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THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE: A LOOMING "BRAIN DRAIN"?

BY

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Department of the Army

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The Senior Executive Service: A Looming "Brain Drain"?

by

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Dr. Greg Baxter
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Randy Edmonds Robertson
TITLE: The Senior Executive Service: A Looming "Brain Drain"?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 25 March 2001  PAGES: 37  CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

For several years commentators of the U.S. Civil Service System have claimed that a flood of departing Senior Executive Service (SES) employees will create severe problems throughout the federal government. These pundits base their concerns on data signaling tremendous increases in the number of retirement eligible SES's throughout the federal government. Recent studies by the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) confirm that nearly three-quarters of today's entire SES population will be eligible to retire by Fiscal year 2005. Based on the OPM and GAO's statistics, this study will examine current/proposed initiatives designed to either retain those currently in the SES, or identify succession programs to train, and assign qualified replacements for senior executives leaving the federal government. A brief review of the U.S. Civil Service System, and personnel/compensation programs developed to meet the unique challenges of personnel management at the senior level of government will provide a backdrop against which to review current agency or federal wide initiatives and recommendations for the future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... vii
THE SESION EXECIVE SERVICE: A LOOMING “BRAIN DRAIN”? ...................................... 1
   OVERVIEW AND SCOPE .................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 3
   ROOTS OF CIVIL SERVICE ........................................................................................... 3
   THE PENDLETON ACT ................................................................................................. 3
   FROM PENDLETON TO 1978 ....................................................................................... 4
THE MOVE TOWARDS THE SES ..................................................................................... 7
   PRELUDE ....................................................................................................................... 7
   THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 & CREATION OF THE SES ............. 9
A CRISIS IN THE MAKING .............................................................................................. 11
   THE SES: PRESENT AND FUTURE ......................................................................... 11
   WHAT’S BEING DONE ............................................................................................... 16
CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD ..................................................................... 21
ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................. 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 27
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. SES REGULAR RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY RATES: FY 92 TO 98 ...............12
TABLE 2. SES REGULAR RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY RATES: FY 99 TO 05 ...............12
TABLE 3. CAREER EXECUTIVES’ OPINIONS ON OBSTACLES TO RECRUITING .......14
TABLE 4. CAREER EXECUTIVES’ OPINIONS ON OBSTACLES TO RETENTION .......14
THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE: A LOOMING "BRAIN DRAIN"?

OVERVIEW AND SCOPE

By the mid-1970s it was obvious that civilian personnel practices, policies, and mechanisms employed within the federal sector were not only antiquated, but also corrupted through abuse, misapplication, and indifference. During his 1976 run for the Oval Office, Jimmy Carter wrote:

There is a pervasive tendency in government toward unrestrained growth in salaries, number of personnel and expenditure of funds. This growth often bears little relationship to the actual need for government services . . . . The first piece of legislation I will send to Congress will initiate a complete overhaul of our federal bureaucracy and budgeting systems. The second part, as a follow-up to the first, would initiate the reorganization of our federal bureaucratic structure . . . . The greatest need facing the United States today is for a well managed structure of government – one that is simple, efficient and economical.¹

Candidate Carter went on to become President, and true to his word, initiated sweeping changes within the U.S. civil service system with the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978.² Not since the 1883 Pendleton Act, which is generally seen as the legislative genesis of the U.S. civil service system, had federal personnel management been so radically altered. While numerous changes were initiated by the CSRA, this paper will deal only with one aspect of that legislation, the Senior Executive Service (SES), and challenges it faces as it reaches maturity.

In his article “The Empty Government Talent Pool”, Paul C. Light, Director, Governmental Studies Program, The Brookings Institute, and renown researcher/observer of federal bureaucracy writes: “The federal public service enters the new century in the midst of its most profound transformation since Congress created the merit system in 1883”.³ To a large extent, the transformation of which Mr. Light speaks will be one created, supported, directed, defended, and analyzed by members of the SES. For years pundits of the federal bureaucracy have voiced their concern that a potential flood of near-term SES retirements may have a tremendously negative impact on government operations. They point to reams of data reflecting the increasing age and years of federal service of SES cadre as the source of their fears. Citing a growing number of supporting statistical studies, this assemblage feels a “brain drain” is imminent as senior government officials leave federal service. Like the child protagonist of
Aesop’s “The Boy Who Cried Wolf”, we wonder if these are truly judicious concerns, or exaggerated cries of alarm.

To avoid the emotionalism entwined in this topic, this paper will be limited to facts related to the possibility of a senior rank “brain drain”, and what, if anything is being done to preclude it. This will be accomplished through examining SES retirement-eligibility data, and federal initiatives aimed at alleviating the inevitable operational shortfalls that will arise if large-scale SES departures do occur. However, to better appreciate the potential challenges facing future federal leaders in general, and the SES in specific, it is important to begin with a brief review of civil service and early senior personnel programs.
BACKGROUND

ROOTS OF CIVIL SERVICE

The US Civil Service System, and ancillary high-grade personnel programs, is not unique in concept, scope, or practice. In their text - *The Higher Civil Service in the United States: Quest for Reform*, authors Mark Huddleston and William Boyer trace the roots of our senior personnel system back to Imperial China; challenging the Western belief that these programs were of European origin. As evidence of this Chinese birthright, Huddleston and Boyer cite from Dr. Harry Krantz' text *The Participatory Bureaucracy: Women and Minorities in a More Representative Public Service*:

Four thousand years before the French named it, Max Weber defined it, or the British refined it, the Chinese invented bureaucracy... As early as 2200 B.C., the Chinese emperor examined his senior officials every third year to determine their fitness for continuing in office.4

Despite evidence of its Chinese genesis, some scholars, including Huddleston and Boyer, maintain our SES was founded on the British elite 'administrative class' of generalists.5 Regardless, whether a stepchild of the Chinese, the British, or both, our move towards the current U.S. civil service system began shortly after the Civil War. Reeling from the graft and corruption of his administration, and the extremes plaguing the patronage or "spoils system", President Ulysses Grant appointed a small commission to examine alternatives to the personnel procurement and placement processes in use throughout the federal government. In its 1874 report, the "Grant Commission" recommended the U.S. move towards the Chinese structure, and copy the use of higher civil appointments as a template for our new system. Reflecting admiration for the China model, the Commissioners wrote: "the most enlightened and enduring government of the Eastern world had required an examination as to the merits of candidates for office, a benefit that should not be denied the American people."6

THE PENDLETON ACT

Prior to 1871 the American system to select federal employees was basically irrational, operating under the adage, "to the victor belong the spoils", hence the expression "spoils system". A classically democratic idea, the "spoils" employed patronage-based office rotation for members of public service. A democratic stalwart, Andrew Jackson, epitomized the "spoils" concept in his 1829 declaration: "No man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another... The duties of all public officers are so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance."7 Though inherently contrary to principles
of merit and equity, this “one size fits all” public personnel process was used throughout the
government until many years after the Civil War. Virtually every recipient of a federal
appointment made his way to office through the political plunder of “spoils”, with power to
employ vested with the party in office. In large measure, the “spoils” helped transform
Washington, D.C. into a veritable “Mecca” for those seeking federal appointment.

Yet time and change made the days of the “spoils” numbered. The unbridled growth of
the federal bureaucracy drove home the point that the old ways of doing business simply could
not keep pace with the increasing needs of government. For example, during the Jackson
administration about 20,000 persons were on the federal payrolls, but 55 years later the roster
had grown to more than 131,000 employees. Concurrently, as the federal rolls grew so did job
specialization. Once a nation of generalists, America was fast becoming a land where focused
expertise, particularly in administration and science, would soon reign. Culminating with
President Garfield’s assassination by a disappointed office-seeker, it was obvious to both those
in government and the American citizen that the “how’s” of choosing and appointing federal
employees had to change.

Garfield’s assassination transformed what had primarily been a matter for Washington,
D.C. into a national issue. In 1883, Congress passed the Civil Service Act, more commonly
known as the Pendleton Act, to address the excesses of the spoils system. Foremost among
the Pendleton Act precedents were provisions to select federal civil servants through open,
competitive examination. Via legislative guarantees the Act also granted federal employees an
early semblance of job security. Best known was the right not to be coerced for political
purposes, and the right not to be solicited in public buildings for political reasons; still fixtures of
federal civil service. The law also created the Civil Service Commission, a predecessor to
today’s Office of Personnel and Management (OPM), empowered to develop rules and
regulations related to the civil service system. FROM PENDLETON TO 1978

Since its 1883 codification, there are those who see our civil service system as a work in
progress. With “reform” always the touted goal, in the first 100 years after its passage, at least
six major legislative initiatives were passed to improve the CSRA. First, the Lloyd-La Follette
Act of 1912, opened labor unions to federal civil servants, and required employing agencies to
provide these workers with the right to know and respond to grounds related to their dismissal.
The 1920 Civil Service Retirement Act laid the foundation for the retirement and pension
programs used by the federal sector today. The Classification Act of 1923 provided the means
to link job classification with salary scales of federal positions. One of the most widely
recognized pieces of civil service law, the Hatch Act (1939) established the framework of rules and regulations governing federal employee participation in political campaigns. Recognizing the contributions of the military, the Veterans Preference Act of 1944 established the practice of veteran preference in federal hiring. Finally, the 1962 Federal Salary Reform Act introduced the concept of private industry pay comparability when setting federal wages.\textsuperscript{10} As noted in the introductory paragraph though, despite a century of progress, by the mid-1970s a sense of frustration and disillusionment with our civil service system prevailed both in and out of government. It was a belief that the civil service policies and practices in use since the 1880s simply were not capable of meeting the needs and expectations of the government and the public it served.
THE MOVE TOWARDS THE SES

PRELUDE

America's initial effort to establish a separate civil service system for high-grade federal officials came in 1955, spearheaded by recommendations of The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, the second Hoover Commission.\(^{11}\) The Commission faulted the existing civil service system by maintaining it emphasized “positions not people.”\(^{12}\) Reflecting the extent of their disillusionment with how the system was operating it charged “jobs were classified, ranked, rated, and paid on the assumption that they can always be filled like jugs merely by turning on the tap.” The commissioners felt that the existing means used to identify and fill higher level federal positions were, for all intent, templates of those used in filling all government positions, and in that respect it “disregarded so completely both the personalities and the careers of individual men.” To meet the unique challenges of identifying, employing, and managing senior-level government officials, the Commission recommended establishment of a Senior Civil Service. They wrote:

The Senior Civil Service (SCS) should consist of a group of Professional Administrators carefully selected from all parts of the civil service...They would have status, rank, and salary as individuals, and could be employed flexibly in a number of authorized positions calling for high administrative talents. The rules...should require them to keep clear of all 'political' activity... The primary objective is to have always at hand in the Government a designated group of highly qualified administrators whose competence, integrity, and faithfulness cannot reasonably be questioned; who will make it easier for political executives to discharge their responsibilities; and who will add to the smoothness, the effectiveness, and the economy of government operations. A secondary but related purpose is to make the civil service more attractive as a career to able men and women.\(^{13}\)

Radical by policy practices of the time, the Commission's proposed SCS immediately drew the ire of several members of Congress. Leading the opposition was Congressman Clarence Brown, who claimed to voice the concerns of many House members: “I am fearful that the addition of lifetime security and tenure to these positions will strengthen and further entrench the bureaucracy.”\(^{14}\) There were also senior civil servants who were equally unconvinced of the need to create a separate SCS, apprehensive they might not be admitted to the System, or assigned to unwanted positions. Not to be left out, a handful of leading academics of the time cast a vote of no confidence in the Commission's proposals. Spearheading the charge from the academic ranks was Cornell's Professor Paul P. Van Riper. In his text, A Theory of Governmental Reform, Van Riper took great efforts to describe the seeming incompatibility of an SCS-like personnel architecture with bureaucracy's “representative” foundation.\(^{15}\) He wrote:
“to be representative a bureaucracy must (1) consist of a reasonable cross-section of the body politic in terms of occupation, class, geography, and the like, and (2) must be in tune with the ethos and attitudes of the society of which it is a part.” In Van Ripper’s eyes, the proposed SCS was a failure on both counts.

In their text, Huddleston and Boyer observed that a stalemate between attracting talented personnel to the higher ranks of civil service and developing a supportive personnel system for this group lasted through the 1960s and late 1970s. Often faced with congressional opposition, intense bureaucratic in-fighting, and/or considerable public indifference, few minor adjustments to government-wide senior-level personnel systems were successfully orchestrated by successive administrations. Unfortunately these “tweaks” often did little more than to exacerbate an already complex amalgam of laws, policies, practices, and precedents surrounding personnel management of high-level government officials. Just a few months after coming to office, when faced with reports of “significant deterioration” in the quality of top-level federal personnel, President Kennedy resorted to the use of a centralized Career Executive Roster. The “Roster” contained relevant career and personal information on nearly 1,000 career executives. Moving away from the concept of openness embedded in the SCS, all federal agencies were obliged to initiate their search for senior officials by referring to the “Roster.”

Huddleston and Boyer contend it was the unrelenting complaints regarding “in house” promotions that prompted officials in the Johnson administration to develop an Executive Assignment System (EAS); which ostensibly complimented the “merit” element of the SCS. To specifically oversee how senior federal billets would be advertised and filled the EAS would establish an Executive Placement Service (EPS). The EPS was designed to assist federal agencies with locating the best-qualified candidates for executive assignment by comprehensively cataloging the duties and requirements of all federal high-grade positions. With government-wide mobility as a parallel interest, the EPS was also responsible to “facilitate and encourage the movement of well-qualified employees into Executive Assignments from one assignment to another. . . .” In time, the name “Executive Assignment System” was changed to “Career Executive Roster”, noting a move by the Executive Branch to concentrate replacement efforts on individuals already within the federal sector.

By the end of the Johnson administration, and throughout the Nixon presidency, the “Executive Inventory” was the personnel tool of choice to manage senior federal officials. While the EPS focused on senior positions, the Executive Inventory was a person-oriented system. Operating under roughly the same concept as the Career Executive Roster, the Executive Inventory was intended to be “a prime source from which individuals could be selected to fill the
positions within the system." Nixon Administration officials hoped that the differences between the systems, person versus position, coupled with the first fully automated system, would make the "Inventory" succeed where others had failed. It didn't according to Huddleston and Boyer. By the mid-1970s, conditions in the civil service system, particularly those related to hiring and managing senior officials, were ripe for radical change.

THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 & CREATION OF THE SES

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), considered by some to be the most significant domestic legislative achievement of the Carter administration, was a watershed event for American civil service. The CSRA encompassed a broad spectrum of management reforms including creation of several new agencies chartered with the responsibility to improve federal personnel management (e.g., the OPM, the Merit System Protection Board, and the Federal Labor Relations Board). More apt to this discussion, it was Title IV of the CSRA, which established today's Senior Executive Service. Established to improve management of federal programs, the SES architecture was built on principles of the "scientific management school" to measure personal and organizational performance. To meet this task, SES financial rewards and penalties were constructed around performance, and regular civil service "protections" were removed. By increasing the dependence of the senior federal officials on the political executive, in theory the SES would increase responsiveness, accountability, and loyalty.

