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UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE BRAHIMI REPORT

BY

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ABSTRACT

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FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 2001 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The purpose of this paper is to assess the Brahimi Report focused specifically on the question if the recommendations of the Panel will make the United Nations again a credible peace operations organization, given the challenges of the future. The scope of this research is the peacekeeping part of a nationbuilding effort that is executed by military forces. The paper defines the future challenge as complex peacekeeping in failing or failed states. It discusses the Reports recommendations concerning peacekeeping doctrine and strategy, mission planning, including mandate, troop levels, unity of effort and communications with troop contributing nations, intelligence, quality of forces and readiness and UN Headquarters support.

The analysis is done by comparing the recommendations with lessons learned in similar operations, and the U.S and NATO Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations doctrines.
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UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE BRAHIMI REPORT

After the disasters of the mid-1990s, including the failure of United Nations (UN) to prevent the genocide in Rwanda or the massacres in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN member states largely turned away from the Organization for major peacekeeping initiatives. Between 1995 and 1999, the UN launched one robust operation in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia and a police-monitoring mission in Bosnia. Both were backed up by the military power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The remaining new efforts were small observer missions. This relative fallow period could have been viewed as breathing space to correct the more obvious problems with UN peacekeeping. However, there seemed to be little interest on the part of the member states to invest more time and money in what was assumed in many quarters to be a failed enterprise. Funders’ arrears mounted and the budget for the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was reduced, and military planning personnel loaned to the UN by member states departed en masse. Modest lessons learned reports were written and filed, but the tears in the UN peacekeeping fabric were left largely unmended.

In 1999, the UN was suddenly called upon, in rapid succession, to administer Kosovo under the protection of NATO; to replace Australia-led INTERFET; to replace Nigeria-led ECOMOG in Sierra Leone; and finally, to oversee a shaky cease-fire in the vast Democratic Republic of Congo. The elements of the UN Secretariat responsible for peacekeeping were at this time under funded, understaffed, unprepared to run a country, and not up to dealing with the ruthless factions who passed for signatories, such as Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front.¹

Clearly, something had to be done to better match UN capabilities to the operational tasks being handed to the Organization. The basic choice was to do these operations right or not to do them at all. The twin assumptions of the mid 1990s – that the United Nations would not again be called upon to undertake tough missions and that regional organizations could handle all elements of such missions – seem to have been proven wrong by the increase in operations in 1999-2000. If that is the case the UN must be prepared; the Security Council must understand what the UN is and is not capable of doing; and new missions must reflect that understanding.² To this end UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan on March 7, 2000 convened a high-level panel chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi to undertake a thorough review of the UN’s peace and security activities.³ The panel delivered the so-called Brahimi Report on August 23, 2000.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the Brahimi Report focusing specifically on whether implementing the recommendations of the report will make the United Nations again a credible peace operations organization. The scope of this research is the peacekeeping part of a nation-building operation executed by military forces. It will discuss the Panel's recommendations concerning peacekeeping doctrine and strategy, mission planning, mandate, troop levels, communication with troop-contributing nations, intelligence, readiness and quality of forces, and UN Headquarters support. Analysis will compare the recommendations with lessons learned in similar operations and the U.S and NATO Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations doctrines.

**FUTURE CHALLENGES**

Peacekeeping is a term applied to many different situations, from Cyprus to Somalia and everywhere in between, with a very diverse range of tasks.

The international conflicts are the ones that traditionally the UN had to deal with earlier in its history. They were basically a struggle between two countries over territory. The job of the UN was to get between the warring parties after a cease-fire, to control or at least patrol the contested territory, build confidence and allow time for a line to be drawn on the map dividing that territory.

Today there are very few examples of those types of conflicts. The problem the world and the UN face today is conflicts and wars within a state over political power. These are normally in the Third World, where one cannot divide power easily.

A study conducted by the National Strategy Information Center suggests there are three main components to the problem of increasing global ungovernability leading to failed states.

First, there is the growth of transnational organized crime. Criminal elements have expanded their reach, upgraded and perfected their methods of operation, and increasingly established links that cut across borders and entire regions of the globe. Second, the explosive resurgence and growth of ethnic and religious conflicts have fueled the pressure towards further fragmentation within countries. Moreover, the apparent intractability of ethnic and religious differences contributes to the erosion of effective government and of public confidence in government. Third, general trends and developments in economic and financial markets, and pervasive influence of technology have also eroded the effectiveness of formal governments to perform those tasks essential to the orderly functioning of society.

