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THE DAMASCUS PARADOX
THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR - THE KINDER, GENTLER ARMY

BY

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THE DAMASCUS PARADOX
The Code Of The Warrior - The Kinder, Gentler Army

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ABSTRACT

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Current literature strongly suggests that today's U.S. Army is an army in crisis: a faltering force, driven by political correctness and beset with a host of problems from recruiting and retention to morale and readiness. A number of writers have articulated, some clearly and some by implication, a root cause for this worsening situation - the supplanting of the "Code of the Warrior" by a "Kinder, Gentler, Army" and its antecedent the feminization of the military.

We all react viscerally to the mere mention of the "Code of the Warrior" or a "Kinder, Gentler, Army". The warrior conjures images of the skilled, dedicated, tough soldiers who defended their country at any cost and against fearful odds in places like Antietam and Omaha Beach. Kinder and gentler evokes formations of emasculated, quivering individuals who could not march together, let alone act in concert to defend their country in battle. Obviously, these two visions represent polar extremes with reality hidden somewhere in the vast shadowlands between the two.

I propose this paper in order to seek out that reality. In doing so, I shall use one standard as my guide: the primary purpose of any military organization is to wage war and win. Certainly peacekeeping, nation building, and other missions may become vital and necessary. However, such missions are ancillary purposes.

On the aforementioned basis, I propose to begin the search by attempting to define the warrior's code and the ethic followed by its adherents. Next, I will explore a kinder, gentler army with a view toward precisely explaining this rather murky theory. I will then examine how each concept has acted to influence the current shape of our force. Finally, the analysis section will assess the impact of "The Code of the Warrior" and "The Kinder, Gentler, Army" on the primary and secondary purposes of a military organization. In other words, how do they affect our ability to achieve each of these purposes. The conclusion will deal with solutions regarding the integration of both concepts into a touchstone to help guide our Army into the future.
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Current literature strongly suggests that today's U.S. Army is an army in crisis: a faltering force, driven by political correctness and beset with a host of problems from recruiting and retention to morale and readiness. A number of writers have articulated, some clearly and some by implication, a root cause for this worsening situation - the supplanting of the "Code of the Warrior" by a "Kinder, Gentler Army", and its antecedent the feminization of the military.

Most of us react viscerally to the mere mention of the "Code of the Warrior" or a "Kinder, Gentler Army." The warrior conjures images of the skilled, dedicated, tough soldiers who defended their country at any cost and against fearful odds in places like Antietam and Omaha Beach. While one can find various descriptions of this type of warrior and his code, perhaps Mr. T.R. Fehrenbach offers an excellent example of this sometimes-quixotic ideal:

The ancient legions, and the proud old British regiments, had been filled with taverns' scum, starvelings, and poor farm boys seeking change. They had been inducted, knocked about, ruled with a rod of iron, made into men of iron, with iron discipline. They were officered by men wholly professional, to whom dying was only a part of their way of life. To these men the service was home, and war--any war--their profession.

These legions of old, like the sword itself, were neither moral nor immoral. Morality depended upon the use to which their government put them. But when put to use, they did not question, did not fail. They marched. 1

Obviously, Mr. Fehrenbach's description rests on historical examples. Just as obviously, the warriors of the past were created by the unique circumstances of their times. However, in the crucible of whatever war they fought, whether victor or vanquished, more often than not, these men defended their countries with the tenacity, gallantry, and mettle that has come to embody the warrior spirit. And only someone who chooses to completely ignore history would suggest that this warrior's ethos is anachronistic and therefore not vital to success on any future battlefield.

Conversely, kinder and gentler evokes formations of emasculated, anemic individuals who cannot march together, let alone act in concert to defend their country in battle. Setting aside, for the moment, the veracity of this concept, one must acknowledge that several serious analysts of the contemporary American military believe it is a fact. Moreover, these analysts place most of the blame for this situation on women in the military. A quote from Mr. Brian Mitchell's book is illustrative:

It is a lie that the presence of women has had only a positive effect on military readiness. The truth is that the overall effect of integration has been a general softening of military service. Conditions and performance requirements that aggravate attrition
among women and expose their limited abilities have been systematically eliminated. The “LaBarge Touch,” with its myopic focus on getting recruits through training instead of preparing them for wartime service, has cheated the field and fleet of the highly trained and capable manpower needed to fight and win. The modern military’s emphasis on self-esteem and “positive motivation,” inspired by the need to protect women from the harshness of military life, has led the military to an excessive reliance upon leadership and a potentially fatal neglect of discipline.²

Mr. Mitchell presents a fair amount of evidence that the United States does indeed have a kinder, gentler military; and that this type of military has required a diminution, if not outright suppression, of the warrior’s code. Every page of his analysis presents women as the root cause of the problem. Some of his arguments have merit in this regard; others do not. However one feels about Mr. Mitchell’s critique, one must recognize that he does not represent a solitary voice in the wilderness. Quite the contrary.

Mr. Fehrenbach’s and Mr. Mitchell’s passages were chosen to introduce this paper because they reflect some of the facts and sentiments at the heart of this contentious issue. That said, one could just as easily have plucked two such examples from dozens of other books, articles, and CRS documents.

After extensive reading on both sides of this controversy, anyone, particularly a professional, is confronted with a number of critical questions. First, what is the raison d’être, mission, of any military organization. Second, what is the warriors code or ethic, and is it the sine qua non of combat effectiveness? Third, what is meant by the term “Kinder, Gentler Army?” Lastly, can today’s Army live up to the reason for its existence?

