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NO HOSTILE INTENT: REDUCING U.S. GROUND FORCES IN LIGHT OF KOREAN UNIFICATION IN 2025

BY

RICHARD SCORZA
Department of State

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No Hostile Intent: Reducing U.S. Ground Forces in Light of Korean Unification in 2025

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RICHARD SCORZA
Department of State

Dr. Andrew Scobell
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Richard Scorza

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This study attempts to analyze the effects of Korean Unification on the role of U.S. ground forces, projecting to the year 2025. In proposing a strategy of gradual troop reduction over a period of years, the proposition is made that the United States can and should play an active role in building confidence within the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as it moves toward full integration with the Republic of Korea (ROK).
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PREFACE

This study had its inception in the Army War College course conducted by Dr. Robin Dorff and thus I will begin by acknowledging Robin’s instruction in that part of the course of study. To Don Boose, a Korea hand, former department head and an Army War College stalwart, I am indebted for his advice and counsel on the particulars of U.S. Forces Korea. His encouragement and suggestions on textual matters also place me in his debt. Lt. Col. Debra Little, Director of Asian Studies in the Department of National and Strategic Studies, read a draft of this study, and I am indebted to her for her thorough review of the text. Dr. Andrew Scobell, Research Professor of National Security Affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute, of course, deserves my thanks for taking on the task of advisor. His copious notes and well-defined pointers gave me the necessary guidance to get the job done.

It may be taken for granted, but the U.S. Army War College Library deserves recognition. The staff there not only is helpful and courteous but genuinely rooting for those of us practicing quasi-scholarship. I am also grateful that the Army War College Foundation generously supports the Library and as a result, I was able to retrieve many helpful volumes in its collection in gathering material for this study.

For two years prior to my entry into the Army War College program I was senior public affairs advisor in the Office of Korean Affairs at the State Department and the spokesman for the U.S. delegation to the Four Party Talks and to bilateral talks with North Korea. While I have drawn heavily from my experience there for this study, the views expressed here are solely my own and do not represent the State Department’s.
NO HOSTILE INTENT: REDUCING U.S. GROUND FORCES IN LIGHT OF KOREAN UNIFICATION IN 2025

BACKGROUND

On November 2, 2000 in her remarks to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Albright framed U.S. security interests and future relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) thus:

The Korean Demilitarized Zone has often been described as the world’s most dangerous place, and understandably so. For decades, heavily armed forces on both sides have stood poised, face to face, prepared for battle. North Korea especially has filled the airwaves with propaganda and hate. Periodic incidents and accidents have sometimes brought us to the threshold of conflict, and we must never forget that 37,000 American troops are among those at risk.

For many years, the United States has worked to create a stable environment in Korea and throughout East Asia. Our goal is a region where no nation seeks to dominate others, and all nations cooperate for prosperity and peace. A fundamental question has been whether the DPRK would ever find its place within such a vision.¹

As recently as the U.S.-ROK Ministerial Consultative Meeting on September 21, 2000, Secretary of Defense Cohen and his ROK counterpart reaffirmed “that the ROK-US security alliance plays a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”² This military alliance has been the underpinning of our policy on the Peninsula for the past half-century. In his Annual Report to the President and the Congress for the year 2000, the Secretary elaborated that policy’s objective in language which has varied little over the same half century: “The United States desires a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict resulting in a non-nuclear, democratic, reconciled and ultimately reunified Peninsula....”³ Toward this end, as they have since the signing of the Armistice, U.S. forces are deployed in South Korea “to assist the ROK in defending against North Korean aggression.”⁴ Because “tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the leading threat to peace and stability in East Asia,”⁵ their presence has been justified with little variance in official thinking over the years. At the same time, the
U.S. has recognized the movement of the DPRK toward dialogue with the South, a policy aggressively pursued by President Kim Dae-jung. Indeed, the White House has underscored that, "President Clinton strongly restated his support for President Kim's vision of engagement and efforts toward reconciliation with the North." Kim's advent as President of the Republic of Korea and his "sunshine (later, engagement) policy" resulted in a sea-change of possibilities for the future of the Korean Peninsula, of course. It is no exaggeration to say that Kim's vision of patiently cultivating North Korean trust while mindful of strong security was the catalyst for the positive developments that this study bases its assumptions on.