Unlike its predecessors, the CSRA provided that most of the SES would come from non-presidentially appointed officials above the GS-15 level but below Level III of the executive schedule. Designed as an elite corps of government officials, the SES was envisioned to be a cadre of federal officials with "shared values, a broad perspective of government, and solid management skills". As indicated, beyond the earlier versions of senior personnel management systems used by previous administrations, President Carter's CSRA was focused on assigning responsibility and accountability to those in the new SES for mission completion and organizational performance. To achieve these lofty goals the Act provided greater authority to agency managers to administer and control their assigned resources. In defining the general intent of the SES, the OPM web page states:

Under CSRA, the SES was set up as a 'third' service, completely separate from the competitive and excepted services. It replaced over 60 separate executive personnel authorities covering one to several thousand positions. Top management positions that had been subject to disparate rules and practices, with requirements for prior approval of almost every personnel action, were joined into a unified and distinct personnel system that provided for considerable agency authority and flexibility.
Since its establishment, numerous studies have been conducted to measure both the satisfaction level of SES' with current programs/policies, and their opinion of suggested reforms. The program elements of the CSRA were originally tailored for evaluation along three lines: personnel allocation, performance effectiveness, and personnel development. Soon after its creation, the SES program began receiving what was described as an "exhaustive" series of evaluations. These studies were conducted partially in response to legislative requirements, but primarily in an effort to ascertain how well the "reformed" civil service system was performing to meet its advertised intentions. One of the earliest studies, conducted two years after passage of the CSRA, reflected the "strongly negative" feelings of those in the system who believed the SES was failing to meet many of its intended objectives. This and comparable study variables pointed to compensation as the prime reason for member dissatisfaction. Since the original studies, additional inquiries have been conducted to measure the "satisfaction" of those in the system. The results not only reflect persistent frustration with SES compensation structure, but system core issues ranging from mobility to composition.

Is the SES pay structure harmful to this issue, and if so, how much? The answer depends on who is asked. Throughout its short history, those in the SES have strongly voiced that their salaries are inadequate in comparison to the responsibilities, demands, and risks of their duties. Compensation has always played a large role in the system; both as a form of motivation, and concurrently, as a conduit for negative opinions regarding the program.

To appreciate the importance of pay, those in the SES often ask the audience to view the issue through their eyes. Their story goes something like this: for over twenty-years, the SES has been seen and promoted as the embodiment of superior talent, responsiveness, and ingenuity within the federal sector. This cadre of career government officials provides the civil service system with the foundation of leadership and intellectual advancement critical to the continuity of federal operations. While the SES has been subject to extensive criticism, countless reviews, and numerous changes, the original values advocated in the CSRA of executive development, decentralization, rewards for high performance, and flexibility remain the same. Yet despite the level of responsibility and authority vested in their positions, many in the SES believe their compensation is pale in comparison to comparable private sector jobs. With disenchantment often so strong, the individual SES's own perception of "rewards" and salaries undoubtedly influence the decision to when to resign or retire. As a backdrop to this discussion, the following examines the current/projected SES retirement picture in an attempt to understand why many see a crisis brewing on the horizon.
A CRISIS IN THE MAKING?

THE SES: PRESENT AND FUTURE

Before looking at the potential "retirement crisis" issue, we should begin by reviewing some elementary conditions of the SES. First, depending on who and when you ask, and there are somewhere around 7,750 Executive Branch SES positions allocated for fiscal years 2000/2001. Though less than one month old at this writing, Bush administration watchers claim the temporary hiring "freeze" recently put in place already has had a negative impact on the above number. During its history, SES positions authorizations have ranged from nearly 8,200, to less than 6,400. Today, career appointees make up approximately 88 percent of the 7,750, with the remainder temporarily appointed. A second factor directly affecting this issue is the retirement programs available to members of the SES. Generally, career SES's can retire under one of two of the federal civilian retirement plans: the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), for employees entering federal service on or before the end of 1983; and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). According to the OPM, as of 30 September 1998, most career SES's were participating in the CSRS. Under the CSRS, full retirement eligibility is reached when the employee is at one of three levels: age 55 with 30 or more years of service, at 60 with 25 or more years of service, or at age 62 with at least five or more years of service. Career SES's play a crucial role in the life of the federal bureaucracy. As noted, under the CSRA they are responsible for the continuity of programs and processes by which presidential, congressional, and administrative objectives are performed. A possible government crisis prompted by the excessive loss of retiring SES's has received significant attention of researchers, academicians, the media, and nearly every federal organization. At the forefront of the issue is the federal "watchdog", the General Accounting Office (GAO), with its recent study – Senior Executive Service: Retirement Trends Underscore the Importance of Succession Training. Central to their study are statistics reflecting extremely high SES retirement eligibility rates over the next few years. Though the scope of the study is too broad to examine here, some of the issues raised are basic to this discussion. Simply stated, the GAO's concern appears to be the data reflecting a sizeable increase of retirement-eligible SES's during the period Fiscal Year (Fy) 1999 to 2005. Assuming their data is correct, possibly the best vantage to examine the situation is through comparison of retirement-eligibility rates from Fy 1992-1998 to those for Fy 1999 to 2005. Compare Table 1 data, which is for career SES's employed in federal agencies with at least 100 SES's on 30 September 1991, to
Table 2 data, which is from career SES’s employed with the same agencies as of 30 September 1998. Viewed together they may provide a sense of how some pundits see the situation.

