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TRANSFORMATION OF THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY: A WAY TO AN END?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W. WISEMAN
United States Army

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20010622 044
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by

LTC John W. Wiseman
United States Army

Colonel Stephen D. Kidder
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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Societies know what to do with losing armies. In general, they disarm or destroy the defeated forces. And what happens with the victors? Normally the victorious nation maintains political power, retains its army, transforms its army into the police force or sees its army evolve into a combination of both police and army. But what happens when the army claiming victory resides as a minority inside a nation it does not own? What happens when that army does not even possess an elected political minority? Can a society internally vanquish or reabsorb such a victor? Or will this beast only be tamed with eventual independence? The end of the Kosovo air war left the world with such a challenge. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) claimed victory but the world would not grant Kosovo its independence. The government of Slobodan Milosevic required the disbanding of the KLA as part of the capitulation. As a compromise, the United Nations (UN) agreed to transform the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Corps.

This paper will examine the overall transformation process. It will examine the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and determine if the transformation of the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps was consistent with the end state objectives of the conflict.
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY: A WAY TO AN END?

Societies know what to do with losing armies. In general, they disarm or destroy the defeated forces. And what happens with the victors? Normally the victorious nation maintains political power, retains its army, transforms its army into the police force or sees its army evolve into a combination of both police and army. But what happens when the army claiming victory resides as a minority inside a nation it does not own? What happens when that army does not even possess an elected political minority? Can a society internally vanquish or reabsorb such a victor? Or will this beast only be tamed with eventual independence?

The end of the Kosovo air war left the world with such a challenge. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) claimed victory but the world would not grant Kosovo its independence. The government of Slobodan Milosevic required the disbanding of the KLA as part of the capitulation. As a compromise, the United Nations (UN) agreed to transform the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Corps.

Was the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into a civilian organization a plausible way to a regional end state of stability? Did the international community provide the means to support the transformation? If the transformation of the KLA was not successful, what would have made it work and are there parts that can be applied to future scenarios?

This paper will examine the overall transformation process. It will examine the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and examine the emerging United Nations concept for transforming armies after a conflict. It will determine if the transformation of the KLA was consistent with the end state objectives of the conflict.

CREATION OF THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

In 1987 Serbian nationalists’ support for Slobodan Milosevic began to grow. He traveled to Kosovo and promised to defend the nationalists’ interests in the province. By 1990 Milosevic successfully changed the Serbian constitution and significantly reduced the provincial autonomy Kosovo enjoyed since 1974. Other measures put tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians out of work and restricted the activities of their cultural organizations. Understandably, Kosovo Albanians began to riot and protest.

The bloody break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) began in 1991. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. In a secret vote, ethnic Albanians proclaimed the creation of the Republic of Kosovo. With the threat of war in Bosnia and Croatia, the international community gave the Kosovo proclamation little recognition. As
Bosnia moved toward independence, war broke out within its borders. In 1992, Europe and the United States extended diplomatic recognition to Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. However, the international community did not extend the recognition to Kosovo.\(^5\)

In May 1992, Kosovar Albanians held unofficial elections and selected the literary scholar and pacifist, Ibrahim Rugova, as president.\(^6\) Rugova immediately began establishing a shadow government.\(^7\) Although a pacifist, Rugova supported an independent Kosovo and the shadow government assisted in orchestrating a campaign of civil disobedience against Milosevic’s regime.

After threats to use force by both President Bush and President Clinton failed to resolve the Bosnia conflict, NATO began airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The NATO airstrikes combined with a successful Croat and Muslim ground offensive brought Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. On 21 Nov 1995, the Dayton Accord ended the war in Bosnia. However, Milosevic remained a power in Serbia and atop the remnants of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And, the Kosovo issue remained unsolved.\(^8\)

The end of the Bosnian war also damaged Ibrahim Rugova’s image among Kosovar Albanians. Rugova assumed wrongly that the independence of settlements in Bosnia would extend to Kosovo as well. Rugova’s credibility was further damaged when Milosevic failed to follow through on a Rugova negotiated agreement to make schools and university buildings available to Kosovar Albanians.\(^9\)

