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THE IMPACT OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) DEPLOYMENTS ON ARMY RC RECRUITING AND RETENTION

BY

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The Impact of Army Reserve Component (RC) Deployments on Army RC Recruiting and Retention

by

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Willie D. Scott, Jr.

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The end of the cold war has created numerous challenges regarding our national security. A major challenge is the increased reliance on the Army Reserve Components (RC) to meet requirements of our National Military Strategy. This paper examines the impact of RC deployments on Army RC recruiting and retention by researching past and current trends and indicators. It includes documentation from various sources that support my findings. This paper only evaluates the impact on the United States Army Reserve (USAR), and Army National Guard (ARNG) units. In an effort to eliminate strategic level decisions that may negatively impact RC recruiting and retention, this paper identifies options and measures that may be used to assess the frequency and methods by which RC units are selected for deployments.
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PREFACE

This paper has afforded me the opportunity to do an unbiased analysis of the impact RC deployments are having on RC recruiting and retention. This research has been an enriching experience. Special acknowledgement to Colonel John F. Scharfeld, Executive Officer, Operations Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, for providing information on USAR deployments. Special acknowledgement to Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Stone, Deputy, Operations Division, National Guard Bureau, for providing information on ARNG deployments. Finally, special thanks to my wife, Anita R. Scott, and my children Cicretia, Katrina, and William for their support in allowing me to sacrifice portions of our family time to complete this project. I selected this topic to assist senior leaders in assessing the impact of RC deployments on recruiting and retention, and its stressful, yet important role in support of both our National Military Strategy (NMS), and our National Security Strategy (NSS).
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THE IMPACT OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) DEPLOYMENTS ON ARMY RC RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Since the drawdown of the active force after Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S), Reserve Component (RC) soldiers have played an integral role in all of the United States' large deployments. The participation of RC soldiers in ODS/S was the first time all of the seven reserve forces were mobilized at the same time in 30 years, and the first time since the major All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was started in 1973.

Over the past decade reservists have participated in deployments such as Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti), Provide Promise and Deny Flight (Bosnia), Restore Hope (Somalia), Southern Watch (Southern Iraq), and Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), to name a few. The increased deployments that active and RC soldiers are now involved in fall under the umbrella of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Existing MOOTW commitments require an increased utilization of RC soldiers.

As of October 2000, the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve have provided more than 20,200 soldiers for Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia, more than 4,300 for Uphold Democracy in Haiti, more than 3,300 for Desert Thunder in Iraq, and more than 1,900 for Allied Force in Kosovo. According to Pentagon surveys, retention has been affected by deployments. The leading reasons soldiers leave the reserves are deployments that cause conflicts over jobs and separation from families.¹

The increasing operation tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) of both active duty and RC soldiers are causing a severe strain on the retention of service members. This concern has been voiced in articles by the Reserve Officers Association (ROA), as well as by military leaders in testimony to Congress, in speeches, and in budget requests. There appears to be no end in sight for a continuous requirement for RC soldiers involvement in peacekeeping and stability operations deployments. According to the article excerpt below:

New instruments of foreign policy provide as visible a sign of American determination to shape the international environment toward peace than the presence overseas of the US Army. In transition states like Kosovo and Bosnia, only ground forces can physically police urban areas, establish checkpoints, conduct search-and-seizure and disarming operations, detect and clear minefields, and resolve conflict among local inhabitants of different ethnicities. But in an age of decreasing military budgets and ever-expanding requirements to deploy ground forces for peacekeeping and stability operations, the US Army is stretched to its limit; its soldiers are exhausted and leaving the service at alarming rates. Not surprising, the Army has increasingly turned to the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the US Army Reserve (USAR) for relief. Anticipating a trend of continued peacekeeping deployments, the Army is making
an effort to integrate the Active Component and Reserve Component (AC and RC) to meet current needs and transform the RC to meet future crises and contingencies as far out as 2025.²

This paper evaluates only the impact of deployments on recruiting and retention within the USAR and ARNG. The overall intent of this research is not to evaluate recruiting and retention statistics, but variables (family, employment, education, high OPTEMPO, and PERSTEMPO) that may influence an individual's desire to join or stay in the reserves. The Army reserve components (USAR/ARNG) are not alone; other reserve component organizations are experiencing similar recruiting and retention concerns.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Reservists have always been an integral part of the US Army's response to large foreign deployments. Thus, understanding how mobilization or deployments of reservists affect their attitudes and those of their families and employers is important because of the potential effects on retention, future recruiting, and the eventual reshaping of the force in perhaps unforeseen ways.³ Mobilizations and deployments have the potential to be positive. They can often bring a unit together and instill a degree of pride in its members, often improving both readiness and retention. However, mobilizations and deployments can also have negative impacts. There has been a dramatic increase in RC deployments since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Family separations and quality of life concerns have a negative impact on RC deployments. With the increased number of deployments, thousands of RC soldiers are forced to put their families, education, and their civilian careers on hold.

