
BY

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 February 20001 PAGES: 35 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS

This Strategy Research Project (SRP) proposes a concept to merge both the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and the United States Army Cadet Command into one accessions organization. For the past five years both USAREC and Cadet Command have found greater difficulty in achieving their annual missions. USAREC, except for FY 00, has missed its recruiting mission for five years straight and Cadet Command failed in its commissioning mission this past year. Now with the establishment of a formal 'partnership' between USAREC and Cadet Command and with recruiters sharing office space with ROTC cadre on college campuses, its appropriate to ask the question-why two commands? Could the redundancy and inefficiency of these two organizations actually be impeding on their ability to recruit? Are there too many 'hand-shake' agreements/partnerships? Perhaps there needs to be a formal command structure that provides command and control by a higher headquarters that is responsible for both missions-officer and enlisted recruiting. How much money and resources could be conserved by sharing these efforts? Could redundancies in staffs cause the reduction in resources if commands and staffs were merged? In a time when the Army is geared towards Transformation and looking at ways to move resources from the institutional army to the warfighting commands—to put troops back in the foxholes—eliminating redundancy and inefficiency in institutional Army organizations like USAREC and Cadet Command make sense. This reorganization is more than a new organization. It proposes a whole new way of doing business--'a new philosophy.' With this concept of total Army recruiting, all green-suitors participating in the recruiting effort, 'one recruiting' organization will be able to systematically penetrate a 'lost market segment' of high quality young people. The lack of rigor which is associated with informal relationships, partnerships, MOUs, etc, that are the methods of today, don't resolve the 'lost segment' problem. An organization that is bound by lines and staff, not 'partnerships', is accountable. At the top, staffs can be merged, reorganized and excess personnel eliminated. Under the concept of one Army Accessions Command (ACC), combined brigades consisting of recruiting and ROTC battalions, would be responsible for the combined mission. The brigade commander will be able to 'weight the fight' to meet mission requirements. This thesis proposes a concept to reengineer Army recruiting by merging USAREC and Cadet Command. The new organization, The Army Accessions Command, establishes an organizational structure that by design and philosophy will penetrate the entire recruiting market for enlisted and officer requirements. Manned by existing personnel and no additional resources, this merger reduces personnel and eliminates redundancy. With it comes a total Army recruiting program that will reduce the marketing void—that 'lost segment'—and put in place systems and procedures that make sense and ensures that the Army meets it's accession staffing requirements throughout this new millennium.
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This Strategy Research Project (SRP) proposes a concept to merge both the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and the United States Army Cadet Command into one recruiting organization. In June 1999, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Erik K. Shinseki, stated, “Manning the force is an urgent priority. We will work to connect America in such a manner that the youth of this country find service in the Army as important, meaningful, rewarding and productive.” It is for this very important reason that I have selected this project, a proposal to improve recruiting conditions through a new organizational framework for the Army to recruit.

The thesis is not reflective of someone on the outside looking in, but by an insider. As the author, I bring with me credible experience serving in a variety of capacities both in USAREC and Cadet Command. As a young PFC in 1974, I served for ninety days as a hometown recruiter. In the early 1980s I commanded two recruiting companies and served as a brigade training officer. During 1997-99 I commanded the Mid-Atlantic Recruiting battalion, and last year (1999-2000), I served as Professor of Military Science at West Virginia State College prior to attending the United States Army War College this year. There are few senior officers that share both the USAREC and Cadet Command experience and, therefore, very few senior leaders that understand the organizations, the recruiting dynamic and the complexity of leadership in both these atypical Army organizations.

For years the Army enjoyed recruiting success, both officer and enlisted, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The difficulty in achieving the enlisted recruiting mission actually began in the mid-1990s and although USAREC made it’s 1999-2000 mission, it was an extremely difficult task. Officer recruiting, as well, is now having difficulty in making their commissioning mission. Having served in USAREC as enlisted, and at the company and field grade officer-level at three different periods spanned across three decades, I can attest, with some legitimacy, that recruiting was never easy. I enjoyed relative success at each level, but have always believed that there must be a better (smarter) way to do business. ROTC, which has been a relatively low intensity environment in the past, now missed its mission for the first time in recent history.

Taking my experiences from both USAREC and Cadet Command, and by tying-in relevant, research data and information provided by ODSCPERS, TRADOC, Cadet Command, USAREC and OCAR, I have been able to articulate a proposal to reorganize the Army’s accession organizations under one flag that will be able to accomplish its recruiting mission for
officers and enlisted soldiers with less resources and more efficiency.

BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Cold War the Army began its effort to downsize from its end strength at the time of 780,000 soldiers to its current numbers of 480,000. Other than during the Gulf War where the Army delayed the draw down for approximately 1 year, the overall end strength has been reduced on a downward glide path from 1989 through the late 1990s. After the Gulf War and on the heals of Operation Provide Comfort in Somalia, the Army began realizing difficulty in meeting it’s enlisted recruiting mission requirements. With further reductions in force structure requirements after ODS, manpower requirements and accessions generally continued downward in both the active and reserve forces. As strength levels neared the reduced programmed end states, the manpower requirements leveled off. During this period, however, recruiting missions actually had to increase to sustain overall steady state-strength levels. Following this period of decline, various efforts were made to recapture the recruiting vigor of the 1980s, to include the restructuring and reallocation of recruiting assets. A National Defense Authorization Action Review published in May 00 stated that the draw down reduced recruiting resources (recruiters, advertising, offices, R&D, etc.) which were a result of rapid, difficult decisions by Congress. Adding resources in 1997 helped the recruiting effort, but was not enough to bring about the turn-around necessary to make the accession mission. The reduction in office space and revision of recruiter incentives exasperated what was already a difficult situation. Productivity by recruiters in 1997 dropped by 33%.

In fact, for the first time since the early 1970s when President Nixon decided to end the draft and implement the All Volunteer Army, and subsequently in the early 1980s when General Max Thurman revitalized USAREC with “Be all you can be,” the Army missed its FY 1996, 97, 98, 99 missions of approximately 50-80,000 per year. In 1999, this failure exceeded 10,500 soldiers (23%) of the total yearly mission. Some of the difficulty is attributed to the high mission, its catalyst being high attrition, which nearly caused the doubling in the recruiting mission. Perhaps the Army downsized too much. During this period the lack of production by recruiters was masked. MG Mark Hamilton, CG USAREC, stated in 1998, “In effect, PERSCOM wrote us a blank check for 30,000 soldiers per year for the last 10 years as we have drawn down. Now we’re out of checks.” In 1999-2000 USAREC made its annual mission, however, it required an inordinate amount of resources, most importantly the augmentation of corporals from Army war fighting units, many who were already severely taxed with requirements in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. USAREC also increased financial incentives (bonuses, Army College Fund, College Loan Repayment) that doubled those previously offered.
in prior years. Accessions consume about $1 billion (+) and 15,000 personnel a year.\textsuperscript{10} This is not a bad thing; it just took the whole Army's participation and twice the resources to get the job done.

Dennis Reimer, former Army Chief of Staff, viewed those problems as tomorrow's operational readiness issues.\textsuperscript{11} He stated, "We reached a point (in 1997) where squads could not function because...of shortages."\textsuperscript{12} By FY 98 USAREC was not only short on filling combat arms jobs which has always been a challenge, but was beginning to fail to recruit adequate numbers for some of the most sought after jobs as well.\textsuperscript{13}

There are many reasons for USAREC's failure during most of the 1990s. A robust economy where unemployment dipped below 4.3%, coupled with low inflation and strong competition from industry were strong factors. DOD estimated a 13% pay gap. Military retirement was reduced from 50% to 40% at twenty years, and the introduction of TRICARE with its myriad of problems, all were factors that were highly detrimental to the recruiting effort.\textsuperscript{14}

On the other hand, Cadet Command has enjoyed a history of recruiting prosperity during the same period. Army ROTC has not failed to achieve it's commissioning numbers during this entire period--until 1998-99. This past year ROTC missed mission by 700 Lieutenants. In 1999, MG Wallace, the CG of Cadet Command, made a statement at a Region Commander's Conference that he "would never fire a PMS for numbers."\textsuperscript{15} Basically, in the past, more productive ROTC battalions covered the shortfalls of the less productive ones. Cadet Command has been in good stead--until 1998-99. ROTC is expected to commission 75% of all the Army's lieutenants, however, in FY 2000, the command actually commissioned less that 60%\textsuperscript{16}.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{figure1.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{FIGURE 1 – CADET COMMAND PRODUCTION}
Today both USAREC and Cadet Command are severely challenged in their recruiting mission endeavors. It's tough business with a lot of obstacles. The prime market, 17-25 year olds--generation Xers and net-generation-ers, is an obstacle in itself. From a marketing perspective, what worked in the past doesn't work anymore. The formula on how to recruit, what programs the Army offers and how it advertises to this prime market, and their parents, has not been successfully developed.

The booming economy and the prosperity that most of us enjoy; what we have prayed, dreamed of and work most of our lives for, also serves as a detriment to productive recruiting, particularly to this market segment. Jobs are abundant and available, kids are reluctant to leave the nest and parents are protective. ‘Influencer’ veterans are declining and aging, and officers and NCOs currently on active duty are generally unwilling (40-80%) to recommend military life. Also, the youth market is shifting significantly with 77-82% of the prime market attending 2 and 4-year colleges, and vo-techs. General values are shifting. There is simply no positive impetus for these generation Xers to leave home and join the Army.

This year the Chief of Staff of the Army made recruiting #1 on his Mission Essential Task List, emphasizing that “we will achieve our recruiting targets.” As with General Max Thurman in the early 1980s, the Army must reengineer recruiting, officer and enlisted; a new organization, a new philosophy, a new way of doing business.

