U.S. APL POLICY: TAKING THE CCW TO THE NEXT STEP

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The antipersonnel landmine (APL) policy of the United States is certainly a struggle between the nation's security and its humanitarian causes. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64 does not strike the right balance between these two objectives. Although using the "Korean Exception" as the rule for the US's APL policy certainly is attractive for those in the military, it does not appear to be politically feasible. An alternative would be to align the country's APL policy with a more restrictive version of Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). This option negligibly increases military risk, while providing increased political acceptability.
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US APL POLICY: TAKING THE CCW TO ITS NEXT STEP

One of the most controversial and publicly demonstrated United States Arms Control policies has been the antipersonnel landmine (APL) policy. In the past five years the antipersonnel landmine issue received unprecedented worldwide attention. The very successful efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a collection of nongovernmental organizations (NGO), along with active endorsement from people like the late Princess Diana, rapidly placed the issue on governmental agendas. The result of these efforts concluded with a worldwide call to ban antipersonnel landmines.

In 1997, the ICBL, with support from the Canadian and Norwegian governments, established a treaty mechanism in Ottawa. The purpose was to acquire country signatures on a worldwide landmine ban by the year 2000. This Ottawa Treaty not only bans the use of all antipersonnel landmines but also denies the manufacture, storage and transfer of these type landmines. In response to this activity, President Clinton stated, “Unfortunately, as it is drafted, I cannot in good conscience add America’s name to that treaty. As Commander-In-Chief, I will not send our soldiers to defend the freedom of our people and the freedom of others without doing everything we can to make them as secure as possible.”¹

Despite the President’s statement, the US policy as stated in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64, dated 23 June 98, does in fact place the United States on a path toward Ottawa compliance. While PDD 64 initially states the importance of maintaining the protection of military and civilians, it does include two critical requirements. The first one directs the search for a mixed antitank system (antipersonnel and antitank mines deployed together) alternative. The second, and more critical component of PDD 64, is the stated objective for the United States to sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if suitable alternatives to antipersonnel landmines and mixed antitank systems can be identified. PDD 64 also contains an interim objective for the Department of Defense (DoD) - to end the use of all APLs, including self-destructing APLs, outside of Korea, by 2003.²

While understanding the requirements of PDD 64, there appears to be not only an opportunity, but a necessity to consider other possible courses of action. The opportunity to review PDD 64 becomes even more viable given the change of administration that has just occurred. An APL policy review should emerge as this new administration accomplishes a congressionally mandated National Security Strategy review. This paper will compare three different US APL policy approaches; maintaining the status quo through the continuation of PDD 64, using the current Korean APL exception as the rule, and proposing that the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) process, as it applies to APLs, adopt further APL restrictions. The criteria of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability are applied to each of the APL policy approaches as a means for comparison. The paper concludes with an APL policy recommendation for the new administration.

ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE

The current policy, as described in PDD 64, is obviously a compromise position attempting to balance two competing objectives of US National Security Strategy - enhancing security at home and abroad and promoting democracy and human rights. It tries to ensure continued protection of the military and US allies by providing an ability (albeit, decreasing) to still use antipersonnel landmines outside of Korea, while maintaining freedom to use all types of antipersonnel landmines in Korea, the most probable high threat theater. Yet, the vast majority of military commanders and personnel still consider antipersonnel landmines critical to their success on the battlefield. In fact, given the expected trends of combat, asymmetrical and complex, a case can be strongly made that antipersonnel landmines are actually more in need. During congressional testimony in 1998, General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, said “... The requirement for such a capability is increasing in light of evolving and future operational concepts that envision our forces conducting dispersed operations over extended battlespace.”

At the same time, the United States considers itself a world leader in promoting humanitarian interests worldwide. The most recent National Security Strategy states, “Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian programs, which are designed to alleviate human suffering ...” President Clinton’s reluctance to sign the Ottawa Treaty placed the country and his administration in a very difficult and uncomfortable position. While professing the importance of worldwide humanitarian rights and being the first to include these in the National Security Strategy, he was still unable to represent the United States as one of over 80 countries to sign an international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines.

The stated milestones established in PDD 64 give US antipersonnel landmine policy a more immediate urgency. Given these requirements, DoD is currently working on an ambitious program leveraging technology in an attempt to find practical alternatives to antipersonnel landmines. The efforts are called APL-A or antipersonnel landmine alternatives.