Most reservists joined their units expecting to serve part time, which has traditionally been no more than a weekend each month, and two weeks during the summer. This is no longer the norm. Many key leaders of RC units spend several hours of personal time, often uncompensated, to meet administrative requirements associated with their unit. Additionally, they are especially challenged by the increased demands they inherit in preparation for deployments. Deployments disrupt family routines, finances, and careers for thousands of reservists. Civilian employers are also forced to make do with what they have and can afford while their employees are away. They juggle work schedules; require other employees to pick up the slack, or incur the added expenses of hiring temporary help to cover the work during extended absences.

Although RC family members and employers are often supportive of RC deployments to support and defend United States national and vital interests, these deployments still put strains on the home front. The impact of how many families and jobs stay intact should be a major
concern of strategic leaders as they plan to rely on the Guard and Reserve more in the future. Each of these variables will undoubtedly be a major consideration as individuals decide to join or remain in the USAR or ARNG. Two of the major concerns of reservists that impact most on recruiting and retention are families and employers.

RESERVE COMPONENT RECRUITING

The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) has missed USAR recruiting goals for the past six years. By comparison, the ARNG has met recruiting goals over the same period. The ARNG, unlike the USAR, does not fall under USAREC for recruiting. Through the National Defense Act of FY00, the House Armed Services Committee has authorized a review of the prospect of having the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) control USAR recruiting. Since August 1978, USAR recruiting, as directed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), has been a USAREC responsibility. Both the Guard and Reserve maintained their retention mission.

In FY99, the USAREC's USAR recruiting percentage hit an all-time low of 76.9% (10,500 soldier shortfall). There is no guarantee that a change in USAR recruiting responsibilities will be a panacea to improve recruiting shortfalls. However, having a separate USAR recruiting command directly controlled by the CAR may be a viable option for re-energizing USAR recruiting efforts, and reversing the downward trend of meeting recruiting goals. It may also help eliminate perceptions that USAREC is placing more emphasis on the Regular Army (RA) recruiting missions and less on the USAR recruiting mission. When AC and RC recruiters view each other as competitors instead of partners in achieving recruiting goals, it is counter-productive. The change in recruiting responsibility may serve as a means for better assessing the true impact of increased deployments on recruiting and retention.

It is essential that future recruiting strategies allow all service components to engage the 'prime market'. The 'prime market' is described as the general male population between the ages of 17-21, minus those who are not qualified because of moral, medical, or educational reasons. The RC recruit, however, is occasionally older because of prior military service, married, and part of the working force. A Defense Department's Youth Attitude Tracking study done in the early nineties indicated that the willingness of young males to enlist in the military dropped dramatically after 1990. Interest among college students also declined. Major reasons included the instability seen in our military that was caused mainly because of downsizing, increased deployments, and a greatly improved economy.
The United States currently has the strongest economy it has seen in several years, and the military has to compete against increased college enrollment and a lucrative job market. Recruiting becomes more difficult when the economy is booming, causing few to view the military as a viable option. Although military service is a noble profession, the uncertainty it brings through unpredictable deployments, and from those in uniform leaving in order to secure more stability at home and at work, is causing potential recruits to question if it is the right profession for them. Over the past decade the USAR and ARNG deployed over 30 times in support of major military operations.
As reflected in the two figures above, RC units have played an even greater role in deployments over the past six years. Throughout this same period of time, USAR recruiting has suffered a major decline. Historically, the military has been able to attract 'prime market' recruits with its esprit de corps, educational benefits and other incentive programs. Today, however, a number of civilian companies are offering educational benefits similar to the Army's. Educational benefits include scholarships, tuition assistance, loan repayments, and student loans. It is imperative that Congress and military leaders of each service component seek and promote programs that will help the military remain competitive. Resources and programs to improve enlistment bonus amounts, incentive bonuses, increased pay and allowances, providing more predictability in deployments, and improvements in quality of life concerns, are basic initiatives that will help improve recruiting and retention.
RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING

Reserve Component forces must effectively train to meet future missions with the flexibility to shape the global environment, deter potential foes, and respond to a broad range of crises and threats. According to the National Military Strategy of the United States:

The Reserve Component, in addition to being essential participants in the full range of military operations, are an important link between the Armed Forces and the public. Mobilization of the Reserve Components has always been an important indicator of the commitment of national will. Guardsmen and Reservists are not only integrated into war plans, but also provide critical skills in carrying out contingency operations, as well as augmenting and supporting active units during peacetime. National Guard and other Reserve Component elements also provide the NCA with a strategic hedge against uncertainty and with an organized basis to expand our Armed Forces if necessary. Additionally, they also provide a rational base to ease tempo of unit and individual deployments for Active components.4

Realistic training gives RC forces the confidence to succeed in challenging situations. The time reservists devote to training exceeds that of any country in the world. Reserve component soldiers are allocated 39 days each year for training, which is typically one drill weekend each month at a local armory or reserve center and two weeks of annual training. However, the time spent on training is often significantly reduced due to other factors such as formations, administrative requirements, and occasional travel between normal drill locations and external training areas.