The end of colonialism and the end of the Cold War have created a growing number of weak, failing, or failed states in which formal authorities compete with a variety of opposition forces. Subnational, transnational and decentralized groups compete with many formal
governments for the loyalties of individuals. The widening gap between the haves and have-nots, both within and across countries, has provided fertile soil for sowing seeds of dissatisfaction and fostering a search for simple alternatives. Frustrated by the inability of governments to help, people may turn away from the sovereign state and embrace smaller, more effective groups.\(^5\)

The problem of failed states has led to civil war type conflicts, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Congo, East Timor and Colombia. When there is a UN SC decision to intervene on a basis of a peace agreement, the UN is faced with tasks such as assembling and demobilizing factions' troops; reintegrating factions' soldiers into civil society; forming a new army along western lines with a sense of accountability and values; de-mining; building a judicial system; establishing the basis for a sustainable political and economic system; and holding elections to choose a legitimate leader. This is the most frequent challenge the UN faces today and in the future. The Brahimi Report calls this complex peacekeeping.

**THE BRAHIMI REPORT**

**Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy**

The Report states that once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully; and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renge on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.\(^6\)

John R. Bolton makes the point that although the Report's doctrinal section begins by reaffirming the traditional preconditions for successful peacekeeping -- "consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self defense", the Report later can be perceived to disregard all of them.

First, the Report lists examples where the local parties can manipulate consent, and where the UN has been unable to respond effectively to such challenges. Secondly, the Report defines impartiality to mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to UN mandates rooted in those principles. Third, the report rejects the symbolic and non-threatening force structures of traditional peacekeeping in favor of bigger forces, better equipped and more costly that will pose a credible deterrent effect and which will have a robust force posture and robust rules of engagement.\(^7\)

Dr. William J. Duff suggests that the Panel's point is that if you think there is a risk of violent challenge when implementing a peace on behalf of the survivors of a civil war, factions
may break off and form new factions that had nothing to do with signing the peace accord. In a complex peacekeeping situation, if the peacekeepers cannot defend themselves and the peace accord, the mission should not be executed in the first place.\(^8\)

NATO's prescription of PKO with respect to consent and use of force states that the strategic and operational level consent comes from formal agreements by recognized parties and is relative stable. At the tactical level, consent does not mean universal approval for every action, but it does involve a general public attitude that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents a basis for cooperation. This has implications for the degree to which force can be used. Impartiality does not limit peacekeepers' intervention against grave violations of human rights. Force can be used where local opinion supports its use, for example, against banditry or looting. Use of force must, however, always be restrictive and cautious.\(^9\)

Traditional peacekeeping as discussed above had some very clear and distinctive characteristics. Among them were: consent of all local parties to the conflict, especially the host nation; impartiality of peacekeeping forces; no "great power" contributing to the forces; limited missions; and use of force for self defense only.

Dr. Robert H. Dorff argues that complex peacekeeping in a failed state conflict, the future challenge, is a very different mission.

First, because failed states typically lack effective governance; serious questions arise about consent of the parties to the conflict. Moreover, in such an environment it may be difficult to discern just who the parties to the conflict are. The cast of characters may ebb and flow as the conflict unfolds. Similarly, there are likely to be real problems with command and control for the parties to the conflict; one might obtain consent only to find that the leaders who offered it have no effective means of implementing and enforcing that consent down the line. Second, impartiality may be desirable in theory, but in this environment it may be impossible to maintain because some actors will be motivated to tear down whatever institutions and processes of governance exist. By being enemies of everything, they will make it extremely difficult for peacekeeping force to be impartial; if the force is there simply to restore order, those who favor disorder will not see it as impartial. Third, in cases of clear breaches of the mandate, the flouting of international law and the abuse of human rights, the use of force, if authorized by the ROE, may serve to enhance the credibility of the peacekeepers and the consent for the operation nationally and internationally.\(^10\)

This point can also be underlined by incidents and use of force during the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia. Serb forces in the Tuzla area fired upon a Danish, UNPROFOR tank company protecting a UN convoy. To protect the convoy and themselves they disregarded the ROE and attacked the Serb positions, neutralizing the threat and killing at least six Serbs. The
Danes were later criticized for not keeping to the ROE and the mandate, but they were never harassed and fired upon by the Serbs after that incident.\textsuperscript{11}

A capable military peacekeeping force willing to use force is more likely to deter the local parties in an operation. The mere show of force sometimes averts the need to use it. Where the local factions know peacekeepers have the capability and willingness to use force improves the ability both locally and centrally to implement the peace agreement without the use of force.

