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REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY: PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF A NON-CONSCRIPTED FORCE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Ready or not, the Russian Army is shifting from a largely conscripted to an all-volunteer force. The intended result of this shift is a professional, capable army, befitting a world power. Unfortunately, this shift has all but stalled. Due partly to its hastily contrived implementation and partly to a pattern of half-hearted and haphazard military reform measures, this transition now appears to be contributing to the opposite than desired effect. The Russian Army today is largely a dispirited, debilitated force in disarray. Russia's hope to professionalize its force remains unfulfilled. Much work awaits President Putin and his new defense team in this regard. Resurrecting this needed transition demands immediate review of flawed policies and procedures and enactment of wholly new initiatives. The prospects for success do not appear promising in the near term. Remaining attentive to the Russian Army's transitional troubles serves U.S. interests. Meaningful peacetime engagement and regional stability weigh in the balance.
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REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY: PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF A NON-CONSCRIPTED FORCE

Changes in a society and in the threats posed to that society can modify both its military institutions and the methods for supporting them. However, only fundamental changes in the values of a society can lead to significant changes in the way it raises its armed forces.

—Robert K. Griffith, Jr.

The Russian Army is embroiled in a manning crisis. Since the Army’s inception, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it has proven increasingly unsuccessful at attracting and keeping quality people in its ranks. Interestingly, this situation has evolved during a period in which the Russian Army dramatically reduced its manpower requirements and augmented its tradition of universal conscription by introducing a contract-based, volunteer service initiative.¹ This paper will analyze one key aspect of the Russian Army’s current mixed manpower acquisition system, its problematic shift from a fully conscripted to an all-volunteer, professional force.

After almost ten years of effort, Russia’s Army has not measured up to its professional hopes. Its contract volunteers often lack desired prerequisites and do not join in adequate numbers. As a result, the Army must continue to rely on a deeply flawed conscription system to satisfy its personnel needs. This precarious manning situation prevents Russia from enjoying the many benefits of a truly professional force and leaves it with an Army of limited utility. These conditions will likely persist for the foreseeable future, as Russia seems unable to improve significantly its efforts to professionalize its Army. To this end caution is warranted. The Russian Army is a badly fractured force that harbors elements of suspect reliability. As such, it presents peacetime engagement and regional security concerns that merit consideration of U.S. policymakers.

This analysis will begin by tracing the development of the Army’s shift to a professional force; an undertaking forced to occur within the larger reform process of the Russian Armed Forces. Subsequent issues addressed will include why it makes sense to pursue this transition; what needs to be done to ensure it succeeds; and how it has progressed to date. This effort will close with commentary on the current risks this transition presents and implications the United States should regard in crafting an effective engagement strategy with Russia.

PART I: BACKGROUND

Russia’s ongoing military reform is rooted in a reform process begun under its predecessor state, the Soviet Union. During the latter half of the 1980s, reform of the Soviet
military was included in Mikhail S. Gorbachev's efforts to restructure Soviet society as one of his many perestroika initiatives. He made official his military reform goals in a major address to the United Nations on 7 December 1988. In his speech, Gorbachev announced to a skeptical world community his intention to reduce and restructure the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Arguably, his bold pronouncement set in motion the most profound changes to affect the European continent and global security structures since the end of World War II. To its utter amazement, the Soviet military found itself at the forefront of these changes.

Gorbachev presented an aggressive two-year plan calling for major cuts in troop strength and conventional equipment levels. In gross terms, his plan reduced the Soviet military's personnel strength by some 500,000 (from a total of 5.2 million). It cut equipment levels by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft. Additionally, over a four-year period, Gorbachev intended to withdraw and disband six tank divisions from Eastern Europe and restructure the remaining Soviet divisions based there as mainly defensive.²

To execute Gorbachev's plan, willingly or not, Soviet generals were forced to apply themselves to the immediate logistical concerns of moving massive amounts of people and equipment from abroad to Russia. Military leaders had to contend with the resettlement of tens of thousands of officers and their families, finding and/or constructing infrastructure to accommodate returning units and personnel, discharging hundreds of thousands of personnel, and disposing of vast quantities of excess equipment. These tasks left little time for serious thought about military reform. Nevertheless, during this tumultuous period the topic of military reform entered into the public discourse.

Of the many reform concepts discussed, the idea of a professional army was one that took hold in the minds of the political leadership, some parts of the military, and the general populace. Anatolii Chemyaev, special assistant to Gorbachev, advised abandoning the "total conscription system" and stated that in its place "a professional, cadre army is needed—quality, not quantity."³ Colonel Alexander Savinkin, as spokesperson for a group of military officers, followed with a public proposal to create a "professional-militia structure."⁴ These ideas offered great prospects for both military opponents and proponents alike. A professional army would be staffed with volunteers; this reasoning was welcome relief for those not desiring to serve. Similarly, a volunteer force would require substantial resources to ensure high quality people and equipment; this view gave a degree of comfort to worried generals (who mostly opposed the concept). Both expectations, though they were proved unrealized, were correct and spurred the popular support that put this issue at center stage of the growing military reform debate.
Colonel (Retired) Vitaly Shlykov, formerly of the General Staff, captured this point, when he wrote:

The core issue of the reform that polarized the military institution was the system of personnel recruitment. Should the Soviet Army abandon the existing arrangement - a regular army staffed by career officers and soldiers recruited through mandatory conscription - and become a volunteer/professional army? The question overshadowed all other aspects of military reform to the extent that the very words “military reform” became synonymous with the introduction of a volunteer/professional army.\(^5\)

At the end of 1990, a group of military deputies advanced a reform program with a goal of the “gradual transition to a volunteer ‘professional army supported by a mobilization reserve on the territorial principle.’”\(^6\) Within a year the Soviet Army (and the Soviet Union), as had been known, ceased to exist, but the deputies’ proposal held momentum. On 7 May 1992, it gained legitimacy when President Boris Yeltsin spoke of shifting to a professional army in his decree that created the Russian Army.\(^7\)