Reservists are essential to the military’s total force of “The Army”. Total force means that many RC soldiers will deploy as an integral part of the active force during mobilization. Consequently, RC soldiers are increasingly being held to the demands of meeting training standards similar to those of their AC counterparts. Additionally, career reservists have to spend an inordinate amount of time on reserve duty in order to remain competitive. Field-grade officers, for example, can easily spend up to 70 days each year on reserve related duty, some compensated and some donated. A few of the demands on field-grade reserve officers include requirements to attend military schools, conferences, workshops, staff calls, training meetings, and performing administrative requirements between drills.

The demands on noncommissioned officers (NCOs) for career development and progression are equally challenging. However, one of the most difficult challenges for a career reservist with a full-time civilian job is finding the time to meet the career development requirements, in addition to the other demands previously mentioned. Career development and professional military education are essential to having the trained personnel and forces
necessary to respond to our NMS. However, these requirements for RC soldiers are increasingly in conflict with family obligations and demanding civilian occupations.

The current force structure will continue to require RC soldiers to be trained to meet the challenges of a Total Force. Additionally, RC soldiers are assuming a significant new role in Homeland Security, to include such emerging missions of consequence management for domestic incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and the protection of national information infrastructure. Collective training and individual training requirements place difficult demands on all reservists. As a career reservist (NCO or commissioned officer) advances in rank and responsibility so do the demands of the Reserve. Demands from family members and employers also heighten. Many reservists are thus faced with the decision of leaving or staying in the Guard or Reserve.

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Unlike the active component soldiers, reserve component soldiers have two bosses to satisfy. They are the Department of Defense (DoD), and their civilian employer. Therefore, there are long-term effects of treating AC and RC units the same when it comes to deployments. Attempting to treat AC and RC soldiers the same when it comes to deployments has the potential to minimize the ability of the Reserve to recruit and retain soldiers, thus impacting its readiness and ability to support a MTW or MOOTW. Presently, the Army’s view of the RC as a pure Strategic Reserve is being challenged. Downsizing of the AC and the transfer of the majority of combat service/combat service support (CS/CSS) units to the Guard and Reserve have contributed to the increased use of the RC for support of MOOTW.

The National Defense Policy (NDP) and National Military Strategy (NMS) enable RC forces to be employed to assist in reducing the AC OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. However, the increased and extended deployments of RC soldiers bring to question the will of the American people (namely employers and family members) to support the continuous uncertainty of deployments. The RC soldiers are often found juggling between their military job, civilian job, and family. The current RC manning shortfalls strain the ability of the RC to continue to support contingency operations and execute the NMS. Additionally, the ability of the RC to support two MTWs is questionable. Contingency operations are also negatively impacting METL proficiency and unit training. The following excerpt regarding AC readiness concerns describes a potential risk in readiness that RC units may face as a result of increased OPTEMPO.

Since the Cold War, the national military strategy has been to retain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs), each roughly the size of Operations Desert Storm. In keeping with the two-MTW
capability, Army force structure was reduced from 18 active divisions and three separate armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) to ten active divisions and two separate ACRs with commensurate cuts to the ARNG and the USAR. However, the national strategy of engagement has stretched the Army beyond the number of Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs) it was designed to absorb—to the point that the ability to fight two nearly simultaneous wars has been placed at risk. In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, General Shinseki stated, "There is moderate risk associated with fighting the first MTW and higher levels of risk associated with the second MTW.'"^6

To ensure that the Guard and Reserve remain relevant, both political and military leaders must do a critical review of the shifted OPTEMPO (AC to RC) to prevent a major decline in the readiness and availability of RC soldiers and units to effectively perform their Strategic Reserve role for the two MTW scenarios. The Guard and Reserve must be ready to provide significant forces during a MTW, with many of these forces required to deploy in the early days of the conflict.

