The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

CONTRACTORS:
A STRATEGIC ASSET OR ACHILLES' HEEL?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD G. SCHENCK
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
CONTRACTORS: A STRATEGIC ASSET OR ACHILLES' HEEL?

by

RICHARD G SCHENCK
United States Army

COL Donald Yates
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Richard G. Schenck
TITLE: Contractors: A Strategic Asset Or Achilles' Heel?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 10 April 2001 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The use of civilian contractors for support within the U.S. Army is not a new phenomenon. From the Revolutionary War through the East Timor peacekeeping mission, contractors have always accompanied America’s forces. An examination of the historical use of contractors demonstrates that their importance has increased from supplying goods, transportation and medical support, to serving as force multipliers. Currently, contractors are a strategic asset that the Army requires for all deployments and operations.

As the Army is confronted with the growing threat of asymmetrical warfare, how much force protection is needed to safeguard a contractor’s employees? In future operations, will our adversaries identify civilian contractors as our Achilles heel, thereby making contractors a strategic vulnerability? The U.S. Army has not been tested in this area during recent conflicts or peacekeeping operations. But if contractors and or their services and facilities are attacked or captured, will the major defense contractors be able to keep their employees on the job? Commanders must include contractors and their roles in their operational plans. Integration of contractor support into their campaign and contingency plans is vital. However, Commanders need to understand during planning for any operation that they do not command or control contractors. They manage them through their staff and the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), and in some instances, the contracting officer.

Commanders and their legal advisors must also deal with discipline and criminal jurisdiction of civilian contractors' personnel. In January 2000, Congressional legislation addressed this perplexing issue. However, procedures for implementing this new law are not yet in place. Nor has the inevitable litigation altering it yet arrived before our courts.

How will the military determine the readiness of its contractors? Yet their failure to perform during conflict will be recognized quickly and painfully. Has the Army wandered down the path of making contractors a strategic asset without a strategic vision for their roles? Have cost saving and force-structure reductions propelled the Army down this perilous path?
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... III

CONTRACTORS: A STRATEGIC ASSET OR ACHILLES' HEEL? ........................................... 1
   HISTORY OF USING CONTRACTORS ........................................................................ 1
   THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ....................................................................................... 1
   NINETEENTH CENTURY ............................................................................................... 2
   TWENTIETH CENTURY ................................................................................................. 2
   FORCE PROTECTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................................. 4
   ACCOUNTABILITY ....................................................................................................... 6
   MANAGEMENT AND TYPES OF CONTRACTS .............................................................. 7
   TYPES OF CONTRACTORS .......................................................................................... 9
   DISCIPLINE ................................................................................................................... 9
   READINESS ................................................................................................................ 10
   COST SAVING OR STRATEGIC VISION ................................................................... 11
   CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 12

ENDNOTES ....................................................................................................................... 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 19
CONTRACTORS: A STRATEGIC ASSET OR ACHILLES’ HEEL?

HISTORY OF USING CONTRACTORS

From the Revolutionary War through peacekeeping questions in Kosovo, contractors have always accompanied America’s forces during war or peacekeeping operations. An examination of the historical use of contractors demonstrates that their importance has increased from supplying goods and transportation to multiplying the force. Currently, the Army cannot deploy or operate without contractors.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Although European armies used private contracting for a century and a half prior to the American Revolution, American leaders were well aware of contractors’ profiteering. Some even suggested that those who advocated private contracting were under Tory influence. So for the first five years of the Revolution, the Continental Army refused their dubious services. However, by 1781 American military leaders were willing to try anything that could possibly improve the logistical supply system.¹ So civilians were employed to drive wagons; provide architectural, engineering, and carpentry services; obtain foodstuffs; and deliver medical services.² Robert Morris, one of the first heads of the Treasury Department, observed that:

Experience has sooner or later pointed out contracts with private men of substance and talents equal to understanding as the cheapest, most certain and consequently the best mode of obtaining those articles, which are necessary for the subsistence, clothing and moving of any army.³

