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ARMY SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE: SUPPORTING THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

BY

COLONEL STUART PIKE
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Army Special Forces Doctrine: Supporting The Objective Force

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines Army Special Forces doctrine and compares it to the requirements of the Objective Force. It then makes recommendations for changes to Special Forces doctrine.

The discussion begins with a review of the missions assigned to USCINCSOC by Section 167, Chapter 6, Title X of the U. S. Code. Once the special operations missions mandated by Congress are identified, the context of the Objective Force – the world as it may exist in 2030 – is postulated. It is cooperative security as described by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross in *Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategies*. The doctrinal tenants of likely adversaries are briefly discussed; they are based on the projections of MG Robert H. Scales, Jr. (Ret.) in *America’s Army in Transition: Preparing for War in the Precision Age*. The *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* are also examined. The tenets of U.S. strategy described in those documents are carried into the future largely unchanged. The capabilities and requirements of the Objective Force are painted in broad strokes; the details are not discussed. The biggest doctrinal difference for the Objective Force is in how the force will see the battlefield. The leaders of the Legacy Force make contact, develop the situation and maneuver their forces. Leaders of the Objective Force will *understand the situation*, move their forces and then make contact.

U.S. Special Forces doctrine is examined and compared to probable Objective Force requirements. The major mismatch is in the area of timely information and intelligence. The paper closes by recommending a number of changes to existing Special Forces doctrine. The recommendations include updating Army Special Forces doctrinal publications to use uniform verbiage; eliminate vague phraseology and subordinating all Special Forces missions to Unconventional Warfare.
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ARMY SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE: SUPPORTING THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The changing world security environment is transforming the way we fight. Powered by the phenomenon of globalization, developed and developing countries are more sensitive to the effects of regional and ethnic armed conflict and more interested in their prompt resolution. The operational environment is shifting towards a complex, urban noncontiguous battlefield as standoff precision weapons relegate the open massing of armor to history. Government coalitions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and the media are contributing to the increase in non-traditional demands presented to our Army across the spectrum of operations. In meeting these demands, often in places we have historically regarded as unimportant, we have realized that our cold war force is so heavy that a simple lack of infrastructure can deny its entry. It is also apparent that we have entered many of these conflicts with a less-than-perfect understanding of the nature of the conflicts themselves. In most instances we have achieved conflict termination but our success in conflict resolution has been qualified at best. How can Special Forces (SF) prepare for the uncertain future? This paper examines the requirements of the Objective Force (OF) and the role that SF will play in supporting it.

HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

COL Bill Doriovan had an idea: use specially selected and trained individuals in small teams to gather intelligence, conduct sabotage and organize indigenous forces to act as surrogate forces. In the crucible of WWII, this was fully supported by the Commander-in-Chief and the War Department, and the exploits of the Jedburgh teams are well known. After the war, COL Donovan's intelligence collecting organization was reorganized to form the CIA. Only with the formation of 10th Special Forces Group in 1952 did doctrine for unconventional warfare re-emerge in the Army.

Aaron Bank was building an unconventional warfare capability focused on Europe and the containment of the Soviet Union. The 10th Group's tremendous language and cultural skills were, in no small part, due to the Lodge Act of 1950. The Lodge Act, sponsored by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., offered citizenship for 12,000 foreign nationals provided they join the Army and serve for 5 years. This farsighted policy provided skilled manpower for the rapid expansion of the U.S. Army. For Arron Bank and SF it meant an unprecedented supply of native speakers seeking to escape their homelands as they came under Soviet control after WWII. The standoff in Europe, the Korean War and the increasing involvement in Southeast Asia meant that the coming decades would be anything but "cold" for SF.