To meet Yeltsin’s reform goals, his Defense Minister, General of the Army Pavel Grachev issued a broad, three-stage reform plan in late 1992.\(^6\) The plan sought to create mobile forces and included a series of restructuring and downsizing initiatives, which, in part, aimed to professionalize the Army. To this end, Grachev’s plan sought to incrementally fill the enlisted and noncommissioned officer ranks with contract volunteers. His goal was to man the force with 50 percent contract personnel by the end of the decade.\(^9\) The Defense Minister’s plan met with initial success. The Army claimed some 90,000 contract volunteers in the ranks by 1994.\(^10\)

But just as Grachev was issuing ambitious reform plans that sought to achieve a more professional force, economic reality hit. In 1993, the new Russian Defense Ministry received only half the budget it requested.\(^11\) Financing since then can best be described as wholly inadequate and intermittent. The impact has proven disastrous to the Army and its reform agenda and has all but “precluded” the shift “to a highly-professional all-volunteer force.”\(^12\) Nevertheless, the shift continued.

Due in part, to severe fiscal constraints, few, if any, of the comprehensive measures envisioned by serious reformers were enacted over the next several years. Rather, observers witnessed a continued trend of force reductions and restructurings labeled as reforms. And surprisingly, the number of contract volunteers nearly doubled to 170,000 by the end of 1995.\(^13\) However, even though the Army was becoming more professional in its composition, its actual performance in the first Chechen campaign proved to be abysmal. These failures, along with serious allegations of corruption and political expediency, led to Grachev’s ouster in the spring of 1996, just prior to Russia’s first presidential election.
In May 1996, while on the campaign trail, the ailing Yeltsin pledged to abolish the draft and create an all-volunteer Army by 2000. His presidential decrees to effect these pledges doubled Grachev’s original goal (50 percent professionals in the ranks by 1999) and sought to achieve it in almost half the time. To the many critical of Yeltsin’s pledge, he responded: “I know the opinion of the experts that it is impossible to create a professional army in such a short period. But it’s always like that in our country. Until you set a task they will try to argue that it cannot be fulfilled. When you make the decision, things will get moving.” Apparently voters were not too upset with Yeltsin’s logic or did not consider the issue of great concern. He won the election run-off in July 1996.

The seemingly impossible task of building a fully professional force by 2000 was left to Yeltsin’s new Defense Minister, General Igor Rodionov. Oddly enough, the outspoken Rodionov had earlier assessed Yeltsin’s decrees to professionalize as: “dangerous and irresponsible electioneering rhetoric that at best would never really be implemented and at worst could cause the final downfall of the Russian Army.” As Defense Minister, Rodionov did little to adjust his assessment of Yeltsin’s plan. Predictably, his uncompromising position put him at odds with Yeltsin and his administration. Within one year Rodionov was retired. The Army’s reform challenges then passed to his successor, Yeltsin’s third Defense Minister in as many years, a career Strategic Rocket Forces officer, General Igor Sergeyev.

Shortly after taking office in July 1997, Marshal Sergeyev opined that “the future lies with a professional army, we cannot escape it.” But, one month later, he conceded that Yeltsin’s goal of having a totally professional force would not be achieved by 2000. In 1998, the wording of President Yeltsin’s original edict that established 2000 as the target date for an all-volunteer army was updated to read that the shift would occur “gradually, as the necessary [economic] conditions are created.” In other words, there was no timeline. At the time, contract servicemen filled about 40 percent of the Army’s ranks and outnumbered their conscripted counterparts by approximately 26,000 personnel (170,000 vs. 144,000).

Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power was accompanied by heightened expectations on the part of Russian generals for assistance in their plight to resurrect a crumbling force. As Acting President, he approved The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation on 21 April 2000. This twenty-one page document offered something to everyone. Among its many tenets it posited:

...the improvement of the system of manning (on the mixed basis of conscription and contract service, with the subsequent growth of the share of contract servicemen owing to the creation of requisite socio-economic conditions, above all contract servicemen holding the posts of junior commanders and specialists of the leading combat professions).
Putin has spoken repeatedly of the need for a more professional army. Though he qualified his statements by saying that he already regarded the Russian Army as a largely professional force. Further he added, that in his view, achieving a more professional force really applied only to positions that demanded technical skills and those positions engaged in dangerous activities.\(^22\)

At this writing President Putin has been on the job for a year. In contrast to his predecessor, he appears at least interested and involved in improving the plight of the military. Russia's new Military Doctrine acknowledges that its mixed system of manning will continue—a realistic assessment. Russia's newly appointed Defense Minister, Mr. Sergei Ivanov, has already "pledged to make the army 'more professional, mobile and combat-ready.'"\(^23\) But it remains to be seen if Putin and his new defense team can make good on their desire to improve and expand the Army's professional cohort. Achieving this goal will reap long term benefit for the Russian Army. To this end, their immediate challenge will be translating presidential decrees into deeds. This is no easy task. There is ample evidence to show that many previous presidential military reform decrees were left unexecuted. Putin must therefore remain attentive to his professionalization goals for the army if they are to be attained.

**PART II: THE BENEFITS OF A PROFESSIONAL FORCE**

The concept of a professional soldier of the current Russian design requires explanation, as it is markedly different from the professional of the generally accepted Western standard—at least at the enlisted level.\(^24\) In the Russian Army, an enlisted soldier becomes a professional by either extending his period of conscription or by entering the Army from reserve status after a break in service.\(^25\) At one extreme, a draftee can sign a contract after only six months in uniform and become a professional. At the other extreme, a reservist can sign a contract at any time after departing active service and become a professional. Career officers, traditionally regarded as professionals in the Western sense, are now also signing contracts after completing commissioning school. These diverse servicemen are labeled variously as professionals, contract soldiers (*kontraktnik*) or volunteers. Essentially then, by virtue of the fact a service member signs a contract, regardless of its duration, previous training or experience the signatory becomes a professional. Despite inconsistencies among today's professionals in the force the concept of their service in increasing numbers is sound for a number of reasons.