The Brahimi Report rightfully points out that the bedrock principles of peacekeeping remain consent of the parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense. However, the lessons learned from the operations in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone clearly indicate that if the peacekeeping force lacks sufficient personnel, training or equipment, and the political and military will to fulfill its mission and reassure the former belligerents, the situation tends to deteriorate. The probability of maintaining a positive attitude among the parties in a conflict improves when peacekeepers are a capable force and have adequate ROE. However, even complex peacekeeping must be carried out with impartiality and judicious and restricted use of force. The Panel's recommendation in this area will bring UN operations in line with the NATO and the U.S. doctrine for Peace Operations.

**Mission planning**

The Panel recommends that:

Before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agrees to implement a cease-fire or peace agreement with a UN-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with human rights standards and practicability or specified tasks and timelines.

The UNSC should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States.

Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort.

The Secretariat must tell the SC what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing missions mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission's use of force.\textsuperscript{12}
Mandate

The recommendation that an agreement between the warring parties must meet threshold conditions concerning human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines seems self-evident. However, this has been and still is a serious problem; for instance, in Bosnia, and the ongoing UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone.

Dennis Jett points out that the UN must consider all factors that influence the situation it sets out to solve. In Sierra Leone this includes the nation's resources and what roles neighboring countries and politicians within the country are playing. If solutions to these factors are not included in the peace agreement, the best peacekeepers in the world will fail. Regardless of how many are put into the situation, if the local actors are determined to fight -- if there are resources there to fuel their arms purchases, if the neighboring countries are all involved, either for profit or other reasons -- then the situation is hopeless and peacekeeping will not succeed.13

Addressing the mission in Bosnia, UN Security Council Resolution 824 established a new concept in Peacekeeping of Safe Areas. The aims for setting up safe areas at Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde were to protect civilians and not opposing forces deployed in the areas. The UNPROFOR Commander, General Wahlgren, worked out a local agreement demilitarizing Srebrenica. Signed by the Commanding Generals of the Serb and Muslim forces, the agreement specifically excluded armed persons or units within the safe areas. Canadian troops deployed and reported that the areas were fully demilitarized and that the UN had full responsibility for them. However, on 3 June 1993, UN Security Council Resolution 836 afforded specific permission to Bosnian government military units to remain within the safe areas. This was a blatant violation of the impartiality principle and of the safe haven's principles of international humanitarian law.14

The UNSC failure to endorse the agreement reached by the UNPROFOR Commander in the field, led to the failure of the safe area concept and the worst atrocities of the Bosnian War, and consequently to a huge loss in the UN's credibility and prestige.

Entering a PKO with a mandate that does not meet the standards of international law and human rights and has flaws in practicability is likely to result in premature deployments that will become debacles for the United Nations. The possibility to resolve complex peacekeeping problem must start with a thorough review of the situation in order to identify all factors that have caused and maintained the conflict. In addition to meeting threshold conditions on human rights, practicalities, and timelines, an agreement must also provide a feasible solution to the other factors influencing the situation. Dr. Robert H. Dorff states:
No amount of peacekeeping and peacebuilding capabilities will make up for the absence of an overall strategy and the underlying consensus on the objectives and the proper ways with which to deal with the challenges. If not embedded in a broader strategy of nationbuilding, military peacekeeping will fall either in theatre as a military operation or as part of the broader strategy when the conflict resumes as soon as the peacekeepers have been withdrawn.\textsuperscript{15}

Peacekeeping additionally calls for transparency of strategy and information gathering capabilities, ability and manning to analyze and understand a complicated situation, and the need to exclude countries with counterproductive interests from participating in the operation.

