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URBAN WARRIOR: BREAKDOWN IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

by

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March 2001

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During this realistic training, the Marines discovered real impediments when organizing the exercise. The problems encountered during this exercise are examples of the impediments that can arise when coordinating with civilian agencies. To overcome potential impediments the Marines found that better coordination could minimize the time and effort required for enhancing civil-military relations.

This thesis argues that with better civil-military relations, training exercises, as well as real exercises, which the National Guard will undertake, these impediments can be erased or diminished. This thesis concludes that most or all impediments that occurred are preventable by an early, aggressive, and adequately staffed public relations campaigns. It concludes further that public relations campaigns should be planned and organized prior to events. This planning and organizing should be conducted on a full-time coordinating and educating basis between military personnel and civilian agencies.

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URBAN WARRIOR: BREAKDOWN IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

It is estimated that by the year 2025, most of the world’s population will be located in urban, coastal environments. This knowledge becomes an indicator for the military as to what areas and types of training soldiers will need in preparation for future battles. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has seen the need to train in actual urban environments in cities across the United States. The USMC conducted one such exercise, Urban Warrior, on March 13, 1999. The city chosen for the exercise was Monterey, California.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis reviews the circumstances surrounding the planning and execution of the Urban Warrior Exercise (UWE) that took place in the city of Monterey, California on March 13, 1999.

Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen in today’s armed services have many obstacles to overcome when preparing for training exercises and when conducting missions as a joint effort with civilian agencies. Sometimes the obstacles during coordination of training exercises are so great that inadequate training sites are substituted for the most realistic training environments. When this trade-off occurs, soldiers are forced to train in a non-realistic environment which is contradictory to the military’s “train as you fight” doctrine, resulting in a potential adverse impact of our troops mission preparedness. Some of these obstacles were exposed during the Urban Warrior Exercise conducted by the United States Marines on March 13, 1999.

The best-trained military in urban warfare, train in a real urban environment. Urban Warrior was an exercise conducted over several days in different communities as a large-scale test of twenty-first century warfare. When searching for the most realistic training environment, Marine Corps personnel estimated that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, most of the world’s population, nation’s capitals, and nuclear reactors would be located in coastal, urban environments. Monterey was one of the cities chosen for the exercise that fit the profile of twenty-first century warfare. Similar exercises were also conducted in Oakland and Alameda.

Over the past two years, the Army Special Forces have conducted urban warfighting exercises in twenty-one US cities. Monterey was the fifth city chosen to host
an urban warrior exercise conducted by the Marines. Previous exercises conducted on a less public and smaller scale in Chicago, Jacksonville, FL, New York City, and Charleston, SC.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, VA organized the exercise; to re-create the chaos servicemen can face in peacekeeping missions, anti-terrorism strikes, and humanitarian aid during natural disasters in which civil order has collapsed. The exercise was designed to train servicemen to subdue rebellions and revolts in other countries, to prepare for domestic emergency disasters, and to provide humanitarian aid to foreigners. Battle exercises began in 1997 and split into East and West Coast phases.

Monterey’s exercise included approximately five hundred Marines who arrived by helicopter at the Monterey Peninsula Airport before conducting a mass casualty drill and neutralizing a mock weapon of mass destruction at the Defense Language Institute. Between one and two hundred personnel from the Navy, Army, and foreign services acted as rioters to create an intense and stressful scenario. Protestors who objected to the Marines assaulting across a beach that would damage the environment disrupted the exercise in Monterey. Before the event, the Marines met and talked to city officials of Monterey and obtained their approval to conduct the exercise. The city council members granted approval without conducting a public hearing, which could have aired concerns by the various civil organizations in the community and issues, might have been worked out prior to the conduct of the exercise. Last minute changes resulted that lessened the effectiveness of the training exercise.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Military planners in today’s armed services have many obstacles to overcome when preparing for training exercises and when conducting missions involving civilian agencies. Sometimes obstacles, which emerge during the coordination of training exercises, are so great that inadequate training sites substitute for the most realistic training environments. When this trade-off occurs, soldiers must train in a non-realistic environment. This is contradictory to the military’s "train as you fight" doctrine, resulting in a potential adverse impact of mission preparedness. Some of these obstacles were exposed during the UWE conducted by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) on March 13, 1999, in Monterey, California.

In developing techniques and strategies to fight in the urban environment of the future, the best-trained soldiers require training in actual urban environments. The UWE, conducted over several days in different communities, was a large-scale test of twenty-first century warfare. Marine Corps planners estimated that most of the world’s population, nations’ capitals, and nuclear reactors would be located in coastal, urban environments\(^1\), at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Monterey was chosen as the site for the exercise that fit the profile of twenty-first century warfare. Over the past two years, Army Special Forces have conducted urban warfighting exercises in twenty-one United States (US) cities. Monterey was the fifth city chosen to host an UWE by the

Marines. Previous exercises, in Chicago, Jacksonville, New York City, and Charleston were less public and conducted on a smaller scale.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) organized the exercise in Quantico, VA; to recreate the chaos soldiers can face in peacekeeping missions, anti-terrorism strikes, and humanitarian aid during natural disasters in which civil order has collapsed. The design of the exercise was to train soldiers to subdue rebellions and revolts in other countries, to prepare for domestic emergency disasters, and to provide humanitarian aid to foreigners. Urban Warrior exercises began in 1997 and split into East and West Coast phases.²

The exercise at Monterey included approximately five hundred Marines who arrived by helicopter at the Monterey Peninsula Airport before conducting a mass casualty drill and neutralizing a mock weapon of mass destruction at the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Between one and two hundred personnel from the Navy, Army, and foreign service personnel from the Naval Postgraduate School acted as rioters to create an intense and stressful scenario.

B. ARGUMENT

This thesis will examine the impediments military organizations face when organizing realistic training exercises in urban environments where population density is high. The Urban Warrior Exercise (UWE), held on 13 March 1999, by the United States Marine Corps (USMC), almost did not occur due to political concerns, environmental issues, and the perception of the potential abuse of civil rights. What happened during

² Ibid.
UWE begs the question: What impediments do military planners face concerning exercises requiring the cooperation of civilian organizations?

In this thesis, I argue that to overcome impediments experienced by military planners, there needs to be a continuous education and communication process between military units and local civilian agencies. In addition to effective, ongoing civil-military relations, urban training should continue and become more prevalent in the future. Soldiers need to train, and they need to train in as realistic an environment as possible.

This thesis will analyze three possible explanations as to why the Marines encountered problems. First, the Marines may not have anticipated local opposition in Monterey since UW exercises in other cities in the United States were without unopposed. Second, the Marines planned for potential problems to and identified methods to minimize them by not acknowledging the complaints until the last possible moment. Third, the Marines may have actually anticipated potential problems, but the media campaign designed to resolve them was insufficient.

This study is significant because it is important to (1) understand what problems confront the military when training or conducting missions in areas with significant civilian population and (2) to find ways of either avoiding or solving these problems. Recent civilian protests over military training in other urban areas, such as Hunter-Liggett and Big Sur, California are only two recent examples of this phenomenon. Specifically, this study is significant because the NG may act in a law enforcement capacity under the Posse Comitatus Act, as are the active components are not. The Army National Guard (ARNG) will continue to cooperate with civilian agencies during natural disasters, civil disorders, and peacekeeping missions. However, problems encountered
by the Marines during Urban Warrior (UW) are similar to those the NG could encounter when fulfilling state or federally directed missions. Understanding how we can avoid civil-military conflicts in the future will facilitate the National Guard’s mission.

C. METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed is a case study of the UWE conducted in Monterey. This case is a recent example of many problems encountered by military planners during coordination and planning of a joint (civilian and military) exercises in an urbanized, politically organized civilian community.

The Urban Warrior exercise in Monterey is also an example of how many civilians experience feelings of anxiety when they feel that their quality of life is threatened. The average citizen is supportive of most exercises conducted by military organizations until those exercises take place in their “backyards.” Since the end of the Cold War, citizens have become less tolerant of the military in general and specifically, less cooperative about training exercises conducted in their immediate environment.

The basis of this thesis is on interviews with local residents and government persons who were personally involved, such as the Monterey City Manager, the Monterey Police Captain, and the co-chair for the Veterans for Peace, Monterey Chapter.

D. ORGANIZATION

Chapter two examines why urban training is so critical to today’s military. It will also explain why Monterey became the test site for the West Coast phase of Urban Warrior. Additionally, this chapter briefly mentions some of the equipment and technology tested. Chapter three discusses the planning phases of UW for Monterey. It includes a chronology of who was involved from the USMC, City of Monterey, US
Navy, and other citizens who supported and opposed the exercise. Chapter four describes the events during the three weeks before the protests took shape that would affect the exercise. It will bring into perspective the perceptions held by the protesters. It also reveals the last minute involvement by the California Coastal Commission that ultimately rejected the hovercraft part of the exercise. Chapter five analyzes what went wrong throughout the nine month planning process. Chapter six points out what military organizations and civilian agencies can do to prevent making the same mistakes made in Monterey. This chapter of lessons learned makes recommendations that apply to active duty training as well as National Guard missions.

E. SUMMARY

Active duty, Reserves, and National Guard units need realistic military training. They have always needed realistic training and the military has always done its best to train as realistically as possible. Today and in the future, battle sites will be in urban environments. Today, military units need to train in urban environments so US soldiers maintain a level of proficiency that ensures their safety and the well being of the United States.