The Russian Army has potentially much to gain from professional soldiers who will serve longer than conscripts. Most contracts are written for a three-year period, vice a twenty-four-month conscript enlistment period (that may be shortened by service in "hot spots" like
Chechnya).\textsuperscript{26} Such a short conscript service obligation virtually disallows the average draftee any opportunity to acquire advanced skills in the more technical military fields. Even for some of the more basic job skills one commander relies heavily on his contract personnel as opposed to his conscripts. The Chief of Motor Vehicle - Road Service in the North Caucasus cites his \textit{kontratnik} as his "most responsible and professionally trained" soldiers who he depends on heavily for critical driving and maintenance functions.\textsuperscript{27}

Also, proficiency in the advanced technical fields associated with information operations, precision engagement and other similar areas is a requirement for success in the increasingly sophisticated battlefield environment. A modern army, such as Russia vies to possess, must keep pace with changing technology and procure modern systems. The exploitation of the advantages brought by modern technology requires capable operators just as much as the advanced technology itself. Arguably, only a high quality professional who serves repetitive tours will provide an acceptable return on the training investment and will provide the kind of technological expertise Russia's objective force of the future demands.

A professional army will serve the defense needs of Russia better than its conscripted alternative. In view of its Military Doctrine, which list many internal and local threats that may necessitate commitment of ground forces, contract soldiers offer the Russian leadership a more useful resource than conscripts do. One author explains that, especially for internal matters, the use of professional soldiers "evokes fewer social frictions."\textsuperscript{28} Witness Russia's latest counter-terrorist action in Chechnya. There the loss of a contract soldier does not elicit the same level of public discontent, as does the loss of a young conscript. The Russian leadership seems to understand this perception. In October 1999, contract sergeants and soldiers accounted for 9 percent of the troops in Chechnya. In 2000, contract servicemen amounted to more than 38 percent of the force; and of this group 80 percent were claimed to be serving in direct combat roles.\textsuperscript{29}

In addition to internal operations such as Chechnya, authorities have chosen to rely heavily on contract soldiers to carry out high profile missions abroad. The 201\textsuperscript{st} Motorized Rifle Division successfully executed its peacekeeping mission in Tajikistan manned completely with contract servicemen.\textsuperscript{30} This practice was in line with Russia's latest Military Doctrine that stated: "Russian service personnel who serve in joint military units with CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states will be professionals (that is, on contract)."\textsuperscript{31} Farther abroad, in keeping with the spirit of this doctrinal assertion, the ranks of Russian troops in the Balkans are filled with predominately contract professionals.\textsuperscript{32}
The quality of servicemen will improve with the maturation of a professional force. The combination of a reliable and reasonable paycheck, acceptable treatment, meaningful work, and a promising career path characterize a professional organization. Such an enterprise, government or civilian, will attract quality people. Highlighting these new considerations of service nudges the Russian Army from its past institutional high ground to the occupational reality it must now confront. Previously, the Russian Army (at least at the enlisted and noncommissioned officer level) was able to ignore these characteristics. The compulsory conscription system did not require authorities to compete for talented people. Their service was guaranteed. A professional force brings no such guarantee. It must win promising recruits in a competitive marketplace. To achieve success, a truly professional Russian Army must embody these organizational constructs, be selective in its recruitment, and qualitatively improve its manning.

In turn, this improved force of servicemen will challenge its commissioned leaders in several ways. Over time a seasoned noncommissioned officer corps will supplant junior officers as master trainers and the backbone of the force. They will police and keep-in-check unprincipled commanders who would wantonly abuse and misuse troops for personal gain. In a sense, the growing cohort of young credible professionals will serve to counterbalance (and ideally replace over time) the excess part of Russia's bloated senior officer corps. At some point, the officers and noncommissioned officer/enlisted soldiers will be forced to develop a bond of trust and mutual respect. This will be a tall order for Russian officers. They have long had direct access to their troops without the serious scrutiny of noncommissioned officers.

Further, ranks full of true professionals would also go a long way in solving one of the more troubling aspects of Russian Army life: dedovshchina—the brutal and sadistic treatment of conscripts by senior soldiers and officers. Such continued hazing of soldiers will undermine the process of recruiting and retaining good people. People will not volunteer if they will be treated badly. And once in uniform, if contractual obligations protecting one's safety and dignity are not upheld, the contract serviceman will have a legal basis to quit and return home. In either case, continuation of the practice of dedovshchina will prove wholly inconsistent with professionalizing the force.

There is valuable political capital to be gained by successfully shifting to a professional army. As Vitaly Shlykov correctly assessed over five years ago, the term military reform has been inextricably intertwined with professionalizing the force. The Putin administration has committed to building a stronger military. A stated goal of this commitment is achieving a more professional force. In other words, the intent is to increase the number of contract volunteers in
the force. Presumably the public assessment of Putin’s efforts on military reform will be shaped, in large measure, by the degree and manner to which his administration has achieved this goal some four years from now.

The successful shift to a professional army will serve another useful purpose for Russian authorities. It will end the traditional system of universal conscription, a deeply troubled and costly process that is failing. Largely regarded as a “broken” system, it is not producing desired results. Currently, the Army is short some 80,000 personnel, despite its mixed composition of contract volunteers and conscripts. This shortage occurs at a time when the draft-eligible cohort averages about 1.2 million annually. Ideally, volunteer shortfalls would be filled with available conscripts. For many reasons, this is not the case.