Nonetheless, contractors continued to create problems during the Revolutionary War. For example, a regiment of artificers was raised to work with civilian artificers supporting construction and ordnance requirements. A special report to Congress in 1781 on the state of this regiment emphasized the disgruntled comments of the soldiers, who complained about the disparity between their wages and those of their civilian counterparts. We can hear the same disgruntled comments in Bosnia and Kosovo today. It was, thus, difficult to reenlist men after their three-year terms had expired.⁴ Further, officers lacked experience and expertise in dealing with contractors. They had difficulty communicating the Army’s requirements, capabilities, and budgeting requirements to the supporting contractors. Likewise, contracting did not get a fair test in combat situations because most contracting was done after Yorktown and involved supplying installations rather than the units engaging in combat.⁵ Thus, although the Continental Army resorted to contracting, it cannot be concluded that this experience proved entirely satisfactory.
NINETEENTH CENTURY

Supplying the Army by the War of 1812 was equally problematic. Arms and ammunition were by then being supplied from the national arsenal systems. Subsistence, clothing, and transportation were still acquired largely under the system of private contracting. Due to contractors' unsatisfactory performance during the War of 1812, the Army slowly weaned itself from the system of private contractors. In 1820 the Army established the office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, which was responsible for feeding the Army.6

By the time of the Mexican War, the Army's logistical bureaus had developed effective procedures for dealing with both procurement and services contracting. The Army's own system for production and distribution of armaments, clothing and equipment was becoming increasingly effective.7 Even so, many contractors were needed to transport troops and supplies throughout the United States and Mexico. The principal issue raised by the Army during the Mexican War was the control and discipline of contractor personnel: Contractors were viewed as difficult to control and generally resistant to Army discipline.

Despite the scope and scale of Civil War logistics operations, there were essentially no new developments in the use of contractors on the battlefield. In the postwar period of the Indian wars from 1865 to 1890, the Army continued to use private contractors to provide food, fuel, and transport to the frontier outposts as a satisfactory compliment to the Army's own system of arsenals, clothing factories, and storehouses.8

The Spanish-American War spurred the creation of the Quartermaster Corps, which responded to a need for a large number of skilled and unskilled soldiers under military control, with sufficient discipline to be deployed as needed, especially in overseas operations. The Quartermaster Corps did not eliminate the need for contractors, but it greatly reduced the Army's dependency on contractors. The Army still found itself using contractors to obtain extra labor, transport, and housekeeping support as its overseas roles increased.9

TWENTIETH CENTURY

There was no substantial change to the Army's use of contractors during War World I. Rapid mobilization gave the Army sufficient skilled and unskilled laborers to cover most of its logistical requirements. In France, the American Expeditionary Forces did use some private contractors to obtain extra laborers, additional transportation, and housekeeping support.10

During World War II, for the first time contractors served as force multipliers. Manufacturers' technical representatives then became essential in forward areas. The increased complexity of military aircraft, signal equipment, vehicles, and other hardware
produced by American corporations, along with the rapid change in models, made technical representatives a welcome addition to the forward areas of operation and front lines. Private civilian contractors built and operated ordnance facilities in North Africa and the Middle East. Were these repair facilities too vital an operation to be entrusted to civilian contractors? Could they become easy targets for sabotage and security violations? Our senior leaders are currently confronted with the threat of asymmetric warfare and must calculate the level of risk that they are willing to accept in relationship to the mission that the contractor is performing.

The Korean War continued World War II practices, although the low level of mobilization required somewhat greater reliance on contractor support. Japanese contractors dominated U.S. support bases located in Japan. In Korea, the Army for the most part relied on Korean contractors to perform stevedoring, road and rail repair, and transportation. Military historians believe that without the use of Japanese and Korean contractors, the Army would have needed a quarter of a million more service members to support the war effort. Today, as in Korea, the Army lacks well-defined doctrine for utilizing contractors. There is considerable confusion about command and control, as well as overall administration of contract services and labor.11

During the Vietnam War, the Army's employment policy of civilians changed. Business Weekly described Vietnam as a war by contractors.12 More than ever before in any U.S. conflict, American companies were working side by side with troops. Contractors had become more than just a force multiplier; they were a strategic asset. President Johnson mandated a ceiling on the numbers of military personnel deployed to Vietnam, but contractor personnel supporting the war effort did not count against the troop ceiling. This flexibility enabled the Army to increase the number of combat soldiers in Vietnam and reduce the logistic soldiers needed to prosecute the war. At the height of the Vietnam War, more than 80,000 contractors supported the war effort. Yet another major reason for the increase in contractor support was the increasing complexity of military equipment and hardware.13