Now, more than ever, effective civil-military relationships need to exist on a continual basis between local military units and civilian agencies. The time has ended when the only contact comes when it is time to conduct a training exercise or when a natural disaster occurs. An education process needs to begin for the general populace on intentions, capabilities, and benefits of the military as a whole.
II. SELECTING THE TEST SITE

A. DEVELOPING A RESPONSE

Aum Shinrikiyo, a terrorist group in Japan, released a chemical gas, sarin, on a Tokyo subway train in March 1995. Twelve people died and more than five thousand were injured, many seriously enough to require hospitalization.\(^3\) This attack brought millions to realize that these types of attacks by terrorist organizations are possible and becoming more likely now than ever before. Many organizations began to devise tactics and strategies to combat and/or prevent future chemical and biological terrorist attacks. The selection of Monterey Bay as a site for the Urban Warrior exercise is a direct result of United States Marine Corps 'need to test new tactics to meet this emerging threat.

After the terrorist attack in Tokyo, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, became seriously concerned about training rapid response teams that could handle future real world situations that he referred to as the Three Block War. The Three Block War consists of Block One, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; Block Two, peace enforcement and peacekeeping; and Block Three, combating hostile conventional forces while engaging Blocks One and Two.\(^4\) He established the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), Quantico, Virginia, in October 1995.\(^5\) As part of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), MCWL's mission is to serve as the focal point for refinement of future warfighting capabilities. The laboratory

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\(^4\) Ibid.

develops tactics, techniques and procedures, and evaluates advanced technologies that enhance or create future warfighting capabilities.

Concept based experimentation is the process Marines use to develop new warfighting capabilities, including those needed to meet the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. MCCDC develops a concept that may improve future warfighting capabilities. Warfighting capabilities to support these concepts are identified, analyzed, and refined through wargaming and are later evaluated through experimentation. The cornerstone document for Marine Corps experimentation is the current Five-Year Experimentation Plan (FYEP). In the Warrior series, which addresses the warfighting capabilities needed to meet the emerging threat of CBW terrorism, the plan consists of three phases of experiments. The three phases are Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior.6

Hunter Warrior, completed in the spring of 1997, was the initial phase of the experiments and explored extended dispersed battlespace concepts. It investigated the contributions a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) could make at the operational level of war using enhanced targeting, precision fires, Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) improvements, and limited deep operational maneuver capabilities.

Building on Hunter Warrior, the Urban Warrior experiments tested further enhancements aimed at ensuring that forward forces can effectively handle a crisis in urban environments. Hunter Warrior identified equipment needed now for operating forces and Urban Warrior continued the process of identifying what soldiers will need to

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meet challenges of an uncertain future. The Urban Warrior phase of experimentation began in September 1997 and ended in July 1999, which led to the last phase of the FYEP, Capable Warrior.7

B. THE NEXT BATTLEFIELD

What is the rationale for developing sophisticated urban warfare capabilities to respond to CBW terrorism? Demographic trends make it highly probable that future operations will involve cities. Population models estimate that seventy percent of the world's population will live in cities by the year 2025.8 Seventy percent of these cities will be located on the world's littorals. Urban Warrior is the experimental effort to prepare Marines for the twenty-first century.

The urban battlespace presents many obstacles that soldiers will have to overcome to complete their objectives. Operations in cities involve maneuver and close range engagement in an environment characterized by concentrated cover and concealment. Urban terrain tends to favor the defender.

In the constrained urban battlespace, it is important for troops to understand the urban infrastructure that can be both ally and enemy. While the urban infrastructure can provide cover and concealment, it limits large-scale use of indirect fires. Structures and interrupted lines of sight vastly complicate communications and targeting. Concrete buildings contribute to ricochets, spalding, and fragment wounds. Most sensing systems are not effective due to structural density, electronic interference, and industrial obscurcation.

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. p. 2.
Third world urban areas pose an even more difficult threat environment. Building materials are normally more flammable and the use of natural gas and propane for heating create a risk of catastrophic fire. ⁹

There are special challenges for the operating forces in an urban environment. One is the enemy's ability to blend into the non-combatant environment. Another is that non-combatants and refugees are likely to clog roads, airfields, and ports. To deal successfully with non-combatants and refugees, the soldier must possess humanitarian skills as well as warfighting skills. ¹⁰ Humanitarian skills are those skills that lend to individual ability to deal with disaster response/relief issues, personal communication skill, and theory and practice of adult learning.

Focusing on the development of new operational concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures, Urban Warrior took on a split, East Coast/West Coast, phase posture. The East Coast phase featured four experiments held at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. There was also limited experimentation in cities. These city exercises consisted of an urban tactical exercise without troops in Jacksonville, Florida; a limited technical assessment of urban cross-canyon mobility gear on Staten Island, New York; and a long-range command and control experiment at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. ¹¹

First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) and the Third Fleet planned to conduct the West Coast phase titled Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment (UWAWE) in Monterey, Oakland and Alameda in early 1999. The West Coast phase,

⁹ Ibid. p. 4.
¹⁰ Ibid. p. 5.
also referred to as Phase II, applied the advanced urban warfare techniques developed in Phase I. The ultimate objective of Phase II was to develop and test capabilities for seabased expeditionary forces operating in the urban littoral.¹²

C. WHY MONTEREY?

For the annual Navy-Marine Corps exercise in Southern California, the Marines chose Monterey for their exercise, referred to as Kernal Blitz.¹³ Monterey has historically been a key military outpost due to its strategic location. Although Fort Ord largely ceased operations during the 1990s, the presence of the Naval Postgraduate School and Defense Language Institute continue the military presence in Monterey. With two military facilities and a coastal city, Monterey was a logical site for naval forces to experiment with wargaming designed to identify urban littoral problems. Train as you would fight is the method of training for all service members. The UWE provided the opportunity to experiment in an actual city. Military bases do not have a wide variety of buildings, complicated road networks, and civilian population. Most military urban training facilities do not allow for a realistic test of new technologies and are only a few blocks in size.

The city of Monterey is approximately 125 miles south of San Francisco Bay and 345 miles north of Los Angeles. Monterey Bay lies to the north, the Pacific Ocean to the west, and Carmel Bay to the south. Monterey's unique attractions, natural beauty, and historic character have enabled it to become one of the premiere tourist destinations in the United States, which has in turn made the local economy heavily dependent on a

¹² MCWL, Conceptual Experimental Framework. 1999. p. 44.

substantial flow of visitors for its success. With an increased focus on the area's environmental assets and on ecotourism, Monterey's expected economic growth will continue over the coming years. The designation of Monterey Bay as a National Marine Sanctuary ensures its preservation as a natural marine environment.

Monterey residents are also culturally diverse, politically active and community oriented. Monterey was recently designated as a "language capital of the world" reflecting the diversity and language skills of its residents. Monterey residents are extremely protective and concerned about their environment. Conscious of preserving health and the environment, affluent Monterey residents do not hesitate to protest if their environment looks like it may be adversely impacted.

Monterey is a city that appreciates art, literature, and the environment; it is not surprising that the Marines met with opposition before the UW exercise. Almost half of those graduating from high school in Monterey go on to get bachelor degrees. The largest working groups in Monterey are highly educated middle class professionals. Last, but not least, the Monterey voters predominantly affiliate themselves with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. In this case, political affiliations significantly influenced civilian attitudes toward the prospect of military exercises in the urban environment in which they resided.

Did the Marines know beforehand what they would be up against when planning this type of exercise in Monterey? City officials agreed to the exercise, but it is reasonable to question whether opinions of these officials accurately reflected those of the public.
D. CONCEPT FOR UWE

The initial plan for the UW exercise consisted of Monterey serving as the setting for a scenario in which a friendly city in a foreign nation requested assistance from the United States. According to this scenario, Marines aboard an amphibious ready group would start the exercise by coming ashore. On the morning of the exercise, a rifle company of about two hundred Marines and the Marine Corps’ Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) would make an amphibious landing at the NPS beach followed by a helicopter landing and a tactical exercise at the Defense Language Institute. Working with Monterey’s Emergency Operations Center, the Marines would also conduct a mass casualty drill.

Designed to focus on command, control, computer, and communications technologies for the twenty-first century, the experiment would include Marines, sailors, and soldiers from DLI role-playing non-combatants, refugees, and enemy infiltrators. In order to make humanitarian assistance training as realistic as possible approximately three hundred role-players participated. A total of approximately eight hundred Marines and others participated in the Monterey exercise. The Marines were members of the IMEF at Camp Pendleton and the sailors were part of the US Navy’s Third Fleet. A Marine reserve regiment headquartered in San Bruno also participated along with soldiers from NPS and DLI.

Simultaneously, the City of Monterey planned to take the opportunity for its police and fire departments to receive much-needed training in the areas of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, should the need ever arise locally. The city also agreed to

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provide support to the operation to ensure safety and speedy movement of personnel and equipment between the beach, NPS, and DLI.

Camp Pendleton’s IMEF was in charge of conducting the exercise while the MCWL directed the exercise. The Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the Laboratory’s experimental unit composed of a command element that trains and deploys with operational forces to conduct experiments. The MAGTF became the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) during the UW exercises. The MEU was composed of an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). During the experiment, the Battalion Landing Team 1/5 served as the GCE. The Third Marine Aircraft Wing Forward served as the ACE. The CSSE consisted of an experimental logistics unit from the First Force Service Support Group.

