The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST CIVIL-WAR PERIOD: INSIGHTS FOR A PEACETIME ARMY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRUCE E. BRYDGES
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST CIVIL-WAR PERIOD: INSIGHTS FOR A PEACETIME ARMY

by

LTC Bruce E. Brydges
United States Army

Professor Leonard J. Fullenkamp
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Bruce E. Brydges
TITLE: Transformation in the Post-Civil War Period: Insights for a Peacetime Army
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 10 April 2001 PAGES: 33 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The experiences of the American Army in the post-Civil War period, and the impacts of those experiences on the Army's performance in the Spanish-American War, are analyzed to gain insights for the provisioning of a peacetime Army. The Army's post-Cold War experiences, to date, are then examined to determine how well those insights were applied to the provisioning of today's peacetime Army. Examination reveals that many, if not most, of the mistakes that were made in the latter half of the nineteenth century were repeated in the 1990s. Neglect, as evidenced by insufficient resourcing and over-commitment to operations other than war impeded the Army's ability to adequately fulfill its overarching purpose during an inter-war period --- preparation to fight and win the nation's next war. Army leadership, just as in the late 1800s, failed to effectively engage and garner the support of the public and the Congress. The consequences of congressional neglect and leadership failure was an unready, unmotivated and unhappy Army. Unlike the post-Civil War experience, leaders within the military establishment and on Capitol Hill have taken notice of these consequences and have initiated corrective actions before the nation finds it necessary to send the Army off to war ill-prepared, as it did in 1898.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR: INSIGHTS FOR A PEACETIME ARMY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ARMY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOWNSIZING</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY POLICY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUALITY-OF-LIFE</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE OFFICER CORPS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING AND MODERNIZATION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSIGHTS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE POST-COLD WAR ARMY</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD: INSIGHTS FOR A PEACETIME ARMY

That men do not learn much from the lessons of history is the most important of all lessons that history has to teach.

—Aldous Huxley

The American military, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and not withstanding the brief interruption of Desert Shield/Storm, once again finds itself in one of those infamous inter-war periods that are commonly characterized by acute reductions in military manpower and appropriations. As the Army struggles with its burden of managing declining resources while trying to ensure that it remains sufficiently prepared to answer the call when the trumpets next sound, it is instructive to reflect upon our previous inter-war experiences to ascertain applicable successes and failures on the part of policy-makers and leadership. The period between the Civil and the Spanish-American Wars offers one such opportunity for study.

One might argue that this is a very different age and Army — that time, technology and scope of interest render it useless to search for commonality with America's frontier Army — but close examination reveals that the United States Army today is presented with many of the same conditions, circumstances and challenges which confronted the Army in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Public attitude toward the Army varied from disinterest to disdain; legislative attitude was motivated by political partisanship. The organization and relationship between the downsized regular Army and the volunteer reserve forces was the subject of much debate. The Army found itself inundated with participation in activities which we today characterize as operations other than war. Commanders were operationally burdened by lack of mobility stemming from heavy dependence on logistical support. Enlistment rates could not compensate for manpower shortages. Discontent was prevalent among both enlisted soldiers and officers alike; competitiveness, careerism and lack of cooperation rankled the officer corps. Training and modernization fell victim to the need to do too much with too little.

The great American Army that so resoundingly won the Civil War, was disorganized, poorly trained and ill-prepared when America went to war again in 1898. Luckily, her opponent was neither prepared nor determined; otherwise the result might have been catastrophe. The dismal performance of the Army invoked public outcry and resulted in the dismissal of the serving Secretary of War. His replacement, Elihu Root, shocked at what the war had revealed, undertook measures to reform the Army and eliminate the inefficiencies that had plagued the service for the previous decades.
The trials and tribulations that the Army encountered during the period between the Civil and the Spanish-American Wars bear a striking resemblance to what some observe as conditions in our Army today. It is important for the edification of senior Army leaders and others who influence policy and resourcing, to recognize, comprehend and apply the insights that may be gleaned from that period of the Army’s storied past — a period that some historians refer to as the “Army’s dark ages.”

THE ARMY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

With the conclusion of the Civil War, the national focus turned from military readiness toward more pressing political, social and economic priorities, such as reconstruction of the southern states, expansion of the rail systems and settlement of the American West. Expenditures during the war were great, and the fiscal sustainment of the post-war Army competed for scarce resources that were desperately needed elsewhere. Americans had traditionally viewed the concept of a large standing Army with distrust, and Congress saw the meager provisioning of the Army as a mechanism by which to achieve economy. This attitude prevailed throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century — fiscal appropriations were woefully inadequate to support the operational requirements of the Army. Lack of men and money presented significant challenges, but the second and third order effects of insufficient resourcing — some of which were beyond the control of senior Army leaders, but many of which were not — had a devastating impact on the professionalism and readiness of the Army. This impact did not go fully unnoticed, and in the 1880s and 1890s several attempts were made by Army leaders to improve conditions within the service. These reform measures, although laudable, were too limited and came too late to significantly improve the condition of the service prior to the Spanish-American War.