From Fiscal Year (FY) 1965 through FY 1971, the Congress appropriated $969 million for construction in Vietnam. Several private contractors participated in the Vietnam construction effort. One of the principal construction contractors was the firm of Richardson-Morrison-Knudson-Brown-Root-Jacobson (RMK-BRJ). Brown and Root Service Corporation, which is the principal Army battlefield contractor today, is the prosperous descendant of the corporation developed for the Vietnam War.14

Despite the relatively short duration of the Gulf War, the U.S. Army relied heavily on contractors to conduct operations. Two percent of those deployed were civilian contractors. Further, the Saudi Arabians provided a great deal of host-nation contracted support. Problems
of management and administration were encountered. And perplexing questions surfaced: Were contractors to be treated as combatants or civilians if captured? Could they carry weapons for self-protection?15

After the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) cut more than 700,000 active duty members from the ranks. Additionally, more than 300,000 DOD civilian positions have been eliminated. These cuts have occurred without a reduction in operational requirements. There has also been a significant increase in operating tempo over the last ten years. Likewise, there has been a growing recognition that more and more support functions previously accomplished by uniformed members must be accomplished by contractors. Declining manpower and budgets have indisputably increased the strategic importance of contractors.16

In Bosnia and Kososvo, contractors have become an acceptable means of augmenting logistical capabilities, particularly in protracted peacekeeping operations. The trend is for an increasing number of civilian contractors in the theater to completely control all logistics functions. During deployment in Bosnia and Kososvo, the ratio of contractors to soldiers was one in ten.17 Today in Bosnia after five years, the ratio of contractor to soldier is getting smaller as the U.S. continues to withdraw troops.18

From the Revolutionary War through World War I, the American military used contractors as suppliers of goods and transportation. Increased complexity of military aircraft, signal equipment, vehicles and other hardware of World War II through Korea brought technical representatives in increasing numbers to forward areas. Contractors evolved from suppliers of goods and transport to force multipliers.

During Vietnam, the Army employed contractors as replacements for support soldiers to keep the Army under mandated troop ceilings set by the President. From Vietnam to Kosovo, contractors have become a strategic asset, an integral part of the U.S. Army’s warfighting and peacekeeping capability. They are no longer a mere rear area logistics resource. Since contractors have become a strategic asset, they are more vulnerable to sabotage and terrorist attacks. Will opposing forces identify civilian contractors as the Achilles’ heels of U.S. forces? Or will U.S. military doctrine acknowledge the vital role of contractors and afford them the protections granted to other war fighters?

FORCE PROTECTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Since the Khobar Towers and the USS Cole incidents, wherein suicide terrorists used bombs to severely damage U.S. equipment and kill U.S. military personnel, force protection has
been one of the highest priorities and responsibilities of commanders. As the Army is confronted with the growing threat of asymmetrical warfare, who will protect and account for contractors' employees? Will the threat determine that civilian contractors are an Achilles’ heel? Has the Army’s increasing reliance on them become a strategic vulnerability? AR715-9 clearly addresses this critical issue:

All U.S. Army-sponsored contractor employees in the Area of Operation shall be designated to a military unit to maintain administrative oversight and accountability. The Theater Support Command, the Logistics Support Element, or other official delegate, as appropriate, will manage contractor employees, and ensure a contracting officer’s representative with direct communications to the contracting officer exists. The unit is also responsible for providing (or coordinating with other units to provide) government furnished material as required by the contract (e.g. facilities, messing, billeting, quality of life issue, transportation, mortuary affairs, and force protection for U.S. contractor personnel).¹⁹

Military support personnel are classified as combatants and are trained in Rules of Engagement and in self-protection. They also can be relied upon to augment the fighting force and defend equipment and terrain if needed. This was demonstrated time and time again in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Clerks and cooks were used to replace infantry soldiers when needed. Contractor personnel, on the other hand, are classified as noncombatants and as such can carry a weapon only for self-protection. The Army has elected in all cases not to allow them to arm themselves. During recent operations in Haiti, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia, the Army did not authorize civilians to carry weapons.²⁰ During the SFOR6 (Stabilization Force) from August 1999 until March 2000, none of the 26 contractors or subcontractors were authorized to carry weapons.²¹