The US Navy’s Third Fleet simultaneously would conduct an independent naval experiment called Fleet Battle Experiment E, or FBE “Echo.” Members of the Third Fleet would also support Marine operations ashore once the exercise began.15

The purpose of the Advanced Warfighting Experiment Urban Warrior was to test experimental capabilities to determine what new technologies, training, or organizations needed changing or modifying. Some of the experimental capabilities examined consisted of the Common Tactical Picture (CTP), urban humanitarian assistance, urban operations, force protection, commercial off-the-shelf communication devices, urban

precision navigation, urban sniper suppression combat decision-making vertical re-supply, automated combat systems, and sea-based logistics.\textsuperscript{16}

To create a more effective force and in an effort to receive better information within the tactical picture, the Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System is the cutting edge technology tested for the first time in Monterey. The CTP refers to the information network designed to be available to Marines from the lowest level of command to the highest. This network focuses on command and control using computers and other communications technologies.

The network was located on the USS Coronado, the flagship of the Third Fleet, referred to as the Experimental Combat Operation Center (ECOC). Tracked from the ECOC, Marines in the field were equipped with global positioning systems (GPS). The Marines communicated with hand-held computers called end-user terminals that operated on an over-the-air network. The GPS and end-user terminal enabled the ECOC to piece together a picture of both enemy and friendly locations in the battlespace.

Regarding humanitarian assistance, two systems tested during the UW exercise were the Advance Surgical Suite for Trauma Casualties and the Portable Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. A key component of many future missions will be providing humanitarian assistance either in the form of medical services or food and water distribution.

Testing of commercial, off-the-shelf, technologies for their potential advantages, such as hand held computers, communication equipment, and radios, was to have taken

\textsuperscript{16} ibid. p. 6.
place. For example, the Marines tested the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) urban navigational systems to verify the accuracy of the system in a built-up area.

Since urban areas offer numerous hiding places for snipers, evaluation of the Mobile Counterfire System required verification as part of the experiment. Mounted on a HMMV, the Mobile Counterfire System is an automated counter sniper system that homes in on the sniper and returns fire within two seconds. This system enables the gunner to operate from inside the vehicle, thus protecting the gunner.

Urban conflicts present a de-centralized combat decision making process in which decisions once reserved for senior officers will have to be made by the lowest level leaders. The MCWL developed a program to teach decision-making skills at the squad level.

Scheduled for testing during UW, all these tactics, techniques, and technologies would undergo further evaluation during Capable Warrior, the third and final phase of MCWL’s initial five-year experimentation plan.

E. SUMMARY

In part as a response to the Aum Shinrikiyo CBW terrorist attack in Tokyo, General Krulak saw the necessity for increased urban training and warfighting capabilities. He further encouraged and influenced the USMC decision to recognize the opportunities for training in US cities to prepare for future urban warfare. On the face of it, Monterey was one of the cities that was well suited to be chosen as a test site given the available facilities and environment. However, from a civil-military relations perspective, the USMC did not verify whether the opinions of local civilian government
officials were representative of those of the general population, nor did they anticipate
that public opinion would evolve once the scope of the exercise became apparent.
III. CREATING PROBLEMS

A. TRAINING EXERCISE AS A CONCEPT

The idea for the Urban Warrior exercise in Monterey, California materialized in December 1997. To coincide with Kernel Blitz, Monterey seemed the logical choice for an urban shoreline test site. Marine officials contacted Monterey officials in March 1998 to introduce the idea to the city and to ask if the city would like to participate. Mr. Fred Muhrer, the City Manager, agreed to allow the exercise to take place. However, as knowledge of the prospect of an urban warfare exercise in Monterey reached the public, opinion swiftly turned against the exercise, substantially complicating the efforts of the USMC to test their new warfighting capabilities.

With the agreement between the Marines and Monterey tentatively reached, the planning for the operation began. In early July, MCWL's public affairs officer Tim Jones, and operations officer, Major Buck Rudolph (who was later replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Gary Schenkel) conducted a site survey. The Marines briefed Admiral Chaplin, Superintendent for the NPS. CDR Robert Anderson, the NPS public affairs officer, contacted the city to set up a date to brief city officials. Mr. Fred Cohn, Deputy City Manager for Monterey, became the official point of contact representing the city. The plan originally discussed on July 9, 1998 entitled, Sea Dragon: Forward from the Sea, the title for the Marine Corp's Five-Year Experimentation Plan, was presented.

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18 Interview, Jack Hanzlick, 2 June 1999.
The Marine Corps did their best to explain the importance and value of realistic training in an urban environment to civilian officials. They pointed out that both Bosnia and Somalia were examples of urban battles fought in the recent past. Phase II, the West Coast Phase of the UW exercise, would start in March 1999. The tactical portion of the exercise in Monterey would commence on March 13, 1999 and tentatively take place in the San Francisco Bay Area from March 15-18, 1999.

B. MONTEREY'S INVOLVEMENT

Proposed activities for the City of Monterey consisted of both a presentation plan and a tactical experiment. As part of the presentation plan, Monterey would enact a public awareness information campaign, conduct media operations, inform the visitor center verbally and with literature of the upcoming exercise, and allow or create observation areas. The tactical exercise would include force on force, vignettes, and local agency integration that would include the police department, fire department, and other emergency responders.¹⁹

The plans for the exercise called for it to be a controlled environment, akin to that of a movie set. There would be "actors" acting as friendly and opposing forces and non-combatants. There would be other participants acting as experiment controllers giving support where needed. "Props" would include vehicles, weapons, and other training equipment. There would be special effects such as blank ammunition and smoke grenades.

The major portion of the exercise would occur on the grounds of NPS and DLI except for the beach landing itself. Designed to be environmentally friendly, the beach

¹⁹ Interview, Jack Hanzlick, 2 June 1999.
landing would take place on the NPS beach. The landing force would move directly to NPS in an orderly fashion and then continue the exercise once on station.

As part of the draft scenario, Monterey would act as a friendly foreign city asking for help from the US Marines. Part of the scenario would include intelligence reports coming in that chemical weapons were located in Monterey.\textsuperscript{20} The Marines would then conduct a Landing Carrier Air Cushion (LCAC) landing at the NPS beach. A helicopter insertion would take place and the chemical weapon storage site would be located and neutralized. CBIRF would arrive and take control of the chemical weapons operation.

Throughout the exercise, opposing forces and non-combatants would act as deterrents to hinder the Marines from accomplishing their mission. This was the plan presented and approved by the Monterey City Council.

C. BEHIND THE SCENES

On August 31, 1998, the MCWL had a meeting with Fred Cohn, deputy City Manager. Representatives from NPS, DLI, and Monterey's Fire and Police departments attended. During this meeting, city officials requested specific briefs from the MCWL, intended to educate and introduce USMC's unique capabilities to other city officials who might be interested. Major Rudolph presented the UW brief and explained how the proposed scenario would play out each day beginning with March 11, 1999.\textsuperscript{21}

Day one, March 11, 1999, two days before the actual exercise began, final coordination would take place between liaison personnel for all parties. The Emergency

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Interview between CDR Robert Anderson, USN Public Affairs Officer, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and the author, 30 April 1999.
Operations Center (EOC) in Monterey would coordinate with DLI EOC, NPS EOC, and CBIRF. Because of the number of different agency participation, communications equipment testing was to be a top priority.

On day two, March 12, 1999, of the preparations before the exercise, all EOCs would activate and participants would initiate information sharing. By 0800 hours, the Marines would deploy opposition forces and civilian role players. A detachment of Marine Corps reconnaissance forces would deploy to join the NPS police force for this part of the scenario.

March 13, 1999, the day of the actual UW exercise, was to begin at 0630 with the NPS Police force isolating opposition forces. By 0800 hours, an LCAC landing on NPS beach was to unload a company of Marines. Before 1200 hours, all NPS sites would be secure. Between 1200 hours and 1600 hours, a two-prong attack was to take place on DLI property. Simultaneously, between 1300 hours and 1600 hours, an explosion and mass casualty drill on DLI property would ensue. Between 1600 hours and 1800 hours, the exercise would come to a halt. The exercise would re-start the next day when the exercise would move to San Francisco.

This scenario called for urban militia forces holding important facilities in the city and threatening to use a biological weapon. A force would land on NPS beach and move to NPS, crossing Del Monte Boulevard (See map). The force would then isolate and attack sites held by the militia force. Helicopter borne forces would land at the Presidio of Monterey. Forces from the beach would move through the city from NPS to the Presidio where the biological weapon would be located and neutralized. The unit would complete its mission and move on to San Francisco.
The proposed civil-military action plan involved the Marines setting up a military liaison cell with Monterey's EOC. Marines would set up a surgical facility to care for casualties that would include non-combatants. Marines would coordinate response to any sniper threats encountered between NPS and the Presidio. There would be a coordinated response to rescue civilians caught in buildings bombed by guerrillas.

During the planning process, the use of acronyms, for which the military is noted, limited communications with civilians. City officials were largely unable to decipher many of the acronyms. To combat this problem, CDR Anderson suggested that to help the city officials get a better understanding of what was to take place; they send key
people to San Diego to tour the ship USS Coronado. This would allow officials to actually participate in a landing operation at Camp Pendleton to give them an idea of what would be going on in the scheduled landing planned for UWE. Mr. Tim Smith, public affairs officer for the MCWL, also drew attention to concerns pertaining to the environmental impact caused by landing on the beach. Commander Anderson put Mr. Smith in touch with Marine planners at NPS and an environmental assessment began.