Theoretically, the new administration could take any of a number of APL policy paths, but they do have two existing international mechanisms addressing antipersonnel landmine issues
to refer to: the Ottawa Convention and Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). As stated earlier, the current US policy, President Clinton's September 1997 statement and PDD 64, are based on achieving Ottawa compliance by 2006, assuming military alternatives to APLs are developed. This is the policy that the new administration just inherited.

The other parallel APL international mechanism that substantially pre-dates the Ottawa Convention is the Convention on Conventional Weapons. The CCW is an international treaty initiated in 1980. The CCW's formal title is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects or more commonly referred to as the Convention on Conventional Weapons. This convention is divided into protocols, each one discussing a particular type of weapon system. For example, Protocol III restricts incendiary weapons, Protocol IV, blinding laser weapons, and Protocol II covers prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices. Protocol II, along with the rest of the Convention, was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1980. The UN establishes regular review conferences which can lead to amended protocols. Amended Protocol II was promulgated on 3 May 1996 at the Review Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Certain Conventional Weapons Convention. The United States Senate eventually approved the amended landmines protocol in May of 1999.⁵

Although the amended Protocol II document added significant restrictions and limitations on antipersonnel landmines as compared to the original Protocol, for many it did not go far enough. The Protocol made strides by establishing minefield marking requirements, placing restrictions on the use of remotely delivered minefields, and establishing a detectability standard. The Protocol did not eliminate the use of antipersonnel landmines for military purposes. Both non self-destructing and self-destructing mines are maintained in the updated Protocol.⁶ This particular aspect of the Protocol was one of several issues that led to the emergence of the Ottawa process and convention in 1996 and 1997.

Of course, the new administration would not necessarily be bound to these existing mechanisms. It could take an entirely different approach. New approaches do have some inherent attractiveness. They can reflect the fact that there is a new administration – a new way of thinking about and solving problems. Establishing a new position also assists the new administration in distinguishing itself from its predecessor. Of course, such a novel APL approach should be complementary to the National Security Strategy. Logically, the overarching security interests, goals, and objectives should lead to the APL policy and not vice versa.
OPTION #1 – THE KOREAN EXCEPTION

As previously mentioned, there is some natural attractiveness for a new administration to set new policy directions. This could also be done in the APL policy arena. The new administration could in fact promote an entirely new APL policy, not directly associated with the Ottawa or Conventional Weapon Conventions. Although these options could theoretically be unlimited, there is an argument making the current Korean exception the rule.

This APL policy option emphasizes the primacy of the military need for APLs. Current US policy allows the use of antipersonnel landmines, both permanent and self-destructing, in Korea only. The North Korean threat, according to the US military, makes all types of APLs a necessity. One senior analyst makes a convincing case that our current Korean exception, should in fact be the policy.7 Due to the United State's current and future military operational concerns worldwide, not just in Korea, and despite the Ottawa Treaty, our country's policy should include the use of antipersonnel landmines.

The argument for a more inclusive policy is partially based on predictions that future warfare, being more asymmetrical, extremely varied and complex, will in fact cause a greater need for landmines.8 Instead of landmines being used against a backdrop of desert warfare, the future battles of the world are more likely to be fought in urban and complex terrain. These types of environments provide the landmine increased utility and lethality.

Due to Desert Storm, many people believe that all of our future battles will be conducted in a sterile environment and the need for 'low tech' weapons, such as landmines, are now obsolete. A sterile environment comprised of precision strikes from far distances would make ground forces unnecessary. Noted landmine activist, Jody Williams, made this point concerning potential combat operations in Korea, "US and South Korean forces are not going to sit here and wait for the North Koreans to come across the line. You’re going to strike very deep into North Korea and pulverize what’s left of that country."9 Rather than attacks against large armored forces, future combat operations are more likely to be of the Somalia/Bosnia/Kosovo/Chechnya variety.

A lack of appreciation for legitimate military requirements, bordering on sheer naivete, is not restricted to landmine ban activists. There are many articles in the press that consistently provide an unbalanced perspective on landmines. A recent article in the Boston Globe said, "...the military utility of landmines on the DMZ has become more dubious than ever. If North Korea ever took the suicidal decision to invade the South, it could use explosive hoses and aerosol defusing sprays to render landmines a mere nuisance. The North Koreans are also capable of tunneling under the minefields or parachuting over them."10
For the military, this proposed policy is very feasible. The policy is feasible since the use of both self-destructing and non self-destructing mines are already permitted in Korea. To adopt this policy in other areas would not require substantial adjustments since this was the policy until very recently and would be a return to the status quo for most in the military.