Troop levels

UN Security Council authorizations for troop levels in PKO has often reflected what member countries have been willing to commit. The Vance Plan for Croatia 1992 estimated 40,000 troops would be required to secure the protected areas in the country. The UN Security Council authorized 13,000. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the estimate called for between 30,000 and 60,000 troops. The UNSC only authorized 8,000.\textsuperscript{16} This may have been the result of the pressure on the UNSC to do something with a situation that called for immediate action, but where nobody could see a good solution.

A difference between needed resources and available ones like in these two recent examples will have huge impact on the possibility of the UN force to be successful. It will affect the credibility of peacekeeping not only in the mission area, but also, generally in the world, including member countries' willingness to commit troops both to present and future operations. The Brahimi Panel's recommendation in this area is consequently sound and must become a requirement the United Nations Security Council must meet.

Unity of Effort and Communication with Troop Contributing Nations

One of the most important lessons learned concerning unity of effort during the UN operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, is that the basic doctrinal principles that govern U.S. and NATO command relationships are appropriate for peace operations. This means that unity of command and effort is essential. Another is that the command and control of a coalition or UN operation must always take into account the existence of parallel lines of authority, especially when the mission of the coalition involves combat.\textsuperscript{17}

In Somalia this manifested itself in a pronounced tendency of some national contingents to seek guidance from their respective capitals before carrying out even routine tactical orders.
According to published reports, the commander of the Italian contingent went so far as to open separate negotiations with the fugitive warlord Mohammed Aideed — apparently with the full consent of his home government. This was, of course, extremely damaging to unity of effort. However, in this situation there were circumstances that underline the significance of transparency and communication with troop contributing nations as well.

In UNOSOM II, UN very rapidly and without consultation with all troop-contributing nations changed the mandate from humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement. This was done overnight, and without a formal political process in the UNSC. The result was a situation where most national contingents or troop providing nations were not prepared for the change and the additional risk involved. This led to a fragmented force that lacked unity of effort and command, resulting in heavy casualties, a disaster for the mission and dashing the international community's willingness to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping missions.

**Intelligence**

The panel recommends the SG establish an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), to support the information and analysis needs of all members of Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). For management purposes it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 18

This recommendation, however, sensitive, is consistent with the challenges and other recommendations discussed above. Before a SC decision on an operation, information and analysis is needed as the basis for the SG's recommendation to the Security Council as to whether this is a situation where the UN should intervene or a mission impossible.

During an operation the UN needs to monitor compliance with the agreements, in order to make timely recommendations on possible changes to the mandate and concepts of operations. In addition, there will always be a need for tactical intelligence as a basis for adequate tactical level decisions.

John R. Bolton thinks that it would be a mistake to allow the UN to develop its own intelligence gathering capability. He claims there is enough open source information generated within the system, by NGOs in the field, and by the UN's own people. However, that information is not currently brought together and analyzed for purposes of looking ahead and anticipating problems. The UN could do quite well with open-source information and selective requests for classified data from member nations if needed. 19
According to Joint Pub 3-07.3, **Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations**, intelligence is critically important to a PK force, not only for mission success but to protect the force. In the NATO operations in the Balkans, intelligence is provided by the troop contributing nations, mainly indirectly via national intelligence headquarters. Even in a fifty years old alliance this is a sensitive and difficult subject. National interests of protecting capabilities, methods and sources sometimes have priority over informing the alliance's own commander. Open sources and information from other countries can provide part of the necessary picture. However, it is consistent with the rest of the report that the UN needs a limited capability of its own. This intelligence gathering and analysis capability must initially provide the information needed to provide the UNSC with what is necessary to understand the situation and establish the prerequisites for a successful UN peacekeeping operation. Since deployment of an intelligence unit can become the beginning of an operation and will be a sensitive issue, the SC must give specific authorization before these assets can be deployed. Intelligence on tactical level should be provided by the troop contributing nations and must therefore be part of force requirements.

**Readiness and quality of forces**

Field experiences indicate that the momentum for peace created by signing of an accord dissipates fairly quickly if there is no visible movement to implement that accord. This led the Panel to recommend benchmarks for deployment of UN operations: 30 days to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operation, and 90 days to deploy a complex operation. The Panel recommends that the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) be developed further by member states working in partnership to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces for robust peacekeeping forces. The Panel also recommends that the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite UN training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet requirements must not be deployed.

