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THESIS

NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMERGING SECURITY ROLE

by

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March 2001

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# Abstract

Since 1999, the member states of the European Union (EU) have been pursuing capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations. The EU has no intention of usurping NATO’s role in collective defense; but it intends to strengthen its influence in international politics and to acquire more options for crisis management.

This thesis analyzes the EU’s emerging role in the management of international security challenges and its implications for the future of NATO, the trans-Atlantic link and the EU itself. It explores the nature and scope of the crisis management role the EU intends to play, critically examines the prospects for the development of the requisite military capabilities in the EU, and assesses the impact of the EU’s emerging role on NATO. From the standpoint of the United States (and other non-EU NATO Allies, such as Norway and Turkey), close NATO-EU cooperation is imperative. The thesis concludes that the extent to which NATO and the EU coordinate their planning will be a decisive factor in the success of CSDP. The EU’s emerging security role is a new test for the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties given formal expression in NATO.
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NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMERGING SECURITY ROLE

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ABSTRACT

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A. PROSPECTS FOR CESDP AND FOR NATO

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1. Continuing deficiency in European Union military capabilities, in conjunction with uncoordinated decision-making structures with NATO.

2. Continuing deficiency in military capabilities, but in conjunction with coordinated decision-making structures with NATO.

3. Improvement in military capabilities, in conjunction with decision-making structures uncoordinated with NATO.

4. Improvement in military capabilities, in conjunction with coordinated NATO-EU decision-making structures.

C. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1999, the member states of the European Union (EU) have been pursuing capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations. The EU has no intention of usurping NATO’s role in collective defense; but it intends to strengthen its influence in international politics and to acquire more options for crisis management.

This thesis analyzes the EU’s emerging role in the management of international security challenges and its implications for the future of NATO, the trans-Atlantic link and the EU itself. It explores the nature and scope of the crisis management role the EU intends to play, critically examines the prospects for the development of the requisite military capabilities in the EU, and assesses the impact of the EU’s emerging role on NATO. It is evident that the EU will not be able to independently conduct the full range of Petersberg tasks at any time in the near future if an operation as demanding as NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict was contemplated as an example of the “peace making” envisaged as one of the Petersberg tasks. However, the EU will likely be able to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping missions with limited assistance from NATO. Supplying the necessary equipment and support (intelligence, logistics, communications architecture, training, etc.) for the EU’s military forces represents a genuine challenge, given the budgetary priorities of EU governments. Only by significantly increasing defense spending, which is not evidently in the future plans of most EU member states, will the EU ever be able to achieve its December 1999 “Headline Goal” (that is, a 50-60,000 troop rapid reaction force capable of being deployed within 60 days and sustained in operations for up to a year in duration) and its
other capability goals. This will not only take time; more importantly, it will require political will and sustained commitment by the various member countries to provide the funds and other resources.

At this early stage, it is difficult to forecast whether the EU’s Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) will ultimately undermine NATO or whether it will strengthen the Alliance and draw the United States and Europe closer together. The latter is, of course, the desired end state from the standpoint of the United States (and other non-EU NATO Allies, such as Norway and Turkey). The United States supports an independent European Union capability as a way of strengthening the transatlantic relationship, but considers it imperative that the EU’s new security role be developed within the framework of NATO, lest the future of the Alliance be threatened. If NATO crumbled, the security of Europe would be at stake and the transatlantic ties would have to be placed on new institutional foundations.

It will be incumbent upon the EU and NATO both to ensure that the structures being put in place now for close interaction will be effective and durable. In addition, the United States must remain actively engaged with the European Union as the framework for CESDP develops. This is absolutely necessary if America wants to safeguard its interests in Europe and, indeed, the larger interests of the Alliance as a whole, including peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. The reality is that the EU will pursue CESDP. The United States accepts and supports this effort as long as it is done correctly, that is, in close cooperation with NATO and in a way that leads to tangible improvements in military capabilities. It is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic, however, that the
EU's emerging security role is a new and challenging test for the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties given formal expression in NATO.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The European Union’s (EU) emerging role in security matters raises several questions that should be addressed before the organization takes the next steps to forge ahead with the project. This thesis focuses on questions concerning the impact of the EU’s emerging security role on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the trans-Atlantic relationship in particular, while touching on the effects it may have on other entities such as the Western European Union (WEU) and EU candidate states. The key questions examined in this thesis are as follows:

(1) What is the nature and scope of the security role that the EU intends to play?

(2) What are the military capabilities required for the security role that the EU intends to play and will the EU member states realistically be able to meet their force goals?

(3) What are the political-military structures that will be put in place to coordinate between the EU, NATO, the WEU and other entities such as EU candidate states to handle crisis management tasks?

(4) How will this emerging security role affect NATO?

(5) What effects will the EU’s Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) have on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO?
(6) What will the relationship be between the EU's political-military structure and NATO and will the proposed structures be able to coordinate successfully between the two organizations?

(7) What effect will CESDP have on trans-Atlantic relations in security matters?

**B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY**

For the past fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the focal point for defense policy in Western Europe while the European Union (EU) has been primarily occupied with economic and commercial matters. It should nonetheless be recalled that the European Union (including its predecessor organizations) was originally established not just for economic reasons, but also for security reasons. The European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Economic Community (1957) represented steps in an effort to maintain peace and security in Europe in the aftermath of two world wars that had left severe marks on the continent. From this perspective, the EU has been successful in certain security matters for many years.

External security was never one of its original goals, however. The EU (including its predecessor organizations) has consistently suffered from a sense of impotence in terms of its political influence in international security affairs despite efforts to improve its standing. In 1970, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands formed the policy consultation and coordination arrangement known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was broadened in scope ten years later to include political and economic aspects of security. The European Community (EC)
articulated its aspirations in documents such as the 1973 Copenhagen report, which stated that Europe had to "make its voice heard in world affairs"\(^1\) and the 1981 London Report, which declared, "The Ten should seek increasingly to shape events, and not simply to react to them."\(^2\) In the Preamble to the Single European Act (1986), the member states professed their ambition to "more effectively ... promote [the EC's] common interests and independence."\(^3\) Political cooperation was on the agenda, but in the bipolar Cold War environment that existed until the 1990s, there was no great incentive to create a strong political, let alone military, capability. Indeed, in light of the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 and the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966, and particularly the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the predominant means of ensuring defense and security in Western Europe, there was no strategic vision for common political or external security cooperation.

The change in geopolitical circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold War forced a reappraisal of the EC's political and security role. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union was significant in that, in addition to laying the groundwork for monetary union, it established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to allow the EU to play a political role in the international arena commensurate with its

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1 Copenhagen report quoted in Philippe in De Schoutheete, The Case for Europe (Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner Pub., 2000), p. 73,

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.
status as an economic power. While the Maastricht Treaty contained ambitious words reflecting the desire of the member states to build a CFSP, it did not provide the tools to accomplish this objective and thus failed to make any progress. As Philippe De Schoutheete has pointed out,

There was no provision for common reflection and analysis, nor a political motor to initiate action, nor any operational decision-making procedure, nor any visible and collective enforcement instrument. Those omissions ... reflect the clear intention of the member states, or at least that of the principal member states, to avoid surrendering any of the instruments of power in this domain.

The member states agreed in theory about what they wanted to achieve, but they lacked the political will and commitment to take action. In De Schoutheete's words, "The paradox lies in the gap between the declared objective and the available instruments; and from that paradox stems impotence."

A marked change in attitude, particularly on the part of Britain, toward common defense and security took place during the French-British summit at St. Malo in December 1998, which resulted in agreement that:

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage... This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP...To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible

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5 De Schoutheete, The Case for Europe, p. 78.

military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises....While acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members....The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication.... In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means.7

While all previous attempts to establish a multinational European security and defense entity more effective than the WEU had been unsuccessful, it appeared that the initiatives made at St. Malo showed true promise. The main reason for this breakthrough, as Jolyon Howorth points out, is that Britain had finally lifted its “effective veto on any structured linkage between, on the one hand, the EEC/EC/EU as an institutional organization and, on the other hand, European defence issues.”8 Cooperation between the French and the British, who have traditionally taken distinct positions on NATO, the WEU, and other institutions for defense and security in Europe, is essential towards progress on this issue. London and Paris have begun to agree on some of the fundamental issues, even if they are not quite “on the same sheet of music” in all respects.

In short, during the 1990s the strength of the CFSP was undermined by a lack of consensus about committing military capabilities to conduct common tasks. The Kosovo


crisis in the spring of 1999 highlighted the military weakness of the EU states -- a weakness revealed during the Bosnia crisis in 1992-95. Riding on the momentum of St. Malo and the EU’s inability to handle the crisis in the Balkans without U.S. assistance via NATO, the EU member states declared their intention at the European Council summit meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) to reinforce the CFSP by developing their own collective military capability to respond to international crises. While the NATO Allies have continued to develop the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that they endorsed in the early 1990s to gain “greater European capacity for autonomous military action,” the EU has also taken steps toward a similar end. According to the Helsinki Summit report of December 1999, "The [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." In order to achieve this objective, the EU member states have “decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks.”

The Helsinki report specifies military capability objectives to support the

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11 “Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999.” Available Online: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action=gettxt=gt&doc=PRES/99/3000[0][RAPID]&lg=EN.
Common European Security and Defense Policy which was set forth at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. In particular, the EU member states have set their own headline goal, to be reached by 2003, of being able to

   deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000–60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.\(^{12}\)

Moreover, three new permanent political-military bodies will be set up within the European Council: a Political and Security Council (PSC), a Military Committee, and a Military Staff.

C. \textbf{IMPORTANCE}

This new Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) is intended to allow the EU to assume responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations known as the Petersberg tasks. First announced at the WEU’s Ministerial meeting in Petersberg, near Bonn, Germany, in 1992, the Petersberg tasks were included in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty on European Union. The tasks include “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”\(^{13}\)

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Developing such capabilities, however, will not only take time; more importantly, it will require political will and sustained commitment by the various member countries to provide the money and resources necessary to build the military forces desired. It will also be important for NATO and the EU to work together to avoid duplication of effort where it is not desired; and to a large extent, this will involve close cooperation in defense planning, procurement exercises, and training. Although some forms of duplication are desired, others are not. François Heisbourg, Chairman for the Geneva Center for Security Policy, writes: "Duplication is no doubt useful in areas where all NATO's members are lacking. Air transport, SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses] and OEW [Offensive Electronic Warfare], in-flight refueling, GPS [Global Positioning Systems]-guided ordnance, CALCMs [Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles]"14 are all desirable capabilities to acquire, although the United States is surely better equipped at present than its European allies. On the other hand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other "Atlanticist" nations do not want any duplication in defense planning or the command structure. Efforts are underway to define more precisely the types of operations the EU wishes to be able to conduct, including the geographical boundaries of those operations. As part of this effort, the extent to which the forces of EU nations will be expected to operate on their own or as part of a NATO-led operation also needs to be delineated.

Certainly, as the Helsinki report asserts, "NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management."\textsuperscript{15} The EU has no intention of usurping NATO's role in collective defense; but there are strong incentives for it to develop a greater capacity to deal with security challenges other than collective defense. This would strengthen its political authority in the international arena and provide it with more options when crises arise. The extent to which NATO and the EU coordinate their crisis management efforts as well as the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties will be determining factors in the success of CESDP.

D. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This thesis analyzes the EU's emerging role in the management of international security challenges and its implications for the future of NATO, the trans-Atlantic link and the EU itself. It is based on qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include official European Union documents (such as European Council reports) covering this topic, official speeches of EU, NATO, United States and European government officials, and official defense documents. Secondary sources consist primarily of analytical studies. These include reports published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (such as \emph{Adelphi Papers} and articles in \emph{Survival}) and Chaillot Papers published by the WEU's Institute for Security Studies.

\textsuperscript{15} "Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999."
The purpose of this first chapter has been to provide an overview of how the EU’s role in security has evolved, highlighting in particular the events since 1998 which have truly given momentum to the idea of a Common European Security and Defense Policy and the incentives for the EU to develop its own military capability. The second chapter explores the nature and scope of the security roles that the EU intends to play, which are usually summed up in the phrase “the Petersberg tasks,” which include missions such as crisis management. The chapter reviews the EU’s history in dealing with crisis management, including the apparent reasons for its lack of success, and examines definitions of the Petersberg tasks. Whether the EU truly intends to be able to carry out its crisis management tasks in a fully autonomous manner raises questions about its military capabilities, which are examined in the third chapter. The Headline Goal stated at Helsinki in December 1999 provides a starting point for the EU to develop a military capability, but is that enough for what it wants to do? This chapter analyzes the ability of the various member states to contribute toward a military capability and identifies the key deficiencies that need to be addressed. The assessed capabilities gap between the United States and the EU is briefly examined too, since it is an important part of any discussion dealing with the development of European military capabilities.