Contractors see force protection as the responsibility of their military hosts, as stated in AR-715-9. They are not willing to accept the legal responsibility of arming their employees. The opposing force or threat might interpret their carrying of side arms as evidence that they are mercenaries or combatants. Most contractors feel that being unarmed is force protection in itself in a low threat environment like Bosnia and Kosovo. Commanders are reluctant to allow contractors to carry side arms because of the concern a relatively insignificant situation could turn into an international incident. Contractors receive no formal weapons or Rules of Engagement training before deploying. If commanders authorized arming of contractors, then they would need to establish a training and certification program. This certification program would require time and manpower that most commanders cannot afford while deployed during an operation.
The commander on the ground must determine what level of force protection is appropriate for the contractors working in his area of operation. The commander must calculate the threat level and the risk that they are willing to accept in relationship to the mission that the contractor is performing for their units. In Somalia, contractors required a military escort nearly all the time. At various times, as many as twelve to eighteen soldiers and six vehicles were assigned to each contractor’s convoy. In contrast, Brown and Root has traveled nearly one million miles a month on the open roads of Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary, mostly without the benefit of any force protection.\textsuperscript{22}

But if contractors’ employees are attacked or captured, will large defense contractors be able to keep their employees on the battlefield when and where needed? In August 1976 American soldiers cutting down trees in the demilitarized zone on the North and South Korean border were attacked by a small unit of North Korean soldiers. This famous tree-cutting incident caused the death of two American soldiers and increased the alert status to the highest state since the Korean War. In response to this alert, hundreds of Department of the Army civilians who had replaced military maintenance and supply soldiers requested immediate transportation out of Korea.\textsuperscript{23}

In fact, contractors working for the U.S. Army have never been attacked. Yet the tree-cutting incident in Korea may indicate how contractors will react if attacked or captured. Most asymmetric threats and terrorists have determined that the U.S. Army’s center of gravity is the will of the American people. Indeed American will, a center of gravity, has been tested in Beirut, Somalia, South West Asia, and during the U.S.S. Cole incident. Small numbers of Americans have been killed in each of these incidents, which always prompt questions as to why we are involved in this area of world. Many refer to this tactic as the “CNN factor”. It will only be a matter of time before the asymmetric threat determines that contractors are a strategic vulnerability or weakness, reasoning that attacks on them at the tactical or operational level can affect the center of gravity. The death, injury or capture of contractors will have a demoralizing effect on the support of any operation.\textsuperscript{24}

Force protection is, thus, a critical requirement. If a commander fails to provide the security necessary, and this results in loss of life or capture, we may find out the hard way how well we can operate without civilian contractors.\textsuperscript{25}

ACCOUNTABILITY

Joint and Army Doctrine are both very ambiguous as to the accountability of contractors on the battlefield. Chapter 4 (Managing Contractors) of FM 100-21 admits:
NOTE: At the time of publication of this FM, detailed Army contractor reporting procedures and policies are still under development. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) and logistic planners to ensure that the necessary mechanisms are in place to record contractor personnel reporting to the theater.  

Without doctrine, accountability for protecting contract personnel resides in an ad hoc system at best. Most senior logisticians believe that accounting for contractor personnel is a G-1 function; just as unit strength reporting is a critical part of force protection and readiness.

Accountability for a contractor's employees is a very important part of force protection. Major contractors, such as Brown and Root and Lockheed Martin, usually require their employees to live on the installations and impose curfews and force protection rules while traveling in the area of operation. However, in Bosnia when the threat level is low, some contractors and sub contractors only laxly place restrictions on how their employees move in and out of the area of operations and where they live.

Many weapon system contractors are sub contractors to a major Department of Defense contractor. They usually place little or no restrictions on their employees. Therefore, many are living in Germany and fly commercially into Hungary and drive rental cars into the area of operations without any type of country clearance from U.S. authorities. They arrive and depart the area of operation at their pleasure. Some contractors have started to rent apartments and houses off the installation in the local communities. With an ad hoc reporting system and different force protection rules for each contractor, accountability is almost impossible. Most commanders have enough to worry about without trying to track down civilian contractors. So they are willing to accept this force protection risk. Doctrine is needed on the reporting and accounting of civilian contractors. Also, additional personnel should be included in G-1 or the Personnel Service Battalion (PSB) to account for contractor's employees and to track their movements.