Past missions have been hampered by slow deployment. In Former Yugoslavia the first observers were deployed in January 1992. It took 13 months to bring the total UNPROFOR strength up to 14,000 men.

The experience from Sierra Leone was more or less the same. The Lome Peace Agreement was signed in July 1999. In October the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping force of
6,000. By January, only 4,800 of the 6,000 peacekeepers were in country.\textsuperscript{23} In both operations this led to the peacekeeping forces being overwhelmed and losing their credibility from the start.

Highly trained forces deployed quickly and decisively in the two NATO operations in the Balkans, IFOR (December 1995) and KFOR (June 1999). Speed in deployment is significant in order to fill the power vacuum and implement the peace accord before the situation deteriorates. This underscores the importance of NATO’s force structure and its immediate reaction forces and reaction forces. NATO’s requirements are that these forces be able to deploy within 10 and 30 days.\textsuperscript{24} It is consequently fair to conclude that deployment benchmarks suggested by the Panel are necessary and will enhance the UN’s possibility for success. The solution must therefore be to encourage countries to provide highly ready forces in a UNSAS system.

Where quality of forces is concerned, developing nations now contribute more that 75 percent of the nearly 30,000 UN troops taking part in 15 missions around the world. The largest troop contributors, India, Nigeria, Jordan, Bangladesh and Ghana supply about 13,700 soldiers, well over a third of UN "blue helmets".\textsuperscript{25}

Bernard Muyet, former chief of the DPKO observes that troops from underdeveloped nations are neither properly trained nor sufficiently equipped to allow the show of intimidating force that is needed to keep the peace in today’s complex peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{26} From the experience during the Nigerian led ECOMOG peace operation in Sierra Leone, it is also fair to conclude that the troops from third world countries more often that do not operate according to the values needed to succeed in peace operations. According to Dennis Jett, ECOMOG was known as "every movable object gone" because the "peace force" spent most of its time looting.\textsuperscript{27} This situation is in stark contrast to the challenges of complex peacekeeping and the Panel’s recommended doctrine and strategy calling for disciplined, robust, capable, cohesive troops, which can resort to use of force, if needed. The forces must be able to do anything from distributing food and patrolling streets, to dispersing violent mobs and defending themselves and the mission against deadly attack. And they must be able to shift between these tasks at a moment’s notice. James Cunningham, US deputy representative to the United Nations, has described the present situation:

We all know that the UN’s most challenging and important operations face desperate shortfalls in terms of troops, equipment and training. Unless we move decisively, peacekeeping, the core function of the United Nations, will fail.\textsuperscript{28}

The Panels recommendation on cooperation between countries for standby agreement systems to provide a number of cohesive and well-trained brigade size units within UN timelines will be a significant improvement. Once an operation is in progress, the pressing need for and
scarcity of forces can corrupt the evaluation system. The UN should therefore set minimum requirements for capabilities and training, and evaluate potential UN assigned units on a regular basis, and not only when a unit is needed. To improve developing countries' abilities to provide forces that can meet UN requirements, training support such as the US cooperation and training assistance to Nigeria is important.29

The Panel also recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS. These would be available on seven days notice to augment DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.30 This will be a step forward from the present situation where nobody is "on call". However, compared to NATO's capability in this field, through the Military Committee, the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) and the different standing deployable combined and joint headquarters, UN's ability and readiness will be inferior. NATO's Military Committee and CJPS can monitor an evolving situation and make contingency plans as the situation develops. A standing deployable Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters, including support units with personnel that works together on a regular basis, would be very much superior to a UN "on call" solution of 100 officers available in New York on seven days' notice. The ability to establish an adequate headquarters for a new mission that can quickly plan the concept of operation and establish status of force requirements is consistent with other recommendations made by the Panel. The Report's proposal for 100 officers will, however, hamper the UN's ability for adequate initial planning, force generation and deployment. The UN needs a more robust capability to do this planning and prepare for the deployment phase. It must be established and exercised on a regular basis as part of the proposed UNSAS system.