Developing military capabilities is only part of the equation for CESDP. Equally important is the foundation of political-military structures that need to be in place for the EU to deal decisively and effectively with security challenges. Both areas – the military capabilities and institutional framework – will require cooperation with NATO. The fourth chapter, therefore, assesses the impact of the EU’s emerging role on NATO with a
focus on the structures put in place for coordination with NATO. The interaction between ESDI and CESDP necessarily forms part of this discussion. Since the nature of the relationship between NATO and the EU in security matters will have a significant impact on the trans-Atlantic relationship, the last part of chapter four is devoted to the U.S. view of CESDP. Finally, the fifth chapter concludes with reflections on the various outcomes that could result from Europe's new security role, particularly as they relate to trans-Atlantic stability, and an assessment of the prospects for CESDP.
II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT TASKS AND THE EU’S INVOLVEMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins by exploring crisis management,\textsuperscript{16} which is by no means a simple topic. The purpose is to provide perspectives about what the EU is facing as it seeks to develop a capability to address the full range of Petersberg tasks. After a survey of the range of crisis management tasks and peace operations, the EU’s involvement in crisis management is discussed. While the EU has dealt with crisis management to a certain degree throughout its existence, the role it seeks now is a greatly expanded one that includes the option of using force. This chapter helps to explain why the EU needs to formulate criteria for engagement which delineate when, where and how it may take action to deal with crises. The complicated nature of contemporary crises demands it.

B. AN EXPLORATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis management runs the gamut of crisis-oriented tasks from conflict prevention and conflict avoidance to conflict resolution. It encompasses intervention in external conflicts to support for peacekeeping operations, peace making, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian assistance and evacuation. Jarat Chopra distinguishes “peace maintenance” from diplomatic peacekeeping and military peace enforcement. According to Chopra, peace maintenance “refers to the overall political framework, as part of which the objectives of diplomatic activities, humanitarian

\textsuperscript{16} For the purposes of this thesis, crisis management and conflict management are the same, but the term “crisis management” will be used as consistently as possible.
assistance, military forces, and civilian components are not only coordinated but harmonized.\textsuperscript{17} According to the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO’s crisis management tasks involve responding to “threats and risks that are ‘multifaceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict.’”\textsuperscript{18} Not only are they hard to predict, but they are also difficult to plan for and usually complex. There are no quick fixes or easy solutions. In fact, once the progression of the crisis management tasks has evolved from prevention to management and resolution to post-conflict settlement, the long-term prospects are often overwhelming.

A prevention strategy should be possible, but despite early warning, it is difficult to gain international consensus for early action to chart a course that appears to all players to be effective and of reasonable cost. Yet there is also no way to stay uninvolved….Even worse, involvement, once it starts, seems never-ending.\textsuperscript{19}

The Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, still in place over five years after the 1995 Dayton Accords brought a provisional end to the Bosnian War, and the UN (Peacekeeping) Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)\textsuperscript{20} still on the island 35 years after the ceasefire, are but two examples of crises that have dragged on.

\textsuperscript{17} Jarat Chopra, ed., \textit{The Politics of Peace Maintenance} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 1998).

\textsuperscript{18} Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, p. 192, citing NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept, par 9, 47.


\textsuperscript{20} The United Nations has had peacekeeping forces on Cyprus since 1964. The size of UNFICYP is now 1,219, with ten countries participating. For more in formation, see the “Cyprus, Status of UN Negotiations, a CRS Issue Brief for Congress, available online at http://www.house.gov/pallone/newslet- cyprus-CRS.html#_1 19.
At the beginning of the spectrum of crisis management is conflict prevention, or more specifically, those measures taken to lessen the probability of violent conflict. General conflict should not necessarily be avoided — nor in fact can it be — for it is one of the means of bringing about social change. However, armed violent conflict should be prevented, if possible. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse distinguish between light preventive intervention and deep preventive intervention. The former involves a combination of crisis management and preventive diplomacy with the aim of preventing threshold conflicts from becoming severe, full-blown violent ones, while the latter seeks to correct the root causes of the conflict, to include resolving underlying political, ideological, or religious disputes and/or clashes of interest. “In the context of post-Cold War conflicts, light prevention generally means improving the international capacity to intervene in conflicts before they become violent; deep prevention means building domestic, regional or international capacity to manage conflict.”\(^2\)

The “light prevention” policy measures that Miall et al. discuss range from official diplomacy to non-official diplomacy (such as private mediation) to efforts by local actors to establish peace. Powerful states or organizations can also coerce governments into taking certain actions, strengthen moderate leaders and mitigate the influence of extremists. This can be done through political measures, economic measures and military measures (such as preventive peacekeeping, arms embargoes, and

One of the examples of successful prevention of imminent armed conflict is the UN operation in 1992 in Macedonia, otherwise known as the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Policy options for "deep prevention" include strengthening or restoring governance, assisting election processes, supporting fair trials and promoting independent media. Certainly, the effectiveness of these policies depends on the circumstances of the situation; but preventing a crisis from breaking out in violence, if possible, may benefit all concerned.

Unfortunately, many crises are not prevented and the role of interested external powers may become one of managing a violent conflict while it is taking place, with the aim of mitigating, containing, and eventually resolving it. It is for this purpose that peacekeeping, peace making and peace enforcement may come into play. It is important to point out, though, that classic peacekeeping, which involved impartial, non-forcible military deployments, with the consent of local antagonists, is not always possible. It is obviously preferable to uphold circumstances in which a ceasefire is in place, the consent of the parties to the conflict has been obtained, and light arms are used by the peacekeepers only for self-defense. In post-Cold War conflicts, however, in many cases the belligerents have not concluded a working ceasefire, the peacekeepers are heavily armed, and one or both parties to the conflict have not given their consent for intervention.

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22 Ibid., p. 111,113.
23 Ibid., p. 113.
Peacekeeping has thus evolved into a more forceful effort in which the peacekeepers must take the offensive to restore order. This approach is sometimes called “second generation” peacekeeping. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali developed the term “peace making” to describe this more forceful role, defined as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means.”24 Additionally, “second generation” peacekeepers have often performed tasks such as monitoring elections, disarming insurgents, and training police. Closely related to peacemaking is peace enforcement, which is essentially the imposition of a settlement by a powerful third party. The situation changes dramatically for the peacekeepers on the ground when a permissive environment becomes a non-permissive one because force protection becomes a critical issue. For this reason, many experts on the subject maintain that building and maintaining the consent of the local antagonists regarding the legitimacy of the peacekeeping intervention should be one of the main foci of action.

With regard to working towards resolution of a conflict, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has cited the need for peacekeeping forces “to find new capabilities for what he [Annan] refers to as positive inducements to gain support for peacekeeping mandates amongst populations in conflict zones.”25 Annan has argued that reliance on coercion will not work because its effects are only temporary and will erode over time. True conflict resolution, or a “durable peace,” requires taking an extra step beyond putting an


25 Annan quoted in indirect discourse in Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 143.
end to the violence: that is, providing positive incentives. The complicated nature of this task is readily apparent, as Miall et al. explain:

Working in conflict zones thus becomes a complex process of balancing coercive inducements with positive inducements, of supplementing military containment and humanitarian relief roles and of promoting civic action to rebuild communities economically, politically and socially. A wide range of actors and agencies, military and civilian, governmental and non-governmental, indigenous and external, therefore constitute the conflict resolution capability in war zones.

Once the crisis has been successfully resolved, post-conflict peace-building takes over. Boutros Ghali defined peace-building as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The two main tasks of peace-building are contained in this definition. Preventing a relapse is the more immediate objective while strengthening peace demands a long-term effort. Boutros Boutros Ghali specified some of the tasks involved in 1992:

disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

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26 Ibid.

27 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 144.

28 Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p. 11.

29 Ibid., p. 32.
R. Paris called peace-building an "enormous experiment in social engineering."\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, this part of crisis management could be the most difficult to achieve. It is often the most time-consuming as well, when one considers the amount of time necessary to create lasting peace at the grass roots level, as the examples of the UN in Cyprus and SFOR in Bosnia suggest. It appears that the Kosovo Force (KFOR) may remain in Kosovo indefinitely unless the replacement of Milosevic by Kostunica in October 2000 leads to circumstances that render the presence of external peacekeepers unnecessary. Many officials in NATO governments feel that the new regime holds new hope for nearer-term solutions. The process of working at the deeper level of reforming institutions and civil society takes crisis management to a new level. Yet without this last step in the spectrum of peace operations, all the efforts that preceded it may be wasted if violence breaks out again.

C. THE EU'S PAST INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Successful management of contemporary crises can rarely be achieved by one organization or entity, and the EU has recognized this. Multiple international security organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and states usually play a role. Moreover, crisis management is always carried out through some combination of diplomacy and force. Diplomacy is the preferred approach -- and often the first used -- while force is generally the last resort. Indeed, force can be -- and often is -- effective as an element in conflict resolution. For example, it can be used

as part of a peace support operation in order to neutralize those who themselves use force to perpetrate atrocities, prey on civilian populations or prevent an otherwise peaceful settlement which has majority support. But...force has a strictly limited role to play and only as part of a wider conflict resolution process.31

Even if force is not used, though, often it is the threat of force that provides the credibility needed for diplomacy to work. The difference between the EU’s role in crisis management in the past and the role that it envisions for the future resides in the prospect of using force. Not being able to use force has had significant implications for the EU’s success, or lack thereof, in crisis management. This is one of the main reasons why the EU’s efforts in conflict management have been unsuccessful so far.

The Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s is a prime example of the EU’s efforts both to prevent and to contain crises.32 When Slovenia and Croatia began making moves toward secession in the face of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s determined efforts to keep the Yugoslav federation together in early 1990, the time was ripe for the interested external powers to intervene before a full-blown crisis erupted. While it is highly questionable whether the outbreak of war could have been prevented, the main external powers and their institutions (including the EC) have been blamed for the way they responded to the conflict, including their failure to mitigate the violence. The EC’s first “failure” in the Balkans, then, was in conflict prevention.

31 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 221.

32 From 1967 to 1993 the EU was known as the EC (European Community). The EU name was officially adopted in November 1993, when the Treaty on European Union entered into force. This discussion will employ the terms used during the periods in question.
The EC made a difficult situation worse, by first insisting on Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, at a time when this course played into Milosevic's hands, and then abruptly changing direction after the Slovenian and Croatian secessions and supporting them against Serbia, despite recommendations of the Badinter Commission\textsuperscript{33} and the danger to Bosnia.\textsuperscript{34}

The second failure of the EC in Yugoslavia was its inability to contain the conflict. In 1991, the European Council decided to send 50 observers to Slovenia, and later to Croatia, to monitor (not enforce) the implementation of the ceasefire.\textsuperscript{35} To its credit, the EC was the first organization to assume responsibility during the first stage of the military conflict. (NATO and the WEU were not asked to take action until mid-1992.) Unfortunately, the EC observer mission was hindered in carrying out its objective in the escalating war in Croatia by its limited mandate and its lack of means to enforce it. Furthermore, the EC member states were unable to reach consensus, particularly as a result of Britain's opposition, on sending in military forces under WEU auspices. "The repudiation of the use of armed force under almost any circumstances weakened the

\textsuperscript{33} As violence spread in Croatia, the EC announced on 27 August 1991 that it was establishing a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and an Arbitration Commission comprising five presidents from among the various constitutional courts of the EC countries. The Arbitration Commission became known as the Badinter Commission after the name of the French lawyer appointed as its president. The EC retracted its position that Yugoslavia's borders could not be altered and set up the Badinter Commission to determine the EC's criteria for recognizing Yugoslav successor states.

\textsuperscript{34} Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{35} Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, eds., The Art of Conflict Prevention, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 7 (London: Brassey's, 1994), p. 151.
influence of the EC over the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{36} Ultimately, the UN and NATO had to step in.\textsuperscript{37}

The Albanian crisis in 1997 has also been cited as an example of the EU’s failure in crisis management. Stemming from a combination of the Tirana government’s failed pyramid schemes and President Berisha’s decision to conduct the 1996 elections in a manner widely considered to be neither free nor fair, civil war broke out in March 1997. The Albanian state started to crumble, armed rebels took over government armories in the southern part of the country, and approximately 1800 people were killed in the anarchy that followed. The army and police force also disintegrated.

The EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO and the WEU (as well as particular states, notably Greece and Italy) expressed alarm over the unrest in Albania, particularly because of the potential for extensive regional consequences; however, none of these organizations or states could come to any agreement over what measures should be taken. NATO and the WEU monitored the events in Albania but did not make any decisions – or even seriously contemplate any decisions – to intervene. Meanwhile, as the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU carried out their shuttle diplomacy, the situation continued to deteriorate.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 152.