MANAGEMENT AND TYPES OF CONTRACTS

Contracting Support is controlled at the highest level. This optimizes the efficiency of the theater contracting effort, achieves economies of scale by consolidating contracting requirements, and minimizes or eliminates the competition for limited resources. (FM 100-10-2)

Commanders must understand during their operational planning that they do not command or control contractors. They manage them through their staff and the Contracting Officer Representative and Contracting Officer. A study done by Logistics Management Institute (LMI) cited a couple of findings worthy of consideration regarding control of contractors:
First, military personnel perceived a lack of clear command and control over contractors. Secondly, many military personnel not working in a logistics field had difficulty determining who has management control over contractors.\textsuperscript{31}

Military commanders generally lack the authority to change or direct contractors’ work. This is a limitation that runs counter to the military culture of command. The authority to modify the contract resides with the Contracting Officer or if delegated the Administrative Contracting Officer.\textsuperscript{32} A commander must also understand that contractor personnel are not compelled by oath. Rather they serve in accord with the terms and requirements of their employment contract.\textsuperscript{33}

Large contracts, such as the Brown and Root Sustainment Contract or Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), are managed by a six to ten person contract team out of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). They work very closely with the unit to insure that the contractor is providing the services and supplies that are called for in the contract. This cell also contains an Administrative Contracting Officer who will modify the contract for the unit if new work is needed. The Contracting Officer limits the Administrative Contracting Officer to a certain dollar threshold. However, many of the systems and smaller contracts such as phone services (Sprint) and aviation maintenance (Lockheed Martin) have no Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer Representative working in the area of operation. This disconnect causes frustration, because there is always a delay when modifications are needed to accomplish new work or a change is required to an old scope of work.\textsuperscript{34}

Senior military leaders sometimes create confusion over the command and control of contractors. In Bosnia, the Brown and Root Sustainment Contract is a logistics contract. The contracting officer is located in Virginia, and works for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Due to the very broad terms of this contract, Brown and Root carried out a large amount of temporary construction. United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering has repeatedly tried to control the engineering portion of this contract, but he clearly has no authority to manage any part of the Brown and Root Sustainment Contract. The requiring activity for the contract is the USAREUR DCSLOG, the Defense Contract Management Agency administers the contract, and the contracting officer resides with the Corps of Engineers in Virginia.\textsuperscript{35}
TYPES OF CONTRACTORS

The Army can no longer sustain itself during conflict or peacekeeping deployments without using civilian contractors. Currently, the Army uses contractors as either systems contractors or contingency contractors.

System contractors typically provide support to specific weapon systems or to support systems. They perform the functions of sustainment, maintenance and management of specified items. System contractors perform very specific and precisely defined activities. They serve during war and peacetime. A 1997 proposal for a prime vendor support arrangement for the Apache Helicopter led to contracts with Boeing and Lockheed Martin as systems contractors for the Apache. This program transferred responsibility for complete wholesale support of the Apache to the contractor.

The second category provides prearranged Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) services. LOGCAP contractors provide prioritized contingency planning for logistics augmentation, engineering, and construction services. CINCs and Service Component Commanders (SSC) determine planning requirements in the projected area of operation. This contractor support is then integrated into tactical plans. Integration of both kinds of contractor support into campaign and contingency plans is vital.36

DISCIPLINE

Another contractor issue involves discipline and criminal jurisdiction of civilian contractors’ personnel while supporting U.S. forces. Commanders and military legal advisors have dealt with this issue and will continue to deal with it in the future.37

Between 1966 and 1968 authorities in Vietnam reviewed sixteen civilian cases for prosecution. The State Department authorized the prosecution of six, ultimately four were tried. One of the civilians was tried and convicted by a general court-martial. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit larceny and of attempted larceny of $36,000 of batteries owned by the United States. However, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals reversed the case because civilians can only be subjects to Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) when Congress has declared war. The Vietnam conflict was never declared a war.38

Until January 2000, federal law applied only to certain crimes committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdictions of the United States. Congress passed a law in 2000 expanding criminal jurisdiction over civilians working for the Department of Defense overseas.