The increased reliance placed on the reserve components requires that the DoD focus on improving the readiness of the reserve forces. It is important to treat members fairly and equitably, while maintaining the readiness levels required in supporting national defense. Recent emphasis by the Secretary of Defense on Total Force integration, coupled with quality of life initiatives by DoD, will help to ensure that this happens. Failure to provide alternatives to the current course of extended deployments will significantly impact US military readiness. Additionally, the effects on RC recruiting and retention will make the current NMS unsustainable. Reserve component readiness is vital to executing and sustaining the NMS.

RESERVE COMPONENT FAMILY INFLUENCE

In any given day, American soldiers are deployed in more than 70 countries. With the increased and extended deployments, many spouses have to manage things on their own, often for the first time. The quality of life of single and married soldiers must remain a top priority of the Army. When soldiers know that their family members are supportive of what they do, and that their family's quality of life issues are being taken care of, it helps in relieving part of the stress of deployed RC soldiers. As with the active component soldier, quality of life will impact a Reserve soldier's decision to reenlist or leave the military.

The mission of RC soldiers has changed extensively over the past decade. However, little focus has been placed on how high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO has impacted RC families. Several senior leaders have acknowledged that it is a problem for service members and their families. Frequent, and sometimes, unexpected deployments of RC soldiers continue to produce stress. The stress of deployments impacts the soldier's family and their quality of life.
If not monitored closely, family and quality of life issues will significantly jeopardize the Army's ability to recruit and retain the quality soldiers needed to support Army missions.

High-quality soldiers are imperative to maintaining readiness within the Reserves. Spouses have a great impact on whether or not a soldier will remain in the reserves. A study conducted three years after Operation Desert Storm examined the retention of enlisted reservists. The main objective of the study was to seek a better understanding of how mobilizations or deployments of reservists impact the attitudes of their family and employers. Table 1 below depicts the retention rate by the perceived attitude of RC spouses.

![Retention Rate by Perceived Attitude of Spouse](chart)

**TABLE 1**

The study revealed that approximately one of every five young married enlisted soldiers reported having spouses with unfavorable attitudes towards their service in the Reserves. It is interesting to note that reservists whose spouses work full-time have a significantly higher retention probability than those whose spouses do not work. One possible reason may be that spouses with full-time jobs may be more familiar with and tolerant of the demands and stresses of working outside the home. More senior reservists spouses reflected only one in ten as unfavorable. Mobilized reservists appeared to have higher levels of unfavorable spouse attitudes. Additionally, nonmobilized reservists who perceived their spouse had a very unfavorable attitude had a retention rate of 30 percent; the retention rate among those with
spouses who were very supportive was over twice that, or 70 percent. Similar patterns are found among mobilized and nonmobilized reservists in other branches of the military. The attitude of a RC soldier's spouse has a significant and large effect on retention.

Reserve soldiers have competing demands that are quite different than those of the active duty soldiers. In most cases, Reserve service is secondary to an RC soldier's main commitments of family and civilian job responsibilities. Balancing the demands of family, civilian jobs, drill weekends, and annual training are already significant retention challenges. These challenges create potential conflicts of loyalty, and are compounded when these individuals become part of a deployment. Other issues such as job relocations, marriages, and the birth of children are life changes that also impact retention of RC soldiers.

Because RC soldiers are so dispersed from their unit, separated by communities, cities, and often states, there is little interaction among spouses of reservists. Except in a few unique situations, networking among spouses of reservists is basically nonexistent. Also, in the active Army, family issues and conflicts about a spouses' job are often shared experiences because so much of the family's life revolves around the military installation. Although these same issues may be important to both AC and RC soldiers, family life issues of a reservist are different. An RC soldier's problem may often only be resolved within the family.

Another difference in AC and RC soldiers is the career development requirement that take soldiers away from their family. For most RC soldiers, attending a professional development school can often be frustrating to schedule and attend, often causing irritation at home, with employers, and with co-workers. This often impacts family income when a soldier has to go away for training and their military pay is less than their civilian pay. Active component soldiers’ income remains the same when they are away in school. Additionally, AC soldiers are programmed, encouraged, and expected to attend professional development schools.

Community and family support for RC soldiers, and particularly deployed RC soldiers immediately after Desert Storm was approximately 87%. However, the attitude of civilian employers and spouses declined within a few months after RC soldiers returned. Family readjustments, the reality that more deployments are inevitable, changes on the job and requirements for refresher training attributed to the decline. Fewer employers had favorable attitudes, and more spouses of deployed soldiers had less favorable attitudes about RC soldier deployments for Desert Storm, as seen in Table 1.

Consequently, the attitude change was more negative among spouses than with employers. Approximately 21% more of deployed soldiers indicated their spouses had a less
favorable attitude toward their deployment, compared to 7% more for employers. Nondeployed soldier spouses and employers also showed a negative shift in attitude.