These seemingly simple questions beg answers that are not polarized; answers that are stripped of the hyperbole and politically correct rhetoric, which inhabit both sides of the issue. This may seem a simple undertaking. However, given the mountains of conflicting information, it presents a difficult challenge. Nonetheless, even at the risk of adding more detritus to the mountain, anyone who aspires to the title military professional should at least make the attempt. To do so is no mere exercise in intellectual gymnastics: for someday, on some distant battlefield, soldiers lives and even our nation’s freedom my hinge on the answers to these questions.
RAISON D'ÊTRE

Any examination of the warrior's code vis-à-vis a kinder, gentler army must begin with the Army's reason for existence - its mission. This nexus influences everything from doctrine and training to manpower and operational readiness. In short, an army's mission both defines and dictates the capabilities it requires to succeed.

The use of the singular, mission, in the foregoing paragraph is both deliberate and provocative. A number of readers will argue that the Army has multiple missions. Agreed. However, a distinction must be made between the Army's primary mission, its raison d'être, and its ancillary missions. Failure to do so, a common occurrence in our relatively peaceful times, tends to leave an army bereft of its esprit de corps, unity of purpose, and direction. Therefore, the distinction becomes critical.

The primary mission of the United States Army, for that matter of any military organization, is to wage and win war in defense of the nation. General Douglas MacArthur phrased this point eloquently in *A Soldier Speaks*:

> Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government: Whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing indulged in too long, by Federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by mortals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be...And through all this welter of change and development your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars.

One can find a tacit, albeit murky, statement of this fact in Mr. Clinton's, *1999 A National Security Strategy For A New Century*: "...the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened." Notice, here he uses the word conflict not war. He does go on to say, nine pages later: "Fighting and winning major theater wars is the ultimate test of our Armed Forces - a test at which they must always succeed." Presumably, then, waging war and winning is the primary mission of the Army and our Armed Forces.

Most people, with certain reservations, acknowledge this fact. But that acknowledgement invariably fails to consider one crucial question - what kind of war? In an effort to avoid the sophistry surrounding the word, one must answer - total war. Very few people want to think about it in that way, even fewer want to discuss it, but unconditional warfare on the scale of the American Civil War or World War II is the primary mission of our Armed Forces. While the orders to wage this kind of war may never come, the military must vigilantly maintain the
capability to do so. Rightly or wrongly, often unspoken, the ability to wage total war in defense of the United States is the principle expectation the American public has of its military.

While the Armed Forces must have the capability to wage total war, they must also win to fulfill their primary mission. History and experience dictate that the taking and holding of ground is the one indispensable element to winning. Mr. Fehrenbach, writing about the Korean Conflict, offers a cogent statement of this rather unpalatable rule:

Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life -- but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

The object of warfare is to dominate a portion of the earth, with its peoples, for causes either just or unjust. It is not to destroy the land and people, unless you have gone wholly mad. 6

For the United States Army, taking and holding ground means battle in Mr. Fehrenbach's mud; and all the bloody, grueling hardship this task implies. Thus, the Army's primary mission engages it in land combat. Mr. H. Joachim Maitre describes such an endeavor quite well: "Combat is brute strength and endurance spread through days and weeks and months of war. Combat is killing and being killed." 7

Success, in this hostile environment requires more than the newest weapons and technology, which may not be available and change over time, success demands a military culture. For, like it or not, military culture always has been and always will be inextricably linked to an armed forces' ability to inculcate in each of its members such indispensable traits as sacrifice, discipline, obedience, and unity of purpose. Without this acculturation, an armed forces' capability to achieve its primary mission, or any mission for that matter, becomes problematic. While this applies to all the branches, it is particularly relevant to the Army, which must engage in combat on the ground.

The military culture, then, has the critical task of nurturing and preparing the single instrument capable of meeting the standard and the horror of the primary mission - the warrior.
CHANSONS DE GESTE, OF WARRIORS AND WARRIORS' WAYS

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the shadow

— T.S. Eliot, “The Hollow Men”

Eliot’s words somehow seem appropriate to the warrior and his code in today’s world. For some, the warrior has come to embody a long-dead ideal badly in need of resurrection, and for others the word represents a hated symbol of male dominance. Nevertheless, whether reviled or revered, the figure of the warrior forms the bedrock of our military culture. Unfortunately, that bedrock becomes quicksand without a clear understanding of the evolution of the concept, and that may be found only in the mists of history.

When prehistoric men and women banded together in small clans, they greatly increased their chances for survival. Thus, the notion of safety in numbers probably gave rise to the first warriors as well as the traits and characteristics required of an individual to claim that title within the clan. Mr. Richard Heckler offers a fair description of these traits in his book, In Search of the Warrior Spirit:

The traditional warrior virtues of courage, loyalty, selflessness, service and guardianship were probably first enacted by these hunter warriors as they stalked and killed game, protected their clans from predatory animals or looting bands, and even participated in “ritual war.”

Gradually, over the millennia, an unwritten code of the warrior evolved between the protectors and the protected. At the very heart of this compact, though amended to conform to the peculiarities and demands of each successive epoch, the values Mr. Heckler describes remained constant. However, over time, courage in the form of aggressive prowess in battle undoubtedly rose to preeminence among the other protector virtues; and in all likelihood became the primary criterion for selection of clan chieftains. Moreover, at the risk of stating the obvious and offending modern sensibilities, these warrior hunters were almost always male.

Down through the centuries that followed the emergence of the warrior hunter, the role of the warrior evolved in conjunction with evolving societies. In organized armies, men served the city states as warrior-soldiers and the Roman Empire as legionnaires; but in whatever time and for whomever they fought, they held forth the core virtues of their forebears as the warriors’ standard. Did they always live up to the standard? Of course not. Nevertheless, the
hunter warrior virtues became the foundation for a culture of arms that the best warriors tried to
live by.