In keeping with a long-established practice, twice a year there is a nation-wide draft call-up. And twice a year there is more bad news. A large percentage of the draft cohort chooses to not even respond to call-up notices. Those who do report are either drafted or granted a deferment. The military is not satisfied with the low turnout, high number of deferments granted, and poor quality of draftees selected. As in proceeding years the results of one call-up last year illustrate the point.

Last spring, 27,712 eligible recruits failed to report. Only about 25 percent of these cases were forwarded to the prosecutor offices for legal action. And of those cases forwarded for investigation the vast majority was not brought to trial. Russian law stipulates 21 grounds for deferment, almost twice the number as during the Soviet era. The result is that 87 percent of those called were granted a deferment. If these numbers don’t look good to the generals, the quality of those selected to serve looks even worse.

Under such a system, those conscripted into the force are not the best, brightest or healthiest. Almost 40 percent enter the service without any work or training experience. In other words, they are unemployed. Fully 55 percent were drafted with health reservations—thus limiting assignment utility. Approximately 12 percent of recruits have had criminal records, and 4 percent had used narcotics. Some conscripts, in fact, are so bad that commanders in the Far East have filed lawsuits demanding financial compensation from several districts of the Khabarovsk territory for sending them such poor quality recruits. Understandably, commanders feel disadvantaged when they are forced to accept unhealthy, unmotivated or morally flawed recruits who demand a disproportionate share of attention and scare resources to only perform someday as substandard soldiers.

The reasons for the dismal semi-annual conscription results are numerous. Russia’s deteriorating health standards, lost prestige of military service, dire economic conditions and
poor treatment in the ranks contribute to the problem. To spice up the meager benefits of conscripted service, the Russian Defense Ministry has made several concessions. For a brief period it decreased the obligatory service length from two years to eighteen months, then reinstated the two-year period. Conscripts are now given assurances that they will not be sent to Chechnya unless they volunteer. And if they do volunteer, they will not only receive extra pay but their time in this “hot spot” will be counted double. This would satisfy one’s service obligation sooner (assuming of course the soldier survives). Despite these added enticements, they still come up short of conscripts.

As obvious as the benefits of a professional army are, the hazards and pitfalls in the transition to such a force are less obvious. In 1992, one defense official predicted that if the shift was “forced” without the proper supports the consequences would have a negative impact on military reform, combat readiness, and Russia’s national defense capability. This official’s caution went unheeded. The fundamental preconditions for a professional army in Russia had not been adequately addressed or firmly established before this transition started. The result has left the Russia Army in a most untenable manning situation. So tenuous is this state of affairs, that Christopher Donnelley, a noted Soviet/Russian military authority, has concluded that the Russian Army today “does not merely have a problem; it confronts systemic failure.”

PART III: THE PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

To avert systemic failure in its drive to professionalize its army, Russia must develop and issue clear military reform guidance; provide funding consistent with requirements; discard its claim to “great power” status; and adhere to the rule of law. These prerequisites are closely related. Progress on each is necessary to achieve overall success. Unfortunately, its hastily contrived move to professionalize has left the Russian Army in the unenviable position of executing this difficult manning shift while it attempts to fulfill these necessary establishing requirements. The situation could not be more challenging, especially in view of the fact that progress will be tied to the success of Russia’s larger military reform effort.

REFORM GUIDANCE

The reform saga in the Russian Army has not been short on ideas or plans. Unfortunately, of the many concepts offered, few have been translated into measurable or achievable goals. The latest Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation potentially enters the scene as yet another official document to be liberally quoted and generally ignored. To avoid this, Putin’s team will have to translate his doctrinal assertions into meaningful actions. The team’s challenge will be to develop directive policies and enact detailed and commensurate
planning measures that will move the Russian Army forward in accordance with Putin’s desires. Without such work to designate necessary implementing measures and bodies, and empowering the latter to act, key elements this doctrine (such as professionalizing the force) may become simply another, in a series of, ineffective decrees in the name of military reform. Only one man can prevent this.

In the words of Chistopher Donnelley, “the prospects of reform still rely on the authority of one man—the president.” Early actions by President Putin indicated he was not about to yield the primacy of his office on any front. However, he still has not used his position and power to direct meaningful change in the area of military reform. For the past year, he appeared content to observe his former Defense Minister trade barbs with his Chief of the General Staff on the direction of military reform. Marshal Sergeyev fought for stronger strategic assets and General Kvashin countered with demands for more capable conventional forces. Though, to his credit, he has pushed through plans for significant troop reductions, just appointed Russia’s first civilian defense minister, and moved to bring much needed financial expertise to the Defense Ministry, there is still much to be accomplished in the area of military reform.

Putin cannot afford to be a “spectator” of the military reform debate. It is critical that he remains engaged in the process for it to achieve any positive result. In the absence of a clearly articulated reform direction from Putin, Defense Minister Ivanov and his functionaries cannot be held accountable for developing supporting reform plans that are feasible and within budget. To exacerbate matters, Putin keeps the Army engaged in the latest Chechen campaign. This costly excursion affords his military leaders a plausible preoccupation to avoid planning and executing many inevitable reforms. Putin can ease the heavy reform burden on his Army by giving it specific reform guidance, holding his military leaders accountable for executing that guidance, and disengaging his Army from Chechnya. Assuming he spurs movement on these initiatives, next in order of importance, Putin will have to address the issue of funding.

ADEQUATE FUNDING

The issue that blocks discussion of reform in the Russian Army more than any other is that of money. Three Defense Ministers in a row have made this point. Funding for the Army continues to be so poor that last year a Moscow bank paid for shoes and winter hats for troops in Chechnya, as “the army simply did not have the money to buy such ‘luxuries.” Clearly, such inadequate funding limits reform in general and makes laughable the thought of successfully shifting to an all-volunteer and more costly professional force.
A former Finance Minister, Yevgeniy Yashin, was fond of saying: “The only way to force the military to think is to not give them money.” Applying his logic, defense officials have been forced to think a lot lately. Defense spending has steadily declined over the past decade. In 1998, Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian Parliament, assessed that the Russian military budget had declined by about 90 percent from earlier Soviet times. This precipitous funding decline was not accompanied by as dramatic a decline in requirements. As a result, wage arrears, housing shortages, nonpayment of bills, little meaningful training and no measurable modernization programs accurately describe the Russian Army as it attempts to include more professionals in its numbers.

