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IMPROVING STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS OF THE TRANSFORMING FORCE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES W. SHUFELT, JR.
United States Army

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by

LTC JAMES W. SHUFELT, JR.
Department of the Army

COL DAVID BROOKS
Faculty Instructor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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Challenged by the last decade's dynamic strategic environment and potential future threats, the U.S. Army is transforming into a force of greater relevance. The creation of the first redesigned units and the selection of an Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) have established the momentum to start and sustain the change process. This paper looks at the lessons-learned that drove the decision to change and reviews the planned transformation process. Two alternative transformation designs, Macgregor's Phalanx and Grange's Air-Mech-Strike concept, are studied to identify candidate ideas to improve the current transformation process. Based on the analysis of the alternatives, this paper recommends adjustments to the transformation process in order to further improve strategic responsiveness. Key recommendations include consideration of an Army-wide rotating unit readiness system, increased use of Reserve Components for existing long-term operational requirements, adjustments in unit stationing, and tactical mobility enhancements for light forces. The value of these initiatives is further enhanced by the positive impact of other current Army actions, such as improvements to unit manning, the development of a consolidated operational rotation plan, and the creation of additional rapid-response capabilities.
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IMPROVING STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS OF THE TRANSFORMING FORCE

Challenged by the last decade’s dynamic strategic environment and a wide range of potential future threats, the U.S. Army has embarked on a journey to transform itself into a force of greater relevance. The creation of the first redesigned units and the selection of an Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) for procurement have established the momentum to start and sustain the change process.¹ This transformation will ultimately transform the Army’s basic combat organization to increase its strategic responsiveness, while still maintaining its critical characteristics of decisive and dominant force. Envisioned as a thirty-year process, this evolution will be especially difficult because the Army must still execute its current commitments, while undergoing transformation. An additional challenge is the fact that the Objective Force’s operational concepts, tactical organization designs and core combat vehicle, the Future Combat System (FCS), do not currently exist. They will have to be the products of hands-on experimentation, the application of current and future lessons-learned and the incorporation of research and development efforts conducted during the initial years of the transformation process.

The purpose of this paper is not to recommend fundamental changes to the process that has already started, nor to attack the logic behind the decision to change. Indeed, the starting point of this paper is that the need for change is an imperative and that the basic route is appropriate. Rather, this paper will look at the lessons-learned that drove the decision to change, review the transformation process, examine alternative transformation designs to identify candidate ideas to improve the current transformation process, and recommend appropriate adjustments to the transformation process.

There are many candidate models for transformation of the U.S. Army, ranging from incremental modernization of its current combat systems and fighting organizations to radical revision of the Army’s basic systems, units, and methods of fighting. By selecting a path that provides focused near-term fixes to documented deficiencies in order to free up resources to support a more radical transformation of the future force, the Army has rejected its previous gradual modernization path, as well as more sweeping and immediate changes proposed by others. While the Army has consciously not accepted alternate reorganization models such as those presented by COL Douglas Macgregor in Breaking the Phalanx and retired Brigadier General David Grange’s team in Air-Mech Strike, these controversial proposals include many ideas that could improve the Army’s strategic responsiveness today. Incorporation of an Army-wide rotating unit readiness structure, increased use of Reserve Components for existing long-
term operational requirements, adjustments in unit stationing, and tactical mobility enhancements for light forces could all help to improve near-term strategic responsiveness of the Army. The value of these initiatives is further enhanced by the positive impact of other ongoing Army actions, such as improvements to the manning of critical units, the development of a consolidated operational rotation plan, and the creation of additional rapid-response capabilities.

THE ORIGIN OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The requirement to transform the U.S. Army from its current structure lies in the Army's experiences since the demise of the Soviet Union. In every challenge over the last decade, the Army succeeded despite the limitations of its available tools, light and heavy forces with Cold War force structures. The conundrum that the U.S Army confronts today is simple in its clarity and profound in its operational impact. The Transformation Campaign Plan explains:

... today's Army force structure and supporting systems were designed for a different era and enemy. The Army's superb heavy forces are unequalled in their ability to gain and hold terrain in the most intense, direct fire combat imaginable and – once deployed – are the most decisive element in major theater wars. The current heavy forces lack strategic responsiveness and deployability. They also have a large logistical footprint and have significant support requirements. On the other hand, the Army's current light forces can strike quickly but lack survivability, lethality and tactical mobility once inserted. The result is a near-term capabilities gap that the Army must address as a matter of the utmost urgency.²

OPERATIONAL LESSONS-LEARNED

Operation "Just Cause," the U.S military's successful 1989 operation to overthrow Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega's regime, demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the Army's Cold War force structure. "Just Cause's" success suggests a model for decisive, simultaneous distributed operations. Such a judgement obscures the fact that the operation was the product of a deliberate planning process and months of preparation, including in-country rehearsals and pre-positioning of selected heavy equipment. Finally, U.S forces fought against a generally inept foe. A key fact was that most of the Army's force structure was too heavy to operate on Panama's primitive roads. As a result, the mechanized elements in this operation possessed some of the lightest and oldest equipment in the U.S. Army inventory:
M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers and M551A1 Sheridan Airborne Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles.  

Similarly, the success of Operations “Desert Shield” and “Desert Storm” obscures the high risks incurred in the initial force deployment and the limited utility of the American light forces during the Allied offensive against the Iraqi forces in February 1991. The rapid deployment of the 82d Airborne Division may have been of great public affairs value, but it had limited capability to stop an Iraqi attack of Saudi Arabia. Once Allied force deployments were complete, offensive operations by the Allies’ conventional heavy forces were decisive. However, the US Army’s light forces in the theater had less utility due to their limited tactical mobility during fast-paced offensive operations and they thus received a secondary mission on the western flank of the operation.