Planners for the Third Fleet also wanted to meet in early September with representatives from the Navy League, NPS, and DLI. This meeting never materialized because the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) for the West coast phase of UW took place on October 6-8, 1998 in San Francisco, California. The Third Fleet may have felt that they should have the IPC before conducting an information meeting. This meeting would have provided the Marines, early on, with information about sensitive issues and concerns of those protesting against the UWE. Issues and concerns could have been resolved that would have reduce disruptive activities at the time of the exercise.

During an earlier meeting with city officials in Monterey, on 31 August 1998, civilians requested more information about the capabilities that the Marines would be testing. To meet this request, the Marines scheduled an Urban Warrior Workshop that took place on October 28, 1998. Representatives from public agencies, emergency service providers, and other interested parties were invited and encouraged to attend. The workshop educated attendees on the scope and purpose of the exercise. A representative

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) spoke on chemical, biological, and terrorist threats. The introduction of CBIRF and explanation of their capabilities provided knowledge of their expertise for this type training exercise. The purpose and capabilities of civil-military operations centers provided further planning considerations for the exercise.

November 1998 was a relatively quiet month in the planning process of Urban Warrior during which the first draft of the UW exercise environmental assessment (EA) was completed. The first draft of the EA was approximately one hundred pages and included items such as regulatory compliance, relevant environmental issues, alternatives to proposed actions, and affected environment encompassing land, air quality, noise, and biological and cultural resources.²⁴

LtCol Schenkel, USMC, and Sam Dennis, USN, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, conducted a meeting held on 2 December 1998 to review the EA for possible additional data needs and accuracy. Also in attendance were representatives from the Third Fleet, NPS, MCWL, and the Engineering Field Activity (EFA). They thoroughly examined environmental consequences, including air quality data, biological, and environmental protection measures.

The Naval Postgraduate School conducted another UW meeting on December 8, 1999. The draft for the National Information Campaign in Monterey and San Francisco was introduced. The Information Campaign draft included ideas for the US Marines, Presidio of Monterey, and the city of Monterey to brief such groups as the Presidio Trust

Project Review, Presidio Committee, Presidio Trust Tenants Council, Neighborhood Association for Presidio Planning, and the Planning Association for Richmond. The suggestion that the Director of Neighborhood Services from the Office of the Mayor, to assign a member of their staff to coordinate with the military and help with the AWE information program was approved.

The Marine planners also attempted to meet with some local groups, such as the Fisherman’s Wharf Association, to explain the purpose of the exercise and to answer any questions. The Marines were also hoping that local merchants on the wharf would do what they could to promote the “Forward from the Sea Exposition.” Not only was this intended to dissipate local concerns associated with the exercise, but the Marines hoped that the local business community would come to see UWE as an opportunity for increased tourism in the form of visitors interested in witnessing a realistic training exercise.

City of Monterey representatives also wanted to organize a consolidated briefing for interested environmental groups about the UW exercise. Unfortunately, this did not happen, because it would have been another opportunity for the public to receive information, possibly diminishing future protests.

The start of the media campaign was February 15, 1999. Part of the reason for the media campaign starting less than one month before the exercise was that the final conference for Kernal Blitz was scheduled for February 2-4, while the UW final planning conference was scheduled for February 9 - 11, both in San Diego. The public information campaign could not begin until the finalizations of the details for the exercise were complete. The media campaign was delayed until February 15. San
Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, and Monterey residents gained awareness through both the print and radio in conjunction with the Pentagon Press Brief. The media campaign included information packets, brochures, briefs, videos, a web site, media handbooks, press conferences, and a phone bank. Recruiters were to brief all local military organizations to coincide with the neighborhood and media program. Such groups would include Navy and Marine Leagues, Marine Corps Coordinating Council and Navy and Marine Corps reserve associations.

However, subsequent to the February 15th, 1999, both the Marines and the City of Monterey failed to follow through with the originally scheduled public meetings to address local concerns. A question and answer generating session, scheduled to take place early in January to better prepare the Marines and the city to respond to potential questions that rose by special interest groups never occurred. Planners for the Third Fleet wanted to set up an information meeting to in early September, but this also did not occur. City representatives also wanted to organize a briefing for interested groups, but it never took place. These meetings would have enabled the Marines and the City to prevent the public from being misinformed and addressed local concerns regarding UWE at an early stage.

D. PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE

The first newspaper article about UWE appeared on December 18, 1998 in the Monterey County Herald. The article mentioned an amphibious assault to take place on the NPS beach and that there would be operations at NPS and DLI. LtCol Jenny Holbert, public affairs officer for the MCWL, explained in detail the scenario, the importance of

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learning battle mistakes in a training exercise as opposed to during an actual battle, and the caution the Marines were taking in planning for the exercise concerning the environment. Commander Bob Anderson, interviewed by the Monterey Herald, stated; “extensive public announcements were scheduled for February and March once all the permits were signed.”26

The San Francisco Business Times came out with a story on December 28, 199827. While the article in the Monterey Herald mainly concerned Monterey, the San Francisco Business Times article focused on the exercise planned to take place at the Presidio in San Francisco. This article projected possible controversy over the use of what now belonged to the National Park Service since 1997 when the Army turned over the Presidio.

Plans for the San Francisco Presidio were similar to those in Monterey, but on a slightly larger scale. Baker Beach would be where the landing would occur. Over the years, utilization of thousands of man-hours has gone into Baker Beach for habitat restoration for replanting rare and endangered plants. The article explained that after one hundred years of occupation by the military, subjected to toxic hospital wastes, fuel spills, and the planting of non-native trees and shrubs has degraded the area. War game proposals in the Presidio of San Francisco required permits from the Park Service and the Presidio Trust. The expected answer was due in early January. If the answer was yes, local groups would protest the decision.

26 Interview with Robert Anderson, 30 April 1999.

The San Francisco Chronicle released an article on December 31, 1998. This article portrayed the exercise as a miniature D-Day. This article was the first to mention neighborhood groups being vocal about the exercise and expressing outrage, although it did not mention what groups were becoming vocal.\textsuperscript{28}

By January, news articles began to appear much more frequently, sparking interest in the San Francisco area. The more clarifying information provided, the more the opposition grew. By the end of January, opposition in the San Francisco Bay area was so strong; the Marines officially abandoned their planned exercise in the San Francisco area and decided to look for suitable training ground elsewhere.

As a result, in February the Marines focused their attention on completing planning for Monterey and the new location of AWE2 in Oakland and Alameda. The Monterey County Herald put out the first news article about UW in November, mentioning that the Marines were planning to conduct an UW exercise. In a later article written by the Herald and published one day after the Navy League Meeting on Saturday, February 13, 1999, the Herald explained the size and scope of the exercise with more detail. It also concluded that there were no problems visualized with the exercise and the Navy League approved the exercise.

The Marines made verbal contact with the Coastal Commission on a number of occasions, and the Commission gave the Marines a "GO" (okay) for the exercise. The Marines had completed four drafts of the EA and they had received total cooperation

from the city. At this point, the Marines had received all the necessary official approvals for the exercise, and they felt that they were ready to focus on the exercise itself.29

E. SUMMARY

Marines and City Officials conducted all affairs by the book and even went beyond the necessary protocol to make sure the exercise would be successful. At this point, approximately three weeks before the exercise, it appeared as though “all systems go.” However, in practice, the delayed official publicity and information on the exercise came well after the media began focusing on the issue in December 1998. In the absence of USMC views on UWE, the news media focused mainly on one side of the story, the opposition of local activists in San Francisco. Moreover, the Marines and City officials missed several opportunities to hold public meetings that would have allowed them to present their side of the story. This meant that the public’s first impression of the exercise was one of controversy. Although Marines always include a contingency plan when conducting operations, issues concerning citizens opposing the exercise bombarded them. In that three-week time span, their interpersonal communication skills received their greatest challenge.

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29 Interview, Robert Anderson, 30 April 1999.
IV. PRE-EXERCISE UNCERTAINTIES

A. THE BATTLE

Beside the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, the Presidio of San Francisco is a history laden preserve that the US Army occupied until 1997. The Pentagon had decided to save hundreds of millions of dollars by abandoning the Presidio as a military base. Local environmentalists successfully lobbied Congress to convert the Presidio of San Francisco into a national park. When it became public knowledge that the Marines were planning a miniature “D-Day” invasion, citizens became extremely upset and vocal in opposition to the UW exercise in San Francisco.

By the end of December 1998, information about the UW exercise was available to the public, but it was not widely publicized. With the actual full-scale media campaign scheduled for publication in the middle of February, one month before the exercise, the only thing left for the Marines at that point was to react. The Monterey County Herald published a public notice of the exercise in Monterey on January 13, 1999. The public notice consisted of a small legal advertisement. From this date, a public comment period ran until February 9, 1999. The public notice generated ten letters of which two were positive. There did not appear to be much opposition to the exercise in Monterey. Some would argue that there was not much opposition because no one pays close attention to a small legal advertisement. This could explain why, while the Marines were experiencing full-scale objections from many protesters in San Francisco, Monterey was surprisingly quiet.