In 1963 the Army created Special Action Forces (SAF). These forces were specially trained, regionally oriented and focused on counterinsurgency. In practice they were SF Groups augmented by detachments from such units as Military Police, Medical, Military Intelligence, Signal, Engineer, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs specialists in public health, education, sanitation, civil administration, public works and forestry. Four SAF were created oriented on the Far East, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. SAF Latin America was most active with 7th Group. The SAF became victims of the draw down of Special Operations Forces (SOF) at the end of the Vietnam War.
Special Forces has demonstrated its usefulness in stability operations and conflict resolution most recently in the Balkans. In an environment where SF Operational Detachments (ODA) can operate openly and with the support (or at least tacit acceptance) of all parties to the conflict, SF soldiers have demonstrated once again their cultural understanding and even-handed approach. More notably, in this environment the Special Forces Groups are also beginning to dust off some of the doctrine of the old Unconventional Warfare “Area Command.” Collating information, identifying gaps and putting together influence diagrams have focused the efforts of the Joint Commissioned Observers (JCO) Teams and provided a valuable product for the Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR). Understanding local politics is at the core of the effort, and the methodology to understand, record and communicate the needs and results has been developed. This unconventional operation assists in gaining timely support for negotiating positions in anticipation of political decisions. This is a force multiplier in the sense that local political intent is being gauged and when possible support is solicited for CINC objectives. It must be emphasized that this is being accomplished in a permissive environment in an overt fashion.

DIRECTION FROM CONGRESS - THE LAW

SECTION 167, CHAPTER 6, TITLE X, U.S. CODE

An examination of SF doctrine must start with a legal review of the U.S. SOCOM mission. Specifically, one must review the U.S. SOCOM tasks mandated by law. Section 167 provides a specific list of the special operations missions for which USCINCSOC is responsible. These are:

- Direct Action (DA),
- Strategic Reconnaissance (SR),
- Unconventional Warfare (UW),
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID),
- Civil Affairs (CA),
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP),
- Counterterrorism (CT),
- Humanitarian Assistance (HA),
- Theater Search and Rescue and
- Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

These missions represent the superset from which the five doctrinal SF missions described in FM 31-20 are drawn: DA, SR, UW, FID and CT.

Organizational structures for U.S. support to insurgencies can be overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, “U.S. Intelligence Activities,” and is subject to approval by the U.S. Congress.
THE FUTURE WORLD

The United States, due to its stature in the world today, will shape the world of tomorrow. Clearly, a neo-isolationist U.S. will mold a different future world than a hegemonic U.S. seeking primacy. Given the broad future world options of neo-colonialism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy\(^4\), I have selected cooperative security as the most likely future world scenario. Cooperative security is based on the premise that peace is indivisible and therefore presents an expansive conception of U.S. interests. Westphalian nation-states will address international security concerns through international institutions as much as possible. This view presumes that democracies are unlikely to fight democracies and subscribes to the premise of strategic interdependence. The economic interdependencies of globalization will reduce the likelihood of armed conflict between beneficiaries but will amplify the effects of violent acts by transnational actors and rogue states. Regional conflict, ethnic cleansing, WMD, terrorism and international crime will impact every participant in the global community. Cooperative security promises a global response; it supports global economics with global security institutions. Violations of the universally acknowledged rights of nation-states (cross-border conflicts, wars of aggression) will be universally condemned. More contentious issues such as gross violations of human rights, terrorism and criminal activity (e.g., narcotics trafficking and large scale destruction of the environment) will remain the principle challenge for cooperative security institutions. Obtaining international consensus will be difficult when nation states grapple with the inconsistencies associated with violating the sovereignty of other nation states in the absence of external aggression or obvious complicity. The nation(s) most impacted by the second and third order effects of these contentious issues will react and may field a unilateral military response or create an ad-hoc coalition. The preferred tool of cooperative security - rapid decisive operations (RDO) - will be ill suited for many of the challenges presented by these gray issues.

In 2030, the United States will still hold the technological lead. The U.S. Government, backed by a powerful economy, will continue to contribute the highest percentage of GDP in the developed world to its Department of Defense. National Missile Defense (NMD) or some variant will be functional and deployed. Many fires will be precision and remotely launched. Improved sensors will gather a wider range of more detailed information. Artificial intelligence will be able to take the place of a human for some platform operation. Improving technology will translate into increased standoff capabilities, precision and lethality. In the OF, fewer soldiers will manage more firepower. Their success (and survival) will be dependent upon near perfect situational awareness and the technologies necessary to communicate it.

DOCTRINAL TENANTS OF FUTURE WORLD ADVERSARIES

Presented with these formidable capabilities, our adversaries in developing and underdeveloped nations will adopt a simple but sophisticated response. Surrender the vertical battlespace. Avoid the precision fires through dispersion, camouflage and deception. Leverage the superior intelligence gathering capabilities that the home-field advantage provides. Mass at the last possible moment and disperse immediately after an engagement. Time and patience are, and will continue to be, an effective
response to technology and precision. A patient opponent will leverage operational stalemate to achieve strategic victory.