It remained for the Middle Ages to provide the quintessential expression of the warrior
and his code...knights and chivalry. These two words summon powerful images: King Arthur
wielding Excalibur to unite a just England, Charlemagne and his paladins sallying forth to defeat
the Saracens, the faithful Roland and his sword, Durendal, fighting the rear-guard action at
Roncesvalles, and Rodrigo Diaz de Bivar, El Cid, holding the fortress city of Valencia for his
faithless King Alfonso. These legends, as well as all the others of the period, were a clever
interweaving of fact with myth to create the most popular entertainment of the day, the
Chansons de Geste.

Jongleurs traveled the land, performing these songs of deeds for a largely illiterate
nobility and peasantry. The purpose was entertainment; but the songs had a consequence that
may or may not have been intended. They built upon the existing culture of arms by extolling the
virtues developed into the complex, arcane code of chivalry that came to dictate the attributes of
warrior knights. A brief look at the Song of Roland, will help illustrate the process.

In the song, Roland, the best of Charlemagne's knights, is ordered to command a rear-
guard action. He and his men are then surrounded by a much larger Saracen Army at
Roncesvalles. Roland, obedient and utterly loyal to his king, courageously stands his ground
against overwhelming odds, sacrificing his life and the lives of his valiant men to protect
Charlemagne's retreating army. Charlemagne, given time by Roland's sacrifice, returns and
defeats the Saracens in battle. This presents a sketch of the original 4002-line story; but it offers
a few examples of the virtues that became part of the chivalric code as a result of the telling and
retelling of knightly deeds.

Of particular note, the Song of Roland praises the virtue of a knight standing and holding
his ground, even unto death. This powerful motif appears again and again in both the French
and English songs of deeds. Arguably, when Henry V stood and held his ground against
overwhelming odds at Agincourt, 349 years after the Song of Roland was first performed, it was
not an accident of circumstance. After three centuries of the re-appearing motif, it had become
part of the chivalric code, military culture, and the warrior's soul. And Henry stood his ground.

The ideal of a warrior never yielding his ground was only one of several themes in
Roland that became a motif in the medieval Chansons. Courage, loyalty, sacrifice, and
obedience also fall into this category, and were usually presented in a single mosaic of knightly
virtues. Of the four, obedience became a unifying force for the other three. When a warrior
obeyed the orders of a warrior of higher rank, he was exhibiting courage, loyalty and sacrifice. Thus, obedience to rank, an absolutely vital component in battle, became a touchstone of the warrior and his code.

A final theme in the Song of Roland is of singular significance, war against the Muslim Saracens. This, too, became a compelling motif in the Chansons of the Middle Ages. From 1096 thru 1271, Christendom’s knights waged a series of Crusades. These wars, fought for both political and religious reasons, had one avowed objective, retaking Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the Saracens. To achieve this goal, warrior knights had to wage holy war; and the Church, in conjunction with the Songs of Deeds sanctified the endeavor.

The Chansons became a collection of apocryphal medieval French and English romances that consecrated the heroic deeds and attributes of legendary knights. True or not, these songs were the fountainhead for the chivalric code. As the code evolved, the expected warrior knight virtues grew to include protecting the weak, piety, manners, and the ideal of courtly love. Ultimately, religion, the Chansons, and the code of chivalry combined to frame and enunciate the dogma of the medieval culture of arms.

The Middle Ages came to a close, historically speaking, five hundred and forty eight years ago. Yet we, society in general and the military in particular, are still profoundly influenced by both period’s notion of holy war and its creation of the ideal warrior. Mr. Rick Fields confirms this point:

The chivalric inheritance includes the basic warrior virtues of the Indo-European bands, the human ideals of Christianity, and the romanticism of courtly love, but it also includes the idea of holy war. The chivalric code thus contains both positive and negative elements. And since it is this code that more than any other is the heritage of the West, it is especially important that we comprehend it, for even today, the Western warrior whose heir we all are has yet to wake from the spell that chivalry still casts.9

Thus, the Middle Ages bequeathed to us deeply ingrained primal expectations of our wars and our warriors. Our wars must be crusades, holy wars, or total war. Our warriors must possess the virtues and valor of the legendary knights, combined with contemporary battle skills.

The fact that these mythical ideals have rarely, if ever, been realized does not discredit them as precepts worthy of pursuit both by a nation and its warriors. In fact, one may reasonably argue that the warrior who stops attempting to live by the ideals of his or her calling gradually ceases to be a warrior; and eventually, if the distance between the ideal and the reality becomes great enough, he or she, becomes little better than an armed thug. And, one
may also argue that as a nation abandons the ideal of total war as a justification for conflict, and moves toward a reality of conflict for lesser reasons, that nation begins to court disaster on a number of fronts.

The question for the United States Army of today is how far have we moved from these ideals. The answers may lie in the ancillary missions, conflicts for lesser reasons, that we perform, and the so-called “kinder, gentler army.”

SHADOWLANDS

And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night

— Matthew Arnold, "Dover Beach"

On 27 April 1805, Lt. Presley O'Bannon, U.S.M.C., and seven marines conducted a raid at Derna, Tripoli to punish the Barbary pirates. In 1916, General Black Jack Pershing led an Amy expeditionary force into Mexico to put an end to the bandit Pancho Villa's cross-border thievery.