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1101 at the end of March 1997 to allow for a Multinational Protection Force (MPF) to be set up and deployed, under Italian command, in April 1997. A “coalition of the willing” comprised of eleven states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey) participated in Operation Alba, as the MPF deployment was called. Although the operation was successful in some respects, it was a failure for European organizations such as the EU, as the MPF Commander, Admiral Guido Venturoni, pointed at later:

Mission Alba was the first crisis-management mission conducted in Europe by a multinational military force comprised of Europeans only and, in my opinion, it proved both the determination and the capability of the European countries to plan and conduct peace-support operations in a difficult situation like Albania. But at the same time it was probably a failure for existing European institutions. I say this with regret, although Italy was at the helm, because a "coalition of the willing" should not be the preferred option for future European crisis-management operations.38

Widely viewed as a “missed opportunity” by not only the EU, but WEU and NATO as well, the Albanian crisis was clearly a failure in conflict prevention; and a large part of that failure was due to lack of political consensus over what actions to take as the crisis was developing. Admiral Venturoni emphasized this point when he stated, "The Albanian crisis, although evident since January 1997, did not generate any preventive

action. As a matter of fact the slow and somewhat hesitating response by the international community and the Euro-Atlantic institutions proved unable to prevent the crisis.\textsuperscript{39}

The tools that the EU (including its predecessor organizations) has had to back its conflict management efforts have included, in some cases, the promise of accession to the EU and the promise (or threat) of economic benefits (or sanctions). Today, these tools are usually not enough. While the United States and Soviet Union, as superpowers, tended to use power projection, ideological warfare, and coercive diplomacy during the Cold War in resolving crises, the EU (including its predecessor organizations) has always – by necessity – preferred moral persuasion, dialogue and cooperation, peaceful change and conflict resolution without force.\textsuperscript{40}

In some cases this approach led to success. The EC’s diplomacy, for example, contributed to arrangements intended to de-escalate potential East-West confrontations through reconciliation and dialogue in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The EC’s emphasis on the importance of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe contributed to the conference’s success, ultimately resulting in the Warsaw Pact’s first acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection.\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, in

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} The U.S. use of force and coercive diplomacy during the Cold War often reflected circumstances deriving from the competition with the USSR. As a democracy, the United States has always favored the peaceful resolution of disputes.

\textsuperscript{41} Bauwens and Reychler, explanation of footnote reference 48, p. 176.
1992 the EC arbitrated to prevent the political conflict between Hungary and Slovakia from escalating any further over the issue of barrage on the Danube.\textsuperscript{42}

Unfortunately, although moral persuasion is clearly a preferable means to solve crises, it is usually not effective; but the EU (including its predecessors) had no other choice. The organization did not have the force needed for coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, until 1998, the member states could never agree on creating any force capability under EU auspices or using the WEU as the military arm of the EU in actual operations. Now at last, there seems to be consensus in the EU – including in Britain – that a military capability is necessary if the EU truly wants political clout and the capability to effectively manage a crisis.

D. \textbf{THE EU’S ENVISIONED ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT}

The mandate that the EU has for crisis management, Bauwens and Reychler point out, stems originally from the 1992 Treaty on European Union, which spelled out the purpose of the EU’s CFSP. The report by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to the European Council in Lisbon on June 27, 1992, implicitly provided for the tasks of peace building and peacemaking, with implications for peacekeeping and enforcement:

\begin{quote}
The CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union’s external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises. Furthermore, the Union will be able to make clearer to third
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., explanation of footnote reference 44, p. 175-6.
countries its own aims and interests, and to match more closely those parties’ expectations of the Union.\textsuperscript{43}

It was unfortunate for the EU, however, that the first test of its CFSP – the crisis in Yugoslavia – took place concurrently with the articulation of the new policy, and it failed miserably. Other EU efforts in crisis management have had greater success. The European Commission Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) has successfully sponsored projects in Bosnia as well as several African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, and Rwanda. Working with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the EU mediated a settlement for the conflict in Congo/Brazzaville.\textsuperscript{44} Additionally, the EU’s Balladur initiative (launched in 1994) has been credited with contributing significantly to the reduction of ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe. This initiative “set in motion a systematic program for Eastern European countries to resolve boundary and ethnic disputes between them and to embody the settlements in comprehensive bilateral treaties of friendship.”\textsuperscript{45}

Due to the uncertainty as to where future crises will break out, one cannot list specifically any conflicts that may put on the EU’s agenda. The following factors specified in the Lisbon report could be taken into account when determining whether joint EU action should be taken: “the geographical proximity of a region or a country;


\textsuperscript{44} Chayes and Chayes, p. 23-24.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 24.
an important interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country; [and/or] the existence of threats to the security interests of the Union.” Furthermore, the report specifies the EU’s priorities in various regions and its possible objectives for managing conflict, with first priority given to Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former Soviet republics.

EC policy towards these countries might thus include peacebuilding, peacemaking and even peacekeeping and enforcement measures. Second priority is given to the Maghreb and Middle East, where EC involvement seems to be restricted to peacebuilding and possibly peacemaking.

These guidelines from the report may be helpful in determining more specifically what types of conflict the EU will seek to “manage” under CESDP, in addition to clarifying the geographic scope of its aspirations.

At present, the EU has not placed any geographic limit on its role other than the priorities identified in the Lisbon report and similar documents, which are somewhat dated. In September 2000 French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin envisioned possible EU operations in Africa. Based on the EU’s previous and continuing involvement in the African continent, through ECHO and the mediation efforts in Congo/Brazzaville, this would not be a significant departure from current practice. Some representatives of the

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46 Bauwens and Reychler, p. 141.
47 Ibid., p. 142.
EU, however, have expressed more far-reaching aspirations. In September 1999, the representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the EU’s 15 Member States at the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Committee for Europe meeting in Florence, Italy, stated that the EU was “fully committed to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of East Timor as soon as possible.”

It was not clear, however, exactly what such assistance would consist of.

Jolyon Howorth states that, because of the global economic status of the EU and the fact that a majority of the EU member states were imperial powers at some point in their history, “The Union can reasonably claim to have interests more or less worldwide...[and] it is difficult for the Union to draw up geographical boundaries beyond which it might consider that it had no responsibility for the defence of human rights.”

However, what the EU is interested in getting involved in may differ from what it can realistically do. In Howorth’s view, “The realistic geographical limit is unlikely to extend much beyond the EU’s near abroad: The Caucasus and trans-Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa.”

This is significant due to the risk of disagreements with Russia about the Caucasus and trans-Caucasus.

One can also speculate about the various roles that the EU might play by reviewing the roles that NATO has played in crisis management during the last ten years,

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50 Howorth, “European Integration and Defence, the Ultimate Challenge,” p. 48

51 Ibid., p. 48
which largely reflect its involvement in the Balkans. To meet the challenges posed by the crisis in Yugoslavia, from the war in Bosnia to the operations in Kosovo (to include the Allied Force air campaign and the Kosovo Force, known as KFOR), NATO had to be prepared to conduct the following missions, among others: supervision of heavy weapons depots in hostile territory, monitoring airspace, protecting UN (or other) humanitarian relief operations, enforcing no-fly zones, establishing safe areas, disarming militant factions, deterring renewed aggression, protecting civilians, and – at the extreme end of the forceful intervention spectrum – bombing air defenses and many other types of targets to compel the Belgrade regime to accept NATO and/or UN Security Council demands. It is widely accepted that the likelihood of NATO having to defend the territories of its member states in the classic “collective defense” role has been fading while the requirement for crisis management has been growing. NATO has moved beyond its core missions of defense and deterrence to take on new roles “ranging from preventing and managing civil wars to monitoring arms control and disarmament agreements.”

The Petersberg tasks generally fall under the category of crisis management; certainly, when one considers NATO’s role in “managing” the recent crisis in Kosovo, it becomes readily apparent that the most demanding Petersberg tasks could in some circumstances be more challenging to deal with than the traditional role of collective defense. The magnitude of the latter challenge would depend, of course, on the identity of the aggressor. Due to the uncertainty over the wide number of crises that could fall

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52 Bauwens and Reychler. p. 114.
under the EU’s purview, the EU’s role as stated in December 2000 at the European Council in Nice should be taken essentially at face value for now: “the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” 53 From the least to the most demanding Petersberg task of peace making (as witnessed in the 1998-99 Kosovo conflict), the EU intends to be prepared — in the long run. What should not be disregarded or wasted is the value of NATO’s expertise in this role:

NATO has collective experience in crisis management. Its consultative mechanisms, its military structures, its experience in the political control of military operations, its range of military capabilities, and its transatlantic membership — together these bring a combination of expertise, experience, and capability ... in support of a wide-range of conflict prevention and crisis management activities. 54

Particularly with respect to the military aspect of CESDP, in which the EU has no background. NATO’s experience and guidance will be essential to the EU’s capability to perform the so-called Petersberg tasks. The EU certainly acknowledges this, notably in the arrangements for NATO-EU relations discussed in the fourth chapter.

Crises are often unpredictable, complicated, costly and long-term. Given the wide range of conflicts available for the EU to get involved in and its limited resources, it must develop criteria for engagement. Priorities for intervention can thus be set to


54 Bauwens and Reycler, p. 133.
determine what the initial involvement in a crisis will be, particularly when multiple crises break out at the same time. For example, referring to humanitarian operations, David Tucker has suggested grouping engagement criteria under two headings: interventions that require fighting (in non-permissive environments) and those that do not (in permissive environments). Due to the fact that operations in non-permissive environments significantly increase the risks for American lives, Tucker has argued, they should only be carried out “when the pending tragedy is of historic proportions.”

Tucker has delineated other possible guidelines for involvement, such as not intervening unless U.S. action forms part of a multilateral effort or intervening if it is necessary to persuade others to participate. Indeed, the intrinsic significance of the crisis, the implications for U.S. interests, and the potential consequences of inaction are integral parts of the equation as well.

Although Tucker’s discussion of engagement criteria pertains to U.S. interventions, the same principle applies to the EU in that the EU needs to formulate its own guidelines. In many cases, because of the common interests and values shared between the United States and Europe, the guidelines will most likely be quite similar. Either way, the EU needs a strategy of selective engagement to define when and where it will get involved. At this juncture, it appears that its strategy consists of getting

involved “where NATO as a whole is not engaged;” but there needs to be more. This is yet another area for joint NATO-EU cooperation, the subject of the next chapter.

III. THE EU’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: WHAT IT HAS AND WHAT IT NEEDS

A. INTRODUCTION

The process of developing the military capabilities that the EU needs for CESDP begins logically with determining the types of operations the organization anticipates having to conduct. The EU has described these operations in general terms as the Petersberg tasks, involving all aspects of crisis management. This is perhaps as specific as the EU’s leaders can be at present, considering the difficulty in predicting future crises. As was shown in the previous chapter’s discussion of what the Petersberg tasks could entail, the spectrum of projected missions is fairly broad, ranging from simple to complex. Planning for the most demanding contingencies means developing the military capabilities for such contingencies as well.

The second step in the process towards acquiring the necessary military capabilities is determining what would be needed to conduct the anticipated operations. After this, the assets already in the inventories of the EU member states must be matched with the capabilities required. Next, those assets that are needed but not available must be identified, leading to the fifth and final step: acquiring the missing assets, or at least finding viable substitutes. The EU is currently working through these steps as it develops its “autonomous capability,” as evidenced by the progress made particularly in the latest European Councils at Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000) and Nice (December 2000), and at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels (November 2000).
This chapter does not seek to provide solutions for the EU member states to develop the capabilities they need for CESDP. Rather, it assesses the EU’s ability – and perhaps more importantly, its political will – to acquire the capabilities and assets needed to conduct the envisioned operations to meet its military goals in addition to identifying and rectifying other shortfalls. The generic capabilities and assets needed to conduct crisis management operations (or to accomplish the Petersberg tasks) are discussed in light of where the EU stands today in defining the capabilities and acquiring the assets it needs. This leads naturally to an exploration of the EU’s capability shortfalls and of the “U.S.-European capability gap.” The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of the EU’s capability – in military terms – to fulfill its CESDP aspirations.

B. GENERAL CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR THE PETERSBERG TASKS

What are the capabilities needed to conduct Petersberg task or crisis management operations? Due to the wide range of missions covered by these terms, it is impossible to outline all the capabilities. However, the better the EU manages to do this, the easier it will be to accomplish its goals. United States Secretary of Defense William Cohen listed the general areas that need to be covered for crisis management, based on the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) guidance: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, command and control information systems, effective engagement, and survivability of forces and infrastructure. “After all,” Secretary Cohen said, “these are
the types of forces the Alliance would need for any Article 5 or non-Article 5 operation."

Granted, the capabilities called for by the lower end of crisis management tasks (such as peacekeeping) differ somewhat from those of the most difficult. Peace making, which may involve combat actions like NATO’s Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict, often requires capabilities such as strike assets, precision-guided munitions, heavy air transport, electronic warfare systems, and aerial refueling. However, even peacekeeping operations require more than is readily apparent – more than troops, vehicles and small arms. Reliable and robust intelligence and communications are, for example, essential for any military operation, no matter who is involved. As David Yost, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, points out, the forces of the EU member states involved in SFOR and KFOR still require U.S. assistance to carry out their missions in areas such as logistics and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture. This includes technical intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities to suppress Serb interference, if necessary. Moreover, if peacekeepers have to be extracted from a particular country in an emergency situation, nearby reinforcements must be available along with augmented capabilities for C4ISR, close air support, electronic warfare and large-scale logistical movement. Operations do not always go according to plan, so provisions must be made

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in case they do not. If the EU wants to achieve the “autonomous” capability it has set forth as its objective, it must develop forces in all these areas, and especially in the five categories that Secretary Cohen listed; yet the EU member states fall short in most, if not all, of them.

