispersed. Potential future conflicts center on events involving disputes between the Ukraine and a resurgent Russia and the reaction of the rest of the world to such a conflict.

The US in 2015 still has global commitments and concerns, but a constrained rate of economic and technological growth. Whether the US chooses a more isolationist path because of these pressures or chooses a more activist role with the sacrifices that would be required is the major question to answer in shaping the world of 2025.
Appendix I

A PRIMER FOR REFLECTIONS ON UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FROM 1950 TO PRESENT DAY

“Partisan Warfare,” Dictionary of United States Army Terms (August 1950)

“Activity carried on against an enemy by people who are devoted adherents to a cause, but who are not members of organized and recognized military forces. It includes guerrilla action, passive resistance by underground groups, espionage, sabotage, and propaganda.” (Special Regulations 350-5-1).

FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (October 1951)

Guerrilla warfare is defined in [Special Regulation] 320-5-1 as operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting military operations of the enemy. The term is sometimes limited to the military operations and tactics of small forces whose objective is to inflict causalities and damage upon the enemy rather than to seize or defend terrain; these operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise and the emphasis on avoidance of causalities. The term…includes organized and directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage and propaganda, and, in some cases, ordinary combat. Guerrilla warfare is ordinarily carried on by irregular, or partisan forces; however, regular forces which have been cut off behind enemy lines or which have infiltrated into the enemy rear areas may use guerrilla tactics.

FM 31-15 Operations Against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action, and Infiltration (January 1953)

Types of Guerrilla Operations. Generally speaking, operations by organized guerrilla forces are offensive in nature and may consist of raids, ambushes, sabotage, and similar actions. For a more detailed discussion on the are in which these forces operate, see pars. 14 and 37, FM 31-20.

In addition, guerrilla operations may include operations characterized by secrecy and stealth and including passive resistance, sabotage, espionage, propaganda, and general subversion through the spreading of rumors, underground newspapers, and leaflets. Such operations are usually conducted by the type of forces which develop in cities, towns, and heavily populated areas, relying on the cover provided by the mass of population for protection.

In a large country, which may contain both built-up areas and regions difficult to access, both types of guerrilla forces may be encountered. Organization of forces and methods of operation follow no set pattern or procedure. Organization and operation of guerrilla forces will vary according to terrain, the character and density of the population, the supply of arms and equipment, the presence of strong and determined leaders, and methods employed to counteract their operations.

Guerrilla Warfare (April 1957)

According to FM 31-21, “Guerrilla Warfare,” March 1955, the broad aims of guerrilla strategy are to: lessen the enemy’s combat effectiveness; delay and disrupt operations of the enemy forces; and weaken the morale and will to resist of a hostile military force.

239 As cited in Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces,” Special Warfare, Summer 1999, 4.
APPENDIX I (CONT.)

Guerrilla Warfare (September 1957)

This is the major lesson from the past; more specific lessons which have emerged are:
1. The need for training the regular army in both guerrilla and antiguerrilla measures now.
2. The preparation and planning in peace of an organization to control, equip, and support guerrillas before hostilities commence so that guerrilla forces can go into action at the outset.
3. Coordination of the activities of guerrilla units so that their efforts are directed to the attainment of the aim of the regular forces’ commander.
4. The necessity for ensuring the loyalty and support of the civil population for the guerrillas; and a corollary in the case of enemy occupied territory, not to involve the civil population directly in case of reprisals against them.
5. The value of air support in delivery and evacuation of guerrillas and the maintenance of forces.242

Nature of Unconventional Warfare (October 1959)

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is a general expression which designates all those resistance activities conducted within the enemy’s sphere of influence primarily utilizing indigenous personnel and resources in furtherance of military, political, or economic objectives. The major components are guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare as it pertains to all phases of unconventional warfare, sabotage, subversion against hostile states, and evasion and escape. These resistance activities may be completely overt, completely covert, or something in between these two extremes, depending upon the effectiveness of the enemy’s countermeasures.