Unlike the Vietnam War, Desert Storm had a considerable amount of public support. It is uncertain how family members and the public will respond in the future with increased and extended international peacekeeping, humanitarian, and nation-building operations. Strategic leaders must understand the adverse impact competing demands of increased readiness requirements, extended deployments, a reservist's family, and civilian employer will have on recruiting and retention. Attitudes following Desert Storm and recent deployments in Bosnia suggest that unfavorable support will likely exist when RC soldiers are involved in extended deployments. The impact of extended RC deployments in the future may result in job losses and family problems. Additionally, these problems associated with RC soldiers will impact retention of quality soldiers, as well as recruitment of personnel for the reserve forces.

There are current examples of how RC deployments are impacting families. The recent deployment of units from the 49th Armored Division of the Texas National Guard to Bosnia was the largest mobilization and deployment of Guard troops since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The deployment disrupted family routines, family finances and, in the worst cases, the families themselves. Many of the strains facing the families of the 49th are the same of course, as those faced by families of active duty troops sent overseas, but for the ARNG and USAR there is a crucial difference. The majority of reservists joined their units expecting to serve part time, usually no more than a weekend a month and two weeks each summer, not for nearly eight months. 9

The 49th, unfortunately, has reported a number of divorces in their units that presumably have direct links to their deployment. The unit also fears that there will be even more divorces when soldiers return home and try to reestablish family relationships that often change during a spouse's absence. Soldier marriages will continue to become victims of increased RC deployments if focused training programs for family members affected by deployments are not developed.

Reserve units are continuously being challenged by increased mission requirements. The Army announced in December 2000 that it would effectively turn over its mission in Bosnia to National Guard units. By late 2002, the peacekeeping mission is to be exclusively commanded in six-month rotations by troops from the eight National Guard divisions. Each division will send companies from eight ARNG enhanced separate brigades to form battalion-level task forces for future rotations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). These future deployments clearly reflect the
Army’s increased reliance on reserve forces. The December announcement will significantly expand the Army’s reliance on the citizen soldier.

Active Army commanders have long complained that the extended Bosnia mission, which began in December 1995, was straining the active Army divisions and their ability to sustain the Army’s overall level of readiness for other contingency operations, such as conflicts and potential major theater of wars. Although the present relief and policy changes help mitigate the effects of high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO for active soldiers conducting peacekeeping operations, the strain will now shift to reserve components. The chart in Figure 3 shows AC and ARNG deployments and commitments as of September 2000.

### Deployments and Commitments as of September 2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Deployments</th>
<th>Other Commitments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Armored Division</td>
<td>Brigade (1) in Kosovo with Task Force Falcon</td>
<td>NATO/ISAF engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanized) Germany and Fort Riley, KS</td>
<td>Battalion task force from Fort Riley in Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division Fort Hood, TX</td>
<td>Battalion task force just returned from Kosovo</td>
<td>Preparing to convert to Division 205 structure and receive new equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Immediate Ready Force (IRF) just returned from Kosovo</td>
<td>Preparing to convert to Division 205 structure and receive new equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanized) Germany and Fort Riley, KS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Providing support to TFARNG’s 49th Armored Division in Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Division</td>
<td>2 brigades forward-stationed in Korea</td>
<td>Preparing to convert to Division 205 structure and receive new equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea and Fort Lewis, WA</td>
<td>2nd Brigade at Fort Lewis, is the Army’s first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and is non-deployable as it undergoes transformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Division</td>
<td>Brigade-sized unit preparing to deploy to Kosovo to relieve the 49th Armored Division in command of Task Force Eagle</td>
<td>Will support the PAARNG’s 29th Infantry Division (Mechanized) when it takes command in Bosnia in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanized) Fort Stewart and Banking, GA</td>
<td>Another brigade to Kosovo in six months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Division</td>
<td>Force XXI Experimental Forces (EXFOR) is currently undergoing transformation to Division XXI design as well as conducting Force XXI experiments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanized) Fort Hood, TX and Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td>Will deploy unit to Bosnia in October 2001 under command of 29th Infantry Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Will also deploy unit to Kosovo in November 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Light) Hawaii and Fort Lewis, WA</td>
<td>Will provide a battalion for the Sinai in January 2001</td>
<td>Engaged in military operations in urban terrain (MOOT) and light force digitization experiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>1st Brigade at Fort Lewis is preparing to become the Army’s second IBCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg, NC</td>
<td>Battalion in the Sinai</td>
<td>Numerous training and engagement deployments throughout the Pacific Rim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)</td>
<td>Scheduled to send a battalion to Kosovo in February 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Campbell, KY</td>
<td>Battalion task force in Kosovo</td>
<td>One brigade prepared at all times to deploy within 18 hours of notification; other two brigades either training up to be the ready brigade or supporting the ready brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Armored Cavalry</td>
<td>Units just returned from fighting fires in western United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment Fort Carson, CO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Armored Cavalry</td>
<td>Has units deployed to Bosnia under command of 49th Armored Division</td>
<td>Active Army's only heavy ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment Fort Lewis, WA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Units deployed to Bosnia supporting 49th Armored Division</td>
<td>Preparing to assume command of Bosnia mission in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mechanized) PA ARNG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Units deployed to Bosnia supporting 49th Armored Division</td>
<td>Preparing to assume command of Bosnia mission in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Light) VA ARNG (also MD, CT, NJ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Infantry Division (NE, KS, KY, IL ARNG)</td>
<td>Units deployed to Saudi Arabia’s Security Forces Command (SECON) for Kuwait Air Defense units</td>
<td>Preparing to assume command of Bosnia mission in 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th Armored Division</td>
<td>Deployed to Bosnia</td>
<td>Will send units to support 29th ID (L) in Bosnia in October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX ARNG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Infantry Brigade (enhanced Separate Brigade)</td>
<td>Units just returned from Saudi Arabia (SECCOR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR ARNG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 3**
Few members of the ARNG and USAR have experienced the difficulties of an extended overseas operation. The anticipated rotations of soldiers to Bosnia on a recurring basis will substantially increase the training requirements of RC soldiers to prepare for the mission over the next two years. Reserve Component soldiers will have to shift responsibilities from being reserve forces on a part-time basis, to a role of being a fully charged Army rotational unit in Bosnia. Again, the training preparation and extended deployment will likely create family hardships, as well as employer concerns. Consequently, the problems caused by extended RC deployments will impact both RC recruiting and retention. It is essential for RC units to be manned appropriately to support current and future operations. The excerpt below is from comments made by Jayson L. Spiegel, Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, for the Military House Armed Services Committee. His comments reaffirm the relevant role RC soldiers and units play in contributing to national objectives.