This policy is also suitable. In fact, as stated earlier, most military commanders believe that there will be an increased need for antipersonnel landmines in future combat. A July 1997 “64 star” letter (signed by 16 four-star generals and admirals) delivered to the US Congress argued that landmines are indeed a combat multiplier for US land forces, especially since the dramatic reduction in force structure.\textsuperscript{11} Antipersonnel landmine support was also echoed by the comments from General Tillelli, former Commander in Chief United Forces Korea, who said, “As the commander on the ground, I think protecting the lives of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines – and the civilians – on the southern side . . . is a humanitarian issue.”\textsuperscript{12}

Another advantage of this option is that it does comply with the most recent Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol. This Korean Exception option prescribes the military necessity of both permanent and self-destructing antipersonnel landmines. Both of these antipersonnel landmine types are in fact permitted by Protocol II. Protocol II did make some significant enhancements, but this international process did not attain antipersonnel landmine elimination.

Unfortunately, the political acceptability of this option is weak. There is an opportunity to change the PDD with the arrival of a new administration, but the pressure applied from the international community, nongovernmental agencies, and influential Congressmen will probably make a complete policy reversion unacceptable. In fact, during the Clinton Administration’s ‘lame duck’ period, dozens of Congressmen appealed to the President to take such steps as “announcing a permanent ban, or at least a moratorium, on the production of APLs and their components”; “immediately placing in inactive status existing APLs, with the intent to destroy as soon as possible”; and “deciding not to produce RADAM mixed mine system (which employs antipersonnel devices to prevent the rapid neutralization of accompanying antivehicle landmines).”\textsuperscript{13}

This is the basic request contained in a letter to President Clinton on 5 October 2000 with more than 90 congressional signatures. At this point, it appears that the ground swell of support for landmine elimination is now a forgone conclusion; to completely void President Clinton’s PDD 64 will probably exact a prohibitive political and international price.
OPTION #2 – TAKING THE CCW TO ITS NEXT STEP

Another possible option would be to align US policy closer to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) instead of the Ottawa Convention. The US Congress ratified the Amended Mines Protocol of this Convention in May of 1999. The amended protocol contains a total of 14 articles, some of the most pertinent ones are listed below:

- All remote delivered mines must contain reliable self-destruction or self-deactivation mechanisms
- Prohibits the use of mines, booby traps, or other devices which employ a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors
- Each party is responsible for all mines, booby traps, and other devices employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy, or maintain them
- Prohibits the use of a self-deactivating mine with an anti-handling device that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after the mine has ceased to function
- Prohibits the use of mines that are not detectable by requiring at least 8 grams of iron in a single coherent mass
- Use of antipersonnel mines, other than remotely delivered mines, must be placed within the perimeter marked area which is monitored by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means to ensure effective exclusion of civilians from the area
- The mine laying party has the responsibility to take positive measures to warn the civilian population and keep them out of such minefields
- Minefields must be recovered before the area is abandoned
- Parties must take all feasible measures to prevent the unauthorized removal, defacement, destruction, or concealment of the markings perimeter
- Maintenance of minefields includes their recording of location, type, dimension, emplacing method, fuse type, date/time of laying, etc.14

A quick review of the above features clearly indicates that the amended Protocol II process did not ban antipersonnel landmines - much to the chagrin of many countries and private interest groups. Despite the lack of a ban, Protocol II did make significant improvement over the original Protocol, particularly in the requirements of minefield marking, restrictions on the use of remotely delivered minefields, and the establishment of a detectability standard.
By restricting 'dumb' antipersonnel landmines to marked and controlled areas, requiring remotely (greater than 500 meters) delivered mines to be self-destructing or self-deactivating, and placing a detectability standard on all antipersonnel landmines, the amended Protocol II process seems to strike a better balance between military requirements and humanitarian concerns. The Protocol attempts to control those mines that are the greatest threat to civilians, those that are dumb or long duration, while still recognizing the utility of landmines in armed conflict.

There are other reasons why the CCW process has some attractiveness for US policy considerations. One of the most important ones is global leadership. The CCW process allows the US to reassert APL leadership. It is clear that the US did not lead the Ottawa process and is seen as an inhibitor by its refusal to sign the Ottawa Treaty. Despite being one of the first countries to call for a world wide landmine ban, President Clinton could not agree to risk a degree of national security in order to join a growing number of Ottawa signatures.