The Presidio Trust, the organization that administers the property of the former Army base in San Francisco, would not agree to allow the Marines to use buildings or
other property. Therefore, on January 29, the Marines officially canceled plans to use the
San Francisco Presidio. Interestingly enough, at this point, few complaints were from the
citizens in Monterey. Protesting in Monterey did not begin until three weeks before the
exercise was to occur.

The City of Monterey officials were excited about the idea of the Marines
conducting the Urban Warrior exercise in March. It would give the economy a boost
with the amount of money the Marines would spend and the amount of money visitors to
Monterey would spend when they came to watch the exercise. As an added benefit to the
city, the Marines were able to interest the city in using the exercise to train their
emergency personnel for possible future scenarios using many of the resources furnished
by the Marine Corps.

Both the Marines and city officials were very surprised at the community’s
reaction in Monterey. Once San Francisco’s problems had passed, the civil-military
participants paused and focused on last minute details for the Monterey exercise.
However, they did not apply the lessons learned from the San Francisco experience to
Monterey. Opposition leaders were just beginning to organize in local communities. It
was not until three weeks before the exercise that a number of people suddenly became
very determined to see the exercise in Monterey stopped.

One of the first articles opposing the UW exercise in Monterey appeared in the
San Jose Mercury News on February 1, 1999.30 A woman and her fiancée were planning
their wedding reception at NPS for the evening of March 13, 1999. Their concern was
that the Marines and all others involved in the exercise would not be gone before the

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30 San Jose Mercury News. Nuptials Beset By Invasion of 6,000 Marines, San Jose, CA, 1999.

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reception started. After mailing 250 invitations, there was no way to change the date or time for the reception, the article stated. This story did not seem to arouse much attention.

On February 2, 1999, Ken Garcia wrote an article in the San Francisco Chronicle shaming San Francisco for not allowing the Marines to train. Garcia pointed out that San Francisco prides itself on being so open and accepting, to everyone, except real soldiers in camouflage. The City of San Francisco actually welcomed the exercise. According to Mr. Garcia, the Presidio Trust and Park Service said no. Mr. Garcia went on to say that San Francisco’s smug attitude should not extend to emergency preparedness, especially when someday soon, the city may be begging for military assistance by land, sea or air.

Many more newspaper articles about the exercise began to circulate, mostly out of the San Francisco area. Most of the articles focused on public protests. In an attempt to defend the Marines, Tim Jones, spokesperson for the MCWL, stated that the exercise was simply to prepare troops to quell rebellions and revolts in other countries. He went on to say, “Regardless of people’s political persuasion, it’s a fact that at some point we will be sending young Marines to combat. So, it is our responsibility to prepare them as well as possible.”

B. PROTESTORS ACTIVATED

It was not until after the article published by the Monterey County Herald on February 14, 1999, that protests began to appear. The article explained when the


invasion would begin, to what extent it would be enacted, and why the exercise was important to future fighting capabilities of our military.\[33\] This article seemed to galvanize the opposition.

By February 18, Monterey City Council had received a letter from the Responsible Consumers of the Monterey Peninsula (RCMP), an organization created by David Dilworth of Carmel. These concerned consumers expressed their feelings that officials seemed to lack concern for what effect the UW exercise would have on normal traffic patterns and loud noise ordinances. The group was more concerned about the Marines violating federal requirements to which federal agencies must adhere when operating in a Marine sanctuary. The group read the Environmental Assessment (EA) prepared by the Marines and found that it did not meet their standards. Copies of the EA were left in the libraries of Monterey and Seaside for the purpose of gaining comments from the concerned public. RCMP argued that the public could only comment on items mentioned in the EA, and their opinion of the EA was that it lacked detail. The group pointed out that the exercise needed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the EA did not comply. They requested that the city begin its own environmental assessment. They insisted that Monterey immediately take action on their concerns. If not the groups would seek a court injunction to stop the exercise.\[34\]

"Kernal Blitz '99" advertisements were in full force throughout San Francisco and surrounding areas. Included in the flyers was an agenda stating dates and times to

\[33\] Monterey County Herald, Marines Set To Invade Monterey, p. B1, Monterey, CA, 1999.

\[34\] Responsible Consumers of the Monterey Peninsula, Memo to Monterey City Council, February 1999.
attend tours of ships in San Francisco, Alameda, and Oakland. Kernal Blitz is a yearly event that had never previously received protests or questions.

Veterans for Peace expressed their views on February 19, 1999, during an interview with a reporter from the Monterey County Herald. A spokesperson for Veterans for Peace stated that they were planning protests because the Marines were threatening environmental and constitutional principles.35

On February 25, 1999, city and Marine officials received word from the California Coastal Commission (CCC), which had scheduled a public hearing for March 11, 1999, at the Carmel Mission Inn. Just two short days before the exercise was to begin, this would be the day for concerned citizens to speak for or against the exercise. It would also be the day for City and Marine officials to defend their positions.

In the last week of February, the Coast Weekly printed a public forum with articles by Donna Kalloch, speaking on behalf of the exercise and the Marine Corps. S. Brian Wilson spoke against the exercise. Mrs. Kalloch, wife of an Army Infantry officer, could not understand why anyone would fear the military when the military’s objective is to protect the nation. She pointed out that many times, when the Army conducts scheduled to training, the training is canceled due to environmental reasons. Computer-simulated scenarios are all the Army has for training. Mrs. Kalloch felt that as a nation, we should all support realistic training as the UWE since realistically trained troops are better prepared than computer-simulated trained troops.36

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36 Coast Weekly, Marines Are Americans Too, p. 8, Monterey, CA, 1999.
Opposing Donna in the public forum was S. Brian Wilson, co-chair of the John Steinbeck IV Veterans for Peace Chapter 46 in Monterey. Mr. Wilson, who served as a combat security officer in Vietnam for the US Air Force, had a few questions he wanted answered by the Marines. He wanted to know why the Marines chose one of the most highly acclaimed marine ecosystems in North America to conduct an Urban Warrior exercise. Why the exercise plan excluded public participation? Why the time of year when whales are migrating and salmon season is opening? He felt the exercise was a violation of civil rights.\(^{37}\)

Sue Fishkoff of the Coast Weekly probably wrote the most thorough and enlightening news article about the UWE. This article raised many questions, concerns, and issues pertaining to the exercise. Again, referring to the UWE as a miniature “D-Day,” the article raised some new questions for the Marines and Monterey city officials. She separated the concerns into different categories including political, environmental, and civil rights concerns. The first set of concerns was political. Discussion of UWE Plans took place with the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary approximately seven months before the scheduled exercise. So, why did the first news article not appear until November? Why did the staff of the California Coastal Commission and the Monterey City Council, instead of a full open discussion, only discuss the exercise amongst themselves? Why were there no public meetings?

Environmental concerns encompassed questions such as why are a large-scale military exercise occurring in a federally protected National Marine Sanctuary. Environmental concerns focused on the noise pollution helicopters and hovercrafts would

cause as well as hovercrafts disrupting protected sea life and landing on fragile sand
dunes.

Many citizens were concerned with civil rights abuses. They believed that city
emergency response personnel would be receiving training by the military, which is
against the law. Specifically, Veterans for Peace believed that exercises like these, in the
midst of civilians, are for the sole purpose of desensitize the public for actions against
civilians in the future.

C. MONTEREY CITY COUNCIL ATTACKED

On March 2, 1999, during a Monterey City Council meeting, approximately fifty
critics were present to express their opinions. Sam Karas showed up on behalf of
Congressman Sam Farr. Mr. Karas read a letter written by the Congressman that stated
he was disappointed that the city council did not get input from the community. He also
commented that the City of Monterey had not made contact with him concerning the
exercise.³⁸

This letter infuriated members of the City Council and Mayor Dan Albert. Council
members were upset for two reasons. First, Congressman Sam Farr never
mentioned, before the reading of the letter at a City Council meeting, that he was
concerned about the exercise. The Monterey City Council viewed this as public
grandstanding at the Monterey City Council’s expense. Second, Congressman Farr did
not present the letter himself.

Mayor Dan Albert wrote a letter expressing his disappointment in the
Congressman the following day. The Mayor made it clear that the UWE was first

mentioned in the July 28, 1998, council meeting. UWE was also on the agenda for the January 5, 1999, council meeting and no one spoke to the issue. In addition to the letter written to Congressman Sam Farr, Mayor Albert wrote a letter to the Santa Cruz City Council expressing his disappointment. Chastising Santa Cruz for basing their opposition on opinions and misinformation instead of facts, the Mayor assured Santa Cruz that their assumptions about the exercise were ridiculous. He also invited Santa Cruz’s mayor and city council members to the exercise on March 13, 1999, so that they could see how their ideas were unfounded.39

By the beginning of March, the situation appeared to be falling apart. The beginning of February, the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary officials said the Marine exercise would be acceptable. One month later, ten days before the scheduled date of the exercise, the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary sent an eight-page list of environmental challenges. Suddenly, the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary was worried about noise pollution from helicopters, operations in the water in close proximity to large congregations of marine animals, and the selection of Monterey for the exercise. They also expressed concerns about being briefed separately by both the Marines and the Navy, and that the information was conveyed with little written verification.