UN Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations

The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the SG to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirement in full. Furthermore, as the Panel states, "wide disparities in staff qualities exist." This leads to a situation where better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. The UN will therefore have to take steps to become a meritocracy.31

As UN-controlled peacekeeping forces became involved in the more complex missions discussed here, the adequacy of the United Nations' existing machinery for controlling complex operations was increasingly called into question. As early as 1992, leading figures connected
with UN peacekeeping activities in both Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had major disputes with the UN headquarters in New York. Because of this the special representative for Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, resigned on 26 October 1992; the former head of UN forces in Sarajevo, Major General Lewis MacKenzie, made the complaint: "Do not get into trouble as a commander in the field after 5 P.M. New York time or on Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone." That is due to the fact that at present there are only 32 posts authorized for military officers in the DPKO. These 32 are the military staff directing close to 30,000 military personnel in the field. Five of them have currently the responsibility for the 13,000 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone.

That level of headquarters support is grossly inadequate and must be improved. The DPKO must be organized and competently manned to fulfill its responsibility from the planning of an operation through deployment, including implementation and redeployment.

**ASSESSMENT OF THE REPORT**

The report and the recommendations are based on a thorough study and candid assessment of the UN's failure in Bosnia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Such assessments are something new and refreshing for the UN.

If the recommendations of the Brahimi Report are implemented, they will clearly improve the UNs' ability to perform complex peacekeeping operations. The most important recommendation is that the Organization must develop an analysis mechanism to distinguish between conflicts where peacekeeping can succeed and where it will become a mission impossible. This calls for support from countries with global intelligence capabilities, use of open sources, and an independent intelligence gathering and analysis capability. To overcome the sensitivity of UN-owned intelligence, the SC must specifically authorize every deployment of these assets. Where the UN decides to establish a peacekeeping operation there must be a peace to be kept, a clear peace plan, reasonable prospects of achieving the goal and the necessary resources must be available.

The second most important recommendation is a change in doctrine and strategy. Today's most frequent challenges can unfortunately not be solved solely through consent of the parties and use of force only in self-defense. The UN needs adequate combat forces that if necessary can defend themselves, other parts of the mission, the mandate and influence/coerce/force the parties to comply with the agreements. This fundamental capability must be the basis for the forces as well as other resources.
The recommendation for an on call list of 100 officers on seven days readiness to meet in New York to establish the headquarters for a new operation is the weakest part of the Report. This solution will hardly give the UN satisfactory ability to plan the concept of operation, and deduct status of forces requirement as basis for the force generation process, much less reconnoiter and make plans for deployment and follow on operations within 30 to 90 day timelines. A solution must be found in UNSAS type of system where the nations providing forces also provide a capable slice of the force headquarters and necessary support units.

There is a huge gap between capabilities of the forces provided for UN peacekeeping by predominantly third world countries and the requirements recommended by the Panel. This gap can only to some extent be bridged by on call lists of single officers on readiness to establish a new headquarters, UNSAS agreements between countries and UN requirements for earmarked units and evaluation of capabilities. However, as long as the part of the world with the best forces does not take part in the operations, the United Nations will still field weak and inadequate forces to deal with the situation. This is a “catch-22” the UN has been in for some time. Without success in ongoing operations, the West is not likely to take part in the operations; without elite forces provided by them, success is not likely.

Within the UN organization itself there is also a fatal stumbling block that is a mixture of the two parts that make up the UN, the political entity and the bureaucracy. As Geoffry Robertson puts it, the UN is far from a meritocracy.

The hiring, promotion and delegation of responsibility rely heavily on seniority or personal and political connections. This call to cleanse the organization of its deep-rooted nepotism and member states protection of their incompetents is Kofi Annan's greatest challenge. 35

It is fact that the main reason for the inadequate manning of the DPKO was caused by the developing countries. They complained when developed countries provided officers for free to do necessary work in the Headquarters. Their argument was that such jobs should be distributed on an equitable geographic basis. Countries, which cannot provide officers with the necessary competence, must stop looking upon the UN as a pork barrel of patronage.

CONCLUSION
The Brahimi Report is a refreshingly honest analysis of how the UN must improve complex peacekeeping. It is the most incisive and comprehensive analysis of peace operations ever undertaken by the UN. The Report covers all significant factors and recommends
adequate, feasible measures to increase efficiency and the possibilities for success. If implemented, these recommendations will immensely improve UN peacekeeping operations.