DOWNSIZING

The Union Army mustered over one million men as the Civil War was fought to a close in early 1865. The vast majority of these soldiers comprised the volunteer units that had been recruited and provided by the northern states; in fact, the actual Regular Army of the United States was really quite small. Following the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, demobilization was swift and steady, if not extreme. Congressional legislation in 1866 established the authorized strength of the Army at just over 57,000 officers and men. Army authorizations suffered almost annual reductions in subsequent years, until reaching a low point of 25,000 enlisted men in 1874. Despite urgent pleas and recommendations from Army
leadership, this figure remained substantially unchanged right up to the declaration of war against Spain.\(^3\)

The series of reductions imposed severe handicaps on the army line. Engineers, ordnance, commissary, medical, quartermaster, the Fort Leavenworth Prison guard, the West Point detachment, and recruiting details absorbed three to four thousand men. Ten cavalry regiments, five artillery regiments, and twenty-five infantry regiments shared the balance. But because of the lag of casualties — discharge, death, desertion — behind replacement, actual strength always fell at least ten percent below authorized strength. Rarely, under the ceiling of 25,000, did the regimental rolls bear the names of more than 19,000 soldiers.\(^4\)

The true impact of manpower reductions was most emphatically manifested at the company level. With 430 company-size units to garrison some two hundred posts, the company/troop, rather than the regiment, was the basic tactical unit. Sickness, imprisonment, and detachment or detail of soldiers to other duties further eroded the company rolls, leading the commanding general to comment that such companies were almost ridiculous.\(^5\)

The Army had indeed become a skeleton. And the skeleton, as General Schofield pointed out, 'was very expensive in proportion to its effective strength.' When trouble occurred, companies on the scene were too weak to handle it and had to be speedily reinforced from elsewhere. Personnel costs dropped, but transportation costs soared. Aside from expense, the system heightened the danger to troops on the scene while awaiting reinforcements, and weakened defenses in areas from which the reinforcements were drawn. 'The unavoidable result', concluded Col. Philippe Regis De Trobriand, 'is that finally an excessive reduction of the Army becomes more expensive than would be its maintenance to a normal strength, and that it costs the people more to stop evils and repair damages than it would cost to prevent them.'\(^6\)

Political partisanship, and in some cases blatant hostility toward the Army, made the attainment of legislation providing for military appropriations an annual struggle and a source of constant aggravation. Many Congressmen had served in the Union Army during the Civil War, and felt that they knew the true needs of the Army without regard to the recommendations of the serving Army leadership. Debate between southern Democrats and Republicans was always bitter, and at times Congressional attacks on military funding were severe. In 1877, less than a year after the nation was shocked by the fatal outcome of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, the Congressional session actually ended without the appropriation of any funds at all for the Army; soldiers went without pay from July to November of that year.\(^7\) "The continually recurring difficulty experienced by the Army in obtaining its annual appropriation was aggravated by the fact that the organization, disposition and use of troops during this period made it a very expensive institution to maintain properly."\(^8\) Appropriations remained reactive, sporadic and doleful until America went to war again in 1898.
OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT

The Army's primary task following the Civil War was to cope with Indians on the country's vast frontier. The nation's Indian policy — ambiguous, inconsistent, discriminatory and seemingly unenforceable — was to remove the Indians from settled areas onto reservations. The responsibility for implementation of the nation's Indian policy was divided between the Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which had been transferred from the War Department to the newly created Department of the Interior in 1849. The Army retained control over military removal of the Indians to designated reservations; the Bureau of Indian Affairs was responsible for managing the activities on the reservations themselves. But when circumstances on the reservations were deemed to be uncontrollable by the Indian Bureau, or when agitated Indians violated the confines of reservation boundaries, the Army was inevitably called upon to restore order. In this capacity the Army "was a conventional military force trying to control, by conventional military methods, a people that did not behave like a conventional enemy and, indeed, quite often was not an enemy at all."10

Frontier duty occupied the Army throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. Units garrisoned forts, which were frequently little more than small settlements, to conduct constabulary service — establishing a presence to deter Indian aggression and, should it be necessary, respond to such aggression. The general dispersion of the many forts and outposts throughout the frontier provided forces that were ill-equipped to conduct independent operations. Expansion of the rail systems by 1880 enabled concentration of forts and forces that were capable of projecting adequate combat power, but were hindered by extensive logistical requirements.11

The monotony of constabulary service was sporadically interrupted by brief periods of offensive operations. Such interruptions began with actions against the Sioux along the Bozeman Trail in 1866, and continued throughout the northern and southern plains, the Pacific Northwest, and along the southern border of the United States for the next twenty-four years, consuming most of the Army's attention, energy and resources during that time. The Army found the roving tribes of the West to be a fierce, elusive and frustrating foe. Various attempts were made to develop organizations, tactics, techniques and procedures to proscribe how best to find, isolate and defeat the hostile bands — including the employment of converging columns, the conduct of winter campaigns, and plain dogged pursuit. Although each of these techniques were at times successful, none proved to be consistently decisive.12
There were times when military actions on the plains aroused much public sympathy, such as the ambush of Captain William J. Fetterman and eighty troopers near Fort Phil Kearny in December 1866, and the devastation of the famous Seventh Cavalry Regiment at the Little Bighorn in June 1876. There were other times when actions elicited public skepticism and disbelief, such as the Army's seemingly inept, 1,700 mile pursuit of the Nez Perce in 1877. Regardless of the public emotion, little was done to significantly improve the capability of the much maligned Army. The Indian Wars culminated with the Battle of Wounded Knee in December 1890, but the Army continued to occupy frontier posts and monitor the reservations until after the Spanish-American War. Although the Army significantly contributed to the effort, in the end it was the expansion of white civilization, the demise of the buffalo and the loss of his livelihood that finally subdued the Indian.

While enforcing Indian policy on the frontier was the Army's primary role in the post-war era, it was by no means its only operational responsibility. A myriad of other tasks consumed the Army, and undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of its efforts on the frontier. For twelve years following the conclusion of the war, a significant number of troops were engaged in the oversight of Reconstruction activities in the erstwhile Confederate states — protecting unpopular civil governments, ensuring federal authority, and attempting to enforce new voting regulations. In 1867, almost forty percent of the entire Army was involved in these occupation duties, and as late as 1876, fifteen percent of the Army was still billeted in the south. Additionally, from 1865 to 1885, roughly twelve percent of the Army was employed garrisoning federal arsenals and coastal forts in the eastern United States.  