In the CCW process the US is a leader. For example, the requirement that all remotely delivered mines contain self-destruction or self-deactivation mechanisms was a very significant United States led improvement to the original Protocol. The US delegation was also able to convince other countries that self-destruction was better than self-neutralization, since it is difficult to distinguish between a self-neutralized mine and one that is not. The original Protocol did not distinguish between self-destructing and self-neutralizing mines.

The US’s successful leadership in this area also led to another initiative. The US delegation attempted to require that all antitank mines also possess a self-destruct mechanism. Although this particular initiative did not gain entry into the Protocol, since most delegates were opposed to any antitank mine language, it does represent the U.S. well as a leader and an innovator in the CCW process.15

US leadership can also drive the CCW to take its next step in the evolution of landmine prohibitions and restrictions. With the US providing the initial momentum and the necessary impetus, the CCW should address antipersonnel landmine elimination. The CCW immediately becomes a more recognizable and internationally accepted standard by addressing such an important elimination.

The next step for the CCW should be the elimination of all 'dumb' or non self-destructing antipersonnel landmines. Such a proposal has three advantages; it addresses at least some of the Ottawa proponents’ concerns, has a very limited affect on military capabilities, and has the potential to reduce the ‘real’ antipersonnel landmine threat to civilians.
Although the Ottawa Treaty was partially initiated by the reluctance of the CCW to address landmine elimination, it was possible that support for the CCW process could have continued if the CCW addressed some limited aspect of antipersonnel landmine elimination. The CCW's inability to progress toward this end significantly contributed to the very public antipersonnel landmine events culminating at Ottawa. A case could possibly be made that if the CCW had addressed even a limited antipersonnel landmine ban, then the Ottawa process could have been avoided. It is unrealistic to assume that the CCW can now override the momentum of Ottawa by introducing a limited antipersonnel landmine ban, but the level of international acceptance for the CCW certainly would be enhanced.

The additional risk that the military assumes by not having access to 'dumb' antipersonnel landmines is limited. The current state of landmine warfare, particularly in the US Army, is substantially dependent on self-destructing mines, not on non self-destructing ones. This choice has essentially been driven by the ability, primarily mechanical, to emplace a large number of scatterable, self-destructing minefields in a very short period of time - a far better method than hand emplaced 'dumb' minefields. Despite the fact that all minefields must still be marked, scatterable, self-destructing minefield systems save significant man-hours through their delivery and emplacement methods. This allows the already overly committed combat engineers to provide other necessary combat engineer support on the battlefield.

A CCW initiative promoting the elimination of all non-self destructing antipersonnel landmines should assist the international community to focus on the 'real' landmine problem - the long duration or 'dumb' antipersonnel landmine. There exists an obviously fundamental, yet rarely discussed disconnect between what many see as the problem, US APL policy, and the stated solution, the Ottawa Convention. This disconnect is described in the following passage from Frank Gaffney of the Washington Times, "Banning the responsible use by the American military of short-duration, self-destructing anti-personnel landmines will not contribute in any way to the enormous humanitarian challenge of finding and destroying what are estimated to be many millions of APLs already in the ground around the world."16

A few national security analysts have recently noted that the Ottawa process was not one based on legitimate discussion of all sides of the issue, no real negotiation, no regular reviews, and no ratification. As the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee said, "The Ottawa Convention served unique political purposes, rather than humanitarian needs. It was negotiated without any serious consideration to security concerns. It was also negotiated in a forum with a large number of NGOs protesting aspects of the US negotiating position..."17
The CCW process, on the other hand, does contain regular reviews of the amended protocol, is determined from state negotiations, and like the Ottawa Treaty, would require Congressional ratification. These characteristics are more closely aligned with our own internal governing process while accommodating PVOs and NGOs in their advocacy role and not in a leadership role.

Whereas the Korean exception has strong political acceptability problems, the option of aligning our APL policy with the CCW and leading a non self-destructing antipersonnel landmine ban using the CCW process, does have a sense of political acceptance to it. Associating US APL policy with an existing international treaty can defray significant criticism both from within the US and from abroad. The CCW is internationally accepted, already ratified by Congress, and has the “added benefit of imposing conditions on countries that have not signed the Ottawa Convention nor have any immediate plans to sign the accord. China and Pakistan, for example, have already ratified the new protocol but refuse to sign the Ottawa Convention.”