With his theme of independence through pacifism damaged, Rugova began to lose the battle for popular support. With the non-violent approach on the skids, a more direct approach began to emerge. In 1996, several irregular attacks directed against Serbian authorities took place in Kosovo. Initially no one took responsibility for the violence. But by the summer of 1997, the small and relatively unknown Kosovo Liberation Army began to claim responsibility for the attacks.\(^10\) Because of apparent frustration over Rugova’s perceived failures to legitimize Kosovo’s plight in the eyes of the international community, the Kosovo Liberation Army also began to claim popular support.\(^11\) The Serbian authorities reacted to the increased violence by increasing the repression of student and ethnic movements in Kosovo. In October 1997, as Serbian security forces clamped down on the resistance, the KLA increased their attacks. The violence continued to escalate.\(^12\)

On 23 February 1998, Robert Gelbard, US diplomat, stated the Kosovo Liberation Army was “without any question a terrorist group.”\(^13\) Many interpreted this statement as a green light for Milosevic to continue the repression in Kosovo.\(^14\)
By March 1998, even Rugova's pacifist shadow government began urging Kosovar Albanians to defend themselves against the Serbs. The KLA increased their attacks on Serbian police. On 7 March Serbian security forces killed over 50 members of the Jashari family in the village of Prekaz. The dead included Adem Jashari, a founder of the KLA. The massacre became a unifying event for Kosovar Albanians and in following weeks, tens of thousands rallied in Pristina to protest the massacre. Serbs responded with counter-demonstrations. In Rome, Madeleine Albright declared, "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia." 15

Although wounded on the popular front, Ibrahim Rugova was re-elected "president" of Kosovo on 23 March 1998 by 99% of vote. However, the election was boycotted by the increasingly popular Kosovar Albanian hard-liners. A month later, in national referendum, 95% of Serbs rejected foreign mediation to solve the Kosovo crisis. 16

The United States began to change its policy in Kosovo. The United States sent Diplomat Robert Gelbard to Switzerland to meet with KLA officials. The United States also named Ambassador and Dayton accord negotiator Christopher Hill as US Special Envoy to Kosovo. The steps taken by the US had the effect of legitimizing the KLA and recognizing Kosovo as having interests separate from Serbia proper. Ambassador Hill traveled to Belgrade and brokered the set first-ever meeting between Rugova and Milosevic. The dialogue was unsuccessful and quickly broke down. 17

On 29 May 1998, in the Oval Office, Rugova sought President Clinton's support for the Kosovar Albanians' cause. On 1 June, Rugova met United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and requested United Nations and NATO intervention. Two weeks later, United States Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, urged NATO defense ministers to begin conceptual planning for potential intervention in Kosovo. The NATO defense ministers directed NATO forces to conduct air exercise in the region to "send a signal" to Milosevic. On 15 June 1998, 85 NATO warplanes flew over Albania and Macedonia in a show of force aimed at Milosevic. 18 The UN and US increased diplomatic pressure. On 23 and 24 June, Dayton accord negotiator Richard Holbrooke met with Milosevic and traveled to Kosovo and talked directly with KLA commanders. 19

In early August 1998, The Serbian forces increased the intensity of their summer offensive. They concentrated their attacks against the KLA and the Kosovar Albanian villages in the Dranica region. The offensive drove thousands of Kosovo Albanians into the hills and eventually into neighboring countries. In September, concerned about the growing refugee
problem, the United States sent former United States Senator Bob Dole and Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck to Kosovo and Belgrade. The visit from these high-level government officials continued to diminish Serbia’s claim that Kosovo was an internal problem.

On 23 September 1998, the UN Security Council approved a statement demanding a cease-fire, a Serb withdrawal of forces, and the return of refugees. The statement also threatened "additional measures" if Serbia refused to comply. Three days later, Serbian security forces killed 35 villagers in Gornje Obrinje in retaliation for losing more than a dozen policemen killed in conflict with the KLA. In response to the escalating violence, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright began pushing for airstrikes against Serbia. On 12 October NATO gave authorization to prepare for a limited bombing campaign. The next day, Holbrooke secured an agreement with the Serbs. The agreement called for Serbian compliance with UN Resolution 1199 that included a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. In addition, the agreement also called for elections, substantial autonomy for Kosovo, and other confidence-building measures. In support of the agreement, NATO temporarily suspended its preparations to bomb Serbia.