THE RECRUITING ORGANIZATIONS

The Army recruits for officers and enlisted active component and USAR primarily by two organizations--USAREC and Cadet Command. During the past 25 years USAREC was directly subordinate to the ODCSPER, and Cadet Command to TRADOC. For two years only, FY 99 and 00, command and control over USAREC was shifted to the CG TRADOC. In October 2000 command and control of USAREC was returned to the ODCSPER.

USAREC, an organization commanded by a major general and headquartered at Ft. Knox, Kentucky, supervises the enlisted RA and USAR recruiting activities for the total Army. The command consists of five recruiting brigades, 41 recruiting battalions and 243 recruiting companies nationwide.
U.S. Army Recruiting Command - FY00

Mission:
Recruit with integrity high quality men and women to meet the accession requirements of America's Army.

FIGURE 2 – USAREC AORs
UNITED STATES ARMY RECRUITING COMMAND

FIGURE 3 – USAREC ORGANIZATION
This organization's headquarters is organized with a full compliment of primary and special staffs and conducts business somewhat like most hierarchical organizations (division and corps). It provides some of its own marketing expertise in-house and contracts-out the remaining marketing piece and all advertising. USAREC consists of over 6000 NCOs-recruiters, 1614 recruiting stations, and a supporting staff of 2040, all focused on selling the Army.  

20
Cadet Command, a less robust organization than USAREC, is also commanded by a major general and is headquartered at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. This command supervises the recruiting and training activities of three ROTC regions, nine ROTC brigades and 270 ROTC battalions nationwide. The ROTC battalions oversee cadet training at over 1000 partnership schools in addition to the 270. The Cadet Command staff, organized similarly to USAREC or any Army headquarters, also has marketing expertise and contracts some marketing and all advertising to the same firm as USAREC.

**Command Structure (FY 00)**

![Map showing the Command Structure of Cadet Command](image)

*Includes 17 CONUS

**FIGURE 4 – CADET COMMAND AORs**

Cadet Command claims its mission is “to commission the future officer leadership of the U.S. Army and motivate young people to be better citizens.” Its METL consists of: market, recruit, train, develop leaders, motivate, retain, access, commission, JROTC support. Unlike USAREC, Cadet Command does not have a professional sales force. Each ROTC battalion has a recruiting operations officer (ROO) who, with the assistance of the ROTC cadre, recruits for their program.
THE PARTNERSHIP

In 1998 USAREC announced it’s initiative to establish a partnership with Cadet Command. This initiative was to be consummated at the recruiting and ROTC battalion level. The partnership basically encouraged commanders from both USAREC and Cadet Command to share leads and work together towards accomplishment of both missions; “to leverage America by expanding the recruiting force.” The ‘partnership,’ per se, had no rigor. It was based on handshakes with no system in place to quantifiably measure success.

Also, during the same timeframe, USAREC placed significant emphasis on recruiting battalions, companies and stations to obtain college stop-out lists and directories. This effort strained relations between recruiting battalion commanders and PMSs, because most PMSs were already protective of the relationships that they had secured and fostered with their institutions, and were uncomfortable with USAREC’s campaign to attack the college market.

In 1999, with USAREC and Cadet Command both now subordinate to TRADOC, were directed to share leads information. A little more rigor was put into the partnership; however, success or failure was based primarily on individual relationships established between recruiters and ROTC, not by a formal ‘partnership.’ In most cases, recruiters continued to prospect the ‘old fashioned way,’ by telephone prospecting and high school visits, and not by using ROTC as their springboard on to the college campus. ROTC instructors tended to ‘stay-in-their-lane’ as
well. ROTC cadre normally supports recruiters on a case-by-case basis, but not as a program.

In January 2000, CG TRADOC directed that the PMSs obtain the stop-out lists for their colleges and universities, and provide them to their nearby, affiliated recruiting battalions. This set a wave of distain and commotion across Cadet Command that severely strained relations between ROTC Cadre and recruiters. Although PMSs were able to meet the CG TRADOC's requirement at 65% compliance, many felt that their positions as academic professionals were being compromised and positive relations on college campuses would be negatively effected.

Also, in spring 2000, USAREC and Cadet Command announced that approximately 140 recruiters would be assigned with duty on college campuses co-located with ROTC Cadre. This would provide USAREC recruiter coverage on about 1/2 of the ROTC main campuses. With this initiative, numerous issues developed that are currently being resolved, e.g., recruiter chain of command, recruiting rules, National Guard (NG) and USAREC interface, and generally speaking, how to make it work. Many ROTC battalions have great relationships with the NG. NG recruiting incentives (100% tuition in many states) make their programs a natural compliment to ROTC/SMP. RA recruiting can directly conflict with ROTC and USAR recruiting. Both RA and USAR processing are unusually more restrictive and less flexible that the NG, and therefore, less complimentary to ROTC. All of this adds to a negative dynamic on-campus that did not exist before.