Yet, there is real potential for improvement. The Russian economy has experienced mild growth in the last two years. In turn, the defense budget grew by some 30 percent from 1999 to 2000. However, it remains to be seen if this trend continues, as that increase coincided with a presidential election and higher revenues from oil sales. And it remains to be seen if full budget allocations actually arrive in Defense Ministry coffers. The central government has consistently neglected to give the Defense Ministry the full defense budget authorized by the Duma. Despite an early indication that he would increase defense spending by 50 percent, President Putin has not given the military a blank check. His increased budget outlay was used only to pay off past debts. And he has made the point that, in his view, “far too much” money is being spent on defense and that “funds are just spread out and wasted.” This statement does not give comfort to defense planners.

Although difficult, these first two preconditions of success in professionalizing the force are achievable in the near term. In contrast, the next two will prove more complex, elusive and long term. Essentially, establishing the following preconditions will require the Russian leadership and general populace to act consistently and concertedly on two levels. On the global level they must discard their claim as a “great power” and second, on a societal level, they must submit to the rule of law in all that they do.

“GREAT POWER” CLAIM

Many Russians, military and civilian alike, believe their country still has a rightful claim to its past “great power” status. This belief impedes movement on the real military reform work Russia must undertake. Zbigniew Brzezinski captures the essence of this point in his assessment:

...that the current ruling elite is more preoccupied with the restoration of a dominant Russian state than with a historic reorientation of Russia. As a result, there is an obvious disconnect between the leadership’s ends and the country’s
means. Contemporary Russia is simply too weak to sustain regional domination while nostalgically reclaiming superpower status.\textsuperscript{59}

In his inaugural address, President Putin spoke of Russia as "a great, powerful and mighty state" and said that they must rebuild a Russia "which commands respect in the world."\textsuperscript{60} Such statements serve political expediency but also give reason for some entities to resist needed change. One such body is the Defense Ministry.

The Defense Ministry appears almost to be conducting a delaying action, resisting real reform and holding out for its past glory days of public unaccountability and arrogance. This perhaps is understandable when one considers that the Defense Ministry is the guarantor of Russia's lone claim to superpower status. It derives this underwriter claim not from a potent conventional force, but from its possession of the world's second largest strategic nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{61} And Russia reminded the world community of its impressive strategic capabilities in a recent test that demonstrated proficient use of its land, sea, and air strategic missiles.\textsuperscript{62} Following Defense Ministry logic, it should not be downsizing or be forced to compete with other of the Russian "Power Ministries" (Interior, Security Services, Border Guards, etc.) for resources. Rather it should be rebuilding and enhancing current capabilities— with little concern for costs, which is reminiscent of the Soviet approach to the issue.

This view of how things should be perpetuates the Defense Ministry's penchant for failing to live within it means. In effect, its superpower aspirations are inconsistent with the reality of its budget. To move forward, the "ruling elite" must cease hiding behind misplaced, nostalgic notions of greatness. They must concede that the money is not available, and will not be available, to maintain unnecessary infrastructure and force structure, or to conduct costly excursions and tests. Continuing to invest scarce resources in unnecessary or questionable pursuits hinders the reform process. Correspondingly, the Army's shift to a professional force will incur added risk as its very success is based on solid financing. Acknowledging its diminished importance on the world stage is not the only sobering reality Russia must confront to succeed in its military reform process.

RULE OF LAW

The Russian Army must accept fundamental change of a deeper kind than simply relenting on its position of global importance. A truly professional force must base itself and its actions on the rule of law, vice the authority of the nearest senior officer. This becomes a fundamental issue in a society where there exists a nonchalant adherence or cavalier approach to written law. Regardless of what is codified in law, uneven enforcement is often the rule rather
than the exception. One's status, wealth, and nationality wrongly weigh in an accepted process that allows those in positions of authority to interpret law out of convenience. Applied to the military service this loose regard for law impedes building a sound, values-based foundation for the growth of a professional force.

Any military force arrogant of the rule of law is ripe for the growth of corrupting activities that will undermine its drive to professionalize. The Russian military hierarchy is notorious for its self-aggrandizement. It sets itself above the law, public concern and any seemingly authoritative scrutiny. It is precisely these practices that will disallow a corrupted senior military body from meeting contractual obligations with its volunteers. And these senior officers can point to the former President whose words reinforce their intransigence for law. When questioned about the government's inability to uphold its contract obligations with its professional soldiers, Yeltsin is reported to have said "that the existing contracts were more like an oath of allegiance." In his mind both parties of the contract were not to be held equally accountable for fulfilling their obligations. Such disregard for responsibility and obligation from the top, frees everyone below from accountability.

Beyond broken contracts, a disregard for law allows the Russian Army to selectively adhere to acceptable professional standards of conduct on the battlefield. One paratrooper, who had served in Chechnya, acknowledged that his unit was guilty of routinely carrying out human rights violations. He believed that this was due in part to the fact that the Russian Army bases its actions "on fervor," as opposed to the U.S. Army that acts professionally and in which there is an effective system of accountability. Closer at home, such disregard for law, and its tacit approval by authorities, perpetuates the maltreatment and common debasement of soldiers by the practice of dedovshchina and the misdeeds of unscrupulous commanders. Unlawful acts committed without consequence, if allowed to continue, may transform Russia's objective professional force into a band of mercenaries by another name.