On 27 October 1998, Serbia withdrew thousands of Serbian security forces from Kosovo. As a result of the withdrawal, thousands of Kosovar Albanians descended from the hills and began to return to their homes as winter threatened. However, Serbian forces continued to battle KLA units throughout the region. In a very brutal crackdown, the Serbian police and army were accused of massacres in several villages throughout Kosovo. In London, NATO foreign ministers issued an ultimatum to the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. The ultimatum required both parties to begin peace negotiations in Rambouillet France on February 6, 1999. At the same time, NATO reissued the authorization to prepare for a limited bombing campaign. Immediately the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Liberation Army announced they would participate in the talks. Although a Serbian delegation participated, Milosevic refused to attend. On 23 February, the Rambouillet talks paused without an agreement. After heavy lobbying, the KLA agreed to sign the peace pact. The talks reconvened on 15 March in Paris. On 18 March the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the plan even though it did not call for Kosovo independence. The plan did call for greater autonomy and to postpone the final disposition of Kosovo for future talks. Milosevic refused to sign and began military exercises in Kosovo the next day.

On 24 March 1999, after Holbrooke’s final ultimatum to Milosevic failed, NATO began their Kosovo air war. Over the next two months, Serbian forces battled KLA forces and kept pressure on Kosovar Albanian civilians. NATO directly and indirectly supported several KLA
Over a million Kosovar Albanians fled Kosovo. NATO operations eventually eroded Serbian resolve. On 9 June 1999, NATO and FRY officials initialed a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the International Security Force and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the republic of Serbia. The agreement governed the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo and established an international security force. The MTA designated the security force Kosovo Force (KFOR). NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, requested suspension of NATO bombing, and on 10 June the United Nations Security Council adopted UN Resolution 1244. The resolution permitted the deployment of international civil and military authorities into Kosovo. On 20 June the Serbs completed their withdrawal from Kosovo and NATO ended their bombing campaign. NATO was now left with the problem of what to do with the KLA. The next day, under NATO pressure, the Kosovo Liberation Army agreed to demilitarize. On 20 September 1999, KFOR certified completion of the KLA demilitarization.

Serbian aggression coupled with the failure of Rugova's pacifist movement led to the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The complete exclusion of Kosovo matters from the Dayton Accords fanned the fire of Kosovo Albanian nationalism. And the inclusion of the KLA in the Rambouillet and Paris peace talks solidified KLA legitimacy as a voice for Kosovar Albanians. The NATO air victory afforded the KLA the opportunity to claim victory on the battlefield and added reinforcement to the KLA argument for Kosovo independence.

THE TRANSFORMATION

The United Nations characterized its peacekeeping operations in the 1990s to include the following elements: demobilization of armed forces; destruction of weapons surrendered in disarmament exercises; and reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Demobilization consisted of retraining and integration into civilian society of some former combatants, and others into a restructured national army, police or other paramilitary force. The UN had no experience transforming a former army into a completely civilian organization.

Four main documents set the conditions for the transformation of the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The documents were United Nations Resolution 1244 (UN 1244), the Military Technical Agreement, the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the KLA, and the Commander KFOR's Statement of Principles for the Kosovo Protection Corps.
UN RESOLUTION 1244

UN resolution 1244 established the framework for the cease-fire in Kosovo and the demilitarization of the KLA. It demanded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo. It also required FRY to complete a verifiable, phased, and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces. The resolution called for the deployment of international civil and security presences and a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence. The resolution also stipulated the demilitarization of the KLA.28

There were four issues in UN Resolution 1244 that would cause problems with the transformation of the KLA. The first was the removal of all Serbian military and police from the Kosovo.29 Their departure created a void that the KLA attempted to fill. The second was the requirement for the KLA to demilitarize vice disarm.30 This would leave KLA weapons available to the follow-on organization. The third permitted the return of an agreed upon number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel to perform the functions in accordance with the resolution.31 The Serbians used this to maintain their claims of sovereignty over Kosovo. The KLA would use this as a justification for not completely disarming. Finally, the resolution left unresolved the final disposition of Kosovo. Specifically the resolution stated:

A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA.32

The KLA interpreted this to mean future independence for Kosovo.

MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT

The Military Technical Agreement established the terms and requirements for the withdrawal of the Serbian and Federal Republic of Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo. The document established the five-kilometer ground safety and twenty-five kilometer air safety zones between KFOR and FRY forces. However, the disposition of the KLA was not included in this agreement.33 The five-kilometer ground safety zone created a safe haven for insurgent activities.
UNDERTAKING OF DEMILITARIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION BY THE KLA

Signed on 20 June 1999, the undertaking provided for the KLA's cease-fire and their disengagement from the zones of conflict. It also required their demilitarization and reintegration back into civil society. The KLA was required to renounce the use of force and to comply with the directions of the Commander of the international security force in Kosovo (COMKFOR). The KLA was also to follow the directions from the civil administration in Kosovo as applicable. The KLA would ensure KFOR and the international civil presence would "continue to deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and that KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission." 34

The undertaking established a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) to ensure compliance with the undertaking and to investigate breaches of the agreement. The undertaking also established the requirements for the demilitarization and transformation of the KLA. The agreement established turn-in procedures for weapons, clearance of minefields and booby traps, and the removal of KLA supporters who were not of local origin. The Undertaking also required all KLA forces to cease wearing KLA uniforms and insignia after 90 days. The specific transformation guidance was:

The KLA intends to comply with the terms of UN Resolution 1244, and in this context that the international community should take due and full account of the contribution of the (KLA) during the Kosovo crisis and accordingly give due consideration to:

Recognition that, while the KLA and its structures are in the process of transformation, it is committed to propose individual current members to participate in the administration and police forces of Kosovo, enjoying special consideration in view of the expertise they have developed.

The formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard in due course as part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accord. 35

Of particular importance is the link between the KLA and a future force structured similarly to a US National Guard unit.
THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS COMKFOR'S STATEMENT OF PRINCIPALS

On 20 September 1999, the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) finalized an agreement detailing the transformation of the KLA. The agreement created the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as a civilian emergency service organization. The KPC organization consisted of three thousand active members and two thousand reservists. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) contracted the International Organization of Migration (IOM) to conduct KPC screenings and to find job placements for those not selected.

The Statement of Principals also defined the transformation process. The purpose of the KPC is to provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo in the event of a natural disaster or similar emergency, support the reconstruction of the Kosovo civilian infrastructure, and provide other assistance as requested by UNMIK. The KPC is the only multidisciplinary, multi-ethnic, indigenous emergency service agency designed to: respond to any disaster affecting the population and territory of Kosovo; conduct search and rescue operations; assist in rebuilding the infrastructure and community of Kosovo; provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and Kosovo Force when required; perform ceremonial duties; and to serve all the people of Kosovo in keeping with the transition to a democratic and free society.

The Kosovo Protection Corps shall act in accordance with the following principles:

a. The Kosovo Protection Corps will exist to serve all of the people of Kosovo. It will be politically neutral, and its members will neither serve in public office nor hold any office or positions in political parties whether voluntary or paid.

b. The Kosovo Protection Corps shall comply with internationally recognized human rights agreements in all aspects including recruitment, retention, career progression and in the activities of the Kosovo Protection Corps. There shall be no discrimination against any person on grounds of race, sex, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or ethnic or social origin or association with a national community, property, birth or other status.

c. Nothing contained in this Statement of Principles shall authorise or permit the Kosovo Protection Corps to intervene or concern itself with, as an organisation or through its membership, any matter other than those specified in this Statement of Principles.
d. Any member of the Kosovo Protection Corps who breaches the principles and regulations contained in this Statement of Principles or the United Nations Mission En Kosovo Regulation 1999/8 may be dismissed from the Corps and may be subject to criminal prosecution.

e. Members of the Kosovo Protection Corps may only operate outside the boundaries of the Province of Kosovo with the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

The Principals directed the Commander KFOR to exercise day to day supervision of the Kosovo Protection Corps and to provide Training and Advisory Teams to the KPC within available means. The Statement of Principals allowed the KPC to retain two thousand weapons in trust. COMKFOR allowed the KPC to retain two hundred weapons for guard requirements.

