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ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OF PDD-68: CREATING SYNERGY WITH INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION (IPI)

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ABSTRACT

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In April of 1999 President William Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive: PDD-68, which outlined guidelines for International Public Information (IPI). Its purpose is to enhance the ability of the U.S. government to communicate to foreign audiences in order to prevent and mitigate crises around the world, as well as promote U.S. foreign policy themes to those audiences. IPI is critical to advancing our interests around the globe by countering misinformation and promoting free flow of information. The lead agency for implementation of PDD-68 is the Department of State. With the transition to a new presidential administration in the White House, it is essential to our national security that we fully implement the goals and objectives of this directive. Department of Defense must aggressively pursue the development of military strategy that is synchronous with the national security strategy that evolves in the new administration, while taking full advantage of rapidly developing technologies that can reach a variety of audiences. Using a collaborative approach to achieve a government-wide synergy with interagency coordination, deconfliction, integration, and interoperability of information dissemination activities, IPI will emerge as the key component in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives under the administration of President George W. Bush.
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ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OF PDD-68: CREATING SYNERGY WITH INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION (IPI)

BACKGROUND

In April of 1999 President William Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive: PDD-68, which outlined guidelines for International Public Information (IPI). Its purpose was intended to enhance the ability of the U.S. government to communicate to foreign audiences in order to prevent and mitigate crises around the world, as well as promote U.S. foreign policy themes to those audiences. IPI are those overt strategic information activities of the U.S. government designed to plan, coordinate, and synchronize the independent activities of Public Affairs, Public diplomacy, and International Military Information.\(^1\) Additionally, the 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States outlines three main national security objectives for the United States Government (USG): they are to enhance U.S. security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights abroad.\(^2\) These core objectives are firmly placed in a globalization framework, encompassing the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural, and political integration. The intent is to bring together citizens from all continents, allowing them to share ideas, goods, and information in an instant. The objective of IPI is to coordinate the informational objectives, themes, and messages that will be projected overseas by the U.S. to anticipate and defuse crises and to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy and National Security Strategy goals. It is the information element of U.S. national power on which PDD-68 focuses.

PDD-68 was created to address problems and concerns identified during military operations in Kosovo and Haiti, when no single U.S. agency was empowered to coordinate U.S. efforts to sell its policies and counteract bad press abroad.\(^3\) The IPI system is geared towards prevention of and mitigation of crises like those in Haiti in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999. Dramatic changes in the global information systems environment in the 1990s necessitate the implementation of a more deliberate, well-developed, thoughtfully conceived, and thoroughly integrated IPI strategy in promoting U.S. values and interests. PDD-68 is intended to replace the provisions of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77, “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security,” issued by President Reagan on 14 February, 1983. President Reagan created a “Special Planning Group” to address information synchronization and reinvigorate strategic Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capabilities. NSDD-77 created
four sub-committees: public affairs, international information, international political activities, and international broadcasting. This group was chaired by the National Security Advisor and was designed to improve the coordination of public diplomacy and strategic PSYOP. While the Reagan administration was primarily focused on issues within the Cold War era, it also recognized the importance of public diplomacy in accomplishing national security objectives. A number of efforts relative to IPI were initiated during the Reagan administration to outline the need for military PSYOP and IPI-type activities at all levels. NSDD 130 (U.S. International Information Policy) and the 1985 and 1990 Department of Defense (DoD) PSYOP Master Plans called attention to strategic PSYOP concerns.

To respond to Presidential direction to revitalize Department of Defense PSYOP and integrate it into other international information programs of the United States Government, the Secretary of Defense in 1985 promulgated the *Psychological Operations Master Plan*. The 1985 Master Plan was preceded by DoD Directive S-3321.1, *Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of War*, which assigned responsibilities and provided guidance for conducting PSYOP within DoD. Similarly the 1990 PSYOP Master Plan contained objectives, which updated the revitalization of PSYOP. The principal aims of the 1990 Master Plan were modernization of PSYOP, training, doctrine, education, planning, force structure, and cooperation agreements with other government agencies. While the 1990 Master Plan addressed some key objectives, it fell short in fulfilling the goal of synergistic interagency cooperation.