In today's parlance, such expeditions have become missions other than war, peacekeeping, nation-building, and constabulary missions. The names have changed with the times, the purpose has not. And, that purpose is incursion. These entries onto foreign soil may involve battle, be uninvited or invited, have clear or murky objectives, and be of questionable duration. Hence, incursions are multi-task and often dangerous missions. They are a useful tool of national policy, and from a strictly military stand point there is nothing inherently wrong with them. But, they are not waging and winning total war in defense of the nation. Thus, such missions become ancillary, in the sense of subordinate, to the Armed Forces primary mission. The current tendency of both national leaders and citizens to disregard this distinction, a common error in peacetime, has had repercussions within the military.

First of all, losing focus on the primary mission has created the erroneous belief in some circles that technology and stand-off weapons will suffice to successfully wage and win war. Mr. Vincent J. Goulding Jr., articulated the concerns that many people have with this theory:

The poorly defined concept of precision engagement has engendered in the minds of too many a one-dimensional response to the infinitely more complex issue of truly achieving strategic objectives. At its core is the ill conceived notion that the United
States and its allies can intimidate, even defeat, adversaries with information superiority and smart weapons. 10

Mr. Goulding's concerns are warranted. While the efficacy of stand-off weapons and technology for the conduct of ancillary missions is questionable, reliance on this concept to wage and win war in defense of the nation is an improbable if not impossible dream.

Next, losing focus on the primary mission combined with the idea of stand-off weapons has resulted in a public expectation of military operations conducted with no casualties. Clearly, from a national security standpoint this expectation has created and will continue to create problems in terms of public support for either incursions or war. But these issues reside in the realm of politics. For the Armed Forces, this belief in policing the world from a distance with no casualties has contributed to a cultural problem that was already under way. The subtle erosion of the warrior as a standard, an ideal becoming lost in the shadowlands.

In the shadowlands, the conduct of ancillary missions becomes the primary mission of the military, and the need for the warrior and his or her culture fades. In the shadowlands, such missions can be conducted from a distance without casualties, and the call for the warrior and his or her culture falls to a soft whisper. And, even that whisper is slowly being silenced by the clamor for a kinder, gentler army.

THE EYE OF THE STORM

The continuing storm over changing the essential qualities and characteristics of the American military has raged for decades. And, the Army has without question evolved as a result. But, has that evolution created a kinder, gentler Army?

A great deal of evidence suggests that the answer is a qualified yes. Such a circumscribed response is prudent due to many of the writers' tendency to rely on anecdotal corroboration. That said, however, the accounts of the effects of political correctness, social engineering, lowered training standards, lack of discipline, and eroding military culture have combined to build a highly persuasive case for a kinder, gentler, Army. Moreover, after reading the mountains of literature on this issue, one comes away with a single, salient fact - women in the military are the cause of the situation. At least, according to most analysts.
Two passages from different authors will illustrate both this point and the trend among their contemporaries:

Unable and unwilling to make women behave more like men, the brass have cooperated with the inevitable and begun to insist that in fact, a kinder, gentler soldier is just what's needed in an era which we are increasingly assigned as peacekeepers. ¹¹

Attempts by the services to reconcile a masculine military and a feminist philosophy have produced strange results. Service women here and there have become somewhat more masculine, but in general the military has been thoroughly feminized. The modern military has trivialized combat as incidental to military service and relegated readiness to secondary status behind the more pressing concern for equal opportunity. The dictum "every Marine a rifleman" is no longer true. The Army's Basic Combat Training is now just Basic Training, with many of the more rigorous drills gone and self-esteem more important than physical fitness. ¹²

These words reflect a scathing indictment of women in the military, and mirror the sentiments in much of the writing on a host of related issues from the combat exclusion to redesigning living space on ships of the line. In all fairness, a few writers draw the distinction between the women actually serving in the military, and those individuals, liberals, feminists, social engineers, who use that presence to publicize and advance their own agendas. Unfortunately, while helpful, that stance begs the issue. To most analysts, the presence of women in the ranks of the military has caused a kinder, gentler Army.

At this point, with the reader's indulgence, one more passage may prove useful:

Now an N.C.O. greeted new arrivals with a smile. Where once he would have told them they made him sick to his stomach, didn't look tough enough to make a go of his outfit, he now led them meekly to his company commander. And this clean-cut young man, who once would have sat remote to the right hand of God in his orderly room, issuing orders that crackled like thunder, now smiled too. "Welcome aboard, gentlemen. I am your company commander; I'm here to help you. I'll try to make your stay both pleasant and profitable."

This was all very democratic and pleasant - but it is the nature of young men to get away with anything they can, and soon these young men found they could get away with plenty. A soldier could tell a sergeant to blow it. In the old Army he might have been bashed, and found immediately what the rules were going to be...

But in the new American Army, the sergeant reported such a case to his C.O. But the C.O. couldn't do anything drastic or educational to the man; for any real action, he had to pass the case up higher. And nobody wanted to court-martial the man, to put a
permanent damaging mark on his record. The most likely outcome was for the man to be chided for being rude, and requested to do better in the future. Some privates, behind their smirks, liked it fine.

Pretty soon, the sergeants, realizing the score, started to fraternize with the men. Perhaps through popularity, they could get something done. The junior officers, with no sergeants to knock heads, decided that the better part of valor was never to give an unpopular order.  

The descriptions in the preceding passage could have come from any of the current literature on the kinder, gentler Army. But they did not. They came from Mr. Fehrenbach's portrayal of the ethos within the U.S. Army stationed on the Korean peninsula at the outbreak of the conflict in 1950. Clearly, a kinder, gentler Army; and just as clearly that same army was almost annihilated during the early days of the fighting. And one more thing is incontrovertible - in this gentle, considerate, and democratic 1950 Army - there were no women.