ANALYSIS OF KLA TRANSFORMATION

UN/US PERCEPTIONS

The UN and US believed the KLA understood the agreements and would comply by transforming into a civilian organization known as the Kosovo Protection Corps. President Clinton stated to Congress that on “September 20, 1999, KFOR Commander Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson accepted the KLA’s certification that the KLA had completed its demilitarization in accordance with the June 21 agreement. The UNMIK thereafter established a civil emergency services entity known as the Kosovo Protection Corps that is intended to provide civic assistance in emergencies and other forms of humanitarian assistance.” Ambassador David Johnson made the following statement to the Permanent Council:

“Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Kouchner recently presented to the Security Council his plan to create a civilian organization—the "Kosovo Protection Corps." It will be a multi-ethnic corps to provide needed services for a post-conflict society that will include disaster relief, search and rescue, reconstruction, and demining. We fully support this initiative. We believe it a necessary and creative step to aid Kosovo’s demilitarization and reconstruction. The international community must rapidly and effectively find ways productively to employ the recently demilitarized KLA members and
prevent the KLA from simply going underground. If we allow that to happen, it will become a lasting threat to Kosovo’s peace and its stability.”

The perception of the international community was unclear on the issue of Kosovo independence. On one hand, Kosovo was viewed as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Some even accepted Kosovo as part of Serbia. On the other hand, some saw clear divisions between Serbia and Kosovo. “In fact,” stated Richard Holbrooke, “the Albanians of Kosovo and the Serbs of Yugoslavia are more different than the Serbs, Moslems and Croats in Bosnia, all of whom in Bosnia had the same language, the same culture, the same background and substantial inter-marriage.” The documents ending the Kosovo air war did nothing to establish a clear and unified international position concerning a final political resolution to the Kosovo conflict.

SERBIAN PERCEPTIONS

According to Robert Neil Cooper, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Plymouth, the “creation of the KPC also undermined the faith of the Serb community in the impartiality of KFOR and UNMIK.” The creation of the KPC caused the two Serbs serving on the UN Transitional Council to withdraw from the body in protest. The Serbs saw no hope of the KPC becoming multi-ethnic, and that was a fair assessment. The Serbs recommended starting a separate Serbian Protection Corps. No matter how much UNMIK tried to drape the multi-ethnic, purely civilian organization label on the KPC, the Serbs and other minorities viewed it as still the KLA. They also understood UN Resolution 1244 as supporting the eventual return of Serbian police and defense forces to Kosovo.

KOSOVO ALBANIAN PERCEPTIONS

Kosovo Albanians saw and still see the KPC as the basis for the future army of Kosovo. They see independence as the inevitable resolution to the Kosovo problem. Kosovar Albanian leaders continue to stress independence and a future military for the region. Hashim Thaci, former KLA political commander and current politician, told the Pristina daily newspaper, Koha Ditore, prior to the signing of the Undertaking, “The KLA will be transformed into an army ...that will defend the territory of Kosova” . According to Xhabir Zharku, former KLA commander in the Kaçanik region, “As we have now agreement, the KLA is going to be transformed into police, regular police forces and National Guard”. Properly quoting the text of the Undertaking, Agim Çeku, KPC Commander, stated:
“In negotiations on the transformation of the KLA we chose to accept the model of the American National Guard because we do not want a big army but a strong guard which will have only a defense role and will not constitute a threat to anyone. The concept of the international community for all the countries in this region is for them to have armies organized along the model of the American National Guard. NATO will be responsible for the security of the whole region, and all the countries must build their security systems within the framework of systems for collective security in the region. 

OTHER FACTORS EFFECTING TRANSFORMATION

Along with the different perceptions of the major players in the transformation process, there are several other factors that confuse the role and stated functions of the Kosovo Protection Corps.

Both the Undertaking and the Statement of Principals task COMKFOR to maintain daily supervision of the Kosovo Protection Corps. However, UNMIK has defined the KPC as a civilian organization. The constant contact between KFOR and the KPC hurts the KPC’s civilian image. The military relationships continue to foster the perception the KPC is only the KLA in disguise. UNMIK was not staffed to provide day-to-day civilian contact or training for the KPC.

The Kosovar Albanians received several other indicators that fed their perceptions the international community supported their call for Kosovo’s independence. The first was the establishment of Kosovo wide elections. These elections would be independent of the Serbian elections. The second was the acceptance of the German Mark as the currency of Kosovo. This acceptance rejected the use of the Yugoslavian dinar and removed Kosovo from the Serbian monetary system. The third was the establishment of Kosovo vehicle license plates.

The KLA was never disarmed. The KPC was allowed to keep two thousand weapons. However, recent KFOR operations show the KLA kept significantly more. KFOR soldiers uncovered a 67-ton weapons cache discovered last summer. They found 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 20,000 grenades and an undisclosed number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. This was the largest cache of illegal arms found since peacekeepers entered Kosovo. The KLA justifies keeping the arms based on the unclear final disposition of Kosovo. If Kosovo becomes independent, they want to retain the weapons for their defense forces.