While U.S. military operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 were significantly different from “Desert Storm,” both in mission objectives and deploying force structures, these operations demonstrated that there is a role for heavy forces in peace operations. Moreover, it underlined that rapid deployment of such forces is critical, if peace operations transition into conventional combat operations. Similarly, U.S. military operations in Haiti demonstrated that, while existing U.S. conventional heavy force equipment may be too heavy for potential third world venues, the coercive effect of the presence of heavy forces makes them highly useful in some situations.

U.S. force deployments to Bosnia further illuminated the strategic deployability shortfalls in the Army’s structure. Current heavy equipment and constrained deployment infrastructures, plus challenges with conventional force design when executing peacekeeping operations, presented major difficulties. While the challenges of the initial U.S. force movement to Bosnia received considerable publicity, the problem with actually using U.S. heavy equipment for mission performance received less attention. Eventually, deployed heavy and light units had to be issued additional wheeled tactical vehicles to assist in mission performance. The provision of these lighter weight vehicles allowed heavy units to minimize the road-damaging movement of their M1 Abrams tanks and M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and helped improve the tactical mobility of resource-poor light units.

The most recent U.S. force deployment, the provision of U.S. forces to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) starting in 2000, confronted similar challenges. The deployment, training, and employment difficulties of “Task Force Hawk,” The United States Army, Europe (USAREUR)’s AH-64 “Apache” and Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) Task Force in Albania are well documented. A greater example of the limited strategic responsiveness of the U.S. Army is evident in the initial operations of “Task Force Falcon,” the U.S. component of KFOR. Major
infrastructure limitations, coupled with U.S. political decisions to not preposition significant quantities of U.S. forces and equipment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in anticipation of eventual operations in Kosovo, meant that the initial U.S. component of KFOR was a hastily assembled task force. Comprised of selected “Task Force Hawk” components, a U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Landing Team, an airborne infantry battalion from the U.S., and command and control elements from the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)’s First Infantry Division, this task force achieved its missions, but at some initial tactical risk due to its ad hoc nature.\textsuperscript{5}

FUTURE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

As tumultuous as the last decade has been, the future environment will most likely involve the continued involvement of the U.S. Army in similar types of operational missions – at least for the foreseeable future. Faced with a multi-polar and complex environment, the United States will confront challenges from a number of regional competitors over the next several decades. Adaptive and evolving adversaries will recognize shortfalls and constraints in U.S. capabilities and adjust their methods to develop and leverage short-term advantages against the demonstrated vulnerabilities of U.S. forces. The Army’s roadmap for its change process, the Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP), summarizes the result of such an analysis:

The adaptive and unpredictable nature of the envisioned future adversary mandates that the Army have a rapid, decisive capability to respond across the full spectrum of operations. The Army’s current capabilities with regard to the envisioned operational environment clearly indicates that there is a near-term strategic capabilities gap which impacts on the ability to provide the NCA [National Command Authority] and CINCS [Commanders in Chief] the full range of landpower options necessary to operate in this dynamic security environment.\textsuperscript{6}

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and the Secretary of the Army further explain the need for change, in terms of the broad spectrum of potential missions and the need for dominance throughout the spectrum of such missions:

The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land force in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major
theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass
destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at every point on that spectrum.
We will provide to the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable
and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions
of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. The Army’s deployment is
the surest sign of America’s commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on
land.⁷

The result of the review of the Army’s experiences over the past decade and future
challenges of the future is to underline the need to transform the Army in order to address
deficiencies apparent in past operations and to perform its current and anticipated future
requirements.

DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS AND PRINCIPLES

According to the CSA, transformation is the process of changing the Army “into a force
capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations. The Army’s Transformation
Strategy will result in an Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the present force.”⁸ Other key characteristics of this
force are the requirement to deploy a combat-capable brigade globally in 96 hours, have a
division on the ground in 120 hours, and deploy five divisions in theater in 30 days.⁹ The
transformation process supports changing the Army into the Objective Force while
simultaneously keeping the Army trained and ready to meet National Military Strategy (NMS)
requirements at all times.¹⁰ The Army Transformation Strategy, captured in the TCP, tracks the
evolution of the three forces that will comprise the Army during transformation: the Legacy
Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force.

THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE TRANSFORMING FORCE

The Legacy Force consists of today’s heavy and light forces. The Army must continue
to support and enhance these forces to maintain their dominant capabilities as the
transformation process proceeds. Continued sustainment and modernization of the Legacy
Force, along with recapitalization of selected Legacy Force equipment, such as the “Abrams”
tank, is critical, as the Legacy Force
will continue to guarantee our nonnegotiable contract with the American people, to fight and win the nation's wars, for a decade or more. The trained and ready Legacy Force maintains the credible deterrent that will cause our adversaries to hesitate before challenging American interests. It keeps open the current window of opportunity to transform The Army. Its readiness is indispensable to that enterprise.\textsuperscript{11}

The Interim Force provides an improved capability to meet current and future requirements for worldwide operational deployments. The Interim Force will consist of six to eight converted heavy and light brigades, dependent on funding, restructured into Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) equipped with off-the-shelf Interim Armored Vehicles (IAVs) that are significantly lighter and are therefore more strategically deployable than the U.S. Army's current armored vehicles. The first IBCT, stationed at Ft Lewis, Washington, will provide the Army with an immediate enhanced capability for strategic deployment and will validate the organizational and operational model for the Interim Force.\textsuperscript{12} The original Army plan was to commence IAV procurement in 2001, supporting operational demonstration of the first IBCT in 2002; however, acquisition and production challenges have delayed the first operational demonstration until 2003-2004.\textsuperscript{13}