Similarly, the Clinton administration recognized the significance of IPI in a rapidly growing, globalized and technologically advanced world. The 1999 National Security Strategy effectively outlines the basis for developing IPI and the reasoning behind PDD-68. Public diplomacy is characterized as being useful as a tool for advancing U.S. leadership around the world by engaging international publics on U.S. principles and policies. The global advance of freedom and information technologies like the Internet has increased the ability of citizens and organizations to influence the policies of governments to an unprecedented degree. This makes our public diplomacy - efforts to transmit information and messages to peoples around the world - an increasingly vital component of our national security strategy. Our programs enhance our ability to inform and influence foreign audiences in support of U.S. national interests, and broaden the dialogue between American citizens and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad. Effective use of our nation's information capabilities to counter misinformation, mitigate inter-ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation helps advance U.S. interests abroad. International Public
Information activities, as defined by the newly asserted PDD-68, are designed to improve our capability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs and other national security information-related efforts to ensure they are more successfully integrated into foreign and national security policy making and execution.

International Public Information is a process designed to coordinate the implementation of the independent information activities of IPI: Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and International Military Information. In addition, it produces a framework in which to enhance U.S. international information activities by promoting innovative thinking and effective, collaborative partnerships. IPI activities can only be effective and credible by occurring with verity and objectivity, and in conjunction with other governmental, non-governmental, and multilateral communication elements. It is only through the carefully synchronized activities of interagency efforts that IPI will provide a synergistic effect to effectively disseminating information to foreign audiences in the 21st century.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Over the past fifty years, the U.S. Information Agency, along with public affairs efforts at the Departments of State, Defense, and other government agencies, have effectively presented U.S. government positions on critical foreign policy issues to the international community. Because of dramatic changes in the global information arena, it is critical that the U.S. implement IPI in a more deliberate and integrated fashion. The proliferation of the Internet as a communication tool has revolutionized the information realm in terms of rapid access to a wide array of foreign audiences. Previously isolated audiences are now potentially more accessible with the advent of global information networks. The U.S. must apply lessons learned from recent military operations to fully integrate IPI into a wide array of traditional media and more advanced technologies.

Events in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in the 1990s and preceding the 1994 genocide in Rwanda demonstrated the unfortunate power of inaccurate and malicious information in conflict-prone situations. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995, which put an end to a four-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations mandated NATO to oversee and enforce a durable cease-fire between the former belligerents. On 20 December 1995, a NATO-led multinational force called the Implementation Force (IFOR) started Operation Joint Endeavor. On 20 December 1996, a smaller NATO coalition called the Stabilization force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. In Operation Joint Guard, SFOR received an 18-month mandate to oversee and enforce the cease-fire. Included in that mandate were
provisions for an information campaign to effect the elements of the peace agreement. Of particular difficulty in Bosnia-Herzegovina under IFOR/SFOR operations was the element of multinationality, which limited effective implementation of public information principles. The reasons for this were primarily due to differing doctrine among participating nations and the resulting difficulty in running a combined (i.e. multinational) information campaign. This information campaign consisted of public information, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and a civil-military cooperation information campaign. The information campaign was based on principles that served both the military commanders and the international community’s needs. Nevertheless, the efforts of the overall campaign were not effectively coordinated and synchronized in utilizing different information activities within the overall operations.

In Haiti, prior to and during Operation Uphold Democracy, problems in interagency political-military planning were characterized as slow and disjointed, and lacking clear political guidance. While civilian agencies were developing a comprehensive political-military plan, major players continued to disagree on the objectives until the final weeks prior to launching the mission. This policy debate delayed planning for the operation. On the other hand, a well-conceived PSYOP campaign was incorporated early into the military operations to educate the Haitian people about the goals of the U.S. government and American involvement and prepare them for the participation of U.S. military forces in the return of President Aristide. The coordination of this effort was only made possible by the interagency process working with unprecedented success. This aspect of IPI in the Haiti operation gave a glimpse of the scope of IPI and interagency cooperation potential in accomplishing national objectives. If any one aspect of Uphold Democracy can be identified as critical to mission success, it must be the level of interagency coordination that was achieved in terms of IPI activities at all levels and among so many agencies. The military could not have hoped to cure all of Haiti’s problems on its own. Only the concerted efforts of all agencies working together to disseminate a coordinated public information campaign could have contributed so successfully to meeting the objectives in Haiti. If there was a failure in the U.S. approach to Haiti, it was a failure to systematically and patiently follow through with a dedicated commitment of U.S. public diplomacy there.