In the intervening months since that White House statement, dramatic and unprecedented agreements between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jong have accelerated the positive possibilities for the future of the Korean peninsula. At the historic Pyongyang summit June 13-15, the two leaders pledged to devote their efforts to amicably resolving the half-century of conflicts and division on the Peninsula. There is therefore a pressing need now to consider our present policies in light of this important change. In this study, I will project to the year 2025 and conjecture on what changes may be required in U.S. thinking about the role of U.S. forces now stationed in South Korea and how they may serve as the atmosphere of inter-Korean relations improves and ultimately results in unification.

ANALYSIS

For fifty years, the purpose of United States forces on the Korean Peninsula has been defined as a deterrent force poised to assist our ROK ally in repelling DPRK possible aggression. This deterrent force is intended to support the current policy end of resolving tensions there. Our means, a highly trained complement of 37,000 U.S. troops, compose the in-country force, and almost 60,000 are stationed in Japan to support and reinforce them should the need arise. North of the 38th parallel, the Korean People's Army stands one million strong with enough weaponry to make it a formidable adversary. Without question, a North Korean attack on the South would result in many allied casualties—as would a pre-emptive strike on the North. Such scenarios were the only ones we could envision in the years before June 2000. Now, it is possible to contemplate another way to use the means of U.S. force strength in achieving our policy end and in supporting President Kim's engagement of North Korea to achieve peace and stability on the Peninsula. The high-level dialogue has already produced concrete results: the reunion of separated families, the continued dialogue between South and
North Korean authorities, inter-Korean economic cooperation, and the reduction of loudspeaker denunciations along the DMZ.⁷

Such beginnings would be impossible without North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's agreement, and so, it can be concluded that North Korean policy has shifted significantly away from its past. It is with this in mind that security issues will have to be addressed if the inter-Korean dialogue is to continue to produce positive results in the coming decades. It is thus imperative to reassess our strategy in this new environment. If the North is to be successfully conditioned to accept a fundamentally altered relationship with the ROK, the U.S. will have to do its part to help shape a positive strategy for that change to occur.

OPTIONS/COURSES OF ACTION

Maintaining the status quo may appear to be an expedient approach, but it may not remain a feasible or appropriate course of action. Certainly, the ROK government and a large majority of its people accept the magnitude and permanence of U.S. forces and their stated mission with equanimity. However, as more improvements are made in official relations with the North, it is possible that the historical ROK minority view against U.S. forces in the South would attract a wider public. As an emotional issue, reunification is an intense one and, if the continued presence of 37,000 U.S. troops becomes widely viewed as an obstacle, the issue could become a political liability for the ROK government. In such a case, energies would be diverted from the tasks imposed by the needs of rapprochement and consumed by a ROK-U.S. debate. The result would be to weaken the unified approach that is essential for achieving positive results with North Korea.

Another option would be to rethink the way the presence of the 37,000-strong U.S force is used. We could conceivably decide that by a date certain the entire force would be removed in its entirety all at once. Announcement of such a decision to remove U.S. forces would be made very far in advance, say ten years out, to act as an incentive for North Korea to intensify its actions in meeting South Korea's requirements for reconciliation. The U.S. pledge would not be followed by actions until—and unless—positive results in terms of our policy objective of reduced tensions and a peaceful Peninsula were observable. Then the decision would be carried out with alacrity. Such a pledge would be used as leverage during the intervening years should North Korea backtrack or stray from the positive path. And the pledge could be revoked
should North Korea revert to its threatening behavior. However, given North Korean suspicions of the U.S., it is unlikely that such a pledge by itself would have the force to impact North Korean decisions. In fact, such a pledge may backfire by causing panic in South Korea, which could foster an unstable political environment there. (Of course, the Carter Administration's contemplation of a force reduction in 1976-8 and its negative consequences for bilateral U.S.-ROK relations might be considered in some ways a rehearsal of this scenario.)