Resistance begins with individual resentment toward an established regime—dissatisfaction with things as they are and a desire for change. The individuals who feel this bitterness toward the government or occupying power have no collective plan of action initially, although they may be performing individual acts of resistance. Organization of the resistance movement may develop spontaneously under initiative of a strong natural leader, or it may be through the efforts of a representative of an outside sponsoring power which is hostile to the occupying power. In either case, the development of a resistance movement is influenced by certain factors, such as the national character of the people, the geography of the area, the civilian support, outside support, and whether or not the enemy’s conventional forces are otherwise engaged.

Unconventional forces may have political aspirations inimical to our own.
Unconventional Warfare may be spontaneous, with no outside sponsorship, or may not be responsive to friendly control or direction.
Unconventional operations are most effective when coordinated with conventional operations.
The tactical value of unconventional forces becomes increasingly important as offensive operations approach the guerrilla area.243

Objectives (January 1960)

In studying the historical precedents of guerrilla warfare and its forms of employment, it can be concluded generally that guerrilla warfare is adopted for one or more of the following reasons:

1. To assist the regular armed forces in operations.
2. To defend the country as a last recourse when the regular armed forces have been routed.
3. To instigate a national action to regain the liberty of a country subjugated by the enemy.
4. To overthrow a dictatorial or tyrannical form of government.
5. To harass and weaken the existing government causing it to fall so as to permit the establishment of a new government.244

USAF Unconventional Warfare (February 1961)

Unconventional Warfare Defined. Unconventional warfare is technically defined as consisting of the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. On the other hand, conventional warfare is not currently defined, technically or otherwise, in any authoritative military publication. It may be deduced that conventional warfare includes all forms not specifically included in the definition of unconventional warfare.

Conventional-Unconventional Warfare Compared. There is a basic similarity between conventional and unconventional warfare. Both forms may be waged by military or civilian personnel. The actions concerned may be overt or covert. The weapons involved may be projectile, missile, high explosive, nuclear, chemical, biological, toxicological—in short, any weapon or weapon system in the existing inventory.

The fundamental difference between conventional and unconventional warfare lies in the circumstances under which the two types are conducted, and to some extent in the objectives of the forces involved. Conventional warfare activities are normally initiated within or are conducted from areas under the general control of friendly forces. Unconventional forces may receive support from forces in friendly territory, but their activities are conducted in hostile areas or in areas dominated by hostile forces.

The primary objective of unconventional forces during war is to defeat hostile offensive forces and deny to the enemy the resources with which to continue the war. The ultimate objective is to bring about a condition which supports and furthers national policy. In general, unconventional forces share the primary objective with conventional forces. However, since a major portion of unconventional forces is composed of indigenous or dissident personnel who have various motives for participation in unconventional warfare, there may be divergent views on the ultimate objective. For this reason, conventional forces must band or absorb unconventional forces as areas of control as operations advance.

Factors Affecting Unconventional Warfare. The nature of unconventional warfare activities will vary in conditions of peace and war. There are no significant differences in unconventional warfare activities between a state of peace or a state of cold war except for intensity. In like manner, hostilities themselves dictate the nature of unconventional warfare activities rather than a proclaimed or recognized state of ‘limited’ or ‘general’ war.

The nature of unconventional warfare activities will also vary according to the nature of the area in which conducted. These areas by characteristics are defined as follows:

a. **Hostile areas.** Areas of enemy homeland, dominated by a hostile power or containing relatively few dissident elements.
b. **Satellite areas.** Areas dominated by a hostile power, which once may have been controlled by a friendly power, and which contains residual or dissident elements.
c. **Occupied areas.** Friendly areas overrun, occupied and dominated by a hostile power, which may have a government in exile and which contain many dissident elements.
d. **Adjacent areas.** Friendly areas adjacent to hostile, satellite, or occupied areas and therefore subject potentially to being overrun or occupied by a hostile power.