MEETING INTERAGENCY CHALLENGES

The Joint Staff is familiar with why the interagency coordination process does not occur smoothly. According to a Joint Staff memorandum, “in the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning” for two reasons: other agencies of the U.S. government do not understand “systematic planning procedures,” and each agency has its own
approach to solving problems. The Department of State, for example, values flexibility and its ability to respond to daily changes in a situation more than it values planning. The CIA is reluctant to coordinate for reasons of security. The former US Information Agency (USIA) held Department of Defense and CIA at bay for fear that it would be perceived as a purveyor of propaganda. If we are to have the true synergy of interagency coordination, those barriers must be overcome.

The key to successful implementation of IPI and PDD-68 is the ability to leverage all components of the interagency process. The interagency process is a developmental, fluid, and adaptable process, and can be frustrating to integrate all elements of national power to provide sound policy recommendations in the information realm. For the military, most IPI-related activities regarding national security objectives are accomplished by the theater CINCs through Theater Engagement Plans. The CINCs are not typically involved in the interagency process, however. The Joint Staff provides the input to the theater commanders from the interagency committees in Washington D.C. The unity of effort required to conduct interagency development of consensus in dissemination of information comes from the activities of the interagency working groups (IWGs), which provide a foundation for development of policy issues. These IWGs can be formed as the result of a crisis or when the White House forwards an issue (such as preparing a national information theme via IPI). They are most commonly formed for development of long-term strategy perspectives. It is in this capacity that the IWG can best serve IPI development to satisfy the objectives of PDD-68. The IWG for Haiti was formed in early 1994 and coordinated the U.S. government’s positions on Haiti and developed consensus throughout the government in order to implement the right information campaign, among other objectives.

As recently as 1997, in another Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-56, the importance of the interagency process is reinforced, in that it directs that political-military plans be developed with greater focus on interagency coordination. PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, mandated reform in the interagency process. The goal of PDD-56 was to achieve interagency unity of effort. This type of synergy is essential to the success of PDD-68 and IPI as well. It is this type of reform that complements the emergence of the significance of IPI in PDD-68. PDD-56 also stressed the importance of training agency leadership and planners to ensure they were adequately prepared to use the PDD-56 framework. Similarly, PDD-68 demands that training among the agency principals be instituted so that IPI can properly be integrated across the full spectrum of information dissemination, not only in peacetime but in crises as well. However, since PDD-56 failed to adequately address the
need for timely response to interagency IPI requirements, PDD-68 and its provisions are needed to ensure that IPI is properly addressed. Other publications that need to complement the IPI process include Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*. Neither conveys a strong message on interagency unity and both fail to provide interagency guidance to commanders. Lack of guidance of this sort led to publishing Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* in 1996. It discusses interagency processes and players, the evolving role of the Armed Services, and the functions of the National Security Council system. It also outlines both principles for organizing interagency efforts on the operational level and roles and responsibilities for Joint Task Forces (JTFs). The publication contains guidance for coordination between CINCs and agencies as well as methodologies for interagency operations.

However valuable a tool this publication was for commanders, it did not adequately explain methods for interagency planning, coordination, and execution. By developing PDD-56, DOD and other government agencies produced a document that contained the necessary policy guidance. Studies designed to examine and improve PDD-56 are useful in looking at how PDD-68 might also be improved. These studies suggest that the key to IPI might also be in mastering the interagency puzzles. Specifically, a March 1999 study, *Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56*, addressed six themes, which parallel necessary improvements to PDD-68, which coincidentally emerged at almost the same time. First, case studies of PDD-56 demonstrated a correlation between the quality of interagency coordination in Washington and the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in the field. This applies directly to IPI efforts as well. Without such coordination, IPI cannot effectively capture the information themes required for successful diplomatic campaigns. Second, PDD-56, and certainly PDD-68 must have a senior-level champion to tend support from key national security agencies. Third, PDD-56, like PDD-68, is intended to be used as an integrated package of complementary coordinating mechanisms and planning tools. It is not intended to be used piecemeal. The full package of IPI tools must be applied to be of maximum utility. Fourth, techniques for applying PDD-56 and PDD-68 need to be streamlined to achieve versatility and interagency acceptance. Fifth, PDD-56 training, simulation, and familiarization must be broadened and resourced to achieve greater outreach – in the case of PDD-68 this suggests reaching a broader audience as well. The sixth and final theme of the study suggests that PDD-56 should be applied to the next suitable complex contingency operation. Certainly this implication was geared toward Allied Force in 1999, and was appropriate for both PDD-56 and PDD-68. The report concludes that PDD-56, if properly implemented, provides a useful, versatile, and acceptable (across national
security agencies) framework for achieving interagency unity of effort. PDD-68 demands the same attention. Together with the provisions of PDD-56, the framework for successful implementation of IPI is beginning to evolve. One more aspect of interagency complications is that which arises between Department of State with its ambassadors and country teams and the Department of State with its regional commands. Failure to properly plan and conduct IPI across agencies frustrates cohesive regional efforts. This problem illustrates the need for an overarching policy to guide all facets of operations. With the best lessons from developing PDD-56, and the concepts of both PDD-56 and PDD-68 working in concert, the overarching nature of interagency synergy is considered.