President Putin can play a major role here if he chooses. Setting things right in the Army is a more manageable task than righting society in general. As president he must clearly articulate to his subordinates that he will hold them accountable to execute his policies, and execute them in a lawful fashion. If they fail he must remove them from office. If he does this at least the foundation of legality may follow. But without this stated and enforced requirement for law-based actions the status quo will likely remain. Leaders will continue to rely on the "rule of force, rather than on the force of rules" to execute policies and prerogatives. This mode of operation will greatly inhibit progress in building a more professional Russian Army.
PART IV: THE RECORD TO DATE

In the Russian Army's haste to professionalize, it neglected to firmly establish any of the prerequisites for success presented above. Rather, out of sheer necessity vice prudent planning, it only addressed two prerequisites: reform guidance and funding. Unfortunately, in each case, only the minimally essential measures were undertaken to initiate a transition that Russia is now unable to sustain effectively or retreat from easily. The Army's weak performance in providing detailed guidance and securing adequate resourcing results in a contract manning system that has progressed little beyond the early success it enjoyed under Defense Minister Grachev and that now approximates the conscript system in terms of effectiveness.

EFFECTS OF INCOMPLETE GUIDANCE

In the absence of clear, executable guidance and appropriate implementing measures to shift to a professional force military leaders were forced to rely largely on the existing conscription system and its Military Commissariat structure to bring volunteers into the force. Though this flawed process brought in good numbers initially, it introduced other troubling aspects. Volunteer soldiers lacked consistent quality and signed contracts for varying terms of service. Their distribution was not balanced and their composition posed suspect utility.

General V. Zherebtsov, former Chief of the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate, pointed to the selection of candidates as the weakest part in the process. He believed that the recruitment centers and unit commanders who assessed contract volunteers into the service did not prove "effective enough to prevent immoral, professionally unsuited people from getting into army ranks."66 Because of the slipshod work of these offices, the operational capability of some units receiving professional soldiers suffered. A commander in the 42d Guards Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Chechnya expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of a group of contract soldiers sent to him from the Urals Military District. "Of almost 300 men, only 20 were selected for one unit and 50 for another. We were forced to send the rest back."67 Those contract soldiers retained for service presented other challenges to commanders.

Commanders, like the one above, of units with a mixture of conscript and contract soldiers have a tough job. They have to meld together cohesive formations from widely divergent groups. New and senior conscripts are of roughly the same age (18-19 years old) and ability. Contract soldiers vary in age, maturity and professional competence and are often difficult to integrate into a unit's hierarchy. Aleksandr Sharavin, head of the Institute for Military-Political Problems in Russia, makes the point that, "the contract soldier of twenty-five or twenty-
six is never going to submit to an eighteen year old serjeant."68 This situation serves to create tension within the ranks to the point where one expert concludes that it is "becoming sufficiently serious to cause real concern for unit stability."69 Between the ranks there is potential friction too. The fact that contract soldiers are not "meek conscripts" who have no choice but to obey confronts especially junior officers with new and more complex leadership demands.70

Professionals serve under widely varying contracts. Though normally executed for three or five years, contracts can vary in duration and purpose. To illustrate the point one author states: "A man decides to become a professional servicemen and signs a contract for several years. Another man, lured by the size of payment in the zone of fighting, signs a contract for a couple of months. There is a difference between the two types of contract servicemen and the attitude of the public to them is different too."71 These professionals serve for different reasons and have different expectations from their army and their leaders.

Unit commanders who have both types of professionals must accommodate their respective motivations and guarantees. One professional may have been contracted to serve only in less desirable places (like Chechnya) while another may have volunteered to serve only close to home (and keep away from places like Chechnya). In this situation, unit cohesion may have to be sacrificed to meet contractual obligations. In a very real sense the commander of a composite unit of variously contracted and conscript soldiers is somewhat akin to a supervisor at a job site who must depend on workers from different labor unions under different contractual obligations to complete his work project. Beating the odds, the commander may prove successful and field a competent unit, but the system has not made it easy for him.

The distribution of contract soldiers is as uneven as the terms of their contracts. Some units are filled completely by professionals and others have a mix of volunteers and conscripts. The former units seem to be engaged in high profile missions abroad and are doing well. The latter are engaged domestically, in less scrutinized operations, with unheralded results. The absence of a uniform distribution system that balances the positive and negative aspects of professionals across the force suggests the Russian Army is developing as a two-tiered force. The top tier holds the few units composed of mostly professionals. These units are largely capable and deployable. The lower tier consists of units filled with a mixture of conscripts and volunteers. These units are less ready and less capable.

Locations demanding a troop presence in Russia are as diverse as the distribution of contract soldiers is uneven. One defense official has made the point that: "there is a great difference between serving in Moscow Region or Volga, and serving on Novaya Zemlya, Chukota or Kamchatka."72 Keeping remote sites manned is another challenge incurred—and
neglected—in the move to a professional force. One must assume that most contract soldiers will agree to serve in these places if offered appropriate pay incentives and extra credit for time served as in "hot spots" like Chechnya. The result gives the Defense Ministry higher personnel costs and turnover rates when they can afford neither.73

Another surprising consequence presented by the shift to a larger contract force has been the increasing number of women in the Russian Army. Although Russian law prohibits women from being drafted, they are free to enter contracts as service members.74 Their numbers are on the rise. By the end of 1994, there were 82,000 women in contract service throughout the armed forces.75 Within three years there were 100,000 women serving under contract in the Army alone. And, of this group, a large percent were wives of officers and noncommissioned officers.76 While this increase demonstrates promise for opening career paths to women, it must also bring into question deployability concerns. In 1998, Marshal Sergeyev stated that over 50 percent of contract personnel [were] women.77 In an earlier report, commanders of some units signed on the spouses and adult children of unit members, ostensibly to fill personnel shortages and to increase household incomes of service personnel. These were referred to a "family operations."78 Units composed of officers, their spouses and children are probably of less than full military utility.