Reserve forces contribute to and are integral parts of all three elements of national strength—a strong economy, a credible military, and a strong national will. First, reservists contribute to the productive segment of the nation’s economy as workers and tax-paying citizens. Second, a strong, viable reserve force is an inseparable part of America’s military, a cost-effective augmentation to the Active force and the marrow of the mobilization base. Finally, mobilizing reserve forces is the litmus test and the enabler of public support and national will. The early and extensive involvement of the Guard and Reserve in the Gulf War was instrumental in achieving the strong support of the military and our national objectives.10

Title 10, United States Code (USC) Sections 12301 through 12304; National Security Strategy; National Military Strategy of the United States of America; and the Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, are essential documents that explain how to employ RC soldiers to support MOOTW. The initial purpose of Title 10 USC, Section 12304, was not written to open the door for RC units and personnel to conduct continuous MOOTW rotations, but to allow the National Command Authority (NCA) flexibility and options during situations other than a fully engaged war. With over 50 percent of the Combat Service and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units located in the RC, active units cannot effectively deploy and undertake sustained operations without RC support. The strategic relevance of the RC will continue to challenge the support of family members and employers, which will also challenge and impact recruiting and retention.

RESERVE COMPONENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYER INFLUENCE

Although the reserve forces have the Employer Support of Guard and Reserve (ESGR) Program, there are still prejudices that exist among employers of RC soldiers. Because of
deployments, some soldiers have heard employers say they will never hire a reserve soldier again. Reservist’s jobs and pensions are protected under federal law for the 270 days they can be called to serve, but call-ups can put irritating stresses on employers and those who run their own businesses.

Absences by reservists engaged in extended MOOTW tours of duty away from their homes, families and jobs, place great strains on the relationship between themselves and their civilian employers. Congressmen Bilirakis and Neathercutt have introduced legislation (HR 172 and 713, and HR 803 respectively) that would provide tax credit for employers of Reservists who must be absent from their jobs to do Reserve duty. This legislation recognizes the contributions that employers make to the national defense by employing members of the Reserve Components. It is imperative that the DoD and Congress seek ways to reach out to employers in an attempt to help minimize the hardship and disruption associated with citizen-soldiers in uniform who are deployed to serve our nation.

The ESGR program was started in 1972 to help build good communicative relationships between RC soldiers and their civilian employers. Improving the cooperation of employers with the Reserve forces is a major agenda item of the ESGR’s key leaders. Surprisingly, only six percent of all businesses in the country employ reservists. This low percentage suggests that there is still a tremendous lack of general knowledge about the Guard and Reserve among employers in the United States.