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY OBJECTIVES

International public diplomacy fueled by IPI has a vital role to play in foreign policy; especially in the post-cold-war era, when foreign policy is more often delivered or swayed by images transmitted instantly around the globe. IPI is a key instrument, therefore, for preventing and mitigating foreign crises and advancing U.S. interests around the globe. In addition to responding to crisis situations, IPI can effectively promote understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Among the policy objectives IPI will attempt to meet are: addressing misinformation and incitement, mitigating inter-ethnic conflict, promoting independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and supporting democratic participation. A principle policy objective is enhancement of IPI as a foreign policy instrument. As such, special consideration must be given to collection and analysis of foreign public opinion on issues vital to U.S. national interests on a continuing basis. In addition PDD-68 reinforces the need to enhance our ability to utilize all information assets, including those, which reflect new and emerging technologies in an innovative and proactive manner. It is also the policy of the U.S. to promote effective use of IPI by the United Nations and other international organizations in support of multilateral peacekeeping and complex contingency operations, as well as to promote cooperation on international information efforts with key allies around the world.16

President George W. Bush published the first of his National Security Presidential Directives, NSPD-1, on 13 February 2001.17 While it does not address IPI specifically, it sets the stage for expected comprehensive changes to the previous administration's policies regarding foreign policy. By reorganizing the National Security Council (NSC), President Bush has created a forum in which interagency coordination may be more integrated than ever before into IPI activities. NSC Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) will be the day-to-day means
for interagency coordination of national security policy. Presumably this will occur in concert with, or replace, traditional Interagency Working Groups (IWGs).

THE FUTURE AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION

Joint Vision 2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual template established by Joint Vision 2010 to guide the continuing transformation of America’s Armed Forces.\(^1\) The primary purpose of those forces has been, and will be, to fight and win the Nation’s wars. The overall goal of the transformation described in this document is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict. The evolution of these elements over the next two decades will be strongly influenced by two factors. First, the continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations. These changes in the information environment make information superiority a key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control. Second, the US Armed Forces will continue to rely on a capacity for intellectual and technical innovation. The pace of technological change, especially as it fuels changes in the strategic environment, will place a premium on our ability to foster innovation in our people and organizations across the entire range of joint operations. The overall vision of the capabilities we will require in 2020, as introduced above, rests on our assessment of the strategic context in which our forces will operate. Three aspects of the world of 2020 have significant implications for the US Armed Forces.\(^2\) First, the United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. Transportation, communications, and information technology will continue to evolve and foster expanded economic ties and awareness of international events. Our security and economic interests, as well as our political values will provide the impetus for engagement with international partners.

Second, potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base and much of the same technology as the US military. We will not necessarily sustain a wide technological advantage over our adversaries in all areas. Increased availability of commercial satellites, digital communications, and the public Internet all give adversaries new capabilities at a relatively low cost. We should not expect opponents in 2020 to fight with strictly “industrial age” tools. Our advantage must, therefore, come from leaders, people, doctrine, organizations, and training that enable us to take advantage of technology to achieve superior warfighting effectiveness.
Third, we should expect potential adversaries to adapt as our capabilities evolve. We have superior conventional warfighting capabilities and effective nuclear deterrence today, but this favorable military balance is not static. In the face of such strong capabilities, the appeal of asymmetric approaches and the focus on the development of niche capabilities will increase. By developing and using approaches that avoid US strengths and exploit potential vulnerabilities using significantly different methods of operation, adversaries will attempt to create conditions that effectively delay, deter, or counter the application of US military capabilities.