**SES Regular Retirement Eligibility Rates Each Year During Fy 92 to 98 by Selected Agencies**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
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<td>Justice (-FBI)</td>
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**TABLE 1**

**SES Regular Retirement Eligibility Rates Each Year During Fy 99 to 05 by Selected Agencies**

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<th>Agency</th>
<th># Career SES</th>
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<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>Energy</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
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**TABLE 2**

At first glance the significance and implication of the information on these tables may not be apparent, but closer scrutiny of the data reveal some of the more difficult challenges faced by the federal sector as a whole and the SES in specific. For example, the figures reflect that between Fy 1999 and 2005, 82 percent of the Veteran Affairs (VA) current SES’s will become
retirement-eligible. On the same note, up to 77 percent of the SES's who work for Commerce, Transportation, and the Department of Agriculture will be eligible to retire from the federal workforce in the next four years. Finally, between now and Fy 2005, 70 percent of NASA's near 400 retirement eligible SES positions may turnover, and 74 percent of the Department of Defense's present retirement eligible SES cadre could leave civil service. Collectively the report found that 71 percent of today's SES workforce will reach their regular retirement eligibility by the end of fiscal year 2005. Exacerbating the anxiety over the impact on government operations by potential SES retirements is comparing them to rates of just a few years ago. The point is brought home with GAO's observation that "generally, under one-third of all career SES employed from 1992 through 1998 were retirement-eligible."27 Fueling the concern is knowledge that the 71 percent reaching regular retirement eligibility by Fy 2005 is about 20 percent greater than the 60 percent of career SES's who became retirement eligible between Fy 92 to Fy 98.28 Statistics reported by the GAO may be the best indicator of the potential challenges federal officials face in this issue. The report authors write: "Over the Fy 1999 to 2005 period, retirement eligibility rates for the SES cohort as of September 30, 1998, will continually increase each year at an average rate of about 7 percentage points each year, compared with the average rate of increase of 5 percent each year that was calculated for the Fy 1992 to 1998 period."29 The study shows projected SES losses are generally spread through much of the federal sector; and, with rare exception, the figures for Fy 1999 to 2005 timeframe are larger than those of Fy 1992 to 1998.

GAO also examined the impact of out-year SES retirements on various civil service career and occupational series. Careerists in various medical occupational fields may be particularly hard-hit by SES retirements in the near future. For example, with 81 percent of its 140 senior Health Systems Administrators eligible to retire by Fy 2005, it may be suspect for the VA to meet its normal hiring needs under today's archaic federal employment systems. The report identified several other career fields particularly susceptible to trouble if large-scale SES losses do occur. Hit hardest are the engineering career series with 38 percent, the administration series with 43 percent, the attorney series with 41 percent, and the program management career series with 49 percent.30

At this point a brief discussion into what issues and/or conditions might influence the SES's retirement decision might be helpful. I contend that at the heart of the issue is this question: What obstacles do you believe get in your way in performing your duties? While not a question confined to those in government service, are there aspects of federal employment in general, and the SES in specific, that SES's believe adversely affect their ability to do the job, and by
default, directly or indirectly influence the retirement decision? In short, the answer seems to be yes. Findings from a recent Price Waterhouse SES study may be useful in identifying personal and professional issues believed to be important to people at this level of the government hierarchy. Over 370 SES's, from 43 federal agencies were asked what were the most significant challenges they would face in the future to recruit and to retain leaders. Their responses to recruiting obstacles are outlined in Table 3, while Table 4 contains responses to factors challenging future retention efforts.

### Career Executives' Opinions On Obstacles To Recruiting Future Career Leaders

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<th>Obstacle</th>
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<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<td>Negative Perception of working for Government</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflexible selection/hiring procedures</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective recruiting/marketing</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limited opportunity to hire mid-level staff</td>
<td>19%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limited career advancement opportunities</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**TABLE 3**

### Career Executives' Opinions On Obstacles To Retaining Future Career Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>% Rating Obstacle as Highly Significant (9 or 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Management</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative perception of working for the government</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Recognition</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Advancement Opportunities</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4**

While the figures do not directly address why SES's choose to stay in the government or retire/resign, I believe they are indicative of the "frustration" that weighs on the decision-maker. An SES's personal perception of, and experience with management, hiring, recognition, and advancement opportunity cannot but help influence his or her career decisions. Not surprising the salary issue is again at the top of the "frustration" list.