At the end of his book, Mr. Mitchell suggests that the removal of most women from the military's ranks would restore its warrior ethos.  

If he got his wish, it's highly doubtful that he would get his desired result. Devoid of women, the Armed Forces would retain its "general softening of military service" and "potentially fatal neglect of discipline." And the Army would still have many of the characteristics that make it kinder, and gentler. That was the case in 1950, and that would undoubtedly be the case in 2001.

This is not a suggestion that the pursuit, for reasons good and bad, of an ever-expanding role for women in the military has not contributed to a kinder, gentler Army. It has. However, one must make a distinction between a contributing factor and a singular cause. Women may be the former; they are not, contrary to what most writers on the subject apparently believe, the latter.

If a causa sine qua non for today's kinder, gentler Army exists, it resides in a broader and more powerful force. Perhaps, in the irresistible current of American society's on-going desire to secularize its military.
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS

The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.

— Robert Frost, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening"

There was and is no danger of military domination of the nation. The Constitution gave Congress the power of life or death over the military, and they have always accepted the fact. The danger has been the other way around - the liberal society, in its heart, wants not only the domination of the military, but acquiescence of the military toward the liberal view of life.

Domination and control society should have. The record of military rule, from the burnished and lazy Praetorians to the juntas of Latin America, to the attempted fiasco of the Legion Étrangère, are pages of history singularly foul in odor.

But acquiescence society may not have, if it wants an army worth a damn. By the very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the world. Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand ready, if need be, to die. 16

Mr. Fehrenbach sounded this unequivocal, prophetic alarm thirty-seven years ago.

Evidently, no one who could act cared to heed the warning. Or, perhaps it was already too late.

In 1939 the active duty army was a small insular band of ascetics, 198,000 total of which 15,000 were officers. 17 Their fellow citizens usually held them in barely concealed contempt; and, officer or enlisted, they received low pay, had scant equipment to train with, and as a rule subsisted in squalor, often with their families. Yet, they endured - for they held in their hearts and souls a unique creed, a faith that bordered on religion. Its canons prescribed admission to the order, rites of passage, dress, ritual, and most of all the ageless virtues of loyalty, discipline, sacrifice, and obedience. This faith - this creed of the warrior - set the often-unobtainable ideal. It bound the band together and sustained them as they prepared for the next war. A war their contemporaries knew would never come.

But it came. World War II engulfed the globe; and the warrior-soldiers, living and dying according to the ideal of their faith, held the line. In the steaming jungles of the Philippines, on Wake Island, they spent their lives to purchase time for their stateside brethren to forge the civilians entering the military into a force capable of waging and winning total war. This they did.
While this huge influx of civilians - the Army swelled from 198,000 in 1939 to 7,920,000 in 1945 and over the same period the officer corps grew from 15,000 to 897,000 - provided the only means to prosecute and win the war, it also created a clash of cultures between the old warrior-soldiers and the host of citizen-soldiers. For these neophytes, the domain of the warrior was an alien, authoritative, hierarchical realm where regimentation prevailed, people were treated unequally, and the rights of the individual were ignored.

In the post-war world the problem would have vanished had the Army been reduced to its pre-war size. But that was not to be. The military believed they needed to maintain a post-war "force to meet international commitments for policing defeated territories, and to care for equipment worth billions of dollars." A much larger peacetime Army became the order of the day in 1945, and that meant recruiting and retention.

Unfortunately, some of the former citizen-soldiers, once again private citizens, began voicing their objections to the military and its harsh, undemocratic culture. Their complaints wound up in the press, and evidently the combined effect caused recruiting problems that the national leadership felt were "indicative of strong public resentment against certain features of the Army."  

Thus, these conditions - public resentment of the Army's undemocratic ways, attendant recruiting problems, and the perceived need for a larger peacetime Army - prompted then Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, to convene a board to report on officer-enlisted man relationships. What became known as the "Doolittle Board" released its findings in May of 1946.

One of the most striking things about the Board was its somewhat unprecedented focus on investigating social relationships within the Army as a cause for the public resentment. The focal point of improving "relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel" drove the evidentiary gathering process and framed the conclusions and recommendations.

The evidence of "lack of democracy in the Army, instances of incompetent leadership and abuse of privileges" derived from a total of five sources: the statements and testimony of 42 witnesses, the comments in 1000 letters sent to the Board, newspaper articles - editorials - letters to the editor, articles in magazines and journals, and radio broadcasts on the topic. Needless to say, to suggest that the written and oral testimony of 1,042 witnesses out of an approximately 8 million-man Army and media criticism constituted reliable evidence stretches credulity to the breaking point. Moreover, in view of both the quantity and quality of that evidence, one might infer that, rather than substantive proof, the Board was driven by a
heightened sensitivity to publicly aired media criticism of the Army in reaching its conclusions and subsequent recommendations.

The confusing conclusions seem to lend credence to such an inference. On the one hand, the Board clearly recognized that the influx of unprecedented numbers of civilians created "an unprecedented personnel problem." However, they avoided clearly stating the source of this problem - the pre-war Army's regimental officers or the quickly commissioned citizen officers. There is a reference to the fact that "poor leadership resulted from the thrusting into positions of authority men who were inherently unqualified or were inadequately trained as leaders." Since it seems highly unlikely that the pre-war officers would fall into either category, one must assume that the Board was implying that the so-called 90-day wonders were responsible.