D. THE SATURDAY SPECIAL

The biggest news and hottest topic in Monterey for the month of March 1999, was the UWE. The topic was so hot that a radio station devoted an entire show, “The Saturday Special,” to the topic on 6 March 1999. Listeners were encouraged to call in and give opinions for or against the exercise. Lieutenant Commander Jack Hanzlick,

Public Affairs Officer for Third Fleet, and Peter Lumsdaine, Resource Center for Non-Violence, participated via telephone conference call. Present in the studio was S. Brian Wilson, Veterans for Peace.40

“The Saturday Special” is a radio show on stations KSCO and KOMY hosted by Michael Zworley that deals with hot local topics and usually lasts two hours. During the two hours on this particular day, many listeners called in to give their heated opinions. The majority of the calls were in opposition to the exercise. However, most of these opposing callers made arguments against the exercise based on misinformation or outlandish assumptions.

This episode of “The Saturday Special” was so popular that callers began to request that it receive more than the normal two hours airtime allotted. Exceptions granted, the talk show continued. By the time the talk show had ended, minds were apparently more open to the exercise. LtCdr Hanzlick was able to answer some questions that were genuine concerns from citizens in Monterey, Seaside, Carmel, Santa Cruz, and Sand City.

LtCdr Hanzlick did a thorough job clearing up many misconceptions held by the public. Included in those misconceptions was the concern that military personnel, interested civilian on-lookers, and military vehicles would congest traffic. In addition, concerns about increased noise pollution raised by the use of the hovercraft and helicopter equipment were resolved. Although in early January, the Joint Information Bureau, designed to answer public concerns about the UWE in San Francisco and Monterey, released information to the public addressing these concerns, Hanzlick took

40 Interview, Jack Hanzlik, 2 June 1999.
the opportunity to address them again on the “Saturday Special.” He stated that there might be a slight increase in pedestrian traffic, but that aviation events would not produce a significant level of noise nor interfere with the normal business of the city since the helicopters would be flying at an altitude three to five times higher than normal.

Additionally, the two guests who opposed the exercise, Mr. Lumsdaine and Mr. Wilson, intelligently discussed their concerns and possibly enlightened some citizens who had not understood their opposition. This radio show was probably the most successful public campaign because it allowed both sides to gain a better understanding of the other’s viewpoints.

What was most interesting, when listening to protesters speak, was the fact that many had the tendency to say a large percentage of the population was against the exercise. Different polls conducted and studies performed with personnel from both sides of the question. The polls and studies determined what the two sides of the question really were, but most news articles printed expressed the opinions of those in opposition to the exercise.

E. CITIZENS SPEAK

However, Coast Weekly has a weekly column called “Street Talk” that allows local citizens to give their opinions on whatever the topic may be for any given week. The week before the exercise, this column, of course, focused on the UW exercise. Surprisingly, the views held by the five interviewed were not at all negative. Citizens questioned were from Monterey, Carmel, and Seaside. Although this was obviously not a poll based on a scientific sample, it does provide some insight into the spectrum of opinions on UWE within the local communities.
When asked how he felt about how the public being informed of the exercise, citizen John Domiter felt the papers did a great job of informing the public. When asked if he felt the exercise would have a negative impact on the environment, Chuck Bartholomew did not think so and went on to say, “As long as there are people like Sadam, we need military CBIRF units to train.” Chris Lewis held the same views as both Domiter and Bartholomew, that the public was well informed and that the exercise would not have a negative impact on the environment. Judi Alexander felt that the Marines did a thorough and honest job informing the public, maybe only a “little late.” The fifth citizen to make a comment was completely neutral on the subject.41

“The Saturday Special” radio program was an unexpectedly significant day in the planning for UW. However, perhaps the most significant day the Marines had planned for was March 11, 1999, the day they were to meet with the CCC for a public hearing. The CCC deals with policies related to public access to coastal marine environments. The meeting lasted through several hours of discussion in which people rejecting the exercise spoke to their concerns. Various speakers pointed out that the Federal Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Federal Endangered Species Act, Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary regulations, and the California Coastal Act protect plants and marine life in Monterey Bay. Hearing these concerns put pressure on the CCC to reach a decision implying that the exercise would cause damage to the environment.

In addition to pressures from activists, the members of the CCC were also frustrated because they felt the Marines had not presented enough information for the CCC to rule in favor of the UW exercise. Although the environmental assessment

prepared by the Marines was approximately two hundred pages long, members of CCC received only an eight-page summary in which one of the pages was a map and two were pictures of military equipment. In an effort to protect migrating gray whales, sea otters and various birds, the CCC voted down the exercise in a unanimous vote seven to zero. Protesters were thrilled and many felt the whole exercise would not take place.

Officially, the CCC had no legal powers to stop the Marines. The only support the CCC's vote could give to protesters would be in their efforts to seek a court injunction. The Marines knew that the CCC had no legal powers to stop them, but to uphold good relations, the Marines decided against the LCAC landing.

The exercise was less than forty-eight hours away and although the Marines scaled back plans by eliminating the LCAC landing, protesters were not finished. They sought a court injunction to officially stop the exercise. US District Judge Martin Jenkins rejected the injunction because the groups failed to prove their claims of environmental damage.

On the day of the exercise, troops arrived by helicopter, instead of hovercraft, at the Monterey Peninsula Airport. The exercise would have been ideal for the testing of new equipment had the LCAC landing gone as originally scheduled. Nevertheless, even without the hovercraft, the conduct of the exercise on March 13, 1999 did take place and deemed a success.

F. SUMMARY

The three weeks before the exercise presented the most challenges for the city and Marine Corps. Although the media campaign would have produced more benefits had it started months earlier, the Marines were able to counter protests with assertive, honest,
and open “last minute” efforts. Not long after the protests began did it become obvious that many individuals could not be swayed to support the exercise.
V. URBAN WARRIOR GOES AWRY

A. WHAT WENT WRONG?

There are two sides to this story. On one side are the Monterey City Officials and the US Marine Corps, and on the other are local activists opposed to the exercise on environmental and civil rights grounds. The inability of the two sides to come to an agreement early created the many impediments officials ultimately faced in organizing the exercise.

What went wrong? According to the protesters, the Marines came bullying their way into Monterey to conduct an exercise. Their feeling was that the Marines should make use of military bases not conduct operation in the city. The protestors also felt the Marines planned were made in secrecy with the support of the City. By contrast, military and city officials saw it as a very beneficial exercise that would give both the City of Monterey and the military substantial training. Officials found it hard to imagine that local activists would work so hard to cancel the exercise when officials felt they had gone to great lengths to ensure that all precautions, safety measures, and bureaucratic processes were thorough and complete.

There are three possible explanations for the failure of USMC and city officials to foresee the degree of public protest in opposition to UW. The first possible explanation is that the Marines knew there would be potential arguments and thought they should not go public until the last minute leaving protesters no time to react. Evidence shows that this was not the case. There were news articles, based on information provided by USMC officials as early as November explaining the exercise. There was a legal notice encouraging public comment in newspapers in January. The EA was on record at local
public libraries. After the many interviews and discussions I conducted, secrecy was never the intent during the planning phase of the exercise. The Marines could have used the beach without securing local permission, but instead proactively contacted many federal agencies to ensure they were covering every possible safety and security measure. Lastly, why would the Marines be concerned with keeping the exercise a secret in Monterey when there were no issues or concerns when they conducted earlier exercises in other cities on the East Coast? The Marines did not see reasons to be concerned with problems in Monterey.

Another possible explanation that I discount is that the Marines did anticipate potential problems, designed the media campaign accordingly, but the campaign was just not sufficient. They did not anticipate problems because of previous experiences in other cities (with the exception of San Francisco). If they had anticipated problems, the Marines, such as occurred in San Francisco, they would have been much better prepared for protesters in Monterey. When the protesting occurred in San Francisco and there was no reaction or uproar in nearby Monterey, it reinforced the idea that there was a general acceptance of the exercise in Monterey.

The Marines did not anticipate the protestors encountered in Monterey. Marines reacted with surprise to the complaints and objections they received from the groups and individuals opposed to the exercise in Monterey. This reaction was because of the success of the exercises conducted on the East Coast. The Marines had a sufficient media campaign designed for the type of reaction that they had met in Charleston, SC, Jacksonville, FL, and Chicago, IL. However, they had not anticipated a reaction akin to
that of San Francisco in Monterey, so the media campaign they designed was inadequate to the situation.

Similarly, the city officials felt as though they had covered every issue concerning UW in a thorough manner. The UWE was on the agenda during city council meetings twice, and no one spoke to the issue. When the press published information about the upcoming exercise, no one seemed to be concerned. In February, media personnel were surprised that people in Monterey did not seem to be that interested in UW given that articles had appeared as early as November and December.

With the exception of the media campaign, the Marines followed the necessary steps in planning the exercise in a complete and effective manner. The Marines received one hundred percent support from the city officials. They provided an environmental assessment in an accurate, thorough, and timely manner. They had the outline and the staff scheduled to begin the media campaign. Delays in exercise planning caused the city and Marine officials to wait until the middle of February to start the media campaign instead of much sooner as originally planned.

B. THE DELAY IN THE MEDIA CAMPAIGN

The reason the campaign was started at around the same time as the protests began and not months sooner, was that the approval process for the UWE was initially aimed at San Francisco. The Presidio Trust in San Francisco requested that the Marines not go public with their plans to use Baker Beach without approval. The media campaign was to include both San Francisco and Monterey simultaneously. The Marines agreed not to implement the original plan to start the media campaign months before the exercise due to the request of the Presidio Trust. Although the Marines normally do not operate in
such a manner, keeping the peace with the city officials in San Francisco was important to them.