The end of the draft significantly changed how Americans view the military. For reasons that are both practical and political, America’s all-volunteer military has become utterly dependent on the factory workers, police officers, airline pilots, and even college students who make up the Guard and Reserve. When RC soldiers are deployed, more of a cross-section of America is deployed.

Initiatives such as the annual Boss Lift, a program designed to expose civilian employers to the military, is one tactic used by the ESGR staff to help create employer awareness about the Guard and Reserve. Unfortunately, only about one percent of civilian employers of RC soldiers participate in the annual event. Another initiative sponsored by the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), is the Employer Pledge Drive. This program solicits and encourages employers and firms to voluntarily pledge their patriotic support to not penalize their current or potential employees who serve in the Reserves. This program enables NG soldiers to serve their country without the threat of losing career opportunities or company benefits because they are deployed.
Employers are voicing their opinion and concerns about RC deployments. A DoD study released in September 2000, reported that employers are experiencing severe inconveniences and, in some cases, financial burdens because of employee absences and work scheduling. In the study, 93 percent of employers said they favor their employees' participation in the Guard and Reserve. However, many of those same employers complained their employees spend too much time away from work on deployments and other military duties. Nearly half the employers surveyed said absences of more than 14 days caused workplace problems; 80 percent complained of effects when absences exceeded 30 days.\textsuperscript{14}

These percentages indicate that most employers want to do what is right regarding their RC employees, but they have a legitimate concern about the frequency and duration of RC employee call-ups. The Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994 provides reemployment and other rights for those persons who perform active duty service, initial active duty for training, or must report for an examination for the purpose of determining fitness for such duty, regardless of whether on a voluntary or involuntary basis.\textsuperscript{15} Although USERRA protects civilian job rights of RC soldiers, there are few measures in place that protect employers.

USERRA does require service members to provide advance written or verbal notice to their employers, which helps to relieve some of their frustration. However, it is becoming more and more important for the military and organizations such as the ESGR, NGAUS, and Reserve Officers Association (ROA) to work with employees and community leaders to increase the awareness of the relevant role RC soldiers have in US national security.

The US Army's decision to limit RC noncombatant deployments to no longer than six months is a step in the right direction. Previously, some Guard and Reserve units were deployed for up to nine months, creating family strains and criticism from employers that they could not do without workers for long periods, especially in a booming US economy. The new policy states that operational deployments of individual soldiers, either AC or RC, in support of an operation other than war (OOTW) or small-scale contingency (SSC) operation will not exceed 179 days in duration. This policy was fully implemented 1 October 2000, and provides deployment equity between AC and RC soldiers deployed to the same theater of operation.

Although the new 179-day maximum deployment policy is a step in the right direction, additional consideration should be given to reducing RC deployments to 90 days. The Air Force has recognized the impact of high pace operations on quality of life. They have further realized that high OPTEMPO will jeopardize their capability to retain the quality force they worked hard to build. Consequently, the Secretary of the Air Force made making life better for Air Force
personnel his number one priority for 2000. He stated that, "to make sure our people have relief from OPTEMPO in a turbulent world...we will never fix our retention rates unless we can guarantee people that in peacetime, they will have a personal life." Frequent and extended deployments are problems that cross all components and branches of the military. The Air Force, however, has had success with its 90-day Expeditionary Aerospace Force (AEF) program, a program that limits noncombatant deployments to 90 days.

Congress also recognizes the potential impact of extended and frequent deployments on RC recruiting and retention. One member of Congress who led a congressional delegation to Bosnia to visit Texas' 49th Armored Division, noted that he hoped that while making policy as a representative in Congress, deployments would be shorten, even below six months. It has been recognized that limiting deployments to 90 days would still serve the needs of the Army, while also serving the needs of soldiers, families, and employers. Given the mission, and most importantly, the flexibility to develop unit packages to support OOTW or SSC operations, both Reserve and Guard units can find effective and innovative ways to reduce mobilization limits to 90 days. Shorter deployments will minimize the stress on units, soldiers, families, and employers.

The current Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) 90-day Rotation Policy Pilot Program is another step in the right direction. The new Pilot program only applies to key medical specialties such as physicians, dentists, and nurse anesthetists under a PRC authority. Instead of 179-day tours for peacekeeping deployments, they will only be required to serve 90 days at a time. Surveys show 81 percent of physicians could serve up to 90 days without serious harm to their practices, but beyond 90 days economic disaster is a real threat. Similar worries affect dentists and nurse anesthetists.

This new pilot program is a response to recognition by the Army that many of these key medical specialty personnel can lose their livelihood if they are forced to leave their businesses too long. It does not apply to Partial, Total, or Full mobilization authorities. The result of this three-year test will provide a better picture of how reducing the length of deployments will impact RC recruiting and retention. Additionally, the success of this test should provide a valid argument for also altering the length of deployments for non-medical specialties within the Guard and Reserve. It is not known what impact this pilot program will have on the morale of Reservists who are not included in this initiative.