On the other hand, despite this implication, they suggest that the cure for that personnel problem lies in correcting the undemocratic nature of the military and resolving the social distinctions between officer and enlisted personnel. Hence, the Board based its recommendations on the premise that the pre-war Army's values and culture had resulted in both the wartime personnel problems and the post-war public criticism.

Obviously, based on such a premise, the Board recommended that the Army abandon its parochial pre-war values in favor of broader values, which better reflected those of American society at large. And, it offered up civilian personnel practices as a method to accomplish such a transformation.

The four pages of recommendations have fourteen major points. The majority of these points reflected an over-riding concern with human relations and advanced business principles. One example of this was the suggested use of "the most advanced practices in personnel selection found in industry, business, government, and..." almost as an afterthought, "those developed in the Army." Other examples included officer selection based on the "potential ability to work with and manage people," and that these officers receive "much more comprehensive instruction in command responsibility, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, and HUMAN RELATIONS."

This same tenor became coupled with the idea of equality as the Board suggested a better alignment of the soldiers' environment with the civilian environment. Such an alignment included the idea of fostering fraternization between the ranks through: "The abolishment of all statutes, regulations, customs and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of
soldiers of similar likes and tastes, because of military rank." And it also included the recommendation "...that all military personnel be referred to as "soldiers."" 27

Finally, to ensure the success of the human relations and business model within the Army, the officers and NCOs must be handcuffed. So, the Board suggested: "That all regulations and instructions be so written that they not only stipulate the limited "privileges" which are essential to the performance of duties in positions of responsibility but also be regulatory in that they will prohibit or minimize POSSIBLE abuses of authority and the prestige that goes with higher rank and responsibility." 28

In this report, made public on 27 May 1946, the Doolittle Board found, without the benefit of much evidence, that the undemocratic relationship between officers and enlisted men was responsible for the public resentment and criticism of the Army as well as the ensuing recruitment problems. As a result, the Board recommended that the Army - paraphrasing Mr. Fehrenbach's words on a different point - acquiesce toward the liberal view of life.

Thus, the post-war Army leadership faced a paradox based on two assumptions. The first, advocated by men like Doolittle, Eisenhower, and Marshall, presupposed America's need for a much larger peacetime Army than it had ever had before. The second assumption, based on public criticism and the Doolittle Board's report, theorized that in order to recruit and maintain such a large army, the Army had to shed its pre-war ethos and convert and conform to egalitarian standards found in government bureaucracies or business organizations - the Army had to be secularized.

The Army leadership could have refuted either assumption. They refuted neither, and, for whatever reasons, the Army's leaders chose to accept and act on the paradox of increasing the Army's size by converting it into a secular, non-military type organization.

In fairness to the leaders of the time, they undoubtedly believed they could manage some sort of intricate balancing act between the military ethos and the secular world, However, by accepting and acting on the paradox, perhaps without realizing it, they began the Army's march along the road to Damascus - the path of the convert. And, this slow conversion would demand some type of secular culture to replace the warrior and his creed.

The preceding events should be revisited and carefully examined by current critics who argue that women in the military are the root cause of today's kinder, gentler Army. That wellspring flows from the Army leadership's 1946 decision to follow the road to Damascus; women were nowhere near the line of departure that May, and many mileposts would have to be passed before their presence became a lightning rod issue.
The summer of 1950 brought America's evolving Army to the first milestone - the Korean conflict. The battles that U.S. troops fought from 5 July through 23 September severely tested the efficacy of four years of secularization. Sadly, particularly for those struggling and dying, the concept proved less than satisfactory. Mr. Fehrenbach described its results:

The United States Army since 1945, had, at the demand of the public, been civilianized. The men in the ranks were enlistees, but these were the new breed of American regular, who, when they took up the soldier, had not even tried to put aside the citizen.

They were normal American youth, no better, no worse than the norm, who though they wore the uniform were mentally, morally, and physically unfit for combat, for orders to go out and die.

They wore the uniform, but they were still civilians at heart. 29

And, these "civilians at heart" endured a horrific summer of retreat. The North Korean Army's onslaught drove the 8th Army down the South Korean Peninsula until there was nowhere left to go. At Pusan, a port town in the southeastern corner of the peninsula, with the sea at their backs, the battered 8th Army and their remaining ROK allies established an approximately 50 mile wide by 100 mile long perimeter. The North Koreans held the rest of South Korea, including the capitol of Seoul. Talk turned to an evacuation by sea, and Pusan becoming America's Dunkirk.

It did not. The strategy, tactics and hard combat that prevented such an evacuation, and ultimately brought the conflict to a stalemate some two years later, though worthy of detailed study, go beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, it was the first three months of the conflict which provided the starkest examples of the consequences of the Army's secularization.

The behavior of some of the men serving in the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry on 6 July 1950 provided a, by no means isolated, case in point. Briefly stated, an engagement went badly and panic ensued. As the 1st of the 34th attempted to withdraw, it left along the roads and in the rice paddies discarded canteens, helmets, ammunition belts, and even rifles. For many, unit cohesion evaporated and the withdrawal became a rout.

The fact that such incidents occurred with alarming frequency that summer had absolutely nothing to do with the courage of the men who fought. They were as brave as any of their predecessors. The attribute they lacked was the unyielding, warrior's standard.

Its absence in their training meant that many of the 8th Army's soldiers had very little acquaintance with the tangible discipline and instant obedience required in combat. Nor were they able to guide their conduct on the battlefield by the intangible, sustaining faith of the mystic
warrior's spirit and soul. For these elements were part of a military culture that had become incompatible with the Army's conversion to an egalitarian bureaucracy. The Army had traveled some distance down the road to Damascus, and the abecedarian soldiers of that long ago summer paid dearly for it.