The IBCT will be an infantry-heavy organization possessing improved tactical mobility and a robust dismounted assault capability. Three motorized infantry battalions, equipped with IAVs, are the primary maneuver elements of the brigade. Each infantry battalion will include three combined arms infantry company teams. The brigade will also include a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron, as well as an organic antitank company, artillery battalion, engineer company, signal company, military intelligence company, and a brigade support battalion. The IBCT is designed to be expandable, based on mission requirements, through the addition of additional like-type forces or by augmentation by forces not resident within the brigade, such as military police or air defense.\textsuperscript{14}

The Objective Force is the endstate of Army Transformation. A dedicated research and development effort over the next decade will lead to satisfaction of the required capabilities of this force: improved responsiveness, agility, versatility, deployability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. Legacy Force units will convert directly to the Objective Force design, constructed around the capabilities of its primary combat system, the Future Combat System (FCS), followed by conversion of the IAV-equipped Interim Force. The current plan sees this conversion as a 15-20 year process, ending around 2030.
STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

Improved strategic responsiveness is the critical requirement for the Interim Force and the Objective Force, as this characteristic addresses the key shortcoming of the Legacy Force. The June 2000 Draft of Army Field Manual (FM) 3-50, Decisive Force, explains that:

Strategic responsiveness is the ability to establish or reinforce credible force, when and where required by the joint forces commander (JFC), to maintain peace, deter conflict, or win war. Army forces meet the goal of strategic responsiveness – they are trained and ready to respond globally with decisive forces capable of executing prompt and sustained operations that span the full spectrum of military operations. The United States Army is the world’s premier land force. Retaining this superiority, however, requires the Army to be strategically responsive. The Army has to move with a greater velocity and sustained lethality to continue its role as the guarantor of victory. The Army must have the capability to maneuver operationally from strategic distances as part of a joint force to provide the joint force commander (JFC) the capability for early and continuous application of interdiction and maneuver.¹⁵

Key components of this definition are “credible force,” the appropriate force needed to accomplish the mission, and the inclusion of a range of potential missions that includes “maintain peace, deter conflict, or win war,” illustrating the full-spectrum aspect of the definition. In other words, strategic responsiveness does not mean just possessing the capability to deploy a small, light force for a peacekeeping operation; it includes deployment of the large, heavy force necessary to win a major theater war. This definition highlights the current challenge facing the Army with respect to strategic responsiveness – the need to deploy both faster and with greater lethality – and further reinforces the need to transform the Army.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF A STRATEGICALLY RESPONSIVE FORCE

The Command and General Staff College’s Student Text 3-0 Operations (Oct 2000) discusses seven attributes of strategically responsive forces: responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.¹⁶ These attributes of a strategically responsive force drive programmatic and operational requirements for the redesign of the Army and the accompanying force redesign and doctrine development processes.

The essence of responsiveness is the deployment of the right Army forces to the right place at the right time. The combination of forward deployed units, forward positioned
capabilities, peacetime military engagement, and force projection from anywhere the needed capabilities reside provide responsiveness today and in the future. Training, planning, and preparation for deployment, to include individual preparation, equipment readiness, and frequent practice of alert and deployment plans and procedures, also influence responsiveness.\textsuperscript{17}

Deployability is a holistic attribute that combines the characteristics of a unit and its equipment with the physical characteristics of deployment support facilities, plans, and transportation modes.\textsuperscript{18} For now and for the foreseeable future, Army ground units possess no inherent capability for strategic deployability – transportation of Army personnel and equipment is dependent on airlift or sealift provided by other services or commercial sources. The capabilities of deployment support facilities and intermediate staging bases, if required, help to further define force deployability. While the Army can request acquisition of additional strategic airlift and sealift assets and can recommend improvements to strategic deployment support facilities, most of these actions are in the purview of other services and often lose out in annual budget struggles. As a result, the simplest way that the Army can improve its strategic deployability is to redesign and re-equip units to enhance their inherent deployability characteristics, preposition heavy equipment in the vicinity of likely areas of conflict, and base selected units within or in close proximity to potential areas of conflict.

Agility is a tenet of Army operations as well as an attribute of a responsive force. A responsive, agile, force is sustainable and possesses sufficiently tactical mobility to accomplish the mission. Limitations on strategic lift currently compel commanders to balance competing mission requirements and develop compromise solutions. Agile commanders and units are capable of transitioning between types of operations without loss of momentum. Agility is the product of tough, realistic training in dynamic environments.\textsuperscript{19}

Versatility is also a tenet of Army operations. This attribute accounts for the requirement for Army forces to conduct full spectrum operations with forces appropriately tailored for accomplishment of the specific mission. Versatility also requires that Army force packages are capable of reorganizing and adapting based on changing missions. Versatility requires that commanders carefully tailor and sequence forces into theater, making sure that their forces have the necessary command and control, combat, combat support, and combat service support assets to accomplish assigned missions.\textsuperscript{20}

Army forces combine all elements of combat power in order to maximize the lethality of the force to defeat the enemy. Commanders must ensure deployed Army forces have enough combat power to overwhelm any potential adversary. Commanders must balance the ability to
mass the effects of lethal combat systems against the requirement to deploy, support, and sustain the units that employ these systems.  \(^{21}\)

Survivability combines technology and methods to provide maximum protection to Army forces. Survivability can be a function of lethality; lethal forces destroy enemies before they strike and can retaliate if necessary. Deploying commanders must integrate sufficient force protection assets to ensure mission accomplishment.  \(^{22}\)

The generation and sustainment of combat power is fundamental to strategic responsiveness. Commanders must reconcile the competing requirements to immediately accomplish assigned missions while also deploying adequate sustainment resources for extended operations. Commanders must tailor force packages to provide adequate combat service support while utilizing every option to reduce its footprint.  \(^{23}\)

**ALTERNATIVE FORCE DESIGNS**

There are two major force designs that this paper will consider as alternatives to the Army's current plan for transformation to identify any major strengths and issues for consideration: Macgregor's Phalanx and Grange's Air-Mech-Strike Force.