EFFECTS OF INADEQUATE FUNDING

Resourcing inconsistent with requirements is the Russian Army’s most immediate and obvious problem. Notwithstanding a declining budget for almost the past decade, defense officials have moved forward on two expensive initiatives, neither of which they can afford. They have reduced the force and simultaneously have begun to professionalize it. The drawdown alone is more costly than keeping soldiers in the force. Russian law requires that senior officers separated involuntarily are entitled to receive "20 monthly salaries, housing (if not already provided), and relocation expenses."79 This requirement alone keeps excess people in the ranks as they are too expensive to separate. Professionalizing is another costly undertaking.

Estimates put the cost of one contract serviceman at 5 times the yearly cost of his conscript counterpart. And if the contract soldier is then posted to a combat zone (as is the current trend) the cost is 10 times higher than for a conscript.80 These ratios are based only on the relative pay and allowances for contract and conscript soldiers. But a professional force incurs many other substantial, but less noticeable costs. The current Chief of the Organization-Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff cautions that:

The development of military installations infrastructure will require considerable funds to cover the additional housing construction for the families of contract
personnel, to expand enterprises and utility services agencies...it becomes quite understandable that the manning of the Russian military with contract personnel is, for the time being, too heavy a burden for both the Armed Forces and Government as a whole.81

Despite General Putilin's assessment, the shift to a contract force has occurred without the requisite fiscal underpinnings. The results are what one might expect.

Low budgets lead to low wages. Today a contract serviceman earning about $25.00 per month makes half the salary of a trolley bus driver.82 While not an attractive pay scale, people do volunteer. Reportedly, there were approximately 180,000 contract soldiers in the Army in late 1997.83 There is no evidence available to show increased numbers of contract servicemen in the Army since that time. Insufficient pay (at least for service outside Chechnya or the Balkans) and a stalled recruiting drive are perhaps part cause and effect of Russia's faltering professionalization effort. From this, one could surmise that those contracted into service are probably not the best of Russia's youth. On this account, one official concedes that, "those people who enter into contract service mainly do so because...they will not be able to find jobs for themselves for a worthy civilian life or they count on obtaining a lot of money in Chechnya."84

Low pay is one problem. Intermittent pay is another. This past fall contract service members twice picketed the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District claiming that they had not been paid for their service in Chechnya.85 In another instance, contract servicemen from the long heralded Taman and Kantemirov divisions, who were serving in Chechnya, simply terminated their contracts ahead of schedule because they did not trust authorities would honor their financial obligations to them.86 While both cases are poor advertisements for recruiting, they raise valid reliability concerns about soldiers who work for money when the money is not forthcoming.

Disgruntled contract soldiers, with few outside legitimate career opportunities, are ripe for involvement in criminal activities. In 1998 alone approximately 24 percent of all contracts written were nullified for illegal activities.87 Last fall two contract soldiers were apprehended selling military property. One was caught attempting to sell 55 kilograms of TNT. Another was seized trying to peddle 40.5 kilograms of mercury for hard currency.88 There is also evidence to suggest that organized criminal groups actively target experienced soldiers for employment in their private security firms and illegal operations.89

There are no fast or easy fixes for most of these problems. Many have grown with the increasing cohort of professionals in the ranks. Some were predicted, and some were not. A raft of detailed, pointed directives and a rapid infusion of funding will not immediately overcome these problems or the flawed implementing practices that caused them. But these measures are
indeed necessary if only to begin to slowly turn and improve the process. Time is a valuable resource here and it must not be squandered. The longer the Russian Army waits to act in a decisive fashion, the weaker and more desperate it will become.

PART V: CURRENT RISKS

Russia’s inability or reluctance to aggressively reform its Army has left it an embittered force. Arguably, its hastened move to professionalize has served to worsen, rather than improve matters. The Russian Army today possesses a radically diminished warfighting capability with a disturbingly increased potential to become a reliability risk. This situation has led one author to conclude that Russia has become “a security risk by weakness,” in contrast to its Soviet predecessor, which posed “a security risk by strength.”

The Russian Army’s financial dilemma is the basis for the security risk it presents domestically and abroad. Because of consistently shaky funding from Moscow, units are increasingly dependent on local governments for support. This situation is a manifestation of the “regimental economy” existing in Russia since the time of the czars. Applied to the Russian Army today, Stephen Blank explains this economic relationship as a system of barter between local authorities and businesses and commanders. “In return for the state’s failure to provide sufficiently for the men’s upkeep and training, officers [have] virtual carte blanche in using them during peacetime.” This barter system reduces soldiers to a cheap labor pool for commanders to parcel out on local work projects in return for support from local enterprises to assist in sustaining their units.

As these local economic relationships grow and solidify, the authority of the center over affected units may diminish. If left unchecked, in time, commanders will become more beholden to local business and regional authorities, and in exchange, those bodies will become more important to commanders. A recent reform initiative enacted to redefine and strengthen the role of the Military District in Russia as the controlling headquarters over all federal forces within its boundaries has served to legitimize these unofficial economic relationships. These newly empowered Military Districts invite a shift in loyalty of affected units from Moscow to their respective administrative and political powers. How reliable then will units be when their controlling district is at odds with Moscow over utilization of its soldiers (who are sustained by the district, vice Moscow)? Reliability concerns raised by this increasing “regionalization” of the Army are worrisome, but they largely constitute an internal matter. Of perhaps more concern however, is the external threat that such a potentially fragmented force poses.
A cash-strapped force developing economic relationships out of necessity, reinforced by design, tends to become less a service and more of a business. There is inherent danger in this phenomenon. The few first rate units (the upper tier) of the Russian Army, engaged in international peacekeeping (and profitable) missions abroad, present a lesser concern here. But the lower tier units, the bulk of the force located in Russia, bear scrutiny. These units are consumed with merely subsisting and independently must fend for themselves. Operating outside the public spotlight they present real potential for improving profitability through illegal means.