The most important recommendation is that the United Nations must be able to distinguish between where it makes sense to launch an operation and situations, which have no basis for a peace operation solution. Equally important is the recommendation for a change in peacekeeping doctrine. The old doctrine based on consent of the parties and use of force in self-defense only, is still valid for traditional peacekeeping. But complex peacekeeping, the more likely challenge, calls for combat forces that can defend themselves, other parts of the mission, the mandate and can assure the local parties and deter actions not in compliance with the peace accord. This fundamental concept must drive the requirements for both quantity and quality of forces, readiness, headquarters support and other resources needed for the mission. The United Nation Headquarters’ ability to plan and execute operations is dependent on the staff in Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York City. This bureaucracy must be changed to a meritocracy.

The weakest part of the Report is its recommendation on how to establish a headquarters for a new mission. This recommendation will not give the UN the ability to launch a peacekeeping operation in a timely fashion and should be revised.

The recommendations of the Brahimi Report will bring UN peacekeeping doctrine and strategy in line with U.S. and NATO operations of this kind and are essential if the United Nations is to be a credible force for peace. However, as long as the countries with the best armies are not prepared to take part in UN-led operations, there will be a limit to what the UN can successfully do. Even after implementation of the recommendations, the UN will be inferior in terms of efficiency and credibility to peacekeeping operations led by NATO, the EU or other ad hoc western-led coalitions. Therefore, when the major western powers have interests at stake, a regional organization that can provide cohesive military forces will be the better choice. Despite the international support the Report received during the Millennium Summit in 2000, the trend we have seen the last five years will likely continue. The United Nations will mainly be called upon for peacekeeping in countries that do not carry much political weight and where the direct and second and third order effects of the conflict do not directly impact the western world.
ENDNOTES

1 Doctor William J. Durch: Senior Associate of the Henry L. Stimson Center in his written statement to the Committee on House International Relations on United Nations Peace Keeping, 20 September 2000, Washington, p 1

2 Ibid., p 1

3 The Brahimi Report is a major study on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations prepared by a panel of ten respected experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General on 7 March 2000. The panel was led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria and included two experts from the USA.


7 John R. Bolton: Senior Vice President; American Enterprise Institute in his written statement to the Committee on House International Relations on United Nations Peace Keeping, 20 September 2000, Washington, p 5

8 Doctor William J. Durch: Senior Associate of the Henry L. Stimson Center in his written statement to the Committee on House International Relations on United Nations Peace Keeping, 20 September 2000, Washington, p 2

9 NATO Allied Joint Procedures 3.4.1 (AJP-3.4.1) Chapter 3- Fundamentals of Peace Support Operations, Section II – Consent, p 3-2


13 Ambassador Dennis C. Jett (Ret), Dean of the International Center; University of Florida in the Congressional hearing on UN Peacekeeping Missions, Committee on House International Relations, 11 October 2000, Washington p 21

14 Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Report on Lessons Learned from Former Yugoslavia 1996, Columbia International Affairs Online,
Working Papers, p 10  
https://www.cc.Columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/BIW01/biw01.html


16 Ibid, p 10


18 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Executive Summary, Summary on Recommendations p 2


https://www.cc.Columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/BIW01/biw01.html

23 Larry Thomson in *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Mass; July 12, 2000

24 NATO Allied Commander Europe Force Standards (ACE Force Standards Volume II)


26 Bernard Miyet, chief of Department of Peacekeeping Operation in *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Philadelphia PA, 14 May, 2000, Number 117567

27 Ambassador Dennis C. Jett (Ret), Dean of the International Center; University of Florida in the *Congressional hearing on UN Peacekeeping Missions*, Committee on House International Relations, 11 October 2000, Washington p 30

29 This initiative is called the African Crisis Response Initiative. Its goal is to train a number of Nigerian battalions for peacekeeping tasks.

30 Report of the Panel on UNITED NATIONS Peace Operations, Executive Summary, Summary on Recommendations p 3

31 Report of the Panel on UNITED NATIONS Peace Operations, Executive Summary, p 6


33 Geoffrey Robertson, The Spectator; Coming Next: A World Army, London; 16 September 2000

34 Andrew Mack, Professor, Director of the Strategic Planning Unit at the Executive Office of the Secretary General at the United Nations in Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bulletin No 17, October 2000, p 2

35 Geoffrey Robertson; The Spectator; Coming Next: A World Army, London; 16 September 2000
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