1. Assets Needed to Match Capabilities

With a good list of capabilities, one can begin to put together the assets needed to realize those capabilities. As noted above, given the complexity of peace enforcement operations, the basic requirements appear little different from those required to fight an all-out war. The three components of any military operation are infrastructure, logistics, and forces. Necessary infrastructure includes “airfields, telecommunications installations, command, control and information systems, military headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage, radar warning and navigational aid installations, port installations, forward storage sites and support facilities for reinforcement forces.”59 Logistics entails the storage, distribution and maintenance of equipment as well as the construction and operation of facilities and installations, and the means to move personnel. Forces consist of all the land, air and maritime units needed to carry out and support the actual mission. Putting the various pieces together to create the desired capability is no simple task, particularly when there is such a wide range of operations that the EU wants to be prepared to conduct.

59 Bauwens and Reychler, p. 124.
Michael O’Hanlon, a defense analyst in the Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution, has conducted an in-depth study of the military requirements for humanitarian interventions. Although his study is directed toward U.S. military interventions, many of his findings can be applied to the EU for the purpose of estimating what would be required for the EU to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks. He judges that most humanitarian operations require 20,000 to 60,000 uniformed personnel. “Forces of that size are appropriate for interventions in most small to medium-size countries, assuming potentially hostile forces numbering in the thousands to low tens of thousands.”60 This assessment is consistent with the EU’s Headline Goal in terms of troop strength. O’Hanlon also concludes that, while intervention in a small country is generally feasible, the intervening force must have transport, logistics, and rapid maneuver capabilities. O’Hanlon offers an important caveat: “armed units of the traditional sort, rather than designated peacekeeping forces, appear the right ones to take on these logistically challenging and militarily dangerous tasks.”61 This has implications for decisions to send in UN peacekeeping troops as opposed to NATO or EU peacekeeping forces, for example.

In addition to examining the requirements for crisis management, O’Hanlon addresses the same questions that the EU must itself consider as it develops CESDP: what operations do intervening forces have to conduct to establish themselves in a violence-ridden country, ensure security for themselves, and restore stability and order?

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If initial ceasefires are broken and stability collapses, what steps must then be taken to restore it? It is in considering the steps needed to establish control in the various scenarios of intervention, as well as what might have to be done if plans go awry, that the importance of the various capabilities listed in the DCI guidance becomes apparent. Even if intervention takes place in a country where a ceasefire already exists, the peacekeepers must be able to defend themselves. Nowhere was this more apparent than during the hostage crisis in the Bosnian war in 1995 when the Serbs captured approximately 375 Dutch UN peacekeepers.\footnote{Ibid., p. 12.}

There is much more to an operation than simply deployable troops. For instance, to get the troops into the country, airlift may be required; and if heavy equipment is needed, sealift may be essential. Are there airfields that can be used in safe locations? Are the ports accessible or must they be seized? For sustainable operations, the minimum numbers will never work. Reserves are absolutely necessary to allow for troop rotation and equipment failure. A force must be large enough to provide for operations exceeding its original mandate.

This leads to the last point that must be emphasized from O'Hanlon's study: exit strategies are critical. It would be imprudent and irresponsible for a country or an organization such as NATO or the EU to intervene and pull out without addressing long-term stability. This undoubtedly lengthens the commitment to troubled regions, as indicated by the presence of SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans today; but it is vitally
important that the exit strategy be considered from the beginning. In some circumstances, without an exit strategy, an intervening force may as well not intervene at all. Certainly, the EU is taking the various intricacies of crisis management operations into account; the question is how well (and how promptly) it will be able to master these intricacies.

2. The EU’s Progress Towards Defining Capabilities/Acquiring Assets

With the declaration of its Headline Goal at Helsinki, the EU delineated the general capabilities it seeks to acquire: a force that is rapidly deployable, self-sustaining, “with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.”63 With the help of NATO expertise, the EU built on the progress of the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 to specify more precisely the EU’s needs in terms of military capabilities to meet the Headline Goal, which it has outlined in a capability catalogue. From this capability catalog, the EU is generating a “force catalogue” to field all the requirements. Based on a combination of assessments by Jolyon Howorth, François Heisbourg, and David Yost, it appears that Britain and France alone could establish the desired force. However, while these two countries will undoubtedly provide a large portion of the assets, it is unrealistic to expect either (or both) of them to shoulder the burden for all the EU member states.

63 “Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999.”
Just prior to the European Council at Nice in December 2000, the EU held a Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on 20 November 2000, at which the member states announced their initial contributions towards the Headline Goal set by the Helsinki European Council. Based on unofficial information derived from press releases, these initial contributions are listed in Table 1. It is also important to note that the EU has welcomed contributions from non-EU members (among the nine accession candidates and non-EU European NATO members). No precise numerical information has been officially published on any of the contributions. The Capabilities Commitment Conference resulted in a pool of assets that includes over 100,000 persons, approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. The EU has declared that these assets make it "possible fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions within the headline goal."64 It is significant, however, that while many of the EU countries can supply troops, they are unable to provide the necessary logistics support, which will have to come from Britain and France.

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64 "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration (20 November 2000)." Available Online: http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main-cfm?LANG=1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Member</th>
<th>Initial Contribution to Force Catalog</th>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>20,000 troops,* 72 combat aircraft, 18 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12,000 troops,** 70 combat aircraft, 2 AWACS, 30 UAVs, warships (to include 1 carrier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13,500 -18,000 troops***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,000 troops mechanized brigade; 1 F-16 squadron, unspecified number of naval vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>500 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,000 troops</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Unspecified number of troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>NO CONTRIBUTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**TABLE 1**

*Conflicting press reports indicate that Britain will contribute from 12,500 to 20,000. In either case, these troops would primarily come from those committed to NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps. Only 10,000 would be deployed at any given time.65

**These troops would include armored forces, Foreign Legion forces, engineering teams, commandoes and gendarmes.

Conflicting press reports indicate that Germany will contribute at least 13,500 troops and perhaps as many as 18,000.

Despite the initial outlay of equipment and personnel toward the Headline Goal and the confidence that it will be met by 2003, the EU still needs to make progress in developing all the capabilities necessary for sustained, long-range operations. The EU is well aware of this. The conference identified “a number of areas in which efforts will be made in upgrading existing assets, investment, development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action.”66 Additionally, the EU member states made a reference at the Capabilities Commitment Conference to continuing their work beyond the Headline Goal target date of 2003 to achieve the “collective capability goals” that they had initially identified at Helsinki as necessary to be able to carry out the most demanding Petersberg tasks. For these goals, they need

to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means; - to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States; - to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; - to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command; - to increase the number of readily deployable troops; - and to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.67

The conference outlined two areas in particular in which the EU member states made the first steps towards improving their strategic capabilities: C3 (Command,

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67 Ibid., par.3.
Control and Communications) and intelligence. In the area of C3, the EU member states "offered a satisfactory number of national or multinational headquarters at strategic, operational, force and component levels,"68 which will be taken into consideration along with possible access to NATO capabilities to ensure reliable command and control. With respect to intelligence, in addition to the IMINT (imagery intelligence) capabilities at the Torrejon Satellite Center, various EU member states are willing to contribute some of their resources to assist the EU in analyzing and monitoring situations; however, they also noted that this area constitutes a significant weak link for future operations. Indeed, "serious efforts would be necessary in this area in order for the [European] Union to have more strategic intelligence at its disposal in the future."69 Although the capabilities commitment declaration mentioned strategic air and naval transport, it did so only to acknowledge that improvements in this area are necessary to conduct the most difficult crisis management operations.

In addition to committing specific assets at the conference, the EU member states committed themselves to various projects within their armed forces to improve their collective capabilities. In an effort to prepare for potential crisis management operations, these projects include developing resources for search and rescue operations and for defense against ground-to-ground missiles, plus precision weapons, logistic support and simulation tools. As evidence of their commitment to achieving such improvements, some of the EU members cited their efforts in restructuring some of the European defense

68 Ibid., par. 4B.
69 Ibid., par. 4B.
industries as well as their participation in certain projects that may help significantly improve European capabilities. These projects include Future Large Aircraft (Airbus A 400M), sea transport vessels, and Troop Transport Helicopters (NH 90). Moreover, some of the EU members announced their intention to "acquire equipment to improve the safety and efficiency of military action" while some committed themselves to improving the EU’s "guaranteed access to satellite imaging, thanks in particular to the development of new optical and radar satellite equipment (Helios II, SAR Lupe and Cosmos Skymed)." What was missing, however, among these expressions of ambitious intentions and commitments was any reference to the need for increased defense spending. Without such spending, real progress is unlikely. Apparently because the EU member states are aware of the need to hold each other accountable to their commitments, the conference established an evaluation mechanism, approved at the European Council at Nice in December 2000, to monitor the progress made toward reaching the Headline Goal. The review mechanism can be compared to the convergence criteria, by which states seeking accession to the EU can work towards satisfying the necessary guidelines set by the EU for membership. The review process will involve EU member state and NATO experts, through expert groups based on the Headline Task Force/Headline Task Force Plus (HTF/HTF Plus) formats, with the assistance of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), evaluating and reviewing the capability goals and progress towards fulfilling the commitments made. Periodic reports will be made to the EU's Military Committee, which will then draft any necessary

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70 Ibid., par.5.
recommendations for the Political and Security Committee (PSC). During the evaluation process, the capability goals will be modified as necessary, according to changing circumstances. Additionally, the mechanism will seek to achieve consistency between the commitments made to the EU and, for the countries concerned, force goals agreed to in the context of NATO defense planning or the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). Maintaining transparency and cooperation in NATO is extremely important for several reasons, not least of which is the desire to avoid duplication of effort and to mutually reinforce the EU’s capability goals with NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (for EU members that are also in NATO).  

C. THE EU’S SHORTFALLS AND THE U.S.-EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES GAP

It is not surprising that the EU is making concerted efforts to improve its capabilities in cooperation with NATO. In fact, it is a positive step, for the Europeans in general – whether part of NATO and/or the EU – suffer from significant military shortfalls, particularly compared to the United States. The organizations involved in recent years in reviewing and assessing Europe’s requirements for military capabilities include: the WEU, with its Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations, which reported in November 1999; NATO, with its Defense

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71 “Presidency Report on the Security and Defense Policy (4 December 2000).” A detailed account of the review mechanism can be reviewed online at http://we.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=1. It is entitled, “Achievement of the Headline Goal: Review Mechanism for Military Capabilities,” and it is an appendix to Annex I of the Presidency Report, “Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration.”

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Capabilities Initiative (DCI),\textsuperscript{72} which commenced in April 1999; the EU interim Military Body (iMB) Headline Goal Task Force (HGTF),\textsuperscript{73} and the EU-NATO Ad Hoc Working Group on collective capabilities (which commenced on July 28, 2000).\textsuperscript{74} Additionally, during its presidency of the WEU and the EU in the latter half of 2000, France convened a meeting of the EU defense ministers in September 2000 to examine the requirements of the various crisis scenarios that the EU could face. This meeting was followed in November 2000 by the Capabilities Commitment Conference discussed above. Some experts and officials have argued that the EU and NATO should streamline their efforts and create one, or at most two, organizations to work on the assessment of requirements together.

On a positive note, two of the entities mentioned at least involve coordinated efforts between the EU and NATO. The EU-NATO Ad Hoc Working Group actually consists of four groups which provide for coordination between the EU and NATO in the following areas: security issues, capabilities goals, procedures for enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation.\textsuperscript{75} The NATO team working on the DCI has also aimed to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[72] Jolyon Howorth, \textit{European Integration and Defence, the Ultimate Challenge}, Chaillot Paper No. 43, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2000), p. 44. NATO’s DCI was established in April 1999 to assess NATO’s overall capacity, identify the capability gaps that need to be filled, and provide for means to fill those gaps.
\item[73] Ibid., p.45. The iMB-HGTF is a 6-stage process that moves “from the overall strategic context, via planning assumptions and scenarios to identification of the full range of Headline Goal requirements.
\item[74] Ibid., p. 45.
\end{itemize}
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coordinate its work with the EU’s work on reaching the Headline Goal. With the large strides that the Europeans need to make to narrow the capabilities gap with the United States, efforts to address the shortfalls should not be inefficient or redundant.

Any discussion of European military capabilities would be incomplete without examining the “U.S.-European capabilities gap.” David Yost has described the shortfalls as “an aggregate of many gaps,” to include those in technology, investment and procurement. Ultimately, all of them add up to a marked U.S. superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, in the ability to conduct military operations and manage crises. The American advantages include “strategic mobility assets (such as aerial refueling and air transport), surface ships and submarines, precision-strike munitions, electronic warfare, power projection (in the sense of long-range air and missile strikes), and … C4ISR.”

That the Europeans Allies are lacking in the areas of deployability, sustainability and logistics is not a surprise when one considers their defensive posture from 1950 to 1990. They did not develop a capability for force projection, as the United States did, because there was no need. Yet, despite the fact that the Cold War ended over ten years ago, they have yet to adapt their force structures to the new geostrategic environment in which collective defense preparedness has become less urgent than peacekeeping, peace making, humanitarian assistance, and other such crisis management tasks. While the

77 Ibid.
Europeans in the past were primarily only concerned with territorial defense, now they must be prepared to go to the crisis – a completely different problem to tackle.