Objectives. From the standpoint of conventional forces, the objectives in unconventional warfare are to reduce the effectiveness and morale of hostile forces; to reduce the military, economic and political potential of the hostile nation; and to provide friendly personnel with the means to ingress into, egress from and movement within areas under hostile domination. These objectives are achieved through guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversive activities. The intensity of these activities is limited by effectiveness of the security systems of the hostile force, the number or motivation of friendly indigenous or dissident personnel, the availability of means of transportation and logistic support within the area and from external sources, and the success of friendly forces and their proximity to designated unconventional warfare areas.\(^{245}\)

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Irregular activities include acts of military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or occupying power, and using primarily irregular and informal groupings and measures.[246]

**FM 31-21 Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (September 1961)**

Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conducted in enemy controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed in varying degrees by and external source.[247]

**Special Warfare: “Use the Right Word” (1962)**

*Special Warfare* is a term used by the U.S. Army to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations.

*Unconventional Warfare* includes the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and resistance. Such operations are conducted in enemy-held or controlled territory and are planned and executed to take advantage of or stimulate resistance movements or insurgency against hostile governments or forces. In peacetime the United States conducts training to develop its capability for such wartime missions.

A *Resistance Movement* is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power. Initially such resistance may consist of subversive political activities and other actions designed to agitate and propagandize the populace to distrust and lose confidence in the legally established government or occupying power. If not suppressed, such resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces.

- **Insurgency** is a condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection against duly constituted government or occupying power wherein irregular forces are formed and engage in actions which may include guerrilla warfare, that are designed to weaken and overthrow that government or occupying power.
- **Guerrilla Warfare** is the conduct of combat operations inside a country in enemy or enemy-held territory on a military or paramilitary basis by units organized from predominately indigenous personnel. The aim is to weaken the established government of the target country by reducing the combat effectiveness of the military forces, the economic means, and the overall morale and will to resist.
- **Irregular Forces** refer to a broad sense to all types of insurgents to include partisans, subversionists, terrorists, revolutionaries and guerrillas.
- **Paramilitary Forces** are those existing alongside armed forces and are professedly nonmilitary, but formed on an underlying military pattern as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization.
- **Evasion and Escape** are those operations where by friendly military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from enemy-held or unfriendly areas to areas under friendly control.[248]

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246 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-15 *Operations Against Irregular Forces*, May 1961, 3.
### APPENDIX I (CONT.)

**Mao’s Three Stages: Fact or Fantasy? (November 1966)**

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<td>I</td>
<td>Enemy=Strategic Offensive Chinese=Strategic Defensive Mobile warfare using large conventional units, supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. (Stage not finished by 1938).</td>
<td>“Contention” Enemy-Defensive Vietnamese=Defensive Positional warfare develops into mobile and guerrilla warfare. Vietnamese withdraw, but keep pressure on.</td>
<td>“Contention” Guerrilla warfare predominates. Camp warfare and mobile warfare also exist.</td>
<td>“Latent and Incipient Insurgency.” Covers situations ranging from the threat of subversion to those in which subversive incidents and activities occur in organized patterns.</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>Enemy=Strategic Offensive Chinese=Preparation for Offensive Guerrilla warfare predominates, supplemented by mobile warfare.</td>
<td>“Equilibrium” Enemy-Defensive Vietnamese=Preparation for Offensive Guerrilla warfare predominates initially, gradually developing into mobile and positional warfare.</td>
<td>“Equilibrium” Guerrilla warfare decreases in importance; camp and mobile warfare increase in importance.</td>
<td>“Organized Guerrilla Warfare.” Subversives gain local or external support, initiate organized guerrilla war against established authority.</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Enemy=Strategic Retreat Chinese=Counteroffensive International forces required, Mobile warfare predominates, positional warfare is supplementary.</td>
<td>“Counteroffensive” Enemy=Retreat Vietnamese=Attack Mobile warfare predominates, guerrillas shift to mobile warfare. Positional warfare develops at end.</td>
<td>“Counteroffensive” Mobile and camp warfare predominate; guerrilla warfare is less important.</td>
<td>“War of Movement.” War of movement between organized forces of insurgents and established government.</td>
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**FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations (February 1969)**

Unconventional warfare consists of military, political, psychological, or economic actions of covert, clandestine, or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and avoids formal military confrontation.