To amend title 18, United States Code, to establish Federal jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United States by persons employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces, or by members of the Armed Forces who are released or separated from active duty prior to being identified and prosecuted for the commission of such offenses, and for other purpose.\textsuperscript{39}

However, there have not yet been any legal procedures or litigation under this new Congressional Law. Until the details of this law are worked out, the general rule is that neither the UCMJ nor federal law has jurisdiction over civilians who commit crimes on foreign soil.\textsuperscript{40}

This lack of legal authority over contractors overseas is a significant and reoccurring problem. Depending on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or other agreements, contractor employees may be subject to the criminal laws of the country in which they are deployed. This could be extremely important in third world countries, where justice is often based on the Talmudic Code, which is an eye for an eye.\textsuperscript{41}

In Bosnia, Hungary, and Kosovo there are no Status of Forces Agreements or other international agreements addressing criminal and civil jurisdiction for civilian contractors. In peacekeeping operations, when the threat and force protection levels are relaxed, contractor criminal activities will inevitably increase in the areas of smuggling, postal fraud, black marketing, and prostitution.\textsuperscript{42}

The commander and his legal advisors, lacking criminal jurisdiction, must rely on administrative sanctions to deal with misconduct of contractor employees. Some of the sanctions a commander can impose are the withdrawal of all privileges, such as entry to installations, medical facilities, dining facilities, and base exchanges. The government can also debar an employee from all current and future federal contracts.\textsuperscript{43}

In most cases contractors agree to terminate employment of offending employees. However, some contractors’ personnel commit serious criminal acts and walk away with only a black mark on their employment record from that defense contractor. The 2000 Law will change this, once federal jurisdiction has been clarified under the law’s tenets.

**READINESS**

Contractor support has always played an important role during various operations. As a strategic asset, they will play an even greater role in the future. How will the military determine the readiness of LOGCAP and contingency contractors to meet their responsibilities, especially during peacetime? Their inability to perform during wartime or while deployed will be recognized quickly and painfully.\textsuperscript{44}

LOGCAP contractors are required by contract to be ready to deploy in 72 hours, to provide initial support within 15 days of the start of the operation. They need to be at full
capability within 30 days of the onset of the deployment. Contractors also must provide their own strategic and in-theater lift capability.\textsuperscript{45} Is it reasonable, then, to expect contractors to meet these timelines for deployment and delivery of goods and/or services? Meeting this deployment time line would be very difficult for any active duty logistic unit.

Currently the Army continuously monitors the readiness of its units for combat operations. Monthly Readiness Reporting, Inspector General Inspections, and command-level oversight organization make independent determinations about whether units are sufficiently manned, equipped, trained, and otherwise able to complete their mission. But contractors are not subject to any inspection or evaluation system to determine their state of readiness.\textsuperscript{46}

LOGCAP and other contingency contractors are not required by their contracts to report the readiness of their personnel and equipment to the unit they support or to the contracting officer. Their contracts are performance based; contractors must accomplish the work to a given standard in a given period of time. If a contractor fails to meet the standards, their award fee is reduced and, in extreme cases, the contract is cancelled. Thus a contractor with an inadequate vehicle fleet could contract with a local vendor for more vehicles to meet the standards established in the contract.\textsuperscript{47} But the contractor is not required to demonstrate the availability of this back-up resource. The only test of contractors’ actual capabilities is deployment itself. If they fail to deliver, they may lose some money. But what will the Army lose?

**COST SAVING OR STRATEGIC VISION**

According to General Bill Tuttle, U.S. Army, Retired, President of Logistics Management Institute, based in Washington, D. C., the Army can cut logistics cost by up to twenty percent by using civilian contractors.\textsuperscript{48}

As the Army forges ahead with Army Transformation, what is the strategic vision for the use of contractors? The Army has continued to let cost savings drive the desired end-state. The solution to this strategic vision problem is to find the right mix of contractor support and force structure. This is no easy task but it is essential if we are to forge ahead with transformation and maintain a world-class fighting force, supported by nothing less than a world-class logistic force.\textsuperscript{49}

Cost comparisons between civilian contractors and service members are difficult. Soldiers frequently work longer hours. A soldier’s job is usually multifaceted. A mechanic will also pull force protection duty and other assigned duties. On the other hand, contractors are very limited by the terms of their contract as to what duties they will perform.\textsuperscript{50} In recent
deployments like Bosnia and Kosovo, the wage rates of the local hires were very low compared to U. S. wages. For example, a trained electrician in Bosnia makes about two dollars an hour. However, the Army cannot assume that all deployments will be in underdeveloped countries where the local civilians will work at extremely low wages.

Local hires can become a vehicle for getting local nationals back to work in a depressed economy. This practice also help support a basic pillar of nation building by teaching vital skills that may have been missing for generations.