RANGE OF OPERATIONS

![Graph showing range of operations]

**FIGURE 1, RANGE OF OPERATIONS**

Figure 1 depicts the Range of Operations as depicted in the Draft U.S. Army FM 3-0, Operations. In this graphic any military mission (Offense, Defense, Stability and Support) can be conducted in support of any of the General U.S. Goals – Fight and Win War, Deter War and Resolve Conflict and Promote Peace in any operational environment: Peacetime Military Engagement, Smaller Scale Contingencies and Major Theater War.

**GUIDANCE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH – THE NSS AND THE NMS**

**The National Security Council**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) will remain stable. The survival of the U.S., the protection of our friends, and the promotion of our values will remain the cornerstone of U.S. national strategy. Our fundamental strengths relative to the rest of the world will not change. We will remain wealthy, continue to devote a large percentage of our Gross Domestic Product to defense and still enjoy the technological edge we enjoy today. The disparity between the richest and poorest countries will continue to grow, in some cases dramatically. The maintenance of the environment will occupy a larger portion of our energies. Internationally, we will return to a bipolar or multipolar world responding to issues on the basis of cooperative security. A review of the current NSS yields the following list of implied tasks for SF that is unlikely to change in the next 30 years:

- Develop comprehensive analytic capabilities.
- Develop improved intelligence collection capabilities.
- Maintain overseas presence.
- Maintain demonstrated ability to form and lead effective military coalitions.
- Be prepared to respond to the full range of threats to U.S. interests abroad.
- Be prepared to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means. Because of U.S. conventional military dominance, adversaries are likely to use asymmetric means, such as WMD, information operations or terrorism.
- Maintain regional expertise, language proficiency, and cross-cultural communications skills – they have never been more important to the U.S. military.⁶

**National Command Authorities Guidance**

Our fundamental National Military Objectives will also remain unchanged. We will continue to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, defeat adversaries. Our activities will encompass the full spectrum of military operations from Peace Operations to high intensity nuclear conflict. Today’s National Military Strategy (NMS) describes three strategic concepts that govern the use of our forces to meet the demands of the strategic environment: Strategic agility, power projection and decisive force. These will not change in the short and mid-term (through the Interim Force). While strategic agility and power projection will remain central to our strategy, the OF will permit us to replace the construct of **decisive force with precise force**.

**DOCTRINAL TENANTS OF THE INTERIM FORCE (IF) AND OBJECTIVE FORCE (OF)**

Transformation is an uncertain process. GEN Shinseki’s guidance is vague; the OF must be capable of fielding a brigade in 96 hours and a 5 divisions in 30 days to a spot anywhere in the world and conduct sustained operations across the spectrum of operations. This tasking has been articulated as requiring a set of agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable and maneuverable platforms that require fewer soldiers, less lift and less support. The difference goes beyond the simple physics of the equation. The leaders of today’s Legacy Force (LF) make contact, develop the situation and maneuver their forces. Leaders of the OF will fight differently: they will **understand the situation**, move their forces and then make contact. Consider the following formulae:

- Situational Understanding = (intelligence + knowledge of friendly unit status)
- Combat Power = (maneuver + firepower + leadership)(situational understanding)

Examining these equations we see that most of the derivatives of combat power have not changed. Maneuver, firepower and leadership are all familiar parts of the combat equation. Like any military, we understand these and we are structured to create them. Situational understanding, however, is a new multiplier in this equation. The difference between **develop the situation** and **understand the situation** is profound. It has moved the understanding of the situational temporally from an activity conducted during combat to a prerequisite for deployment. No longer in the hands of the tactical or operational commander, it is derived from the friendly situation and intelligence normally provided by third party(s). In its best form it will give the commander the ability to limit casualties, see and expand the battlefield, and position the highly lethal, mobile combat elements of the OF to win quickly. Conversely, the absence of it will negate the combat power and possibly destroy the OF.
From the vantage point of a task force commander it means that national intelligence assets must produce and deliver timely, accurate and complete intelligence from initial alert to final recovery regardless of the duration of the mission.