A third option would be to take a gradualist approach. The present policy objective would not change: our goal will continue to be to reduce tensions and promote stability. The role of the U.S. troop presence toward that end, however, would be altered. Instead of positing a North Korean threat to be deterred by the U.S. troop strength, the U.S. would change permanent presence to gradual reduction as an inducement to North Korea to reduce and reposition its own forces. The ROK would determine its own force needs, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to prescribe for the ROK what steps it might take. I propose that over a period of twenty years, starting in 2005 to allow for more seasoning in developing positive relations among the ROK, DPRK, and U.S., a reduction in U.S. troop strength of five percent each year for a decade to be followed by a second reduction of five percent of the remaining force in the second decade. This gradual reduction would result in a powerful and observable indication of the U.S. confidence in the process begun in earnest at the June 2000 ROK-DPRK summit. A critical component of this proposal is that the North complete obligations it takes on with the ROK as well as meeting U.S. “milestones of non-beligerance.” The latter would include reductions in force of equal proportion to the U.S. reduction and positioning the remaining forces in such a way as to be non-threatening to Seoul. Thus, the U.S. reductions over time would achieve a much reduced North Korean army, a key desired outcome of the expected new robust political relationship with the North as it merges with the South as Kim Dae-jung’s vision is executed since a “de-militarizing” North Korea is a sine qua non if the policy objective of stability and reduced tensions is to take concrete form in the lead up to a unified Korea.

Besides this primary effect, the course of action of changing the concept from permanence to gradual reduction would have a “second order effect”: it will induce Beijing to continue and enhance its encouragement of the North’s normalization process since the Chinese, too, will have hard evidence that at the end of the process there will be almost no U.S. forces on Chinese borders which the PRC would share with a newly amalgamated North and South Korea in 2025. Beijing has pursued a policy of encouragement of North-South dialogue
and reconciliation in recent years, principally in its participation in the Four Party Talks. It is clear that Chinese self-interest is a key motivating factor for pursuing the stated objectives of reducing tensions and establishing a peace regime on the Peninsula the Four Party process envisioned from its outset in 1996. Indeed, Chinese endorsement of the Clinton-Kim Young Sam proposal for the talks was the best indication of the PRC's vision of a stable Peninsula on its border.

While it is immediately clear that, as the old saying goes, "you can't prove a negative statement," it is possible to take actions that would have the desired effect of reducing tensions by reducing military deployments. While some would propose small steps at first, especially in light of the checkered past of DPRK military operations against the South in similar periods of thaw, small steps would be either regarded by the other side as insignificant or as proof that the U.S. was insincere. Formal military-to-military contacts between senior U.S. and DPRK flag-ranks, for example, could be considered as "more of the same, " since General Officers Talks have been an on-going feature of our dialogue with the DPRK. Other courses of actions might be flatly imprudent. If, for example, even a modest joint de-mining project was developed, the potential exposure of the South to a Northern surprise attack would increase. Whereas, a small reduction of 1850 (5%) U.S. soldiers annually for ten years would not leave an equivalent exposure. With a five percent withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, South Korea would still be protected, for example in 2015 by the remaining 18,000 troops combined with the strength of the ROK's own formidable force and the remaining U.S. air assets both in Korea and in Japan. In fact, U.S. troops stationed in Japan would provide a double benefit in assuring a smooth and peaceful transition, acting as a reserve. Ironically, this reserve U.S. force in Japan would also keep China comfortable in its perception of the Japan-based U.S. forces as a stabilizing element to check Japanese defense forces from expanding. Indeed, a recent study concluded as much:

By the end of the 1980s, China more consciously favored the possible function of the U.S.-Japan alliance to restrain Japan. Although China worried about the increasing military might of Japan, it did not for the remainder of the Cold War period once again view the two alliances as targeted at China.8