**Concept.** UW is conducted to exploit military, political, economic, or psychological vulnerabilities of an enemy. It is implemented by providing support and direction to indigenous resistance forces where appropriate, or by unilateral operations of U.S. UW forces. Its conduct involves the application of guerrilla warfare and selected aspects of subversion, political warfare, economic warfare, and psychological operations in support of national objectives.

**Unconventional Warfare Operations.** Unconventional warfare operations may be covert, clandestine, or overt in nature. Covert operations are conducted in such a manner as to conceal the identity of the sponsor, while clandestine operations place emphasis on concealment of the operation rather than the identity of the sponsor. Overt operations do not try to conceal either the operation or the identity of the sponsor. In an established theater of operations in which significant ground operations by conventional U.S. military force will be undertaken, UW is conducted primarily to complement, support, or extend conventional operations. Within geographical areas under enemy control or influence, to which conventional U.S. forces will not be deployed, UW may be conducted as an economy of force measure, and to reduce or dissipate the enemy potential.

**FM 31-21 Special Forces Operations (December 1974)**

Unconventional warfare is defined as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy, enemy held, enemy controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape.

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250 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations, February 1969, 3-1.
subversion, sabotage, direct action missions and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace.

**Concept.** UW is conducted to exploit military, political, economic, or psychological vulnerabilities of an enemy. It is implemented by providing support and direction to indigenous resistance forces where appropriate, or by unilateral operations of US UW forces. Its conduct involves the application of guerrilla warfare and selected aspects of subversion, political warfare, economic warfare, and psychological operations in support of national objectives.

**Unconventional Warfare Operations.** UW operations may be covert, clandestine, low-visibility or overt in nature. Covert operations are conducted in such a manner as to conceal the identity of the sponsor, while clandestine operations place emphasis on concealment of the operations rather than the identity of the sponsor. Low-visibility operations are operations wherein the political/military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operations may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. Overt operations do not try to conceal either the operation or the identity of the sponsor. In established theater of operations in which significant ground operations by a conventional US military force will be undertaken, UW is conducted primarily to complement, support or extend conventional operations. Within geographical areas under enemy control or influence, to which conventional forces will not be deployed, UW may be conducted as an economy of force measure, and to reduce or dissipate the enemy potential.

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251 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-21 *Special Forces Operations*, December 1974, 3-1.

252 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20 *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, April 1990, Glossary-12.
accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources to guard against future attack.

(4) In UW, the intelligence function must collect, develop, and report information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the established government or occupying power and its external sponsors. In this context, intelligence activities have both offensive and defensive purposes and range well beyond military issues, including social, economic, and political information that may be used to identify threats, operational objectives, and necessary supporting operations.

(5) E&E is an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to:
(a) Move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control,
(b) Avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control,
(c) Once captured, escape. SO personnel often will work in concert with the JRCC of the JFC while operating in an E&E network.

UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become protracted politico-military activity. From the US perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving US national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. SOF provides advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic objectives or operational objectives.

When UW is conducted independently during military operations short of war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include:

1. Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
2. Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
3. Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
4. Isolating the target authority from international, diplomatic, and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
5. Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.

When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. However, the political and psychological implications remain. UW operations delay and disrupt hostile military activities, interdict LOC, deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas, divert the hostile power’s attention and resources from the main battle area, and interdict hostile warfighting capabilities. Properly integrated and synchronized UW operations can extend the depth of air, sea, or ground battles, complement conventional military operations, and provide the JFC with the windows of opportunity needed to seize the initiative through offensive action.