Needless to say, this will be a difficult task for our national intelligence community. Gaps in the collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence will have second- and third-order effects that have the potential for national disaster. The intelligence support required by OF commanders will be the Achilles Heel, the point of asymmetric attack, the center of gravity for the OF.

And it is here that SF should focus its efforts. SF operating in an UW environment can provide timely intelligence to support the OF Commander. If the SF community prepares properly, the CINC will have an invaluable strategic tool at their disposal: SF teams capable of conducting the indirect activity of intelligence collection. SF cadre operating in a UW environment prior to open hostilities will substantially improve the chances of success for the OF anywhere in the world. Existing UW doctrine is contradictory and confusing.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE TODAY

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE AS PRESENTED BY USSOCOM PUBLICATIONS

As mentioned above, USCINCSOC is tasked by Congress to provide trained forces for special operations. He is also responsible for creating the doctrine necessary to support those activities. In doing so, the organizations he has tasked to maintain doctrine have created a distinction between direct special operations and indirect special operations. Direct special operations include DA, SR, CT and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP). Indirect action special operations includes CA, PSYOP, UW, FID and anti-terrorism.

USCINCSOC also discriminates between peacetime and wartime activities. Peacetime activities include but are not limited to Arms Control, CT, Counterdrug (CD), FID, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Civil Support Operations, Peace Operations and support to Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Wartime activities include but are not limited to FID, UW, CT, DA and SR. The necessity and advisability of these doctrinal categorizations is unclear. While some activities are listed in both peacetime and in war, some are exclusively in the realm of one status or the other. Left undefined are the terms war and wartime. Is a declaration of war required to have a war? Is armed conflict required? Special Operations doctrine is silent on this question. The qualification include but are not limited to further dilutes the meaning of these statements. It is clear that the terms peacetime and wartime need to be reviewed and defined or eliminated. There is room for clarification in these terms. Are they meant to limit the application and use of certain Special Operations missions such as UW? The surrogate nature of UW means it is often conducted in the absence of a declared conflict.

The United States has not fought in a declared war since WWII. It is unlikely we will do so again in the near-or mid-term. Does this mean that UW, DA and SR are tools not available to us in times of conflict but short of declared war? Clearly not; one can find many examples of the use of DA and SR in the post
WWII world. The doctrinal insistence on classifying certain types of special operations missions based on the legal status between the combatants is at best confusing. In the worst case it can be interpreted as an argument to prevent the use of UW and other special operations capabilities in peacetime.

To confuse things, there is a circular logic associated with UW doctrine. FM 31-20 states “Armed resistance provides UW with its environmental context”. The USCINCSOC says peacetime operations include Support to Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies - and UW and PSYOP are used to support insurgencies. So USCINCSOC states that UW has a peacetime role while FM 31-20 says armed resistance (i.e. combat of some type) is a requirement to conduct UW. Joint Pub 3-05-3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, supports FM 31-20 by stating that UW may occur within the context of conflict or war. We have allowed the changing definitions of peace and war to obfuscate the doctrinal application of UW.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

The discussion in Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, is simple: the function of USSOCOM is to train, equip, and provide combat-ready forces for the conduct of special operations--specifically unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism.

Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, uses the SF mission of SR to collect intelligence. No mention is made of UW other than to be sure and analyze and produce intelligence on adversary's UW capabilities. One of the indirect activities of UW, intelligence activities, apparently is not recognized by the Intelligence community.

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, uses Special Operations to prepare the battlefield by gathering intelligence using Special Reconnaissance or “other HUMINT operations.”

Joint Pub 3-0 also states that typical post conflict activities includes intelligence gathering. This is a special operations mission in a Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) environment. Furthermore, it lists support to insurgencies as a type of operation other than war in which U.S. forces train insurgent forces on UW tactics, techniques and procedures.

Joint Pub 3-05-3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, states that UW may occur within the context of conflict or war.

U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUALS

The draft of FM 3-0, Operations introduces a new set of terms: Offensive, defensive, stability and support.

UW applies to offense, defense and stability operations. Stability operations may be conducted before hostilities, in crises, during hostilities, and after hostilities. Stability operations are purported to exist across the spectrum of operations (Figure 1-1, Range of Army Operations) and Chapter 9 states that the Army conducts 10 types of stability operations:


Peace Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Support to Insurgencies, CD, Combating Terrorism, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Arms Control and Show of Force. As we have seen earlier, “support to insurgency” is a euphemism for UW.