The federal government also used the Army to execute tasks for which no other agency existed. When droughts and grasshopper infestations devastated settlers on the northern plains, soldiers were used to distribute surplus rations, blankets, shoes and other provisions. The Army was dispatched to maintain order in Chicago after a fire destroyed much of the city in 1871. In 1877, over four thousand soldiers protected government property, opened railroads and restored order in response to a massive strike by the nation's railroad workers. During the 1880s, Army units occupied Omaha, Seattle and Rock Springs, Wyoming when civilian authorities were unable to maintain peace after racially-motivated riots. Almost two thirds of the Army actively participated or stood on-call to respond to civil unrest when nearly three quarters of a million workers went on strike.  

"Beyond these spectacular appearances, the Army was called upon in more than three hundred labor disputes during the period." Participation in Reconstruction and strike-breaking duty did little to endear the Army to effected communities, and only exacerbated the Army's problems with the Congress.
ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY POLICY

The Army was reorganized under a coordinate system, wherein it was composed of the staff and line, in 1866. But the staff was not the commanding general’s staff, it was actually the War Department staff, and for “four decades after the Civil War, the resulting hostility between staff and line deeply troubled the Army.”

The War Department staff, as defined by the act of 1866, consisted of ten administrative and technical bureaus, officially called departments or corps: the Adjutant General’s Department, the medium of orders and commands and the custodian of records and archives; the Inspector General’s Department, charged with inspecting and reporting on the proficiency, discipline, and leadership of the Army, together with its arms, accouterments, clothing, quarters, and other material; the Judge Advocate General’s Department (or Bureau of Military Justice), reviewing authority for military courts and source of legal advice for the Secretary of War; the Quartermaster’s Department, responsible for barracks and quarters, transportation of personnel and material, and procurement and distribution of most classes of supplies; the Subsistence Department, responsible for the content, procurement, and distribution of rations; the Medical Department, custodian of the health and hygiene of the army; the Pay Department, whose paymasters traveled endlessly to distribute the soldiers’ wages; the Corps of Engineers, charged with mapping and construction; the Ordnance Department, responsible for testing, selecting, procuring or manufacturing, and distributing arms, ammunition, and all related accouterments and equipment; and the Signal Corps, the infant service concerned with communication, particularly flags, torches, and telegraph.

The Army line consisted of the officers and men assigned to the regiments that performed the operational tasks of the Army; it was structured along geographic lines with divisions of the Atlantic, Missouri and the Pacific. The divisions were further divided into subordinate departments.

Hostility stemmed from the confused delineation of authority and responsibility between the commanding general — who obtained his position by being the most senior officer in the service, and reported directly to the President — and the civilian appointed Secretary of War. Regulations conferred the commanding general with authority over discipline and military control of the Army. The Secretary, working through the staff chiefs, was responsible for the political, administrative and fiscal affairs of the War Department. But fiscal control strongly influenced troop operations through the procurement and distribution or diversion of supplies. The struggle for control that frequently existed between the commanding general and the Secretary of War resulted in strained personal and professional relationships that permeated throughout the service and greatly reduced efficiency. The relationship between General Sherman and
Secretary of War William J. Belknap soured to the point that, in 1874, Sherman "abdicated all pretense at command and moved his headquarters [from Washington] to St. Louis."¹⁹

Staff chiefs were provided life tenure and possessed near autonomy in their capacities; they answered directly to the Secretary of War and they wielded tremendous influence on the Army through the exercise of that relationship. The staff bureaus were swollen with high-ranking officers — over half of the Army's brigadier generals and majors, and almost half of the colonels and lieutenant colonels held positions within the staff. The staff bureaus were stationed almost entirely in cities, and staff officers enjoyed comforts and privileges which officers of the line did not. Lower ranking officers of the staff were positioned at department and divisional headquarters, but they continued to be dominated by their powerful Washington-based superiors. As a result, operational commanders never felt adequately supported by the staff officers who maintained effective control of logistics within the field commands. The coordinate system, and the virtual lack of mobility between staff and line, resulted in the seeming existence of very distinct subcultures within the Army, and fostered distrust, contempt and animosity between the two.²⁰ One disgruntled officer observed that "every chief of bureau in the War Department has a little army of his own, apparently independent of all superior authority except Congress."²¹

The inter-war period did provide opportunity for observation and reflection. In 1875, General Sherman dispatched a panel of three officers, headed Colonel Emory Upton, to observe and report on the armies of Asia and Europe. Upton became enthralled with what he observed of the Prussian Army. He used his report as a catalyst to champion his advocacy of military reform; he proposed many substantive measures, including reform of the nation's traditional military policy regarding dual (federal and state) control of volunteer forces. Upton detested the concept of state involvement; he believed that the Regular Army should be made robust, and organized so as to provide the sole cadre around which any wartime army should be formed. He submitted that volunteers should be organized on a national level and should provide lower enlisted personnel only — officers and noncommissioned officers should all come from the Regular Army. Upton's ideas, frequently published in the leading periodicals of the day, sparked much heated debate between traditionalists and reform advocates. His proposals regarding the organization of volunteer forces were so radical that they never had much chance of gaining public support. "By proposing a military policy that the country could not accept, Emory Upton helped ensure that the country would continue to limp along with virtually no military policy at all. Even as the decades of the 1890s unveiled a new national interest in possible foreign adventures...the Army continued to languish in neglect."²²
The inadequacies of the coordinate system and the nation's lack of an effective military policy were readily exposed when America went to war again in 1898. "Though the War with Spain had been foreseen for some time, nothing had been done toward changing our ludicrous, defensive weakness, let alone our offensive capacity. Even the militia law was more than one hundred years old."\footnote{23} As the country mobilized for war, the Uptonian volunteer policy debate resurfaced, and Congress hurriedly responded by enacting compromise legislation that only partially satisfied the demands of both the Regular Army and the National Guard. Securing enough men willing to fight was no problem, but getting the expanded Army sufficiently mobilized proved a different matter. There was no one agency in the War Department that was responsible for mobilization, and the staff bureaus had done nothing to plan or prepare for the task then at hand. Virtually every aspect of mobilization and deployment proved problematic. Soldiers were issued woolen flannel or cotton duck uniforms for wear in the tropics. Men idled in Florida camps, awaiting supplies and transportation. Cars loaded with military equipment sat congested on rail tracks from the port in Tampa all the way to Columbia, South Carolina. The Army hurriedly purchased wagons (at inflated prices) to carry what could be off-loaded from the trains, because it had discarded its wagon trains in 1895, having determined they were no longer needed. Deficient transportation contributed to food and medical problems as well. The lack of preparedness and coordination between the staff departments reflected, above all, the Army's lack of a directing brain.\footnote{24}