In the post-Cold War era, the Gulf War in 1990-1991 was the first combat demonstration of the significant capabilities gaps between the United States and its European Allies, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, precision attack, transport and force protection.\textsuperscript{78} Eight years later in 1999, and even today, the situation has shown no improvement. While the example of Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict cannot be considered a completely accurate depiction of how far the Europeans have fallen behind, due to the fact that the campaign was fought according to U.S. designs and played to U.S. advantages (as with the Gulf War), it was nevertheless a clear indication of what the Europeans were (and still are) not capable of doing. The United States delivered 80\% of the weapons and was responsible for 90\% of the air-to-air refueling capability. Additionally, the United States was alone, or almost alone, in providing offensive electronic warfare, airborne command and control, all-weather precision guided munitions and mobile target acquisition. For every strike sortie conducted by a European aircraft, three U.S. support aircraft were needed.\textsuperscript{79}

One of the most significant problems revealed by the Kosovo campaign, which was a result of the capabilities gap between the United States and its European Allies, was that of interoperability and intelligence. The United States was responsible for


supplying 95% of the intelligence support. Yet, passing pertinent intelligence to the Allies was often cumbersome and slow as a result of the process of obtaining clearance for releasing the information. The United States also clearly holds the advantage in strategic intelligence assets. The only real capability in Europe now resides in the Helios 1 spy satellite held jointly by France, Spain and Italy. However, the Germans, who were dissatisfied with the satellite imagery that the United States provided during the Kosovo conflict, are reportedly discussing investment in a German radar satellite called SAR/LUPE. In terms of theater-reconnaissance capability, the United States is far better equipped than its European Allies with assets such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2 reconnaissance planes, JSTARS ground-surveillance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles such as Predator and Hunter.

Lack of secure communications was also a significant obstacle to the transfer of operational and intelligence information among the Allies. This posed a particular threat to force protection. As James Thomas points out, "the lack of secure, interoperable aircraft communications and anti-jam radios meant that command-and-control aircraft and other Allied planes had to pass information in the clear, thereby badly compromising operational security." Additionally, the lack of interoperability between the primary U.S. secure messaging system (the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNET) and NATO's system (known as the Crisis Response Operations NATO

81 Heisbourg, *European Defense, Making it Work*, p. 60
82 Ibid., p.66.
Operating System, or CRONOS) inhibited operational effectiveness. So much of the Kosovo effort relied on web-based technologies, e-mail and video-conferencing, due to the fact that this was the way the United States forces operated, that managing the use of such technologies in coordination with the other allies in the conflict was extremely challenging.

Even if the EU members want an EU-only capability independent of the United States and not necessarily interoperable with U.S. systems, an improved C4ISR architecture would pay large dividends by enabling them to conduct the most demanding crisis management tasks more effectively. The benefit of being able to operate more smoothly with U.S. forces in coalition efforts, which in reality is what the Europeans will most likely find themselves doing for the foreseeable future, makes improved and interoperable C4ISR that much more important. Even without the United States, however, the EU feels it must develop its own capabilities for intelligence – for providing indications and warning to its troops and accurate, timely assessments to the operators and decision-makers alike; and the countries involved must be willing to share that intelligence among themselves – a prospect that has proven to be challenging thus far.

Before the EU can hope to rectify the situation it is in today, it will need to address the reasons why it has fallen so far behind. Certainly, the defensive, Cold War mentality is largely responsible, particularly with the United States poised to fight all the major battles. On the basis of declared policy, the EU is working to change this mentality, although it is obvious that the force structures in many of the European Union

83 Thomas, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalition p. 53.
countries do not reflect this. It remains true that, despite professed desires for autonomy, the presence and power of the United States still constitute a crutch on which the Europeans lean – even the French.

Two other causes have played into the U.S.-European capabilities gap, however: reduced defense spending and reliance on conscript armies. In fact, declining defense budgets in many EU countries are cited as one of the main sources of the capabilities gap. Not surprisingly, the Europeans have traditionally received large amounts of criticism for this, particularly from U.S. officials frustrated with America footing the majority of the bill for certain crisis operations in Europe.\textsuperscript{84} Although there are some difficulties in comparing defense budgets due to variations from country to country as to the structure and content of such budgets, general trends can nevertheless be drawn from a comparison. The United States spends approximately $285 billion per year on defense, or 3.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), compared to the EU, which spends (collectively) approximately $165 billion per year, or 2.1 percent of its combined GDP.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, America’s 3.2 percent is spent more efficiently than the 2.1 percent in Europe, with a greater proportion on procurement. François Heisbourg points out that the Europeans should be able to achieve 60% of the U.S. capability since their defense budget is 60% what the United States spends; yet, “They are probably below 10% in the realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level C4ISR, at substantially less than 20%.

\textsuperscript{84} In the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, the U.S. share of the troops on the ground is much smaller than the total contributed by other nations.

in airlift capacity (by volume and tonnage), and possibly less than 10% in terms of precision-guided air-deliverable ordnance."86 Europeans have spent more of their defense budgets on personnel and less on research and development. Not counting quantity of systems, this translates into a U.S. qualitative advantage.

Additionally, the Europeans’ traditional reliance on conscript armies has drawn criticism from the United States, with Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands being the notable exceptions among the European states. As a result, money that could go toward procurement is spent on the high costs of short-term conscripts, training, pensions and infrastructure. In the high technology environment in which wars are fought and crises are managed today, forces need to be professional. As John Hulsman, a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, points out, “The demands of warfare in this new century will require a commitment to extensive training that can only be expected of professionals.”87 Fortunately, France has now almost completed its transition to an all-professional armed force. Italy, Portugal, and Spain are also moving in the same direction. By no means is the transition to an all-professional force an easy task. Indeed, it has been a more expensive venture for the French than they thought it would be, despite the reduction in overall force size. Such a transition should nonetheless assist

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greatly in improving operational flexibility and equipment modernization for these states.88

D. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF EU’S MILITARY CAPABILITY

Closing the capabilities gap is no small matter. As Jolyon Howorth states, “The shortfall in European military capacity is widely perceived, in Europe and in the United States, as the major priority to be addressed by the Europeans.”89 The bottom line for the Europeans in improving their military capabilities is that they will not be able to achieve their objectives if they do not increase their defense budgets, or worse, if they keep decreasing them. This applies to the European countries in general, both the European NATO countries and the EU member states. General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and former Commander of the U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), has stated, “It is time to halt the reduction of resources dedicated to defense – the so-called peace dividend – and face up to the reality that in this still dangerous world, security never comes cheap.”90 The EU knows this in theory, but its practice has to date been a different story. It will politically difficult in all of the EU countries to increase defense spending, particularly in this time of relative peace. As the embarrassment of Kosovo falls further into the background, the task will not get any easier; but it must be done if the EU truly wants its “autonomous capacity.”


89 Howorth, European Integration and Defence, the Ultimate Challenge, p. 44.

Meeting the Headline Goal is but one “baby step” towards achieving forces capable of conducting the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks. As David Yost points out, “The EU’s ‘headline goal’ for 2003 is cast in such broad terms that the member states are almost certain to declare victory in meeting it.”91 It was established as the maximum that could gain consensus among the members. Its proponents hope that it will generate the momentum needed for creating a greater military capability in the long-term.

According to Jolyon Howorth’s description of the size of the force envisioned by experts when the Headline Goal is actually met, the numbers do not look promising. Using the general rule of thumb that one third of the forces are used for logistics, one third for combat, and one third for combat support, and assuming provisions must be made for troop rotation and replacement, the EU would really need to have at least 180,000-200,000 ground forces.92 The air forces would need to consist of 300 combat aircraft (organized into eight or nine wings) with 180 support aircraft, and the naval forces would need at least three task groups with 20 frigates each, or one carrier group with 15 frigates.93 In an analysis consistent with Howorth’s assessments, François Heisbourg states that with 60,000 troops, which would include both logistic and combat support units, only 20,000 troops would be left to conduct the actual mission. “Such a...

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92 Jolyon Howorth explains that this total number would provide the equivalent of 15 brigades on active service, another 15 training to go, and a further 15 recently relieved.

93 Howorth, European Integration and Defence, the Ultimate Challenge, p. 25.
fighting force," he argues, "could not be deployed for the most demanding Petersberg tasks," no matter what the EU declared at Helsinki.

Once again, it comes down to resources and how much effort the EU member states are willing to make to organize a serious military capacity for crisis management operations. In defining the Headline Goal, the EU perhaps purposely made the objective achievable, to create a sense of progress toward the ultimate goal. The many institutional structures, ad hoc working groups and committees that have been established likewise contribute to this sense of progress. However, the hard road lies just ahead in translating political will, assuming it exists, into increased defense budgets to obtain the air transport, air-to-air refueling, airborne command and control, offensive electronic warfare, and surveillance and reconnaissance and other assets that the EU member states need.

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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE EU’S EMERGING SECURITY ROLE ON NATO

A. INTRODUCTION

The Common European Security and Defense Policy marks a new step in European integration – one that comes with significant challenges and implications for the U.S. relationship with the European Union. As CESDP comes to life, the EU will have to develop a cohesive “European security culture” that is “a vital ingredient not only in the decision-making process itself, but also in ensuring that practical implementation will happen as foreseen.”95 In other words, the EU’s member states need to look past and overcome their differences to pursue this common goal, and the progress report thus far is somewhat promising. The accomplishments of the European Council Meetings at Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) were hailed as illustrations of a remarkable consensus among the 15 member states more significant than even such critical initiatives as the European Monetary Union. Nevertheless, the potential for future deadlock exists because the various member states hold different views on how CESDP should be implemented. One of the most contentious issues – and certainly the one most critical to the United States – revolves around how CESDP will affect the EU’s relationship with NATO. As Javier Solana observed in a speech in Berlin in November 2000:

95 Howorth, European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge, p. 27.
The development of the ESDP inevitably has evoked questions about the EU’s relationship with NATO. We have responded to these questions from the very beginning: The EU is not in the business of collective defence. Nor is it in the business of creating a European army. The creation of a European Security and Defense Policy is aimed at strengthening, not weakening transatlantic ties.  

Unfortunately, not everyone in Europe or the United States agrees.

This chapter explores the impact of the EU’s emerging security role on NATO by first providing an overview of the political-military structures that the EU has put in place (or will put in place) for coordination with NATO. The proposed modalities for discussions with EU candidate states and non-EU European NATO members are also reviewed. Given this understanding of how the EU intends to work with NATO (at least for the present), the nature of the prospective relationship between the EU and NATO is assessed. The two main opposing views of the impact that CESDP will have on NATO are then analyzed. The chapter concludes by presenting the United States view of CESDP, to include the positive aspects as well as some concerns of the United States.

B. POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUCTURES FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN NATO AND EU

The Presidency Report on ESDP of 4 December 2000 stressed the EU’s recognition of NATO’s primary role in collective defense and further emphasized that ESDP “will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the

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management of crises with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making autonomy.” Establishing a permanent and effective EU-NATO relationship in the beginning, developmental stages of CESDP is extremely significant, and the EU has clearly made a concerted effort towards this end. The precise arrangements for transparency, dialogue and cooperation between the EU and NATO have yet to be worked out in detail. The EU proposals for these arrangements are contained in Annex VII to the Presidency Report on ESDP, titled “Standing Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation Between the EU and NATO.” In it, the general guiding principles of the relationship are outlined, followed by the procedures for consultation both during and outside times of crisis. The appendix to this annex, “Annex to the Permanent Arrangements on EU/NATO Consultation and Cooperation on the Implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communique,” specifically deals with the modalities for EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities and “pre-identified assets and capabilities.”

Cooperation between the two organizations has already taken place, primarily in the form of meetings and the establishment of regular dialogue between the two organizations at various levels. At the highest level, Javier Solana (the EU Council’s Secretary-General and also the EU’s High Representative for CFSP) and Lord Robertson (NATO’s Secretary General) have met and will continue to do so. Significantly, the two Secretaries-General concluded an Interim Security Agreement that “encouraged the development of

http://db.consilium.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cfm?MAX=1&DOC=!!&BID=107&DID=63, emphasis in the original.
[EU-NATO] relations by authorising initial exchanges of documents and opened the way to a definitive arrangement between the European Union and NATO. 98 Regular meetings have also started at the senior levels of the two organizations (the EU’s Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session). The first two such meetings were held on 19 September and 9 November 2000. Additionally, the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000) established four ad hoc EU/NATO working groups to discuss issues of security, capabilities, the process of EU access to NATO assets and structures, and definitions of permanent agreements.

Significant interaction has taken place, particularly in the area of developing the EU’s military capabilities. In fact, NATO’s military expertise assisted greatly in developing the EU’s “Capabilities Catalogue.” As General Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, pointed out,

As the only multinational headquarters which has direct experience of such operations, SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] was closely involved in the design of the Headline Goal Catalogue. Experts from all NATO nations in SHAPE worked alongside experts from the EU throughout the summer and early autumn to provide technical advice. 99

Such interaction is vitally important and will – if all goes as planned – continue. One of the ad hoc groups set up by the Feira European Council, the group on EU/NATO

98 Ibid., Section IV.
capabilities, intends to ensure that EU and NATO capabilities develop consistently in those areas where they overlap (especially those that fall under the overall EU headline goal and NATO’s DCI); this will certainly benefit both organizations.