The Marines had planned to simultaneously publicize the exercises in San Francisco and Monterey. When the request came down from the Presidio Trust in San Francisco to hold off on going public, the Marines did not go public in Monterey as well. After the publishing of at least two news articles and a public notice concerning the environmental assessment, no complaints were forthcoming from either individuals or groups in the Monterey area.

The decision to honor the request of the Presidio Trust in San Francisco ended up being the biggest mistake made by the Marines. A mistake eventually gained momentum and caused many more problems. When the media campaign had finally begun, the public assumed that activists’ complaints were the reason for the campaign. Their initial exposure to the exercise was associated with controversy, so they perceived the media campaign to be a reactive response protest instead of proactive campaign.

The late start to the media campaign was the fundamental problem. Every problem the Marines faced was a result of the late, and therefore inadequate, campaign. Obstacles with the California Coastal Commission would not have appeared had the media campaign been started when originally planned. Media personnel were able to send out distorted messages and information. Many other issues appeared due to the lateness and inadequacy of the media campaign. Protesters perceived the exercise in ways that were not accurate. Even the name of the exercise influenced perceptions in a negative way. As a result, protestors, reacting to the short response time, bombarded the Marines at the last minute with numerous accusations.
C. CONTINUUM OF OPPOSITION

When examining the local opponents to the UW exercise, it is important to distinguish them into different groups or degrees along a continuum. At each end of the continuum were the extremists, those who were adamantly opposed to the exercise, and those who fully supported the exercise. Each group falls into a spectrum between intransigent and those who are open to dialogue. The outer limits of the opposition of the exercise included the Veterans for Peace.

Overt protests in Monterey began three weeks before the exercise, starting with Mr. Phil Butler representing Veterans for Peace. Mr. Butler takes credit for the initial complaint called in to the California Coastal Commission. Mr. Butler is retired from the United States Navy and was a prisoner of war in North Vietnam for eight years. Mr. Butler was also an instructor at the Naval Postgraduate School. With twenty years in the service, Mr. Butler understands the value and importance of the US Military conducting training exercises. Mr. Butler does not understand why the Marines were not using their bases to conduct this UW training since training is the very reason military bases exist. He and other members of Veterans for Peace feel strongly that these types of exercises should only take place in military training areas.42

Veterans for Peace opinions would not change. Members of this organization are to an extent anti-government. They do not approve of the government’s actions domestically or internationally. This group is not as much anti-military as it is against the use of non-military training areas outside of military posts. This fact is very evident as expressed during an interview with S. Brian Wilson of the Coast Weekly, “There are

42Interview, Phil Butler, 5 June 1999.
numerous large military installations in the continental US and elsewhere designed to provide the space for simulating various mission.” 43

Other groups on the extreme end of the continuum in the category of intransigent would include the Resource Center for Non-Violence, the Green Party, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Since the military advocates’ violence, these groups oppose military exercises, especially those conducted in the midst of a civilian population, like UW in Monterey.

In the middle of the spectrum or continuum would be individuals whose first information about the exercise was negative but with some education and positive interpretation, these individuals might possibly change their views. These people were simply misinformed or under informed. A positive media campaign can adequately inform and reassure these people that the Marines and city officials have their best interest at heart. With most of the protesters falling into the category of misinformed individuals, the lack of an early public relations campaign created the momentum for the problems encountered by the Marines.

All along the mid range of the continuum were those people, uncommitted one way, or the other, simply by the actions of the officials. These individuals are the ones on which the media campaign should focus. Since the media campaign did not begin as initially planned, it appeared as though the officials did not care about what these individuals thought or that the officials were trying to keep the exercise a secret. The secrecy of this exercise created distrust. It enabled the intransigent opponents of the

43 Coast Weekly, Scrap the Invasion, Monterey, CA, 1999.
exercise to gain support from the public located along the mid range of the continuum of opposition. The result, many became supporters of the protesters. Armed with little information, supporters came to their own conclusions creating distorted perceptions about the exercise.

D. PROTESTER'S PERSPECTIVE

There were many different perceptions of UW evident among different groups and individual protesters. Many felt that this exercise was a grossly overt way to recruit children into the military. Others had the impression that Urban Warrior was an exercise in terrorist training and due to the Posse Comitatus Act; there was no reason for active duty military personnel to be training for such an exercise.\textsuperscript{44} These protesters, misinformed by the media, called the exercise a terrorist exercise. This however, was only a portion of the total exercise. Thinking the US military is training for a terrorist attack also caused groups and individuals to be concerned with violations of their civil rights. In addition to these views, protesters included people who thought the CIA in cooperation with the United Nations concocted UW. Mr. Gordon Smith, Veterans for Peace, believes that the military did not do a proper EA and did not do it in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{45} Concern that troops are being trained to take over US cities was expressed by Mr. Mike Watson, President of the Monterey Bay Area Regional Fisherman Association.

Why did the protesters take such an active stance and why were so many people confused about the exercise? The protesters initially got offended mainly because the

\textsuperscript{44} The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 specifically prohibits the use of the military in domestic law enforcement unless authorized by Congress or the Constitution and does not allow for military intervention through actions by the Secretary of Defense or even an executive order from the President.

media campaign conducted by the Marines and the City of Monterey was inadequate and late. They also felt that information about the exercise had deliberately been delayed in an attempt to compromises their ability to respond. Most protesters were on the end of the continuum in which they were simply misinformed and/or open for dialogue. Although the Marines tried to inform the public, their efforts allowed for rumor and assumptions to spread rampanty throughout the general population. It also allowed time for more individuals to move in the direction of the intransigence.

Had the media campaign been adequate, the vote in opposition to UW by the California Coastal Commission would not have occurred. The Marines thought that talking to the staff at the CCC would suffice. Initial relations were good, and the CCC staff felt this exercise only required routine approval. However, when many concerned citizens and groups started to complain the staff began to worry they had made a premature decision and decided to put the question before the panel of commissioners.

The California Coastal Commissioners, appointed positions by the State of California, sit on a board that meets occasionally. Staff personnel are permanent members who work full time for the CCC. Normally, when the staff gives approval, the exercise does not need to go for a vote before the Commissioners. The staff became concerned because of the opposition, and they did not want to take responsibility for saying yes to the Marines. Therefore, they passed the issue to the board, which is not the normal procedure.

January was a time for changing from old commissioners to new. Some of the new commissioners were ready and willing to answer the concerns of the public where these concerns did not exist or had not surfaced during the tenure of the previous
commissioners. Again, an adequate and early media campaign would have caused less
alarm within society, and therefore, new commissioners would not have been alarmed.

The reason the California Coastal Commission was so important to the process is
due to a tendency of activists in California to use environmental issues to stop activities
they oppose. This is exactly what the Veterans for Peace did. There would have been no
problems with the CCC if these protesters had not been able to gain the support that they
did. A solid media campaign would have diminished the support gained by the
intransient elements of the UW opposition.

While all cities need a solid and effective media campaign, a city like Monterey
needs more extensive efforts than other cities simply because it is a Marine Sanctuary.
Moreover, this sanctuary is a key part of the natural attractions that make Monterey a
popular tourist destination and a visitor-oriented economy. There seemed to be a lack of
education within the Marine Corps on the extent of the protected environment in the area,
and the degree the public would go to protect that environment.

E. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In all military operations in which civilians will simultaneously operate, early
media campaigns need adequate staffing. In order to properly handle and execute media
campaigns of this magnitude, effective civil-military relations are the key. The military
should set its sights on gaining as much support from the public as early as possible. This
is only possible through civil-military relations conducted on a continual basis. Media
campaigns, including EA’s and information packets, should be prepared and printed prior
to the idea of the training exercise, natural disaster, or civil disorder. With continuous
interaction as a basis for a civil-military relationship, an education process will begin to
take place for civilian agencies as well as the general populace on the capabilities and benefits of local military units and exercises.

F. SUMMARY

Marine officials discovered the real impediments they faced stemmed from the inadequacy of their media campaign. If the media campaign had begun when the Marines initially wanted it to start, the intransigent opposition to UW would not have been able to gain the support they did. Without that support, many of the issues Marines faced in Monterey would have been less disruptive.

This exercise caused many to realize the importance of gaining public support for military training exercises. These exercises are more complicated with respect to getting agency approvals. This exercise also opened many eyes to the importance of controlling perceptions of the public. Citizens will draw their own conclusions, which sometimes completely unfounded, if not positively controlled to some extent.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. LESSONS LEARNED

According to Morris Janowitz, certain pre-conditions must be present in order to experience effective civil-military relations. These preconditions include sound legal provisions, strong political leadership, clear missions and tasks, a supportive civil culture, successful governance, and a professional military. During the UW training exercise, conducted by the Marines on March 13, 1999, failure to identify initial problems resulted in failure to meet all requirements.

Problems faced during the planning and organizing stages of the exercise ultimately hindered the Marines' ability to train in a realistic environment by restricting the in use of all training equipment they had originally planned to use. This chapter will suggest recommendations to alleviate problems in future civil-military relations encountered by active duty, reserve units, or National Guard units.