'The Partnership' between USAREC and ROTC, which is underway today, has increased recruiter access to the college campus. TRADOC stated in the 2000-01 Accessions Campaign Plan intent statement that "this partnership is not just a taxonomy," at those institutions where PMSs and recruiting battalion commanders worked together to make this partnership work, USAREC has benefited greatly. Although not considered by USAREC when selecting campuses to employ recruiters, those colleges and universities with long-standing positive relations with ROTC, would have been the best candidates. Recruiters do pose some threat to academia, and elite schools are usually less receptive to having recruiters on campus. This could also negatively impact on ROTC recruiting as well.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL - TRADOC OR DCSPER**

In 1998, USAREC became subordinate to TRADOC. Previously, as now, USAREC was commanded and controlled by ODSPER. In 1998, when USAREC shifted to TRADOC, there was a good reason. In an effort to bring recruiting and initial training under the asperses of one organization, it made sense to have USAREC, Cadet Command and the training base under the same leadership—TRADOC. During this short two-year tenure common recruiting—training base issues were resolved. A shared ownership concerning the Army's recruits began to
evolve between both USAREC and the training base. Frequent visits by recruiting brigade and battalion commanders with entourages of educators occurred annually. Also, AIT organizations established partnerships with nearby recruiting battalions, which also facilitated an atmosphere of a shared mission between the recruiting and training base establishment. With this partnership training battalions provided SMEs for high school demonstrations, COI activities and for monthly DEP functions. In October 2000, USAREC was returned to the ODSPER.

THE 00-01 ACCESSIONS CAMPAIGN PLAN

Joint Pub 3.0 states that a campaign plan is a “series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives.” The TRADOC Accessions Campaign Plan “synchronizes efforts focused on accessing quality people to man the Army. The plan pursues innovative ways to bring the next generation of young men and women into the Army.”

The campaign plan is built around one primary and nine major thrust lines focused on a single end state--hitting the target--connecting with the American people.

The overarching concept for the campaign plan occurs when the right people and proper resources are applied to the appropriate area of the target, ensuring coverage of each of the rings. Basically, everything we do should contribute to the mission.

**Accessions Thrust Lines**

![Diagram of Accessions Thrust Lines]

**FIGURE 6 - ACCESSION THRUST LINES**
The Accessions Campaign Plan identifies the strategic tasks to be accomplished and the major players in the campaign.

### Accessions Campaign Plan

**Hitting the Target**

- **Opinion Leaders**
- **Political, Business & Education Leaders**
- **Centers of Influence**
  - Parents / Educators
- **Target Market**
  - High School Diploma Grads / College Students
- **Recruiters/APMS**
  - HRAP/ADSW
- **Recruiters/SQQ & NCOQ**
  - Bn & Co Leadership/PMS
- **Bde Commanders / CASA**
- **General Officers & CSIs**

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**Overarching Concept - transcends thrust lines**

**FIGURE 7 – HITTING THE TARGET**

The plan was published in late FY 00 prior to announcement that USAREC would return to ODCSPER on 2 October 00 for command and control, however, TRADOC would still be the executive agent for Army Accessions.

### THE PROBLEM

This past year OCAR conducted a review of reserve recruiting. In that document it aired some concerns. It stated that there is many problems associated with officer and enlisted recruiting today. The most crucial tenet of manning the force is the Army's recruiting effort. Robust economies, high competition, and a less sympathetic marketplace have created the most challenging recruiting market since the beginning of the all-volunteer force. The Army continues to experience difficulties and may continue to fail the recruiting mission.\(^{29}\)

The prosperous economic conditions in this country today combined with the challenges posed with the X-generation, our primary market, are not the only conditions impeding on the recruiting effort. Conditions today are not as they were in the early 1970s, post Viet Nam, Cold War, during establishment of the new all-volunteer Army. To re-tread Max Thurman’s ‘Be All You Can Be’ recruiting initiative one more time is not enough. For 25 years the Army has
recruited basically the same way. We've changed acronyms and renamed procedures, but basically, recruit as we always have.

Since 1997, USAREC has had four commanding generals. All have attempted to improve recruiting, primarily through two methods—more recruiters and more money. There are 1/3 more recruiters in USAREC today than just a few years ago, 50% more incentives than three years ago; and $20,000K more spent annually in advertising. More is not necessarily better and at the current trend, USAREC can't simply keep throwing more resources at the market hoping to meets its numbers. Also, what will happen if congress allows the Army to increase end strength to 530,000? How can USAREC increase its annual take by 50,000 when it is hardly making its mission now?

A 5 May 2000 OCAR memorandum titled “National Defense Authorization Action (Section 552) Review on Reserve Recruiting” states, “the Army created one of today's most recognized marketing slogans that packaged the idea of self actualization through the ‘be all you can be’ advertising campaign. However, what the Army has failed to do is create a perception that the Army has all the building blocks to acquire self-actualization through mechanisms that meet basic needs and encourage personal growth in today's marketplace. One of the problems for the Army is that their competitors have outpaced them by creating the same type of message. Competitors have been quick to assess market needs and have employed methods that maximize available dollars, options, choices, work locations and hours, flexibility, and independence. This has created intense competition for today’s Army.”