While the salary structure has consistently been the reason cited most often for SES's leaving government service, some contend it is a significant contributor to those desiring to join the system. In 1980, SES pay levels were capped at slightly more than $50,000. Ten years later, during the Reagan administration, the pay limit had grown to just under $80,000 annually. Current pay scales for the SES top out at over $130,000. Despite seemingly constant criticism
by those within the ranks, the author could find no study affirming that the perception of low salaries deterred applicants from vying for SES vacancies. The salary issue certainly is not new. In many respects the above figures mirror data compiled in 1985, when the SES was in its infancy. A survey of SES’s who left the program that year, just six years after codification of the CSRA, identified compensation and a desire to avoid retirement pension reductions as the primary factors influencing the retirement decision of SES’s.\textsuperscript{33} Virtually every study reviewed for this paper agreed that the SES pay system is inadequate, and the compensation package under which it operates archaic. But while the literature is full of those citing the need for changes to the pay system, the Price Waterhouse study observed that only 5 percent of the SES’s responding to their survey thought that the government would “offer salaries/compensation comparable to the private sector” in the future.\textsuperscript{34}

If the salary structure is as unfair and insufficient as some claimed, why doesn’t the GAO study show SES’s retiring as soon as possible? The works of celebrated industrial psychologist Frederick Herzberg may provide the best insight into these phenomena. In his renowned Motivator/Hygiene theory of behavior, Herzberg observed that when asked about their salary, most people generally felt they were underpaid.\textsuperscript{35} The theory suggests that whenever a pay raise is given, regardless of much the amount, over time the perception of being underpaid returns. Borrowing from Herzberg, while nearly every study of the SES finds its members believe their salaries are too low, for most the pay was not low enough to move to resigning or early retirement.

It should also be noted there are many who find fault with both the way the GAO report was compiled and its conclusions. Some contend the study is overly alarmist; while others accuse the GAO of using statistics to unfairly paint a worse case scenario. Opening with an executive summary portraying a potentially dismal future for the SES, the “meat” of the report is too often buried in mounds of statistics. While the alarmist accusation would be understandable if confined to the contents of the executive summary, the contention withers with a thorough examination of the complete report. Careful review of the summary and the “Results in Brief” not only reveal a balanced, well researched document, but a rare government study in which logic presents a credible call for action. As to the claims of worst case reporting, the authors take special effort to support their position with help from OPM statisticians. Though OPM officials do not foresee SES departures comparable to the retirement-eligible population outlined by the GAO, their analysis does support at least 45 percent of those in retirement-eligible range leaving government by 2005.
Finally, what about the suggestion that things in the SES are not really as bad as the statistics indicate; that there simply won’t be an “exodus” of SES’s retiring in the next few years. Despite data-driven predictions that a crisis is imminent from the loss of this skilled group of civil servants, are there equally compelling reasons to believe that business will go on as usual? While the SES is an aging workforce, its members merely reflect a similar trend occurring throughout the American workforce. The aging workforce is evident in virtually every important sector of today’s economy. 1999 statistics reflect a growing number of men and women aged 62 to 64 were still active in the work force, and the percent of all workers who are over age 62 is increasing.36 This “graying” population may be due to 65 being the minimum age for collecting full Social Security benefits, however, recent Department of Labor’s statistics show that 29 and 18 percent of men and women respectively in the 65 to 69 age group were still in the labor force. Today’s worker can expect to live longer, is healthier, and leads a more active life. Age may not be the great barrier to staying in the workforce that it once was. A study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute found that 80 percent of baby boomers, who are just now reaching 55, indicate they plan to keep working at least part-time after reaching age 65.37

On average, federal workers retire at age 61; not significantly different from the national retirement age average of all workers at age 62.38 Yet despite the opportunity to retire from the federal sector, if the trend to remain in government after becoming retirement-eligible persists, the mass leadership exodus may just be prophecy. Evidence of this possibility is strong. For example, in 1996, despite four years of “downsizing”, nearly 400,000 retirement-eligible employees were still in the federal workforce.39 In either case, whether the future is one of a leadership crisis, or is nothing more than prolonged reflection of societal trends, the potential large-scale SES loss may well prove to be a fortuitous opportunity to rejuvenate a moribund system.

WHAT IS BEING DONE?

If decisions were implemented on data alone, one could speculate that confident federal officials were at the ready with programs and procedures to keep or replace soon-to-retire SES’s. But politics, money, time, and people all have a role in program implementation, and as in this case, the gap between decision-making and resources is deep and wide. The potential mass SES retirement issue is twofold; there is a problem with succession, and a problem with retention. While an optimist would believe federal officials have complimentary policies and programs tailored for both components of this problem, few agencies possess the means to ease the impact of large-scale SES departures. In short, most federal agencies simply do not have the personnel succession plans needed to address that side of this issue.
In a recent *Washington Post* interview, when questioned about the potential for large-scale civil servant losses, Janice LaChance, then Director of the Office of Personnel Management, stated: "there is a potential crisis, but the administration (Clinton) has anticipated the problem and is developing the tools that will help agencies manage in a way that will get results the American people want". The interviewer, Stephen Barr, noted that the "tools" LaChance was referring to included creation of a government-wide internship, and legislative proposals to strengthen the government's ability to compete with the private sector. Though admirable and necessary, while OPM's initiatives address challenges of lower level recruiting and retention, they ignore the immediate needs to retain and/or replace SES's. In the federal government the question of who are tomorrow's leaders remains. From where will these thousands of needed SES's come?

At the U.S. Army War College's 2001 Anton Myrer Leadership Symposium, more than 50 leading academic, business, and military leaders addressed the skills and abilities future leaders will require. The common thread tying their remarks was agreement that the leadership challenges of tomorrow will be more complex and ambiguous than today. Three factors: the explosion of technology; performance-based government; and the increasing diversity of tomorrow's workforce will unite to demand that leadership skills of future federal managers be radically different from the executive skills employed today. The key is to connect today's leadership and management experience in the federal sector with the ambiguous complexity of tomorrow's government, is succession planning at the senior-most level.