The KLA was supposed to demilitarize. The Undertaking required them to cease wearing their military uniforms and patches within 90 of signing the agreement. However, KPC
members loosely followed this requirement. The uniform patches are identical to the patches worn by the KLA except the KLA was replaced with the KPC symbol. The patch also matches the one now used by the insurgents in the Serbian Presevo valley. UNMIK also agreed to allow the KPC to wear "insignias denoting seniority" but there will be no defacto ranking system\textsuperscript{45}. No matter how much the UN opposed any militarization of the KPC, this agreement had the effect of establishing ranks for the KPC.

Former Kosovo Protection Corps members are directly supporting the insurgency efforts in the Presevo Valley. Shaqir Shaqiri was the deputy commander for the KPC element located in Gnjilane. He is now a spokesman for the insurgents in the Presevo Valley. While still a KPC member he made the following statement: "For sure, there's going to be a war . . . The best solution would be for them (Presevo Region) to join Kosovo. Belgrade does not need a place it cannot rule. The residents are going to face a moment when they will have to get their weapons and defend themselves."\textsuperscript{46}

The Kosovo Protection Corps also lacks proper funding and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) support to purchase necessary equipment, to perform reconstruction missions, and to train. Both the SRSG and COMKFOR addressed and continue to address the budget shortfall. Current budgets provide barely enough to cover basic pay and some minimal equipment purchases. In addition to the budget shortfall, there is also a significant problem in developing projects for the KPC. One of the initial priority missions for the KPC is to assist with rebuilding Kosovo's neglected and damaged infrastructure. Key funding sources for these infrastructure projects are the NGOs. However, NGOs are reluctant to use the KPC in support of their missions. They believe the KPC link to the KLA hurt their image of impartiality.

**CONCLUSION**

The transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Corps has not been successful. In the final ends, ways, and means analysis, the creation of the KPC was a way, without means, to a nonexistent end. The UN intent did not match the Kosovo Albanian or the Serbian perceptions. The KLA did not disarm and did not fully demilitarize. The KPC intentions are also suspect. The international community sees the KPC as a civilian civil disaster organization. The KPC sees themselves as a future army. There are direct links between the KLA, the KPC and the insurgent uprising in the Presevo valley region of Serbia. The KPC did not receive the means, the international support and trust, needed to support rebuilding Kosovo's infrastructure and to train and equip as a civilian disaster relief agency.
But the biggest issue hindering the success of the KPC was the failure of the international community to impose a political end to the Kosovo issue. The current agreements leave the fate of Kosovo to future decisions. There are too many inconsistent indicators to both sides as to the final fate of the small province. The Kosovo Albanians see the future as independence with the KPC the nucleus of a future Kosovo defense force. The Serbians see a Kosovo returned to Serbian control.

There are only two possible political end states for the Kosovo conflict. The first is the return of Kosovo to Serbian control. It could almost be guaranteed the UN imposed KPC would not survive this return. The KPC will continue to remain the nucleus of an army. It will be the future defense forces of an independent Kosovo. Or, if Kosovo returns to Serbian control, it will again become the insurgent army inside Serbia. The international community must also admit their Kosovo policy and military intervention were failures if they return Kosovo to Serbia. The return would recognize Serbia’s sovereign right to quell insurgencies within its borders and the return of Kosovo would surely re-ignite the insurgency.

The other possible solution to the Kosovo conflict is an independent Kosovo. This is the only political end in which the creation of the KPC would have been successful. In this case the KPC would transform into the army of defense forces of Kosovo. By all indications, an independent Kosovo would remain a very poor state. The weak GNP of the new self-governing Kosovo would hinder the Kosovo defense forces from growing into a major regional threat. To counter this minor threat, the international community would have to put mechanisms in place to guarantee the sovereignty of the bordering countries of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia against any future Kosovar aggression. The international community would also have to ensure Serbia would not use force to regain the province.

The transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Corps was an excellent study of ends, ways and means. In this case, the KPC was a way without means. Future transformations of insurgent armies must clearly link the transformation to a well-defined political end. Once the end is defined and agreed to, the international community must fully support the transformation with the means for success.

WORD COUNT = 5,125
ENDNOTES


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