One of the aspects of the NATO-EU relationship that is perhaps most critical to a successful CESDP is, to employ the EU’s terms, “guaranteed permanent access to NATO’s planning capabilities” and the “presumption of availability of pre-identified [NATO] assets and capabilities.”¹⁰⁰ The EU has emphasized this on several occasions. Specifically, the Presidency Report on ESDP report stated:

The European Union will call on NATO for operational planning of any operation using NATO assets and capabilities. When the Union examines options with a view to an operation, the establishing of its strategic military options could involve a contribution by NATO's planning capabilities. The EU would stress the importance of appropriate provisions giving those who so wish access to Alliance structures in order, when necessary, to facilitate effective participation by all Member States in EU-led operations which make use of NATO assets and capabilities.¹⁰¹

At this point, the arrangements set forth in the appendix to Annex VII (referred to above) are only suggestions. First of all, the EU wants “guaranteed” access to NATO’s planning capabilities. Second, in a case where an EU-led operation calls for NATO assets, the appendix lays out a procedure whereby certain “pre-identified assets and capabilities” (which have yet to be determined) will be placed at the disposal of the EU.

Third, with respect to command and control, "Discussions will take place between experts from the EU and the Alliance with a view to identifying a series of possible options for the choice of all or part of a chain of command (operation commanders, force commanders, unit commanders and associated Military Staff elements)." \(^{102}\) Many of the points made in this appendix, however, still need to be validated by the military committees of both organizations and approved by the EU and NATO.

Each of the three permanent institutions set up for ESDP – the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) – has tasks assigned specifically for coordination with NATO. For example, the PSC "plays a major role in enhancing consultations, in particular with NATO and the third States involved." \(^{103}\) The EU Military Committee (EUMC), which provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, will assess the implications of particular crises with respect to EU relations to third parties and other organizations, including NATO.

Finally, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), which serves as the link between the EUMC and the EU's military force, is charged with establishing permanent relations with NATO according to the document on "EU/NATO Permanent Relations." As part of its duties, the EUMS contributes to "the process of elaboration, assessment and review of the capability goals taking into account the

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\(^{101}\) Ibid., Section IV.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., Appendix to Annex VII, par. 3.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., Annex III.
need, for those Member States concerned, to ensure coherence with NATO’s Defence Planning Process (DPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in accordance with agreed procedures."\textsuperscript{104} It also coordinates the procedures with national and multinational HQs including those NATO HQs available to the EU, ensuring, as far as possible, compatibility with NATO procedures . . . [and] plans, conducts and evaluates the military aspect of the EU’s crisis management procedures, including the exercising of EU/NATO procedures.\textsuperscript{105}

Apart from the purely NATO-EU relationship, arrangements have also been made to allow for non-EU European NATO members and EU accession candidates to participate in the EU’s military crisis management. In fact, the relations between the EUMC and NATO will be defined in the document on EU/NATO permanent relations, while the relations between the EUMC and non-EU European NATO members are defined in the document on the EU’s permanent relations with third countries.\textsuperscript{106} There is undoubtedly going to be some duplication and overlap in EU arrangements with non-EU European NATO members. These arrangements include regular and substantive dialogue in ministerial meetings and meetings of military experts. One of these ministerial meetings took place following the Capabilities Commitment Conference to discuss the participation of these countries and their assets in any future EU-led operations. While the EU has made it clear that it welcomes contributions from non-member states, the process

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., Annex V, par. 3.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., Annex V, par. 4.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., Annex IV, par. 5.
of non-member participation in decision-making needs to be clarified. This could prove to be quite challenging, for the EU naturally insists that its decision-making authority must be respected; but other states will also likely insist that they participate in the decision-making process when their assets are being used.

Despite General Ralston’s optimism for the NATO-EU relationship, he summarized the future challenges well:

This joint work [referring to SHAPE’s role in assisting the EU] has demonstrated that SHAPE involvement and an operational link to the alliance need not undermine EU autonomous decision-making. [But] we are only at the beginning of a long process. Many difficult decisions lie ahead for all nations that will contribute forces to EU operations particularly in managing increasing demands on the finite pool of national armed forces. The forces that constitute the EU Headline Goal Catalogue will need to be trained, exercised and developed in a way that does not conflict with or undermine existing commitments. Therein lies the real challenge.  

In particular, General Ralston – along with other NATO officials – may be concerned about a potential conflict with NATO’s existing commitments. Certain British units, for example, are earmarked for the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force, NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps and Britain’s own military operations. This “triple-hatted” situation makes it all the more necessary to establish clear procedures on the use of the forces. The EU and NATO hope to avoid any conflicts through the structures for regular dialogue and transparency that they have set up.

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107 General Joseph Ralston, “For the EU and NATO, A Welcome New Military Partnership.”

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Due to the experience and assets NATO has to conduct crisis management operations, a strong NATO-EU relationship is indispensable to the success of CESDP. The EU will have to rely on this experience for the near term in developing its new security role. There are other reasons, too, why NATO and the EU must develop mutual transparency and cooperate effectively. For the eleven NATO countries that are also in the EU, their efforts to improve their military forces in accordance with the EU headline and collective capability goals and those they devote to NATO’s DCI will be mutually reinforcing.

To avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, the two organizations must communicate with each other. For the EU, this means relying on technical data emanating from existing NATO mechanisms such as the Defence Planning Process and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Recourse to these sources would be had, with the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), via consultations between experts in a working group set up on the same model as that which operated for the drawing up of the capabilities catalogue (HTF Plus).108

The progress that has been made thus far – such as the NAC meetings with the EU’s PSC, the joint EU-NATO consultations on force and capability requirements for the EU Headline Goal, and interim security agreements allowing the exchange of classified material – must be sustained and built upon.109


C. OPPOSING VIEWS OF THE IMPACT OF CESDP ON THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

The Common European Security and Defense Policy, according to government leaders in Europe and the United States, is officially intended to strengthen the trans-Atlantic ties. It is meant to benefit both NATO and the EU and to strengthen European security. As William Cohen, then Secretary of Defense, emphasized in October 2000, flexibility on both sides is essential:

The process of developing [NATO and the EU’s] new relationship has only just begun, and we realize it will take time to complete. NATO can and should be flexible and generous in establishing such a relationship. Equally, the EU – a strong, confident, and vibrant institution that has accomplished so much in bringing Europeans toward an ‘ever closer union’ in so many areas – can and should be flexible and generous in its approach.\(^{110}\)

While both NATO and the EU recognize this in theory, the key will be whether they do so in practice. Two strong and opposing views have emerged on CESDP and the impact it will have on NATO. One view is that CESDP will undermine the Alliance and adversely affect the trans-Atlantic relationship; and the other view, which is the official position of NATO and the EU, is that ESDP will strengthen the trans-Atlantic ties. Advocates of both views can be found among political, diplomatic and military officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic. Ultimately, the end result will depend on how the NATO-EU relationship develops over the next few years.

Before analyzing these two opposing views, it is important to consider the differences of opinion on this subject among the European states – the United Kingdom and France, in particular. The EU can be divided into two general camps: the French-led Europeanists and the British-led Atlanticists. For France, CESDP comes first and the Europeans must be prepared to act autonomously, independent of the United States. While consensus on this approach is more widely shared in France than in any other EU country, politicians supportive of this outlook can be found in Belgium, Germany, and other countries. For Britain, and the other states allied with its position (such as the Netherlands and Portugal), the trans-Atlantic ties come first and CESDP is merely a vehicle to provide the EU with improved capabilities for crisis management and other Petersberg tasks, should the United States choose not to participate in particular contingencies. The Europeanist-Atlanticist contention is significant not least because it pits France against Britain; and as Jolyon Howorth points out, “the fate of CESDP at the turn of the millennium lay largely in the hands of the British and the French.”\(^{111}\) They have been the leaders in the initiative since the December 1998 St. Malo declaration. Moreover, these two countries will be responsible for providing a significant portion of the EU’s military capability.

Up until December 2000, one example of the differences between the French and the British concerned operational planning. The British (and other NATO countries, including the United States) wanted planning to be conducted at SHAPE, whereas the

\(^{111}\) Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge*, p. 53.
French wanted a separate EU planning body independent of SHAPE. This should not have come as a surprise since the French have not participated in NATO's defense planning, the core issue within the integrated military structure, since 1966. However, a separate EU defense planning structure could involve a significant duplication of resources and effort and undermine NATO's political cohesion and the NATO-EU relationship. While observers on both sides of the Atlantic have suggested that a motive inspiring many of the French has been to weaken U.S. influence in Europe, the French would describe their objectives in more positive terms: reducing the EU's dependence on U.S. political leadership and military capabilities, enabling the EU to define its own policies in international security, and increasing the EU's influence in international politics. In December 2000, the French withdrew their insistence on separate EU and NATO defense planning structures and endorsed the mechanisms outlined in the Nice Presidency Report on CESDP. Turkey is now blocking the consensus in NATO for allowing the EU access to NATO's planning capabilities.

In Britain, the issue of ESDP and a "European defense force" has become a hot political topic. British Prime Minister Tony Blair supports it with great conviction. The nay-sayers, on the other hand, are led by William Hague and the Conservatives in Parliament. In fact, William Hague has indicated that a Conservative government would

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pull British troops out of the EU force. This would be an enormous setback to CESDP. Three arguments in the British debate against what some are calling a "European army" are as follows: first, it risks causing damage to NATO; second, British forces are already overstretched with existing commitments across the globe; and third, Britain does not want to relinquish control over its forces to the EU. Other concerns include the impact that an EU force could have on the special intelligence-sharing relationship between the United States and Britain, especially if the United States began refusing to share sensitive intelligence with the British for fear that it would end up in the hands of other Europeans. The position of Sir John Weston, former British ambassador to the Alliance, is representative of many who fear that the EU Rapid Reaction Force will undermine NATO. According to Weston, "The present course ... leads inexorably to the progressive downgrading and deconstruction of NATO as the main western instrument of collective defense and security and to attenuation of the Washington Treaty as the main legal expression of transatlantic unity." Weston has also argued that it makes no sense for two multinational organizations to do the same thing.

The plans for building EU-NATO transparency certainly have many wrinkles that will not be ironed out so easily; and it is perhaps the recognition of these "wrinkles" that underlies the pessimism expressed in some quarters over the NATO-EU relationship. For instance, the dispute between the British and the French over the defense planning


arrangements was a serious concern for the other EU members as well as NATO; but the other difficulties involve countries that are non-EU European NATO states. Turkey is concerned about the EU’s military ambitions due to its exclusion from the EU “club.” As noted above, in December 2000, Turkey blocked a U.S.-backed initiative for NATO’s planning facilities to be made available automatically to the EU for EU-led operations. Turkey has offered to lift its veto if the EU allows it to have a voice in decisions on EU-led military actions taken in the region, including the Balkans and the Mediterranean; but the EU leaders insist that “they cannot risk undermining the political legitimacy of their new defense role by allowing Turkey, a non-EU state, to have what amounts to a seat in their military councils.”

The United States is seeking a solution to the disagreement and, with good cause, is trying to convince the EU that it needs to be more flexible and inclusive in its plans for a military force if it wants to work more closely with Turkey and the other non-EU European NATO members. Simply from the standpoint of providing assets, these other countries have a lot to offer the EU force if the EU is willing to let them participate to the degree that they want. This issue is but one of the challenges ahead for the EU, but it shows that it will require significant give and take on both sides if a good working relationship is to be established.

Many people in NATO countries welcome greater European military cooperation only within NATO, and others are skeptical about CESDP’s prospects for success. Some critics say that the projected gains in European military capability may be too meager to

116 Fitchett, “Turkey Puts Roadblock In EU Force Negotiations.”
justify the risk of creating a potential rival to NATO. In the worst case, if the EU does not develop its force, but tears the Alliance apart in the process of trying, security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region will be at risk. John Hamre, former U.S. deputy defense secretary and currently the head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, talked at length during a NATO-EU conference about the problem of declining European defense budgets and lack of funding. He said, quite bluntly, that without spending more on defense, the failure of the European Union force could mean the end of NATO:

‘The Europeans have galvanized themselves around some very concrete goals and I for one think it is a good thing,’ [Hamre] said. ‘But I do believe strongly that if the European defense policy fails at this stage it will be the death of NATO.’ Failure of the European force would convince America once and for all that its burdens are unending, Hamre said. ‘If Europe cannot get its act together ... I personally believe the United States would shed itself of this burden.’\(^{117}\)

Many Europeans do in fact fear that the United States will disengage from Europe. The reaction to initial announcements from newly elected President Bush that he intends to withdraw U.S. forces from the Balkans was one of grave concern. According to senior NATO generals, United Nations officials, and Western diplomats,

the American role in Kosovo is as crucial now as ever, and they assert that ... Bush’s expressed desire to pull American troops out of the Balkans is both ill-timed and damaging to Western goals in the region. ... If the Americans should suddenly withdraw or downgrade their commitment in a big way, the implications would be severe

for the NATO alliance, for regional stability, relations with Russia and the behavior of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars as well.118

Some Europeans believe that small-scale crises might become all-out wars if the United States is not involved. While this belief may be a bit extreme, particularly in light of the prevailing U.S. consensus that Europe is too vital an interest for the United States to disengage from, it underscores the fact that the European Union still depends ultimately on the United States to underwrite security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.