The potential of such asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future – and this danger includes long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to US citizens and territory. The asymmetric methods and objectives of an adversary are often far more important than the relative technological imbalance, and the psychological impact of an attack might far outweigh the actual physical damage inflicted. An adversary may pursue an asymmetric advantage on the tactical, operational, or strategic level by identifying key vulnerabilities and devising asymmetric concepts and capabilities to strike or exploit them. To complicate matters, our adversaries may pursue a combination of asymmetries, or the United States may face a number of adversaries who, in combination, create an asymmetric threat. These asymmetric threats are dynamic and subject to change, and the US Armed Forces must maintain the capabilities necessary to deter, defend against, and defeat any adversary who chooses such an approach. To meet the challenges of the strategic environment in 2020, the joint force must be able to achieve full spectrum dominance. The ultimate goal of our military force is to accomplish the objectives directed by the National Command Authorities. For the joint force of the future, this goal will be achieved through full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations. The goal of achieving full spectrum dominance through such means encompasses all aspects of information dissemination to foreign audiences.  

It is important to note that solving the challenges of information technologies and the ability to leverage them in the future is a key contributor to JV 2020. However, questions remain as to how interagency coordination among key component organizations will progress to meet the needs of IPI in implementing the vision of PDD-68. The evolution of information technology will increasingly permit us to integrate the traditional forms of information operations with sophisticated all-source intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in a fully synchronized
information campaign. The development of a concept labeled the global information grid will provide the network-centric environment required to achieve this goal. The grid will be the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and people to manage and provide information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. It will enhance combat power and contribute to the success of noncombat military operations as well. Realization of the full potential of these changes requires not only technological improvements, but also the continued evolution of organizations and doctrine and the development of relevant training to sustain a comparative advantage in the information environment. JV 2020 clearly makes the point that interagency coordination will be difficult to achieve but is necessary to realizing the full potential described above.

The power of information to move and influence people has changed fundamentally and will continue to evolve dramatically. Even though it is altering the foundations of the world we live in, the information revolution is only beginning. For example, SONY's "Playstation Two" a powerful $300 general purpose computer "toy" built for Internet access, is capable of massive amounts of information processing and storage, and may change the entire process of providing information to people. Add to that the capability of developing nations to move from fixed wire networks to cellular networks, with Internet access in inexpensive personal digital devices, and the entire landscape of personal communication is drastically changing. Wireless communications and the Internet have dramatically changed the way in which IPI dissemination can occur currently and in the future. Targeting can become precise – targeting specific segments of a population or even individuals can be achieved through the Internet, email, personal computers, paging systems, cellular telephones, CD-ROMs, and Video games. All of this is on top of existing television channels, radio stations, and printed media.

In the information age, the challenge of focusing national power may become both more difficult and easier. Since immediate on-scene news reporting will always be present, and is increasingly swift in its delivery to global audiences, the speed of diplomatic responsive activities will need to increase as well. Both government-controlled information systems and the news media may be used irrespective of national boundaries to send information signals directly to national leaders or to their citizens. These information capabilities affect national political processes and thus the interaction between diplomatic and political actions, as always, will have to be carefully orchestrated through interagency coordination. In the future, information technology will likely assume greater significance in focusing national power. Publics will have much greater access to rapidly growing pools of information. Governments will need to ensure that their citizens are exposed to accurate details, and that they can suitably counter opponents'
disinformation or propaganda campaigns. This is essential if they are to create and sustain an internal political consensus that focuses all efforts on achieving national objectives. Strategic orchestration will most likely be significantly more complex in the future, with the revolution in information technologies making a wide array of additional resources available. However, this technology-driven revolution will serve to lessen the difficulties for the interagency strategists to apply the necessary tools of IPI.

The impact of the information revolution is a new phenomenon, but has been felt just long enough to permit a broad assessment of its effects on U.S. national security and the interagency implications. The rapid growth of processing of data and sharing of knowledge is beneficial in several ways. First, it improves the international security environment by spreading ideals of freedom and democracy, putting oppressive state power on the defensive or out of business, and helps long-poor societies modernize. Second, it enhances the power of the U.S. at the expense of nations opposed to its principles and interests, by increasing the strategic value of free markets, sciences, and technology. The risk in that is from terrorist organizations and rogue states. Finally, it alters warfare in a way that will allow the U.S. to protect its interests and international peace at an acceptable risk, even considering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These trends should continue if pursued through interagency efforts, strengthened by IPI, and reinforced by orchestrated policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATION OF INTERAGENCY SYNERGY BY IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION

The establishment of the International Public Information Interagency Core Group (ICG) in conjunction with the signing of PDD-68 on 30 April 1999 offered an opportunity to make some strong recommendations from a variety of sources. While PDD-56 had shown some utility in providing interagency coordination, it did not adequately provide for communicating the messages of the U.S. to foreign audiences. Prior to PDD-68, the Interagency Peacekeeping Core Group established an International Public Information Sub-Group in December 1997. The purpose of this sub-group was to make assessments and recommendations regarding IPI. During the course of its assessment period, the sub-group became involved in strategic PSYOP and IPI activities in Rwanda, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Counter-Terrorist measures. The sub-group was also able to assess past IPI activity from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Haiti, Rwanda, and Iraq. The experience gained during this period of six months enabled the IPI sub-group to make some conclusions and recommendations: First, while somewhat limited, past IPI activity was generally successful. Second, IPI should have a
strategic perspective, not just regional. Third, there must be a standing IPI Core Group, not simply an ad hoc group thrown together in a time of crisis. Fourth, NSC level of involvement is necessary for successful IPI. Fifth, there was a strong need for a policy document to codify the all-important IPI process. These recommendations preceded the establishment of PDD-68 in April of 1999. Since the publishing of PDD-68, the information activities in Operation Allied Force have illustrated further recommendations encompassed in improving interagency and IPI efforts.

Serving as Chair of the IPI Core Group is the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The National Security Council provides the Deputy. PDD-68 demonstrates some vision in coordinated interagency issues, directing development of a National Information Strategy (NIS) to address regional and transnational issues such as Counter-Proliferation, Counter-Drug, and Counter-Terrorism. By including direction relative to such diverse issues, PDD-68 integrates IPI into a wide range of inter-related activities. Included in the charter of the ICG is the specification of integrating IPI perspectives into foreign policy as well. By incorporating IPI into all realms of foreign policy, the realization of greater interagency synergy can be more easily achieved.

Similar to the provisions of PDD-56, PDD-68 appropriately calls for a requirement for training across the interagency spectrum to ensure efficient execution and interoperability when disseminating IPI. Each agency involved in IPI should be required to identify, train, and equip personnel to conduct IPI activities. As mentioned above, several other PDD’s are inextricably interwoven with PDD-68 and IPI. Such issues as international crime, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, all require a more cohesive relationship with IPI. DoD deliberate and contingency plans do not generally address IPI in any annexes. PSYOP is generally included, and to some extent information operations, but IPI must specifically be integrated into all levels of planning. This will help to ensure that interagency strategy is coordinated with military activities.

A variety of recommendations are obviously inherent in the development of PDD-68 and the efforts of the ICG to implement its objectives. By creating a dedicated staff of ICG personnel under Department of State, IPI will develop continuity that is precious to interagency synergy. Similarly, DoD should continue to emphasize the creation of staff officer positions focusing on IPI at a variety of levels, for the same reasons. By dictating that PDD-68 and its activities operate under PDD-2, the intent of establishing interagency process guidelines is met. However, the continuity across presidential administrations must be considered important to the success of IPI as well. In development of U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military
Strategy, it is essential that IPI be integrated to reinforce policy. Interaction with appropriate international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is vital to ensuring IPI success because of their increasing stature in global activities. The promotion of IPI efforts in multilateral peacekeeping and complex contingency operations is also a key element to consider in integrating IPI, and it reinforces the complementary nature of the various PDD’s.

Because of the concern for lack of proper IPI integration in Operation Allied Force, some recommendations specifically tailored to that arena are appropriate. The content of IPI products and dissemination through military means were less effective than commercial capabilities, and should be immediately addressed to take full advantage of commercial technologies available now and in the future. Reaching sophisticated foreign audiences takes increasingly more sophisticated media. The production of such IPI media is a key element to the success of the overall IPI objectives. A major acquisition effort and the corresponding funding are required to address the delivery mechanisms necessary to disseminate IPI products in the future. The acquisition of technical capabilities to reach foreign audiences should be one of the most important goals of IPI. To do so requires the full spectrum of interagency cooperation, and will provide the synergy required to deliver synchronized IPI to project U.S. information abroad. If IPI is to be a valuable tool in the future, it must be a versatile asset capable of delivering accurate information quickly, to the right audience, and in a way that is technologically as sophisticated as any adversaries or competitors in the region. A relatively small investment in IPI can reap great rewards for the United States and its allies, both militarily and diplomatically.
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid., 36.


9 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


19 Ibid., 5.

20 Ibid., 19.

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