Contracting and outsourcing are frequently touted as ways for the Department of the Army to save money during these financially austere times. It is less expensive to contract out maintenance of technologically advanced equipment than it is to incur the cost of training military personnel. This reliance on contractors has started to degrade the military’s internal capability to meet logistical needs. If the Army is not careful, the use of contractors and outsourcing could completely eliminate many classes of military logisticians and technicians, leaving the Army totally dependent on contractors for some essential services.

CONCLUSION

Our Army has always depended in one way or another on contractors, especially in wartime. Currently, the Army depends more than ever before on contractors. Even during short duration operations like Operation Just Cause, eighty-two contractors deployed to Panama to support aviation assets.

Commanders will continue to struggle to provide force protection. They must determine what level is appropriate for the contractors working in their area. No one other than the commander can make that decision.

Newly published Army Regulations, Congressional Laws, and Army Field Manuals, are addressing doctrinal and strategic implications of contractors on the battlefield. As doctrine continues to evolve in such areas as accountability, management, and criminal jurisdiction, ad hoc systems will continue to be exercised. As Bosnia and Kosovo operations continue to mature, better procedures and written guidance will eliminate many of the problems that are associated with a large number of contractors supporting deployed U. S. forces.

Yet, it is highly unlikely that the Army will deploy without contractors in the future. In order to be better prepared, the Army must insure that basic contracting procedures are included in its schooling and training systems. Millions of dollars are being spent preparing units at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) for peacekeeping operations.
Very little contract management and training is incorporated into these exercises. Training in contract management is the only way that the Army can insure that its leadership can fully utilize this strategic asset.

WORD COUNT 4907
ENDNOTES


3 Huston, 72.

4 Airforce, 10.

5 Dr. Charles R. Shrader, "Contractors on the Battlefield" Land Power Essay Series, May 1999, 3

6 Shrader, 4.

7 Ibid, 4.

8 Ibid, 5.

9 Huston, 278.

10 Shrader, 6.

11 Ibid, 7.


13 Airforce, 10.

14 Shrader, 8.

15 Airforce, 11.

16 Ibid, 10.

17 Ibid, 11.

18 Richard G. Schenck, LTC, personnel notes from Bosnia SFOR6, 7 March 2000, U.S. Army War College

19 Department of the Army, Contractors Accompanying the Force, Army Regulation 715-9 (Department of the Army Washington, DC 29 October 1999), 15


21 Schenck.


25 Airforce, 17.

26 Department of the Army, Contractors on the Battlefield, Field Manual (FM) 100-21 (Department of the Army Washington, DC 4 March 2000), 4-2.

27 Ibid, 4-2.

28 Schenck.

29 Ibid.

30 Department of the Army, Contractors Support on the Battlefield, Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2 (Department of the Army Washington, DC 4 August 1999), 2-10.

31 Airforce, 16.

32 Davidson, 266.

33 Airforce, 16.

34 Schenck.

35 Ibid.


37 Davidson, 238.

38 Ibid, 240.

39 Ibid, 240.

40 Donald R Yates, <Donald.Yates@Carlisle.Armyn.mil>, “Public Law” electron mail message to Richard G. Schenck SchenckRG@Carlisle.army.mil, 19DEC2000.

41 Airforce, 16.

42 Davidson, 242.

44 Airforce, 58.

45 Airforce, 63.


47 Schenck.

48 Orsini, 29.

49 Castillo, 27.

50 Ibid, 27.

51 Schenck.

52 Davidson, 263.

53 Castillo, 26.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gilies, Phillip K. Major and Galvin, Thomas P.Captain, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis and Application, January 1996, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College


Schenck, Richard G. LTC Personnal notes from Bosnia SFOR6, 7 March 2000, U.S. Army War College.


Stevenson, Bill, Contingency Contracting in Support of Task Force Hawk, Army RD&A January-February 2000

U.S. Department of the Army, Contractors Support on the Battlefield, Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2 (Department of the Army Washington, DC 4 August 1999), 2-10.

U.S. Department of the Army, Contractors on the Battlefield, Field Manual (FM) 100-21 (Department of the Army Washington, DC 4 March 2000), 4-2.

U.S. Department of the Army, Contractors Accompanying the Force, Army Regulation 715-9 (Department of the Army Washington, DC 29 October 1999), 15.