TRADOC's Accessions Campaign Plan, although well developed and thought-out, lacks rigor. Although somewhat imaginative and innovative, it's an Army campaign plan, not a Business Plan. It tasks numerous Army organizations to do things that are not those organizations' primary missions. The premise of this thesis is that 'rigor' must be put into the Army accessions business. One recruiting organization for Army Accessions (officer and enlisted) is a way to establish more accountability by the activities and organizations involved.

Cadet Command missed its commissioning mission by 700 during FY 00. There is no indication that conditions will improve using current cadet contracts and scholarship utilization data as indicators. Basically, Cadet Command is encumbered by the same marketing trends as USAREC and perhaps recruiting techniques and procedures that are no longer relevant. Cadet Command shares the same marketing and advertising firm as USAREC. ROTC in the past years has focused primarily on training, not recruiting. It’s time for that paradigm to change.
TWO COMMANDS - REDUNDANT AND INEFFICIENT

With the formal 'partnership' between USAREC and Cadet Command now consummated by an MOU, and with recruiters sharing office space with ROTC cadre on college campuses, it may be appropriate to ask the question--why two commands? Could the redundancy and inefficiency of these two organizations actually be impeding on their ability to recruit? Are there too many 'hand-shake' agreements/partnerships? Perhaps there needs to be a formal command structure that provides command and control by a higher headquarters that is responsible for both missions--officer and enlisted recruiting. Are we putting our eggs in too many baskets, e.g., market analysis, marketing, advertising and operations? How much money and resources could be conserved by sharing these efforts? Could redundancies in staffs cause the reduction in resources if commands and staffs were merged? In a time when the Army is geared towards Transformation and looking at ways to move resources from the institutional army to the warfighting commands--to put troops back in the foxholes--eliminating redundancy and inefficiency in institutional army organizations like USAREC and Cadet Command makes sense.

THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS

USAREC this past year increased its top bonus from $12,000 to $20,000. Coupled with a $50,000 Army College Fund or the $65,000 college loan repayment program, the Army can spend up to $85,000 per enlistment ($20K bonus + $65K college loan repayment=$85K), which does not account for processing and training. USAREC has also increased its advertising budget from $93,941K in 1997 to $122,601K this year. This reflects nearly a 1/3 increase in just four years. What will advertising cost in 2006?

Cadet Command spends nearly $70 million on scholarships annually with an attrition rate of about 50% of scholarship recipients. Attrition of these cadets costs the Army millions per year for they are never commissioned. The way that the Army recruits, both officer and enlisted, requires significant change. Not simply re-treading old procedures and generating more resources, but by serious, systematic, organizational change. The two charts below enrollment to contract and the actual retention of scholarship recipients.
Scholarship Retention

An analysis of average Retention Rates provide the following table (3-yr Composite)

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<th>%</th>
<th>Commissions</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>2910</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 9 – ROTC SCHOLARSHIP RETENTION
THE LOST SEGMENT - TWO COMPETING ORGANIZATIONS THAT INOCULATE A MARKETING VOID

Some say that USAREC and Cadet Command are recruiting in different markets. The USAREC recruiter recruits 17-23 year olds, primarily I-III A test category (top 50%) and college stop-outs. Until recently, the enlisted recruiters focused almost entirely on the high school market. Cadet Command, on the other hand, recruits the college bound (>900 SAT/19 ACT) student normally already attending college. ROTC also provides a centrally controlled 4-year scholarship that is primarily recruited through advertising not by the ROTC cadre on-campus. Over 1/2 of the ROTC cadets are recruited on-campus during their freshman and sophomore years.

In recent years these markets of interest by USAREC and ROTC recruiters have come together. Both USAREC and ROTC are recruiting for the same prospect--18-25 year old (+), I-III A, college-bound, high school grads and seniors. USAREC recruiters are now on-campus more than ever before and both USAREC and ROTC are working junior ROTC programs at the high schools. The problem is that their efforts are not coordinated and compete with each other. Leads and prospects fall-out that should be referred from either ROTC to the enlisted recruiter, or vice versus.

When recruiting, whether USAREC or ROTC, recruiters don't recruit for the total Army, just for what they get credit for. There's a lost segment of quality, propensed, young men and women that are recruited by one or the other (enlisted or ROTC), but not for both. The diagram depicted below graphically shows how this segment, normally high-grad, college students, is lost by both officer and enlisted recruiters. During the recruiting process there must be a seamless handoff ROTC--enlisted/enlisted--ROTC and also RA--USAR/USAR--RA. This is not currently occurring as a process. Approximately 37% of college freshman do not return for their sophomore year and 46% never complete college. By recruiting as a team, ROTC and enlisted recruiters can exploit this viable recruiting market. As one organization they can systematically identify who those students are, determine what are their specific reasons for leaving college, what are their interests or needs, and then sell them on that niche, whether it be with enlisted or officer programs. Both ROTC and enlisted recruiters have resources available to them (college student directories, college stop-out lists, lists of scholarship applicants not selected, etc.), which can assist officer and enlisted recruiting and reduce this 'lost market segment.'
CURRENTLY MARKET COVERAGE BY USAREC & ROTC DOES NOT OVERLAP. THAT VOID
REPRESENTS A 'LOST' MARKET SEGMENT.