**LEADERSHIP**

The Army saw only five commanding generals between the Civil and Spanish-American Wars. Four of them—Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Schofield—were distinguished Civil War generals; the other, Nelson A. Miles, was also a Civil War general, but was more renowned as an Indian-fighter. Grant's term, after the war, was for but four years, as his immense popularity catapulted him to the Presidency in 1869. Sherman followed, serving as the Army's senior officer for the next fourteen years. In 1883, Sheridan assumed the post and held it for five years, to be followed by Schofield, who remained in the position for seven years. Miles became the Army's last commanding general in 1895 and served in the position until his retirement eight years later.

Notwithstanding the limitations of the coordinate system, the commanding general did possess the capacity to influence public and Congressional attitudes toward the Army. "The Civil War had cemented powerful bonds between the people and their army. Postwar developments loosened, then almost entirely severed these bonds."\footnote{25} The commanding
general had the opportunity to converse, correspond, and foster relationships with members of Congress. He also had access to the public through newspapers, periodicals, personal appearances, etc. But the post-war commanding generals made little or poor use of the tools at their disposal. They proved to be non-engaged, non-persuasive and ineffective in the measure of keeping the Army in the graces of the public and Congress. Sherman's performance in this regard was the most disheartening:

Unfortunately for his cause, Sherman hated politics. When he succeeded, after Grant's inauguration, to the position of General of the Army, the grizzled veteran would have to face Congressional committees and explain to them as best he could why the army needed more men and more money. The grim, tight-lipped mouth, the scowling manner, and the cryptic comments would goad into fury those members of Congress who resented Sherman's aloofness and manner of superiority. His brutal frankness would alienate certain pressure groups, like the peace societies, which demanded lenient treatment for the Indians. Sherman was miserable in the public glare; and in trying to cope with those who could give him the things he needed — men and money — he showed his weakest side. How to fight politicians effectively, he was never able to learn. The

QUALITY-OF-LIFE

Poor pay, inadequate food, deplorable living conditions, harsh discipline, and monotonous, yet demanding duty characterized life in the Army. It was a life which offered little appeal, and this was reflected in the inability of the Army to sufficiently recruit and retain quality personnel. Disgruntled soldiers expressed their dissatisfaction with their feet - desertion became a common practice. In 1871, 32.6% of the aggregate enlisted strength of the Army — 8,800 soldiers — deserted. The post-war regular ranks filled with recruits of a lower order of intelligence, physical fitness, and motivation. The New York Sun's charge that 'the Regular Army is composed of bummers, loafers, and foreign paupers' was only partially accurate; there were other undesirables as well.

By the end of the Civil War, an private's pay was a mere sixteen dollars per month. Congress reduced the soldier's pay to the pre-Civil War figure of thirteen dollars a month in 1871, but quickly rescinded the reduction when its effect (manifested through desertion) became apparent. In 1872, Congress adopted a bill which left the basic pay of enlisted men unchanged, but did provide for small annual increases based on years of service, and reenlistment bonuses. Basic soldier pay remained unchanged until 1908.

Rations and living conditions were abhorrent. Food lacked in both quantity and variety. There were no cooks assigned to the Army; food was prepared by untrained soldiers detailed to that purpose. As such, the food served was universally ill-prepared. Inadequate housing vexed
the troops for years. Companies of men lived in facilities that lacked any comforts or conveniences other than beds, a chair or two, and a small number of candles. Soldiers were generally required to sleep two to a bunk in unsanitary buildings which were defective in both material and construction. Married enlisted men lived with their families in the overcrowded sheds and shanties that existed at every post.  

Soldiers posted to the frontier found garrison duty to be arduous, they complained:

We first enlisted with the usual ideas of the life of a soldier;...but we find in service that we are obliged to perform all kinds of labor, such as all the operations of building quarters, stables, storehouses, bridges, roads, and telegraph lines; involving logging, lumbering, quarrying, adobe and brick making, lime-burning, mason-work, plastering, carpentering, painting, &c. We are also put at teaming, repairing wagons, harness, &c., black-smithing, and sometimes woodchopping and hay-making. This in addition to guard duty, care of horses, arms and equipments, cooking, baking, police of quarters and stables, moving stores, &c., as well as drilling, and frequently to the exclusion of the latter.  

Duty on the frontier was often made all the more discomforting by the climate. Winters in the northern plains were frequently severe, with raging blizzards and deep snow from October until May. These were followed by short, intensely hot summers that were accompanied by the infestation of gnats, flies, grasshoppers and mosquitoes. Life in the southwest was characterized by extreme heat and drought, and an abundance of snakes, scorpions, and tarantulas. One soldier in Arizona observed that it was a place where everything that grew pricked and everything that breathed bit.  