**MACGREGOR'S PHALANX**

Written by a professional soldier during his year as a Military Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*, inspired intense debates on the redesign of the Army.  \(^{24}\) COL Douglas A. Macgregor’s 1997 analysis of the role of landpower in joint operations and his resulting recommendations for Army reorganization were controversial both in scope and the response they inspired. Arguing that the Army needed to evolve due to changes in the strategic environment, to leverage technology better and to integrate better with joint operations, Macgregor recommended reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups. These groups, designed for rapid and decisive action, are then task-organized based on the situation under the command and control of corps headquarters-based Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters.

Basing his recommendations on historical analysis of the decisive role of landpower in combat and the documented difficulty of achieving revolutionary change in peacetime organizations, Macgregor identified the US Army's most pressing requirement as the "... need to emphasize qualitative improvements to compensate for reduced numbers of Army ground forces and the need for adaptable warfighting structures that can fill a wide range of mission requirements."  \(^{25}\) Combining this with a historical trend toward smaller, more mobile, integrated
“all arms” combat formations, Macgregor recommended the formation of four types of 4,000-5,000 man combat groups: Heavy Combat Groups, Airborne-Air Assault Groups, Heavy Reconnaissance-Strike Groups, and Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups. All Combat Groups would be self-contained, all-arms, self-supporting organizations, commanded by Brigadier Generals. Macgregor further recommended the formation of additional functional groups to provide operational level support: General Support Groups, Engineer Support Groups, Rocket Artillery Groups, Theater High Altitude Air Defense Groups, Air Defense Groups, Aviation Strike Groups, Aviation Support Groups, and Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Groups. Under Macgregor’s concept, the entire Army, to include reserve components, would reorganize into this group-based structure.

The most controversial aspect of Macgregor’s recommendation is the elimination of the division command and control echelon, in favor of the use of corps headquarters-based JTF headquarters directly commanding assigned groups. Macgregor argues that this option allows force tailoring without the removal of assigned forces or headquarters from divisions, as occurs today, which often leaves a division incapable of executing any other operational missions. He further believes that this organization is more capable of rapidly executing operations based on Joint Intelligence, due to elimination of a redundant echelon of command, the division headquarters. Macgregor also argues that this reorganization is inherently more prepared for commitment, as it better facilitates a tiered rotating readiness system. In the readiness systems presented by Macgregor, the combat groups rotate through three six month long operational readiness cycles in peacetime, enabling 1/3 of the combat groups in the Continental United States (CONUS) to be available for worldwide deployment at any time.

Macgregor also recommends changes to other aspects of the force. He proposes minor adjustments in current overseas stationing plans, specifically reducing the quantity of forces in Europe and Korea and increasing the quantity of forces permanently stationed in the Middle East. Macgregor argues that these minor stationing changes would actually increase the overall amount of contingency forces that are available for commitment to wartime theaters. He argues that doctrine must also evolve along with organizational changes and the incorporation of new technology and that training needs to become more challenging and dynamic.

Macgregor concludes that changes are needed throughout the US defense establishment, especially eliminating redundant service capabilities and unjustified new weapons systems. He stresses the importance of revolutionary changes needed in the American Army, explaining that in order to deter future aggression where the strategic stakes justify the risks, the US must be willing and able to respond to vigorously with American
landpower.36 However, he notes, “attempts to graft large-scale technological change onto old thinking and old structures can only be a temporary expedient; new capabilities demand their own organizations and operational culture.” 37

Macgregor’s book inspired immediate and vigorous response from many critics. The most common argument challenged the elimination of the division echelon of command, citing the creation of potential span of control problems. One critic stressed the low probability of getting support for this recommendation “from senior leaders who are well aware of the division’s proven flexibility and staying power.” 38 As anticipated, there are many critics who focus on the unpopularity of specific changes that Macgregor recommends for their military service or Army Branch, but all concurred with the need to think innovatively both on the battlefield and in the redesign of the Army.

Despite these criticisms, there are many attractive features to Macgregor’s proposals. His small, self-contained combat groups possess great inherent responsiveness and deployability, especially in comparison to current heavy divisions. The all-arms nature of these organizations enhances their agility and versatility, and the modularity of their design provides even greater versatility to the JTF Commander, who can construct a landpower organization based on a menu of available groups. The Combat Groups provide varying lethality, allowing force selection commensurate with potential threat. Survivability and sustainability of these organizations is inherent in their self-contained, self-supporting design.

GRANGE’S AIR-MECH-STRIKE FORCE

Another alternative force design is offered in Air-Mech-Strike Force, co-authored in 2000 by retired Brigadier General David Grange and a team of retired, active duty, and reserve component soldiers.39 This proposal recommends the conversion of the Army’s divisions into new organizations that are more strategically deployable and tactically mobile than current Army forces. Organizational redesign and the incorporation of light mechanized equipment and commercial all-terrain vehicles provide increased strategic and tactical mobility. According to the authors, the Air-Mech-Strike concept, “provides a flexible, land combat force with the capability of air, mechanized, and dismounted maneuver to achieve decisive action through positional advantage regardless of open or restricted terrain.” 40

The key component of this concept is the fielding of medium-weight tracked infantry carriers (modified M113 Armored Personnel Carriers – nicknamed Gavin Fighting Vehicles [GFWs] by the authors), the M8 Armored Gun System (AGS), lightweight tracked reconnaissance vehicles (modified 4 ton German Wiesel vehicles – nicknamed Ridgway
Fighting Vehicles [RFVs] by the authors), and commercial All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs). The key feature of the GFV is its ability to be transported by CH47F Medium Lift Helicopters. The RFVs and ATVs are transportable on commercial cargo aircraft, US Air Force strategic and tactical transport aircraft, and US Army CH47 and UH60 helicopters.\footnote{41}

Under the Air-Mech–Strike concept, all heavy brigades would consist of an RFV and ATV-equipped reconnaissance troop, a GFV mechanized infantry battalion, an M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) mechanized infantry battalion, and an M1 Abrams tank battalion. This combination of organizations would allow 3-dimensional maneuver within a brigade combat team, while retaining a significant direct fire decisive combat capability. Light brigades would improve their tactical mobility by converting one infantry battalion per brigade to a GFV mechanized infantry battalion organization and equipping the remaining two infantry battalions with RFVs and ATVs.