FIGURE 10 – THE LOST MARKET SEGMENT

Merging USAREC and Cadet Command could establish a ‘one recruiting’ organization
that is able to systematically penetrate that ‘lost segment.’ The lack of rigor which is associated
with informal relationships, partnerships, MOUs, etc, that are the methods of today, don’t
resolve the ‘lost segment’ problem. An organization that is bound by lines and staff, not
‘partnerships’, is accountable. At the top, staffs can be merged, reorganized and excess
personnel eliminated. The critical command and control element where the functional
commands of officer and enlisted recruiting are merged will be at brigade. Currently USAREC
has five geographically dispersed brigades. Cadet Command has three regions and nine
brigades. All are commanded by colonels. Under the concept of one Army Accessions
Command (ACC), combined brigades consisting of recruiting and ROTC battalions, would be
responsible for the combined mission. Under this concept the brigade commander can ‘weight
the fight’ to meet mission requirements.

THE ANALYSIS

The concept of reengineering USAREC and Cadet Command is not necessarily novel.
There have been past studies and currently, TRADOC’s initiative, “Out-of-the-Box Total Force
Accessions Alternatives” where solutions to improve recruiting have been and are being
considered. Under the TRADOC umbrella vast initiatives have been implemented during FY 99
and 00 to share the recruiting effort throughout TRADOC (USAREC, Cadet Command, basic training and AIT installations and units) as well as Conus-based FORSCOM installations and units. This total Army team approach to recruiting, coupled with a drastic increase in resources in FY00 (recruiting incentives and advertising) has led USAREC to mission accomplishment for the first time in five years.

Reorganization of both commands under one flag, The Army Accessions Command, may establish a command structure that, by this organizational change, will naturally close the marketing void--'the lost segment,' which, was mentioned earlier. By establishing brigade-level command and control of both recruiting battalions and ROTC battalions within the same organization--the brigade, near-seamless coverage of that quality market by both enlisted and ROTC recruiters would be enhanced. Brigade commanders could 'weight the fight,' focusing on those crucial marketing shortfalls peculiar to their brigades.

The chart below shows how both enlisted and officer-recruiting programs can benefit from a systematic, shared approach to recruiting. Both enlisted recruiters and ROTC have various resources that, when shared, can benefit both programs.

Currently about ½ of the ROTC detachments are planned to have a USAREC recruiter permanently assigned on campus. This is a new initiative that was implemented this past year. Under this initiative, the rating chain of the recruiter consists of both ROTC and USAREC leaders.

**On-Campus Recruiter**

**Concept**
- Provide Office
- Part of the team (ie. PT, Labs, etc.)
- RA/USAR/ROTC/SMP mission

**Benefit**
- ROTC
  - Leads
  - ASVAB
  - LRL
  - COI
  - LEADS Card
  - Cadre support
  - Joint Exhibits
  - ARISS

- USAREC
  - Leads
  - Stop-out
  - ROTC Drop-out
  - OCS/WOFT (RA-only if already stop-out/drop-out)
  - Access to college events
  - Back up program to sell at Community Colleges “Credibility”
  - Use ROTC as COI

**FIGURE 11 – ON-CAMPUS RECRUITER**
The PMS actually has no enlisted mission and therefore, this rating system is unfair to the recruiter. Of course, in many cases, it will work due to sound relationships among some of the players—ROTC and USAREC. 

If both ROTC detachments and recruiting battalions were part of the same organization—hypothetically, with the AAC concept, ROTC detachments could be assigned with an enlisted, RA and USAR mission that would be accomplished by the enlisted recruiter (previously USAREC) and with the assistance of the entire ROTC cadre. This would work both ways. The enlisted recruiter would also assist ROTC by systematically referring logical prospects that are more propensed towards the ROTC program. In the past these referrals would usually never get to the ROO at the ROTC battalion. Also, USAR recruiting on campus would dovetail well with SMP recruiting. As a matter of practice, one USAR enlistment, in many cases, could be two contracts—USAR and SMP, both benefiting the same organization.

Currently USAREC battalions are encouraged to provide referrals to ROTC. Primarily due to the intensity of the USAREC mission, the ROTC referral mission falls by the wayside. USAREC recruiters typically work 12-14 hour days with missions of 2-3 (RA) or 3-5 (USAR) a month. With that very difficult mission hanging over their heads, plus the frequent associated requirements to spend 6+ hours a day telephone prospecting, conducting high school and college visits, developing centers-of-influence, transporting applicants to MEPs, and conducting the required, formal, daily dialogue with recruiting station commanders; providing ROTC referrals simply is not on the recruiter's screen. Recruiter Lead Refinement Lists (LRL) are full of potential ROTC prospects that never enlist in the Army. There currently is no incentive or relevant system in-place for the recruiters to provide that information to ROTC.