According to FM 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces are responsible for the following missions:

1. Unconventional Warfare and the indirect activities of
   a. Guerrilla Warfare (GW)
   b. Subversion
   c. Sabotage
   d. Intelligence Collection
   e. Evasion & Escape (E&E)

2. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
3. Direct Action (DA)
4. Special Reconnaissance (SR)
5. Counterterrorism (CT)

“Armed resistance provides Unconventional Warfare with its environmental context” and includes Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion & Escape, subversion and sabotage. “In Unconventional Warfare, intelligence collection is designed to collect and report information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of the established government, or occupying power, and its external sponsors. In this context, intelligence collection includes both offensive and defensive low-level source operations.”

The only mention of UW in the SOF Posture Statement 2000 is associated with the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF) and the Republic of Korea. In the section titled “Shaping Tomorrow’s SOF” evolving capabilities are discussed. They are listed in three broad categories: Surgical strike and recovery (listed as “SOF’s highest priority”), SR and Political-Military Operations. Political-Military Operations are defined as FID, PSYOP, CA, HA, “responding to natural disasters”, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and “operating as a vanguard for conventional military forces.”

“Desired Operational Capabilities” is a category in the SOF Posture Statement 2000. These capabilities are defined as the means to carry out the objectives of the flagship capabilities. They are:

- **Personnel survivability** – improve the survivability of personnel operating in hostile areas
- **Counter WMD** – improve the capability to perform SOF CP missions
- **Mobility in denied areas** – improve the capability to conduct undetectable ground, air, sea, and (possibly) space mobility operations in areas conventional forces are denied
- **Recruitment and leader development** – improve the capability to recruit, select, assess, train, and retain SOF leaders with strong legal, ethical and moral foundations
- **Information avenues** – improve effective use of information technologies across a wide range of SOF capabilities
- **Sensory enhancements** – improve capability to augment human sensory systems to provide increased performance
- **Organizational design** – improve the ability of the SOF organizational structure to integrate, operate, and sustain activities with DoD forces, and national and international agencies
- **Space and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) utilization** – improve capability to fully interface and operate within the space surveillance network
- **Remote reconnaissance** – improve the capability to utilize advances in technology for remote reconnaissance and mission situational awareness
- **Versatile weapons** – improve multi-role/multi-purpose weapons with target discrimination and broader range of effects.

This list is noteworthy in that it is focused on the use of technology to service targets as opposed to the traditional SF skills associated with cultural awareness and the human dimension of conflict.

The chief SOF flagship capabilities (to support the desired operational capabilities) are:

- **Ubiquitous Presence.** Combat-ready SOF units are routinely deployed around the world to support peacetime engagement and to prevent conflict. Should conflict arise, these global scouts can quickly transition to combat operations and spearhead a decisive victory.
- **Strategic Agility.** SOF will provide greater strategic and operational agility through the development of a more flexible and responsive force structure. The key elements to this structure are maintaining an unparalleled national mission capability and developing more robust theater special operations commands (SOC).
- **Global Access.** Although theater engagement provides SOF access to most parts of the world, SOF must retain the capability to go where U.S. forces are unwelcome. The capability to conduct clandestine operations anywhere in the world in support of the National Command Authorities (NCA) or theater CINC is one of the defining attributes of SOF.
- **Information Dominance.** The information age has opened up a wide range of new opportunities, seemingly endless possibilities, and significant vulnerabilities for all military forces, SOF included. Accordingly, USCINCSOC is examining new ways to enhance SOF capabilities to ensure uninterrupted information exchange, reduce an adversary’s ability to use information, and influence situations to support mission accomplishment.

**ARE THERE ANY MISMATCHES?**

A graphical comparison of the doctrinal publications concerning SOF and SF is revealing.

USSOCOM Pub 1 separates SOF activities into three categories: missions, collateral activities and peacetime operations. Thirteen publications were examined. Eight were Joint Pubs, three were Army Field Manuals and two were USSOCOM Pubs: USSOCOM Pub 1 and the SOF Posture Statement 2000.
I created a matrix with SF missions on the X axis and publications on the Y axis. Every time a publication referenced missions, collateral activities or peacetime operations in a SF, Army Special Operation Forces or Special Operation Forces context, I placed an ‘X’ where that publication and a mission, collateral activity or peacetime operation intersected.