The vigorous exploitation of the restructured force's third dimension of maneuver, the rapid air movement of light mechanized forces, is the key element of the Air-Mech–Strike operational concept. This new capability to strike enemy forces at unexpected times and locations and conduct simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of the battlefield facilitates the rapid and decisive defeat of the enemy.\footnote{42} By converting all active Army forces in accordance with this concept, every type of Army division would be fully capable of executing the Air-Mech–Strike operational concept. In this design, the most significant enhancements occur in the Army’s light, airborne and air assault divisions due to significant increases in their tactical mobility, survivability, and lethality.

While the conversion of the Army to the Air-Mech–Strike design would theoretically improve Army strategic responsiveness, at least in terms of its strategic deployability, the operational impact of conversion is currently unknown. An Army converted to the design presented in Air-Mech–Strike appears to be more agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than its predecessor. However, the operational concept of three-dimensional warfare presented in Air-Mech–Strike is currently unproven and the logic of immediately changing the organization of the entire army based on an unproven operational concept without significant analytical study is questionable. Improving the tactical mobility of light infantry units through the acquisition of light mechanized vehicles and ATVs does deserve study and hands-on experimentation. In addition, analysis and experimentation with the Air-Mech–Strike operational concepts may provide significant insights into concepts applicable to the Objective Force and could help define required capabilities for the Future Combat System.
CURRENT ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ARMY STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

The U.S. Army, under General Shinseki’s leadership, is already taking steps to improve its current strategic responsiveness. The formation of the first redesigned Brigade Combat Teams at Ft Lewis, Washington, development of the organizational design and operational concept for the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the selection of an Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) for procurement are important internal measures to improve Army strategic responsiveness. Recognizing the complexity of the change process, the Army developed and implemented a Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP), a methodology for managing the thirty yearlong change process. The successful initiation of this change process is illustrated by two actions that are already helping to improve strategic readiness of the entire force: the CSA’s unit manning initiatives and the development of a consolidated unit operational rotation plan.

THE CSA’S UNIT MANNING INITIATIVE

The CSA’s unit manning initiative, announced in November 1999, improves the manning of the Army’s primary war-fighting organizations: its active duty divisions and armored cavalry regiments. Unlike traditional tiered manning schemes, where only a selected set of high priority units where fully manned, the CSA directed the manning of all active duty divisions and armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) at 100% of their authorized grades and skill levels. Achieving this objective will occur in several phases. During Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the Army goal was to fill the 10 active component divisions and the ACRs to 100% of their aggregate personnel authorizations. The next step, targeted for second quarter FY 2001, is to fill the active divisions and ACRs to 100% of authorizations by skill within three grade bands: E1-E4 (junior enlisted soldiers), E5-E6 (junior noncommissioned officers), and E7-E9 (senior noncommissioned officers). This simple directive significantly improves the responsiveness of all divisions and ACRs by ensuring that they have adequate personnel to accomplish their peacetime and wartime tasks. This initiative is painful to both the institutional army and corps-level and higher units, who have suffered reduced manning as the divisions and ACRs have been fully filled. Continued implementation of the manning initiative will focus on improved manning of other critical units, such as corps-level field artillery and logistics support units.43

IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONSOLIDATED OPERATIONAL ROTATION PLAN

The development of a consolidated operational rotation plan has also had significant positive impact on the strategic responsiveness of the force, as it provides greater predictability
and shares the burden of standing operational requirements throughout service components. The plan includes existing operational rotations through June 2005. It identifies specific divisions and corps responsible for providing units and headquarters for unit rotations to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, the Multinational Observer Force (MFO) in the Sinai, and Operation “Intrinsic Action” in Southwest Asia. The SFOR rotation, in particular, is unique in the direct incorporation of National Guard units and headquarters. The implementation of this plan facilitates improved strategic responsiveness by providing advance notice of these deployments to units, thus improving unit stability and supporting focused training. This plan also establishes a precedent for expanded use of National Guard units to perform other standing operational requirements, thus freeing up active duty units for other missions. This plan does not account for any new operational rotation requirements – a revision would be required if any new requirements for operational force deployments develop.

USAREUR’S IMMEDIATE READY FORCE

A final initiative that has directly improved strategic responsiveness of the force is the creation of additional rapid-response capabilities such as USAREUR’s Immediate Ready Force (IRF). This force is a battalion-size force consisting of a heavy company team with “Abrams” tanks and “Bradley” Fighting Vehicles, a medium-weight mechanized infantry company with M113A3 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and scout, engineer, military police and communication platoons, designed for deployment in 24 to 48 hours from notification. The responsibility for providing the IRF rotates every six months between USAREUR’s four heavy maneuver brigades. The force is tailored, based on the mission, and thus provides the USAREUR Commander with a range of force options in a quick-reaction scenario. The most likely employment of the IRF is in conjunction with commitment of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), an Italy-based U.S. airborne infantry brigade combat team. The inclusion of a non-standard M113A3 APC-equipped mechanized infantry company leverages the in-theater availability of US Air Force Europe (USAFE) C-130 tactical airlift aircraft, and creates a unique medium-weight U.S. mechanized capability in Europe. Deployment of the IRF’s heavy team would require allocation of CONUS-based US Air Force C-17 or C5A strategic airlift aircraft due the weight of its “Abrams” tanks and “Bradley” fighting vehicles.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS

Although the Army has already made a decision on which path it will follow for transformation, alternative and more radical transformation designs like Macgregor’s Phalanx and the Air-Mech Strike Concept include features that could improve the Army’s current and future readiness. Features that should be studied for inclusion in the Army plan for transformation include an Army-wide rotating unit readiness system, increased use of Reserve Component units for existing long-term operational requirements, adjustments in unit stationing, and tactical mobility enhancements for light forces.