It is logical that under one command structure, the routine sharing of prospect information and recruiting resources could be procedural. In a Think piece produced by TRADOC on 2 October 2000 titled, "Recruiting Analysis—Attacking the Objective," it is proposed to establish a 3-star Accessions Command, however, it suggests maintaining Cadet Command and USAREC as separate interim structures. The briefing also suggests an overhaul of ROTC programs. 31

With the merger of Cadet Command and USAREC as a 3-star Accessions Command, systems could very easily be put in place to ensure that what are currently USAREC and ROTC assets could be concurrently utilized by both as a routine way of doing business. Under the asperses of the brigade, ROTC and enlisted recruiting missions could be divvied-up by brigade to both ROTC and recruiting battalion that would promote overall success, not simply to achieve the enlisted mission by one organization and the ROTC mission by another. Through this near seamless recruiting coverage much of that 'lost segment' will be now be captured. As example,
currently USAREC recruits enlisted (RA and USAR), OCS, WOFT and special missions, e.g.,
band, because the market for these prospects is on college campuses. Many times PMSs
encounter second semester juniors and seniors that are interested in ROTC, but it's too late.
These prospects would be prime candidates for OCS or WOFT. Also, many times ROTC
cadets fall out of the program for one reason or another. Before losing them efforts should be
made to convert them to other Army programs. Also, USAREC recruits for nurses, doctors and
other medical specific specialties. ROTC recruits for MS I-III cadets for the AC and USAR, and
for nurses. Recruiting for Army medical programs could be shared by both ROTC and nurse
recruiters.

Hypothetically, as one organization, USAREC and Cadet Command combined, how
these missions are accomplished could be revised considerably. It is logical that ROTC cadre
should recruit for OCS, WOFT and some of the special missions. As mentioned earlier, it
would also be logical for enlisted recruiters to provide prospect information and referrals to
ROTC. The problem now is ‘credit.’ Although the use of this term ‘credit’ may sound self-
"
THE NEW ORGANIZATION

"Strategy is an intellectual construct linking where you are today with where you want to be tomorrow in a substantive, concrete manner."33 "As discussed so far, we are not where we need to be in the process of recruiting for the Army of tomorrow. Consequently, we need to decide what construct will move us where we want to be. This construct cannot be more of the same from today and yesterday. The restructuring of Army recruiting must involve the design and construction of new patterns, and the reconceptualization of old operational techniques if there is any hope for increasing recruiter production," and ultimately, accessions.

The current organizational structures of USAREC and Cadet Command are depicted on pages 6-8. A proposal to merge USAREC and Cadet Command under one flag is as follows:

- Commander (3-star) - currently Deputy TRADOC Commander for IET
- 2 Commanders—ACC-East and ACC-West (2-star) - currently CG USAREC and CG Cadet Command
- 2 Deputy Commanders - ACC-E and ACC-W (1-star) - currently 2 USAREC DCGs and 1 CC DCG (savings of one 07 billet)
- 13 Brigade Commanders (aligned similar to current ROTC brigades) - current pool of 06s - 5 USAREC Brigade Commanders (+5 06 deputies), 3 ROTC Region Commanders (+3 06
deputies), 13 ROTC Brigade Commanders --total: 29

- 13 Deputy Brigade Commanders - with 13 brigade commanders and 13 deputy brigade commanders, total savings in 06 billets: 3
- 41 Recruiting Battalion Commanders - no change
- 270 ROTC Battalion Commanders/Professor of Military Science - no change

The ACC organizational command structure saves at least one 07 and numerous 06 billets. Although this thesis will not attempt to align specific recruiting battalions and ROTC battalions within the new ACC brigade, it is logical that the alignment would attempt to establish brigade boundaries under the current Cadet Command geographical layout, which would maximize the use of current infrastructure, habitual relationships with MEPS, USAR organizations, Army installations, high schools and colleges, etc.

**PROPOSED ARMY ACCESSIONS COMMAND (AAC) ORGANIZATION**

![Diagram of Proposed Army Accessions Command Organization](image)

**FIGURE 13 – ACC ORGANIZATION**

The proposed ACC headquarters should incorporate assets from both USAREC and Cadet Command and, through their merger, attempt to save personnel spaces as it makes sense. There are several functions within the staffs that will create redundancies once merged, e.g., marketing, advertising, resource management, etc. This will provide an opportunity to reduce overall overhead, specifically military and civilian personnel. Some ROTC-USAREC-
peculiar activities should be retained, as they are, e.g. ROTC training, JROTC management, enlisted recruiter training and operations for both.

**FIGURE 14 – PROPOSED ACC ORGANIZATION**

**A NEW PHILOSOPHY**

This reorganization, the merger of USAREC and Cadet Command, is more than a new organization. It proposes a whole new way of doing business—'a new philosophy.' The concept of total Army recruiting, all green-suitors participating in the recruiting effort, is not new. A variety of campaigns, initiatives and partnerships have been instituted to get the entire Army involved in recruiting.