Many who are optimistic about the effect that CESDP will have on trans-Atlantic ties emphasize that, even though not all the groundwork for CESDP has been laid, the concept of a better-equipped and more capable European Union working together with NATO and the United States makes sense. Lord Robertson pointed out that “Frankly, if it [ESDP] were to undermine or endanger the North Atlantic Alliance, I as Secretary General of NATO would have nothing to do with it.”119 In a Senate hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs in March 1999, Anthony Wayne, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, presented the case in support of the EU’s security and defense policy. He argued that “an effective EU with an effective CFSP would be a power with shared values and strong Atlantic ties with which we could work to solve a number of the global problems and regional problems in other parts of the


world.” A similar assessment was made by The Economist: “Combining the conflict-prevention tools of the EU and the war-fighting and crisis-management experience of NATO should make it easier to deal with problems within Europe and beyond.” The caveat to that assessment was, “But the deal is not sewn up yet.”

The hard issues – the “heavy stones” which have yet to be laid – include working out the planning processes and command and control arrangements, determining how access to NATO capabilities and assets will be achieved, and deciding how to include non-EU states in the planning and operational process. While the French may insist on separate planning structures and separate bodies to ensure the EU has full autonomy in crisis management, the reality is that until the EU can come up with its own set of assets and capabilities, full autonomy will never be reached. The price of using NATO assets is the requirement to work with NATO. There really is no other choice.

Dr. Frank Kramer, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, spoke at a roundtable on Department of Defense views concerning NATO and European Union defense planning. The tone of his remarks was one of optimism and support for ESDP; however, he too stressed the need for transparency between NATO and the EU. As he explained, “There’s only one set of forces. If there are potentially two different political directives, they have to have common priorities.


common planning so that there won’t be inconsistent directives for the single set of forces.\textsuperscript{122} He discussed the planning issue at length to show how it would work in a NATO-EU relationship. Kramer pointed out that there are three levels of planning: strategic planning, force planning and operational planning; and transparency must occur at all three levels. Due to the significant overlap between NATO and the EU, the combined membership involves only 23 countries.\textsuperscript{123} This is a manageable number for strategic and force planning. Moreover, because of Partnership for Peace, all of the non-NATO EU countries are already doing some force planning with NATO. Kramer’s argument, then, was that “to bring these countries together with NATO is not hard because it’s already being done for the most part.”\textsuperscript{124} He also pointed out that France does not do such planning with NATO. According to Kramer, the French are “working out how they’re going to do this because they have issues for themselves with respect to the headline goal and their capabilities conference.”\textsuperscript{125}

In terms of operational planning, Kramer described the Berlin Plus arrangement, whereby the Europeans would have assured access to the NATO planning mechanism,


\textsuperscript{123} There are 19 countries in NATO and 15 in the EU, but 11 countries are in both NATO and the EU: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The four non-NATO EU countries are Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The non-EU NATO countries are Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States.

\textsuperscript{124} Dr. Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, speaking at a roundtable on Department of Defense views concerning NATO-European defense planning, 18 October 2000.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
whether the United States chooses to participate in the non-Article 5 operation or not. Although Berlin Plus had been agreed to, some issues still needed to be worked out, especially for the involvement of NATO countries that are not EU members; but he reiterated that the process was moving forward. Kramer emphasized the fact that there is only one set of forces, so the claims that a "European army" is being formed are completely inaccurate. The EU Rapid Reaction Force is merely a different way of organizing some of the same forces; and in all likelihood, the European Union members, the non-EU European NATO Allies, and the United States will still find ways to work together effectively.

On the issue of command and control, the proposal offered by NATO is to have NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR), currently British General Sir Rupert Smith, command the EU Rapid Reaction Force.\textsuperscript{126} The Chief of Staff would then be chosen by the EU’s Council of Ministers, which has nominated the current Director, EU Military Staff, German General Rainer Schuwlirth. Here too, the French are reportedly obstructing the final decision pending agreement on the mechanisms for planning; and while they are fairly isolated in their position, they bear enough weight to hold up progress.\textsuperscript{127} While the other EU member states have emphasized that their priority is to avoid unnecessary duplication, the French do not seem to endorse this idea wholeheartedly.

\textsuperscript{126} Responsibility for the position of DSACEUR rotates between Germany and the United Kingdom.

Although unofficially many Europeans are pessimistic about CSEDP’s potential impact on relations with the United States and NATO, the official view from all EU governments is that CSEDP will strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship. German Ambassador Jürgen Chrobog made this official position clear in a speech in October 2000. He emphasized that CSEDP will make a significant contribution to trans-Atlantic burden-sharing by developing European military capabilities. Additionally, he argued that CSEDP will strengthen trans-Atlantic ties because the EU will be able to “use its crisis management capability to complement and reinforce NATO,” and will do so when the United States and/or NATO is otherwise occupied or chooses not to take action. He stressed that the EU is not trying to compete with NATO, or to create a “European army.” His final words summarize the optimistic view well:

EU and NATO have very different backgrounds, histories and structures. They will not detract from each other, but grow closer in values, convictions, and actions. For the European Union, and Germany in particular, the transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on the European continent. And one thing is absolutely certain: NATO remains responsible for the collective defense of Europe. NATO will not lose any of its importance, and ESDP will strengthen the European Union and NATO.129

The key will be to get the “European security culture” to stand behind Ambassador Chrobog’s words.


129 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
D. U.S. VIEWS OF CESDP

The U.S. position towards CESDP can be described as cautiously supportive. As long as the EU works within the framework of NATO, the United States will back CESDP wholeheartedly. While the United States naturally wishes to retain its influence in European security matters, U.S. authorities are convinced that NATO remains the key to preserving stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and the only reliable framework for the construction of “a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.”\textsuperscript{130} Clearly emphasizing the primacy of NATO’s role in European collective defense and security matters, as the Europeans themselves have done, William Cohen described the U.S. view of the EU’s new security role: “It is right and natural that an increasingly integrated Europe seeks to develop its own Security and Defense Policy with a military capability to back it up. Let me be clear on America’s position: we agree with this goal … with wholehearted conviction.”\textsuperscript{131} Yet he couched U.S. support in the context of his vision for a strong NATO-EU relationship:

\begin{quote}
a relationship wherein NATO and EU efforts to strengthen European security are coherent and mutually reinforcing; the autonomy and integrity of decision-making in both organizations are respected, each organization dealing with the other on an equal footing; both organizations place a high premium on transparency, close and frequent contacts on a wide range of levels, and efforts that are
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{130} The phrase “a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe” was employed in the Alliance’s 1967 Harmel Report. See Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, p. 74.

complementary; and there is no discrimination against any of the member states of either organization.\textsuperscript{132}

As Secretary Cohen also pointed out, it is difficult to envision a situation in which the European Union states would want to act on their own when the United States was prepared to assist them. However, if the EU chose to do so, the EU should have assured access to "NATO's operational and defense planning capabilities in peacetime, during an emerging crisis, during an EU-led crisis response operation using NATO capabilities and common assets, and during an EU-led crisis response operation that does not use NATO capabilities and common assets."\textsuperscript{133} In fact, he proposed a "European Security and Defense Planning System" (ESDPS), which would combine NATO and EU efforts into one collaborative approach to dealing with European security challenges.

The United States clearly understands how important it is for the European NATO Allies and the EU to work together to improve their military capability. By tying the EU’s CESDP efforts to NATO’s ESDI efforts, the United States is, in essence, attempting to uphold NATO’s continued centrality in European security affairs. A truly autonomous European Union capability – one that could accomplish the most demanding Petersberg tasks on its own, without U.S. support or perhaps even in the face of U.S. objections – would mean less U.S. influence in Europe. In certain extreme cases, the United States might find itself with no influence over the EU’s actions in international security affairs. This is difficult to imagine, especially in light of William Cohen’s comment that “the

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

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United States intends to remain fully engaged in European security issues, both politically and militarily.”

However, the United States can do this most effectively through NATO.

Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center in Washington, has discussed CFSP with caution. One of his main points cannot be ignored from the standpoint of American foreign policy: “For better or worse, implicitly or explicitly, Europe’s relationship to the United States is at the heart of what is being changed.”

One of the reasons why the United States is concerned about CESDP is that it fears losing power and influence in European security affairs. The possibility that a truly autonomous EU might take military action without seeking consensus in the Alliance is particularly troublesome for some U.S. observers. Jeffrey Gedmin’s testimony at a March 1999 Senate hearing reflects some of the skepticism held by U.S. observers. Gedmin offered three reasons for his position. First, he alluded to an “emerging political climate in the European Union itself, which I believe has tendencies, not dominant today … which, at their best, are anti-hegemonic and, at their worst, outright anti-American.”

Although the

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133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Peter W. Rodman, speaking at a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations on March 24, 1999, as written in his prepared Statement, “NATO and the European Union’s ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy,’” p. 35.
136 Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, speaking at a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations on March 24, 1999, p. 19.
French are regularly accused of harboring such sentiments, he pointed out that there is evidence that “it is not only the French but other West Europeans and the Germans, too, who refer now to America as the rogue superpower.”¹³⁷ Second, he warned against underestimating the “structural and historical obstacles to the West Europeans doing what we want them to do,” and he cautioned that in times of crisis, “the European formula institutionally may be a formula for common foreign and security policy, but the common part may often be for paralysis, inaction, and lowest common denominator politics.”¹³⁸ In effect, he has serious doubts that the EU could achieve a viable CFSP. Third, Gedmin argued that, as a result of the end of the Cold War, the West Europeans feel less dependent on the United States: and with the generational change that is taking place, the Europeans are “busy developing European institutions with minimal American participation and consultation.”¹³⁹

Gedmin’s remarks were not meant as any argument for U.S. disengagement; on the contrary, he fully supports maintaining the Allied relationships in Europe. However, he pointed out - quite realistically – that while the United States wants to share its burdens, it also wants to remain a superpower, which has “costs but also benefits.” In Gedmin’s view, “it makes sense to support the choices our European colleagues make. They are sovereign, democratic

¹³⁷ Ibid.
¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 19-20.
¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 20.
Nation-States. But ... for this process we have ‘hopes and apprehensions.’”

Gedmin’s recommendation was to articulate these apprehensions and deal with them appropriately to mitigate their effects and ensure that they do not lead to undermining the Atlantic Alliance.

However, the reality of the Europeans’ military weakness, which will not be alleviated substantially any time soon, should allay the fears expressed by some Americans. Europe will continue to rely on the United States whether it wants to or not. As Jay Garner states:

> There will be continued European reliance upon America’s unique strategic reach and access. One example is space, though Europeans are likely to enter this domain somewhat more ambitiously in the next century. Another example is troop and material lift, which remains a sine qua non for out-of-area sector operations.¹⁴¹

It appears that, while many Europeans are content to rely on the United States, they do not want to admit it.

François Heisbourg argues justifiably that a European Union with a stronger ability to act on its own would benefit NATO – and therefore the United States – for several reasons. First, it would increase the flexibility of NATO, politically and militarily, by making “a larger range of crisis management options” available. Second, “it would increase the credibility of deterrence.” Third, it would provide more forces to deal with the growing number of crises.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 21.
Significantly for the United States, this “would reduce the risk of competition for access to U.S. military assets by the Europeans when the United States is facing a major crisis elsewhere.”\footnote{142} NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict certainly stretched the U.S. military capabilities – and it was not even a full-scale war. \footnote{143} John Hulsman points out that

Meeting America’s global commitments with the limited resources available in a peacetime economy will be one of the most challenging aspects of post Cold-War U.S. foreign and strategic policy. The danger of overstretched the military is a real one for America, which must make the transition from a position of dominance in its alliances to one of leadership. \footnote{143}

The fourth benefit of a strong autonomous EU capability that Heisbourg discusses is “a greater redundancy of relatively scarce capabilities, thus increasing sustainability and diminishing the likelihood of unpleasant surprises.” Additionally, it would allow for “a more balanced burden-sharing among the Allies,” which really means more balanced burden-sharing with the United States. \footnote{144} CESDP could (and should) help NATO if it actually improves the defense capabilities of the member states. From a United States perspective, this last point holds a substantial amount of weight because of all the criticism


\footnote{142} Heisbourg, \textit{European Defense: Making it Work}, p. 49.

\footnote{143} Hulsman, “The Future of the American Military Presence in Europe (May 2000).”

\footnote{144} Heisbourg, \textit{European Defense: Making it Work}, p. 49.

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Washington has directed toward the European Allies about America carrying too much of the load in terms of military capabilities.

The United States perhaps views the situation as a zero sum game between burden sharing and power sharing. The greater the burden carried, the more power and influence a state has in North Atlantic Council deliberations; but relinquishing a certain amount of that burden also means giving up a certain amount of power. John Hulsman describes the inextricable link between burden sharing and power sharing.