Several measures were implemented in the late 1800s to ease the burdens of soldiers and promote the attractiveness of service life. Beginning in 1880, a serious effort was made to bring the military justice system into line with acceptable standards of jurisprudence. In 1881 a general order was issued, directing that certain articles necessary for the comfort and cleanliness of the men be made available by the Subsistence Department at all military posts, and emphasis was placed on providing suitable recreational opportunities for soldiers. Congress finally passed a retirement law in 1885, providing that soldiers completing thirty years of service would thereafter receive three-fourths of their pay and allowances. Additionally, a building program was inaugurated to convert temporary wooden barracks and quarters into more permanent facilities. Despite all these efforts, on the eve of the war with Spain, there still persisted in the public outlook, the opinion that the Army was composed largely of underpaid, poorly fed and inadequately equipped soldiers who were governed by an abusive disciplinary system.
THE OFFICER CORPS

Numerous problems beset the officer corps after 1865. Men who had grown accustomed to public adulation and rapid promotion during the war found themselves serving in an Army that was routinely scorned, and where opportunity for advancement waned. Officers who had led divisions as brevet general officers during the war, found themselves reverted back to their regular ranks as colonels, majors and sometimes even captains.34

Promotions after the war were accorded based on seniority within one's regiment. The strictness of this system, coupled with the dramatic shrinking of the Army and the lack of a mandatory age-based retirement, stagnated promotions for three decades and resulted in a significant increase in the average age of the officer corps. "As officers aged without advancement, their initiative, energy and impulse for self-improvement diminished. Their concerns narrowed. They fragmented into hostile factions - staff and line, infantry and cavalry, young and old, West Point and Volunteer, Civil War veteran and peacetime newcomer. They bickered incessantly...."35 These problems persisted until Congress enacted laws in 1890-91 reforming the Army's promotion system and compelling officers over the age of sixty-four to retire.36

Officer problems adversely effected operational cooperation as well. Overcaution or advancing age prevented some officers from successfully combating elusive Indians. Others, because of abrasive personalities, petty animosities or personal ambition, failed to coordinate their efforts with adjacent or supporting units.37 "Although most officers understood their general frontier duties and objectives, the open dialogue that might have helped them achieve their goals more smoothly was practically nonexistent."38

Until the late 1800s, the lack of published tactical doctrine and professional education hindered officer development. Officers received virtually no instruction for assumption of responsibility beyond the company-level. Fortunately for the Army, while General Sherman lacked the interpersonal skills necessary to successfully engage Congress, he was "one of the most cerebral and innovative of all its commanding generals."39 Sherman directed the publication of doctrine for the application of infantry, cavalry and artillery tactics. He promoted advanced learning within the officer corps when he established the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth in 1881. "Although the course of instruction then prescribed for this institution was primitive and elementary, the very installation was the beginning of general and special service schools that were to spring up later and make our officers the peers in the art and science of war of any in the world."40 Sherman's avid
encouragement of technical, tactical and intellectual development helped to mitigate some of the problems incurred through the diminished expectations of the officer corps.

TRAINING AND MODERNIZATION

The impact of reduced funding and heavy operational commitment severely constrained the Army's ability to sufficiently train the force and modernize its aging weapons. Neglect of training began at time of enlistment. "The pressing demand for recruits to fill up existing commands precluded the possibility of providing anything more than the most rudimentary training to the recruits at the [recruiting] depots."41 If the recruits expected to receive advanced training upon arrival at their regiments, they were frequently disappointed. Newly arriving soldiers found that their labor was needed for other services that provided little time for training. While offensive operations on the frontier did provide opportunity for the execution of combat-related tasks, such occurrences were infrequent and were generally limited to small unit activity. In 1874, an officer in Texas observed that a man could enlist, serve five years, and get discharged without ever firing his weapon.42 The limited training that did occur, was conducted at or below the company level. It wasn't until the late 1880s that full regiments were assembled to conduct training.

Throughout the late nineteenth century, American arms development stagnated to the point of obsolescence, despite knowledge of the many technological advancements adopted by the armies of Europe. Although the benefits of repeating rifles had been ably demonstrated, troopers remained equipped with an improved version of the model '69 Springfield rifle for most of the period. It was a .45 caliber, single-shot breechloader, of proven reliability; "but the Henry and Remington repeaters were better, and officers and men provided themselves with the latter whenever they could afford to do so."43

The Army didn't adopt a repeating rifle as the standard weapon until 1892. It was the Danish .30 caliber Krag-Jorgensen, possessing a five round magazine capacity and firing smokeless cartridges. Money for production was limited to supply the regular Army only. Procurement of the weapon was rapidly accelerated when war with Spain was imminent, but many of the volunteers who participated carried the old single-shot Springfield. Some units received the new weapons only after their arrival in Cuba. Many of these troops went to war undrilled; in one regiment, in fact, over three hundred men had never fired a gun.44

American inferiority in artillery was even more pronounced. By 1898, breech-loading artillery, smokeless propellants, effective explosive shells, and recoil absorbing devices had become almost universally adopted in Europe. But the American Army had only just begun
limited experimentation with some of these innovations.\textsuperscript{45} On the eve of the twentieth century, the American Army went to war largely equipped with mid-nineteenth century weapons; luckily America's neglect of military modernization did not effect the ultimate outcome against the listless Spanish forces.

**INSIGHTS**

"The post-Civil War American Army was in the doldrums. Reduced in size by Congress until it numbered less than 25,000 officers and men, it had little to offer the ambitious soldier."\textsuperscript{46} Insufficient appropriations coupled with heavy commitment, to activities that we today categorize as operations other than war, severely impacted service morale, professionalism and readiness. The unattractiveness of service life provided enlistment incentive only during the worst economic times, and then generally to the lowest caliber of recruit. The Army languished far behind its European counterparts, in both military modernization and organizational preparedness, when America went to war again in 1898.

Thanks to the hearty cooperation of the Spanish, the United States won her war. But she did so at immense, unnecessary cost. In Cuba, in July, American soldiers fought in the old, heavy wool uniforms of the Civil War. They fired a black-powder cartridge which every other civilized nation in the world had discarded in favor of smokeless powder. Due to the inefficiency of the staff bureaus, the troops ate rancid meat and suffered terribly from typhoid and malaria. When it was all over an enraged public demanded a scapegoat...\textsuperscript{47}

The experiences of America's post-Civil War Army, and the resulting impacts of those experiences on the Army's performance in the Spanish-American war, provide compelling evidence of the maladies which can frequent inter-war armies. Analysis of these experiences offer several insights for both civilian and military policy-makers in the provisioning of a peacetime American Army.