As the Army experienced its problems in Korea, back at home, the manpower shortage became something of a crisis due to the conflict. In response, the then Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall created the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services to assist the Defense Department in enlisting and retaining women. Thus, in 1951, women became an emerging factor in the paradox; they presented an untapped means to increase the Army's size, and offered a supplemental incentive to secularize.

Although the first year of the Korean Conflict may have given some in the Army pause for thought on the wisdom of conversion as a method for maintaining the Army's desired size, the institution itself did not alter its path. And, lighting the way, the emerging field of management and behavioral science gradually became a sort of substitute culture for the creed of the warrior.

In the years following the Korean Conflict, the part of the Army that would actually fight became overshadowed by the growing bureaucracy intended to sustain it. As a consequence, management theories, already a somewhat accepted idea due to the paradox, began to dominate institutional thinking.

The general direction of that thought can be characterized by several quick examples. First, in 1957, the political scientist, Mr. Samuel P. Huntington's work, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, referred to the officer corps as being "both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization." Mr. Huntington also portrays the career enlisted man as "one who works for monetary gain."

Another example of the trend can be found in the Army's use of Management By Objectives (MBO). This concept was first introduced to the civilian world in 1954 by Peter F. Drucker, a management consultant, in his book *The Practices of Management*. Drucker's basic model revolved around the motivation of the employee, and relied heavily on managerial psychologists to offer the means. MBO wound its way into the Army through the Army Material Command in 1964.

A last illustration of the manager tendency mindset was the Army's adoption of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) from its civilian counterpart, Organizational Development. OE at its essence, provided a synthesis of management techniques, behavioral science, and human
resource management into a bewildering, albeit integrated, approach to mission accomplishment.

Of course, the idea that the Army could accomplish its missions through a bureaucracy run on the principles of management and human resources did not occur in splendid isolation. The concepts also gained acceptance and popularity because they seemed to offer solutions to the ever-increasing external pressures American society was placing on the Army. And, possibly the worst of these pressures was the political necessity of an All Volunteer Force.

The ending of the draft, July 1, 1973, and the subsequent reliance on an all-volunteer force became a watershed that would stretch the paradox almost to the breaking point. A fact seemingly recognized by Mr. William Hauser in 1972: "The armed services will have to determine, by high level decision in order to take the pressure off commanders, the necessary balance between liberalization for the sake of recruiting and authoritarianism for the sake of combat effectiveness." 34

Undoubtedly bolstered by the 1970 Gates Commission Report, the high level decision was exquisitely bureaucratic; the solution to the All Volunteer Force was to treat service in the military, for the most part, as just another occupation. As a result, the recruiting problems would be resolved by "monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards," and the ability to utilize more women. 35

Thus, the end of the draft became a pivotal milestone on the road to Damascus. At its juncture, the solution to recruiting and maintaining an army again rested on making the Army even more like the civilian world. This enlarged concept created a much greater pool of potential employee-recruits based on the premise that most of the Army's ranks could be filled with men and now more women who had little need of and not much desire for the warrior's faith, culture, and calling. Any possible drawbacks this concept had in terms of the Army's ability to wage war were addressed by dividing the labor force into the combat arms and the non-combat arms, more or less.

Given the volatile pressure of the time - Vietnam, an almost universal dislike of the military that bordered on hatred in some quarters, and the burgeoning feminist movement, it is highly unlikely that the Army could have found another solution. However, when the Army began to institute their somewhat modified version of an occupational model, they opened the floodgate for a continual stream of escalating demands for Army practices to mirror those of civilian society. Moreover, after presenting, at times tacitly and at other times, explicitly, soldiering as similar to an occupation, the Army had an increasingly difficult time making a case for the
discriminatory standards, discipline and obedience that combat might one day require of some of their employees.

This swirling vortex of societal pressures, political agendas, and bureaucratic imperatives created the conditions under which the Army increased the number of women in its ranks. And, from this point on, despite the fact that the Army was already kinder, and gentler, women in the ranks became the lightening rod for concerns about the Army's obvious loss of the warrior's ethos.

In the final analysis, American society has never had any great love for the warrior, the warrior's faith, or the warrior's culture. If any singular cause exists for this, it is probably the undemocratic, seemingly unfair standards which rule the warrior's realm. So, while conceding the need for such a culture during wars, America has generally tried to marginalize it when the fighting ended. This is a national idiosyncrasy.

Thus, the Army's long march on the road to Damascus, with all the changes that journey has wrought, was undertaken at the behest of the American society which that Army lives to protect and defend.

KEEPING THE FAITH

In following the 'Road to Damascus' it became evident that women, in fact, were not the root cause of the kinder, gentler army of today. It was instead, a slow erosion of the military culture and a dimming of the warrior ethos; that in fact, began almost 60 years ago - about 27 years before women were integrated into the army. This process of "democratizing" the force began in 1946 with the publication of The "Doolittle Report." The recommendations from this study of "officer and enlisted-man relationships" during World War II, has been, and continues to be, the blueprint for a kinder, gentler force. It was here the army began to change its institutional way of life in order to attract enough civilians to fill the ranks of a large, standing army. The warrior ethos and the way the army had always conducted itself since its inception was no longer compatible with the democratic society it served. Choosing to travel down the road of "democratization," required the army to diminish the warrior ethos and supplant it with a kinder, gentler military culture.