Of course, the U.S. view is that the forces are a bedrock in its commitment to Japan's security.
If the DPRK matched the U.S. five percent reduction, the first year would see withdrawal of 50,000 KPA troops, five percent of its million man army. By 2015, the U.S. force would be about 18,000 and the KPA would be about half a million strong. In 2025, the U.S., by reducing the 18,000 troops remaining by 5% a year would have 9,000 soldiers on the Korean Peninsula, while the North would have about 250,000. Of course, nothing would be done to discourage accelerating or increasing the North’s reductions in these years. Indeed, as ROK economic incentives increased, there would be a powerful attraction for the North to utilize its manpower to fill a growing labor market. As a “reward” for their service, serving KPA troops could be demobilized at a rapid rate to fill industrial sector jobs. Serving in the Korean People’s Army is a –perhaps the only—path for an ordinary Northerner to achieve any semblance of status and a measure of economic stability. The dilemma for Kim Jong-il will be for him to create conditions that encourage demobilization and produce enough jobs to absorb that flow of people into an inchoate workforce. (Indeed, if Kim’s much supposed obsession for sustaining his regime is true, the strategy contemplated here would be seen as insurance to keep de-mobbed KPA vets occupied, less their idleness turn them to anti-regime activity.) The South Korean initiatives thus far have planned to incorporate vast private sector resources as well as ROK government assistance to cushion the North’s journey away from a militarized economy. In this regard, “patience” is probably the most important admonition in Kim Dae-jung’s vocabulary. No one expects to proceed at a pace so fast that it will threaten the ability of the North to change gradually and not collapse suddenly. This assumption undergirds all of Kim Dae-jung’s visionary program to assist the North in accommodating the shifts that are required for resuscitating the North economically. In contemplating troop reductions himself, Kim Jong-il is likely ripe for a kind of defense conversion effort. If properly instituted this would be an excellent incentive for Pyongyang to gradually dismantle its vast military industrial complex—as long as the incentives the ROK puts forward match the rewards for the DPRK military top echelon. In conjunction with the U.S. calendar of withdrawal, the North reductions could be tied to South Korean investments that directly target the defense conversion effort by creating “receiving bins” for demobilized KPA troops to deposit themselves in.
RECOMMENDATIONS

While the focus of this study is to project to 2025, a conservative estimate for the process of reunification, it is important to consider as well the necessary reconciliation that must take place for unification to follow. Unlike any time in the modern history of the Korean Peninsula, significant moves have already been made by both the Republic of Korea and by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea toward fundamental economic and political cooperation. The United States has acknowledged these in words as well in deed. The invitation to and subsequent visit by Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington October 10—12, 2000 not only reciprocated the high-level visit by Presidential Envoy William Perry in May 1999, but it also signaled the Administration’s recognition of “improvements in the overall atmosphere.” That atmosphere included significant contact between the ROK and DPRK on defense and security issues at the Ministerial level, giving substance to the language of the Joint Declaration issued at the conclusion of the North-South summit in June 2000. The process of dialogue on such significant matters is a sine qua non for reconciliation to proceed.

Other steps by the North have also encouraged unprecedented optimism that the DPRK will in fact abandon its isolation. The DPRK attended its first ever meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a step acknowledged by no less than a formal bilateral “side bar” meeting between the DPRK’s Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun and Secretary of State Albright. Of course, Albright’s historic visit to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-il built upon these precedents and served as the platform for a major policy statement in which both the DPRK and US declared that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other.” This is a particularly important joint pledge, especially in light of the conclusion drawn by Special Envoy Perry in his October 1999 recommendation to the President. In it, he observed that the sense of threat from the U.S. displayed by the North had to be considered as real. He cautioned that to dismiss the North’s concerns about U.S. military intentions was a mistake and counseled that this dismissal should be avoided. Thus, in acknowledging the fears of the North and in agreeing that both had “no hostile intent,” Albright and Kim Jong-il have laid the ground work for removing an impediment to resolving the half-century of conflict on the Peninsula. The critical term, “no hostile intent,” would be the primary focus of the option being explored here. For U.S. policy to
concretize such a posture, of course, would require a thorough re-thinking of its military posture on and around the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{10} In the way perceptions follow "facts on the ground," the logical course for the U.S. to take would be positive steps, in unison with the DPRK if possible, and certainly in coordination with the ROK and Japan, to demonstrate "no hostile intent."

Certainly South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has made the path broader still and continues to take steps that are bringing ordinary Koreans together, either through approving the Hyundai-sponsored tours of Mt. Kumgang or promoting family reunions, and inter-Korean sports cooperation, the most visible of which was the joint Olympic team march in Sydney at the start of the 2000 summer games. Together, these steps taken by the South, North, and the U.S. are acting synergistically to stabilize a once volatile relationship.