Organizational psychologist Richard Hagberg defines succession planning as "developing the next generation of leaders." Though federal officials have wrestled for years with the need to have viable succession planning, the "merit" principles of civil service have stymied progress. However, in the last ten years some inroads have been made, and succession planning is receiving growing attention from inside the federal arena. In 1989, the National Commission on Public Service, better known as the Volker Commission, identified the need for an executive development strategy emphasizing leadership training and succession. In the early 1990s, the National Academy of Public Administration foresaw the possibility of mass SES retirements, while further noting an apparent lack of interest about the issue existed in both the federal and public sectors. Recognizing the need to identify and develop senior leadership, in May 1980, the OPM fielded a government-wide senior-level succession concept known as the Candidate Development Program (CDP). The CDP attempted to provide development activities and training to qualified SES applicants, but until recently it was practically abandoned due to early failures and widespread claims of being a dumping ground.
for unproductive employees.\textsuperscript{44} Since the mid-1990s however, the CDP has provided the basic succession-planning template used by federal agencies.

But there are bright spots on an otherwise dark horizon. Thought not a executive federal agency by definition or design, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) is seen by many as one of the most progressive government organizations in the area of senior leader succession planning. The USPS had massive executive cutbacks in the early 1990s, yet just a few years later the Service found itself with too much work, and not enough personnel. In an 18-month window during the 1999-2000 timeframe, in addition to a projected 35 to 40 percent SES-equivalent retirement eligibility, 35 USPS executive positions opened through retirement. To combat the loss of its senior executives the Postal Service aggressively expanded its mid-level management training programs; developed fast-track courses to place interns in key management positions in as little as four years; and refocused its efforts to retain current executives through departmental rotation programs.\textsuperscript{45} Borrowing on a concept used by Deloitte Consulting, the USPS is looking at how to implement its own "Senior Leader Program (SLP)". Aimed towards retaining the institutional knowledge of its top-most leaders, Deloitte’s SLP allows executives to individually redesign their own positions. Depending on how a position is structured, that could mean reducing the hours worked, the amount of travel performed, or the level of responsibilities held. Other options include consulting, assuming different duties, or essentially whatever agreement the executive and the CEO reach.\textsuperscript{46}

Operating within the overall CDP framework, the OPM web page names fifteen federal agencies/organizations with CDP-based succession planning and programs. Agencies/organizations are allowed to tailor their programs to meet their needs, but at minimum they must include the following:

- an Individual Development Plan based on needs and competencies;
- a minimum of 80 hours or training addressing the SES executive core competencies;
- a four month (minimum) developmental assignment;
- an SES mentor.\textsuperscript{47}

With the retention/succession dichotomy in mind, these organizational programs focus their resources and energies on either retaining their SES’s, or implementing programs to identify and train successors. One example is a proposed OPM exchange program for SES’s exemplifies the retention type initiative.\textsuperscript{48} Under the exchange program selected members of the SES would work in leading private sector organizations in return for extended federal service. According to OPM, "expectations are that they would bring back valuable contacts, experience and knowledge of private sector best practices that would benefit federal
Initiatives at the Department of Defense (DoD) and military departments appear aimed at the succession planning side of the situation. Holding education as the pivotal executive leadership characteristic, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Policy, Diane Disney, stated, "DoD is transforming its approach to civilian education and training to focus on the idea of investment rather than cost." With education as the centerpiece, Ms. Disney cites the newly created Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) as a leap towards improving internal management accessions. In congressional testimony she held that DLAMP was the "first systematic departmentwide program to prepare civilians for key leadership positions." Based on an individually tailored program of military and defense related civilian training, and rotational assignments, DLAMP is designed to provide selected mid-managers with a kind of succession training for senior levels that was absent within the Department. Though not a complete list, other DoD/service-level programs oriented towards the succession component include the departmentwide Executive Leadership Development Program; the Army's Management Staff College and Organizational Leadership for Executive program; and the Navy's Commander's Development Program. While designed to improve member performance and capabilities, these programs also provide experiences, access, and collegial contacts that often prove instrumental in promoting successful participants to key organizational leadership positions.

The GAO seems to be the federal agency striving the hardest to build programs to meet the demands of retaining its current SES's, while working to establish succession programs to make organizational leadership changes as seamless as possible. The GAO had 104 SES positions allocated for FY 2000, with career appointments constituting 98 percent. Approximately 55 percent of GAO's current SES members will be eligible for retirement by 2005. Apart from aggressive use of an intern program and various organizational upward mobility programs, the GAO has created its own SES Development Program. The program is designed to strengthen the core competencies of the SES through organizational and academic training, duty rotations, and long-term mentorship. The GAO is also experimenting with an "on the job" training concept. Some of its most promising non-SES senior employees are placed in a "Super Band" category. Those selected for the program are placed in positions of significantly increased responsibility such as Acting or Associate Director billets, but with no additional compensation. The intent of this experience is to actually match a Super Band employee to a soon to be vacated SES position. There is twofold benefit to the organization: first from creating an environment and processes that facilitate passing vital institutional knowledge from the SES to the potential replacement, and second, no permanent commitment is made if the employee
proves not to be a good match for the position. Initial reports suggest that while GAO leadership has been encouraged by this program, it is too early to predict long-term success.
CONCLUSIONS AND A WAY FORWARD