AN ARMY-WIDE ROTATING UNIT READINESS SYSTEM

As discussed earlier in this paper, the execution of a centralized Army operational deployment plan has positive impact on the Army’s strategic responsiveness, as it reduces Active Army unit commitments and provides increased training schedule predictability, directly improving unit stability and training. The continued use of this method of centralized scheduling of operational deployments, in coordination with a centrally managed rotating unit readiness system as discussed by Macgregor, could have even greater impact by improving overall strategic responsiveness of the force.

An Army-wide rotational unit readiness plan using existing active duty organizations parallels rotational readiness systems currently utilized by every other branch of military service. Macgregor bases his rotational plan on his Combat Groups. A similar rotating readiness plan for the US Army today would have to be based on divisions, since current U.S. Army brigades are neither self-contained nor self-supporting organizations. Analysis of the forces in today’s Army shows that the Active Army has a total of 35 light Infantry or heavy brigade-size units, 10 division headquarters, and 4 corps headquarters. Six of these brigades are not available because of other commitments, such as general strategic commitments (the 75th Infantry Regiment – the Ranger Regiment), ceremonial duty (the 3rd Infantry Regiment – the Old Guard), operational missions in Korea (1 heavy brigade and 1 light brigade), and ongoing IBCT conversions at Ft Lewis (1 heavy brigade and 1 light brigade). Similarly, 1 division headquarters (the 2d Infantry Division) is unavailable due to operational missions in Korea and 1 corps headquarters (I Corps) is unavailable due to reduced Active Component manning authorizations. This leaves a total of 29 brigades (15 heavy brigades, 12 light brigades, 1 ACR, and 1 light ACR), 9 division headquarters (5 heavy divisions and 4 light divisions) and 3 corps headquarters available for incorporation in the rotating force readiness system.
Macgregor proposes an 18 month long readiness cycle, starting with a 6 month long training cycle, followed by a 6 month ready cycle, followed by a six month long reconstitution cycle. During the training cycle, units would conduct collective training, to include a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, while higher headquarters would conduct a simulation exercise, all in direct preparation for transition to the highest readiness cycle, the ready cycle. During this cycle units would maintain their individual and collective training proficiency and serve as the Army’s primary designated crisis response forces. After 6 months of duty on the ready cycle, units would then move to the reconstitution cycle, where they conduct individual replacement, education, leave, changes of command, and other necessary actions prior to starting the training cycle once again.

This model of rotating readiness can be applied to the pool of available units in several different fashions. Based on the available number of units, the Army could have a corps headquarters, 3 division headquarters, and a combination of 9 light infantry and heavy brigades in each cycle. The simplest rotational system is to use existing unit assignments and corps structures as much as possible (see TABLE 1). For example, if III Corps is the training cycle corps headquarters, it could be combined with the 4th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 25th Infantry Division headquarters and combat brigades from all three divisions, augmented with brigades from the 101st Air Assault and 82d Airborne Divisions. Similarly, if USEUR’s V Corps is the ready cycle corps headquarters, the ready corps could consist of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1st Armored Division, and 10th Mountain Division headquarters and the combat brigades currently assigned to the divisions, along with the 187th Airborne Brigade, which provides a forced entry capability. Forces in the reconstitution cycle are the XVIIIth Airborne Corps Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 82d Airborne and 101st Air Assault division headquarters, heavy brigades from the 3d and 4th Infantry Divisions (Mechanized), the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and light brigades from the 82d Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions. The biggest problems with this model are that it maximizes the demand for local training resources in a narrow band in time and it rigidly perpetuates current relationships without using the potential capabilities of a broad pool of available units.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Cycle</th>
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<th>Reconstitution Cycle</th>
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<td>187th Abn</td>
<td>2/101 AA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: This leaves 2 Brigades unassigned plus 2 converting to IBCT

**TABLE 1. READINESS CYCLES WITH TRADITIONAL UNIT ALIGNMENTS**

An alternative example of unit readiness rotations spreads brigades in a division across the various readiness cycles, thus minimizing competition for training resources and supporting training priority rotation schemes already followed internally in most divisions, at least in divisions stationed in the U.S. (see TABLE 2). While this rotational readiness scheme is more theoretically efficient than one based on more traditional unit relationships, with respect to utilization of available training resources, the complexity of command and control and support relationships limits its current utility. This type of readiness scheme could only work if brigades were re-structured to be more independent, self-contained organizations, and if division and corps headquarters were re-structured and re-equipped to be more generic in capability. This alternative provides enhanced efficiency, as well as the benefits of the improved unit and headquarters self-sufficiency and modularity -- advantages that should be considered in future transformation of the force – especially with respect to improving the strategic responsiveness of the Legacy Force over the next thirty years.
<table>
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<td>2/10th Mtn</td>
<td>1/10th Mtn</td>
<td>3/10th MD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This leaves 2 Brigades unassigned plus 2 converting to IBCT