B. SOUND LEGAL PROVISIONS

The main shortfall in establishing a solid legal foundation for the exercise was the environmental assessments. Anytime an urban environment is used, an environmental assessment is required. It will always be a benefit to alleviate fears and to answer questions pertaining to whether or not the military is doing what it should to care for the environment. When comparing Monterey's UWE to that of other UW exercises, there were more problems encountered by the Marines due in part to Monterey being a coastal

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46 Morris Janowitz is, Distinguished Professor in the Dept. of Sociology at the University of Chicago. A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he produced writings in political and urban sociology. He authored The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. He has also served as chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.
Marine Sanctuary. However, always doing an EA, no matter what the environment, will benefit the military concerning public relations. It sends the signal that the military cares.

In addition to writing an EA, the military needs to publish and publicize the results. The EA for Monterey was on file in the Monterey public libraries, but this step alone failed to benefit the Marines. The facts resulting from the EA should be a major part of the public relations campaign.

C. STRONG POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Falling into the realm of strong political leadership is public information. This should be the primary focus on govenment communication in preparation for an exercise. The public relations campaigns should come before any other planning for the training exercise when the active duty is involved and before movement into an area when the National Guard is involved. This lets civilians know what actions are going to take place in their locality. Even during natural disasters and civil disorder, civilians can get the wrong impression of military actions and come to the wrong conclusions when not informed, as we see in Monterey. Therefore, the military should inform, and inform accurately, from the beginning of an operation.

Strong political leadership is also needs to be prepared for a public opinion backlash. Leaders should be strong enough to provide accurate information and be ready to defend their positions if a public opinion backlash occurs. Additionally, since officials should be the first to put the word out, they need to be prepared to battle the long lead-time given to protesters. This requires thorough preparations and strong support.

Leaders need to be as proactive as possible with a public relations campaign. They should not allow a situation to develop where the media presents a military
operation in a negative way due a shortage of accurate information. In addition, leaders should not assume that just because matters are proceeding smoothly that no problems exist. When there seems to be no problems, leaders may feel the PR campaign is of secondary importance. However, there will always be negative views. Effective communication skills and positive responses to inaccurate statements can minimize the effects expressed negative views.

It is imperative that strong, aggressive, proactive, and thorough PR campaigns exist to support any operation, especially in a highly populated urban environment. The Marines and Monterey city officials involved in the UW exercise will never forget the lack of this type of PR campaign. Public relations need to be aggressive in order to alleviate fears displayed by the public from the beginning. Waiting too long did not give the Marines the opportunity they needed to ensure the public perceived their exercise properly. The Marines ended up in a reactive situation, having to respond to the protestor’s views.

In support of the public relations campaign, both military and civilian officials should cover every aspect of the exercise with as many groups or individuals as possible through press conferences and public meetings. Along with contacting groups and individuals in a timely manner, it is important to keep constant and efficient communication between the military and civilian organizations. The military should never assume that the civil authorities would handle the public relations. They should always follow-up to ensure that media awareness, in fact, is accomplished.

A proper public relations campaign can be quite an ordeal. Therefore, the PR staff should be both adequate and resourceful. Consider assigning an adequate number of
personnel to the PR campaign. Individuals should be resourceful in determining ways to project the most positive image. The staff needs to be capable and able to function in an aggressive and knowledgeable manner. These are the personnel that will not allow the media campaign to be less important than planning the exercise. The media staff's only job should be dealing with the media campaign. In all cases, it would be better to allot too much staff to the public relations campaign than too little.

D. CLEAR MISSIONS AND TASKS

Setting clear missions and tasks is almost as important as the public relations campaign. When missions and tasks are not clear, weaknesses in planning become evident to all involved, and this creates uncertainty among all participants involved. The amount of time sent on the media campaign should equal or even exceed the amount of time spent actually organizing the exercise. National Guard units should provide rules of engagement for each unit when delegating the proper staff in cases when called into service.

Logistics is also a significant issue. Allocating responsibility for logistics among military or civilians agencies requires early planning. Attempting to clarify these issues late in the process creates more problems for parties involved to overcome at a time when they face other pressing issues. When working with civilian agencies and coordinating logistic support, it is imperative that the military gain a tight grip on the logistics dedicated by the different entities. Part of the logistics issue is the need to provide adequate amounts of personnel for the public relations campaign ensures an effective working cell for the public relations campaign.
Missions and tasks cannot be clear to all participants if the same language is not used. Language was an obstacle in the beginning of UW since the military use of acronyms tended to confuse city organizations. To prevent this issue from recurring in the future, the military should develop a document that deciphers these acronyms for civilians. Civilian organizations require such a document to assist them with military supported operations. These documents would be most beneficial if issued to cities throughout the nation as part of a disaster preparation manual or packet.

It is also important to consider the fact that many civilians do not understand the military chain of command. Military personnel should put great effort into educating civilians on the chain of command concept and structure, especially when conducting joint exercises.

E. SUPPORTIVE CIVIC CULTURE

A strong public relations campaign is a key to gaining a supportive civic culture. Immediate public awareness of such an exercise is imperative. Early transmission of such information allows civilians to believe the exercise is in their best interest. Coinciding with the public relations campaign, an education program must provide additional information about the proposed exercise. Education by the military to the public on the importance of the military after the Cold War is a necessity. The public considers the military less important than in previous years. Moving into the twenty-first century, this attitude of reduced importance of the military could create problems when the active components are conducting training or when the National Guard is moves into a town to "assist" with natural disaster operations. As part of the teaching process, it is most beneficial for the military to begin communications with civilian counterparts as
part of a long-term process. Although it may take time, manpower, and funds, the long-
term benefits will far outweigh the short-term problems in terms of public support.

Perceptions by the public are extremely important when trying to gain their support. Language is also an issue when naming training exercises. Urban Warrior, known by another name, such as "City Relief" or "Operation Sunshine," it could have assisted in allowing the perceptions of the public to be less negative. The Marines are supposed to be aggressive in their operations, but when dealing with the public that may not totally understand, it is important to use wording and phrases that are less offensive or reduce fears in the minds of individuals or organizations.

During any urban military training exercise, the military needs to understand the political entities within the urban environment. This is essential to gaining public support. From the onset, the military should recognize possible opposition groups and try to anticipate the public's concerns. These concerns need addressing as soon as possible for all parties involved, which in turn, will dissuade undecided citizens from moving to support opponents out of lack of accurate information.

F. SUCCESSFUL GOVERNANCE

To achieve successful governance, the military must understand the local politics, which will differ from city to city. The military must also understand that these local politics would not be the same as military politics. The military must not assume that the civilian staff's at local agencies operate in the same manner as the staff in a military unit. Research, as well as prior proper planning, should take place to understand the processes of different political entities.
An example of this would be finding out whom to go to initially within the city government. One city’s contact may be the Mayor, while another city’s contact person may be the City Manager, as it was in Monterey. Another example would be the California Coastal Commission. Understanding the power of the commissioners compared to the full time staff personnel at the California Coastal Commission could have made Monterey’s UW run more efficiently.

Successful governance occurs when concerns of individual citizens are understood. Some concerns are obvious, while others may not be as obvious until they unfold. Therefore, just because concerns do not appear to be relevant in the present moment, does not mean that these concerns could not create problems later.

To assist with successful governance, coordination efforts are on a continual basis with city officials in disaster relief missions. Most cities within the US need a better understanding of the military’s disaster relief capabilities. Accomplishment of this understanding is through periodic community based information meetings.

Additionally, there should be more scenarios like that of UW in the future. Despite the opposition, the benefits of civilian personnel and military personnel working together to improve working relationships whether through disaster relief, urban operations training, civil disturbances, or emergency operations tests, will improve civil-military relationships and capabilities. There will always be opposition to military activity in local communities. Minimizing its effect will result in civilians eventually learning to trust the military.
G. SUMMARY

Every branch of the United States Military needs to get serious about civil-military relations. Most of our battles in the future, domestic or international, will be located in cities. As the National Guard works simultaneously with active duty entities, so the US military, as a whole, will work simultaneously with the civilian populations throughout the world.

The Marines conduct urban training exercises in real world environments. Our soldiers, sailors, and airmen need this training to provide for safe operations while protecting lives within the United States and in other countries. The Marines discovered many special scenarios and tools to help them in future urban battles. More lessons learned and more training in real urban environments, by more than just US Army Special Forces and the US Marine Corps, are required in the future.

The biggest problem with these types of training exercises, as experienced first hand in Monterey, is getting the public to support the exercise. In order to gain this support, implementation of a proper public relations campaign requires is critical. A strong public relations campaign requires a designated staff long before the first preparation for the exercise begins.

In addition, we should develop specific regulations stating the duties of each staff member of the public relations team. This staff would be tasked with different jobs including, but not limited to, preparing an environmental assessment and publicizing results, educating the public on benefits of the military, capabilities of local units, provide documents that define military acronyms, and coordinating with the different political
entities to learn their protocols and processes. This staff's only job would be that of public relations. This staff would conduct press conferences and private meetings for concerned groups. Most importantly, the staff would understand the importance of an aggressive, honest, and thorough public relations campaign to gain support from the populace.

Civil-military relations in the future need to evolve and develop into a relationship that is more than just a word or a relationship that only exists when the need arises. Civil-military relations should be ongoing and continually progressing. The lack of efficient civil-military relations on a local level is becoming increasingly detrimental to the defense and safety of our soldiers and society. Urban Warrior in Monterey is just one example of the urgent need for improved civil-military relations in the United States.
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