Of course, Congressional hawks will immediately raise the specter of a North Korean attack at the first sign of U.S. willingness to reduce its forces. The main claims of these criticisms have been catalogued—and refuted—by Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project.\textsuperscript{11} First and foremost, critics charge that the U.S. is succumbing to blackmail by Pyongyang, which engages in threatening or wild acts only to be bought off before it will cease. Sigal points out (and Perry's admonition should be borne in mind here) that from the North Korean point of view, it is responding at such times in "tit-for-tat" affronts or reneges by Washington. Those opposing a policy of engagement with the North also complain about the lack of reciprocation by the North. Sigal explains that the U.S. has indeed gained in the last six years of its pursuit of normalized relations with the North, including a moratorium on long-range missile testing, a freeze in fissile materials production facilities, on-site inspections of the suspect site at Kumchang-ni, and Kim Jong-il's offer to Secretary Albright during her visit to Pyongyang to reduce the North's tanks, artillery, and troop strength.

The argument that the North's dire economic straits make it a "basket case" for assistance or that it is on its deathbed and engaged in desperate flailing acts only to survive is well understood by both U.S. and South Korean policy makers. President Kim has in fact taken prudent economic assistance steps that are designed to avoid the East German fiasco, when Prime Minister Kohl attempted too swift an absorption in the rush to reunite Germany.

Among other criticisms of the policy to engage the North, one that deserves special attention is the claim that the North is aiming at getting the U.S. troops out of Korea. In fact,
according to President Kim Dae-jung, the North has qualified its views on U.S. troops presence. According to Sigal, "...once the relationship is no longer hostile, U.S. troops in Korea could remain in a new role, that of peacekeepers, while still allied with the South." This is an important consideration in making a policy recommendation to completely re-think the role of U.S. ground forces on the Korean peninsula as unification is pursued. In recommending a deliberate pace of reductions in troop strength, determining North Korea's actual intentions is of course the most critical element in making decisions about continuing the policy. To take into account the desires of our allies, as I have indicated above, is also a practical necessity. Such a position must have strong and vocal ROK support for the proposed strategy. A scare campaign might raise the specter of a North Korean trick to eliminate the U.S. and expose the ROK to attack. With ROK concurrence, counter-arguments pointing to ROK preparedness, and of course to expected DPRK cooperation, such scare tactics can be effectively nullified. To obtain such ROK concurrence, we must assure the ROK of the continued vigilance and readiness of the remaining forces and of our willingness to reconstitute the force at full strength if there is evidence of DPRK recidivism.

Of the "decision points" that may be considered optional are the views of both the North Koreans and the Chinese. If the North desires a "peacekeeping" U.S. force after a number of years along the gradual reduction route, U.S. policy makers would have to balance what the cost of a presence would be against what security it would provide. I would argue that it would be more realistic to complete the twenty-year withdrawal recommended here since the nature of the North Korean regime would be fundamentally altered over the two decades of modernization and normalization that ROK policy projects. In such a scenario, only Chinese support could be affected, and as such, a large U.S. withdrawal, while it pose a political obstacle for China, which has rather consistently expressed reservations about U.S. troops in adjacent bordering lands, the remaining force would serve as a salve to weary investors, and thus Chinese reservations would be overcome. As a recent study explains, Chinese views on the subject have demonstrated flexibility in the past:

China's ideological and treaty commitment to North Korea defined its attitude toward the U.S. military presence in South Korea. At the official level China under no circumstances wavered from its demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops even during the heyday of the struggle against Soviet hegemony. On the other hand, the normalization of relations between Beijing and Seoul in the early 1990s effectively modified the former's perception of the target of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
We should also consider what, concretely, a U.S. force could accomplish beyond being an assurance to the international business community of stability. I would suggest that the continuation of the search for MIA remains in the North would not only be politically defensible both in the U.S. and abroad, but would yield valuable confidence building as the years progress.

In order to accommodate changes already underway on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. policy should pursue the objective of achieving stability and reducing tensions in a new way, through gradual troop reductions. In using the resource of U.S. troop strength in such a fashion, a powerful inducement will be created over the next two decades for North Korea to continue—indeed accelerate—its moves toward normalcy on the Peninsula and in the region by enabling the North to securely (in its view) redirect its meager resources toward the new economic possibilities put forward by the ROK. In this way, we will bolster ROK efforts to assure the DPRK of its intentions; we will demonstrate to the DPRK our own intentions; and we will have the added advantage of saving scarce defense dollars as reductions take place over the twenty-year period.