Above all, it should be recognized and universally accepted that the overarching purpose of the peacetime Army must be preparation to fight and win the nation's next war. It is reasonable to expect that the peacetime Army will be a downsized Army, as manifested through reductions in both manpower and funding. But the nature and magnitude of these reductions must not significantly impede the Army's ability to adequately fulfill its overarching purpose. The cost of sufficiently maintaining a peacetime Army will always seem high in light of pressing domestic requirements; but the price of neglect may be needless or excessive loss of American lives.

It is also reasonable to expect that the peacetime Army will be employed to further the nation's foreign policy goals by participating in operations other than war, but such employment
should be cautiously measured. Protracted commitment or extended participation of forces to such operations poses the potential to dramatically consume and/or divert resources (personnel, equipment, funds, time). The consumption/diversion of resources by participation in operations other than war must not be permitted to the extent that it brings into doubt the Army's preparedness to fight and win the next war.

Army leadership must maintain an adequate view to the future, and develop organizational structures and force capabilities that effectively link allocated resources to anticipated wartime requirements. In this regard, it is essential that Army leadership and defense policy-makers actively, honestly and persuasively engage the both the public and the Congress. Timely, complete and accurate assessments of funding impacts on the Army's ability to fulfill its overarching purpose must be provided to those who appropriate funds for the nation's defense. Peacetime defense appropriations are always influenced by competing domestic programs, political priorities, and the temperament of the electorate. The Army can ill-afford to be separated from the affections of the very public who funds it.

Quality-of-life, professional development, training and modernization are all essential components of the Army's preparation to fight and win the next war, and they must never be neglected. Quality-of-life impacts recruitment, retention, morale and readiness. If the Army is to attract and retain quality personnel, it must offer a reasonable standard of living as measured by pay, benefits, and lifestyle. Professionalism must be fostered to ensure the technical, tactical and intellectual development of future generations of Army leadership. Professionalism increases morale, effectiveness and efficiency. Organizational and functional systems, leaders, soldiers and equipment must be routinely exercised if the Army is to adequately prepare to fight and win the nation's next war — training is the bedrock of readiness. Modernization increases lethality and survivability. Modernization is required if the Army is to remain technologically ahead, or at least abreast, of potential adversaries. America should never send the Army — its very sons and daughters — into harms way unprepared or ill-equipped.

THE POST-COLD WAR ARMY

"In November 1989, the United States again emerged victorious from forty years of war. It was a cold war, however, fought not on the plains of western Europe, but by professional soldiers in classrooms, training areas, and simulation centers across the United States." The Cold War was unique in the annals of conflict. It was the ultimate game of one-ups-man-ship between the world's two great superpowers, and it was largely fought through military spending, as evidenced in force structure and capability. United States defense spending increased
significantly in the 1980s, under the administration of Ronald Reagan. The Soviet economy imploded under the strain of attempting to keep pace with U.S. efforts.

The justification for Reagan's defense expenditures, and the credibility of the Army it financed, were suitably demonstrated in the Gulf War. In February 1991, following a month-long air campaign, the United States Army took only one hundred hours to rout the Iraqi Army — the fourth largest army in the world. The procurement of advanced weapons systems, the establishment of modern training centers, the years of conducting extensive joint and combined training exercises — things that defined the progression of the U.S. Army in the 1980s — were all validated by Army's performance in the Gulf War. But even before units were initially deployed to the Arabian Gulf region in 1990, plans were being implemented to downsize the force and structure the defense establishment for the post-Cold War environment.

The defense expenditures of the 1980s, which ultimately won the Cold War and provisioned the force that performed so superbly in the Gulf War, also resulted in a tripling of the nation's gross federal debt under Reagan. When George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency in 1989, the national debt was 2.6 trillion dollars. With the nation in an economic recession and the threat of a superpower competitor gone, prudent fiscal responsibility and the emotion of the electorate — notwithstanding the intense but short-lived public fervor displayed toward the military's performance in the Gulf — mandated that military spending be decreased.

The subsequent downsizing of America's military occupied two presidents. President Bush began implementation of the Base Force concept in 1990. First proposed by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell — the Base Force was the Bush administration's attempt to structure the military for the demands of the post-Cold War world. Under the Base Force concept, the Army would shrink from eighteen to twelve active-duty divisions by 1997.

Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in January 1993; within a month he announced that he would cut at least $88 billion from Bush's projected defense budgets for 1994-1997. Between the spring of 1993 and the fall of 1995, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin — former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and perhaps the most powerful proponent of additional force reductions — directed the conduct of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the Clinton administration's attempt to correctly size the military for the realities of the changing strategic environment. The BUR was, in fact, driven more from the top-down as opposed to the bottom-up; and "due at least partly to the cuts promised by Clinton during the presidential campaign, force reductions were driven to an even greater extent than before by budgetary and
political considerations." The BUR, not unexpectedly, recommended further reductions beyond what was envisioned in the Base Force.

The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged that the Base Force was sized to allow us to fight two [major theater wars] plus conduct other concurrent operations. Nevertheless, it recommended that the [Army's] force structure be reduced to ten active divisions and five-plus reserve divisions in order to achieve the expected post-Cold War 'peace dividend'. Additionally, it called for 15 Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades to be enhanced to improve their readiness and offset the risk of the reduced number of active divisions....

The Army was substantially impacted by both the magnitude and the method of downsizing efforts between 1990 and 1996. During this period, the size of the Army shrank by more than a third — significantly more than the other services — with incremental endstrength reductions from 770,000 to 535,000 to 495,000 to 475,000. Likewise, the Army endured relatively more drastic cuts in its service budget than both the Navy and the Air Force. The Army's percentage of the Defense Department's Total Obligational Budget Authority declined from 30 to 23 percent during the period. Army budget authority figures for 1990 and 1997 were roughly $100 billion and $60 billion, respectively (in constant 1997 dollars).