This military culture - what we've been talking about - breeds in its adherents the will to fight and die. For, like it or not, military culture always has been and always will be inextricably
linked to an armed forces' ability to inculcate in each of its members such indispensable traits as sacrifice, discipline, obedience, and unity of purpose. Without this acculturation, an armed forces' capability to achieve its primary mission, or any mission for that matter, becomes problematic. The military culture, then, has the critical task of nurturing and preparing the single instrument capable of meeting the standard and the horror of the primary mission - the warrior. It is a culture that cannot be created or sustained by the application of civilian ideology and business practices. It is created by something that you cannot quantify. It is the mystical warrior ethos.

Yet, human resource systems and behavioral science management techniques borrowed from civilian corporations were allowed to creep into the institution. Once introduced into the army, these theories began to permeate the military professional. The "calling" of the military profession lost itself to a corporate, bureaucratic mentality; the profession of arms became a "job;" and the soldier became merely an employee of the institution. It is at this pivotal juncture - when the warrior stops attempting to live by the ideals of his or her calling - he or she gradually ceases to be a warrior.

Ms. Gutmann vividly depicts the dangers of losing the warrior culture to a "corporate mentality:"

Fighting a war - or even doling out supplies in the territory close to the front line of a war - is different from working in a corporation. Executives at Fortune 500 corporations like to pretend they march into battle each day-- dukiit out cell phone to cell phone-- but we know they don't really face matters of life and death. The stress of war and its primal, elemental, physical nature have a way of stripping away the veneer of civilization, and the physical, unforgiving, either-you-do-it-or-you-don't nature of much military work flushes out what is most elemental about ourselves...³⁶

Without all those intangibles, without the monastery, stripped of its aggressive "we kill people and break stuff" nature, military service becomes the corporation at its dreary, petty, soul-killing worst, or just another civil service job-- a place of low pay, dim lighting, crummy furniture, ugly buildings, piles of paperwork, and a sort of sexless, exhausted male/female rapport. ³⁷

Just how far has the United States Army of today moved from the ideals of sacrifice, discipline, obedience, and unity of purpose? For the warrior-soldiers in 1939, the distance between the ideal and the reality was small. They imparted that ideal to the citizen soldiers who joined their ranks. Today, however, that answer may lie in the shadowlands, where the conduct of ancillary missions becomes confused with the primary mission of the military. It is during
these missions that the need for the warrior and his or her culture seems to fade. Lying dormant that is, until the primary mission - to wage and win war - is called upon. Only then, in the critical test when the lives of our military men and women are at stake on the battlefield, will it become clear just how wide and how deep the canyon has become that separates the ideal of the warrior's code from the reality of a kinder, gentler army. It is reasonable to argue that in today's Army, the distance is so great that one wonders if the need arises, whether it can be bridged, in time.

But bridge it we must. And the foundation for that can be found in re-awakening our warrior spirit; re-igniting our military culture and restoring our professionalism. Dr. Don Snider, a Professor of Political Science at the US Military Academy at West Point, writes in the World Policy Journal, "Restoring professionalism in all three of its components, <the military-technical (warfighting), the ethical, the socio-political> emerges as the single most urgently needed response from the officer corps in charge of our armed forces." ⁳⁶ Similarly, in a recent study conducted by Dr. Leonard Wong, of the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute; a vital link between military culture and junior officers' retention and morale is revealed:

The objective here is to preserve aspects of one of the Army's intangible, yet extremely powerful, retention tools -- the Army's culture. Resurrect officer calls. When the Army got rid of happy Hour ... an unintended side effect was the removal of an organizational ritual that served to strengthen the bonds between officers in a unit. Bring back "mandatory" social gatherings such as...dining-ins... Rituals and traditions are often viewed suspiciously by outsiders as frivolous, but they serve the important purpose of strengthening the bonds within a unit...maintaining our culture of camaraderie is priceless.⁳⁹

When we don the uniform, we become the keepers of a flame that has burned brightly for over two hundred years - it lit the field at Yorktown, flared brightly at Gettysburg, streaked the sky at St. Lô, heated hearts at the Chosin Reservoir, blazed at Khe Sanh, and blinded the enemy in Kuwait. It is our heritage; and without its traditions - when you fail to salute - when you fail to wear the uniform properly - when you comport yourself like those at Tailhook and Aberdeen, you break the faith of those proud warriors. Those great warriors, who shed their blood and sacrificed their lives for our nation and the future of its people. We must not lose that faith.
In closing, I return to Mr. Fehrenbach as he recounts an episode in our history when we broke the faith:

Each year, for the decade following the Korean conflict, on St. George's Day units of the British and Australian armies have sent telegrams of thanks and appreciation to certain units of the United States Army.

Each of the units so honored helped the British in a sticky place.

Each year, a telegram comes to one American tank battalion that gained great tradition and prestige in the bloody hills, whose men, like those of the Glosters, learned to walk the hills with confidence and pride. Because of them, certain men now living in England and elsewhere are still alive.

When the message comes to this battalion, however, the people in the Pentagon do not know what to do with it. On the rolls of the Pentagon, where slowly human hearts and the legends men live by are being replaced by computers, this unit no longer exists.

The Gloucestershire Regiment, now with forty-five battle honors and an American citation, will never understand. 40

WORD COUNT = 9141
ENDNOTES

5. Ibid., 19.
6. Fehrenbach, 290.
13. Fehrenbach, 294.
15. Ibid., 342.
18. Ibid., 7.
19. Ibid., 4.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 1.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 14.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 15.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 18.
28. Ibid.
29. Fehrenbach, 59, 60.
32. Ibid., 8.
36. Gutmann, 21,22.
37. Ibid., 277.
40. Fehrenbach, 314.
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