Under this new organization, both the ACC, how the Army recruits and what programs it offers, need revision. Currently, enlisted and officer recruiting incentives and options don't crossover. It's either one or the other, why? With the combined efforts of ROTC and enlisted recruiters working together under the same command and with the crossover in recruiting responsibilities proposed under this new organization, why not redefine enlistment and commissioning options and incentives that benefit both enlisted and officer recruiting? As examples, the following is proposed:

- **2 + 2:** For applicants with prior college; 2 years enlisted + 2 years ROTC/SMP = commission and degree (includes bonus and/or ACF)
- **18 + 18:** 18 months AC and 18 months USAR (includes bonus/ACF/LRP)
- 2 + OCS; 2 years enlisted with guaranteed OCS (avail for high grad-2 yr college)
- MS III/IV + OCS; College seniors take ROTC for year with guaranteed OCS (no BCT)

These are only examples of how enlisted and officer recruiting options and programs can be offered together. Under this new philosophy, 'total Army recruiting--officer and enlisted,' the opportunities and incentives that the Army can provide are only limited by resources. This new recruiting organization, the ACC, which embraces total coverage of the entire recruiting market and especially that 'lost segment' described.

UNDER THE ACC CONCEPT THERE CAN BE MARKET COVERAGE BY THE RECRUITING BATTALIONS AND ROTC ORugging. THAT 'LOST' MARKET SEGMENT VOID IS NOW NEARLY ELIMINATED.

FIGURE 15 – MARKET COVERAGE UNDER THE ACC CONCEPT

Cadet Command and USAREC currently offer two programs, Green-to-Gold and The Concurrent Admissions Program (CONAP), respectively. Under a combined ACC concept these two programs could mutually benefit the active, reserve, enlisted and officer recruiting programs.

Under Green-to-Gold recruiters would identify recruits with future officer potential, e.g. 110+ GT/50 AFQT, previous college, etc. They would provide that information to the ROO at the ROTC detachment. The PMS would then make contact with the recruit while serving during his/her enlistment to encourage future participation in the ROTC program at their college or university under the Green-to-Gold program.
Green to Gold

FIGURE 16 – GREEN TO GOLD

Under the CONAP program enlisted recruiters currently encourage delayed entry program members (DEPs) to enroll in the Concurrent Admissions Program where a college or university accepts them and agrees to accept the their college course work while in the DEP and serving on active duty. This program, by design, mutually benefits the DEP, the Army and the college or university. It is the intent that after the enlistment period is completed the service member returns to that college or university. Under the ACC concept recruiters would advise the ROTC detachment of these recruits who are enrolled in CONAP. Like the Green-to-Gold concept delineated above, the PMS would make contact with the recruit while serving on active duty and encourage him/her to return to that college and ROTC program on Green-to-Gold or as a regular ROTC cadet after completion of their enlistment. By including the soldier’s chain of command, e.g., battalion and company commanders, retention NCOs, etc., these new recruiting processes would ultimately imbed themselves into the Army retention business, as well.
FIGURE 17 - CONAP

The ACC concept puts it all together—a new organization, a new philosophy, a new way of doing business—all in sync. The ACC saves military and civilian spaces and other resources, eliminates redundancies currently shared by USAREC and Cadet Command, and puts rigor (or accountability), instead of relationships and partnerships, in how enlisted and officer recruiters crossover to ensure total success.

CONCLUSION

The Army’s vision states “The Army will be a professionally rewarding and personally enriching environment within which people take pride in being part of the Nation’s most highly esteemed institution. Our physical, moral, and mental competence will give us the strength, confidence, and fight to win anywhere, anytime.” The Defense Manpower Commission concluded their report by saying, “The overwhelming lesson of this report is that human considerations now have become primary in planning of the nation’s defense. It is for that reason that we believe without hesitation that defense manpower is the keystone to our national defense.”

Manpower is the key to The Army vision and in saying, is the Army’s number 1 METL task. In FY 2000, the Army threw virtually every possible resource available at recruiting. Clandestine partnerships, bonuses that near-double previous offers, nearly 400 corporals
diverted from warfighting units to USAREC in FY 99-00 and a 30% increase in advertising and marketing initiatives, were examples of how the Army attacked the FY 2000 recruiting mission as its number 1 METL task. What will it take in FY 2001? Will the Army continue to raise the bar of resources to meet its FY 2001 and beyond recruiting missions?

The existing organizational structures of USAREC and Cadet Command used against a backdrop of today’s recruiting environment demonstrates the problems with identifying and therefore changing the paradigm. It is the case of not being able to see the forest for the trees. The misconception that more recruiters equate to more recruits may have pulled-out FY 00, but what about the future? What if the Army goes 530,000?

This thesis proposes a concept to reengineer Army recruiting by merging USAREC and Cadet Command. The new organization, The Army Accessions Command, establishes an organizational structure that by design and philosophy will penetrate the entire recruiting market for enlisted and officer requirements. Manned by existing personnel and no additional resources, this merger reduces personnel and eliminates redundancy. With it comes a total Army recruiting program that will reduce the marketing void—that ‘lost segment’—and put in place systems and procedures that make sense and ensures that the Army meets it’s accession manning requirements throughout this new millennium.

Word Count: 7,783
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