In retrospect, post-Cold War downsizing efforts may have, indeed, disproportionately targeted the Army. But political policy-makers do not bear sole responsibility for the magnitude of the cuts suffered by the Army. Policy-makers are greatly influenced by cogent, persuasive arguments, and in this regard, the Army's leadership failed. The Army was the last of the services to publish a white paper detailing a vision of its role in the post-Cold War era. The Air Force published *Global Reach - Global Power* in June 1990. The Navy and Marine Corps followed with *Power from the Sea* in October 1993. "In contrast, the Army did not publish a white paper until 1994, and even then its contents were oriented more toward describing the changing strategic landscape than explaining the Army's vision...." When the Army subsequently published its leadership's vision (Force XXI Operations 1994), its message was too complex and difficult to articulate. The political ineffectiveness of the Army's leadership extended beyond the confines of the Pentagon to Capitol Hill.

...on numerous occasions [Army leaders] modified their positions concerning the minimal force levels necessary in the post-Cold War era as political and budgetary pressures heightened. Both General Sullivan and General Vuono [Army Chiefs of Staff from 1991 to 1995 and 1987 to 1991, respectively], for example, testified before Congress that the reductions under consideration would 'fracture' the army and posed unacceptable levels of risk. Within a year, however, each voiced his support for the force levels he had previously opposed.
The extensive reduction of both manpower and buying power, resulting from the Army's downsizing in the aftermath of the Cold War, was further complicated by the excessive commitment of its forces to operations other than war throughout the 1990s. Since 1989, the United States has conducted over thirty-five major military deployments; the Army provided more than sixty percent of the forces involved in those deployments. The average frequency of Army contingency deployments increased from one every four years to one every fourteen weeks. The Army experienced a three hundred percent increase in missions rates while being shrunk by more than a third, and losing almost forty percent of its budget authority.55

The deleterious combination of insufficient resourcing and over-commitment severely hindered the Army's ability to fulfill its overarching purpose of preparation to fight and win the nation's next war. The House Committee on National Security determined in 1997 that the combined pressures of downsizing and extensive participation in operations other than war, were "having a significant impact on the readiness of U.S. military forces and [were] placing at risk the decisive military edge that this nation enjoyed at the end of the Cold War...."56 Seven years of trying to do more with less had taken its toll — the Army had been stretched to the breaking point, and virtually every aspect of its readiness suffered as a consequence.

Proficiency, training and morale declined as a result of undermanning. The Army experienced shortages of mid-grade personnel within both the officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Junior soldiers were required to assume positions of responsibility usually reserved for more senior and experienced personnel. As a result, teams and platoons were less proficient at their designated combat tasks. The Army's Forces Command reported that its units contained only 56 to 60 percent of their authorized strength in majors in 1997. Captains, at a critical decision-point in their careers, opted to depart the service in tremendous numbers. Shortages exacerbated personnel turnover rates, creating turbulence and making the achievement of unit stability impossible.57

The negative effects of the high pace of operations on the smaller force seriously degraded combat training within the Army. Maintaining combat skills at the individual and unit level is largely a function of the availability of time, people and resources; and they are skills that need to be practiced on a recurring basis. Units deployed to conduct operations other than war found it nearly impossible to conduct requisite combat training; and the compressed turnaround time between deployments compelled units to rush training to attain a standard of currency rather than proficiency. Units that were not deployed experienced difficulty as well — nondeployed units were constantly being stripped of people, parts, equipment and funds to resource shortages in the deploying units.58
The perception of comparative quality of life eroded during the 1990s as soldiers worked longer and harder, and were deployed away from their families more frequently. Throughout the Army, an increasing percentage of both troop housing facilities and family quarters, many of which were built in the 1950s, were classified as inadequate according to the Defense Science Board Task Force. A lack of funds prohibited the completion of desperately needed renovations.\textsuperscript{59} In 1998, a year in which American economic determinants were at historic highs, the pay comparability gap—a measure of the difference between the change in salaries of private industry and the actual change in military pay, expressed as a percentage—was fourteen percent.\textsuperscript{60} Some of the impacts of downsizing were manifested in changes to the services that were previously provided to military dependents. Dependent health and dental care requirements were contracted out to civilian agencies as opposed to being provided for by military health care providers. The availability of adequate, low-cost, on-post child care declined. Concern over the apparent erosion of both active-duty and retirement benefits imparted a sense of frustration and bitterness within the Army. In response to an internal Army survey, over twenty-five percent of the senior noncommissioned officers and officers queried indicated that they were leaving the Army earlier than planned due to job dissatisfaction resulting from downsizing, deployment tempo, stress and quality of life. More than half said that they would not recommend the Army as a career.\textsuperscript{61}

The loss of eight divisions combined with the frequency of rotation had a telling impact on the officer corps. Prior to downsizing, officers had come to equate battalion command with career success. With fewer opportunities to command, and less time in requisite preparatory jobs—where impressions are made and command potential is evaluated—officers were under tremendous stress to make the best impression in the limited time they had. Increasing competitiveness undermined cooperation and spawned a careerist outlook within the officer corps, and the perception of a "zero defects", or unforgiving professional climate.\textsuperscript{62}

Unable to sufficiently fund all the Army's requirements, Army leadership had to make tough choices regarding the assumption of risk in areas of readiness. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 1998, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer, told of how the Army had protected near-term readiness during the drawdown years (1991-98) by reducing investment in modernization. Army procurement had declined by seventy-three percent and only the Army's highest priority programs were funded. Funding for Army modernization in 1998 was at its lowest level of investment since 1959.\textsuperscript{63} This internal
shifting of resources, however, could not stem the decline of readiness that the Army experienced as it was insufficiently resourced and overcommitted.