TABLE 2. READINESS CYCLES WITH NONTRADITIONAL UNIT ALIGNMENTS

IMPROVING LIGHT FORCE TACTICAL MOBILITY

Macgregor and Grange also address actions to improve tactical mobility of light forces. In Macgregor’s model, light forces are multipurpose forces, capable of airborne or air assault forced entry. Once committed, Macgregor sees Army helicopters as the primary provider of light unit tactical mobility. The Air-Mech-Strike concept improves light unit tactical mobility by fielding additional light mechanized and wheeled vehicles to all light infantry units. While light units selected for conversion to the IBCT design will have increased tactical mobility due to fielding of the IAV, unconverted Legacy Force light infantry units do not receive any enhancements to their tactical mobility, in the current plan. This deficiency creates a fertile area for further study and experimentation; the Air-Mech-Strike concept proposes several methods for improving light infantry tactical mobility that should be examined for improving the strategic responsiveness of light infantry units in the Legacy Force.

INCREASED UTILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS

Both Macgregor and Grange note that conversion of the reserve component is a much more complex issue than conversion of active duty units, for a variety of political and operational reasons. The increased use of reserve component units to perform long-term operational deployment requirements could further reduce the burden on already over-taxed active
component units, and offers many direct and indirect benefits to the reserve component. By performing long-notice operational missions, reserve component units demonstrate their continued ability to contribute to the maintenance of national defense. Performing these types of deployments, which feature adequate time for member notification and individual and unit preparation, demonstrates the strengths of the reserve component with minimal degradation to mission performance, as already illustrated by the Texas National Guard’s 49th Armored Division’s recent SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Increased use of reserve component units to perform other long-term operational requirements, to include KFOR and MFO missions, further reduces active duty unit operational deployment requirements and allows active duty units to focus on training and preparation for no-notice deployments, thus improving Active Army strategic responsiveness.

ADJUSTING UNIT STATIONING

Minor stationing adjustments could also contribute to improved strategic responsiveness. While further reductions in the strength of the Army components in Europe and Korea may be difficult, due to treaty obligations, this option could increase the quantity of available contingency forces in CONUS. Furthermore, the permanent stationing of a heavy brigade-size force in the Middle East, as recommended by Macgregor, has great strategic utility. A permanent force would provide an increased deterrent effect, due to its increased combat power in comparison to the current rotating force. In addition, the removal of the “intrinsic Action” unit operational deployment requirement would eliminate the turbulence created by the current rotation cycle. Conversion of at least one Europe-based heavy brigade to the IAV-equipped IBCT design should also be considered, as a forward-stationed IBCT is then immediately available for use in and around the European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility, further reducing strategic airlift requirements.

IBCT CONVERSION DECISIONS

The Army should also consider creating a floating prepositioned set of IBCT equipment. While it is difficult to predict where a crisis will occur and the Army cannot afford multiple sets of IBCT equipment scattered around the world, the creation of even a single floating IBCT equipment set could improve overall force strategic responsiveness. The proactive deployment of the floating set to a likely area of conflict would in itself be a signal of possible US intentions, while it would also facilitate rapid deployment of an IBCT with reduced dependence on strategic airlift. The greatest value of a floating IBCT, however, would be in a situation where deployment
of multiple brigades is required. In a future Balkan crisis, for example, the combination of a self-deploying Europe-based IBCT, a floating IBCT set linked with personnel flown in by commercial aircraft, coupled with deployment of a third IBCT by USAF strategic airlift, would enable the rapid arrival and commitment of a division-size force, perhaps even within the CSA's 120 hour division deployment goal.

Consideration of the issues of eventual IBCT stationing, prepositioned equipment, and the role of Reserve Components has direct impact on IBCT fielding/conversion decisions. A conversion and stationing recommendation, based on incorporation of the issues and recommendations previously discussed, is in TABLE 3.

| IBCT #1: Heavy Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA |
| IBCT #2: Light Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA |
| IBCT #3: Light Brigade, Fort Drum, NY |
| IBCT #4: Heavy Brigade, Europe |
| IBCT #5: Pre-positioned equipment set, floating |
| IBCT #6: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk (if funded) |
| IBCT #7: Light Brigade, Fort Drum, NY (if funded) |
| IBCT #8: Air Assault Brigade, Fort Campbell, KY or pre-positioned equipment set, floating (if funded) |

**TABLE 3. PROPOSED IBCT CONVERSIONS AND LOCATIONS**

The first two IBCT conversions reflect the ongoing conversion of two brigades at Fort Lewis. This paper does not recommend any changes to these conversions, due to the adverse impact that any change in the current conversion of these units would have on overall momentum of Army transformation. The selection of an East Coast-based brigade for the third converting brigade results in a pool of three CONUS-based IBCTs, which facilitates a rotational readiness plan incorporating the three IBCTs and utilizes strategic deployment platforms on both coasts of the United States. Creation of the fourth IBCT from a European-based brigade creates an improved capability for strategic responsiveness within this theater, supporting the constant availability of an IAV-equipped battalion-size Immediate Ready Force in Europe. Use of the fifth set of IBCT equipment to create an floating IBCT set of pre-positioned equipment provides a capability to preposition equipment in the proximity of a likely theater of employment,
provides the National Command Authority with the flexibility of an additional tool for deterrence, and supports rapid strategic deployment of forces by a variety of strategic deployment means.

If congressional funding supports the conversion of additional IBCTs, conversion of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to an IBCT-like structure provides additional flexibility, due to its ability to execute economy-of-force missions and the inherent self-supportability of its component Armored Cavalry Squadrons. Conversion of an additional brigade at Ft Drum would create the first division composed of IBCTs, providing an ideal opportunity for experimentation with this type of organization, as well as further expanding the readiness pool of available CONUS-based IBCTs. Selecting an air assault brigade from the 101st Air Assault Division at Fort Campbell, KY for the next conversion supports experimentation within a different type of division (air assault) and further expands the IBCT readiness pool. As an alternative for the final set, creation of an additional floating IBCT set of equipment IBCT would allow the positioning of floating IBCT sets of equipment in two potential areas of conflict, or if the situation demands, staging of two floating IBCT sets in a single potential area of conflict, further improving strategic responsiveness of the force.