I also selected a subset of six publications that should directly define SOF and SF doctrine and sorted them by date of publication from oldest to newest: FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (1990); Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (1993); US SOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations in Peace and War (1996); Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (1998); Joint Pub 1-02, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (1999) and the Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2000 (2000).

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**TABLE 1, PRIMARY SPECIAL FORCES MISSIONS**

Fortunately, there is universal agreement on the following three SF missions: DA, SR and FID. Interestingly, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, directly references DA, SR and FID but only obliquely references unconventional warfare vis-à-vis insurgency – “Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF...” 20
Unconventional warfare is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as including guerrilla warfare and the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and escape & evasion. Guerrilla warfare and the indirect activities are fully articulated in USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, but curiously absent from the USSOCOM publication, the Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2000.

On UW and the remainder of SOF and SF missions, collateral activities and peacetime operations our Service and joint publications reflect a myriad of inconsistencies. Some of the inconsistencies are no doubt due to the normal evolution of doctrine, but in other cases missions, collateral activities and peacetime operations appear; disappear and then reappear in separate publications over time (CP, command and control warfare, coalition support, HA, arms control, NEO, etc). In a number of cases missions, collateral activities and peacetime operations become intermixed or confused with non-SOF missions (Information Warfare vice Information Operations, CBT vice CT vice Antiterrorism, HA vice Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Combat Search and Rescue vice Personnel Recovery vice Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Demining vice Countermine Activities, CD vice Counternarcotics).

Inconsistencies abound with respect to UW, insurgency and counterinsurgency. In USSOCOM Pub 1, insurgency is a peacetime operation that is supported by the SOF missions of UW and PSYOP. In FM 31-20, an insurgency has three phases and transitions from peacetime to conflict to war in the forms of incipient insurgency, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare. According to Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Joint Pub 3-0 further muddies the waters by providing the following ‘clarification’ on MOOTW: “Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force: Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains U.S. influence in foreign lands. Such operations include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, arms control, support to U.S. domestic civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping.”

Finally, a discussion about time is appropriate. The Chief of Staff of the Army is taking great pains to compress the timelines required to deploy and fight the OF. This has a very important implication for SF - the Army will be more reliant on Special Force’s capability to act as global scouts. The commander of the OF will need robust intelligence prior to his arrival on the battlefield. Since doctrine states the OF commander must understand the situation prior to entry and a brigade of the OF can be on the ground and operational within 96 hours of notification, simple logic dictates that the OF brigade will need access to informed U.S. military in the region to begin building situational awareness immediately upon notification. SF should actively seek this forward role and fulfill it using UW to achieve the required economy of force. In the event these feeds are required but not on the ground at the time the OF is notified, the timelines for SF mission planning will be compressed to doctrinal minimums and the ability for
SF to contribute to the Objective Force Commander’s situational understanding prior to his arrival will be greatly diminished.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE.

1. Rewrite the doctrinal definition of UW and expand its use. The application of SF should mean, by definition, the application of UW. DA, SR, FID, CT, Subversion, Sabotage, Guerrilla Warfare and Intelligence Collection should all be subordinate to UW. Furthermore, UW should be applicable across the range of operations: offensive, defensive and stability and support. The long term presence of SF in broad geographical regions should be written in to USSOCOM doctrine as an economy of force measure required to support U.S. interests including the introduction of the OF. The conduct of SF missions should be predicated on national interests and not constrained by doctrine to require the presence (or absence) of conflict or war.

2. Harmonize USSOCOM doctrine. Change USSOCOM publications so that they all carry the same definitions. Work with the Joint community to eliminate vague phrases like “other HUMINT operations.” on page IV-2, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations.

3. Continue to refine the abbreviated mission planning process.

4. Finally, USCINCSOC should articulate the need for a new Lodge Act. If passed, this proven concept will improve the ability of SF to conduct long-term forward operations in support of the OF and national interests as we move into the 21st century.

WORD COUNT = 4827.
ENDNOTES


2 Title 10, Armed Forces, U.S. Code, Section 167


7 United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations in Peace and War. (MacDill AFB, FL.: United States Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996) 1-4


12 Ibid., V-6


16 Ibid., 3-2

17 Ibid.

ibid., 34.

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