While the extent of the potential crisis is not clear, data available makes a "brain drain" appears imminent within the ranks of federal SES's. Some agencies and activities have begun to address the potential impact of large-scale SES losses, but periodic works of writers such as Brookings' Paul Light, former Washington Post "Federal Page" writer Mike Causey, and others suggest federal wide initiatives are often sporadic and insufficient. When examining possible solutions to the issues posed in this paper, one must keep in mind the existence of two separate but related challenges: first, the need to retain selected current retirement-eligible SES's; and second, the need to develop succession programs to replace SES's who will eventually retire.

Without doubt the perception of adequate compensation appears to be the most contentious component of the "brain drain" issue. As noted throughout this paper, nearly every study of the SES has identified inadequate compensation as a leading cause of dissatisfaction among the members of the SES. Depending on the sources examined and definitions used, the average annual compensation packet for the "senior personnel officer" of large American industrial companies was close to $200,000. While one can debate the comparability between SES's and these senior personnel billets, the point is to demonstrate the pay gap between positions of generally equal levels of responsibility and authority. The current SES salary structure simply serves as constant reminder that the "grass is greener on the other side". Any initiative designed to retain federal leadership and/or attract qualified replacements must begin not only with a thorough examination of the SES pay structure, but a genuine attempt to ameliorate general perception of inadequacy.

While there is inherent logic and value in striving to retain current SES's, the author opines government agencies should focus their attention on the succession component of this problem. Considering the OPM estimate of nearly 2,500 departures of retirement-eligible SES's between now and Fy 2005, efforts and resources spent on retaining today's SES's only serve to delay the inevitable. The future lies in identifying and preparing the best qualified replacements to make the leadership transition as transparent and seamless as possible.

While expensive, rotational assignments must be core elements of any succession plan. As resources diminish and information explodes, the lines separating federal organizations are blurring. The opportunity to experience and view generic agency processes from leadership positions outside one's own organization can provide a candidate with a unique advantage.
when competing for an SES billet. As reinforced by instructors at the Army War College, with
DoD's expanded role in the interagency process, experience in that arena may well become
more important to future senior leadership development. Rotational assignments provide a
means to see, understand, and practice senior leadership through different lenses.

Finally, I believe federal officials should re-examine leadership development with an aim
to make it an intrinsic part of career management. The Management Intern Program stands as
an example of what the federal sector has done in that regard. Examine the issue by comparing
leadership training/opportunities for military officers to that of their federal civilian counterparts.53
While both groups have formal training programs, officers must successful pass each
prescribed course in order to progress (e.g., OBC, OAC, CAS3, CGSC, SSC). To paraphrase
Ms. Elizabeth Throckmorton, Deputy to Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel),
receiving civilian training is often a matter of timing and luck.54 I contend that until civilian
training becomes a prerequisite to advancement, and senior civilian training becomes centrally
managed and funded, luck and timing will continue dominating the training discussion.
Concurrently, I believe that unique and/or unconventional work experiences and opportunities
are vital to infuse “new blood” into federal agencies/organizations. Leadership development
inside the federal government seems too often viewed as exclusively met through formal
training and education. Observations and experiences lead me to advocate expanding career
opportunities to those outside the federal sector, with the aim to stimulate creativity and the
development of dormant or non-existent skills and abilities. In spite of the concepts and rules of
“merit”, from personal research and discussions there are many in the public who feel the
government is “close-minded” for normally limiting SES recruitment to current status candidates.
Recruiting outside the federal sector may be a way to encourage a diversity of management
ideas at the policy-making level of the organization.

This is a classical good news/bad news story. The good news is the issue of
retaining/replacing retiring SES's is not longer resting on the backburner. The topic is in the
public. It has received substantial attention both in and outside the federal sector. Things have
been and are being done to alleviate the impact of large-scale SES losses in the near future.
The bad news is that it got to this point.

WORD COUNT: 8,074
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 101.


4 Huddleston and Boyer, 8.

5 Ibid., 10.

6 Ibid., 17.


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Huddleston and Boyer, 38.

12 Ibid., 39.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 41.

15 Ibid., 42.

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17 Ibid., 57-58.

18 Ibid., 60.

19 Ibid., 62-63.


25 Ibid., 42.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.


32 Ring and Perry, 130.


34 Price Waterhouse, Table 9.

35 Frederick Herzberg, Interview with Saul Gellerman, Encyclopedia Briticannia Film Series, 1968.


38 Ibid., 6.


43 Candidate Development Programs, Handout, provided by Patricia P. Blumenthal, Senior Personnel Manager, United States General Accounting Office, personal interview by author, 10 December 2000.

44 Ibid., 561.


47 Candidate Development Programs.


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51 Patricia P. Blumenthal. Interview, 10 December 2000.

52 Ibid.

53 Elizabeth Throckmorton, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel), class presentation to the U.S. Army War College, 12 February 2001.

54 Ibid.
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