During war, SOF may directly support the resistance movement by infiltrating operational elements into denied or politically sensitive areas. They organize, train, equip, and advise or direct the indigenous organization. In situations short of war, when direct US military involvement is inappropriate or infeasible, SOF may instead provide indirect support from an external location.

UW may be conducted by all designated SOF, but it is principally the responsibility of the Army SF. Augmentation other than SOF, will usually be provided as the situation dictates by PSYOP and CA units, as well as other selected conventional combat, combat support, and combat service support forces.

Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (April 1998)

Unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).

SOF support strategic and operational goals with the capability to advise, assist, organize, train, and equip indigenous forces and resistance movements. Working in local languages, SOF assist indigenous forces with training, intelligence, communications, PSYOP operations, civic action projects, and medical support. These activities can either be conducted in support of conventional forces—acting as a force multiplier in an integrated theater campaign—or as part of a stand-alone unconventional operation. UW includes the following:

- Guerrilla warfare—military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities.
- Subversion—activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.
- Sabotage—an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and material.
- Support to E&E Networks—an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to: move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control; avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control; and once captured, escape.

**FM 31-20 (Initial Draft) Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (December 1998)**

UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR). UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. UW is thus a protracted politico-military activity. SF units do not create resistance movements. They provide advice, training, and assistance to indigenous resistance movements already in existence. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain the supported insurgent or resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. When conducted independently, the primary focus on UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. Military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or an occupying power. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. The political and psychological implications remain, however.

Contemporary UW is significant for several reasons. Historically, SF has focused on UW as an adjunct to a major theater of war. The new strategic environment, however, requires SF to focus on UW during MOOTW, especially as it relates to UAR. Moreover, global urbanization dictates a shift in SF emphasis from rural guerrilla warfare to all aspects of clandestine UW.

**Unconventional Operations Proposal (Spring 1999)**

The conduct of missions and operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements throughout the operational continuum. Unconventional operations include, but are not limited to, a broad spectrum of operations that can be of long duration. UO are conducted by elements that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, or directed in varying degrees by external sources. UO are characterized by their joint and interagency complexion and are either overt, covert, or clandestine. Examples of UO include stability operations; guerrilla warfare; subversion; sabotage; information and intelligence activities; evasion and escape; special reconnaissance; underground operations; auxiliary operations;

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establishing support systems; establishing command and control systems; and direct action conducted by indigenous or surrogate elements.  

Proposed definition for unconventional warfare, Jones and Tone. (Summer 1999)

Unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations that are not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating the enemy’s military forces in combat. It includes subversion, sabotage, intelligence-collection, training and employing surrogate forces, offensive information operations, and offensive command-and-control warfare. These operations may be conducted in peace, conflict or war, and they may be overt, covert, or clandestine in nature. If these operations are conducted when our nation is not at war, their success, failure and even exposure are politically sensitive and carry strategic implications.\footnote{Jones and Tone, 9.}

\footnote{Michael J. Ivosevic, “Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definition,” Special Warfare, Spring 1999, 39.}
Appendix J

US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND STRATEGY-TO-TASK MODEL

SOF SUPPORT TO NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

- PROMOTE STABILITY
- THwart AGGRESSION

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

FIGHT TO WIN

National Military Objectives

Engagement
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Psychological Operations
- Civil Affairs
- Unconventional Warfare
- Information Warfare

Strike
- Direct Action
- Special Reconnaissance
- Combating Terrorism
- Counterproliferation of WMD

Mobility

Support

C4I

Required Capabilities List--Supporting Tasks

Strategy-to-Task Model (US Army Special Operations Command, 1997)

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258 United States Army Special Operations Command, Strategic Planning Guidance, 9.