Military service in the Guard and Reserve is rewarding, but can also be frustrating at times. It requires many citizen soldiers to balance a full-time civilian career with service to their country. The increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO experienced by all Reserve Components
are causing individuals to spend more time away from their full-time job to meet military obligations. Employers also feel the effects of the burdens placed on RC soldiers. Employer support is the key to the successful use of reserve forces. Military and political leaders must continue to listen and be responsive to their concerns, and seek ways to improve relationships and their understanding of the value of America’s Reservists. There must be a balance in deployments so that serving in the Guard and Reserve does not become so onerous that fewer want to join, and more want to leave.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Today’s strategy is one that is three-fold: it calls on the military to shape the international environment, prepare our forces for the future, and respond to crises when and where our interests require. As we enter into the next century and embrace this strategy, the Guard and Reserve is at the forefront helping to secure peace, promote democracy, and market economies globally.

Reserve components must be ready to meet the challenges of new threats and major regional conflicts. The manpower of the Ready Reserve is over one-third of the United States’ total military force. The cost of operating reserve forces represents $21 billion, or only about eight percent of the total defense budget of approximately $257 billion. With shrinking defense budgets, it is understandable that the nation must make the fullest use of the lesser cost and expense of deploying the Reserves—while closely checking the impact of that use on recruiting, retention, and readiness.

Although the monetary costs of deploying RC soldiers are more economical, the threat of losing trained soldiers due to family and employer conflicts is extremely costly. It is costly for RC manning, readiness, and the ability of the Reserves to support United States National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, and its role as a Strategic Reserve in support of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.

The following recommendations are made in an effort to eliminate strategic level decisions that may negatively impact RC recruiting and retention. This is not a prioritized list.

1. Provide appropriate funding in the Defense budget for “first-to-fight” Reserve component units. The current FY01 DoD Budget has critical shortfalls of funds necessary to ensure “first-to-fight” units are ready to deploy. Current Army downsizing and the transfer of combat service/combat service support units into the Reserve has required greater reliance on the Army Reserve. Budget shortfalls negatively impact training, readiness, quality of life, morale, and retention of RC soldiers.
2. Fully fund the Army Reserve's recruiting and advertising budget. The current FY01 budget underfunds recruiting and advertising by at least $23 million. Without the appropriate allocation of funds, it is impossible to compete fairly with the market effects of a strong economy and the low propensity of America's youth to join the military.

3. Urge Congress to pass incentive laws that will not penalize Reservists who incur out-of-pocket expenses to attend a drill assembly because they live outside of the commuting distance (a 50 mile radius) of their unit. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 prevents Reservists from deducting the full cost of travel, food, and lodging expenses related to attending drill.

4. Urge Congress to pass pending legislation (HR 172 and 713, and HR 803 respectively) that provides a tax credit or tax incentive for employers of Reservists. Incentive programs should include local, state, and federal employers of RC soldiers.

5. Authorize the Chief of Army Reserve to control USAR recruiting. The United States Army Recruiting Command's failure to meet USAR recruiting goals for six consecutive years indicates that the USAR needs to take charge of its own recruiting destiny to build the Army Reserve of the future. Unit commanders must be accountable for unit personnel strength. The ARNG is responsible for its own recruiting and has continued to meet recruiting goals in spite of the highly competitive recruiting market.

6. Establish a standing committee of civilians and military appointees to assess the impact that increased/extended mobilizations and deployments are having on RC families, with one of its goals being to better educate and prepare families and family support groups to cope with the absence of a mobilized or deployed family member.

7. Establish a standing committee of civilian and military appointees to assess the impact of increased/extended RC deployments on recruiting and retention.

8. Establish a standing committee to seek ways to make unit deployments more predictable, and not as long. The current Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) 90-day Rotation Policy Pilot Program should be extended to all deployments. The 90-day pilot program will allow Reserve units the flexibility to develop their own unit packages for mission support. Some operations may require less than 90 days to perform.

9. Clearly articulate the threat to the nation's vital interest prior to committing active and Reserve military forces.

10. Involve military associations, service organizations, families, and employers with family support and family care planning to help establish and build a community based support network for mobilized or deployed personnel.
11. Improve the quality of life for recruiters. Set realistic recruiting goals, and make serving as a recruiter more of career enhancer for career advancement.

WORD COUNT = 7583
ENDNOTES


7 United States Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, 11.


11 Ibid., 5.


14 “ESGR Redoubles Efforts as Deployments Increase,” National Guard, October 2000, 12.


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