Using the amended Protocol II of the CCW, including a push for a ‘dumb’ antipersonnel landmine ban, as US APL policy, does not have significant feasibility nor suitability issues. The military use of non-self destructing mines would cease, but the additional risk to our soldiers is minimal at best. From a practical and military perspective, the non self-destructing antipersonnel landmines have already been rendered operationally obsolete by the introduction of scatterable, self-destructing antipersonnel landmines. These landmines are employed in far less time and require far less resources. The ability to employ battlefield minefields based on combat engineer platoon-hour production rates and significant haul capabilities does not compare to an option that uses self-sufficient 2 man crews emplacing minefields in a matter of minutes.

**OPTION #3 – THE STATUS QUO**

The new administration does not have to change the current US APL policy. There are certainly far greater foreign policy issues confronting the country and its new leadership. The US antipersonnel landmine policy cannot compare with issues such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the Middle East, China and Taiwan, NATO and the European Union, and Russia. Given the relative importance of antipersonnel landmines in the larger realm of national security and foreign affairs, it would not be unexpected to see the new administration continue, at least temporarily, the current US APL policy.

Maintaining the status quo with respect to a US APL policy as stated in PDD 64 does have the political advantage of having a measure of national acknowledgment and acceptance.
The new administration could easily assume the current policy, thereby allowing it to focus on other, more pressing issues, or to provide additional time for review and analysis. Since PDD 64 is already a year and a half old, the new administration can assess both the positive and negative aspects of the policy by reviewing comments and criticisms over this period. This type of review can allow the new administration more than enough information to determine the future of the US APL policy.

There is also some political benefit for a new administration by avoiding potentially controversial, low-level policy statements. Politically, such an announcement tends to shorten the new administration's 'honeymoon' period. Some would argue that the administration should reserve controversial announcements, particularly those made early in the term of office, for major, nationally known issues.

Certainly, from a military perspective, the continuation of PDD 64 is less attractive than the other two options. PDD 64, in essence, will eventually lead the US to Ottawa compliance. For the US military, the risk to service members will increase. Risk is increased because their 'tools', antipersonnel landmines, are removed from the inventory.

Landmines are employed for many purposes, for friendly forces, as well as against enemy forces. They are used to delay the enemy, provide self protection, increase the enemy's vulnerabilities, deny enemy access, protect friendly advances, increase obstacle effectiveness, etc. By removing these 'tools', service members assume greater risk, the attainment of their objectives become less certain, and national security goals can be jeopardized.

Despite the increase in the application of technology on the battlefield, the landmine still retains much of its utility. This will particularly be true given what most consider the future battlefields and the nature of warfare. The asymmetric threat and the complex terrain of urban warfare increase the likelihood of mine use.

PDD 64 places the US on an Ottawa compliant path – as long as suitable alternatives to antipersonnel landmines and mixed munitions can be identified. The US Army's Antipersonnel Landmine – Alternative (APL-A) program is the current effort set forth by the Department of Defense (DoD) to find these suitable alternatives. The new APL-A will be a man-in-the-loop munition that will consist of three components; a controller; a munition with a sensor; and a signal relay for the transfer of data among the munitions in the minefield and the controller.¹⁹

The US Army expects to deploy the APL-A system by 2005, but the program is not without controversy. The controversy centers on a setting that could be added to the mine know as 'battlefield override'. In this mode the mines would detonate whenever an approaching person tripped either a wire or an electronic sensor. Senator Patrick Leahy, a longtime critic of
landmine employment, calls the technology ‘very troubling’ and says it would violate the Ottawa Treaty.\textsuperscript{20}

On the other hand, there are some national security analysts that say this feature is what the mine needs in order to be fully functional and practical on the battlefield. “Man-in-the-loop would require some poor fool stay at the controls while the rest of the unit bugs out under an assault, and that’s not a great way to run things”, said Dan Goure, of the Center of Strategic and International Studies in Washington.\textsuperscript{21} It appears from most of the recent APL-A announcements that the technology is feasible in providing some sort of alternative mine system, but one that may have features that will cause some controversy – particularly since the weapon system’s objective is to be Ottawa compliant.

Maintaining the status quo with respect to a US APL policy is certainly a credible option. For a new administration attempting to ease their way into a position of credibility, the continuation of the current US APL policy as stated in PDD 64 has merit. As stated earlier, the country’s antipersonnel landmine policy is certainly not a foreign affairs headliner. On the other hand, most military personnel would agree that the total elimination of antipersonnel landmines increases the risk of military operations and therefore is less suitable compared to other policy options. From a feasibility perspective, the APL-A remains in the testing and evaluation phase, but appears to be achievable, albeit with some controversy concerning allowable features.