This means that the European pillar must increase its financial and military contributions to the alliance while claiming a greater amount of power within NATO. Likewise, while the United States would benefit from being able to decrease its transatlantic defense burden, it must consent to giving the Europeans a greater role in determining how the alliance is run.¹⁴⁵

Hulsman’s comments refer to increasing the European NATO members’ role in Alliance affairs. As CESDP develops, however, the United States will also have to include the non-NATO EU member states in the pool of Europeans that it cooperates with in European security activities.¹⁴⁶ This is true, of course, as long as the EU member states contribute toward strengthening the European pillar.

It is not a zero sum game, though. It has already been shown that the United States will not lose all – or even most – of its influence in NATO, at least for the near term. Therefore, the benefits for the United States in sharing the burden with the European Union will far outweigh the small amount of power that the United States may

have to relinquish. Besides, the United States has been pushing for the European Allies to carry more of the weight of handling crises in their vicinity. Not only is it imperative for the Europeans’ action to match their rhetoric; it is also necessary for the United States to remain engaged and to back its own words with concrete support for the Europeans in this latest initiative.

Frank Kramer answered a question concerning whether ESDP would break the trans-Atlantic link by pointing out that first, the United States has vital interests in Europe, and second, Europe has vital interests in keeping the United States engaged in Europe. On the basis of this common interest, common goals can be generated and the two organizations (NATO and the EU) can work together to achieve those goals. He provided the following progress report on what has been accomplished towards this end so far: “We aren’t finished. There is work to be done ... I don’t want to tell you everything is done until it is done, but I do want to tell you that the process is reasonably sensible and making progress.”\textsuperscript{147} While the work will not be accomplished overnight, it is important to continue to move forward and show evidence of the progress being made; and it is important for the United States to continue moving forward with NATO and the EU.

\textsuperscript{146} In fact, all the non-NATO EU member states participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, so a basis for more extensive cooperation is already in place.

\textsuperscript{147} Dr. Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, speaking at a roundtable on Department of Defense views concerning NATO-European defense planning, 18 October 2000.
V. CONCLUSION: FOUR POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

A. PROSPECTS FOR CESDP AND FOR NATO

A great deal of excitement has been generated since the European Union announced its new security ambitions in 1999. The momentum for the initiative is promising, but some observers have expressed a sense of foreboding about what it may mean for NATO. For those who favor European integration, CESDP is a tremendous step forward. For those who desire a more balanced burden-sharing relationship with the United States, it holds the potential to make improved European military capabilities a reality. For those who revere NATO and Europe’s ties with the United States, however, it has evoked mixed reactions. It could either strengthen NATO or undermine it. At this early stage, it is difficult to forecast the outcome, because much depends on decisions that have yet to be made.

How the NATO-EU relationship develops over the next few years will be a critical factor in determining CESDP’s overall impact on NATO and transatlantic ties. The success of the EU’s emerging security role depends on positive interaction with NATO, for many challenges lie ahead for Europe. In October 2000 William Cohen, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, listed them for NATO’s defense ministers, though they apply equally to the EU: “building security and preventing conflict within our Euro-Atlantic community and beyond; [responding] effectively to crises that we cannot prevent; and [rebuilding] war-torn societies after the shooting stops so that the cycle of violence will
not repeat itself.” 148 Meeting these challenges will be difficult enough for NATO, let alone for an organization that has no real military experience.

The EU’s history of dealing effectively with crisis management has been unsuccessful thus far, primarily because it has lacked forces to give its efforts political credibility. The Common Foreign and Security Policy set forth in the Maastricht Treaty consisted essentially of declarations until the EU member states as a group, led by Britain and France, finally admitted that military capabilities would be required to give the CFSP the backbone it needed. Certainly, the organizational structures put in place to support such a capability are extremely important, and the EU has made substantive progress towards this end. The more important and more demanding challenges are creating the military force to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks and making the appropriate arrangements for close interaction with NATO.

Even though the EU aims to be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks, it does not now have – nor will it soon have - the capability to do so. It is conceivable that the force envisioned in the Headline Goal will be able to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, although even these missions will probably require NATO assistance, depending on their complexity. It is not realistic to assume that the EU will be able to carry out the most demanding crisis management activities, such as peace enforcement, any time soon – and certainly not by 2003. Achieving this goal will require obtaining all the capabilities identified as shortfalls in the “capabilities gap assessments,”

and this is no simple task. Garnering the requisite number of military personnel is not as much of a problem, as the results of the Capabilities Commitment Conference show. However, supplying the necessary equipment and support (intelligence, logistics, communications architecture, training, etc.) for these forces represents a genuine challenge, given the budgetary priorities of EU governments.

The EU’s march towards the military capability it desires, whether truly autonomous or not, must begin with increased defense spending. The United States supports the concept of CESDP because it should, in theory, strengthen the European pillar in NATO and thus promote a more balanced burden-sharing relationship with the United States. However, at this point, even though the EU has taken significant steps in establishing its Rapid Reaction Force, in reality the force does not reflect any real increase in capability on the part of the European participants. It is merely a re-organization of the same forces.

Only by significantly increasing defense spending, which is not evidently in the future plans of most EU member states, will the EU ever be able to achieve its Headline Goal and other capability goals. This will not only take time; more importantly, it will require political will and sustained commitment by the various member countries to provide the money and resources. As the embarrassment of the Europeans’ weakness in the Kosovo intervention fades with time (and if relative peace and stability prevail on the continent), it will be increasingly difficult for European Union governments to feel justified in making the necessary increases in defense spending to address the shortfalls. In just two years, the EU has indeed made significant progress toward realizing its
Common Foreign and Security Policy; the key will be to keep the momentum going to make CESDP a reality, even if progress is made one small step at a time.

When Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence in the United Kingdom, made a statement to the House of Commons on 22 November 2000, following the end of the Capabilities Commitment Conference, he described CESDP as

...a planning process to ensure a more effective defence effort by European forces, and a mechanism to improve European contributions to NATO and to ensure that European nations can in future play a more effective part in Allliance operations.149

EU officials have made it clear that the EU’s efforts are going to be coordinated with NATO, and that one of the aims of CESDP is to strengthen the trans-Atlantic link; but the details of the relationship, which have yet to be completely worked out, face some serious challenges that will not be overcome easily. Stagnant defense budgets aside, internal divisions among the EU member states pose potential problems. Specifically, France’s pursuit of full autonomy and “independence” from the United States could lead to a wasteful duplication of structures and operational efforts. Some EU observers have expressed concern that French reservations about cooperation with NATO could lead to an undermining of the transatlantic relationship. It is also true, though, that the EU as a whole needs to remain flexible in its efforts to work with non-EU member states that wish to contribute to the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force. This means allowing those

contributing states to have an acceptable amount of involvement in the decision-making processes involving their forces.

B. **FOUR POSSIBLE SCENARIOS**

As far as the prospects for CESDP and its impact on NATO are concerned, the EU’s current security and defense ambitions could lead to four possible outcomes. Each of these outcomes has implications for the future of European security, NATO, and Europe’s relationship with the United States.

1. **Continuing deficiency in European Union military capabilities, in conjunction with uncoordinated decision-making structures with NATO.**

   This scenario holds the greatest threat to NATO and the transatlantic relationship. CESDP would fail and European security would be at stake. While it would not necessarily lead to an undermining of the Alliance, relations would be at the least severely strained – among the NATO members and the non-NATO EU members, and especially between the United States and Europe. The United States has made it clear that its support for CESDP is contingent upon close EU interaction with NATO. The lack of such interaction coupled with U.S. frustration with the Europeans’ inability to shoulder more of the burden of crisis management, especially in Europe itself, would probably mean withdrawal of U.S. support for the initiative. The worst possible outcome would result if the EU failed to achieve the military capability it desires, but undermined the NATO Alliance in the process of trying. In that case, there would be no reliable means of crisis management in Europe, and the Europeans would not be able to rely on
the United States to come to their assistance. The breakdown of NATO could have far-reaching consequences for political order in Europe.150

2. Continuing deficiency in military capabilities, but in conjunction with coordinated decision-making structures with NATO.

This scenario, which is one of the more likely outcomes, would lead to a situation little different from the one that exists today. The European pillar of the Alliance would remain relatively weak and the United States would continue to urge that the European NATO members share more of the burden in crisis management. The EU would not have achieved its goals for an autonomous capability and would continue to rely on U.S. capabilities and assets. However, the United States would retain the influence it currently has in European security affairs. With coordinated decision-making structures in place, the relationship between the EU and NATO would be fairly solid, so the Alliance would probably not be threatened. The United States would also continue to support CESDP. Because of the established relations between the two organizations and the goodwill of the United States, there would be a greater chance that the Europeans (whether European NATO members and/or EU members) would eventually be able to improve their military capabilities and the EU would achieve its goal.

150 David Yost, *NATO Transformed*, pp. 50-51.
3. Improvement in military capabilities, in conjunction with decision-making structures uncoordinated with NATO.

This scenario could undermine NATO and the transatlantic ties; and from the U.S. perspective, it could be almost as threatening as the first scenario described. The tension caused by the EU trying to conduct its own operations without proper consultation with NATO would lead to frustration among European countries (within and outside the EU) and the United States. There would undoubtedly be wasteful duplication of structures and assets, which the Europeans can ill afford. As the NATO Alliance weakened, the United States would lose its influence in European security matters. On the one hand, because certain assets would still most likely be commonly funded and maintained NATO assets, the EU could find its hands tied in trying to conduct crisis management operations. On the other hand, the European Union member states could hypothetically decide that NATO was no longer necessary at all. This would lead to the EU having full autonomy to conduct crisis management operations, regardless of the views of the United States and other non-EU NATO countries. The chance that Britain and some of the other EU members that cherish the relationship with the United States would let this happen, and the chance that the European Union would achieve such a military capability as to be fully independent of the United States, even in collective defense contingencies, appears to be small in the foreseeable future; but the possibility must be considered for the long-term.
4. Improvement in military capabilities, in conjunction with coordinated NATO-EU decision-making structures.

This is the goal and the most desirable outcome for the United States, NATO, and the EU. CESDP would be successful and the European Union would be able to handle more security challenges on its own, without necessarily calling on the United States. Eventually, the more balanced burden-sharing relationship would lead to a strengthened Alliance, but the United States would also retain influence in Europe through NATO. Unfortunately, this goal is not realistic at this time.

C. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

There are strong incentives for the EU to develop a greater capacity to deal with security challenges other than collective defense. Developing an effective capability for crisis management would strengthen its political authority in the international arena and provide it with more options when crises arise. It would be ideal, and most efficient, if the EU and NATO fused their efforts into one coordinated approach to crisis management. Instead of two distinct organizations working separately, but relying on the same assets and trying to pursue their activities in an uncoordinated way, there would be one streamlined organization dealing with European security. William Cohen's proposal in October 2000 for a consolidated EU-NATO collaborative planning system, the European Security and Defense Planning System (ESDPS), is one that should be pursued and developed.

The extent to which NATO and the EU coordinate their crisis management efforts as well as the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties will be determining factors
in the success of CESDP. The United States supports an independent European Union
capability as a way of strengthening the transatlantic relationship, but considers it
imperative that the EU’s new security role be developed within the framework of NATO,
lest the future of the Alliance be threatened. If NATO crumbled, the security of Europe
would be at stake and the transatlantic ties would have to be placed on new institutional
foundations. As the new Secretary of Defense for the Bush Administration, Donald
Rumsfeld, said in February 2001,

Weaken NATO and we weaken Europe, which weakens all
of us. We and the other nations of the alliance are bound
together in pursuit and preservation of something great and
good, indeed, something without parallel in history. Our
greatest asset still lies in our values – freedom, democracy,
respect for human rights and the rule of law. And in the
face of shared risks, we still must share the
responsibility.151

It will be incumbent upon the EU and NATO both to ensure that the structures being put
in place now will be effective and durable.

Despite the desire to obviate the need for U.S. participation in dealing with
security challenges in Europe as much as possible, the EU states and the non-EU
European members of NATO will continue to rely on U.S. military capabilities for the
foreseeable future, at least in large-scale contingencies. The degree of that reliance will
depend on whether the European Union countries can make their military capabilities
strong enough to match their rhetoric.

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February 2001, remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in Munich, Germany on
As Secretary Rumsfeld’s remarks indicate, the United States remains committed to ensuring the security of Europe. Because of the common ideals shared with Europe – those of preserving peace and security, and promoting peace and democracy – Rumsfeld said, “Our consultations and cooperation are at the center of this new world.” NATO remains the key institution for sustaining the U.S. commitment in Europe, however. The United States must remain actively engaged with the European Union as the framework for CESDP develops. This is absolutely necessary if America wants to safeguard its interests in Europe and, indeed, the larger interests of the Alliance as a whole, including peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. In the end, both sides of the Atlantic will benefit. As the United States works with its European Allies and the EU to improve their military capabilities, the resulting strengthened European pillar will serve to enhance the transatlantic relationship.

The reality is that the EU will pursue CESDP. The United States has accepted that and supports this effort if it is done correctly – in a way that allows for transparency with NATO and leads to tangible improvements in European military capabilities. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that it will be pursued properly. Blunders could lead to the undermining of the most successful political-military alliance the modern world has known. Evidently, this is a risk that the EU and NATO are willing to take, with the hope that the common values and interests that span the Atlantic are strong enough to overcome the most difficult obstacles.

152 Ibid.
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