General Reimer appeared before the Committee, along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, to testify about readiness problems and to request additional funding for defense spending. Although the service chiefs had routinely appeared before the committee, they had not previously requested more money, and they had always indicated that military readiness was not an issue. In this appearance, they painted a much gloomier picture, and they were soundly chastised for their failure to warn the Committee of problems in their previous testimonies. Secretary of Defense William Cohen later stated that the congressional criticism of the Chiefs was misplaced. "Cohen said he had told the services to live within the existing defense budget and not expect extra money. That guidance, he said, was based on his 'political assessment' that chances were slim of getting more defense funding". "Regardless of the criticism, the Chiefs' arguments proved successful. Amidst a booming economy and projections of unsurpassed revenue surpluses, the Congress authorized significant increases in defense spending.

General Eric K. Shinseki assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the Army on 22 June 1999; he came into the job recognizing that the Army needed changing — in structure, in capabilities, in image and in spirit. General Shinseki announced a Vision charting a new direction for the Army, to enable it to become more "responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable." "His plan for implementation of the Vision has become widely known simply as the "Army Transformation"; it is forward-looking, far-reaching, all encompassing, and expensive. General Shinseki has devoted enormous energy toward obtaining the resources necessary to fully implement the Army Transformation. Thus far, in light of the readiness decline of the 1990s and the expectations of continued revenue surpluses, he has garnered favorable conceptual support from influential policy-makers.

CONCLUSION

As policy-makers structured and resourced the Army for the post-Cold War strategic environment, they failed to recognize, or perhaps appreciate, the insights offered by the Army's experiences in the post-Civil War period. Indeed, the meager provisioning of the Army — to realize economic "peace dividends" — coupled with its protracted involvement in operations other than war, resulted in unacceptable declines in training, modernization, professionalism, quality of life and morale. By 1998, readiness had suffered to the point that it was questionable whether or not the Army was adequately prepared to fight the nation's next war.
Fault for the deterioration of the Army can not be laid solely at the feet of civilian policymakers. The Army leadership was unduly influenced by political pressures and did not present Congress with wholly factual determinations as to the readiness of the Army. The Army leadership proved to be generally ineffective in regard to its engagement of the public and the Congress.

The future looks more promising for the Army. Recent funding increases have resulted in general improvement of quality of life factors — pay, housing, education and retirement benefits, etc. Additional funding has enabled the Army to improve public relations and reenergize its recruiting program, which although not yet fully successful, has improved significantly. President George W. Bush came into the White House noting the degraded state of readiness within the Armed Forces and promising to do something about it. During his campaign, President Bush indicated that the military was deployed to participate in operations other than war too often, and for too long. He contended that the United States must carefully weigh the benefits and costs of participation in such deployments.

General Shinseki successfully obtained the funding required to begin implementation of the Army Transformation. He is intent on structuring the Army to meet the demands of war well into the future, while concurrently improving readiness and morale. A student of history, the insights of the post-Civil War Army have not escaped him. In an article published Army Magazine's Green Book, General Shinseki said:

At the end of the last century, Secretary Root presided over an Army between the wars. He saw a world in transition and an Army ill-prepared to deal with the challenges of the future. The safe course of action would have been to respond to events as they arose — to react and change as the forces dictated with no clear sense of direction. Instead, he laid out a program for changing the Army. Those plans led to the establishment of the Army War College and the restructuring of the Army headquarters. They fostered a coherent modernization strategy and a series of innovative training experiments. Our later successes in two world wars — wars wholly unimaginable in 1899 — owed a great deal to Elihu Root's bold preparation for the future. Today, we are again an Army between the wars. We are a decade past a major victory in the Cold War, and are in the midst of a series of crises large and small, symptoms of a less stable international environment. We all hope that in the century to come the world will find peaceful equilibrium, and that all will come to enjoy the blessings of democracy and the rule of law. But history teaches those of us in uniform to be prepared for the worst. That is our duty to ourselves, to our nation, and to our children and grandchildren yet unborn. Thus, we study history and we imagine the future in ways bold and grand so that we can prepare for the unforeseen. We must and will move purposefully into the next millennium so that our successors in 2009 will look back with great favor on the legacy we have left to them.
The nation's economy has recently taken a downward turn. Debate ensues over the size and structure of President Bush's proposed tax cut. There are still significantly under-resourced domestic programs that are vital to the health and prosperity of the American public. It may be expected that enthusiastic support of increased military expenditures may wane if revenue surpluses do not attain anticipated levels. Political pressures may direct renewed assumption of risk in regard to military readiness. General Shinseki's observations are insightful; it can only be hoped that policy-makers will continue to understand and heed his message.

WORD COUNT = 8870
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid., 16.

6 Ibid., 17.


8 Foner, 1.


10 Utley, 411.

11 Ibid., 46-48.

12 Ibid., 48-56.


14 Ibid., 15-16.

15 Weigley, 281.

16 Utley, 31.

17 Ibid., 11-12.

18 Ibid., 28-29.

19 Ibid., 30.

20 Ibid., 31-32.

21 Ibid., 31.

22 Weigley, 281.

24 Weigley, 295-305.

25 Utley, 59.


27 Foner, 223.

28 Utley, 22.

29 Foner, 15-151.

30 Ibid., 17-21.

31 Utley, 83-84.

32 Foner, 13-14.

33 Ibid., 77-124.

34 Utley, 13.


36 Ganoe, 365-366.

37 Wooster, 70-71.

38 Ibid., 209.

39 Weigley, 273.

40 Ganoe, 355.

41 Foner, 13.

42 Wooster, 33.

43 Ganoe, 334.

44 Ibid., 367-379.

45 Weigley, 290-291.

46 Ambrose, 86.
47 Ambrose, 154-155.


50 McCormick, 40.


52 McCormick, 26.

53 Ibid., 58.

54 Ibid., 53.


57 Ibid., 5.


59 Ibid., 18.


62 McCormick, 136-141.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