CONCLUSION

When examining the three options using the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability criteria, one option emerges as superior to the other two. Changing US APL policy to better coincide with the Mines Protocol of the CCW, while advocating a ban on non self-destructing antipersonnel landmines through the CCW process, appears to have some political attractiveness, and a lack of major feasibility and suitability concerns. The status quo option has significant military suitability problems, while the Korean exception has equally significant political acceptability issues.

It is difficult to foresee a future scenario in which the new administration would opt to reverse the US’s APL policy by making the Korean exception the rule. Although this option clearly places military and security concerns over humanitarian concerns, the overwhelming public and political support for the United States to participate and contribute to international APL reduction initiatives, makes it highly unlikely that US policy can revert to a pre-PDD 64 status.
By implementing a pre-PDD 64 policy and making the Korean exception the rule, the military could use both self and non-self destructing landmines. For the military, such a policy is very feasible and, likewise, would be considered more than suitable. Unfortunately, the current APL momentum generated by the previous administration, PDD 64, the United Nations, private interest groups, and the Ottawa Treaty make such a policy reversion appear very unlikely.

The new administration could also continue the status quo by reaffirming PDD 64 and thereby maintaining the track of Ottawa compliance by 2006. As stated earlier, this option does have some political merit. There is no great cause to risk political capital on such a relatively minor foreign policy and security issue. Assuming the new administration does not see significant potential in this policy to differentiate itself from the former administration, then continuation of the status quo would seem reasonable.

The problem with the status quo is that it lacks balance. Military suitability has already been subordinated for humanitarian concerns with the promulgation of PDD 64 and its Ottawa compliant requirements. Although this policy provides time for the military to search for alternatives, the underlying theme continues to reflect the subordination of military requirements with possibly adverse national security implications.

Reviewing the latest APL-A information indicates that near term technology will provide some sort of alternative to antipersonnel landmines. The reports from the US Army and their contractors do provide a measure of confidence indicating that the program is feasible. Despite its apparent feasibility, it also can be expected that the struggle between military necessity and humanitarian concerns will continue through the development and use of APL-A.

Advocating a non self-destructing landmine ban within the CCW construct as a guide for US APL policy, on the other hand, has a number of advantages. First, by aligning US policy with the CCW, the US would be aligning its policy with an established international standard. This standard and process existed long before the Ottawa Treaty. Many national and international criticisms can easily be deflected by linking US policy with an established international standard that receives regular United Nations review. Second, the use of the CCW ensures a more balanced consideration of needs and requirements. The CCW, while acknowledging the humanitarian impact of antipersonnel landmines, also tries to advance policy restrictions and enhancements on the military's use of these weapons. As stated earlier, the CCW’s results are less ambitious because its process is more inclusive. Third, the CCW offers the US an opportunity to provide global leadership. The US already has a very active and important role in the CCW process. By aligning US and CCW landmine policy, particularly with
the initiation of a modified antipersonnel landmine ban, the CCW process can take on a much greater role in setting global APL policy while creating a landmine policy niche for the US.

Aligning US APL policy with the CCW while providing sufficient leadership to accomplish an international ban on non self-destructing antipersonnel landmines will require considerable effort - by diplomats, politicians, and the military alike. This sharing of effort and compromise could render a successful conclusion. There is no guarantee that the American people or the Congress will accept this change. It will require some positive American influence to push the Convention toward a ban on 'dumb' or non self-destructing antipersonnel landmines. The military will have to continue their emphasis on self-destructing antipersonnel landmines only. Their doctrine and training will have to incorporate these changes.

The country's APL policy currently portrays a struggle between the nation's security and its humanitarian causes. PDD 64 does not strike the right balance between these two objectives. By aligning US APL policy with the CCW and leading this process to its next step, a non self-destructing antipersonnel landmine ban, we are able to maintain equilibrium between the security of US armed forces and their allies and the export of American values.

WORD COUNT = 5330
ENDNOTES


5 "US Ratifies Amended CCW Landmines Protocol," Arms Control Today 29 (April/May 1999), 44.


8 Ibid, 98.


11 Letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 July 1997; available from <http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1997/97-D97at.html>; Internet.


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21 Ibid.
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