Lost control over units from the center to the regions is one problem. But losing control of units’ equipment or properties locally, or to neighboring states or farther abroad raises the stakes considerably. Russia still claims over 10,000 nuclear weapons and 40,000 tons of chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{94} The prospect for trade in these and conventional weaponry falls well within the realm of possibility in Russia today. The blend of full arsenals, desperate troops, and willing buyers combine as a volatile mix. At best the mix warrants concern. At worst it could have a destabilizing effect in Russia, along its periphery and beyond.

Acknowledging this possibility, John Reppert stated: “The leadership of the Ministry of Defense cannot be congratulated on achieving reform, but deserves praise and even gratitude for maintaining the armed forces under governmental control at a time when neither officers nor enlisted personnel were adequately fed or paid.”\textsuperscript{95} Praise will quickly give way to condemnation should control be lost. U.S. policymakers observing these potential manifestations of an unsteady military reform process in Russia can ill afford to neglect their serious repercussions. In this effort, there is much those officials should regard.

PART VI: DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS

To deal with the Russian military effectively, U.S. policy developers and defense planners must understand what they are dealing with. The notion of a powerful Russian Army is an empty notion. Rather it is a mirror, of sorts, of the deep-set societal problems of a Russian state in turmoil. With a new administration in Washington, there exists an opportunity within an atmosphere of constructive cooperation to engage the Russians on a meaningful level. To progress in this direction it is important that officials:

- Clearly understand that the Russian Army is unable to model its professional force on the U.S. Army. There is simply too much distance between the two forces materially and psychologically. Last year's budget for the U.S. Army was more than 13 times that of the entire Russian Defense Ministry.\textsuperscript{96} The U.S. Army has achieved its current level of
professionalism after almost thirty years of nurture and experience. The Russian Army is caught in an identity crisis. It is fighting its natural predisposition to rely on conscription to man its force while it experiments with professionalizing it. And past experience makes the bulk of the Russian Army distrustful that its military and civilian leaders will provide the necessary resources to succeed at this transition.

- Carefully avoid an engagement strategy that takes the shape of a "one-sided courtship." To show the Russians the merits of the U.S. system it is important to share the most effective elements of that system with them—on their turf. Bringing Russian officers to U.S. military schools is a one-sided process. More would be gained by demanding reciprocity; exchange on a quid pro quo basis. The U.S. Army has ranks full of capable officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers. To this end, the U.S. Army should rely on its professionals to showcase their talents at the individual soldier level in Russia. U.S. service personnel would benefit from a broadening experience. The Russians would benefit from direct exposure to their U.S. counterparts and gain a sense of satisfaction in knowing that they still possess valuable skills and practices of interest to Western military professionals.

- Recognize that it may prove more cost effective to assist the Russian Army reduce its force than to focus on helping improve it. Providing transition assistance (essentially to officers) in the way of acquiring civilian job skills, financial support and education benefits would accomplish several goals. Such assistance would provide incentives for officers to leave the service. It would free scarce budget resources that the Russians could then focus on their other military priorities (training, modernization, improving social and living conditions, etc.). Over time this investment would help create a body of professional people in Russia amenable to cooperation with the West. In this regard, a narrowly focused and relatively modest commitment of resources would serve the broader strategic goals of the United States targeting Russian defense conversion.

- Make patience and persistence the hallmarks of an effective engagement strategy. The problems confronting the Russian Army are born of a societal transformation that is trying to undo 70 years of communist experience. Only time will tell where and when this process will end. On a military level, U.S. engagement policies and plans should be marked by consistent programming backed-up by consistent availability for consultation and training.
The realization must be that whatever support provided today will not have an immediate impact. Rather the impact of this investment will be realized in the coming generation.

- Realize that the Russian Army units serving side by side with U.S. Army units abroad represent perhaps “islands of excellence in a sea of backwardness” of sorts. However good (or bad) these “islands” might appear, they are most likely the best that Russia has to offer. The units serving in the Balkans are composed of handpicked volunteers. They serve for payment in hard currency. In a perverse sense, Balkan service today ranks as a “prestige posting” for Russian soldiers. Behind the Russian borders there exists a dramatic drop in capability and professionalism. Conclusions drawn from experiences with Russian peacekeepers likely may not be representative of experiences drawn from working or training with Russian soldiers somewhere deep inside Russia.

CONCLUSION

Prospects for success of a non-conscripted force in Russia do not appear promising in the near term. The Russian Army’s mixed system of manpower acquisition is failing to attract and keep the right people in the right numbers. There appears little incentive to return to and invigorate the system of compulsory conscription. The means have not been made available, nor have implementing mechanisms been fixed adequately to move forward on the contract system. Military reform to date has been more cosmetic than substantive. Russia’s intended transition to a professional force is on hold, if not regressing. In fact, over the past three years the conscript cohort in the Russian Army has increased by 32 percent (from 144,000 in 1998 to 190,000 in 2000). The Russian Army remains trapped by difficult times.

This precarious and risky situation is very likely to persist. President Putin has not proven the dramatic savior the defense establishment had hoped for. Nor has he proven the new democrat that reformists had kept praying for. It would appear then that the Russian Army is largely left to its own devices in transitioning to a professional force. There is little doubt that Russia has the inherent expertise to organize and train its Army. Being supported adequately by the Russian leadership to allow full application of its expertise is the crux of the matter. Competitor states should remain attentive to Russia’s troubled process and be prepared to facilitate its success. A stable, professional army in Russia is a far better alternative then the unstable, semi-professional and fractured force we observe today. If the Russian Army does fail as an institution the implications could pose grave consequence to Russian, its neighbors and the global community.
WORD COUNT= 9,269
ENDNOTES


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60 Putin quoted in Brzezinski, 8.

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