This recommendation does not include the conversion of any reserve component brigades to the IBCT structure, as this would not appreciably improve Army strategic responsiveness unless accompanying fundamental changes occur in the roles and readiness of reserve component forces. Until the deployment readiness of a converted reserve component brigade can be changed to match that of any active component IBCT in pool of available brigades, diversion of IBCT equipment to the reserve component does little to improve overall Army strategic responsiveness. Reserve component units would be better used during Army Transformation to perform long lead-time operational requirements such as SFOR and KFOR rotations and to provide temporary augmentation when Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)- apportioned forces are unavailable due to ongoing conversion to the IBCT design.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Army's transformation process has the potential to quickly correct short-term deficiencies and will fundamentally change the Army in the long term. This process, initiated by General Shinseki and guided by the TCP, must be a dynamic process, reflecting funding realities, experimental results, and ongoing lessons-learned. In addition, the process must truly address all components of the Army, in order to ensure that improvements in overall strategic responsiveness occur throughout the service, not just the Interim Force or the Active Component. Although not addressed in this paper, evolving training and doctrinal issues
caused by Army transformation are not trivial. The Army will have to wrestle with the employment of various combinations of forces and changing conflict scenarios, and these issues must also be considered in the transformation process.

As this paper has shown, there are many options that the Army should consider in order to improve its internal strategic responsiveness. While the exact plan selected for transformation is not as radical as some alternatives, such as Macgregor's Phalanx and Grange's Air-Mech-Strike concepts, the Army TCP does allow the Army to move forward with a process that will simultaneously fix short-term strategic responsiveness deficiencies and lead to better determination of how the Army will fight in the future. The selected path also appears to have sufficient flexibility to allow incorporation of selected components from alternate transformation proposals, if these components provide significant improvement to strategic responsiveness. For example, a rotational readiness scheme that incorporates centralized management of operational requirements and increased utilization of the Reserve Components offers the potential to improve strategic readiness of the entire force. Decisions about IBCT conversion and the creation of a floating IBCT equipment set could also have direct positive impact on force readiness. Regardless of which direction these decisions go, execution of Army Transformation is a necessity; accomplishment of any step of the process - even the creation of only a single IBCT - will significantly improve the Army's current strategic responsiveness.

WORD COUNT = 7933
ENDNOTES


2 U.S. Army, Transformation Campaign Plan (Pre-decisional Final Coordination Draft), 27 October 2000.

3 By 1997, both mechanized units utilized in this operation no longer existed. The M551A1 battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor (Airborne), was deactivated due to cancellation of procurement of the Armored Gun System (AGS), the designated replacement vehicle for the obsolete M551A1, and the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Polk was relocated to Ft Hood, Texas and converted to an M1 tank and M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle organization.

4 Elements of the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor (Airborne), were deployed to Haiti in 1995 for thirty days in order to provide additional direct firepower to the U.S. Army force there and to enhance security of selected facilities.


6 Transformation Campaign Plan.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Myers.


16 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Operations*, ST 3-0 (Ft Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 October 2000), 3-2. This document is the current draft version of the replacement for Army FM 100-5, *Operations*.

17 Ibid., 3-3.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 3-4.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 3-5.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid., 52.

26 Ibid., 53. The Heavy Combat Group is designed to conduct decisive offensive and defensive maneuver operations and consists of a reconnaissance squadron, three balanced combined arms battalions, an indirect fire battalion, a command/control/communications/computers/intelligence (C4I) battalion and a group support battalion.

The Airborne-Air Assault Group is designed to be air-delivered in order to conduct forced entry operations, close and deep economy of force operations in support of decisive operations, contingency operations, and operations other than war as needed. In order to conduct its forced entry and deep economy of force operations, the Airborne-Air Assault Group consists of three airborne-air assault infantry battalions, an air attack squadron, three helicopter assault battalions, an indirect fire battalion, a C4I battalion, and a group support battalion.

The Heavy Recon-Strike Group is designed to conduct close and deep economy of force maneuver operations in support of the Joint Task Force (JTF) mission and security missions (guard, screen, cover) to protect the JTF. The Heavy Recon-Strike Group is assigned three heavy reconnaissance squadrons, an air attack squadron, an indirect fire battalion, a group support squadron, and a C4I squadron.

The Light Recon-Strike Group is designed to be air-deliverable and conducts close and deep economy of force maneuver operations, forced entry operations, contingency operations, and OOTW as needed. The Light Recon-Strike Group is equipped with three light reconnaissance squadrons, an air attack squadron, a combat engineer mobility battalion, a group support squadron, and a C4I squadron.

27 Ibid., 75-82.

28 Ibid., 82-83.
39 Ibid., 84.
30 Ibid., 85.
31 Ibid., 85.
32 Ibid., 152.
33 Ibid., 155.
34 Ibid., 143, 165.
35 Ibid., 212-213. Macgregor believes that the U.S. Army’s “Crusader” artillery system, the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 E/F aircraft, the US Air Force’s F-22 aircraft, the U.S. Marine Corps’ V-22 “Osprey” aircraft, and its Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle should all be either reduced or cancelled.
36 Ibid., 226.
37 Ibid., 227.


40 Ibid., 19-20.
41 Ibid., 31.
42 Ibid., 27-28.


46 Examples are the U.S. Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Wing concept, U.S. Navy carrier battle group and submarine deployment scheduling, and U.S. Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment rotations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