Confidence building is a process that requires time and patience. It does not, however, require blind hope. This policy recommendation is soundly based on the concrete actions already taken by both South and North Korea and envisions changes in their relations which are already taking shape. Carrying out a new way to achieve our constant policy goal is both a practical and a prudent use of military means toward the end of a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula.

CONSEQUENCES

To imagine the last day of the last contingent of U.S. forces resident in Korea is not a fantasy as once it might have been. To propose in about 2025 there would be 25% of today's force there is something more than a remote possibility. Certainly, it will take tremendous strides to rehabilitate the North and to gain a critical mass of reconciliation with which to leverage the inevitable difficulties that will challenge President Kim Dae-jung's successors to keep to the vision he has so steadfastly pursued. Kim himself has repeatedly conjectured that the process will take "ten to twenty years." For our purposes it is important to make the mental
lep to that time in the future and leave behind the present perspective we have so deeply ingrained in us from fifty years of mutual animosity and distrust. The new Korea, in whatever form it has determined for itself, will not be the combination of ally in the South and adversary in the North we deal with now. Certainly, in general terms, conditions would be such that the perceptions of mutual threat, South Korea vs. North Korea, U.S.-ROK vs. North Korea and instability from the perspectives of the Chinese, Russians, and Japanese would be things of the past. Within the borders of unified Korea, the U.N.'s colors would also be retired, the Armistice having been rendered moot by the peace regime. There would be a coherent political and economic system within Korea's borders as determined by the Koreans themselves. Presumably, the energy of Seoul's economy and the necessity to engage in a global market as an equal partner would assure the strengthening of democratic institutions and building them where none existed in the North.

Obviously, the United States would want to keep its presence in Asia, and the proposal here does not prevent this. In fact, the maintenance of forces in Japan is assumed to continue unchanged and the U.S.-Japan security treaty kept intact. While some form of U.S.-Korea security treaty might be an option, the result of a demilitarized North will be a net gain and the U.S. presence in Japan would represent the continuity of assurances to our allies and a steady check on China. (It hardly would be to China's benefit to create a military threat to Korea, thus opening a second front for it to face.) The slow pace of withdrawal under this proposal is itself a guarantee of sorts, since in the early stages where threats might develop more precipitously, the bulk of forces would still be on the Peninsula and ready. But presence in the new century will be more defined in economic terms than ever, I would predict. That the U.S. will have imbedded partnerships all along the economic spectrum from private sector to bilateral governmental ones with Korea is also predictable. Therefore, the strategy suggested here would in effect bolster relations in Northeast Asia in an atmosphere of stability, peace, and prosperity. If the suggestions seems far afield, no less a body than PACOM itself has come to the same conclusion in its Asia-Pacific Economic Update 2000:

If Seoul and Pyongyang choose to procrastinate for unity, they could find themselves both flat-footed and reacting hysterically [sic]. That, in turn, would be a recipe for economic disaster for Korea and the rest of Asia.
If that occurs the world would look to the USG for the distasteful job of crisis management. A better strategy would have been careful and early planning for economic integration and comprehensive policy coordination as a means of crisis prevention [sic].

The same urgency exists now, at the point of transition between American administrations and the very real demands of the Army’s planning process. There is every prospect that the United States can prevent another crisis on the Korean Peninsula by acting out the meaning of “no hostile intent” in unambiguous—and reciprocated—reductions in its troop strength there.

Word Count: 4780.
ENDNOTES

1 “Remarks of Secretary of State Albright at the National Press Club, November 2, 2000,” U.S. Department of State official text.


4 Ibid. p.11.


6 Ibid.


9 Statement by Ambassador Joan M. Plaisted, Senior Advisor, on agenda item 183: Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula, Plenary, October 31, 2000,” U.S. State Department official text.

10 According to USFK, the current major units of United States military assets in South Korea are as follows:

Eighth US Army:

2nd Infantry Division (Two brigades)
6th Cavalry Brigade
UN Command Security Battalion (Joint Security Area, P'anmunjom)
17th Aviation Brigade
19th Theater Support Command
8th Military Police Brigade
501st Military Intelligence Brigade
1st Signal Brigade
18th Medical Command
8th Personnel Command
US Air Forces Korea/7th Air Force:
8th Fighter Wing (Kunsan)
51st Fighter Wing (Osan)


12 Ibid.


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